RSUIJCG Volume 1 Number 1 (January-December 2014)

The Study of Using ASEAN Conflict Settlement

Abstract
Numerous reports on the South China Sea dispute are constantly dominated by confrontations
occurring in the disputed territories. There has been a tendency to focus more on the role of
regional organizations in dispute settlement whilst less attention is given to the role of the
regional regimes, in this case the ASEAN Political Security Community. In light of this
observation, this paper was intended to critically analyze the ASEAN dispute settlement
mechanisms in managing the SCS conflict in pursuit of regional peace and security. The
maritime dispute over potentially resourceful territories and waters that also cover strategic
sea lanes of trade involves China, Taiwan and four ASEAN member states i.e. the
Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam and Brunei Darussalam.
In this study a qualitative research method was employed as the researcher intended to
critically analyze how the ASEAN Political Security Community has facilitated and
encouraged trends, transactions, and trust by establishing norms of behavior, monitoring
mechanisms, and sanctions to enforce those norms in its attempts to resolve the South China
Sea dispute. An explanatory qualitative method was used in studying this phenomenon. The
qualitative approach was implemented as it was capable of illustrating the specific patterns of
the relations and causal explanations in the interaction amongst the claimant states. The
researcher had on the one hand used traditional sources such as books and articles in well
reputable journals, but also moved beyond this and used pieces from magazines, news,
reports, the internet and official statements from the actors involved.
The research findings show that ASEAN member states have implemented various programs
through Track I diplomacy, Track II diplomacy, Confidence Building Mechanisms (CBMs)
and Preventive Diplomacy to contain the dispute from escalating into outright conflict. The
findings also clarify that as a regional regime the ASEAN Political Security Community does
not possess authority to dictate over its member states. However, it is addressing challenges
amongst its members and improving its dispute settlement mechanisms. As such, ASEAN
member states continue to optimistically look forward to a future with an ASEAN Political
Security Community whose developed mechanisms will minimize conflicts amongst its
members and the region at large.

Keywords: South China Sea, ASEAN Political Security Community, Track I Diplomacy,
Confident Building Mechanism, Preventive Diplomacy

Introduction
Territorial disputes have been witnessed across the world throughout history. The Asian
region is noted to have the highest number of territorial disputes in the period after 1945.
Today the Southeast Asian region characterized by controversy over the ownership of several
atolls, coral reefs, islands and adjacent waters in the South China Sea (SCS) proves that the
region is indeed no alien to territorial disputes. The SCS stretches from Singapore to the strait
of Taiwan and is said to have around two hundred islands and reefs, including the Spratly and
Paracel islands, Scarborough Shoal, the Pratas islands and the Macclesfield Bank which are

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believed to hold rich fishing grounds and to have large oil and natural gas reserves. The
ownership of most of these islands and that of the adjacent waters is disputed by six claimant
states, namely China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. Of these
claimant states four are ASEAN member-states i.e. Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and
Brunei.
The scenario in the SCS is laden with security implications whose consequences could be far
reaching because China, the region’s biggest power claims sovereignty over all the disputed
islands. Moreover, China’s energy lifelines as well as those of Japan, South Korea and India
and a large part of their trade pass through the disputed SCS. Table below illustrates the
claimant states involved in the SCS dispute and their respective claims. Although, Indonesia
is not included in this study as a major claimant state in the SCS dispute its involvement is
acknowledge, firstly because China’s historical claims of the SCS waters overlap with
Natuna gas reserves of Indonesia, secondly, Indonesia’s involvement is also noted through its
role as the former ASEAN Chairman of 2011.

