Cases Classification of Property

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PROPERTY CASES: CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY

16 The Court could not act on these cases
immediately because the respondents filed a
G.R. No. 92013 July 25, 1990 motion for an extension of thirty (30) days to
file comment in G.R. No. 92047, followed by a
SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner, second motion for an extension of another
vs. thirty (30) days which we granted on May 8,
RAMON GARCIA, as head of the Asset 1990, a third motion for extension of time
Privatization Trust, RAUL MANGLAPUS, as granted on May 24, 1990 and a fourth motion
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and CATALINO for extension of time which we granted on
MACARAIG, as Executive June 5, 1990 but calling the attention of the
Secretary, respondents. respondents to the length of time the petitions
have been pending. After the comment was
G.R. No. 92047 July 25, 1990 filed, the petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 asked
for thirty (30) days to file a reply. We noted his
DIONISIO S. OJEDA, petitioner, motion and resolved to decide the two (2)
vs. cases.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY MACARAIG, JR.,
ASSETS PRIVATIZATION TRUST I
CHAIRMAN RAMON T. GARCIA,
AMBASSADOR RAMON DEL ROSARIO, et The subject property in this case is one of the
al., as members of the PRINCIPAL AND four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the
BIDDING COMMITTEES ON THE Philippine government under the Reparations
UTILIZATION/DISPOSITION PETITION OF Agreement entered into with Japan on May 9,
PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT PROPERTIES IN 1956, the other lots being:
JAPAN, respondents.
(1) The Nampeidai Property at 11-24
Arturo M. Tolentino for petitioner in 92013. Nampeidai-machi, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo which
has an area of approximately 2,489.96 square
meters, and is at present the site of the
Philippine Embassy Chancery;
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
(2) The Kobe Commercial Property at 63
These are two petitions for prohibition seeking Naniwa-cho, Kobe, with an area of around
to enjoin respondents, their representatives 764.72 square meters and categorized as a
and agents from proceeding with the bidding commercial lot now being used as a
for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land warehouse and parking lot for the consulate
at 306 Roppongi, 5-Chome Minato-ku Tokyo, staff; and
Japan scheduled on February 21, 1990. We
granted the prayer for a temporary restraining (3) The Kobe Residential Property at 1-980-2
order effective February 20, 1990. One of the Obanoyama-cho, Shinohara, Nada-ku, Kobe, a
petitioners (in G.R. No. 92047) likewise prayes residential lot which is now vacant.
for a writ of mandamus to compel the
respondents to fully disclose to the public the The properties and the capital goods and
basis of their decision to push through with services procured from the Japanese
the sale of the Roppongi property inspire of government for national development projects
strong public opposition and to explain the are part of the indemnification to the Filipino
proceedings which effectively prevent the people for their losses in life and property and
participation of Filipino citizens and entities in their suffering during World War II.
the bidding process.
The Reparations Agreement provides that
The oral arguments in G.R. No. 92013, Laurel reparations valued at $550 million would be
v. Garcia, et al. were heard by the Court on payable in twenty (20) years in accordance
March 13, 1990. After G.R. No. 92047, Ojeda with annual schedules of procurements to be
v. Secretary Macaraig, et al. was filed, the fixed by the Philippine and Japanese
respondents were required to file a comment governments (Article 2, Reparations
by the Court's resolution dated February 22, Agreement). Rep. Act No. 1789, the
1990. The two petitions were consolidated on Reparations Law, prescribes the national
March 27, 1990 when the memoranda of the policy on procurement and utilization of
parties in the Laurel case were deliberated reparations and development loans. The
upon. procurements are divided into those for use by
the government sector and those for private
parties in projects as the then National
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Economic Council shall determine. Those specifically mentioned in the first "Whereas"
intended for the private sector shall be made clause.
available by sale to Filipino citizens or to one
hundred (100%) percent Filipino-owned Amidst opposition by various sectors, the
entities in national development projects. Executive branch of the government has been
pushing, with great vigor, its decision to sell
The Roppongi property was acquired from the the reparations properties starting with the
Japanese government under the Second Year Roppongi lot. The property has twice been set
Schedule and listed under the heading for bidding at a minimum floor price of $225
"Government Sector", through Reparations million. The first bidding was a failure since
Contract No. 300 dated June 27, 1958. The only one bidder qualified. The second one,
Roppongi property consists of the land and after postponements, has not yet materialized.
building "for the Chancery of the Philippine The last scheduled bidding on February 21,
Embassy" (Annex M-D to Memorandum for 1990 was restrained by his Court. Later, the
Petitioner, p. 503). As intended, it became the rules on bidding were changed such that the
site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter $225 million floor price became merely a
was transferred to Nampeidai on July 22, suggested floor price.
1976 when the Roppongi building needed
major repairs. Due to the failure of our The Court finds that each of the herein
government to provide necessary funds, the petitions raises distinct issues. The petitioner
Roppongi property has remained undeveloped in G.R. No. 92013 objects to the alienation of
since that time. the Roppongi property to anyone while the
petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 adds as a
A proposal was presented to President principal objection the alleged unjustified bias
Corazon C. Aquino by former Philippine of the Philippine government in favor of selling
Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to the property to non-Filipino citizens and
make the property the subject of a lease entities. These petitions have been
agreement with a Japanese firm - Kajima consolidated and are resolved at the same
Corporation — which shall construct two (2) time for the objective is the same - to stop the
buildings in Roppongi and one (1) building in sale of the Roppongi property.
Nampeidai and renovate the present
Philippine Chancery in Nampeidai. The The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 raises the
consideration of the construction would be the following issues:
lease to the foreign corporation of one (1) of
the buildings to be constructed in Roppongi (1) Can the Roppongi property and others of
and the two (2) buildings in Nampeidai. The its kind be alienated by the Philippine
other building in Roppongi shall then be used Government?; and
as the Philippine Embassy Chancery. At the
end of the lease period, all the three leased (2) Does the Chief Executive, her officers and
buildings shall be occupied and used by the agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to
Philippine government. No change of sell the Roppongi property?
ownership or title shall occur. (See Annex "B"
to Reply to Comment) The Philippine Petitioner Dionisio Ojeda in G.R. No. 92047,
government retains the title all throughout the apart from questioning the authority of the
lease period and thereafter. However, the government to alienate the Roppongi property
government has not acted favorably on this assails the constitutionality of Executive Order
proposal which is pending approval and No. 296 in making the property available for
ratification between the parties. Instead, on sale to non-Filipino citizens and entities. He
August 11, 1986, President Aquino created a also questions the bidding procedures of the
committee to study the disposition/utilization Committee on the Utilization or Disposition of
of Philippine government properties in Tokyo Philippine Government Properties in Japan for
and Kobe, Japan through Administrative being discriminatory against Filipino citizens
Order No. 3, followed by Administrative Orders and Filipino-owned entities by denying them
Numbered 3-A, B, C and D. the right to be informed about the bidding
requirements.
On July 25, 1987, the President issued
Executive Order No. 296 entitling non-Filipino II
citizens or entities to avail of separations'
capital goods and services in the event of sale, In G.R. No. 92013, petitioner Laurel asserts
lease or disposition. The four properties in that the Roppongi property and the related
Japan including the Roppongi were lots were acquired as part of the reparations
from the Japanese government for diplomatic
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and consular use by the Philippine possibility of alienating the four government
government. Vice-President Laurel states that properties in Japan; (3) the issuance of
the Roppongi property is classified as one of Executive Order No. 296; (4) the enactment by
public dominion, and not of private ownership the Congress of Rep. Act No. 6657 [the
under Article 420 of the Civil Code (See infra). Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law] on June
10, 1988 which contains a provision stating
The petitioner submits that the Roppongi that funds may be taken from the sale of
property comes under "property intended for Philippine properties in foreign countries; (5)
public service" in paragraph 2 of the above the holding of the public bidding of the
provision. He states that being one of public Roppongi property but which failed; (6) the
dominion, no ownership by any one can deferment by the Senate in Resolution No. 55
attach to it, not even by the State. The of the bidding to a future date; thus an
Roppongi and related properties were acquired acknowledgment by the Senate of the
for "sites for chancery, diplomatic, and government's intention to remove the
consular quarters, buildings and other Roppongi property from the public service
improvements" (Second Year Reparations purpose; and (7) the resolution of this Court
Schedule). The petitioner states that they dismissing the petition in Ojeda v. Bidding
continue to be intended for a necessary Committee, et al., G.R. No. 87478 which
service. They are held by the State in sought to enjoin the second bidding of the
anticipation of an opportune use. (Citing 3 Roppongi property scheduled on March 30,
Manresa 65-66). Hence, it cannot be 1989.
appropriated, is outside the commerce of man,
or to put it in more simple terms, it cannot be III
alienated nor be the subject matter of
contracts (Citing Municipality of Cavite v. In G.R. No. 94047, petitioner Ojeda once more
Rojas, 30 Phil. 20 [1915]). Noting the non-use asks this Court to rule on the constitutionality
of the Roppongi property at the moment, the of Executive Order No. 296. He had earlier
petitioner avers that the same remains filed a petition in G.R. No. 87478 which the
property of public dominion so long as the Court dismissed on August 1, 1989. He now
government has not used it for other purposes avers that the executive order contravenes the
nor adopted any measure constituting a constitutional mandate to conserve and
removal of its original purpose or use. develop the national patrimony stated in the
Preamble of the 1987 Constitution. It also
The respondents, for their part, refute the allegedly violates:
petitioner's contention by saying that the
subject property is not governed by our Civil (1) The reservation of the ownership and
Code but by the laws of Japan where the acquisition of alienable lands of the public
property is located. They rely upon the rule domain to Filipino citizens. (Sections 2 and 3,
of lex situs which is used in determining the Article XII, Constitution; Sections 22 and 23 of
applicable law regarding the acquisition, Commonwealth Act 141).i•t•c-aüsl
transfer and devolution of the title to a
property. They also invoke Opinion No. 21, (2) The preference for Filipino citizens in the
Series of 1988, dated January 27, 1988 of the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
Secretary of Justice which used the lex covering the national economy and patrimony
situs in explaining the inapplicability of (Section 10, Article VI, Constitution);
Philippine law regarding a property situated in
Japan. (3) The protection given to Filipino enterprises
against unfair competition and trade
The respondents add that even assuming for practices;
the sake of argument that the Civil Code is
applicable, the Roppongi property has ceased (4) The guarantee of the right of the people to
to become property of public dominion. It has information on all matters of public concern
become patrimonial property because it has (Section 7, Article III, Constitution);
not been used for public service or for
diplomatic purposes for over thirteen (13) (5) The prohibition against the sale to non-
years now (Citing Article 422, Civil Code) and Filipino citizens or entities not wholly owned
because the intention by the Executive by Filipino citizens of capital goods received by
Department and the Congress to convert it to the Philippines under the Reparations Act
private use has been manifested by overt acts, (Sections 2 and 12 of Rep. Act No. 1789); and
such as, among others: (1) the transfer of the
Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai (2) the (6) The declaration of the state policy of full
issuance of administrative orders for the public disclosure of all transactions involving
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public interest (Section 28, Article III, ART. 419. Property is either of
Constitution). public dominion or of private
ownership.
Petitioner Ojeda warns that the use of public
funds in the execution of an unconstitutional ART. 420. The following things
executive order is a misapplication of public are property of public dominion
funds He states that since the details of the
bidding for the Roppongi property were never (1) Those intended for public
publicly disclosed until February 15, 1990 (or use, such as roads, canals,
a few days before the scheduled bidding), the rivers, torrents, ports and
bidding guidelines are available only in Tokyo, bridges constructed by the State,
and the accomplishment of requirements and banks shores roadsteads, and
the selection of qualified bidders should be others of similar character;
done in Tokyo, interested Filipino citizens or
entities owned by them did not have the (2) Those which belong to the
chance to comply with Purchase Offer State, without being for public
Requirements on the Roppongi. Worse, the use, and are intended for some
Roppongi shall be sold for a minimum price of public service or for the
$225 million from which price capital gains development of the national
tax under Japanese law of about 50 to 70% of wealth.
the floor price would still be deducted.
ART. 421. All other property of
IV the State, which is not of the
character stated in the preceding
The petitioners and respondents in both cases article, is patrimonial property.
do not dispute the fact that the Roppongi site
and the three related properties were through The Roppongi property is correctly classified
reparations agreements, that these were under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil
assigned to the government sector and that Code as property belonging to the State and
the Roppongi property itself was specifically intended for some public service.
designated under the Reparations Agreement
to house the Philippine Embassy. Has the intention of the government regarding
the use of the property been changed because
The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for the lot has been Idle for some years? Has it
public service is expressly spelled out. It is become patrimonial?
dictated by the terms of the Reparations
Agreement and the corresponding contract of The fact that the Roppongi site has not been
procurement which bind both the Philippine used for a long time for actual Embassy
government and the Japanese government. service does not automatically convert it to
patrimonial property. Any such conversion
There can be no doubt that it is of public happens only if the property is withdrawn
dominion unless it is convincingly shown that from public use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene
the property has become patrimonial. This, Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]). A
the respondents have failed to do. property continues to be part of the public
domain, not available for private appropriation
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi or ownership until there is a formal
lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot declaration on the part of the government to
be alienated. Its ownership is a special withdraw it from being such (Ignacio v.
collective ownership for general use and Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]).
enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction
of collective needs, and resides in the social The respondents enumerate various
group. The purpose is not to serve the State as pronouncements by concerned public officials
a juridical person, but the citizens; it is insinuating a change of intention. We
intended for the common and public welfare emphasize, however, that an abandonment of
and cannot be the object of appropration. the intention to use the Roppongi property for
(Taken from 3 Manresa, 66-69; cited in public service and to make it patrimonial
Tolentino, Commentaries on the Civil Code of property under Article 422 of the Civil
the Philippines, 1963 Edition, Vol. II, p. 26). Code must be definiteAbandonment cannot be
inferred from the non-use alone specially if the
The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are: non-use was attributable not to the
government's own deliberate and indubitable
will but to a lack of financial support to repair
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and improve the property (See Heirs of Felino the disposition of the properties of the
Santiago v. Lazaro, 166 SCRA 368 [1988]). Government in foreign countries, did not
Abandonment must be a certain and positive withdraw the Roppongi property from being
act based on correct legal premises. classified as one of public dominion when it
mentions Philippine properties abroad.
A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Section 63 (c) refers to properties which are
Nampeidai in 1976 is not relinquishment of alienable and not to those reserved for public
the Roppongi property's original purpose. use or service. Rep Act No. 6657, therefore,
Even the failure by the government to repair does not authorize the Executive Department
the building in Roppongi is not abandonment to sell the Roppongi property. It merely
since as earlier stated, there simply was a enumerates possible sources of future funding
shortage of government funds. The recent to augment (as and when needed) the Agrarian
Administrative Orders authorizing a study of Reform Fund created under Executive Order
the status and conditions of government No. 299. Obviously any property outside of the
properties in Japan were merely directives for commerce of man cannot be tapped as a
investigation but did not in any way signify a source of funds.
clear intention to dispose of the properties.
The respondents try to get around the public
Executive Order No. 296, though its title dominion character of the Roppongi property
declares an "authority to sell", does not have a by insisting that Japanese law and not our
provision in its text expressly authorizing the Civil Code should apply.
sale of the four properties procured from
Japan for the government sector. The It is exceedingly strange why our top
executive order does not declare that the government officials, of all people, should be
properties lost their public character. It merely the ones to insist that in the sale of extremely
intends to make the properties available to valuable government property, Japanese law
foreigners and not to Filipinos alone in case of and not Philippine law should prevail. The
a sale, lease or other disposition. It merely Japanese law - its coverage and effects, when
eliminates the restriction under Rep. Act No. enacted, and exceptions to its provision — is
1789 that reparations goods may be sold only not presented to the Court It is simply
to Filipino citizens and one hundred (100%) asserted that the lex loci rei sitae or Japanese
percent Filipino-owned entities. The text of law should apply without stating what that
Executive Order No. 296 provides: law provides. It is a ed on faith that Japanese
law would allow the sale.
Section 1. The provisions of
Republic Act No. 1789, as We see no reason why a conflict of law rule
amended, and of other laws to should apply when no conflict of law situation
the contrary notwithstanding, exists. A conflict of law situation arises only
the above-mentioned properties when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or
can be made available for sale, ownership of an immovable, such that the
lease or any other manner of capacity to take and transfer immovables, the
disposition to non-Filipino formalities of conveyance, the essential
citizens or to entities owned by validity and effect of the transfer, or the
non-Filipino citizens. interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are
to be determined (See Salonga, Private
Executive Order No. 296 is based on the International Law, 1981 ed., pp. 377-383);
wrong premise or assumption that the and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and
Roppongi and the three other properties were its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a
earlier converted into alienable real properties. domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the
As earlier stated, Rep. Act No. 1789 need to determine which law should apply.
differentiates the procurements for the
government sector and the private sector In the instant case, none of the above
(Sections 2 and 12, Rep. Act No. 1789). Only elements exists.
the private sector properties can be sold to
end-users who must be Filipinos or entities The issues are not concerned with validity of
owned by Filipinos. It is this nationality ownership or title. There is no question that
provision which was amended by Executive the property belongs to the Philippines. The
Order No. 296. issue is the authority of the respondent
officials to validly dispose of property
Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act No. 6657 (the CARP belonging to the State. And the validity of the
Law) which provides as one of the sources of procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is
funds for its implementation, the proceeds of
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governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex signed by the President of the
situs does not apply. Philippines on behalf of the
Government of the Philippines
The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary unless the Government of the
of Justice sheds light on the relevance of Philippines unless the authority
the lex situs rule is misplaced. The opinion therefor be expressly vested by
does not tackle the alienability of the real law in another officer. (Emphasis
properties procured through reparations nor supplied)
the existence in what body of the authority to
sell them. In discussing who are capable of The requirement has been retained in Section
acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely 48, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987
explains that it is the foreign law which (Executive Order No. 292).
should determine who can acquire the
properties so that the constitutional limitation SEC. 48. Official Authorized to
on acquisition of lands of the public domain to Convey Real Property. —
Filipino citizens and entities wholly owned by Whenever real property of the
Filipinos is inapplicable. We see no point in Government is authorized by law
belaboring whether or not this opinion is to be conveyed, the deed of
correct. Why should we discuss who can conveyance shall be executed in
acquire the Roppongi lot when there is no behalf of the government by the
showing that it can be sold? following:
The subsequent approval on October 4, 1988 (1) For property belonging to and
by President Aquino of the recommendation titled in the name of the Republic
by the investigating committee to sell the of the Philippines, by the
Roppongi property was premature or, at the President, unless the authority
very least, conditioned on a valid change in therefor is expressly vested by
the public character of the Roppongi property. law in another officer.
Moreover, the approval does not have the force
and effect of law since the President already (2) For property belonging to the
lost her legislative powers. The Congress had Republic of the Philippines but
already convened for more than a year. titled in the name of any political
subdivision or of any corporate
Assuming for the sake of argument, however, agency or instrumentality, by the
that the Roppongi property is no longer of executive head of the agency or
public dominion, there is another obstacle to instrumentality. (Emphasis
its sale by the respondents. supplied)
There is no law authorizing its conveyance. It is not for the President to convey valuable
real property of the government on his or her
Section 79 (f) of the Revised Administrative own sole will. Any such conveyance must be
Code of 1917 provides authorized and approved by a law enacted by
the Congress. It requires executive and
Section 79 (f ) Conveyances and legislative concurrence.
contracts to which the
Government is a party. — In Resolution No. 55 of the Senate dated June 8,
cases in which the Government 1989, asking for the deferment of the sale of
of the Republic of the Philippines the Roppongi property does not withdraw the
is a party to any deed or other property from public domain much less
instrument conveying the title to authorize its sale. It is a mere resolution; it is
real estate or to any other not a formal declaration abandoning the
property the value of which is in public character of the Roppongi property. In
excess of one hundred thousand fact, the Senate Committee on Foreign
pesos, the respective Department Relations is conducting hearings on Senate
Secretary shall prepare the Resolution No. 734 which raises serious policy
necessary papers which, together considerations and calls for a fact-finding
with the proper investigation of the circumstances behind the
recommendations, shall be decision to sell the Philippine government
submitted to the Congress of the properties in Japan.
Philippines for approval by the
same. Such deed, instrument, or The resolution of this Court in Ojeda v.
contract shall be executed and Bidding Committee, et al., supra, did not pass
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upon the constitutionality of Executive Order suffered during the Japanese

