Petitioner Vs Vs Respondent Leo Luis P. Mendoza For Petitioner. Robiso & Reyes For Respondent
Petitioner Vs Vs Respondent Leo Luis P. Mendoza For Petitioner. Robiso & Reyes For Respondent
Petitioner Vs Vs Respondent Leo Luis P. Mendoza For Petitioner. Robiso & Reyes For Respondent
SYNOPSIS
SYLLABUS
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1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EMINENT DOMAIN; EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN BY AN LGU; A MUNICIPALITY MAY EXERCISE THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN PURSUANT ONLY TO AN ORDINANCE AND NOT A MERE
RESOLUTION. — Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent
domain, also lays down the parameters for its exercise. It provides as follows: "Section
19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and
acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use,
or purpose, or welfare for the bene t of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just
compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: . . . In
the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent
domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no
compliance with the rst requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere
resolution, it would have simply adopted the language of the previous Local
Government Code. But Congress did not. In a clear divergence from the previous Local
Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the local chief
executive act pursuant to an ordinance.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; CAUSE OF ACTION; PETITIONER'S
COMPLAINT DOES NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION; REASON. — It is hornbook
doctrine that ". . . in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to
state a cause of action, the question submitted before the court for determination is
the su ciency of the allegations in the complaint itself. Whether those allegations are
true or not is beside the point, for their truth is hypothetically admitted by the motion.
The issue rather is: admitting them to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in
accordance with the prayer of the complaint?" The fact that there is no cause of action
is evident from the face of the Complaint for expropriation which was based on a mere
resolution. The absence of an ordinance authorizing the same is equivalent to lack of
cause of action. Consequently, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in
affirming the trial court's Decision which dismissed the expropriation suit.
3. ID.; EMINENT DOMAIN NOT BARRED BY RES JUDICATA . — The Court holds
that the principle of res judicata, which nds application in generally all cases and
proceedings, cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private
property. The very nature of eminent domain, as an inherent power of the State, dictates
that the right to exercise the power be absolute and unfettered even by a prior
judgment or res judicata. The scope of eminent domain is plenary and, like police
power, can "reach every form of property which the State might need for public use." All
separate interests of individuals in property are held by the government under this tacit
agreement or implied reservation. Notwithstanding the grant to individuals, the eminent
domain, the highest and most exact idea of property, remains in the government, or in
the aggregate body of the people in their sovereign capacity; and they have the right to
resume the possession of the property whenever the public interest requires it." Thus,
the State or its authorized agent cannot be forever barred from exercising said right by
reason alone of previous non-compliance with any legal requirement.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN , J : p
Assuming that plaintiff has a cause of action, the same is barred by a prior
judgment. On September 29, 1987, the plaintiff led a complaint for expropriation
involving the same parcels of land which was docketed as Civil Case No. 17939
of this Court (page 26, record). Said case was dismissed with prejudice on May
18, 1988 (page 39, record). The order of dismissal was not appealed, hence, the
same became nal. The plaintiff can not be allowed to pursue the present action
without violating the principle of [r]es [j]udicata. While defendant in Civil Case No.
17939 was Limpan Investment Corporation, the doctrine of res judicata still
applies because the judgment in said case (C.C. No. 17939) is conclusive
between the parties and their successors-in-interest (Vda. de Buncio vs. Estate of
the late Anita de Leon). The herein defendant is the successor-in-interest of
Limpan Investment Corporation as shown by the 'Deed of Assignment Exchange'
executed on June 13, 1990.
Factual Antecedents
Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, 6 the
Municipality of Parañaque led on September 20, 1993, a Complaint for expropriation 7
against Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation, over two parcels of land (Lots 2-A-
2 and 2-B-1 of Subdivision Plan Psd-17917), with a combined area of about 10,000
square meters, located at Wakas, San Dionisio, Parañaque, Metro Manila, and covered
by Torrens Certi cate of Title No. 48700. Allegedly, the complaint was led "for the
purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes
for the homeless through a socialized housing project." 8 Parenthetically, it was also for
this stated purpose that petitioner, pursuant to its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No.
577, Series of 1991, 9 previously made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the
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property with private respondent, which the latter did not accept. 1 0
Finding the Complaint su cient in form and substance, the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Branch 134, issued an Order dated January 10, 1994, 1 1 giving it due course.
Acting on petitioner's motion said court issued an Order dated February 4, 1994, 1 2
authorizing petitioner to take possession of the subject property upon deposit with its
clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value based on
its current tax declaration.
On February 21, 1994, private respondent led its Answer containing a rmative
defenses and a counterclaim, 1 3 alleging in the main that (a) the complaint failed to
state a cause of action because it was led pursuant to a resolution and not to an
ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code); and (b) the cause of
action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. On private respondent's
motion, its Answer was treated as a motion to dismiss. 1 4 On March 24, 1994, 1 5
petitioner led its opposition, stressing that the trial court's Order dated February 4,
1994 was in accord with Section 19 of RA 7160, and that the principle of res judicata
was not applicable.