Table 1 The South China Sea Claimant States and their claims
Claimant State Basis of Claim The Claim
China Historical foundations Claims the entire SCS; Claims sovereignty
over all the disputed islands
Taiwan Historical foundations Claims the whole of the SCS; Controls the
Pratas Islands in the Spratlys is said to have
even built an airstrip and has since settled-in
its military
Vietnam Colonial Principles of Claims the Spratlys and Paracel Islands;
the continental shelf installed patrols around the disputed Islands
Philippines Principles of the Main claim is on the Macclesfield Bank
continental shelf which it currently controls a huge underwater
group of reefs and shoals; in 1950 it claimed
six other Islands which form some of the
largest Islands in the disputed waters; in 1971
made a formal claim of eight islands known
as the Kalayaan
Malaysia Principles of the 1979 claimed eleven cluster coral Islands in
continental shelf and the southeastern Spratly Islands; Controls
Mapping that it three Islands.
conducted, following
particular geographical
coordinates
Brunei Principles of the Has the same claims as Malaysia
continental shelf
Source: Buntaro (2011)

When Beijing declared that the “South China Sea now constituted as China’s ‘core interest’
on par with Taiwan, Tibet or Xinjiang” (Sukma, 2010), the news was not well received by
ASEAN countries. As a result, “tense maritime stand-offs between China and some of its
neighbors have persisted in the disputed SCS, where key shipping lanes carry some US$5
trillion a year in world trade” (Martina, 2011). Although, China has sought to pursue bilateral
means of resolving the dispute in the SCS, ASEAN has taken it upon itself to bring the issue
to the regional body and address it multilaterally as a topical agenda in the ASEAN Defense

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Ministers Meetings and other such forums in which there is a desire “to see the South China
Sea as a peaceful and stable region” (Martina, 2011).
Founded in 1967, ASEAN primarily focused on resolving political-territorial disputes
amongst the countries Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.
According to Rana (2002) “today these bilateral disputes are history, resolved through mutual
accommodation, and more important, the creation of deep-rooted mutual confidence”. Rana
(2002) goes on to say “ASEAN and China have also managed to evolve a method of putting
into cold storage the complex sea boundary issue in the SCS that involves several countries
of the region”. However, contemporary developments prove otherwise and East Asian
nations have to face thorny issue i.e. the SCS dispute. Buntoro (2011) adds that “the dilemma
encountered by ASEAN is that of having to maintain harmonious relations amongst its
member states, whilst on the other hand it should minimize the potential of conflict in the
field that can threaten its regional security”.
Using the ‘ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC) Blueprint’ as a guideline, another
useful tool that is being used in order to try and attain a win-win situation toward resolving
the dispute is the Declaration on the Conduct (DOC) of Parties to the South China Sea
conflict signed between ASEAN countries and China in 2002. With ASEAN working toward
upgrading the Declaration of the code of conduct in the SCS and how to implement it, there
are prospects that the APSC may fulfill a fairly successful diplomatic role as it attempts to
diffuse the tensions of the conflicting claimants in the SCS territorial dispute. It would appear
that the multilateral approach should be acceptable to all the claimant states in view of the
fact that they all recognize the 2002 Declaration of Conduct (DOC). The DOC can be used as
a basis for further collective regional negotiations to come up with a workable solution. In
light of this observation, this study differs from the previous researches because firstly it
focuses on the ASEAN Political Security Community as a regional regime, which differs
from other studies which usually give primary attention to the bigger regional organizations.
Such contrasting attitudes raises questions on how the researcher intends to analyze the case
study and here among other points the researcher intends to make use of two of Archer’s
(2001) conclusions in regards to security communities in which he says, “by monitoring
state’s agreements, international organizations give them the confidence to cooperate in the
absence of trust….and….international organizations can help shape state practices by setting
down norms that define what is acceptable”.
Numerous reports on the SCS are constantly dominated by news of the conflicts and
confrontations occurring in the territory in question, and tend to focus on the bigger regional
organizations whilst less attention is given to the role of regional regimes in this case the
APSC. In light of this background and observation, the following research question is
established.

“How has the ASEAN Political Security Community so far managed the South China Sea
dispute in ASEAN’s efforts to settle the dispute in its pursuit of regional security?”

