[No. 12592. March 8, 1918.

]
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. FELIPE BUSTOS ET AL.,
defendants and appellants.

1. 1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND

PRESS; AsSEMBLY AND PETITION; HISTORY.—Freedom of speech as
cherished in democratic countries was unknown in the Philippine Islands
before 1900. It was among the reforms sine quibus non insisted upon by the
Filipino People. The Malolos Constitution, the work of the Revolutionary
Congress, in its bill of rights, zealously guarded these basic rights. A reform
so sacred to the people of these Islands and won at so dear a cost should now
be protected and carried forward.

1. 2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The Constitution of the United States and the State
constitutions guarantee the right of freedom of speech and press and the
right of assembly and petition.—Beginning with the President's Instructions
to the Commission of April 7, 1900, these guaranties were made effective in
the Philippines. They are now part and parcel of the Organic Law—of the
Constitution—of the Philippine Islands.

1. 3.ID.; ID.; ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.—These paragraphs in the

Philippine Bill of Rights carry with them all the applicable English and
American jurisprudence.

1. 4.ID.; ID.; GENERAL PRINCIPLES.—The interests of society and the

maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of

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7 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
32
United States vs. Bustos.

1. public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is

necessary for free speech. "The people are not obliged to speak of the
conduct of their officials in whispers or with bated breath in a free
government, but only in a despotism." (Howarth vs. Barlow [1906], 113 App.
Div. N. Y., 510.) Of course, criticism does not authorize defamation.

1. 5.ID.; ID.; ID.—The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the
right to criticize judicial conduct.

1. 6.ID.; ASSEMBLY AND PETITION; GENERAL PRINCIPLES.—The right to

assemble and petition is a necessary consequence of republican institutions
and the complement of the right of free speech. Assembly means a right on
the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public
affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply
without fear of penalty to the appropriate branch or office of the
Government for a redress of grievances.
1. 7.ID.; FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS; ASSEMBLY AND
PETITION; PRIVILEGE.—The doctrine of privileged communications rests
upon public policy, "which looks to the free and unfettered administration of
justice, though, as an incidental result, it may, in some instances, afford an
immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer."
(Abbott vs. National Bank of Commerce, Tacoma [1899], 175 U. S., 409,
411.)

1. 8.ID.; ID.; ID.; QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE.—Qualified privilege is a prima

facie privilege which, may be lost by proof of malice. "A communication
made bona fide upon any subject matter in which the party communicating
has an interest or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if made
to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contain
criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and
actionable." (Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E. & B. 344; 1 Jur. [N. S.], 846; 25 L. J. Q.
B., 25; 3 W. R., 474; 85 E. C. L., 344.)

1. 9.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—Even when the statements are found to be false, if there
is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in
good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of the
individual. Personal injury is not necessary. The privilege is not defeated by
the mere fact that the communication is made in intemperate terms.
Finally, if a party applies to the wrong person through some natural and
honest mistake as to the respective functions of various officials, such an
unintentional error would not take the case out of the privilege.

1. 10.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MALICE.—In the usual libel case, malice can be
presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that presumption. The
onus of proving malice then lies on the plaintiff.

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United States vs. Bustos.

1. 11.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—A privileged communication should not be subjected to

microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such
excessive scrutiny will defeat the protection which the law throws over
privileged communications.

1. 12.ID.; ID.; ID.—Previous decisions of this court concerning libel reviewed

and distinguished.

1. 13.ID.; ID.; ID.—A petition, prepared and signed at an assembly of numerous

citizens including affidavits by five individuals, charging a justice of the
peace with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal, was presented
through lawyers to the Executive Secretary. The Executive Secretary
referred the papers to the judge of first instance of the district. The judge of
first instance, after investigation, recommended to the GovernorGeneral
 that the justice of the peace be removed from office. Later, on the/justice of
the peace filing a motion for new trial, the judge of first instance ordered the
suppression of the charges and acquitted the justice of the peace of the
same. Criminal action was then begun against the petitioners, now become
the defendants, charging that portions of the petition presented to the
Executive Secretary were libelous. The trial court found thirty-two of the
defendants guilty and sentenced each of them to pay a nominal fine. On a
review of the evidence, we find that express malice was not proved by the
prosecution. Good faith surrounded the action of the petitioners. Their ends
and motives were justifiable. The charges and the petition were transmitted
through reputable attorneys to the proper functionary. The defendants are
not guilty and instead of punishing them for an honest endeavor to improve
the public service, they should rather be commended for their good
citizenship.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. Moir,