No. 296. Contrary to respondents' assertion, military occupation, for the
we did not uphold the authority of the suffering of widows and orphans
President to sell the Roppongi property. The who lost their loved ones and
Court stated that the constitutionality of the kindred, for the homes and other
executive order was not the real issue and properties lost by countless
that resolving the constitutional question was Filipinos during the war. The
"neither necessary nor finally determinative of Tokyo properties are a
the case." The Court noted that "[W]hat monument to the bravery and
petitioner ultimately questions is the use of sacrifice of the Filipino people in
the proceeds of the disposition of the the face of an invader; like the
Roppongi property." In emphasizing that "the monuments of Rizal, Quezon,
decision of the Executive to dispose of the and other Filipino heroes, we do
Roppongi property to finance the CARP ... not expect economic or financial
cannot be questioned" in view of Section 63 (c) benefits from them. But who
of Rep. Act No. 6657, the Court did not would think of selling these
acknowledge the fact that the property became monuments? Filipino honor and
alienable nor did it indicate that the President national dignity dictate that we
was authorized to dispose of the Roppongi keep our properties in Japan as
property. The resolution should be read to memorials to the countless
mean that in case the Roppongi property is re- Filipinos who died and suffered.
classified to be patrimonial and alienable by Even if we should become
authority of law, the proceeds of a sale may be paupers we should not think of
used for national economic development selling them. For it would be as if
projects including the CARP. we sold the lives and blood and
tears of our countrymen. (Rollo-
Moreover, the sale in 1989 did not materialize. G.R. No. 92013, p.147)
The petitions before us question the proposed
1990 sale of the Roppongi property. We are The petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 also states:
resolving the issues raised in these petitions,
not the issues raised in 1989. Roppongi is no ordinary
property. It is one ceded by the
Having declared a need for a law or formal Japanese government in
declaration to withdraw the Roppongi property atonement for its past
from public domain to make it alienable and a belligerence for the valiant
need for legislative authority to allow the sale sacrifice of life and limb and for
of the property, we see no compelling reason deaths, physical dislocation and
to tackle the constitutional issues raised by economic devastation the whole
petitioner Ojeda. Filipino people endured in World
War II.
The Court does not ordinarily pass upon
constitutional questions unless these It is for what it stands for, and
questions are properly raised in appropriate for what it could never bring
cases and their resolution is necessary for the back to life, that its significance
determination of the case (People v. Vera, 65 today remains undimmed,
Phil. 56 [1937]). The Court will not pass upon inspire of the lapse of 45 years
a constitutional question although properly since the war ended, inspire of
presented by the record if the case can be the passage of 32 years since the
disposed of on some other ground such as the property passed on to the
application of a statute or general law (Siler v. Philippine government.
Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175,
[1909], Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., Roppongi is a reminder that
312 U.S. 496 [1941]). cannot — should not — be
dissipated ... (Rollo-92047, p. 9)
The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 states why
the Roppongi property should not be sold: It is indeed true that the Roppongi property is
valuable not so much because of the inflated
The Roppongi property is not prices fetched by real property in Tokyo but
just like any piece of property. It more so because of its symbolic value to all
was given to the Filipino people Filipinos — veterans and civilians alike.
in reparation for the lives and Whether or not the Roppongi and related
blood of Filipinos who died and properties will eventually be sold is a policy
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determination where both the President and a valid authorization. I am happy to note that
Congress must concur. Considering the in the several cases where this Court has
properties' importance and value, the laws on ruled against her, the President of the
conversion and disposition of property of Philippines has submitted to this principle
public dominion must be faithfully followed. with becoming grace.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,

the petitions are GRANTED. A writ of
prohibition is issued enjoining the PADILLA, J., concurring:
respondents from proceeding with the sale of
the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan. The I concur in the decision penned by Mr. Justice
February 20, 1990 Temporary Restraining Gutierrez, Jr., I only wish to make a few
Order is made PERMANENT. observations which could help in further
clarifying the issues.
SO ORDERED.
Under our tripartite system of government
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Bidin, Griño-Aquino ordained by the Constitution, it is Congress
and Regalado, JJ., concur. that lays down or determines policies. The
President executes such policies. The policies
determined by Congress are embodied in
legislative enactments that have to be
approved by the President to become law. The
President, of course, recommends to Congress
Separate Opinions the approval of policies but, in the final
analysis, it is Congress that is the policy -
determining branch of government.
CRUZ, J., concurring: The judiciary interprets the laws and, in

appropriate cases, determines whether the
I concur completely with the excellent laws enacted by Congress and approved by
ponencia of Mr. Justice Gutierrez and will add the President, and presidential acts
the following observations only for emphasis. implementing such laws, are in accordance
with the Constitution.
It is clear that the respondents have failed to
show the President's legal authority to sell the The Roppongi property was acquired by the
Roppongi property. When asked to do so at Philippine government pursuant to the
the hearing on these petitions, the Solicitor reparations agreement between the Philippine
General was at best ambiguous, although I and Japanese governments. Under such
must add in fairness that this was not his agreement, this property was acquired by the
fault. The fact is that there is -no such Philippine government for a specific purpose,
authority. Legal expertise alone cannot namely, to serve as the site of the Philippine
conjure that statutory permission out of thin Embassy in Tokyo, Japan. Consequently,
air. Roppongi is a property of public dominion and
intended for public service, squarely falling
Exec. Order No. 296, which reads like so within that class of property under Art. 420 of
much legislative, double talk, does not contain the Civil Code, which provides:
such authority. Neither does Rep. Act No.
6657, which simply allows the proceeds of the Art. 420. The following things are
sale of our properties abroad to be used for property of public dominion :
the comprehensive agrarian reform program.
Senate Res. No. 55 was a mere request for the (1) ...
deferment of the scheduled sale of tile
Roppongi property, possibly to stop the (2) Those which belong to the
transaction altogether; and ill any case it is State, without being for public
not a law. The sale of the said property may be use, and are intended for some
authorized only by Congress through a duly public service or for the
enacted statute, and there is no such law. development of the national
wealth. (339a)
Once again, we have affirmed the principle
that ours is a government of laws and not of Public dominion property intended for public
men, where every public official, from the service cannot be alienated unless the
lowest to the highest, can act only by virtue of property is first transformed into private
Page |9
property of the state otherwise known as authority extended to the President to sell
patrimonial property of the state. 1 The Roppongi thru public bidding or otherwise.
transformation of public dominion property to
state patrimonial property involves, to my It is therefore, clear that the President cannot
mind, a policy decision. It is a policy decision sell or order the sale of Roppongi thru public
because the treatment of the property varies bidding or otherwise without a prior
according to its classification. Consequently, it congressional approval, first, converting
is Congress which can decide and declare the Roppongi from a public dominion property to
conversion of Roppongi from a public a state patrimonial property, and, second,
dominion property to a state patrimonial authorizing the President to sell the same.
property. Congress has made no such decision
or declaration. ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the
petition and to make PERMANENT the
Moreover, the sale of public property (once temporary restraining order earlier issued by
converted from public dominion to state this Court.
patrimonial property) must be approved by
Congress, for this again is a matter of policy
(i.e. to keep or dispose of the property). Sec.
48, Book 1 of the Administrative Code of 1987 SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
provides:
The central question, as I see it, is whether or
SEC. 48. Official Authorized to not the so-called "Roppongi property' has lost
Convey Real Property. — its nature as property of public dominion, and
Whenever real property of the hence, has become patrimonial property of the
Government is authorized by law State. I understand that the parties are agreed
to be conveyed, the deed of that it was property intended for "public
conveyance shall be executed in service" within the contemplation of paragraph
behalf of the government by the (2), of Article 430, of the Civil Code, and
following: accordingly, land of State dominion, and
beyond human commerce. The lone issue is,
(1) For property in the light of supervening developments, that
belonging to and is non-user thereof by the National
titled in the name Government (for diplomatic purposes) for the
of the Republic of last thirteen years; the issuance of Executive
the Philippines, by Order No. 296 making it available for sale to
the President, any interested buyer; the promulgation of
unless the Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive
authority therefor Agrarian Reform Law, making available for the
is expressly vested program's financing, State assets sold; the
by law in another approval by the President of the
officer. recommendation of the investigating
committee formed to study the property's
(2) For property utilization; and the issuance of Resolution No.
belonging to the 55 of the Philippine Senate requesting for the
Republic of the deferment of its disposition it, "Roppongi", is
Philippines but still property of the public dominion, and if it
titled in the name is not, how it lost that character.
of any political
subdivision or of When land of the public dominion ceases to be
any corporate one, or when the change takes place, is a
agency or question our courts have debated early. In a
instrumentality, by 1906 decision, 1 it was held that property of
the executive head the public dominion, a public plaza in this
of the agency or instance, becomes patrimonial upon use
instrumentality. thereof for purposes other than a plaza. In a
(Emphasis later case, 2 this ruling was reiterated.
supplied) Likewise, it has been held that land, originally
private property, has become of public
But the record is bare of any congressional dominion upon its donation to the town and
decision or approval to sell Roppongi. The its conversion and use as a public plaza. 3 It is
record is likewise bare of any congressional notable that under these three cases, the
character of the property, and any change
P a g e | 10
occurring therein, depends on the actual use Roppongi, 5-Chome, Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan
to which it is dedicated. 4 (hereinafter referred to as the "Roppongi
property") may be characterized as property of
Much later, however, the Court held that public dominion, within the meaning of Article
"until a formal declaration on the part of the 420 (2) of the Civil Code:
Government, through the executive
department or the Legislative, to the effect [Property] which belong[s] to the
that the land . . . is no longer needed for State, without being for public
[public] service- for public use or for special use, and are intended for some
industries, [it] continue[s] to be part of the public service -.
public [dominion], not available for private
expropriation or ownership." 5 So also, it was It might not be amiss however, to note that
ruled that a political subdivision (the City of the appropriateness of trying to bring within
Cebu in this case) alone may declare (under the confines of the simple threefold
its charter) a city road abandoned and classification found in Article 420 of the Civil
thereafter, to dispose of it. 6 Code ("property for public use property
"intended for some public service" and
In holding that there is "a need for a law or property intended "for the development of the
formal declaration to withdraw the Roppongi national wealth") all property owned by the
property from public domain to make it Republic of the Philippines whether found
alienable and a land for legislative authority to within the territorial boundaries of the
allow the sale of the property" 7 the majority Republic or located within the territory of
lays stress to the fact that: (1) An affirmative another sovereign State, is not self-evident.
act — executive or legislative — is necessary The first item of the classification property
to reclassify property of the public dominion, intended for public use — can scarcely be
and (2) a legislative decree is required to make properly applied to property belonging to the
it alienable. It also clears the uncertainties Republic but found within the territory of
brought about by earlier interpretations that another State. The third item of the
the nature of property-whether public or classification property intended for the
patrimonial is predicated on the manner it is development of the national wealth is
actually used, or not used, and in the same illustrated, in Article 339 of the Spanish Civil
breath, repudiates the Government's position Code of 1889, by mines or mineral properties.
that the continuous non-use of "Roppongi", Again, mineral lands owned by a sovereign
among other arguments, for "diplomatic State are rarely, if ever, found within the
purposes", has turned it into State territorial base of another sovereign State. The
patrimonial property. task of examining in detail the applicability of
the classification set out in Article 420 of our
I feel that this view corresponds to existing Civil Code to property that the Philippines
pronouncements of this Court, among other happens to own outside its own boundaries
things, that: (1) Property is presumed to be must, however, be left to academicians.
State property in the absence of any showing
to the contrary; 8 (2) With respect to forest For present purposes, too, I agree that there is
lands, the same continue to be lands of the no question of conflict of laws that is, at the
public dominion unless and until reclassified present time, before this Court. The issues
by the Executive Branch of the before us relate essentially to authority to sell
Government; 9 and (3) All natural resources, the Roppongi property so far as Philippine law
under the Constitution, and subject to is concerned.
exceptional cases, belong to the State. 10
The majority opinion raises two (2) issues: (a)
I am elated that the Court has banished whether or not the Roppongi property has
previous uncertainties. been converted into patrimonial property or
property of the private domain of the State;
and (b) assuming an affirmative answer to (a),
whether or not there is legal authority to
FELICIANO, J., dissenting dispose of the Roppongi property.
With regret, I find myself unable to share the I

conclusions reached by Mr. Justice Hugo E.
Gutierrez, Jr. Addressing the first issue of conversion of
property of public dominion intended for some
For purposes of this separate opinion, I public service, into property of the private
assume that the piece of land located in 306 domain of the Republic, it should be noted
P a g e | 11
that the Civil Code does not address the the Law of Waters.
question of who has authority to effect such Consequently, until a formal
conversion. Neither does the Civil Code set out declaration on the part of the
or refer to any procedure for such conversion. Government, through the
executive department or the
Our case law, however, contains some fairly Legislature, to the effect that the
explicit pronouncements on this point, as land in question is no longer
Justice Sarmiento has pointed out in his needed for coast-guard service,
concurring opinion. In Ignacio v. Director of for public use or for special
Lands (108 Phils. 335 [1960]), petitioner industries, they continue to be
Ignacio argued that if the land in question part of the public domain not
formed part of the public domain, the trial available for private
court should have declared the same no appropriation or ownership. (108
longer necessary for public use or public Phil. at 338-339; emphasis
purposes and which would, therefore, have supplied)
become disposable and available for private
ownership. Mr. Justice Montemayor, speaking Thus, under Ignacio, either the Executive
for the Court, said: Department or the Legislative
Department may convert property of the State
Article 4 of the Law of Waters of of public dominion into patrimonial property
1866 provides that when a of the State. No particular formula or
portion of the shore is no longer procedure of conversion is specified either in
washed by the waters of the sea statute law or in case law. Article 422 of the
and is not necessary for Civil Code simply states that: "Property of
purposes of public utility, or for public dominion, when no longer intended
the establishment of special for public use or for public service, shall form
industries, or for coast-guard part of the patrimonial property of the State". I
service, the government shall respectfully submit, therefore, that the only
declare it to be the property of requirement which is legitimately imposable is
the owners of the estates that the intent to convert must be reasonably
adjacent thereto and as an clear from a consideration of the acts or acts
increment thereof. We believe of the Executive Department or of the
that only the executive and Legislative Department which are said to have
possibly the legislative effected such conversion.
departments have the authority
and the power to make the The same legal situation exists in respect of
declaration that any land so conversion of property of public dominion
gained by the sea, is not belonging to municipal corporations, i.e., local
necessary for purposes of public governmental units, into patrimonial property
utility, or for the establishment of such entities. In Cebu Oxygen Acetylene v.
of special industries, or for Bercilles (66 SCRA 481 [1975]), the City
coast-guard service. If no such Council of Cebu by resolution declared a
declaration has been made by certain portion of an existing street as an
said departments, the lot in abandoned road, "the same not being included
question forms part of the public in the city development plan". Subsequently,
domain. (Natividad v. Director of by another resolution, the City Council of
Lands, supra.) Cebu authorized the acting City Mayor to sell
the land through public bidding. Although
The reason for this there was no formal and explicit declaration of
pronouncement, according to conversion of property for public use into
this Tribunal in the case of patrimonial property, the Supreme Court said:
Vicente Joven y Monteverde v.
Director of Lands, 93 Phil., 134 xxx xxx xxx
(cited in Velayo's Digest, Vol. 1,
p. 52). (2) Since that portion of the city
street subject of petitioner's
... is undoubtedly that the courts application for registration of
are neither primarily called title was withdrawn from public
upon, nor indeed in a position to use, it follows that such
determine whether any public withdrawn portion becomes
land are to be used for the patrimonial property which can
purposes specified in Article 4 of
P a g e | 12
be the object of an ordinary queda desde el primer momento

contract. resuelta. Hay un punto de
partida cierto para iniciar las
Article 422 of the Civil Code relaciones juridicas a que
expressly provides that "Property pudiera haber lugar Pero puede
of public dominion, when no ocurrir que no haya
longer intended for public use of taldeclaracion expresa,
for public service, shall form part legislativa or administrativa, y,
of the patrimonial property of the sin embargo, cesar de hecho el
State." destino publico de los bienes;
ahora bien, en este caso, y para
Besides, the Revised Charter of los efectos juridicos que resultan
the City of Cebu heretofore de entrar la cosa en el comercio
quoted, in very clear and de los hombres,' se entedera que
unequivocal terms, states that se ha verificado la conversion de
"Property thus withdrawn from los bienes patrimoniales?
public servitude may be used or
conveyed for any purpose for El citado tratadista Ricci opina,
which other real property respecto del antiguo Codigo
belonging to the City may be italiano, por la afirmativa, y por
lawfully used or conveyed." nuestra parte creemos que tal
debe ser la soluciion. El destino
Accordingly, the withdrawal of de las cosas no depende tanto de
the property in question from una declaracion expresa como
public use and its subsequent del uso publico de las mismas, y
sale to the petitioner is cuanda el uso publico cese con
valid. Hence, the petitioner has a respecto de determinados bienes,
registrable title over the lot in cesa tambien su situacion en el
question. (66 SCRA at 484-; dominio publico. Si una fortaleza
emphasis supplied) en ruina se abandona y no se
repara, si un trozo de la via
Thus, again as pointed out by Sarmiento J., in publica se abandona tambien
his separate opinion, in the case of property por constituir otro nuevo an
owned by municipal corporations simple non- mejores condiciones....ambos
use or the actual dedication of public property bienes cesan de estar Codigo, y
to some use other than "public use" or some leyes especiales mas o memos
"public service", was sufficient legally to administrativas. (3 Manresa,
convert such property into patrimonial Comentarios al Codigo Civil
property (Municipality of Oas v. Roa, 7 Phil. Espanol, p. 128 [7a ed.; 1952)
20 [1906]- Municipality of Hinunganan v. (Emphasis supplied)
Director of Lands 24 Phil. 124 [1913]; Province
of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, The majority opinion says that none of the
22 SCRA 1334 (1968). executive acts pointed to by the Government
purported, expressly or definitely, to convert
I would also add that such was the case not the Roppongi property into patrimonial
only in respect of' property of municipal property — of the Republic. Assuming that to
corporations but also in respect of property of be the case, it is respectfully submitted
the State itself. Manresa in commenting on that cumulative effect of the executive acts
Article 341 of the 1889 Spanish Civil Code here involved was to convert property
which has been carried over verbatim into our originally intended for and devoted to public
Civil Code by Article 422 thereof, wrote: service into patrimonial property of the State,
that is, property susceptible of disposition to
La dificultad mayor en todo esto and appropration by private persons. These
estriba, naturalmente, en fijar el executive acts, in their totality if not each
momento en que los bienes de individual act, make crystal clear the intent of
dominio publico dejan de serlo. the Executive Department to effect such
Si la Administracion o la conversion. These executive acts include:
autoridad competente legislative
realizan qun acto en virtud del (a) Administrative Order No. 3 dated 11
cual cesa el destino o uso August 1985, which created a Committee to
publico de los bienes de que se study the disposition/utilization of the
trata naturalmente la dificultad Government's property in Japan, The
P a g e | 13
Committee was composed of officials of the attributable not to the Government's own
Executive Department: the Executive deliberate and indubitable will but to lack of
Secretary; the Philippine Ambassador to financial support to repair and improve the
Japan; and representatives of the Department property" (Majority Opinion, p. 13). With
of Foreign Affairs and the Asset Privatization respect, it may be stressed that there is no
Trust. On 19 September 1988, the Committee abandonment involved here, certainly no
recommended to the President the sale of one abandonment of property or of property rights.
of the lots (the lot specifically in Roppongi) What is involved is the charge of the
through public bidding. On 4 October 1988, classification of the property from property of
the President approved the recommendation of the public domain into property of the private
the Committee. domain of the State. Moreover, if for fourteen
(14) years, the Government did not see fit to
On 14 December 1988, the Philippine appropriate whatever funds were necessary to
Government by diplomatic note informed the maintain the property in Roppongi in a
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the condition suitable for diplomatic
Republic's intention to dispose of the property representation purposes, such circumstance
in Roppongi. The Japanese Government may, with equal logic, be construed as a
through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied manifestation of the crystalizing intent to
that it interposed no objection to such change the character of the property.
disposition by the Republic. Subsequently, the
President and the Committee informed the (d) On 30 March 1989, a public bidding was in
leaders of the House of Representatives and of fact held by the Executive Department for the
the Senate of the Philippines of the proposed sale of the lot in Roppongi. The circumstance
disposition of the Roppongi property. that this bidding was not successful certainly
does not argue against an intent to convert
(b) Executive Order No. 296, which was issued the property involved into property that is
by the President on 25 July 1987. Assuming disposable by bidding.
that the majority opinion is right in saying
that Executive Order No. 296 is insufficient The above set of events and circumstances
to authorize the sale of the Roppongi property, makes no sense at all if it does not, as a
it is here submitted with respect that whole, show at least the intent on the part of
Executive Order No. 296 is more than the Executive Department (with the knowledge
sufficient to indicate an intention to convert of the Legislative Department) to convert the
the property previously devoted to public property involved into patrimonial property
service into patrimonial property that is that is susceptible of being sold.
capable of being sold or otherwise disposed of
II
(c) Non-use of the Roppongi lot for fourteen
(14) years for diplomatic or for any other Having reached an affirmative answer in
public purposes. Assuming (but respect of the first issue, it is necessary to
only arguendo) that non-use does not, by address the second issue of whether or not
itself, automatically convert the property into there exists legal authority for the sale or
patrimonial property. I respectfully urge that disposition of the Roppongi property.
prolonged non-use, conjoined with the other
factors here listed, was legally effective to The majority opinion refers to Section 79(f) of
convert the lot in Roppongi into patrimonial the Revised Administrative Code of 1917
property of the State. Actually, as already which reads as follows:
pointed out, case law involving property of
municipal corporations is to the effect that SEC. 79 (f). Conveyances and
simple non-use or the actual dedication of contracts to which the
public property to some use other than public Government is a party. — In
use or public service, was sufficient to convert cases in which the Government
such property into patrimonial property of the of the Republic of the Philippines
local governmental entity concerned. Also as is a party to any deed or other
pointed out above, Manresa reached the same instrument conveying the title to
conclusion in respect of conversion of property real estate or to any other
of the public domain of the State into property property the value of which is in
of the private domain of the State. excess of one hundred thousand
pesos, the respective Department
The majority opinion states that Secretary shall prepare the
"abandonment cannot be inferred from the necessary papers which, together
non-use alone especially if the non-use was with the proper
P a g e | 14
recommendations, shall Secondly, examination of our statute books