Objective and Scope

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Scope
The principles of International Law have been thought to play a key role in resolving the
dispute; however, they may not necessarily provide a set of answers to absolutely every issue.
Thus, this study looked beyond the sovereignty issue such as defining the maritime areas that
each claimant state is entitled to according to international law, or intending to draw maritime
boundaries in the SCS. The intention is to identify the role played by APSC in solving the
dispute and determine what significance those resolutions really made in the dispute; and the
impact of ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC) with a view to recommending the
possibility of the conflict solutions, therefore, the approaches of conflict management such as
CBMs, preventive Diplomacy, mediation, Code of Conduct and others joint cooperation
dialogue among the parties will be analyzed.

Conceptual Framework
The concepts discussed in this study are both the guidelines and the solution mechanism as
the researcher attempts to appreciate the role of the APSC in the SCS dispute and in the end
also give recommendations. There most likely will still remain numerous questions in regards
to this research thereby opening avenues for further studies to be carried out. Not one concept
has power over another, but rather a comprehensive amalgamation of the wide ranging
approaches are used to explain the behavior of states towards maritime territorial disputes as
well as attempt to pave a way for resolving the disputes. The use of various conceptual
frameworks in this study indicates that each of these concepts has something to offer in the
understanding and analysis of different dispute settlement mechanism. The diagram below
illustrates the so-called dispute settlement mechanisms employed by ASEAN Political
Security Community. In this regard, the ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC) is the
independent variable which is again separated into four categories, that is to say, Track I
Diplomacy, Track II Diplomacy, Preventive Diplomacy and Confidence Building
Mechanisms; while, the South China Sea Dispute is the dependent ones.

Research Methodology
In this research, a qualitative data collection method was employed as the researcher intended
to analyze how the ASEAN Political Security Community facilitated and encouraged trends,
transactions, and trust by establishing norms of behavior, monitoring mechanisms, and
sanctions to enforce those norms in its attempts to resolve the SCS dispute. An explanatory
qualitative method was used in studying this phenomenon. The researcher had on the one
hand used traditional sources such as books and articles in well reputable journals, but also
moved beyond this and used pieces from magazines, news, reports, the internet and official
statements from the actors involved. Therefore, the study was based on library and
documentary research.

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Research Results
The APSC fulfills its key role in managing the SCS dispute through mechanisms such as
Track I diplomacy, Track II diplomacy together with the Confidence Building Measures
(CBMs) and Preventive Diplomacy. These mechanisms are credited for avoiding the
escalation of the SCS dispute into a more volatile conflict. They have been and continue to be
important in the governance of the Southeast Asian region. However, there are a number of
factors that have evidently hampered its progress towards resolving the SCS dispute over the
past years:
Firstly, from the signing of the DOC between ASEAN states and China 2002, only until
recently has there been a sense of urgency to implement a working plan toward settling the
SCS dispute. Notable efforts to spearhead the SCS dispute settlement have been during
Indonesia’s chairmanship of ASEAN particularly during its 2011 term. Indonesia played a
pivotal role by “asking China, for example, for the meaning of the nine bars encompassing
the entire South China Sea….insisting on the conformity of maritime claims with UNCLOS
provisions” (Severino, 2012). These ‘nine bars’, commonly referred to as the nine dotted line
have not only been of importance to Indonesia, but also to Vietnam, an ASEAN member state
which is also a claimant in the SCS.
The ‘nine dash line’ is not recognized internationally or legally but it falls within the 12
nautical miles of Vietnam’s EEZ. China claims this nine dotted and Vietnam regards this as
severe threat to its sovereignty. Vietnam is strongly bemused by China’s claims. It feels as
though China is making previously undisputed waters to now become disputed such that the
SCS dispute is developing into an issue concerning that security of Vietnam.
Secondly, the APSC mechanisms have not been strong enough to sway the claimant states to
reach an agreement to collectively resolve the SCS dispute. There has been some weak
solidarity amongst ASEAN member states. This flaw in ASEAN was particularly evident
when the ten member bloc failed to produce a joint statement for the first time in its history at
the end of the July 2012 ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Phnom Penh. The issue
stemmed from the fact that “some countries still kept insisting on putting in (as part of the
joint communiqué) the Scarborough Shoal issue, which is a bilateral dispute between the
Philippines and China. And some still insisted on putting the dispute between Vietnam and
China on an exclusive economic zone and a sea dispute” (Voice of America Khmer, 2012).
Not being able to even agree to disagree to include the developments of the SCS dispute in
the joint communiqué was definitely embarrassing for ASEAN. The failure to have a regional
position to reach a consensus was a blow and probably a wake-up call for ASEAN. With a
general culture of indirectness that has penetrated even in the political systems, this
development has forced the ASEAN into action. Again here the Indonesian leadership
continues to play a pivotal role through the notable six principles that it is currently
championing to gain consensus for ASEAN solidarity to establish a working COC on the
SCS. These are efforts aimed at reducing tensions in the SCS, and hopefully in the future the
dispute can be settled.
Thirdly, the U.S-China involvement in the SCS dispute has had an impact on the
developments within ASEAN as well as in the disputed territories. The U.S and China both
deny any suggestions that the SCS dispute is primarily about a U.S-Sino competition. The
U.S justifies its concerns in the SCS as legitimate because of the strategic sea lanes covered
in the disputed areas which are of crucial importance to its trade. It maintains its main interest
on the freedom of flow of commerce and freedom of navigation in the SCS. China on the
contrary disagrees with the U.S argument and does not acknowledge the UNCLOS
stipulations in regards to the SCS. Nonetheless, their relations with different ASEAN states
have resulted in divisions within ASEAN. On one hand, there are notable partnership

