NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9858 OF 2013

(Arising out of SLP(C) No. 1056 of 2008)

Radhakrishna and another ....Appellants

versus

Gokul and others ....Respondents

JUDGMENT

G.S. SINGHVI, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Feeling dissatisfied with the meagre enhancement of Rs.8,000 granted by the

Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the amount of compensation

determined by Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Barwaha (West), Ni-

mar (for short, ‘the Tribunal’), the appellants have filed this appeal.

3. Nilesh (son of the appellants) was killed in a road accident, which occurred

on 20.1.2003, when the motorcycle on which he was going along with his friend

Rohit was hit by the truck belonging to respondent No.1.

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4. The appellants filed a petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act,

1988 (for short, ‘the Act’) for award of compensation to the tune of Rs.50,60,000.

Their claim was founded on the following assertions:

(i) The accident was caused due to rash and negligent driving of the truck

owned by respondent No.1, which was insured with respondent No.3 –

United India Insurance Co.

(ii) At the time of accident, the deceased was 19 years old and he was a

student of degree course in Engineering.

(iii) After completion of study, the deceased was expected to get a good

job as an Engineer and earn substantial salary.

5. In the written statement filed by them, the owner and the driver (respondent

Nos. 1 and 2) claimed that the truck was duly insured with respondent No.3 and

the compensation, if any, was payable by respondent No.3. In a separate state-

ment, respondent No.3 denied its liability by asserting that the driver of the truck

and the motorcyclist did not have valid driving licences. It was further pleaded that

the appellants are not entitled to compensation because the deceased was travelling

as a pillion rider.

6. On the pleadings of the parties, the Tribunal framed the following issues:

“1. Whether the Resp-2 by driving the truck No. MP-11A/2453 in

rash & negligent manner caused the accident with the motor cycle No.
MP 10 D 42/4 driven by Resp-4 coming from opposite direction?

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 2. Whether the pillion rider on the motor cycle, i.e., the son of ap-
plicants Nilesh died due to physical injuries received in the said acci-
dent?

3. Whether the truck No. MP/11A/2454 was being driven in viola-

tion of Insurance policy & provision of the M.V. Act at the time of ac-
cident, If yes its effect?

4. Whether the motor cycle No. MP 10 D 4214 was being driven in

violation of Insurance policy & provision of M.V. Act? If Yes, its ef-
fect?

5. Whether the applicant is entitled to get compensation. If yes,

what amount and from whom?

6. Relief and Cost.”

7. After analyzing the evidence produced by the parties, the Tribunal answered

issues No.1 to 4 in favour of the appellants. While dealing with the issue relating

to the quantum of compensation, the Tribunal referred to the statement of appellant

No.1 Radhakrishna Soni and the documents produced by him and observed:

“The age of Nilesh is stated to be 19 years by the applicant at the time

of accident which is supported by school record. As the deceased was
studying at the time of death, his probable income can be determined at
Rs.15,000/- p.a. from which 1/3 is deducted for the annual dependency
of the applicants. It is proper to apply 17 multiplier keeping in view the
age of the deceased. Accordingly the total dependency amount is
Rs.10,000x17=Rs.1,70,000. Due to the untimely death of son the ap-
plicant are deprived from love & affection of son. So each applicant is
entitled to Rs.10,000 is the annual dependency of the applicants. It is
proper to apply 17 multiplier keeping in view the age of the deceased
Rs.1,70,000. Apart from this Rs.2000/- is awarded for funeral ex-
penses. Thus the grand total compensation of the applicants is
Rs.1,92,000/- entitled to get from Res 1-3 jointly or separately.”

8. The appellants challenged the award of the Tribunal by filing an appeal

under Section 173 of the Act but could not persuade the High Court to grant

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substantial enhancement in the amount of compensation and the appeal was

disposed of with a direction to respondent Nos. 1 to 3 to pay additional

compensation of Rs.8,000 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum.