J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Kincaid & Perkins for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes, for appellee,

MALCOLM, J.:

This appeal presents the specific question of whether or not the defendants
and appellants are guilty of a libel of Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of
Macabebe and Masantol, Province of Pampanga. The appeal also submits the
larger question of the attitude which the judiciary should
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734 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
United States vs. Bustos.
take in interpreting and enforcing the Libel Law in connection with the basic
prerogatives of freedom of speech and press, and of assembly and petition.
For a better understanding, the facts in the present appeal are first narrated
in the order of their occurrence, then certain suggestive aspects relative to
the rights of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition are
interpolated, then the f facts are tested by these principles, and, finally,
judgment is rendered.
First, the facts. In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the
Province of Pampanga assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the
Executive Secretary through the law office of Crossfield & O'Brien, and five
individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace
of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking
for his removal. Crossfield & O'Brien submitted this petition and these
affidavits with a complaint to the Executive Secretary. The petition
transmitted by these attorneys was signed by thirty-four citizens apparently
of considerable standing, including councilors and property owners (now the
defendants), and contained the statements set out in the information as
libelous. Briefly stated' the specific charges against the justice of the peace
were.

1. 1.That Francisca Polintan, desiring to make complaint against

Mariano de los Reyes, visited the justice of the peace, who first told
her that he would draw up the complaint for P5; afterwards he said
he would take P3 which she paid; also kept her in the house for four
days as a servant and took f from her two chickens and twelve
"gandus;"
2. 2.That Valentin Sunga being interested in a case regarding land which
was on trial before the justice of the peace, went to see the justice of
the peace to ascertain the result of the trial, and was told by the
justice of the peace that if he wished to win he must give him P50.
Not having this amount, Sunga gave the justice nothing, and a few
days later was informed that he had lost the case. Returning again to
the office of the justice of the peace in order to

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VOL. 37, MARCH 8, 1918. 735
United States vs. Bustos.

1. appeal, the justice told him that he could still win if he would pay P50;
2. 3.That Leoncio Quiambao, having filed a complaint for assault against
four persons, on the day of the trial the justice called him over to his
house, where he secretly gave him (Quiambao) P30; and the
complaint was thereupon shelved.