be submitted to the Congress of shows that authorization by law for
the Philippines for approval by disposition of real property of the private
the same. Such deed, domain of the Government, has been granted
instrument, or contract shall be by Congress both in the form of (a) a general,
executed and signed by the standing authorization for disposition of
President of the Philippines on patrimonial property of the Government; and
behalf of the Government of the (b) specific legislation authorizing the
Philippines unless the authority disposition of particular pieces of the
therefor be expressly vested by Government's patrimonial property.
law in another officer. (Emphasis
supplied) Standing legislative authority for the
disposition of land of the private domain of the
The majority opinion then goes on to state Philippines is provided by Act No. 3038,
that: "[T]he requirement has been retained in entitled "An Act Authorizing the Secretary of
Section 4, Book I of the Administrative Code of Agriculture and Natural Resources to Sell or
1987 (Executive Order No. 292)" which reads: Lease Land of the Private Domain of the
Government of the Philippine Islands (now
SEC. 48. Official Authorized to Republic of the Philippines)", enacted on 9
Convey Real Property. — March 1922. The full text of this statute is as
Whenever real property of the follows:
Government is authorized by law
to be conveyed, the deed of Be it enacted by the Senate and
conveyance shall be executed in House of Representatives of the
behalf of the government by the Philippines in Legislature
following: assembled and by the authority
of the same:
(1) For property belonging to and
titled in the name of the Republic SECTION 1. The Secretary of
of the Philippines, by the Agriculture and Natural
President, unless the authority Resources (now Secretary of the
therefor is expressly vested by Environment and Natural
law in another officer. Resources) is hereby authorized
to sell or lease land of the private
(2) For property belonging to the domain of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines but Philippine Islands, or any part
titled in the name of any political thereof, to such persons,
subdivision or of any corporate corporations or associations as
agency or instrumentality, by the are, under the provisions of Act
executive head of the agency or Numbered Twenty-eight hundred
instrumentality. (Emphasis and seventy-four, (now
supplied) Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended) known as the Public
Two points need to be made in this Land Act, entitled to apply for
connection. Firstly, the requirement of the purchase or lease or
obtaining specific approval of Congress when agricultural public land.
the price of the real property being disposed
of is in excess of One Hundred Thousand SECTION 2. The sale of the land
Pesos (P100,000.00) under the Revised referred to in the preceding
Administrative Code of 1917, has been deleted section shall, if such land is
from Section 48 of the 1987 Administrative agricultural, be made in the
Code. What Section 48 of the present manner and subject to the
Administrative Code refers to is authorization limitations prescribed in
by law for the conveyance. Section 48 does not chapters five and six,
purport to be itself a source of legal authority respectively, of said Public Land
for conveyance of real property of the Act, and if it be classified
Government. For Section 48 merely specifies differently, in conformity with
the official authorized to execute and sign on the provisions of chapter nine of
behalf of the Government the deed of said Act: Provided, however, That
conveyance in case of such a conveyance. the land necessary for the public
service shall be exempt from the
provisions of this Act.
P a g e | 15
SECTION 3. This Act shall take persons, and which were also acquired by the
effect on its approval. Philippine Government.
Approved, March 9, 1922. After the enactment in 1922 of Act No. 3038,
(Emphasis supplied) there appears, to my knowledge, to be only
one statute authorizing the President to
Lest it be assumed that Act No. 3038 refers dispose of a specific piece of property. This
only to agricultural lands of the private statute is Republic Act No. 905, enacted on 20
domain of the State, it must be noted that June 1953, which authorized the
Chapter 9 of the old Public Land Act (Act No.
2874) is now Chapter 9 of the present Public President to sell an Identified parcel of land of
Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141, as the private domain of the National
amended) and that both statutes refer to: "any Government to the National Press Club of the
tract of land of the public domain which being Philippines, and to other recognized national
neither timber nor mineral land, is intended to associations of professionals with academic
be used for residential purposes or standing, for the nominal price of P1.00. It
for commercial or industrial purposes other appears relevant to note that Republic Act No.
than agricultural" (Emphasis supplied).i•t•c- 905 was not an outright disposition in
aüsl In other words, the statute covers the perpetuity of the property involved- it provided
sale or lease or residential, commercial or for reversion of the property to the National
industrial land of the private domain of the Government in case the National Press Club
State. stopped using it for its headquarters. What
Republic Act No. 905 authorized was really
Implementing regulations have been issued for a donation, and not a sale.
the carrying out of the provisions of Act No.
3038. On 21 December 1954, the then The basic submission here made is that Act
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural No. 3038 provides standing legislative
Resources promulgated Lands Administrative authorization for disposition of the Roppongi
Orders Nos. 7-6 and 7-7 which were entitled, property which, in my view, has been
respectively: "Supplementary Regulations converted into patrimonial property of the
Governing the Sale of the Lands of the Private Republic. 2
Domain of the Republic of the Philippines";
and "Supplementary Regulations Governing To some, the submission that Act No. 3038
the Lease of Lands of Private Domain of the applies not only to lands of the private domain
Republic of the Philippines" (text in 51 O.G. of the State located in the Philippines but also
28-29 [1955]). to patrimonial property found outside the
Philippines, may appear strange or unusual. I
It is perhaps well to add that Act No. 3038, respectfully submit that such position is not
although now sixty-eight (68) years old, is still any more unusual or strange than the
in effect and has not been repealed. 1 assumption that Article 420 of the Civil Code
applies not only to property of the Republic
Specific legislative authorization for located within Philippine territory but also to
disposition of particular patrimonial property found outside the boundaries of the
properties of the State is illustrated by certain Republic.
earlier statutes. The first of these was Act No.
1120, enacted on 26 April 1904, which It remains to note that under the well-settled
provided for the disposition of the friar lands, doctrine that heads of Executive Departments
purchased by the Government from the are alter egos of the President (Villena v.
Roman Catholic Church, to bona fide settlers Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil. 451 [1939]),
and occupants thereof or to other persons. and in view of the constitutional power of
In Jacinto v. Director of Lands (49 Phil. 853 control exercised by the President over
[1926]), these friar lands were held to be department heads (Article VII, Section
private and patrimonial properties of the 17,1987 Constitution), the President herself
State. Act No. 2360, enacted on -28 February may carry out the function or duty that is
1914, authorized the sale of the San Lazaro specifically lodged in the Secretary of the
Estate located in the City of Manila, which Department of Environment and Natural
had also been purchased by the Government Resources (Araneta v. Gatmaitan 101 Phil.
from the Roman Catholic Church. In January 328 [1957]). At the very least, the President
1916, Act No. 2555 amended Act No. 2360 by retains the power to approve or disapprove the
including therein all lands and buildings exercise of that function or duty when done by
owned by the Hospital and the Foundation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural
San Lazaro theretofor leased by private Resources.
P a g e | 16
It is hardly necessary to add that the foregoing in the several cases where this Court has
analyses and submissions relate only to the ruled against her, the President of the
austere question of existence of legal power or Philippines has submitted to this principle
authority. They have nothing to do with much with becoming grace.
debated questions of wisdom or propriety or
relative desirability either of the proposed
disposition itself or of the proposed utilization
of the anticipated proceeds of the property PADILLA, J., concurring:
involved. These latter types of considerations
He within the sphere of responsibility of the I concur in the decision penned by Mr. Justice
political departments of government the Gutierrez, Jr., I only wish to make a few
Executive and the Legislative authorities. observations which could help in further
clarifying the issues.
For all the foregoing, I vote to dismiss the
Petitions for Prohibition in both G.R. Nos. Under our tripartite system of government
92013 and 92047. ordained by the Constitution, it is Congress
that lays down or determines policies. The
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gancayco, Cortes and President executes such policies. The policies
Medialdea, JJ., concurring. determined by Congress are embodied in
legislative enactments that have to be
approved by the President to become law. The
President, of course, recommends to Congress
the approval of policies but, in the final
analysis, it is Congress that is the policy -
Separate Opinions determining branch of government.
CRUZ, J., concurring: The judiciary interprets the laws and, in

appropriate cases, determines whether the
I concur completely with the excellent laws enacted by Congress and approved by
ponencia of Mr. Justice Gutierrez and will add the President, and presidential acts
the following observations only for emphasis. implementing such laws, are in accordance
with the Constitution.
It is clear that the respondents have failed to
show the President's legal authority to sell the The Roppongi property was acquired by the
Roppongi property. When asked to do so at Philippine government pursuant to the
the hearing on these petitions, the Solicitor reparations agreement between the Philippine
General was at best ambiguous, although I and Japanese governments. Under such
must add in fairness that this was not his agreement, this property was acquired by the
fault. The fact is that there is -no such Philippine government for a specific purpose,
authority. Legal expertise alone cannot namely, to serve as the site of the Philippine
conjure that statutory permission out of thin Embassy in Tokyo, Japan. Consequently,
air. Roppongi is a property of public dominion and
intended for public service, squarely falling
Exec. Order No. 296, which reads like so within that class of property under Art. 420 of
much legislative, double talk, does not contain the Civil Code, which provides:
such authority. Neither does Rep. Act No.
6657, which simply allows the proceeds of the Art. 420. The following things are
sale of our properties abroad to be used for property of public dominion :
the comprehensive agrarian reform program.
Senate Res. No. 55 was a mere request for the (1) ...
deferment of the scheduled sale of tile
Roppongi property, possibly to stop the (2) Those which belong to the
transaction altogether; and ill any case it is State, without being for public
not a law. The sale of the said property may be use, and are intended for some
authorized only by Congress through a duly public service or for the
enacted statute, and there is no such law. development of the national
wealth. (339a)
Once again, we have affirmed the principle
that ours is a government of laws and not of Public dominion property intended for public
men, where every public official, from the service cannot be alienated unless the
lowest to the highest, can act only by virtue of property is first transformed into private
a valid authorization. I am happy to note that property of the state otherwise known as
P a g e | 17
patrimonial property of the state. 1 The It is therefore, clear that the President cannot
transformation of public dominion property to sell or order the sale of Roppongi thru public
state patrimonial property involves, to my bidding or otherwise without a prior
mind, a policy decision. It is a policy decision congressional approval, first, converting
because the treatment of the property varies Roppongi from a public dominion property to
according to its classification. Consequently, it a state patrimonial property, and, second,
is Congress which can decide and declare the authorizing the President to sell the same.
conversion of Roppongi from a public
dominion property to a state patrimonial ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the
property. Congress has made no such decision petition and to make PERMANENT the
or declaration. temporary restraining order earlier issued by
this Court.
Moreover, the sale of public property (once
converted from public dominion to state
patrimonial property) must be approved by
Congress, for this again is a matter of policy SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
(i.e. to keep or dispose of the property). Sec.
48, Book 1 of the Administrative Code of 1987 The central question, as I see it, is whether or
provides: not the so-called "Roppongi property' has lost
its nature as property of public dominion, and
SEC. 48. Official Authorized to hence, has become patrimonial property of the
Convey Real Property. — State. I understand that the parties are agreed
Whenever real property of the that it was property intended for "public
Government is authorized by law service" within the contemplation of paragraph
to be conveyed, the deed of (2), of Article 430, of the Civil Code, and
conveyance shall be executed in accordingly, land of State dominion, and
behalf of the government by the beyond human commerce. The lone issue is,
following: in the light of supervening developments, that
is non-user thereof by the National
(1) For property Government (for diplomatic purposes) for the
belonging to and last thirteen years; the issuance of Executive
titled in the name Order No. 296 making it available for sale to
of the Republic of any interested buyer; the promulgation of
the Philippines, by Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive
the President, Agrarian Reform Law, making available for the
unless the program's financing, State assets sold; the
authority therefor approval by the President of the
is expressly vested recommendation of the investigating
by law in another committee formed to study the property's
officer. utilization; and the issuance of Resolution No.
55 of the Philippine Senate requesting for the
(2) For property deferment of its disposition it, "Roppongi", is
belonging to the still property of the public dominion, and if it
Republic of the is not, how it lost that character.
Philippines but
titled in the name When land of the public dominion ceases to be
of any political one, or when the change takes place, is a
subdivision or of question our courts have debated early. In a
any corporate 1906 decision, 1 it was held that property of
agency or the public dominion, a public plaza in this
instrumentality, by instance, becomes patrimonial upon use
the executive head thereof for purposes other than a plaza. In a
of the agency or later case, 2 this ruling was reiterated.
instrumentality. Likewise, it has been held that land, originally
(Emphasis private property, has become of public
supplied) dominion upon its donation to the town and
its conversion and use as a public plaza. 3 It is
But the record is bare of any congressional notable that under these three cases, the
decision or approval to sell Roppongi. The character of the property, and any change
record is likewise bare of any congressional occurring therein, depends on the actual use
authority extended to the President to sell to which it is dedicated. 4
Roppongi thru public bidding or otherwise.
P a g e | 18
Much later, however, the Court held that public dominion, within the meaning of Article
"until a formal declaration on the part of the 420 (2) of the Civil Code:
Government, through the executive
department or the Legislative, to the effect [Property] which belong[s] to the
that the land . . . is no longer needed for State, without being for public
[public] service- for public use or for special use, and are intended for some
industries, [it] continue[s] to be part of the public service -.
public [dominion], not available for private
expropriation or ownership." 5 So also, it was It might not be amiss however, to note that
ruled that a political subdivision (the City of the appropriateness of trying to bring within
Cebu in this case) alone may declare (under the confines of the simple threefold
its charter) a city road abandoned and classification found in Article 420 of the Civil
thereafter, to dispose of it. 6 Code ("property for public use property
"intended for some public service" and
In holding that there is "a need for a law or property intended "for the development of the
formal declaration to withdraw the Roppongi national wealth") all property owned by the
property from public domain to make it Republic of the Philippines whether found
alienable and a land for legislative authority to within the territorial boundaries of the
allow the sale of the property" 7 the majority Republic or located within the territory of
lays stress to the fact that: (1) An affirmative another sovereign State, is not self-evident.
act — executive or legislative — is necessary The first item of the classification property
to reclassify property of the public dominion, intended for public use — can scarcely be
and (2) a legislative decree is required to make properly applied to property belonging to the
it alienable. It also clears the uncertainties Republic but found within the territory of
brought about by earlier interpretations that another State. The third item of the
the nature of property-whether public or classification property intended for the
patrimonial is predicated on the manner it is development of the national wealth is
actually used, or not used, and in the same illustrated, in Article 339 of the Spanish Civil
breath, repudiates the Government's position Code of 1889, by mines or mineral properties.
that the continuous non-use of "Roppongi", Again, mineral lands owned by a sovereign
among other arguments, for "diplomatic State are rarely, if ever, found within the
purposes", has turned it into State territorial base of another sovereign State. The
patrimonial property. task of examining in detail the applicability of
the classification set out in Article 420 of our
I feel that this view corresponds to existing Civil Code to property that the Philippines
pronouncements of this Court, among other happens to own outside its own boundaries
things, that: (1) Property is presumed to be must, however, be left to academicians.
State property in the absence of any showing
to the contrary; 8 (2) With respect to forest For present purposes, too, I agree that there is
lands, the same continue to be lands of the no question of conflict of laws that is, at the
public dominion unless and until reclassified present time, before this Court. The issues
by the Executive Branch of the before us relate essentially to authority to sell
Government; 9 and (3) All natural resources, the Roppongi property so far as Philippine law
under the Constitution, and subject to is concerned.
exceptional cases, belong to the State. 10
The majority opinion raises two (2) issues: (a)
I am elated that the Court has banished whether or not the Roppongi property has
previous uncertainties. been converted into patrimonial property or
property of the private domain of the State;
and (b) assuming an affirmative answer to (a),
whether or not there is legal authority to
FELICIANO, J., dissenting dispose of the Roppongi property.
With regret, I find myself unable to share the I

conclusions reached by Mr. Justice Hugo E.
Gutierrez, Jr. Addressing the first issue of conversion of
property of public dominion intended for some
For purposes of this separate opinion, I public service, into property of the private
assume that the piece of land located in 306 domain of the Republic, it should be noted
Roppongi, 5-Chome, Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan that the Civil Code does not address the
(hereinafter referred to as the "Roppongi question of who has authority to effect such
property") may be characterized as property of
P a g e | 19
conversion. Neither does the Civil Code set out declaration on the part of the
or refer to any procedure for such conversion. Government, through the
executive department or the
Our case law, however, contains some fairly Legislature, to the effect that the
explicit pronouncements on this point, as land in question is no longer
Justice Sarmiento has pointed out in his needed for coast-guard service,
concurring opinion. In Ignacio v. Director of for public use or for special
Lands (108 Phils. 335 [1960]), petitioner industries, they continue to be
Ignacio argued that if the land in question part of the public domain not
formed part of the public domain, the trial available for private
court should have declared the same no appropriation or ownership. (108
longer necessary for public use or public Phil. at 338-339; emphasis
purposes and which would, therefore, have supplied)
become disposable and available for private
ownership. Mr. Justice Montemayor, speaking Thus, under Ignacio, either the Executive
for the Court, said: Department or the Legislative
Department may convert property of the State
Article 4 of the Law of Waters of of public dominion into patrimonial property
1866 provides that when a of the State. No particular formula or
portion of the shore is no longer procedure of conversion is specified either in
washed by the waters of the sea statute law or in case law. Article 422 of the
and is not necessary for Civil Code simply states that: "Property of
purposes of public utility, or for public dominion, when no longer intended
the establishment of special for public use or for public service, shall form
industries, or for coast-guard part of the patrimonial property of the State". I
service, the government shall respectfully submit, therefore, that the only
declare it to be the property of requirement which is legitimately imposable is
the owners of the estates that the intent to convert must be reasonably
adjacent thereto and as an clear from a consideration of the acts or acts
increment thereof. We believe of the Executive Department or of the
that only the executive and Legislative Department which are said to have
possibly the legislative effected such conversion.
departments have the authority
and the power to make the The same legal situation exists in respect of
declaration that any land so conversion of property of public dominion
gained by the sea, is not belonging to municipal corporations, i.e., local
necessary for purposes of public governmental units, into patrimonial property
utility, or for the establishment of such entities. In Cebu Oxygen Acetylene v.
of special industries, or for Bercilles (66 SCRA 481 [1975]), the City
coast-guard service. If no such Council of Cebu by resolution declared a
declaration has been made by certain portion of an existing street as an
said departments, the lot in abandoned road, "the same not being included
question forms part of the public in the city development plan". Subsequently,
domain. (Natividad v. Director of by another resolution, the City Council of
Lands, supra.) Cebu authorized the acting City Mayor to sell
the land through public bidding. Although
The reason for this there was no formal and explicit declaration of
pronouncement, according to conversion of property for public use into
this Tribunal in the case of patrimonial property, the Supreme Court said:
Vicente Joven y Monteverde v.
Director of Lands, 93 Phil., 134 xxx xxx xxx
(cited in Velayo's Digest, Vol. 1,
p. 52). (2) Since that portion of the city
street subject of petitioner's
... is undoubtedly that the courts application for registration of
are neither primarily called title was withdrawn from public
upon, nor indeed in a position to use, it follows that such
determine whether any public withdrawn portion becomes
land are to be used for the patrimonial property which can
purposes specified in Article 4 of be the object of an ordinary
the Law of Waters. contract.
Consequently, until a formal
P a g e | 20
Article 422 of the Civil Code relaciones juridicas a que