9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. For

deciding the question whether the appellants are entitled to higher compensation, it

will be useful to notice some of the precedents. In Sarla Verma v. D.T.C. (2009) 6

SCC 121, a two-Judge Bench of this Court took cognizance of the lack of

uniformity and consistency in awarding compensation to the victims of accidents

caused by motor vehicles, referred to the judgments in U.P.S.R.T.C. v. Trilok

Chandra (1996) 4 SCC 362, G.M., Kerala SRTC v. Susamma Thomas (1994) 2

SCC 176 and made the following observations:

“Assessment of compensation though involving certain

hypothetical considerations, should nevertheless be objective.
Justice and justness emanate from equality in treatment,
consistency and thoroughness in adjudication, and fairness and
uniformity in the decision-making process and the decisions.
While it may not be possible to have mathematical precision or
identical awards in assessing compensation, same or similar
facts should lead to awards in the same range. When the
factors/inputs are the same, and the formula/legal principles are
the same, consistency and uniformity, and not divergence and
freakiness, should be the result of adjudication to arrive at just
compensation. In Susamma Thomas (1994) 2 SCC 176, this
Court stated:
“16. … The proper method of computation is the
multiplier method. Any departure, except in exceptional
and extraordinary cases, would introduce inconsistency of
principle, lack of uniformity and an element of
unpredictability, for the assessment of compensation.”
Basically only three facts need to be established by the claimants

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for assessing compensation in the case of death:
(a) age of the deceased;
(b) income of the deceased; and
(c) the number of dependants.
The issues to be determined by the Tribunal to arrive at
the loss of dependency are:
(i) additions/deductions to be made for arriving at the in-
come;
(ii) the deduction to be made towards the personal living
expenses of the deceased; and
(iii) the multiplier to be applied with reference to the age
of the deceased.

If these determinants are standardised, there will be uniformity

and consistency in the decisions. There will be lesser need for
detailed evidence. It will also be easier for the insurance com-
panies to settle accident claims without delay.

To have uniformity and consistency, the Tribunals should de-

termine compensation in cases of death, by the following well-
settled steps:

Step 1 (Ascertaining the multiplicand)

The income of the deceased per annum should be determined.
Out of the said income a deduction should be made in regard to
the amount which the deceased would have spent on himself by
way of personal and living expenses. The balance, which is con-
sidered to be the contribution to the dependant family, consti-
tutes the multiplicand.

Step 2 (Ascertaining the multiplier)

Having regard to the age of the deceased and period of active
career, the appropriate multiplier should be selected. This does
not mean ascertaining the number of years he would have lived
or worked but for the accident. Having regard to several impon-
derables in life and economic factors, a table of multipliers with
reference to the age has been identified by this Court. The multi-
plier should be chosen from the said table with reference to the
age of the deceased.

Step 3 (Actual calculation)

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 The annual contribution to the family (multiplicand) when multi-
plied by such multiplier gives the “loss of dependency” to the
family.

Thereafter, a conventional amount in the range of Rs 5000 to Rs

10,000 may be added as loss of estate. Where the deceased is
survived by his widow, another conventional amount in the
range of 5000 to 10,000 should be added under the head of loss
of consortium. But no amount is to be awarded under the head of
pain, suffering or hardship caused to the legal heirs of the de-
ceased.

The funeral expenses, cost of transportation of the body (if in-

curred) and cost of any medical treatment of the deceased before
death (if incurred) should also be added.”

The Bench then considered the question whether there should be addition to

the income for future prospects and observed:

“In view of the imponderables and uncertainties, we are in fa-

vour of adopting as a rule of thumb, an addition of 50% of actual
salary to the actual salary income of the deceased towards future
prospects, where the deceased had a permanent job and was be-
low 40 years. (Where the annual income is in the taxable range,
the words “actual salary” should be read as “actual salary less
tax”). The addition should be only 30% if the age of the de-
ceased was 40 to 50 years. There should be no addition, where
the age of the deceased is more than 50 years. Though the evid-
ence may indicate a different percentage of increase, it is neces-
sary to standardise the addition to avoid different yardsticks be-
ing applied or different methods of calculation being adopted.
Where the deceased was self-employed or was on a fixed salary
(without provision for annual increments, etc.), the courts will
usually take only the actual income at the time of death. A de-
parture therefrom should be made only in rare and exceptional
cases involving special circumstances.”