The Executive Secretary referred the papers to the judge of first instance for
the Seventh Judicial District requesting investigation, proper action, and
report. The justice of the peace was notified and denied the charges. The
judge of first instance found the first count not proved and counts 2 and 3
established. In view of this result, the judge, the Honorable Percy M. Moir,
was of the opinion "that it must be, and it is hereby, recommended to the
Governor-General that the respondent be removed from his position as justice
of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Province of Pampanga, and it is
ordered that the proceedings had in this case be transmitted to the Executive
Secretary."
Later the justice of the peace filed a motion for a new trial; the judge of
first instance granted the motion and reopened the hearing; documents were
introduced, including a letter sent by the municipal president and six
councilors of Masantol, Pampanga, asserting that the justice of the peace was
the victim of prosecution, and that one Agustin Jaime, the auxiliary justice of
the peace, had instituted the charges for personal reasons; and the judge of
first instance ordered a suppression of the charges against Punsalan and
acquitted him of the same. Attorneys for complainants thereupon appealed to
the Governor-General, but whether the papers were forwarded to the
Governor-General as requested the record does not disclose.
Criminal action against the petitioners, now become the defendants, was
instituted on October 12, 1916, by virtue of the following information:
"That on or about the month of December, 1915, in the municipality of
Macabebe, Pampanga, P. I., the said accused, voluntarily, illegally, and
criminally and with malicious in-
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736 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
United States vs. Bustos.
tent to prejudice and defame Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano who was at said
time and place justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol of this
province, wrote, signed, and published a writing which was false, scandalous,
malicious, defamatory, and libelous against the justice of the peace Mr.
Roman Punsalan Serrano, in which writing appear among other things the
following:
" 'That the justice of the peace, Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano, of this town
of Macabebe, on account of the conduct observed by him heretofore, a conduct
highly improper of the office which he holds, is found to be a public
functionary who is absolutely unfit, eminently immoral and dangerous to the
community, and consequently unworthy of the office.
" That this assertion of the undersigned is evidenced in a clear and
positive manner by facts so certain, so serious, and so denigrating which
appear in the affidavits attached hereto, and by other facts no less serious,
but which the undersigned refrain from citing herein for the sake of brevity
and in order not to bother too much the attention of your Honor and due to
lack of sufficient proof to substantiate them.
" 'That should the higher authorities allow the said justice of the peace of
this town to continue in his office, the protection of the rights and interests of
its inhabitants will be illusory and utopic; rights and interests solemnly
guaranteed by the Philippine Bill of Rights, and justice in this town will not
be administered in accordance with law.
" 'That on account of the wrongful discharge of his office and of his bad
conduct as such justice of the peace, previous to this time, some respectable
citizens of this town of Macabebe were compelled to present an
administrative case against the said Roman Punsalan Serrano before the
judge of first instance of Pampanga, in which case there were made against
him various charges which were true and certain and of different characters.
" 'That after the said administrative case was over, the said justice of the
peace, far from changing his bad and despicable conduct, which has roused
the indignation of this
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VOL. 37, MARCH 8, 1918. 737
United States vs. Bustos.
town of Macabebe, subsequently performed the acts abovementioned, as
stated in the affidavits herewith attached, as if intending to mock at the
people and to show his mistaken valor and heroism.'
"All of this has been written and published by the accused with the
deliberate purpose of attacking the virtue, honor, and reputation of the
justice of the peace, Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano, and thus exposing him to
public hatred, contempt, and ridicule. All contrary to law."
It should be noted that the inf formation omits paragraphs of the petition
mentioning the investigation before the judge of first instance, the affidavits
upon which based and the concluding words, "To the Executive Secretary,
through the office of Crossfield & O'Brien."
The Honorable Percy M. Moir found all the defendants, with the exception
of Felix Fernandez, Juan S. Alfonso, Restituto Garcia, and Manuel Mallari,
guilty and sentenced each of them to pay a fine of P10 and one thirty-second
part of the costs, or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
New attorneys for the defense, coming into the case, after the handing down
of the decision, filed on December 16, 1916, a motion for a new trial, the
principal purpose of which was to retire the objection interposed by the then
counsel for the defendants to the admission of Exhibit A consisting of the
entire administrative proceedings. The trial court denied the motion. All the
defendants, except Melecio S. Sabado and Fortunato Macalino appealed
making the f following assignments of error:

1. "1.The court erred in overruling the motion of the convicted defendants

for a new trial.
2. "2.The court erred in refusing to permit the defendants to retire the
objection inadvertently interposed by their counsel to the admission
in evidence of the expediente administrativo out of which the
accusation in this case arose.
3. "3.The court erred in sustaining the objection of the prosecution to the
introduction in evidence by the accused of the affidavits upon which
the petition forming the basis of the libelous charge was based.

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738 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
United States vs. Bustos.

1. "4.The court erred in not holding that the alleged libelous statement
was unqualifiedly privileged.
2. "5.The court erred in assuming and impliedly holding that the burden
was on the defendants to show that the alleged libelous statements
were true and free from malice.
3. "6.The court erred in not acquitting the defendants.
4. "7.The evidence adduced fails to show the guilt of the defendants
beyond a reasonable doubt. This is especially true of all the
 defendants, except Felipe Bustos, Dionisio Mallari, and Jose T.
Reyes."