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between the U.S and the Philippines; the U.S and Malaysia and the U.S and Vietnam. On the
other hand, China and Cambodia have maintained strong ties.
This research focuses on the six SCS claimant states and the APSC, but there has been a need
to briefly discuss the U.S involvement as a superpower. As reiterated by Buzan and Waever
(2003), by nature superpowers have wide ranging interests which transcend the logic of
geography. An issue that raises eyebrows in particular is the fact that the U.S is committing
so many resources to safeguard the Southeast Asian region yet it has a huge budget deficit.
This may be an indication that the U.S may actually have something to gain from the region
that may help it to recover from its financial and economic crisis. As mentioned in the
previous section, in international politics states prioritize their own survival. Like any other
state America needs to survive in this competitive global economic and political arena and
will do what it can to maintain its position as superpower. The same goes for China, a
growing power which needs to maintain an increase on its estimated annual average 10%
economic growth rate. The U.S and China have stronger political muscle over the ASEAN
states. In as much as they have partnered with different members of the ten member bloc, the
U.S and China could still used their power to override the claims by the other smaller states.
Of course this will not be done violently, and not even by means of active combat between
the U.S and China in the least.
Although the U.S and China may not agree on certain issues, they are great powers who need
each other particularly in regards to their economic interdependence. Southeast Asian states
are not only ones who do not want a war outbreak, even these two powers are aware of the
devastating consequences of a war between them, more so when they are still recovering
from the global economic crisis of the past decade. An ideal solution to economic growth for
the two would be to manipulate their persuasive diplomatic means and their leverage as great
powers over the smaller ASEAN claimant states and Taiwan. In such a scenario Malaysia, the
Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei and Taiwan emerge as ‘convenient actors’ in the SCS dispute as
the U.S and China ‘divide’ the territories between themselves. As the more capacitated state,
in long run the U.S could exploit resources on behalf of its Southeast Asian partners whilst
China on the other end exploits within some of its already claimed territories.
Lastly, the issue of confidence within ASEAN itself is still to be improved to create a better
platform to collectively resolve disputes. ASEAN member states seem not to have much
confidence with each other, there is still a sense of skepticism prevailing within the ten
member bloc. However, having conducted this research there is no doubt that ASEAN
member states still have some hope. They continue to optimistically look forward to a future
with an APSC whose developed mechanisms will be able to minimize conflicts amongst its
members. Experience has demonstrated that regional security mechanisms normally play a
pacifying role as they are often crafted between and among regional leaders who know or are
familiar with each other. In the case of the Asia-Pacific region, it is hoped that, ASEAN,
through the APSC, will fulfill as successful role in its overall pursuit for regional security.
The APSC is more about internal consolidation i.e. within its region. By being able to firstly
resolve its internal issues, then ASEAN itself will be in a better position to attempt addressing
issues that affect its members and its neighbors as in the case with the SCS dispute which
also involves China and Taiwan.
This research also sought to briefly assess the prospects of the establishment of an ASEAN
Community in 2015 in the background of the SCS dispute. The establishment of the ASEAN
Community by 2015 is good and noble objective by ASEAN, but its establishment will
definitely be affected by the developments in the SCS dispute. However the SCS dispute does
not stop the ASEAN Community from being established. For a successful ASEAN
Community 2015 there is need for concrete dispute settlement mechanisms. What ASEAN
member state needs to do is to strengthen the APSC mechanisms. This will be in efforts to