The next issue considered by the Bench was whether there should be

deduction for personal and living expenses. After noticing some precedents, the

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Bench observed:

“.......... Having considered several subsequent decisions of this

Court, we are of the view that where the deceased was married,
the deduction towards personal and living expenses of the
deceased, should be one-third (1/3rd) where the number of
dependent family members is 2 to 3, one-fourth (1/4th) where
the number of dependent family members is 4 to 6, and one-fifth
(1/5th) where the number of dependent family members exceeds
six.
Where the deceased was a bachelor and the claimants are the
parents, the deduction follows a different principle. In regard to
bachelors, normally, 50% is deducted as personal and living
expenses, because it is assumed that a bachelor would tend to
spend more on himself. Even otherwise, there is also the
possibility of his getting married in a short time, in which event
the contribution to the parent(s) and siblings is likely to be cut
drastically. Further, subject to evidence to the contrary, the
father is likely to have his own income and will not be
considered as a dependant and the mother alone will be
considered as a dependant. In the absence of evidence to the
contrary, brothers and sisters will not be considered as
dependants, because they will either be independent and earning,
or married, or be dependent on the father.
Thus even if the deceased is survived by parents and siblings,
only the mother would be considered to be a dependant, and
50% would be treated as the personal and living expenses of the
bachelor and 50% as the contribution to the family. However,
where the family of the bachelor is large and dependent on the
income of the deceased, as in a case where he has a widowed
mother and large number of younger non-earning sisters or
brothers, his personal and living expenses may be restricted to
one-third and contribution to the family will be taken as two-
third.”

Finally, the complex issue relating to application of multiplier was examined

and decided in the following words:

“We therefore hold that the multiplier to be used should be as

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 mentioned in Column (4) of the table above (prepared by
applying Susamma Thomas (1994) 2 SCC 176, Trilok Chandra
(1996) 4 SCC 362 and Charlie (2005) 10 SCC 720), which
starts with an operative multiplier of 18 (for the age groups of 15
to 20 and 21 to 25 years), reduced by one unit for every five
years, that is M-17 for 26 to 30 years, M-16 for 31 to 35 years,
M-15 for 36 to 40 years, M-14 for 41 to 45 years, and M-13 for
46 to 50 years, then reduced by two units for every five years,
that is, M-11 for 51 to 55 years, M-9 for 56 to 60 years, M-7 for
61 to 65 years and M-5 for 66 to 70 years.”

10. However, the issue relating to award of compensation to the parents of the

deceased, who was a student was neither dealt with nor decided in Sarla Verma’s

case. In Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar (2001) 8 SCC 197, a three-Judge Bench

of this Court entertained a writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution

for ordering prosecution of the officers of the Tata Iron and Steel Company and

their agents and servants for the alleged negligence in organizing a function at

Jamshedpur in which 60 people were killed due to fire accident and for issue of a

direction to the State Government as well as the company to pay compensation to

the victims. For assessing the compensation payable to the victims, this Court

requested the former Chief Justice Shri Y.V. Chandrachud to examine the matter

and submit a report. The first part of the report submitted by Shri Justice Y.V.

Chandrachud dealt with the cases of death and the second part dealt with the cases

of burn injury. After taking cognizance of three judgments of the Andhra Pradesh

High Court in Chairman, A.P. SRTC v. Shafiya Khatoon 1985 ACJ 212, Bhagwan

Das v. Mohd. Arif 1987 ACJ 1052 and A.P. SRTC v. G. Ramanaiah 1988 ACJ

223 and the views of the British Law Commission wherein adoption of the

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multiplier method was advocated and approved, Justice Chandrachud took the

contribution of children above 10 years of age at Rs.12,000 per annum, applied

multiplier of 11 and suggested award of conventional amount of Rs.25,000. After

considering the arguments of Ms. Rani Jethmalani and Shri F.S. Nariman, learned

counsel for the parties, this Court directed payment of higher compensation. While

dealing with the cases of children, the Court observed as under:

“So far as the award of compensation in case of children is

concerned, Shri Justice Chandrachud has divided them into two
groups, the first group between the age group of 5 to 10 years
and the second group between the age group of 10 to 15 years.
In case of children between the age group of 5 to 10 years, a
uniform sum of Rs 50,000 has been held to be payable by way
of compensation, to which the conventional figure of Rs 25,000
has been added and as such to the heirs of the 14 children, a
consolidated sum of Rs 75,000 each, has been awarded. So far
as the children in the age group of 10 to 15 years, there are 10
such children who died on the fateful day and having found their
contribution to the family at Rs 12,000 per annum, 11 multiplier
has been applied, particularly, depending upon the age of the
father and then the conventional compensation of Rs 25,000 has
been added to each case and consequently, the heirs of each of
the deceased above 10 years of age, have been granted
compensation to the tune of Rs 1,57,000 each. In case of the
death of an infant, there may have been no actual pecuniary
benefit derived by its parents during the child's lifetime. But this
will not necessarily bar the parents' claim and prospective loss
will found a valid claim provided that the parents establish that
they had a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit if the
child had lived. This principle was laid down by the House of
Lords in the famous case of Taff Vale Rly. v. Jenkins and Lord
Atkinson said thus:
“… all that is necessary is that a reasonable expectation of
pecuniary benefit should be entertained by the person who
sues. It is quite true that the existence of this expectation
is an inference of fact — there must be a basis of fact
from which the inference can reasonably be drawn; but I
wish to express my emphatic dissent from the proposition

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 that it is necessary that two of the facts without which the
inference cannot be drawn are, first, that the deceased
earned money in the past, and, second, that he or she
contributed to the support of the plaintiff. These are, no
doubt, pregnant pieces of evidence, but they are only
pieces of evidence; and the necessary inference can, I
think, be drawn from circumstances other than and
different from them.”
At the same time, it must be held that a mere speculative
possibility of benefit is not sufficient. Question whether there
exists a reasonable expectation of pecuniary advantage is always
a mixed question of fact and law. There are several decided
cases on this point, providing the guidelines for determination of
compensation in such cases but we do not think it necessary for
us to advert, as the claimants had not adduced any materials on
the reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefits, which the
parents expected. In case of a bright and healthy boy, his
performances in the school, it would be easier for the authority
to arrive at the compensation amount, which may be different
from another sickly, unhealthy, rickety child and bad student, but
as has been stated earlier, not an iota of material was produced
before Shri Justice Chandrachud to enable him to arrive at a just
compensation in such cases and, therefore, he has determined
the same on an approximation. Mr Nariman, appearing for
TISCO on his own, submitted that the compensation determined
for the children of all age groups could be doubled, as in his
views also, the determination made is grossly inadequate. Loss
of a child to the parents is irrecoupable, and no amount of money
could compensate the parents. Having regard to the environment
from which these children were brought, their parents being
reasonably well-placed officials of Tata Iron and Steel
Company, and on considering the submission of Mr Nariman,
we would direct that the compensation amount for the children
between the age group of 5 to 10 years should be three times. In
other words, it should be Rs 1.5 lakhs, to which the conventional
figure of Rs 50,000 should be added and thus the total amount in
each case would be Rs 2.00 lakhs. So far as the children
between the age group of 10 to 15 years, they are all students of
Class VI to Class X and are children of employees of TISCO.
TISCO itself has a tradition that every employee can get one of
his children employed in the Company. Having regard to these
facts, in their case, the contribution of Rs 12,000 per annum
appears to us to be on the lower side and in our considered
opinion, the contribution should be Rs 24,000 and instead of 11

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 multiplier, the appropriate multiplier would be 15. Therefore, the
compensation, so calculated on the aforesaid basis should be
worked out to Rs 3.60 lakhs, to which an additional sum of Rs
50,000 has to be added, thus making the total amount payable at
Rs 4.10 lakhs for each of the claimants of the aforesaid deceased
children.”