We have thus far taken it for granted that all the proceedings, administrative
and judicial, were properly bef fore this court. As a matter of f act counsel for
def fendants in the lower court made an improvident objection to the
admission of the administrative proceedings on the ground that the
signatures were not identified and that the same was immaterial, which
objection was partially sustained by the trial court. Notwithstanding this
curious situation by reason of which the attorney for the defense attempted to
destroy through his objection the very foundation for the justification of his
clients, we shall continue to consider all the proceedings as before us. Not
indicating specifically the reason for this action, let the f following be stated:
The administrative proceedings were repeatedly mentioned during the trial.
These proceedings were the basis of the accusation, the information, the
evidence, and the judgment rendered. The prosecution cannot be understood
without knowledge of anterior action. Nothing more unjust could be imagined
than to pick out certain words which standing by themselves and
unexplained are libelous and then by shutting off all knowledge of facts
which would justify these words, to convict the accused. The records in
question are attached to the rollo, and either on the ground that the
attorneys for the defense retired the objection to the introduction of the
administrative proceedings by the prosecution, or that a new trial should
have been had because under section 42 of the Code of Criminal Procedure "a
case may be reopened on account of errors at law committed at the trial,"
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VOL. 37, MARCH 8, 1918. 739
United States vs. Bustos.
or because of the right of this court to call in such records as are sufficiently
incorporated into the complaint and are essential to a determination of the
case, or finally, because of our conceded right to take judicial notice of official
action in administrative cases and of judicial proceedings supplemental to the
basis action, we examine the record as before us, containing not alone the
trial for libel, but the proceedings previous to that trial giving rise to it. To
this action, the Government can not complain for it was the prosecution
which tried to incorporate Exhibit A into the record.
With these facts pleading justification, before testing them by certain
principles which make up the law of libel and slander, we feel warranted in
seizing the opportunity to 'intrude an introductory and general discussion of f
freedom of speech and press and assembly and petition in the Philippine
Islands. We conceive that the time is ripe thus to clear up certain
misapprehensions on the subject and to place these basic rights in their
proper light.
Turning to the pages of history, we state nothing new when we set down
that freedom of speech as cherished in democratic countries was unknown in
the Philippine Islands before 1900. A prime cause for revolt was consequently
ready made. Jose Rizal in "Filipinas Después de Cien Años" (The Philippines
a Century Hence, pages 62 et seq.) describing "the reforms sine quibus
non," which the Filipinos insist upon, said:
"The minister, * * * who wants his reforms to be reforms, must begin by
declaring the press in the Philippines free and by instituting Filipino
delegates."
The Filipino patriots in Spain, through the columns of "La Solidaridad"
and by other means invariably in exposing the wants of the Filipino people
demanded "liberty of the press, of cults, and of associations." (See Mabini, La
Revolución Filipina.) The Malolos Constitution, the work of the
Revolutionary Congress, in its Bill of Rights, zealously guarded freedom of
speech and press and assembly and petition.
740
740 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
United States vs. Bustos.
Mention is made of the foregoing data only to deduce the proposition that a
reform so sacred to the people of these Islands and won at so dear a cost,
should now be protected and carried forward as one would protect and
preserve the covenant of liberty itself.
Next comes the period of American-Filipino cooperative effort, The
Constitution of the United States and the State constitutions guarantee the
right of freedom of speech and press and the right of assembly and petition.
We are therefore, not surprised to find President McKinley in that Magna
Charta of Philippine Liberty, the Instruction to the Second Philippine
Commission, of April 7, 1900, laying down the inviolable rule "That no law
shall be passed abridging the f freedom of speech or of the press or of the
rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for a
redress of grievances."
The Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, and the Jones
Law, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, in the nature of organic acts for
the Philippines, continued this guaranty. The words quoted are not
unfamiliar to students of Constitutional Law, for they are the counterpart of
the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which the
American people demanded before giving their approval to the Constitution.
We mention the foregoing facts only to deduce the proposition never to be
forgotten for an instant that the guaranties mentioned are part and parcel of
the Organic Law of the Constitution—of the Philippine Islands.
These paragraphs found in the Philippine Bill of Rights are not threadbare
verbiage. The language carries with it all the applicable jurisprudence of
great English and American Constitutional cases. (Kepner vs. U.
S. [1904], 195 U. S., 100; Serra vs. Mortiga [1907], 204 U. S., 470.) And what
are these principles? Volumes would inadequately answer. But included are
the following:
 The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a
full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct
of public me"
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VOL. 37, MARCH 8, 1918. 741
United States vs. Bustos.