Thereafter, the trial court issued its August 9, 1994 Resolution 1 6 nullifying its
February 4, 1994 Order and dismissing the case. Petitioner's motions for
reconsideration and transfer of venue were denied by the trial court in a Resolution
dated December 2, 1994. 1 7 Petitioner then appealed to Respondent Court, raising the
following issues:
"1. Whether or not the Resolution of the Parañaque Municipal Council No. 93-95,
Series of 1993 is a substantial compliance of the statutory requirement of
Section 19, R.A. 7180 [sic] in the exercise of the power of eminent domain
by the plaintiff-appellant.
As previously mentioned, the Court of Appeals a rmed in toto the trial court's
Decision. Respondent Court, in its assailed Resolution promulgated on January 8, 1997,
1 9 denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
2. The principle of res judicata as a ground for dismissal of case is not applicable
when public interest is primarily involved." 2 1
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise
the power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the
local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent
domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.LexLib
The fact that there is no cause of action is evident from the face of the Complaint
for expropriation which was based on a mere resolution. The absence of an ordinance
authorizing the same is equivalent to lack of cause of action. Consequently, the Court of
Appeals committed no reversible error in a rming the trial court's Decision which
dismissed the expropriation suit.
Second Issue:
Eminent Domain Not Barred by Res Judicata
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals 4 3 and the trial court, 4 4 all the
requisites for the application of res judicata are present in this case. There is a previous
nal judgment on the merits in a prior expropriation case involving identical interests,
subject matter and cause of action, which has been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over it.
Be that as it may, the Court holds that the principle of res judicata, which nds
application in generally all cases and proceedings, 4 5 cannot bar the right of the State or
its agent to expropriate private property. The very nature of eminent domain, as an
inherent power of the State, dictates that the right to exercise the power be absolute
and unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata. The scope of eminent domain
is plenary and, like police power, can "reach every form of property which the State
might need for public use." 4 6 "All separate interests of individuals in property are held
of the government under this tacit agreement or implied reservation. Notwithstanding
the grant to individuals, the eminent domain, the highest and most exact idea of
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property, remains in the government, or in the aggregate body of the people in their
sovereign capacity; and they have the right to resume the possession of the property
whenever the public interest requires it." 4 7 Thus, the State or its authorized agent
cannot be forever barred from exercising said right by reason alone of previous non-
compliance with any legal requirement.
While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to
exercise eminent domain, it does apply to speci c issues decided in a previous case.
For example, a nal judgment dismissing an expropriation suit on the ground that there
was no prior offer precludes another suit raising the same issue; it cannot, however, bar
the State or its agent from thereafter complying with this requirement, as prescribed by
law, and subsequently exercising its power of eminent domain over the same property.
48 By the same token, our ruling that petitioner cannot exercise its delegated power of
eminent domain through a mere resolution will not bar it from reinstituting similar
proceedings, once the said legal requirement and, for that matter, all others are
properly complied with. Parenthetically and by parity of reasoning, the same is also true
of the principle of "law of the case." In Republic vs De Knecht, 4 9 the Court ruled that the
power of the State or its agent to exercise eminent domain is not diminished by the
mere fact that a prior nal judgment over the property to be expropriated has become
the law of the case as to the parties. The State or its authorized agent may still
subsequently exercise its right to expropriate the same property, once all legal
requirements are complied with. To rule otherwise will not only improperly diminish the
power of eminent domain, but also clearly defeat social justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED without prejudice to petitioner's
proper exercise of its power of eminent domain over subject property. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED. cdrep
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 21-25.
2. Special Sixth Division, composed of J. Antonio M. Martinez (now an associate justice of the
Supreme Court), ponente and chairman; and JJ. Ricardo P. Galvez and Hilarion L.
Aquino, concurring.
3. See Rollo, p. 25.
20. The case was deemed submitted for resolution on March 13, 1998, when the Court received
private respondent's Memorandum.
26. Province of Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 173, 179-180, May 17, 1993, per
Quiason, J.
27. Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., The Local Government Code of 1991: The Key To National
Development, 1993 ed., p. 110.
28. Supra.
29. Petitioner's Memorandum, p. 6; Rollo, p. 189.
30. Approved on February 10, 1983 and published in 79 O.G No. 7. See Moday vs. Court of
Appeals, supra, p. 593. Sec. 9 of BP 337 reads:
"SEC. 9. Eminent Domain. — A local government unit may, through its head and
acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent domain
and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.
34. Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 747, 762, February 26, 1997, per Panganiban, J.;
citing Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590, 596, September 28, 1995.
35. City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila, 40 Phil 349, 366 (1919), and Arriete vs.
Director of Public Works, 58 Phil 507, 511 (1933). See also Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 348.
41. See private respondent's Memorandum, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 201-202.
42. Travel Wide Associated Sales (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 205, 210, July 15,
1991, per Cruz, J.; citing The Heirs of Juliana Clavano vs. Genato, 80 SCRA 217, 222,
October 28, 1977.
43. Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 25.
48. See National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 577, March 11, 1996.
49. 182 SCRA 142, 147-148, February 12, 1990.