expressly provides that "Property pudiera haber lugar Pero puede
of public dominion, when no ocurrir que no haya
longer intended for public use of taldeclaracion expresa,
for public service, shall form part legislativa or administrativa, y,
of the patrimonial property of the sin embargo, cesar de hecho el
State." destino publico de los bienes;
ahora bien, en este caso, y para
Besides, the Revised Charter of los efectos juridicos que resultan
the City of Cebu heretofore de entrar la cosa en el comercio
quoted, in very clear and de los hombres,' se entedera que
unequivocal terms, states that se ha verificado la conversion de
"Property thus withdrawn from los bienes patrimoniales?
public servitude may be used or
conveyed for any purpose for El citado tratadista Ricci opina,
which other real property respecto del antiguo Codigo
belonging to the City may be italiano, por la afirmativa, y por
lawfully used or conveyed." nuestra parte creemos que tal
debe ser la soluciion. El destino
Accordingly, the withdrawal of de las cosas no depende tanto de
the property in question from una declaracion expresa como
public use and its subsequent del uso publico de las mismas, y
sale to the petitioner is cuanda el uso publico cese con
valid. Hence, the petitioner has a respecto de determinados bienes,
registrable title over the lot in cesa tambien su situacion en el
question. (66 SCRA at 484-; dominio publico. Si una fortaleza
emphasis supplied) en ruina se abandona y no se
repara, si un trozo de la via
Thus, again as pointed out by Sarmiento J., in publica se abandona tambien
his separate opinion, in the case of property por constituir otro nuevo an
owned by municipal corporations simple non- mejores condiciones....ambos
use or the actual dedication of public property bienes cesan de estar Codigo, y
to some use other than "public use" or some leyes especiales mas o memos
"public service", was sufficient legally to administrativas. (3 Manresa,
convert such property into patrimonial Comentarios al Codigo Civil
property (Municipality of Oas v. Roa, 7 Phil. Espanol, p. 128 [7a ed.; 1952)
20 [1906]- Municipality of Hinunganan v. (Emphasis supplied)
Director of Lands 24 Phil. 124 [1913]; Province
of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, The majority opinion says that none of the
22 SCRA 1334 (1968). executive acts pointed to by the Government
purported, expressly or definitely, to convert
I would also add that such was the case not the Roppongi property into patrimonial
only in respect of' property of municipal property — of the Republic. Assuming that to
corporations but also in respect of property of be the case, it is respectfully submitted
the State itself. Manresa in commenting on that cumulative effect of the executive acts
Article 341 of the 1889 Spanish Civil Code here involved was to convert property
which has been carried over verbatim into our originally intended for and devoted to public
Civil Code by Article 422 thereof, wrote: service into patrimonial property of the State,
that is, property susceptible of disposition to
La dificultad mayor en todo esto and appropration by private persons. These
estriba, naturalmente, en fijar el executive acts, in their totality if not each
momento en que los bienes de individual act, make crystal clear the intent of
dominio publico dejan de serlo. the Executive Department to effect such
Si la Administracion o la conversion. These executive acts include:
autoridad competente legislative
realizan qun acto en virtud del (a) Administrative Order No. 3 dated 11
cual cesa el destino o uso August 1985, which created a Committee to
publico de los bienes de que se study the disposition/utilization of the
trata naturalmente la dificultad Government's property in Japan, The
queda desde el primer momento Committee was composed of officials of the
resuelta. Hay un punto de Executive Department: the Executive
partida cierto para iniciar las Secretary; the Philippine Ambassador to
P a g e | 21
Japan; and representatives of the Department property" (Majority Opinion, p. 13). With
of Foreign Affairs and the Asset Privatization respect, it may be stressed that there is no
Trust. On 19 September 1988, the Committee abandonment involved here, certainly no
recommended to the President the sale of one abandonment of property or of property rights.
of the lots (the lot specifically in Roppongi) What is involved is the charge of the
through public bidding. On 4 October 1988, classification of the property from property of
the President approved the recommendation of the public domain into property of the private
the Committee. domain of the State. Moreover, if for fourteen
(14) years, the Government did not see fit to
On 14 December 1988, the Philippine appropriate whatever funds were necessary to
Government by diplomatic note informed the maintain the property in Roppongi in a
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the condition suitable for diplomatic
Republic's intention to dispose of the property representation purposes, such circumstance
in Roppongi. The Japanese Government may, with equal logic, be construed as a
through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied manifestation of the crystalizing intent to
that it interposed no objection to such change the character of the property.
disposition by the Republic. Subsequently, the
President and the Committee informed the (d) On 30 March 1989, a public bidding was in
leaders of the House of Representatives and of fact held by the Executive Department for the
the Senate of the Philippines of the proposed sale of the lot in Roppongi. The circumstance
disposition of the Roppongi property. that this bidding was not successful certainly
does not argue against an intent to convert
(b) Executive Order No. 296, which was issued the property involved into property that is
by the President on 25 July 1987. Assuming disposable by bidding.
that the majority opinion is right in saying
that Executive Order No. 296 is insufficient The above set of events and circumstances
to authorize the sale of the Roppongi property, makes no sense at all if it does not, as a
it is here submitted with respect that whole, show at least the intent on the part of
Executive Order No. 296 is more than the Executive Department (with the knowledge
sufficient to indicate an intention to convert of the Legislative Department) to convert the
the property previously devoted to public property involved into patrimonial property
service into patrimonial property that is that is susceptible of being sold.
capable of being sold or otherwise disposed of
II
(c) Non-use of the Roppongi lot for fourteen
(14) years for diplomatic or for any other Having reached an affirmative answer in
public purposes. Assuming (but respect of the first issue, it is necessary to
only arguendo) that non-use does not, by address the second issue of whether or not
itself, automatically convert the property into there exists legal authority for the sale or
patrimonial property. I respectfully urge that disposition of the Roppongi property.
prolonged non-use, conjoined with the other
factors here listed, was legally effective to The majority opinion refers to Section 79(f) of
convert the lot in Roppongi into patrimonial the Revised Administrative Code of 1917
property of the State. Actually, as already which reads as follows:
pointed out, case law involving property of
municipal corporations is to the effect that SEC. 79 (f). Conveyances and
simple non-use or the actual dedication of contracts to which the
public property to some use other than public Government is a party. — In
use or public service, was sufficient to convert cases in which the Government
such property into patrimonial property of the of the Republic of the Philippines
local governmental entity concerned. Also as is a party to any deed or other
pointed out above, Manresa reached the same instrument conveying the title to
conclusion in respect of conversion of property real estate or to any other
of the public domain of the State into property property the value of which is in
of the private domain of the State. excess of one hundred thousand
pesos, the respective Department
The majority opinion states that Secretary shall prepare the
"abandonment cannot be inferred from the necessary papers which, together
non-use alone especially if the non-use was with the proper
attributable not to the Government's own recommendations, shall
deliberate and indubitable will but to lack of be submitted to the Congress of
financial support to repair and improve the the Philippines for approval by
P a g e | 22
the same. Such deed, by Congress both in the form of (a) a general,
instrument, or contract shall be standing authorization for disposition of
executed and signed by the patrimonial property of the Government; and
President of the Philippines on (b) specific legislation authorizing the
behalf of the Government of the disposition of particular pieces of the
Philippines unless the authority Government's patrimonial property.
therefor be expressly vested by
law in another officer. (Emphasis Standing legislative authority for the
supplied) disposition of land of the private domain of the
Philippines is provided by Act No. 3038,
The majority opinion then goes on to state entitled "An Act Authorizing the Secretary of
that: "[T]he requirement has been retained in Agriculture and Natural Resources to Sell or
Section 4, Book I of the Administrative Code of Lease Land of the Private Domain of the
1987 (Executive Order No. 292)" which reads: Government of the Philippine Islands (now
Republic of the Philippines)", enacted on 9
SEC. 48. Official Authorized to March 1922. The full text of this statute is as
Convey Real Property. — follows:
Whenever real property of the
Government is authorized by law Be it enacted by the Senate and
to be conveyed, the deed of House of Representatives of the
conveyance shall be executed in Philippines in Legislature
behalf of the government by the assembled and by the authority
following: of the same:
(1) For property belonging to and SECTION 1. The Secretary of

titled in the name of the Republic Agriculture and Natural
of the Philippines, by the Resources (now Secretary of the
President, unless the authority Environment and Natural
therefor is expressly vested by Resources) is hereby authorized
law in another officer. to sell or lease land of the private
domain of the Government of the
(2) For property belonging to the Philippine Islands, or any part
Republic of the Philippines but thereof, to such persons,
titled in the name of any political corporations or associations as
subdivision or of any corporate are, under the provisions of Act
agency or instrumentality, by the Numbered Twenty-eight hundred
executive head of the agency or and seventy-four, (now
instrumentality. (Emphasis Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
supplied) amended) known as the Public
Land Act, entitled to apply for
Two points need to be made in this the purchase or lease or
connection. Firstly, the requirement of agricultural public land.
obtaining specific approval of Congress when
the price of the real property being disposed SECTION 2. The sale of the land
of is in excess of One Hundred Thousand referred to in the preceding
Pesos (P100,000.00) under the Revised section shall, if such land is
Administrative Code of 1917, has been deleted agricultural, be made in the
from Section 48 of the 1987 Administrative manner and subject to the
Code. What Section 48 of the present limitations prescribed in
Administrative Code refers to is authorization chapters five and six,
by law for the conveyance. Section 48 does not respectively, of said Public Land
purport to be itself a source of legal authority Act, and if it be classified
for conveyance of real property of the differently, in conformity with
Government. For Section 48 merely specifies the provisions of chapter nine of
the official authorized to execute and sign on said Act: Provided, however, That
behalf of the Government the deed of the land necessary for the public
conveyance in case of such a conveyance. service shall be exempt from the
provisions of this Act.
Secondly, examination of our statute books
shows that authorization by law for SECTION 3. This Act shall take
disposition of real property of the private effect on its approval.
domain of the Government, has been granted
P a g e | 23
Approved, March 9, 1922. After the enactment in 1922 of Act No. 3038,
(Emphasis supplied) there appears, to my knowledge, to be only
one statute authorizing the President to
Lest it be assumed that Act No. 3038 refers dispose of a specific piece of property. This
only to agricultural lands of the private statute is Republic Act No. 905, enacted on 20
domain of the State, it must be noted that June 1953, which authorized the
Chapter 9 of the old Public Land Act (Act No.
2874) is now Chapter 9 of the present Public President to sell an Identified parcel of land of
Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141, as the private domain of the National
amended) and that both statutes refer to: "any Government to the National Press Club of the
tract of land of the public domain which being Philippines, and to other recognized national
neither timber nor mineral land, is intended to associations of professionals with academic
be used for residential purposes or standing, for the nominal price of P1.00. It
for commercial or industrial purposes other appears relevant to note that Republic Act No.
than agricultural" (Emphasis supplied). In 905 was not an outright disposition in
other words, the statute covers the sale or perpetuity of the property involved- it provided
lease or residential, commercial or industrial for reversion of the property to the National
land of the private domain of the State. Government in case the National Press Club
stopped using it for its headquarters. What
Implementing regulations have been issued for Republic Act No. 905 authorized was really
the carrying out of the provisions of Act No. a donation, and not a sale.
3038. On 21 December 1954, the then
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural The basic submission here made is that Act
Resources promulgated Lands Administrative No. 3038 provides standing legislative
Orders Nos. 7-6 and 7-7 which were entitled, authorization for disposition of the Roppongi
respectively: "Supplementary Regulations property which, in my view, has been
Governing the Sale of the Lands of the Private converted into patrimonial property of the
Domain of the Republic of the Philippines"; Republic. 2
and "Supplementary Regulations Governing
the Lease of Lands of Private Domain of the To some, the submission that Act No. 3038
Republic of the Philippines" (text in 51 O.G. applies not only to lands of the private domain
28-29 [1955]). of the State located in the Philippines but also
to patrimonial property found outside the
It is perhaps well to add that Act No. 3038, Philippines, may appear strange or unusual. I
although now sixty-eight (68) years old, is still respectfully submit that such position is not
in effect and has not been repealed. 1 any more unusual or strange than the
assumption that Article 420 of the Civil Code
Specific legislative authorization for applies not only to property of the Republic
disposition of particular patrimonial located within Philippine territory but also to
properties of the State is illustrated by certain property found outside the boundaries of the
earlier statutes. The first of these was Act No. Republic.
1120, enacted on 26 April 1904, which
provided for the disposition of the friar lands, It remains to note that under the well-settled
purchased by the Government from the doctrine that heads of Executive Departments
Roman Catholic Church, to bona fide settlers are alter egos of the President (Villena v.
and occupants thereof or to other persons. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil. 451 [1939]),
In Jacinto v. Director of Lands (49 Phil. 853 and in view of the constitutional power of
[1926]), these friar lands were held to be control exercised by the President over
private and patrimonial properties of the department heads (Article VII, Section
State. Act No. 2360, enacted on -28 February 17,1987 Constitution), the President herself
1914, authorized the sale of the San Lazaro may carry out the function or duty that is
Estate located in the City of Manila, which specifically lodged in the Secretary of the
had also been purchased by the Government Department of Environment and Natural
from the Roman Catholic Church. In January Resources (Araneta v. Gatmaitan 101 Phil.
1916, Act No. 2555 amended Act No. 2360 by 328 [1957]). At the very least, the President
including therein all lands and buildings retains the power to approve or disapprove the
owned by the Hospital and the Foundation of exercise of that function or duty when done by
San Lazaro theretofor leased by private the Secretary of Environment and Natural
persons, and which were also acquired by the Resources.
Philippine Government.
It is hardly necessary to add that the foregoing
analyses and submissions relate only to the
P a g e | 24
austere question of existence of legal power or the Court of First Instance praying that the
authority. They have nothing to do with much attachment on the said property be dissolved,
debated questions of wisdom or propriety or that the said attachment be declared null and
relative desirability either of the proposed void as being illegal and violative of the rights
disposition itself or of the proposed utilization of the defendant municipality.
of the anticipated proceeds of the property
involved. These latter types of considerations Plaintiffs counsel objected o the fiscal's motion
He within the sphere of responsibility of the but the court, by order of August 12, 1925,
political departments of government the declared the attachment levied upon the
Executive and the Legislative authorities. aforementioned property of the defendant
municipality null and void, thereby dissolving
For all the foregoing, I vote to dismiss the the said attachment.
Petitions for Prohibition in both G.R. Nos.
92013 and 92047. From this order the plaintiff has appealed by
bill of exceptions. The fundamental question
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gancayco, Cortes and raised by appellant in her four assignments of
Medialdea, JJ., concurring. error is whether or not the property levied
upon is exempt from execution.
EN BANC
17
The municipal law, section 2165 of the
G.R. No. L-24950 March 25, 1926 Administrative Code, provides that:
VIUDA DE TAN TOCO, plaintiff-appellant, Municipalities are political bodies

vs. corporate, and as such are endowed
THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF with the faculties of municipal
ILOILO, defendant-appellee. corporations, to be exercised by and
through their respective municipal
Arroyo & Evangelista for appellant. government in conformity with law.
Provincial Fiscal Borromeo Veloso for appelle.
It shall be competent for them, in their
VILLAMOR, J.: proper corporate name, to sue and be
sued, to contract and be contracted
It appears from the record that the widow of with, to acquire and hold real and
Tan Toco had sued the municipal council of personal property for municipal
Iloilo for the amount of P42,966.40, being the purposes, and generally to exercise the
purchase price of two strips of land, one on powers hereinafter specified or
Calle J. M. Basa consisting of 592 square otherwise conferred upon them by law.
meters, and the other on Calle Aldiguer
consisting of 59 square meters, which the For the purposes of the matter here in
municipality of Iloilo had appropriated for question, the Administrative Code does not
widening said street. The Court of First specify the kind of property that a
Instance of Iloilo sentenced the said municipality may acquire. However, article
municipality to pay the plaintiff the amount so 343 of the Civil Code divides the property of
claimed, plus the interest, and the said provinces and towns (municipalities) into
judgment was on appeal affirmed by this property for public use and patrimonial
court.1 property. According to article 344 of the same
Code, provincial roads and foot-path, squares,
On account of lack of funds the municipality streets, fountains and public waters, drives
of Iloilo was unable to pay the said judgment, and public improvements of general benefit
wherefore plaintiff had a writ of execution built at the expense of the said towns or
issue against the property of the said provinces, are property for public use.
municipality, by virtue of which the sheriff
attached two auto trucks used for street All other property possessed by the said towns
sprinkling, one police patrol automobile, the and provinces is patrimonial and shall be
police stations on Mabini street, and in Molo subject to the provisions of the Civil Code
and Mandurriao and the concrete structures, except as provided by special laws.
with the corresponding lots, used as markets
by Iloilo, Molo, and Mandurriao. Commenting upon article 344, Mr. Manresa
says that "In accordance with administrative
After notice of the sale of said property had legislation" (Spanish) we must distinguish, as
been made, and a few days before the sale, the to the patrimonial property of the towns,
provincial fiscal of Iloilo filed a motion which "between that a common benefit and that
P a g e | 25
which is private property of the town. The first essential, and to deny them these
differs from property for public use in that means the very purpose of their
generally its enjoyment is less, as it is limited creation would be materially impeded,
to neighbors or to a group or class thereof; and in some instances practically
and, furthermore, such use, more or less destroy it. Respecting this subject the
general, is not intrinsic with this kind of Supreme Court of Louisiana remarked:
property, for by its very nature it may be "On the first view of this question there
enjoyed as though it were private property. is something very repugnant to the
The third group, that is, private property, is moral sense in the idea that a
used in the name of the town or province by municipal corporation should contract
the entities representing it and, like and debts, and that, having no resources
private property, giving a source of revenue." but the taxes which are due to it, these
should not be subjected by legal
Such distinction, however, is of little practical process to the satisfaction of its
importance in this jurisdiction in view of the creditors. This consideration, deduced
different principles underlying the functions of from the principles of moral equity has
a municipality under the American rule. only given way to the more enlarged
Notwithstanding this, we believe that the contemplation of the great and
principle governing property of the public paramount interests of public order
domain of the State is applicable to property and the principles of government."
for public use of the municipalities as said
municipal is similar in character. The It is generally held that property owned
principle is that the property for public use of by a municipality, where not used for a
the State is not within the commerce of man public purpose but for quasi private
and, consequently, is inalienable and not purposes, is subject to execution on a
subject to prescription. Likewise, property for judgment against the municipality, and
public of the municipality is not within the may be sold. This rule applies to shares
commerce of man so long as it is used by the of stock owned by a municipal
public and, consequently, said property is also corporation, and the like. But the mere
inalienable. fact that corporate property held for
public uses is being temporarily used
The American Law is more explicit about this for private purposes does not make it
matter as expounded by Mcquilin in Municipal subject execution.
Corporations, volume 3, paragraph 1160,
where he says that: If municipal property exempt from
execution is destroyed, the insurance
States statutes often provide the court money stands in lieu thereof and is also
houses, jails and other buildings owned exempt.
by municipalities and the lots on which
they stand shall be exempt from The members or inhabitants of a
attachment and execution. But municipal corporation proper are not
independent of express statutory personally liable for the debts of the
exemption, as a general proposition, municipality, except that in the New
property, real and personal, held by England States the individual liability
municipal corporations, in trust for the of the inhabitant is generally
benefit of their inhabitants, and used maintained.
for public purposes, is exempt.
In Corpus Juris, vol 23, page 355, the
For example, public buildings, school following is found:
houses, streets, squares, parks,
wharves, engines and engine houses, Where property of a municipal or other
and the like, are not subject to public corporation is sough to be
execution. So city waterworks, and a subjected to execution to satisfy
stock of liquors carried in a town judgments recovered against such
dispensary, are exempt. The reason for corporation, the question as to whether
the exemption is obvious. Municipal such property is leviable or not is to be
corporations are created for public determined by the usage and purposes
purposes and for the good of the for which it is held. The rule is that
citizens in their aggregate or public property held for public uses, such as
capacity. That they may properly public buildings, streets, squares
discharge such public functions parks, promenades, wharves, landing
corporate property and revenues are places fire engines, hose and hose
P a g e | 26
carriages, engine houses, public order to become private property of the city;
markets, hospitals, cemeteries, and wherefore the company could not levy
generally everything held for execution upon the wharf in order to collect
governmental purposes, is not subject the amount of the judgment rendered in favor
to levy and sale under execution thereof.
against such corporation. The rule also
applies to funds in the hands of a In the case of Klein vs. City of New Orleans (98
public officer. Likewise it has been held U. S., 149; 25 Law. ed., 430), the Supreme
that taxes due to a municipal Court of the United States that a public wharf
corporation or country cannot be seized on the banks of the Mississippi River was
under execution by a creditor of such public property and not subject to execution
corporation. But where a municipal for the payment of a debt of the City of New
corporation or country owns in its Orleans where said wharf was located.
proprietary, as distinguished from its
public or governmental capacity, In this case a parcel of land adjacent to the
property not useful or used for a public Mississippi River, which formerly was the
purpose but for quasi private purposes, shore of the river and which later enlarged
the general rule is that such property itself by accession, was converted into a wharf
may be seized and sold under execution by the city for public use, who charged a
against the corporation, precisely as certain fee for its use.
similar property of individuals is seized
and sold. But property held for public It was held that the land was public property
purposes is not subject to execution as necessary as a public street and was not
merely because it is temporarily used subject to execution on account of the debts of
for private purposes, although if the the city. It was further held that the fees
public use is wholly abandoned it collected where also exempt from execution
becomes subject to execution. Whether because they were a part of the income of the
or not property held as public property city.
is necessary for the public use is a
political, rather than a judicial In the case of Tufexis vs. Olaguera and
question. Municipal Council of Guinobatan (32 Phil.,
654), the question raised was whether for the
In the case of City of New Orleans vs. payment of a debt to a third person by the
Louisiana Construction Co., Ltd. (140 U. S., concessionaire of a public market, the said
654; 35 Law. ed., 556), it was held that a public market could be attached and sold at
wharf for unloading sugar and molasses, open public auction. The Supreme Court held that:
to the public, was property for the public use
of the City of New Orleans and was not subject Even though a creditor is
to attachment for the payment of the debts of unquestionably entitled to recover out
the said city. of his debtor's property, yet when
among such property there is included
In that case it was proven that the said wharf the special right granted by the
was a parcel of land adjacent to the Government of usufruct in a building
Mississippi River where all shipments of sugar intended for a public service, and when
and molasses taken to New Orleans were this privilege is closely related to a
unloaded. service of a public character, such right
of the creditor to the collection of a debt
That city leased the said wharf to the owed him by the debtor who enjoys the
Louisiana Construction Company, Ltd., in said special privilege of usufruct in a
order that it might erect warehouses so that public market is not absolute and may
the merchandise upon discharge might not be be exercised only through the action of
spoiled by the elements. The said company court of justice with respect to the
was given the privilege of charging certain fees profits or revenue obtained under the
for storing merchandise in the said special right of usufruct enjoyed by
warehouses and the public in general had the debtor.
right to unload sugar and molasses there by
paying the required fees, 10 per cent of which The special concession of the right of
was turned over to the city treasury. usufruct in a public market cannot be
attached like any ordinary right,
The United States Supreme Court on an because that would be to permit a
appeal held that the wharf was public person who has contracted with the
property, that it never ceased to be such in state or with the administrative officials
P a g e | 27
thereof to conduct and manage a administrative agencies for the state,