is a scalpel in the case of f free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves
the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and
an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear
conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to
comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of
the individual be exalted. Of course, criticism does not authorize defamation.
Nevertheless, as the individual is less than the State, so must expected
criticism be born for the common good. Rising superior to any official or set of
officials, to the Chief Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary—to any
or all the agencies of Government—public opinion should be the constant
source of liberty and democracy. (See the well considered cases
of Wason vs. Walter, 4 L. R. 4 Q. B., 73; Seymour vs. Butterworth, 3 F. & F.,
372; The Queen vs. Sir R. Carden, 5 Q. B. D., 1.)
The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to
criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital
public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit
subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the
peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be
effectively muzzled. Attempted terrorization of public opinion on the part of
the judiciary would be tyranny of the basest sort. The sword of Damocles in
the hands of a judge does not hang suspended over the individual who dares
to assert his prerogative as a citizen and to stand up bravely before any
official. On the contrary, it is a duty which every one owes to society or to the
State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the
duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or
the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those
whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them. In the words of Mr. Justice
Gayner, who contributed so largely to the law of libel. "The people are not
obliged to speak of the conduct of their officials in whispers or with
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742 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
United States vs. Bustos.
bated breath in a free government, but only in a despotism,"
(Howarth vs. Barlow [1906], 113 App. Div., N. Y., 510.)
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of
republican institutions and the complement of the right of free speech.
Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for
consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or
group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch
or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons
assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the
charges made.
Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of
government have demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and
incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of
privilege.
"The doctrine of privileged communications rests upon public policy,
'which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice, though, as
an incidental result, it may in some instances afford an immunity to the evil-
disposed and malignant slanderer.' " (Abbott vs. National Bank of Commerce,
Tacoma [1899], 175 U. S., 409, 411.)
Privilege is classified as either absolute or qualified. With the first, we are
not concerned. As to qualified privilege, it is as the words suggest a prima
facie privilege which may be lost by proof of malice. The rule is thus stated by
Lord Campbell, C. J.
"A communication made bona fide upon any subjectmatter in which the
party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty,
is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty,
although it contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would
be slanderous and actionable." (Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E. & B., 344; 1 Jur. [N.
S.], 846; 25 L. J. Q. B., 25; 3 W. R., 474; 85 E. C. L., 344.)
A pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege is a
complaint made in good faith and without malice in regard to the character
or conduct of a public of-
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VOL. 37, MARCH 8, 1918. 743
United States vs. Bustos.
ficial when addressed to an officer or a board having some interest or duty in
the matter. Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is
probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good
faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual.
But the statements must be made under an honest sense of duty; a self-
seeking motive is destructive, Personal injury is not necessary. All persons
have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of
public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient if it is
social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes he is acting
in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. The privilege is not
defeated by the mere fact that the communication is made in intemperate
terms. A further element of the law of privilege concerns the person to whom
the complaint should be made. The rule is that if a party applies to the wrong
person through some natural and honest mistake as to the respective
functions of various officials such unintentional error will not take the case
out of the privilege.
 In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words.
Privilege destroy that presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies on,
the plaintiff.' The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the existence of
malice as the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence of
probable cause will amount to proof of malice. (See White vs. Nicholls [1845],
3 How., 266.)
A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic
examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny
would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged
communications. The ultimate test is that of bona
fides. (See White vs. Nicholls [1845], 3 How., 266; Bradley vs. Heath [1831],