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create a credible security environment for the region. When this is achieved it may be easier
for the ASEAN member states convene and collectively address the SCS dispute. Political
observers argue that the APSC may be adopted in 2015 in the ASEAN Community but that
the actual implementation will be delayed because of the intra and regional disputes. With
such a pessimistic forecast, then it is most likely that at its establishment, ASEAN
Community 2015 will be a weak Community, just like ASEAN itself was a weak
organization at its formation in 1967. Only with time and experience will there be hope for a
stronger ASEAN Community.

Recommendations
This research may not have developed a new concept to address the management of disputes,
but based on the data analysis of the research, the researcher makes the following
recommendations:
1) There is need to develop the ASEAN Political Security Community at a fast and
committed level in such a manner that results in strengthening the APSC’s mechanisms and
efforts towards dispute settlement between its member states and other states from outside its
region;
2) APSC is affected by weak intra-ASEAN solidarity. In the world of politics all states have
interests of some which differ, but again in an interdependent world, for their own good-
states sometimes have to agree to disagree and work for a common good. ASEAN member
states have to uphold regional solidarity for the sake of regional interests;
3) ASEAN member states will have to minimize the influence of external powers in their
affairs because this has adverse impacts on intra-ASEAN relations. ASEAN member states
need to make bold moves against great power involvement or manipulation so as to establish
and work with their own mechanisms i.e. make the APSC effective, and not always have to
rely on international institutions e.g. the ICJ;
4) The urgent efforts by ASEAN to establish a concrete working COC are greatly
commended. Nevertheless ASEAN also needs a COC that has principles directly addressing
the settlement of the disputed territories, as well as one to which China can also sign. That
way ASEAN has better chances to effectively implement its multilateral mechanisms in
covering the initial stages of the SCS dispute settlement;
5) On the practical side, the APSC regime should greatly consider influencing its member
states to develop a united regional defense mechanism; and
6) ASEAN states have to build a common regional position on every other issue to establish
balanced Pillars for an effective ASEAN Community 2015.

Conclusion
By use of the APSC Blueprint and the ASEAN Charter, the APSC member states have
implemented varying programs in Track I diplomacy, Track II diplomacy together with the
Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and Preventive Diplomacy as dispute settlement
mechanisms in efforts to manage the SCS dispute. Whilst APSC is characterized by these
commendable documents and mechanisms, the procedures toward resolving disputes are
more complex than just following a set norms, principles or customs. As a result, so far the
APSC has not been able to guarantee its region sustainable regional peace and security.
Unfortunately the APSC is not an institution therefore it does not have the authority to dictate
over its member states. The APSC is a regional regime, as such, its key role only goes as far
as influencing its member states to act in ways that favor and maintain regional peace and
security.

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