service of a public character, to be and to provide for the police and local
substituted, without the knowledge and government of certain designated civil
consent of the administrative divisions of its territory. To this end
authorities, by one who took no part in they are invested with certain
the contract, thus giving rise to the governmental powers and charged with
possibility of the regular course of a civil, political, and municipal duties. To
public service being disturbed by the enable them beneficially to exercise
more or less legal action of a grantee, to these powers and discharge these
the prejudice of the state and the public duties, they are clothed with the
interests. authority to raise revenues, chiefly by
taxation, and subordinately by other
The privilege or franchise granted to a modes as by licenses, fines, and
private person to enjoy the usufruct of penalties. The revenue of the public
a public market cannot lawfully be corporation is the essential means by
attached and sold, and a creditor of which it is enabled to perform its
such person can recover his debt only appointed work. Deprived of its regular
out of the income or revenue obtained and adequate supply of revenue, such a
by the debtor from the enjoyment or corporation is practically destroyed and
usufruct of the said privilege, in the the ends of its erection thwarted. Based
same manner that the rights of such upon considerations of this character,
creditors of a railroad company can be it is the settled doctrine of the law that
exercised and their credit collected only only the public property but also the
out of the gross receipts remaining after taxes and public revenues of such
deduction has been made therefrom of corporations cannot be seized under
the operating expenses of the road. execution against them, either in the
(Law of November 12, 1896, extended to treasury or when in transit to it.
the overseas provinces by the royal Judgments rendered for taxes, and the
order of August 3, 1886.) proceeds of such judgments in the
hands of officers of the law, are not
For the reasons contained in the authorities subject to execution unless so declared
above quoted we believe that this court would by statute. The doctrine of the
have reached the same conclusion if the inviolability of the public revenues by
debtor had been municipality of Guinobatan the creditor is maintained, although the
and the public market had been levied upon corporation is in debt, and has no
by virtue of the execution. means of payment but the taxes which
it is authorized to collect.
It is evident that the movable and immovable
property of a municipality, necessary for Another error assigned by counsel for
governmental purpose, may not be attached appellant is the holding of the court a quo that
and sold for the payment of a judgment the proper remedy for collecting the judgment
against the municipality. The supreme reason in favor of the plaintiff was by way or
for this rule is the character of the public use mandamus.
to which such kind of property is devoted. The
necessity for government service justifies that While this question is not necessarily included
the property of public of the municipality be in the one which is the subject of this appeal,
exempt from execution just as it is necessary yet we believe that the holding of the court,
to exempt certain property of private assigned as error by appellant's counsel, is
individuals in accordance with section 452 of true when, after a judgment is rendered
the Code of Civil Procedure. against a municipality, it has no property
subject to execution. This doctrine is
Even the municipal income, according to the maintained by Dillon (Municipal Corporations,
above quoted authorities, is exempt from levy vol. 4, par. 1507, 5th ed.) based upon the
and execution. In volume 1, page 467, decisions of several States of the Union
Municipal Corporations by Dillon we find that: upholding the same principle and which are
cited on page 2679 of the aforesaid work. In
Municipal corporations are instituted this sense this assignment of error, we believe,
by the supreme authority of a state for is groundless.
the public good. They exercise, by
delegation from the legislature, a By virtue of all the foregoing, the judgment
portion of the sovereign power. The appealed from should be and is hereby
main object of their creation is to act as
P a g e | 28
affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ................................................

ordered. 3
Hospital Site
................................................
Avanceña, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, 3
Leprosarium
Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real., JJ.,
................................................
concur. 1
Curuan School
................................................
1
Trade School
18 EN BANC ................................................
2
Burleigh School
G.R. No. L-24440 March 28, 1968 ................................................
2
High School Playground
THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL ................................................
NORTE, plaintiff-appellee, 9
Burleighs
vs. ................................................
CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, SECRETARY OF 1
Hydro-Electric Site (Magay)
FINANCE and COMMISSIONER OF
................................................
INTERNAL REVENUE,defendants- 1
San Roque
appellants.
................................................
23
Fortugaleza, Lood, Sarmiento, M. T. Yap & vacant
Associates for plaintiff-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for It appears that in 1945, the capital of
defendants-appellants. Zamboanga Province was transferred to
Dipolog. 2 Subsequently, or on June 16, 1948,
BENGZON, J.P., J.: Republic Act 286 was approved creating the
municipality of Molave and making it the
Prior to its incorporation as a chartered capital of Zamboanga Province.
city, the Municipality of Zamboanga used to
be the provincial capital of the then On May 26, 1949, the Appraisal
Zamboanga Province. On October 12, 1936, Committee formed by the Auditor General,
Commonwealth Act 39 was approved pursuant to Commonwealth Act 39, fixed the
converting the Municipality of Zamboanga into value of the properties and buildings in
Zamboanga City. Sec. 50 of the Act also question left by Zamboanga Province in
provided that — Zamboanga City at P1,294,244.00. 3
Buildings and properties which On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was
the province shall abandon upon the approved dividing the province of Zamboanga
transfer of the capital to another place into two (2): Zamboanga del Norte and
will be acquired and paid for by the City Zamboanga del Sur. As to how the assets and
of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by obligations of the old province were to be
the Auditor General. divided between the two new ones, Sec. 6 of
that law provided:
The properties and buildings referred to
consisted of 50 lots and some buildings Upon the approval of this Act,
constructed thereon, located in the City of the funds, assets and other properties
Zamboanga and covered individually by and the obligations of the province of
Torrens certificates of title in the name of Zamboanga shall be divided equitably
Zamboanga Province. As far as can be gleaned between the Province of Zamboanga del
from the records, 1 said properties were being Norte and the Province of Zamboanga
utilized as follows — del Sur by the President of the
Philippines, upon the recommendation
No. of the Auditor General.
of Use
Lots Pursuant thereto, the Auditor General,
on January 11, 1955, apportioned the assets
................................................
1 and obligations of the defunct Province of
Capitol Site
Zamboanga as follows: 54.39% for Zamboanga
................................................ del Norte and 45.61% for Zamboanga del Sur.
3
School Site Zamboanga del Norte therefore became
entitled to 54.39% of P1,294,244.00, the total
P a g e | 29
value of the lots and buildings in question, or prayed that: (a) Republic Act 3039 be declared
P704,220.05 payable by Zamboanga City. unconstitutional for depriving plaintiff
province of property without due process and
On March 17, 1959, the Executive just compensation; (b) Plaintiff's rights and
Secretary, by order of the President, issued a obligations under said law be declared; (c) The
ruling 4 holding that Zamboanga del Norte had Secretary of Finance and the Internal Revenue
a vested right as owner (should be co- Commissioner be enjoined from reimbursing
owner pro-indiviso) of the properties the sum of P57,373.46 to defendant City; and
mentioned in Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act (d) The latter be ordered to continue paying
39, and is entitled to the price thereof, payable the balance of P704,220.05 in quarterly
by Zamboanga City. This ruling revoked the installments of 25% of its internal revenue
previous Cabinet Resolution of July 13, 1951 allotments.
conveying all the said 50 lots and buildings
thereon to Zamboanga City for P1.00, effective On June 4, 1962, the lower court
as of 1945, when the provincial capital of the ordered the issuance of preliminary injunction
then Zamboanga Province was transferred to as prayed for. After defendants filed their
Dipolog. respective answers, trial was held. On August
12, 1963, judgment was rendered, the
The Secretary of Finance then dispositive portion of which reads:
authorized the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue to deduct an amount equal to 25% of WHEREFORE, judgment is
the regular internal revenue allotment for the hereby rendered declaring Republic Act
City of Zamboanga for the quarter ending No. 3039 unconstitutional insofar as it
March 31, 1960, then for the quarter ending deprives plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte
June 30, 1960, and again for the first quarter of its private properties, consisting of
of the fiscal year 1960-1961. The deductions, 50 parcels of land and the
all aggregating P57,373.46, was credited to improvements thereon under
the province of Zamboanga del Norte, in certificates of title (Exhibits "A" to "A-
partial payment of the P764,220.05 due it. 49") in the name of the defunct
province of Zamboanga; ordering
However, on June 17, 1961, Republic defendant City of Zamboanga to pay to
Act 3039 was approved amending Sec. 50 of the plaintiff the sum of P704,220.05
Commonwealth Act 39 by providing that — payment thereof to be deducted from its
regular quarterly internal revenue
All buildings, properties and allotment equivalent to 25% thereof
assets belonging to the former province every quarter until said amount shall
of Zamboanga and located within the have been fully paid; ordering
City of Zamboanga are hereby defendant Secretary of Finance to direct
transferred, free of charge, in favor of defendant Commissioner of Internal
the said City of Zamboanga. (Stressed Revenue to deduct 25% from the
for emphasis). regular quarterly internal revenue
allotment for defendant City of
Consequently, the Secretary of Finance, Zamboanga and to remit the same to
on July 12, 1961, ordered the Commissioner plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte until said
of Internal Revenue to stop from effecting sum of P704,220.05 shall have been
further payments to Zamboanga del Norte and fully paid; ordering plaintiff Zamboanga
to return to Zamboanga City the sum of del Norte to execute through its proper
P57,373.46 taken from it out of the internal officials the corresponding public
revenue allotment of Zamboanga del Norte. instrument deeding to defendant City of
Zamboanga City admits that since the Zamboanga the 50 parcels of land and
enactment of Republic Act 3039, P43,030.11 the improvements thereon under the
of the P57,373.46 has already been returned certificates of title (Exhibits "A" to "A-
to it. 49") upon payment by the latter of the
aforesaid sum of P704,220.05 in full;
This constrained plaintiff-appellee dismissing the counterclaim of
Zamboanga del Norte to file on March 5, 1962, defendant City of Zamboanga; and
a complaint entitled "Declaratory Relief with declaring permanent the preliminary
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction" in the mandatory injunction issued on June
Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del 8, 1962, pursuant to the order of the
Norte against defendants-appellants Court dated June 4, 1962. No costs are
Zamboanga City, the Secretary of Finance and assessed against the defendants.
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It was
P a g e | 30
It is SO ORDERED. provincial roads, city streets, municipal

streets, the squares, fountains, public
Subsequently, but prior to the waters, promenades, and public works
perfection of defendants' appeal, plaintiff for public service paid for by said
province filed a motion to reconsider praying provinces, cities, or municipalities.
that Zamboanga City be ordered instead to
pay the P704,220.05 in lump sum with 6% All other property possessed by any of
interest per annum. Over defendants' them is patrimonial and shall be
opposition, the lower court granted plaintiff governed by this Code, without
province's motion. prejudice to the provisions of special
laws. (Stressed for emphasis).
The defendants then brought the case
before Us on appeal. Applying the above cited norm, all the
properties in question, except the two (2) lots
Brushing aside the procedural point used as High School playgrounds, could be
concerning the property of declaratory relief considered as patrimonial properties of the
filed in the lower court on the assertion that former Zamboanga province. Even the capital
the law had already been violated and that site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and
plaintiff sought to give it coercive effect, since the school sites will be considered patrimonial
assuming the same to be true, the Rules for they are not for public use. They would fall
anyway authorize the conversion of the under the phrase "public works for public
proceedings to an ordinary action, 5 We service" for it has been held that under
proceed to the more important and principal the ejusdem generis rule, such public works
question of the validity of Republic Act 3039. must be for free and indiscriminate use by
anyone, just like the preceding enumerated
The validity of the law ultimately properties in the first paragraph of Art
depends on the nature of the 50 lots and 424. 7 The playgrounds, however, would fit
buildings thereon in question. For, the matter into this category.
involved here is the extent of legislative control
over the properties of a municipal corporation, This was the norm applied by the lower
of which a province is one. The principle itself court. And it cannot be said that its actuation
is simple: If the property is owned by the was without jurisprudential precedent for
municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in Municipality of Catbalogan v. Director of
in its public and governmental capacity, the Lands, 8 and in Municipality of Tacloban v.
property is public and Congress has absolute Director of Lands, 9 it was held that the capitol
control over it. But if the property is owned in site and the school sites in municipalities
its private or proprietary capacity, then it is constitute their patrimonial properties. This
patrimonial and Congress has no absolute result is understandable because, unlike in
control. The municipality cannot be deprived the classification regarding State properties,
of it without due process and payment of just properties for public service in the
compensation. 6 municipalities are not classified as public.
Assuming then the Civil Code classification to
The capacity in which the property is be the chosen norm, the lower court must be
held is, however, dependent on the use to affirmed except with regard to the two (2) lots
which it is intended and devoted. Now, which used as playgrounds.
of two norms, i.e., that of the Civil Code or
that obtaining under the law of Municipal On the other hand, applying the norm
Corporations, must be used in classifying the obtaining under the principles constituting
properties in question? the law of Municipal Corporations, all those of
the 50 properties in question which are
The Civil Code classification is devoted to public service are deemed public;
embodied in its Arts. 423 and 424 which the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm,
provide:1äwphï1.ñët to be considered public, it is enough that the
property be held and, devoted for
ART. 423. The property of governmental purposes like local
provinces, cities, and municipalities is administration, public education, public
divided into property for public use and health, etc. 10
patrimonial property.
Supporting jurisprudence are found in
ART. 424. Property for public the following cases: (1) HINUNANGAN V.
use, in the provinces, cities, and DIRECTOR OF LANDS, 11where it was stated
municipalities, consists of the that "... where the municipality has occupied
P a g e | 31
lands distinctly for public purposes, such as .................. .................. Scho

for the municipal court house, the public 540 17
.................. .................. ol
school, the public market, or other necessary 6 1
.. .. Site
municipal building, we will, in the absence of High
proof to the contrary, presume a grant from Scho
the States in favor of the municipality; but, as .................. ..................
556 16 ol
indicated by the wording, that rule may be .................. ..................
4 8 Play-
invoked only as to property which is used .. ..
groun
distinctly for public purposes...." (2) VIUDA d
DE TANTOCO V. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF
ILOILO 12 held that municipal properties 15
.................. .................. Trade
necessary for governmental purposes are 556 7&
.................. .................. Scho
public in nature. Thus, the auto trucks used 7 15
.. .. ol
by the municipality for street sprinkling, the 8
police patrol automobile, police stations and High
concrete structures with the corresponding Scho
.................. ..................
lots used as markets were declared exempt 558 16 ol
.................. ..................
from execution and attachment since they 3 7 Play-
.. ..
were not patrimonial properties. (3) groun
MUNICIPALITY OF BATANGAS VS. d
CANTOS 13 held squarely that a municipal lot Curu
.................. (O. ..................
which had always been devoted to school 618 an
.................. C.T ..................
purposes is one dedicated to public use and is 1 Scho
.. .) ..
not patrimonial property of a municipality. ol
.................. .................. Lepro
Following this classification, Republic 119 92
.................. .................. sariu
Act 3039 is valid insofar as it affects the lots 42 6
.. .. m
used as capitol site, school sites and its .................. .................. Lepro
grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites and 119 92
.................. .................. sariu
the high school playground sites — a total of 43 7
.. .. m
24 lots — since these were held by the former
Zamboanga province in its governmental .................. .................. Lepro
119 92
capacity and therefore are subject to the .................. .................. sariu
44 5
absolute control of Congress. Said lots .. .. m
considered as public property are the Burle
.................. ..................
following: 555 17 igh
.................. ..................
7 0 Scho
.. ..
TC ol
T Burle
.................. ..................
Nu Lot Number Use 556 18 igh
.................. ..................
mb 2 0 Scho
.. ..
er ol
.................. .................. Capit .................. ..................
220 556 17 Burle
.................. 4-B .................. ol .................. ..................
0 5 2-B igh
.. .. Site .. ..
.................. .................. Scho .................. ..................
281 14 557 17 Burle
.................. .................. ol .................. ..................
6 9 0 1-A igh
.. .. Site .. ..
.................. .................. Hospi .................. ..................
328 12 557 17 Burle
.................. .................. tal .................. ..................
1 24 1 2-C igh
.. .. Site .. ..
.................. .................. Hospi .................. ..................
328 12 557 17 Burle
.................. .................. tal .................. ..................
2 26 2 4 igh
.. .. Site .. ..
.................. .................. Hospi .................. ..................
328 12 557 17 Burle
.................. .................. tal .................. ..................
3 25 3 8 igh
.. .. Site .. ..
.................. 43 .................. Scho .................. ..................
374 558 17 Burle
.................. 4- .................. ol .................. ..................
8 5 1-B igh
.. A-1 .. Site .. ..
P a g e | 32
.................. .................. 13 12 San