11. In M.S. Grewal v. Deep Chand Sood (2001) 8 SCC 151, a two-Judge Bench

considered issues of negligence resulting in death of 14 students of Dalhausie

Public School. The students died due to drowning in River Beas. After holding

that the teachers of the school were negligent, the Court referred to the judgment in

Lata Wadha’s case as also the judgment in G.M., Kerala SRTC v. Susamma

Thomas (supra) and proceeded to observe:

“In Lata Wadhwa case however, this Court came to a conclusion

that upon acceptability of the multiplier method and depending
upon the fact situation, namely, the involvement of TISCO in its
tradition that every employee can get one of his children
employed in the Company and having regard to the multiplier 15
the compensation was calculated at Rs 3.60 lakhs with an
additional sum of Rs 50,000 as a conventional figure making the
total amount payable at Rs 4.10 lakhs for each of the claimants
of the deceased children.
The decision in Lata Wadhwa thus, is definitely a guiding factor
in the matter of award of compensation wherein children died
due to an unfortunate incident as noticed more fully hereinbefore
in this judgment.
Having considered the matter in its proper perspective and the
applicability of the multiplier method and without even any
further material on record, we do feel it expedient to note that
though Mr Bahuguna attributed the quantum granted by the High
Court as strangely absurd, we, however, are not in a position to
lend our concurrence therewith. It is not that the award of
compensation at Rs 5 lakhs can be attributed to be the resultant
effect of either emotions or sentiments or the High Court's
anguish over the incident. The High Court obviously considered

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 the overall situation as regards social placement of the students.
As stated hereinafter the School presently is one of the affluent
schools in the country and the fee structure and other incidentals
are so high that it would be a well-nigh impossibility to think of
admission in the School at even the upper middle class level.
Obviously the School caters to the need of the upper strata of the
society and if the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act
can be termed to be any guide, the compensation could have
been a much larger sum. Thus in the factual situation, award of
compensation at Rs 5 lakhs cannot by any stretch be termed to
be excessive. Another redeeming feature of Mr Bahuguna's
submissions pertains to the theory of ability to pay: audited
accounts have been produced for the year 1995 depicting a
situation, though not of having stringency but the situation truly
cannot but be ascribed to be otherwise comfortable to pay as
directed by the High Court. The matter, however, was prolonged
in the law courts in the usual manner and it took nearly six years
for its final disposal before this Court — these six years,
however, had rendered the financial stability of the School
concerned in a much more stronger situation than what it was in
the year 1995. The School as of date stands out to be one of the
most affluent schools in the country, as such ability to pay
cannot be termed to be an issue in the matter and in the wake
thereto we are not inclined to deal with the same in any further
detail.”

12. At this stage, we may usefully notice the judgment in Arvind Kumar Mishra

v. New India Assurance Company Limited (2010) 10 SCC 254. In that case, a

two-Judge Bench considered the issue relating to award of compensation to the

appellant who had suffered grievous injuries in a road accident. At the time of the

accident, the appellant’s age was 25 years and he was a student of Bachelor of

Engineering (Mechanical). The Tribunal had awarded compensation of

Rs.2,50,000. The High Court enhanced it to Rs.3,50,000. After noticing the

judgments in G.M., Kerala SRTC v. Susamma Thomas (supra) and Sarla Verma v.

DTC (supra), the Bench enhanced the amount of compensation to Rs.9,06,000.