12 Pick. [Mass.], 163; Kent vs. Bongartz [1885], 15 R. L, 72; Street,
Foundations of Legal Liability, vol. 1, pp. 308, 309; Newell, Slander and
Libel, various citations; 25 Cyc. pages 385 et seq.)
Having ascertained the attitude which should be assumed
744
744 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
United States vs. Bustos.
relative to the basic rights of freedom of speech and press and of assembly
and petition, having emphasized the point that our Libel Law as a statute
must be construed with reference to the guaranties of our Organic Law, and
having sketched the doctrine of privilege, we are in a position to test the facts
of this case with these principles.
It is true that the particular words set out in the inf formation, if said of a
private person, might well be considered libelous per se. The charges might
also under certain conceivable conditions convict one of a libel of a
government official. As a general rule words imputing to a judge or a justice
of the peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or misconduct touching
him in his office are actionable. But as suggested in the beginning we do not
have present a simple case of direct and vicious accusations published in the
press, but of charges predicated on affidavits made to the proper official and
thus qualifiedly privileged. Express malice has not been proved by the
prosecution. Further, although the charges are probably not true as to the
justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good
faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that
malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the
motives of these citizens—to secure the removal from office of a person
thought to be venal—were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege.
These respectable citizens did not eagerly seize on a frivolous matter but on
instances which not only seemed to them of a grave character, but which
were sufficient in an investigation by a judge of first instance to convince him
of their seriousness. No undue publicity was given to the petition. The
manner of commenting on the conduct of the justice of the peace was proper.
And finally the charges and the petition were submitted through reputable
attorneys to the proper functionary, the Executive Secretary. In this
connection it is sufficient to note that justices of the peace are appointed by
the Governor-General, that they may be removed by the Governor-General
upon the recommendation of a Judge of
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VOL. 37, MARCH 8, 1918. 745
United States vs. Bustos.
First Instance, or on the Governor-General's own motion, and that at the
time this action took place the Executive Bureau was the office through
which the Governor-General acted in such matters. (See Administrative Code
of 1917, secs. 203 and 229, in connection with the cases of U.
S. vs. Galeza [1915], 31 Phil., 365, and of Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E. & B., 344,
holding that where defendant was subject to removal by the sovereign, a
communication to the Secretary of State was privileged.)
The present facts are further essentially different from those established
in other cases in which private individuals have been convicted of libels of
public officials. Malice, traduction, falsehood, calumny, against the man and
not the officer, have been the causes of the verdict of guilty. (See U.
S. vs. Sedano [1909], 14 Phil., 338, 339; U. S. vs. Contreras [1912], 23 Phil.,
513; U. S. vs. Montalvo [1915], 29 Phil., 595.)
The Attorney-General bases his recommendation for confirmation on the
case of the United States vs. Julio Bustos ([1909], 13 Phil., 690). The Julio
Bustos case, the Attorney-General says, is identical with the Felipe Bustos
case, with the exception that there has been more publicity in the present
instance and that the person to whom the charge was made had less
jurisdiction than had the Secretary of Justice in the Julio Bustos case.
Publicity is immaterial if the charge against Punsalan is in fact a privileged
communication. Moreover, in the Julio Bustos case we find wild statements,
with no basis in fact, made against reputable members of the judiciary, "to
persons who could not furnish protection." Malicious and untrue
communications are not privileged. A later case and one more directly in
point to which we invite especial attention is United
States vs. Galeza ([1915], 31 Phil., 365). (Note
also Yancey vs. Commonwealth [1909], 122 So. W., 123.)
We find the defendants and appellants entitled to the protection of the
rules concerning qualified privilege, growing out of constitutional guaranties
in our bill of rights. Instead of punishing citizens for an honest endeavor to
746
746 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Flores vs. Zurbito.
improve the public service, we should rather commend them for their good
citizenship. The defendants and appellants are acquitted with the costs de
officio, So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Johnson, Araullo, Street, and Fisher, JJ., concur.

CARSON, J., concurring:

I concur.
I think it proper to observe, however, that in my opinion the Attorney-
General is entirely correct when he says that this case is substantially
identical with the former "Bustos case (The United States vs. Bustos, 13 Phil.
Rep., 690). I believe that a careful reading of our decisions in these cases is
sufficient to demonstrate that fact. The truth is that the doctrine of the
prevailing opinion in the former Bustos case has long since been abandoned
by this court; and in my opinion it would make for the more efficient
administration of the Libel Law in these Islands to say so, in so many words.
(Cf. U. S. vs. Sedano, [1909], 14 Phil. Rep., 338, 339; U.
S. vs. Contreras [1912], 23 Phil. Rep., 513; U. S. vs. Montalvo [1915], 29 Phil.
Rep., 595; and U S. vs. Galeza [1915], 31 Phil. Rep., 365.)
Judgment reversed; defendants acquitted.

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