558 17 Burle ................... ...................
.................. .................. 19 7- Roqu
6 3 igh ................... ...................
.. .. 8 0 e
.................. .................. 55 ................... 16 ................... Burle
558 17 Burle
.................. .................. 69 ................... 9 ................... igh 15
7 2-A igh
.. .. 55 ................... 17 ................... Vaca
58 ................... 5 ................... nt
We noticed that the eight Burleigh lots 55 ................... 18 ...................
above described are adjoining each other and "
59 ................... 8 ...................
in turn are between the two lots wherein the
55 ................... 18 ...................
Burleigh schools are built, as per records "
60 ................... 3 ...................
appearing herein and in the Bureau of Lands.
Hence, there is sufficient basis for holding 55 ................... 18 ...................
"
that said eight lots constitute the appurtenant 61 ................... 6 ...................
grounds of the Burleigh schools, and partake 55 ................... 19 ...................
"
of the nature of the same. 63 ................... 1 ...................
55 ................... 17 ...................
"
Regarding the several buildings existing 66 ................... 6 ...................
on the lots above-mentioned, the records do 55 ................... 17 ...................
not disclose whether they were constructed at "
68 ................... 9 ...................
the expense of the former Province of
55 ................... 19 ...................
Zamboanga. Considering however the fact that "
74 ................... 6 ...................
said buildings must have been erected even
before 1936 when Commonwealth Act 39 was 18
55 ................... ...................
enacted and the further fact that provinces 1- "
75 ................... ...................
then had no power to authorize construction A
of buildings such as those in the case at 18
55 ................... ...................
bar at their own expense, 14 it can be assumed 1- "
76 ................... ...................
that said buildings were erected by the B
National Government, using national funds. 55 ................... 18 ...................
Hence, Congress could very well dispose of "
78 ................... 2 ...................
said buildings in the same manner that it did
55 ................... 19 ...................
with the lots in question. "
79 ................... 7 ...................
But even assuming that provincial 55 ................... 19 ...................
"
funds were used, still the buildings constitute 80 ................... 5 ...................
mere accessories to the lands, which are 15
55 ................... ...................
public in nature, and so, they follow the 9- "
81 ................... ...................
nature of said lands, i.e., public. Moreover, B
said buildings, though located in the city, will 55 ................... 19 ...................
"
not be for the exclusive use and benefit of city 82 ................... 4 ...................
residents for they could be availed of also by 55 ................... 19 ...................
the provincial residents. The province then — "
84 ................... 0 ...................
and its successors-in-interest — are not really
55 ................... 18 ...................
deprived of the benefits thereof. "
88 ................... 4 ...................
But Republic Act 3039 cannot be 55 ................... 18 ...................
"
applied to deprive Zamboanga del Norte of its 89 ................... 7 ...................
share in the value of the rest of the 26 55 ................... 18 ...................
"
remaining lots which are patrimonial 90 ................... 9 ...................
properties since they are not being utilized for 55 ................... 19 ...................
distinctly, governmental purposes. Said lots "
91 ................... 2 ...................
are: 55 ................... 19 ...................
"
92 ................... 3 ...................
TCT Number Lot Number Use 55 ................... 18 ...................
Mydr "
93 ................... 5 ...................
55 ................... 17 ................... o, 73 ................... 41 ...................
77 ................... 7 ................... Maga "
79 ................... 47 ...................
y
Moreover, the fact that these 26 lots
are registered strengthens the proposition that
P a g e | 33
they are truly private in nature. On the other the Appraisal Committee formed by the
hand, that the 24 lots used for governmental Auditor General.
purposes are also registered is of no
significance since registration cannot convert Plaintiff's share, however, cannot be
public property to private. 16 paid in lump sum, except as to the
P43,030.11 already returned to defendant
We are more inclined to uphold this City. The return of said amount to defendant
latter view. The controversy here is more along was without legal basis. Republic Act 3039
the domains of the Law of Municipal took effect only on June 17, 1961 after a
Corporations — State vs. Province — than partial payment of P57,373.46 had already
along that of Civil Law. Moreover, this Court is been made. Since the law did not provide for
not inclined to hold that municipal property retroactivity, it could not have validly affected
held and devoted to public service is in the a completed act. Hence, the amount of
same category as ordinary private property. P43,030.11 should be immediately returned
The consequences are dire. As ordinary by defendant City to plaintiff province. The
private properties, they can be levied upon remaining balance, if any, in the amount of
and attached. They can even be acquired thru plaintiff's 54.39% share in the 26 lots should
adverse possession — all these to the then be paid by defendant City in the same
detriment of the local community. Lastly, the manner originally adopted by the Secretary of
classification of properties other than those for Finance and the Commissioner of Internal
public use in the municipalities as patrimonial Revenue, and not in lump sum. Plaintiff's
under Art. 424 of the Civil Code — is "... prayer, particularly pars. 5 and 6, read
without prejudice to the provisions of special together with pars. 10 and 11 of the first
laws." For purpose of this article, the cause of action recited in the
principles, obtaining under the Law of complaint 17clearly shows that the relief
Municipal Corporations can be considered as sought was merely the continuance of the
"special laws". Hence, the classification of quarterly payments from the internal revenue
municipal property devoted for distinctly allotments of defendant City. Art. 1169 of the
governmental purposes as public should Civil Code on reciprocal obligations invoked by
prevail over the Civil Code classification in this plaintiff to justify lump sum payment is
particular case. inapplicable since there has been so far in
legal contemplation no complete delivery of
Defendants' claim that plaintiff and its the lots in question. The titles to the registered
predecessor-in-interest are "guilty of laches is lots are not yet in the name of defendant
without merit. Under Commonwealth Act 39, Zamboanga City.
Sec. 50, the cause of action in favor of the
defunct Zamboanga Province arose only in WHEREFORE, the decision appealed
1949 after the Auditor General fixed the value from is hereby set aside and another judgment
of the properties in question. While in 1951, is hereby entered as follows:.
the Cabinet resolved transfer said properties
practically for free to Zamboanga City, a (1) Defendant Zamboanga City is hereby
reconsideration thereof was seasonably ordered to return to plaintiff Zamboanga del
sought. In 1952, the old province was Norte in lump sum the amount of P43,030.11
dissolved. As successor-in-interest to more which the former took back from the latter out
than half of the properties involved, of the sum of P57,373.46 previously paid to
Zamboanga del Norte was able to get a the latter; and
reconsideration of the Cabinet Resolution in
1959. In fact, partial payments were effected (2) Defendants are hereby ordered to
subsequently and it was only after the effect payments in favor of plaintiff of whatever
passage of Republic Act 3039 in 1961 that the balance remains of plaintiff's 54.39% share in
present controversy arose. Plaintiff brought the 26 patrimonial properties, after deducting
suit in 1962. All the foregoing, negative therefrom the sum of P57,373.46, on the basis
laches. of Resolution No. 7 dated March 26, 1949 of
the Appraisal Committee formed by the
It results then that Zamboanga del Auditor General, by way of quarterly payments
Norte is still entitled to collect from the City of from the allotments of defendant City, in the
Zamboanga the former's 54.39% share in the manner originally adopted by the Secretary of
26 properties which are patrimonial in nature, Finance and the Commissioner of Internal
said share to computed on the basis of the Revenue. No costs. So ordered.
valuation of said 26 properties as contained in
Resolution No. 7, dated March 26, 1949, of Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and
P a g e | 34
Fernando, JJ., concur. the City of Manila which he

Concepcion, C.J., is on leave. cancelled, if that is feasible, or
issue a new certificate of title for
EN BANC the same parcel of land in the
19 name of the City of Manila.1
The facts necessary for a clear understanding

G.R. No. L-29788 August 30, 1972 of this case are as follows:
RAFAEL S. SALAS, in his capacity as On February 24, 1919, the 4th Branch of the
Executive Secretary; CONRADO F. Court of First Instance of Manila, acting as a
ESTRELLA, in his capacity as Governor of land registration court, rendered judgment in
the Land Authority; and LORENZO GELLA, Case No. 18, G.L.R.O. Record No. 111,
in his capacity as Register of Deeds of declaring the City of Manila the owner in fee
Manila, petitioners-appellants, simple of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 1,
vs. Block 557 of the Cadastral Survey of the City
HON. HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding of Mani1a, containing an area of 9,689.8
Judge of Branch XXIII, Court of First square meters, more or less. Pursuant to said
Instance of Manila; ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, judgment the Register of Deeds of Manila on
in his capacity as Mayor of the City of August 21, 1920, issued in favor of the City of
Manila; and the CITY OF Manila, Original Certificate of Title No. 4329
MANILA, respondents-appellees. covering the aforementioned parcel of land.
On various dates in 1924, the City of Manila
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. sold portions of the aforementioned parcel of
Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor-General Antonio land in favor of Pura Villanueva. As a
A. Torres, Solicitor Raul I. Goco and Magno B. consequence of the transactions Original
Pablo & Cipriano A. Tan, Legal Staff, Land Certificate of Title No. 4329 was cancelled and
Authority for petitioners-appellants. transfer certificates of title were issued in
favor of Pura Villanueva for the portions
Gregorio A. Ejercito and Felix C. Chavez for purchased by her. When the last sale to Pura
respondents-appellees. Villanueva was effected on August 22, 1924,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21974 in the
name of the City of Manila was cancelled and
in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 22547 covering the residue thereof
ESGUERRA, J.:p
known as Lot 1-B-2-B of Block 557, with an
area of 7,490.10 square meters, was issued in
This is a petition for review of the decision of the name of the City of Manila.
the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch
XXIII, in Civil Case No. 67946, dated
On September 21, 1960, the Municipal Board
September 23, 1968, the dispositive portion of
of Manila, presided by then Vice-Mayor
which is as follows:
Antono J. Villegas, adopted a resolution
requesting His Excellency, the President of the
WHEREFORE, the Court renders Philippines to consider the feasibility of
judgment declaring Republic Act declaring the City property bounded by
No. 4118 unconstitutional and Florida, San Andres, and Nebraska Streets,
invalid in that it deprived the under Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 25545
City of Manila of its property and 22547, containing a total area of 7,450
without due process and square meters as a patrimonial property of the
payment of just compensation. City of Manila for the purpose of reselling
Respondent Executive Secretary these lots to the actual occupants thereof.2
and Governor of the Land
Authority are hereby restrained
The said resolution of the Municipil Board of
and enjoined from implementing
the City of Manila was officially transmitted to
the provisions of said law.
the President of the Philippines by then Vice-
Respondent Register of Deeds of
Mayor Antonio J. Villegas on September 21,
the City of Manila is ordered to
1960, with the information that the same
cancel Transfer Certificate of
resolution was, on the same date, transmitted
Title No. 80876 which he had
to the Senate and House of Representatives of
issued in the name of the Land
the Congress of the Philippines.3
Tenure Administration and
reinstate Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 22547 in the name of
P a g e | 35
During the First Session of the Fifth Congress the President of the Philippines
of the Philippines, House Bill No. 191 was filed and Congress of the Philippines
in the House of Representatives by then the feasibility of declaring this
Congressman Bartolome Cabangbang seeking property into disposable or
to declare the property in question as alienable property of the State.
patrimonial property of the City of Manila, and There is therefore a precedent
for other purposes. The explanatory note of that this parcel of land could be
the Bill gave the grounds for its enactment, to subdivided and sold to bona fide
wit: occupants. This parcel of land
will not serve any useful public
In the particular case of the project because it is bounded on
property subject of this bill, the all sides by private properties
City of Manila does not seem to which were formerly parts of this
have use thereof as a public lot in question.
communal property. As a matter
of fact, a resolution was adopted Approval of this bill will
by the Municipal Board of Manila implement the policy of the
at its regular session held on Administration of land for the
September 21, 1960, to request landless and the Fifth
the feasibility of declaring the Declaration of Principles of the
city property bounded by Florida, Constitution, which states that
San Andres and Nebraska the promotion of Social Justice
Streets as a patrimonial to insure the well-being and
property of the City of Manila for economic security of all people
the purpose of reselling these should be the concern of the
lots to the actual occupants State. We are ready and willing
thereof. Therefore, it will be to to enact legislation promoting
the best interest of society that the social and economic well-
the said property be used in one being of the people whenever an
way or another. Since this opportunity for enacting such
property has been occupied for a kind of legislation arises.
long time by the present
occupants thereof and since said In view of the foregoing consideration and to
occupants have expressed their insure fairness and justice to the present bona
willingness to buy the said fide occupants thereof, approval of this Bill is
property, it is but proper that the strongly urged.5
same be sold to them.4
The Bill having been passed by the House of
Subsequently, a revised version of the Bill was Representatives, the same was thereafter sent
introduced in the House of Representatives by to the Senate where it was thoroughly
Congressmen Manuel Cases, Antonio Raquiza discussed, as evidenced by the Congressional
and Nicanor Yñiguez as House Bill No. 1453, Records for May 20, 1964, pertinent portion of
with the following explanatory note: which is as follows:
The accompanying bill seeks to SENATOR FERNANDEZ: Mr.

convert one (1) parcel of land in President, it will be re called that
the district of Malate, which is when the late Mayor Lacson was
reserved as communal property still alive, we approved a similar
into a disposable or alienable bill. But afterwards, the late
property of the State and to Mayor Lacson came here and
provide its subdivision and sale protested against the approval,
to bona fide occupants or and the approval was
tenants. reconsidered. May I know
whether the defect in the bill
This parcel of land in question which we approved, has already
was originally an aggregate part been eliminated in this present
of a piece of land with an area of bill?
9,689.8 square meters, more or
less. ... On September 21, 1960, SENATOR TOLENTINO: I
the Municipal Board of Manila in understand Mr. President, that
its regular session unanimously that has already been eliminated
adopted a resolution requesting and that is why the City of
P a g e | 36
Manila has no more objection to further, That in the event of lease

this bill. the rentals which may be
charged shall not exceed eight
SENATOR FERNANDEZ: Mr. per cent per annum of the
President, in view of that assessed value of the property
manifestation and considering leased: And provided, finally,
that Mayor Villegas and That in fixing the price of each
Congressman Albert of the lot, which shall not exceed
Fourth District of Manila are in twenty pesos per square meter,
favor of the bill. I would not want the cost of subdivision and
to pretend to know more what is survey shall not be included.
good for the City of Manila.
Sec. 2. Upon approval of this Act
SENATOR TOLENTINO: Mr. no ejectment proceedings against
President, there being no any tenant or bona fide occupant
objection, I move that we of the above lots shall be
approve this bill on second instituted and any ejectment
reading. proceedings pending in court
against any such tenant or bona
PRESIDENT PRO-TEMPORE: The fide occupant shall be dismissed
biII is approved on second upon motion of the defendant:
reading after several Senetors Provided, That any demolition
said aye and nobody said nay. order directed against any tenant
or bona fide occupant shall be
The bill was passed by the Senate, approved lifted.
by the President on June 20, 1964, and
became Republic Act No. 4118. It reads as Sec. 3. Upon approval of this Act,
follows: if the tenant or bona
fide occupant is in arrears in the
Lot I-B-2-B of Block 557 of the payment of any rentals, the
cadastral survey of the City of amount legally due shall be
Manila, situated in the District of liquidated and shall be payable
Malate, City of Manila, which is in twenty-four equal monthly
reserved as communal property, installments from the date of
is hereby converted into disposal liquidation.
or alienable land of the State, to
be placed under the disposal of Sec. 4. No property acquired by
the Land Tenure Administration. virtue of this Act shall be
The Land Tenure Administration transferred, sold, mortgaged, or
shall subdivide the property into otherwise disposed of within a
small lots, none of which shall period of five years from the date
exceed one hundred and twenty full ownership thereof has been
square meters in area and sell vested in the purchaser without
the same on installment basis to the consent of the Land Tenure
the tenants or bona fide Administration.
occupants thereof and to
individuals, in the order Sec. 5. In the event of the death
mentioned: Provided, That no of the purchaser prior to the
down payment shall be required complete payment of the price of
of tenants or bona the lot purchased by him, his
fide occupants who cannot afford widow and children shall
to pay such down succeed in all his rights and
payment: Provided, further, That obligations with respect to his
no person can purchase more lot.
than one lot: Provided,
furthermore, That if the tenant Sec. 6. The Chairman of the
or bona fide occupant of any Land Tenure Administration
given lot is not able to purchase shall implement and issue such
the same, he shall be given a rules and regulations as may be
lease from month to month until necessary to carry out the
such time that he is able to provisions of this Act.
purchase the lot: Provided, still
P a g e | 37
Sec. 7. The sum of one hundred But due to reasons which do not appear in the
fifty thousand pesos is record, the City of Manila made a complete
appropriated out of any funds in turn-about, for on December 20, 1966,
the National Treasury not Antonio J. Villegas, in his capacity as the City
otherwise appropriated, to carry Mayor of Manila and the City of Manila as a
out the purposes of this Act. duly organized public corporation, brought an
action for injunction and/or prohibition with
Sec. 8. All laws or parts of laws preliminary injunction to restrain, prohibit
inconsistent with this Act are and enjoin the herein appellants, particularly
repealed or modified accordingly. the Governor of the Land Authority and the
Register of Deeds of Manila, from further
Sec. 9. This Act shall take effect implementing Republic Act No. 4118, and
upon its approval. praying for the declaration of Republic Act No.
4118 as unconstitutional.
Approved, June 20, 1964.
With the foregoing antecedent facts, which are
To implement the provisions of Republic Act all contained in the partial stipulation of facts
No. 4118, and pursuant to the request of the submitted to the trial court and approved by
occupants of the property involved, then respondent Judge, the parties waived the
Deputy Governor Jose V. Yap of the Land presentation of further evidence and
Authority (which succeeded the Land Tenure submitted the case for decision. On September
Administration) addressed a letter, dated 23, 1968, judgment was rendered by the trial
February 18, 1965, to Mayor Antonio Villegas, court declaring Republic Act No. 4118
furnishing him with a copy of the proposed unconstitutional and invalid on the ground
subdivision plan of said lot as prepared for the that it deprived the City of Manila of its
Republic of the Philippines for resale of the property without due process of law and
subdivision lots by the Land Authority to bona payment of just compensation. The
fide applicants.6 respondents were ordered to undo all that had
been done to carry out the provisions of said
On March 2, 1965, the City Mayor of Manila, Act and were restrained from further
through his Executive and Technical Adviser, implementing the same.
acknowledged receipt of the proposed
subdivision plan of the property in question Two issues are presented for determination,
and informed the Land Authority that his on the resolution of which the decision in this
office would interpose no objection to the case hinges, to wit:
implementation of said law, provided that its
provisions be strictly complied with.7 I. Is the property involved private
or patrimonial property of the
With the above-mentioned written conformity City of Manila?
of the City of Manila for the implementation of
Republic Act No. 4118, the Land Authority, II. Is Republic Act No. 4118 valid
thru then Deputy Governor Jose V. Yap, and not repugnant to the
requested the City Treasurer of Manila, thru Constitution?
the City Mayor, for the surrender and delivery
to the former of the owner's duplicate of I.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22547 in order
to obtain title thereto in the name of the Land As regards the first issue, appellants maintain
Authority. The request was duly granted with that the land involved is a communal land or
the knowledge and consent of the Office of the "legua comunal" which is a portion of the
City Mayor.8 public domain owned by the State; that it
came into existence as such when the City of
With the presentation of Transfer Certificate of Manila, or any pueblo or town in the
Title No. 22547, which had been yielded as Philippines for that matter, was founded
above stated by the, City authorities to the under the laws of Spain, the former sovereign;
Land Authority, Transfer Certificate of Title that upon the establishment of a pueblo, the
(T.C.T. No. 22547) was cancelled by the administrative authority was required to allot
Register of Deeds of Manila and in lieu thereof and set aside portions of the public domain for
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 80876 was a public plaza, a church site, a site for public
issued in the name of the Land Tenure buildings, lands to serve as common pastures
Administration (now Land Authority) pursuant and for streets and roads; that in assigning
to the provisions of Republic Act No. these lands some lots were earmarked for
4118.9 strictly public purposes, and ownership of
P a g e | 38
these lots (for public purposes) immediately the land in question as communal, the Courts
passed to the new municipality; that in the certainly owe it to a coordinate branch of the
case of common lands or "legua comunal", Government to respect such determination
there was no such immediate acquisition of and should not interfere with the enforcement
ownership by the pueblo, and the land though of the law.
administered thereby, did not automatically
become its property in the absence of an Upon the other hand, appellees argue by
express grant from the Central Government, simply quoting portions of the appealed
and that the reason for this arrangement is decision of the trial court, which read thus:
that this class of land was not absolutely
needed for the discharge of the municipality's The respondents (petitioners-
governmental functions. appellants herein) contend,
among other defenses, that the
It is argued that the parcel of land involved property in question is
herein has not been used by the City of Manila communal property. This
for any public purpose and had not been contention is, however, disproved
officially earmarked as a site for the erection by Original Certificate of Title No.
of some public buildings; that this 4329 issued on August 21, 1920
circumstance confirms the fact that it was in favor of the City of Manila
originally "communal" land alloted to the City after the land in question was
of Manila by the Central Government not registered in the City's favor. The
because it was needed in connection with its Torrens Title expressly states
organization as a municipality but simply for that the City of Manila was the
the common use of its inhabitants; that the owner in 'fee simple' of the said
present City of Manila as successor of the land. Under Sec. 38 of the Land
Ayuntamiento de Manila under the former Registration Act, as amended,
Spanish sovereign merely enjoys the usufruct the decree of confirmation and
over said land, and its exercise of acts of registration in favor of the City of
ownership by selling parts thereof did not Manila ... shall be conclusive
necessarily convert the land into a patrimonial upon and against all persons
property of the City of Manila nor divest the including the Insular
State of its paramount title. Government and all the
branches there ... There is
Appellants further argue that a municipal nothing in the said certificate of
corporation, like a city is a governmental title indicating that the land was
agent of the State with authority to govern a 'communal' land as contended
limited portion of its territory or to administer by the respondents. The
purely local affairs in a given political erroneous assumption by the
subdivision, and the extent of its authority is Municipal Board of Manila that
strictly delimited by the grant of power the land in question was
conferred by the State; that Congress has the communal land did not make it
exclusive power to create, change or destroy so. The Municipal Board had no
municipal corporations; that even if We admit authority to do that.
that legislative control over municipal
corporations is not absolute and even if it is The respondents, however,
true that the City of Manila has a registered contend that Congress had the
title over the property in question, the mere power and authority to declare
transfer of such land by an act of the that the land in question was
legislature from one class of public land to 'communal' land and the courts
another, without compensation, does not have no power or authority to
invade the vested rights of the City. make a contrary finding. This
contention is not entirely correct
Appellants finally argue that Republic Act No. or accurate. Congress has the
4118 has treated the land involved as one power to classify 'land of the
reserved for communal use, and this public domain', transfer them
classification is conclusive upon the courts; from one classification to
that if the City of Manila feels that this is another and declare them
wrong and its interests have been thereby disposable or not. Such power
prejudiced, the matter should be brought to does not, however, extend to
the attention of Congress for correction; and properties which are owned by
that since Congress, in the exercise of its wide cities, provinces and
discretionary powers has seen fit to classify
P a g e | 39
municipalities in their must either decide