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The reasons for this approach are discernible from paragraphs 13 to 15 of the

judgment, which are extracted below:

“13. The appellant at the time of accident was a final year

Engineering (Mechanical) student in a reputed college. He was a
remarkably brilliant student having passed all his semester
examinations in distinction. Due to the said accident he suffered
grievous injuries and remained in coma for about two months.
His studies got interrupted as he was moved to different
hospitals for surgeries and other treatments. For many months
his condition remained serious; his right hand was amputated
and vision seriously affected. These multiple injuries ultimately
led to 70% permanent disablement. He has been rendered
incapacitated and a career ahead of him in his chosen line of
Mechanical Engineering got dashed for ever. He is now in a
physical condition that he requires domestic help throughout his
life. He has been deprived of pecuniary benefits which he could
have reasonably acquired had he not suffered permanent
disablement to the extent of 70% in the accident.
14. On completion of Bachelor of Engineering (Mechanical)
from the prestigious institute like BIT, it can be reasonably
assumed that he would have got a good job. The appellant has
stated in his evidence that in the campus interview he was
selected by Tata as well as Reliance Industries and was offered
pay package of Rs. 3,50,000 per annum. Even if that is not
accepted for want of any evidence in support thereof, there
would not have been any difficulty for him in getting some
decent job in the private sector. Had he decided to join
government service and got selected, he would have been put in
the pay scale for Assistant Engineer and would have at least
earned Rs. 60,000 per annum. Wherever he joined, he had a fair
chance of some promotion and remote chance of some high
position. But uncertainties of life cannot be ignored taking
relevant factors into consideration. In our opinion, it is fair and
reasonable to assess his future earnings at Rs. 60,000 per annum
taking the salary and allowances payable to an Assistant
Engineer in public employment as the basis. Since he suffered
70% permanent disability, the future earnings may be discounted
by 30% and, accordingly, we estimate upon the facts that the
multiplicand should be Rs. 42,000 per annum.
15. The appellant at the time of accident was about 25 years.

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 As per the decision of this Court in Sarla Verma v. DTC the
operative multiplier would be 18. The loss of future earnings by
multiplying the multiplicand of Rs. 42,000 by a multiplier of 18
comes to Rs. 7,56,000. The damages to compensate the
appellant towards loss of future earnings, in our considered
judgment, must be Rs. 7,56,000. The Tribunal awarded him Rs.
1,50,000 towards treatment including the medical expenses. The
same is maintained as it is and, accordingly, the total amount of
compensation to which the appellant is entitled is Rs. 9,06,000.”

13. In Lata Wadhwa’s case, the accident had occurred on 03.03.1989 and this

Court awarded compensation of Rs.4,10,000 to the parents of the deceased

children who were students of Classes VI to X. In M.S. Grewal’s case, the

accident had occurred on 28.5.1995. This Court awarded compensation of

Rs.5,00,000 to the parents of the children who were students of IV, V and VI

classes. In Anil Kumar Mishra’s case, the accident had occurred on 23.6.1993 and

the victim of accident, who was a student of final year Engineering was awarded

compensation of Rs.9,06,000.

14. In the present case, the accident occurred on 20.1.2003. The deceased was

19 years old and was a student of Engineering course. The Tribunal determined

the compensation by taking his annual income to be Rs.15,000 and deducted 1/3 rd

towards personal expenses. In Arvind Kumar Mishra’s case, the Bench proceeded

on the assumption that after completion of the Engineering course, the appellant

could have been appointed as Assistant Engineer and earn Rs.60,000 per annum.

However, keeping in view the degree of disability, his estimated earning was taken

as Rs.42,000 per annum and accordingly the amount of compensation was

awarded. By applying the same yardstick and having regard to the age of the

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parents of the deceased, i.e., 45 and 42 respectively, we feel that ends of justice

will be served by awarding a lump sum compensation of Rs.7,00,000 to the

appellants.

15. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. The impugned judgment is

modified and it is declared that the appellants shall be entitled to compensation of

Rs.7,00,000 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the enhanced amount

with effect from the date of filing petition under Section 166 of the Act.

16. Respondent No.3 is directed to pay the amount of enhanced compensation

and interest within a period of three months by getting prepared two demand drafts

of equal amount in the names of appellant Nos.1 and 2. It will be open to

respondent No.3 to recover from respondent Nos.1 and 2 their respective shares of

the compensation.

......………………………..….J.
[G.S. SINGHVI]

New Delhi, ...….……..…..………………..J.

October 31, 2013. [GYAN SUDHA MISRA]

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