'patrimonial' capacity. that case
conformable to the
Art. 324 of the Civil Code constitution,
provides that properties of disregarding the
provinces, cities and law, the court must
municipalities are divided into determine which of
properties for public use and these conflicting
patrimonial property. Art. 424 of rules governs the
the same code provides that case. This is of the
properties for public use consist very essence of
of provincial roads, city streets, unconstitutional
municipal streets, the squares, judicial duty.
fountains, public waters,
promenades and public works Appellees finally concluded that when the
for public service paid for by said courts declare a law unconstitutional it does
province, cities or municipalities. not mean that the judicial power is superior to
All other property possessed by the legislative power. It simply means that the
any of them is patrimonial. power of the people is superior to both and
Tested by this criterion the Court that when the will of the legislature, declared
finds and holds that the land in in statutes, stands in opposition to that of the
question is patrimonial property people, declared in the Constitution, the
of the City of Manila. judges ought to be governed by the
Constitution rather than by the statutes.
Respondents contend that
Congress has declared the land There is one outstanding factor that should be
in question to be 'communal' borne in mind in resolving the character of the
and, therefore, such designation land involved, and it is that the City of Manila,
is conclusive upon the courts. although declared by the Cadastral Court as
The Courts holds otherwise. owner in fee simple, has not shown by any
When a statute is assailed as shred of evidence in what manner it acquired
unconstitutional the Courts have said land as its private or patrimonial
the power and authority to property. It is true that the City of Manila as
inquire into the question and well as its predecessor, the Ayuntamiento de
pass upon it. This has long ago Manila, could validly acquire property in its
been settled in Marbury vs. corporate or private capacity, following the
Madison, 2 L. ed. 60, when the accepted doctrine on the dual character —
United States Supreme Court public and private — of a municipal
speaking thru Chief Justice corporation. And when it acquires property in
Marshall held: its private capacity, it acts like an ordinary
person capable of entering into contracts or
... If an act of the making transactions for the transmission of
legislature, title or other real rights. When it comes to
repugnant to the acquisition of land, it must have done so
constitution, is under any of the modes established by law for
void, does it, the acquisition of ownership and other real
notwithstanding its rights. In the absence of a title deed to any
validity, bind the land claimed by the City of Manila as its own,
courts, and oblige showing that it was acquired with its private
them to give effect? or corporate funds, the presumption is that
It is emphatically such land came from the State upon the
the province and creation of the municipality (Unson vs.
duty of the judicial Lacson, et al., 100 Phil. 695). Originally the
department to say municipality owned no patrimonial property
what the law is ... except those that were granted by the State
So if a law be in not for its public but for private use. Other
opposition to the properties it owns are acquired in the course
constitution; if both of the exercise of its corporate powers as a
the law and the juridical entity to which category a municipal
constitution apply corporation pertains.
to a particular case,
so that the court
P a g e | 40
Communal lands or "legua comunal" came Ed., p. 197, citing Monagham vs. Armatage,
into existence when a town or pueblo was 218 Minn. 27, 15 N. W. 2nd 241).
established in this country under the laws of
Spain (Law VII, Title III, Book VI, Recopilacion True it is that the legislative control over a
de las Leyes de Indios). The municipalities of municipal corporation is not absolute even
the Philippines were not entitled, as a matter when it comes to its property devoted to public
of right, to any part of the public domain for use, for such control must not be exercised to
use as communal lands. The Spanish law the extent of depriving persons of their
provided that the usufruct of a portion of the property or rights without due process of law,
public domain adjoining municipal territory or in a manner impairing the obligations of
might be granted by the Government for contracts. Nevertheless, when it comes to
communal purposes, upon proper petition, property of the municipality which it did not
but, until granted, no rights therein passed to acquire in its private or corporate capacity
the municipalities, and, in any event, the with its own funds, the legislature can
ultimate title remained in the sovereign (City transfer its administration and disposition to
of Manila vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil. an agency of the National Government to be
327). disposed of according to its discretion. Here it
did so in obedience to the constitutional
For the establishment, then, of mandate of promoting social justice to insure
new pueblos the administrative the well-being and economic security of the
authority of the province, in people.
representation of the Governor
General, designated the territory It has been held that a statute authorizing the
for their location and extension transfer of a Municipal airport to an Airport
and the metes and bounds of the Commission created by the legislature, even
same; and before alloting the without compensation to the city, was not
lands among the new settlers, a violative of the due process clause of the
special demarcation was made of American Federal Constitution. The Supreme
the places which were to serve as Court of Minnessota in Monagham vs.
the public square of the pueblo, Armatage, supra, said:
for the erection of the church,
and as sites for the public ... The case is controlled by the
buildings, among others, the further rule that the legislature,
municipal building or the casa having plenary control of the
real, as well as of the lands local municipality, of its creation
whick were to constitute the and of all its affairs, has the
common pastures, and propios right to authorize or direct the
of the municipality and the expenditures of money in its
streets and roads which were to treasury, though raised, for a
intersect the new town were laid particular purpose, for any
out, ... . (Municipality of legitimate municipal purpose, or
Catbalogan vs. Director of Lands, to order and direct a distribution
17 Phil. 216, 220) (Emphasis thereof upon a division of the
supplied) territory into separate
municipalities ... . The local
It may, therefore, be laid down as a general municipality has no such vested
rule that regardless of the source or right in or to its public funds,
classification of land in the possession of a like that which the Constitution
municipality, excepting those acquired with its protects in the individual as
own funds in its private or corporate capacity, precludes legislative
such property is held in trust for the State for interferences. People vs. Power,
the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for 25 Ill. 187; State Board (of
governmental or proprietary purposes. It holds Education) vs. City, 56 Miss.
such lands subject to the paramount power of 518. As remarked by the
the legislature to dispose of the same, for after supreme court of Maryland
all it owes its creation to it as an agent for the in Mayor vs. Sehner, 37 Md. 180:
performance of a part of its public work, the "It is of the essence of such a
municipality being but a subdivision or corporation, that the government
instrumentality thereof for purposes of local has the sole right as trustee of
administration. Accordingly, the legal the public interest, at its own
situation is the same as if the State itself good will and pleasure, to
holds the property and puts it to a different inspect, regulate, control, and
use (2 McQuilin,Municipal Corporations, 3rd
P a g e | 41
direct the corporation, its funds, Approval of this bill will

and franchises." implement the policy of the
administration of "land for the
We therefore hold that c.500, in landless" and the Fifth
authorizing the transfer of the Declaration of Principles of the
use and possession of the Constitution which states that
municipal airport to the "the promotion of social justice
commission without to insure the well-being and
compensation to the city or to economic security of all people
the park board, does not violate should be the concern of the
the Fourteenth Amendment to State." We are ready and willing
the Constitution of the United to enact legislation promoting
States. the social and economic well-
being of the people whenever an
The Congress has dealt with the land involved opportunity for enacting such
as one reserved for communal use (terreno kind of legislation arises.
comunal). The act of classifying State property
calls for the exercise of wide discretionary The respondent Court held that Republic Act
legislative power and it should not be No. 4118, "by converting the land in question
interfered with by the courts. — which is the patrimonial property of the
City of Manila into disposable alienable land of
This brings Us to the second question as the State and placing it under the disposal of
regards the validity of Republic Act No. 4118, the Land Tenure Administration — violates
viewed in the light of Article III, Sections 1, the provisions of Article III (Secs. 1 and 2) of
subsection (1) and (2) of the Constitution the Constitution which ordain that "private
which ordain that no person shall be deprived property shall not be taken for public use
of his property without due process of law and without just compensation, and that no
that no private property shall be taken for person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
public use without just compensation. property without due process of law". In
support thereof reliance is placed on the
II . ruling in Province of Zamboanga del Norte vs.
City of Zamboanga, G.R. No. 2440, March 28,
The trial court declared Republic Act No. 4118 1968; 22 SCRA 1334, which holds that
unconstitutional for allegedly depriving the Congress cannot deprive a municipality of its
City of Manila of its property without due private or patrimonial property without due
process of law and without payment of just process of law and without payment of just
compensation. It is now well established that compensation since it has no absolute control
the presumption is always in favor of the thereof. There is no quarrel over this rule if it
constitutionality of a law (U S. vs. Ten Yu, 24 is undisputed that the property sought to be
Phil. 1; Go Ching, et al. vs. Dinglasan, et al., taken is in reality a private or patrimonial
45 O.G. No. 2, pp. 703, 705). To declare a law property of the municipality or city. But it
unconstitutional, the repugnancy of that law would be simply begging the question to
to the Constitution must be clear and classify the land in question as such. The
unequivocal, for even if a law is aimed at the property, as has been previously shown, was
attainment of some public good, no not acquired by the City of Manila with its
infringement of constitutional rights is own funds in its private or proprietary
allowed. To strike down a law there must be a capacity. That it has in its name a registered
clear showing that what the fundamental law title is not questioned, but this title should be
condemns or prohibits, the statute allows it to deemed to be held in trust for the State as the
be done (Morfe vs. Mutuc, et al., G.R. No. L- land covered thereby was part of the territory
20387, Jan. 31, 1968; 22 SCRA 424). That of the City of Manila granted by the sovereign
situation does not obtain in this case as the upon its creation. That the National
law assailed does not in any manner trench Government, through the Director of Lands,
upon the constitution as will hereafter be represented by the Solicitor General, in the
shown. Republic Act No. 4118 was intended to cadastral proceedings did not contest the
implement the social justice policy of the claim of the City of Manila that the land is its
Constitution and the Government program of property, does not detract from its character
"Land for the Landless". The explanatory note as State property and in no way divests the
of House Bill No. 1453 which became Republic legislature of its power to deal with it as such,
Act No. 4118, reads in part as follows: the state not being bound by the mistakes
and/or negligence of its officers.
P a g e | 42
One decisive fact that should be noted is that resulting subdivision lots to the occupants by
the City of Manila expressly recognized the Congressional authorization does not operate
paramount title of the State over said land as an exercise of the power of eminent domain
when by its resolution of September 20, 1960, without just compensation in violation of
the Municipal Board, presided by then Vice- Section 1, subsection (2), Article III of the
Mayor Antonio Villegas, requested "His Constitution, but simply as a manifestation of
Excellency the President of the Philippines to its right and power to deal with state property.
consider the feasibility of declaring the city
property bounded by Florida, San Andres and It should be emphasized that the law assailed
Nebraska Streets, under Transfer Certificate of was enacted upon formal written petition of
Title Nos. 25545 and 25547, containing an the Municipal Board of Manila in the form of a
area of 7,450 square meters, as patrimonial legally approved resolution. The certificate of
property of the City of Manila for the purpose title over the property in the name of the City
of reselling these lots to the actual occupants of Manila was accordingly cancelled and
thereof." (See Annex E, Partial Stipulation of another issued to the Land Tenure
Facts, Civil Case No. 67945, CFI, Manila, p. Administration after the voluntary surrender
121, Record of the Case) [Emphasis Supplied] of the City's duplicate certificate of title by the
City Treasurer with the knowledge and
The alleged patrimonial character of the land consent of the City Mayor. To implement the
under the ownership of the City of Manila is provisions of Republic Act No. 4118, the then
totally belied by the City's own official act, Deputy Governor of the Land Authority sent a
which is fatal to its claim since the Congress letter, dated February 18, 1965, to the City
did not do as bidden. If it were its patrimonial Mayor furnishing him with a copy of the
property why should the City of Manila be "proposed subdivision plan of the said lot as
requesting the President to make prepared for the Republic of the Philippines
representation to the legislature to declare it for subdivision and resale by the Land
as such so it can be disposed of in favor of the Authority to bona fide applicants." On March
actual occupants? There could be no more 2, 1965, the Mayor of Manila, through his
blatant recognition of the fact that said land Executive and Technical Adviser,
belongs to the State and was simply granted acknowledged receipt of the subdivision plan
in usufruct to the City of Manila for municipal and informed the Land Authority that his
purposes. But since the City did not actually Office "will interpose no objection to the
use said land for any recognized public implementation of said law provided that its
purpose and allowed it to remain idle and provisions are strictly complied with." The
unoccupied for a long time until it was foregoing sequence of events, clearly indicate a
overrun by squatters, no presumption of State pattern of regularity and observance of due
grant of ownership in favor of the City of process in the reversion of the property to the
Manila may be acquiesced in to justify the National Government. All such acts were done
claim that it is its own private or patrimonial in recognition by the City of Manila of the
property (Municipality of Tigbauan vs. Director right and power of the Congress to dispose of
of Lands, 35 Phil. 798; City of Manila vs. the land involved.
Insular Government, 10 Phil. 327;
Municipality of Luzuriaga vs. Director of Consequently, the City of Manila was not
Lands, 24 Phil. 193). The conclusion of the deprived of anything it owns, either under the
respondent court that Republic Act No. 4118 due process clause or under the eminent
converted a patrimonial property of the City of domain provisions of the Constitution. If it
Manila into a parcel of disposable land of the failed to get from the Congress the concession
State and took it away from the City without it sought of having the land involved given to
compensation is, therefore, unfounded. In the it as its patrimonial property, the Courts
last analysis the land in question pertains to possess no power to grant that relief. Republic
the State and the City of Manila merely acted Act No. 4118 does not, therefore, suffer from
as trustee for the benefit of the people therein any constitutional infirmity.
for whom the State can legislate in the
exercise of its legitimate powers. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby
reversed, and petitioners shall proceed with
Republic Act No. 4118 was never intended to the free and untrammeled implementation of
expropriate the property involved but merely Republic Act No. 4118 without any obstacle
to confirm its character as communal land of from the respondents. Without costs.
the State and to make it available for
disposition by the National Government: And Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar,
this was done at the instance or upon the Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Antonio,
request of the City of Manila itself. The JJ., concur.
subdivision of the land and conveyance of the
P a g e | 43
Barredo and Makasiar, JJ., took no part. intended for public use is considered part of
the public domain and therefore outside the
SECOND DIVISION commerce of man. Consequently, it cannot be
20 subject to registration by any private
individual.5
G.R. No. L40474 August 29, 1975 After hearing the parties, on October 11, 1974
the trial court issued an order dismissing the
CEBU OXYGEN & ACETYLENE CO., petitioner's application for registration of
INC., petitioner, title.6 Hence, the instant petition for review.
vs.
HON. PASCUAL A. BERCILLES Presiding For the resolution of this case, the petitioner
Judge, Branch XV, 14th Judicial District, poses the following questions:
and JOSE L. ESPELETA, Assistant
Provincial Fiscal, Province of Cebu, (1) Does the City Charter of Cebu
representing the Solicitor General's Office City (Republic Act No. 3857)
and the Bureau of Lands, respondents. under Section 31, paragraph 34,
give the City of Cebu the valid
Jose Antonio R Conde for petitioner. right to declare a road as
abandoned? and
Office of the Acting Solicitor General Hugo E.
Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant Solicitor General (2) Does the declaration of the
Octavio R. Ramirez and Trial Attorney David road, as abandoned, make it the
R. Hilario for respondents. . patrimonial property of the City
of Cebu which may be the object
of a common contract?
CONCEPCION, Jr., J.: (1) The pertinent portions of the Revised

Charter of Cebu City provides:
This is a petition for the review of the order of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu dismissing Section 31. Legislative Powers.
petitioner's application for registration of title Any provision of law and
over a parcel of land situated in the City of executive order to the contrary
Cebu. notwithstanding, the City
Council shall have the following
The parcel of land sought to be registered was legislative powers:
only a portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo,
Cebu City. On September 23, 1968, the City xxx xxx xxx
Council of Cebu, through Resolution No.
2193, approved on October 3, 1968, declared (34) ...; to close any city road,
the terminal portion of M. Borces Street, street or alley, boulevard,
Mabolo, Cebu City, as an abandoned road, the avenue, park or square. Property
same not being included in the City thus withdrawn from public
Development Plan.1 Subsequently, on servitude may be used or
December 19, 1968, the City Council of Cebu conveyed for any purpose for
passed Resolution No. 2755, authorizing the which other real property
Acting City Mayor to sell the land through a belonging to the City may be
public bidding.2 Pursuant thereto, the lot was lawfully used or conveyed.
awarded to the herein petitioner being the
highest bidder and on March 3, 1969, the City From the foregoing, it is undoubtedly clear
of Cebu, through the Acting City Mayor, that the City of Cebu is empowered to close a
executed a deed of absolute sale to the herein city road or street. In the case of Favis vs. City
petitioner for a total consideration of of Baguio,7 where the power of the city Council
P10,800.00.3 By virtue of the aforesaid deed of of Baguio City to close city streets and to
absolute sale, the petitioner filed an vacate or withdraw the same from public use
application with the Court of First instance of was similarly assailed, this court said:
Cebu to have its title to the land registered.4
5. So it is, that appellant may
On June 26, 1974, the Assistant Provincial not challenge the city council's
Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss the act of withdrawing a strip of
application on the ground that the property Lapu-Lapu Street at its dead end
sought to be registered being a public road from public use and converting
P a g e | 44
the remainder thereof into an G.R. No. L-61744 June 25, 1984
alley. These are acts well within
the ambit of the power to close a MUNICIPALITY OF SAN MIGUEL,
city street. The city council, it BULACAN, petitioner,
would seem to us, is the vs.
authority competent to HONORABLE OSCAR C. FERNANDEZ, in his
determine whether or not a capacity as the Presiding Judge, Branch IV,
certain property is still necessary Baliuag, Bulacan, The PROVINCIAL
for public use. SHERIFF of Bulacan, MARGARITA D. VDA.
DE IMPERIO, ADORACION IMPERIO,
Such power to vacate a street or RODOLFO IMPERIO, CONRADO IMPERIO,
alley is discretionary. And the ERNESTO IMPERIO, ALFREDO IMPERIO,
discretion will not ordinarily be CARLOS IMPERIO, JR., JUAN IMPERIO and
controlled or interfered with by SPOUSES MARCELO PINEDA and LUCILA
the courts, absent a plain case of PONGCO, respondents.
abuse or fraud or collusion.
Faithfulness to the public trust Pascual C. Liatchko for petitioner.
will be presumed. So the fact
that some private interests may The Solicitor General and Marcelo Pineda for
be served incidentally will not respondents.
invalidate the vacation
ordinance.
(2) Since that portion of the city street subject RELOVA, J.:
of petitioner's application for registration of
title was withdrawn from public use, it follows In Civil Case No. 604-B, entitled "Margarita D.
that such withdrawn portion becomes Vda. de Imperio, et al. vs. Municipal
patrimonial property which can be the object Government of San Miguel, Bulacan, et al.",
of an ordinary contract. the then Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
on April 28, 1978, rendered judgment holding
Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly herein petitioner municipality liable to private
provides that "Property of public dominion, respondents, as follows:
when no longer intended for public use or for
public service, shall form part of the WHEREFORE, premises
patrimonial property of the State." considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs
Besides, the Revised Charter of the City of and against the defendant
Cebu heretofore quoted, in very clear and Municipal Government of San
unequivocal terms, states that: "Property thus Miguel Bulacan, represented by
withdrawn from public servitude may be used Mayor Mar Marcelo G. Aure and
or conveyed for any purpose for which other its Municipal Treasurer:
real property belonging to the City may be
lawfully used or conveyed." 1. ordering the partial revocation
of the Deed of Donation signed
Accordingly, the withdrawal of the property in by the deceased Carlos Imperio
question from public use and its subsequent in favor of the Municipality of
sale to the petitioner is valid. Hence, the San Miguel Bulacan, dated
petitioner has a registerable title over the lot October 27, 1947 insofar as Lots
in question. Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, Block 11 of
Subdivision Plan Psd-20831 are
WHEREFORE, the order dated October 11, concerned, with an aggregate
1974, rendered by the respondent court in total area of 4,646 square
Land Reg. Case No. N-948, LRC Rec. No. N- meters, which lots are among
44531 is hereby set aside, and the respondent those covered and described
court is hereby ordered to proceed with the under TCT No. T-1831 of the
hearing of the petitioner's application for Register of Deeds of Bulacan in
registration of title. the name of the Municipal
Government of San Miguel
SO ORDERED. FIRST DIVISION Bulacan,
2. ordering the defendant to

21
execute the corresponding Deed
P a g e | 45
of Reconveyance over the on June 14, 1982 in G. R. No. L-

aforementioned five lots in favor 59938 and;
of the plaintiffs in the proportion
of the undivided one-half (½) Considering further that there is
share in the name of plaintiffs no opposition to plaintiffs'
Margarita D. Vda. de Imperio, motion for execution dated July
Adoracion, Rodolfo, Conrado, 23, 1983;
Ernesto, Alfredo, Carlos, Jr. and
Juan, all surnamed Imperio, and Let a writ of execution be so
the remaining undivided one-half issued, as prayed for in the
(½) share in favor of plaintiffs aforestated motion. (p. 10, Rollo)
uses Marcelo E. Pineda and
Lucila Pongco; Petitioner, on July 30, 1982, filed a Motion to
Quash the writ of execution on the ground
3. ordering the defendant that the municipality's property or funds are
municipality to pay to the all public funds exempt from execution. The
plaintiffs in the proportion said motion to quash was, however, denied by
mentioned in the immediately the respondent judge in an order dated
preceding paragraph the sum of August 23, 1982 and the alias writ of
P64,440.00 corresponding to the execution stands in full force and effect.
rentals it has collected from the
occupants for their use and On September 13, 1982, respondent judge
occupation of the premises from issued an order which in part, states:
1970 up to and including 1975,
plus interest thereon at the legal It is clear and evident from the
rate from January 1970 until foregoing that defendant has
fully paid; more than enough funds to meet
its judgment obligation.
4. ordering the restoration of Municipal Treasurer Miguel C,
ownership and possession over Roura of San Miguel, Bulacan
the five lots in question in favor and Provincial Treasurer of
of the plaintiffs in the same Bulacan Agustin O. Talavera are
proportion aforementioned; therefor hereby ordered to
comply with the money judgment
5. ordering the defendant to pay rendered by Judge Agustin C.
the plaintiffs the sum of Bagasao against said
P3,000.00 for attomey's fees; and municipality. In like manner, the
to pay the cost of suit. municipal authorities of San
Miguel, Bulacan are likewise
The counterclaim of the ordered to desist from plaintiffs'
defendant is hereby ordered legal possession of the property
dismissed for lack of evidence already returned to plaintiffs by
presented to substantiate the virtue of the alias writ of
same. execution.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 11-12, Rollo) Finally, defendants are hereby

given an inextendible period of
The foregoing judgment became final when ten (10) days from receipt of a
herein petitioner's appeal was dismissed due copy of this order by the Office of
to its failure to file the record on appeal on the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan
time. The dismissal was affirmed by the then within which to submit their
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-12118 written compliance, (p. 24, Rollo)
and by this Court in G.R. No. 59938.
Thereafter, herein private respondents moved When the treasurers (provincial and
for issuance of a writ of execution for the municipal) failed to comply with the order of
satisfaction of the judgment. Respondent September 13, 1982, respondent judge issued
judge, on July 27, 1982, issued an order, to an order for their arrest and that they will be
wit: release only upon compliance thereof.
Considering that an entry of Hence, the present petition on the issue

judgment had already been made whether the funds of the Municipality of San
Miguel, Bulacan, in the hands of the
P a g e | 46
provincial and municipal treasurers of Furthermore, Section 15, Rule 39 of the New
Bulacan and San Miguel, respectively, are Rules of Court, outlines the procedure for the
public funds which are exempt from execution enforcement of money judgment:
for the satisfaction of the money judgment in
Civil Case No. 604-B. (a) By levying on all the property
of the debtor, whether real or
Well settled is the rule that public funds are personal, not otherwise exempt
not subject to levy and execution. The reason from execution, or only on such
for this was explained in the case of part of the property as is
Municipality of Paoay vs. Manaois, 86 Phil. sufficient to satisfy the judgment
629 "that they are held in trust for the people, and accruing cost, if he has more
intended and used for the accomplishment of than sufficient property for the
the purposes for which municipal purpose;
corporations are created, and that to subject
said properties and public funds to execution (b) By selling the property levied
would materially impede, even defeat and in upon;
some instances destroy said purpose." And,
in Tantoco vs. Municipal Council of Iloilo, 49 (c) By paying the judgment-
Phil. 52, it was held that "it is the settled creditor so much of the proceeds
doctrine of the law that not only the public as will satisfy the judgment and
property but also the taxes and public accruing costs; and
revenues of such corporations Cannot be
seized under execution against them, either in (d) By delivering to the judgment-
the treasury or when in transit to it. debtor the excess, if any, unless
Judgments rendered for taxes, and the otherwise, directed by judgment
proceeds of such judgments in the hands of or order of the court.
officers of the law, are not subject to execution
unless so declared by statute." Thus, it is The foregoing has not been followed in the
clear that all the funds of petitioner case at bar.
municipality in the possession of the
Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, as well as ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted and
those in the possession of the Provincial the order of respondent judge, dated July 27,
Treasurer of Bulacan, are also public funds 1982, granting issuance of a writ of execution;
and as such they are exempt from execution. the alias writ of execution, dated July 27,
1982; and the order of respondent judge,
Besides, Presidential Decree No. 477, known dated September 13, 1982, directing the
as "The Decree on Local Fiscal Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan and the
Administration", Section 2 (a), provides: Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, Bulacan
to comply with the money judgments, are SET
SEC. 2. Fundamental Principles. ASIDE; and respondents are hereby enjoined
— Local government financial from implementing the writ of execution.
affairs, transactions, and
operations shall be governed by SO ORDERED.
the fundamental principles set
forth hereunder:
(a) No money shall be paid out of Makalintal, C.J, Fernando, Barredo and
the treasury except in pursuance Aquino, JJ., concur.
of a lawful appropriation or other
specific statutory authority.
EN BANC
22
xxx xxx xxx
G.R. No. L-28379 March 27, 1929
Otherwise stated, there must be a
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE
corresponding appropriation in the form of an
ISLANDS, applicant-appellant,
ordinance duly passed by the Sangguniang
vs.
Bayan before any money of the municipality
CONSORCIA CABANGIS, ET AL., claimants-
may be paid out. In the case at bar, it has not
appellees.
been shown that the Sangguniang Bayan has
passed an ordinance to this effect.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellant.
Abad Santos, Camus & Delgado for appellees.
P a g e | 47
VILLA-REAL, J.: a large parcel of land belonging to the

predecessor of the herein claimants and
The Government of the Philippine Islands appellees. From the year 1896 said land began
appeals to this court from the judgment of the to wear away, due to the action of the waves of
Court of First Instance of Manila in cadastral Manila Bay, until the year 1901 when the said
proceeding No. 373 of the Court of First lots became completely submerged in water in
Instance of Manila, G. L. R. O. Cadastral ordinary tides, and remained in such a state
Record No. 373, adjudicating the title and until 1912 when the Government undertook
decreeing the registration of lots Nos. 36, 39 the dredging of Vitas Estuary in order to
and 40, block 3055 of the cadastral survey of facilitate navigation, depositing all the sand
the City of Manila in favor of Consuelo, and silt taken from the bed of the estuary on
Consorcia, Elvira and Tomas, surnamed the low lands which were completely covered
Cabangis, in equal parts, and dismissing the with water, surrounding that belonging to the
claims presented by the Government of the Philippine Manufacturing Company, thereby
Philippine Islands and the City of Manila. slowly and gradually forming the lots, the
subject matter of this proceeding.
In support of its appeal, the appellant assigns
the following alleged errors as committed by Up to the month of February, 1927 nobody
the trial court in its judgment, to wit: had declared lot 39 for the purposes of
taxation, and it was only in the year 1926 that
1. The lower court erred in not holding Dr. Pedro Gil, in behalf of the claimants and
that the lots in question are of the appellees, declared lot No. 40 for such
public domain, the same having been purpose.
gained from the sea (Manila Bay) by
accession, by fillings made by the In view of the facts just stated, as proved by a
Bureau of Public Works and by the preponderance of the evidence, the question
construction of the break-water (built arises: Who owns lots 36, 39 and 40 in
by the Bureau of Navigation) near the question?
mouth of Vitas Estero.
The claimants-appellees contend that
2. The lower court erred in holding that inasmuch as the said lots once formed a part
the lots in question formed part of the of a large parcel of land belonging to their
big parcel of land belonging to the predecessors, whom they succeeded, and their
spouses Maximo Cabangis and Tita immediate predecessor in interest, Tomas
Andres, and in holding that these Cabangis, having taken possession thereof as
spouses and their successors in soon as they were reclaimed, giving his
interest have been in continuous, permission to some fishermen to dry their
public, peaceful and uninterrupted fishing nets and deposit their bancas thereon,
possession of said lots up to the time said lots belong to them.
this case came up.
Article 339, subsection 1, of the Civil Code,
3. The lower court erred in holding that reads:
said lots existed before, but that due to
the current of the Pasig River and to the Article 339. Property of public
action of the big waves in Manila Bay ownership is —
during the south-west monsoons, the
same disappeared. 1. That devoted to public use, such as
roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
4. The lower court erred in adjudicating and bridges constructed by the State,
the registration of the lands in question riverbanks, shorts, roadsteads, and
in the name of the appellees, and in that of a similar character.
denying the appellant's motion for a
new trial. xxx xxx xxx
A preponderance of the evidence in the record Article 1, case 3, of the Law of Waters of
which may properly be taken into August 3, 1866, provides as follows:
consideration in deciding the case, proves the
following facts: ARTICLE 1. The following are part of
the national domain open to public use:
Lots 36, 39 and 40, block 3035 of cadastral
proceeding No. 71 of the City of Manila, G. L. xxx xxx xxx
R. O. Record No. 373, were formerly a part of
P a g e | 48
3. The Shores. By the shore is competent authority, in 1896 when the waters
understood that space covered and of the sea began to wear it away, in
uncovered by the movement of the tide. accordance with the provisions of Article 29 of
Its interior or terrestrial limit is the line the aforecited Law of Waters of August 3,
reached by the highest equinoctial 1866, and their failure to do so until 1901,
tides. Where the tides are not when a portion of the same became completely
appreciable, the shore begins on the covered by said waters, remaining thus
land side at the line reached by the sea submerged until 1912, constitutes
during ordinary storms or tempests. abandonment.
In the case of Aragon vs. Insular Government Now then: The lots under discussion having
(19 Phil., 223), with reference to article 339 of been reclaimed from the seas as a result of
the Civil Code just quoted, this court said: certain work done by the Government, to
whom do they belong?
We should not be understood, by this
decision, to hold that in a case of gradual The answer to this question is found in article
encroachment or erosion by the ebb and flow 5 of the aforementioned Law of Waters, which
of the tide, private property may not become is as follows:
'property of public ownership,' as defined in
article 339 of the code, where it appears that
the owner has to all intents and purposes
abandoned it and permitted it to be totally
destroyed, so as to become a part of the 'playa' ART. 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea
(shore of the seas), 'rada' (roadstead), or the in consequence of works constructed by
like. . . . the State, or by the provinces, pueblos
or private persons, with proper
In the Enciclopedia Juridica Espanola, volume permission, shall become the property
XII, page 558, we read the following: of the party constructing such works,
unless otherwise provided by the terms
With relative frequency the opposite of the grant of authority.
phenomenon occurs; that is, the sea
advances and private properties are The fact that from 1912 some fishermen had
permanently invaded by the waves, and been drying their fishing nets and depositing
in this case they become part of the their bancas on lots 36, 39 and 40, by
shore or beach. They then pass to the permission of Tomas Cabangis, does not
public domain, but the owner thus confer on the latter or his successors the
dispossessed does not retain any right ownership of said lots, because, as they were
to the natural products resulting from converted into public land, no private person
their new nature; it is a de facto case of could acquire title thereto except in the form
eminent domain, and not subject to and manner established by the law.
indemnity.
In the case of Buzon vs. Insular Government
Now then , when said land was reclaimed, did and City of Manila (13 Phil., 324), cited by the
the claimants-appellees or their predecessors claimants-appellees, this court, admitting the
recover it as their original property? findings and holdings of the lower court, said
the following:
As we have seen, the land belonging to the
predecessors of the herein claimants-appellees If we heed the parol evidence, we find
began to wear way in 1896, owing to the that the seashore was formerly about
gradual erosion caused by the ebb and flow of one hundred brazas distant from the
the tide, until the year 1901, when the waters land in question; that, in the course of
of Manila Bay completely submerged a portion time, and by the removal of a
of it, included within lots 36, 39 and 40 here considerable quantity of sand from the
in question, remaining thus under water until shore at the back of the land for the
reclaimed as a result of certain work done by use of the street car company in filling
the Government in 1912. According to the in Calle Cervantes, the sea water in
above-cited authorities said portion of land, ordinary tides now covers part of the
that is, lots 36, 39 and 40, which was private land described in the petition.
property, became a part of the public domain.
The predecessors of the herein claimants- The fact that certain land, not the bed
appellees could have protected their land by of a river or of the sea, is covered by sea
building a retaining wall, with the consent of water during the period of ordinary
P a g e | 49
high tide, is not a reason established by exception of registry record No. 8147, to
any law to cause the loss thereof, show that the lots here in question
especially when, as in the present case, were not excluded from the application
it becomes covered by water owing to presented in said proceeding.
circumstances entirely independent of
the will of the owner. It will be seen that in the case of Buzon vs.
Insular Government and City of Manila, cited
In the case of Director of Lands vs. Aguilar above, the rise of the waters of the sea that
(G.R. No. 22034),1 also cited by the claimants- covered the lands there in dispute, was due
appellees, wherein the Government adduced not to the action of the tide but to the fact that
no evidence in support of its contention, the a large quantity of sand was taken from the
lower court said in part: sea at the side of said land in order to fill in
Cervantes Street, and this court properly held
The contention of the claimants that because of this act, entirely independent
Cabangis is to the effect that said lots of the will of the owner of said land, the latter
are a part of the adjoining land could not lose the ownership thereof, and the
adjudicated to their deceased father, mere fact that the waters of the sea covered it
Don Tomas Cabangis, which, for over as a result of said act, is not sufficient to
fifty years had belonged to their convert it into public land, especially, as the
deceased grandmother, Tita Andres, land was high and appropriate for building
and that, due to certain improvements purposes.
made in Manila Bay, the waters of the
sea covered a large part of the lots In the case of the Director of Lands vs. Aguilar
herein claimed. also cited by the claimants-appellees, the
Insular Government did not present any
The Government of the Philippine evidence in support of its contention, thus
Islands also claims the ownership of leaving uncontradicted the evidence adduced
said lots, because, at ordinary high by the claimants Aguilar et al., as to the
tide, they are covered by the sea. ownership, possession and occupation of said
lots.
Upon petition of the parties, the lower
court made an ocular inspection of said In the instant case the evidence shows that
lots on September 12, 1923, and on from 1896, the waves of Manila Bay had been
said inspection found some light gradually and constantly washing away the
material houses built thereon, and that sand that formed the lots here in question,
on that occasion the waters of the sea until 1901, when the sea water completely
did not reach the aforesaid lots. covered them, and thus they remained until
the year 1912. In the latter year they were
From the evidence adduced at the trial reclaimed from the sea by filling in with sand
of this cause, it may be inferred that and silt extracted from the bed of Vitas
Tita Andres, during her lifetime was the Estuary when the Government dredged said
owner of a rather large parcel of land estuary in order to facilitate navigation.
which was adjudicated by a decree to Neither the herein claimants-appellees nor
her son Tomas Cabangis; the lots now their predecessors did anything to prevent
in question are contiguous to that land their destruction.
and are covered by the waters of the
sea at extraordinary high tide; some 50 In conclusion, then, we hold that the lots in
years before the sea did not reach said question having disappeared on account of the
strip of land, and on it were gradual erosion due to the ebb and flow of the
constructed, for the most part, light tide, and having remained in such a state
material houses, occupied by the until they were reclaimed from the sea by the
tenants of Tita Andres, to whom they filling in done by the Government, they are
paid rent. Upon her death, her son public land. (Aragon vs. Insular Government,
Tomas Cabangis succeeded to the 19 Phil., 223; Francisco vs. Government of the
possession, and his children succeeded Philippine Islands, 28 Phil., 505).
him, they being the present claimants,
Consuelo, Jesus, Tomas, and Consorcia By virtue whereof, the judgment appealed
Cabangis. from is reversed and lots Nos. 36, 39 and 40
of cadastral proceeding No. 373 of the City of
The Government of the Philippine Manila are held to be public land belonging to
Islands did not adduce any evidence in the Government of the United States under
support of its contention, with the the administration and control of the
P a g e | 50
Government of the Philippine Islands. So evident bad faith, constructed a house on a

ordered. portion of Lot 2344 and refused to vacate the
premises despite written and oral demands.14
FIRST DIVISION
24 At the trial, twenty-three-year old Nestor
G.R. No. 151440 June 17, 2003 Santiago, one of the children of Simplicio
Santiago, admitted that since he attained the
HEIRS OF SIMPLICIO SANTIAGO, age of reason, the house of Mariano Santiago
represented by ANGELITA S. was already existing in Lot No. 2344-C. His
CASTRO, petitioners, father allegedly advised Mariano to remove the
vs. house but the latter refused to do so.15
HEIRS OF MARIANO E.
SANTIAGO, respondents. In his answer,16 Mariano Santiago contended
that Lot 2344 was subdivided into three
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: portions, i.e., Lot 2344-A, with an area of 168
square meters; Lot 2344-B, with an area of
A free patent issued over a private land is null 349 square meters; and Lot 2344-C, with an
and void and produces no legal effects area of 57 square meters.17 Petitioners owned
whatsoever. Quod nullum est, nullum producit only Lot 2344-B, and Lots 2344-A and 2344-
effectum.1 Free patent applications under the C, containing an area of 225 square meters,
Public Land Act2 apply only to disposable was fraudulently included in the free patent
lands of the public domain, and not to private and certificate of title issued to Simplicio
lands which became such by virtue of a duly Santiago. Mariano testified that he and his
registered possessory information or by open, sister, Belen S. Marcelo, purchased Lot 2344-
continuous, exclusive, and notorious A from Simplicio Santiago for the price of
possession, of the present or previous P5,000.00, as evidenced by a deed of sale
occupants.3 dated September 15, 1972.18 Immediately after
the sale, they constructed a house on the
This petition seeks to reverse and set aside the lot.19 Without their knowledge, however,
December 3, 1999 decision4 of the Court of Simplicio secured a free patent and an original
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 42761, which certificate of title over the entire Lot 2344. On
reversed and set aside the December 3, 1999 the other hand, he and his sister inherited Lot
decision5 of the Regional Trial Court of 2344-C from their grandmother, Marta
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 27 in Civil Case No. Santiago, who in turn inherited the lot from
7401-M. her parents, Vicente and Magdalena. During
her lifetime, Marta had been living in the
The instant controversy involves a 574 square house built on the said lot.20 When Mariano
meter parcel of land known as Lot No. 2344, was born in 1926, the house was still made
Cad-349,6 located in Poblacion, Angat, of nipa, but it was subsequently improved in
Bulacan, which was formerly owned by the 1931 and 1952 into a house of strong
spouses Vicente Santiago and Magdalena materials.21
Sanchez. The spouses had five children,
among whom were Pablo and Marta. Pablo is Mariano’s testimony was corroborated by
the father of Simplicio Santiago and Guillermo seventy-year old Socorro Ocampo,22 first
Santiago; while Marta is the mother of Jose cousin of Simplicio and Mariano’s father,
Santiago.7 Jose, and by fifty-two-year old Flordeliza
Austria,23 a long-time neighbor of the parties.
On April 3, 1984, petitioners, the heirs of Both witnesses testified that since they were
Simplicio Santiago, initiated a still children, the house of Marta where she
complaint8 for accion publiciana with damages and Mariano’s family resided was already
against Mariano Santiago, son of Jose existing on Lot 2344-C.
Santiago.9 They alleged that Lot 2344 was
acquired by Simplicio by purchase from his On August 6, 1991, the trial court rendered a
father, Pablo, and brother, Guillermo.10 When decision in favor of petitioners. It found that
Simplicio retired from government service in Mariano’s claim over the controverted lot lacks
1968, he constructed a house on the said basis and held that his defense constitutes a
lot.11 Before his demise on May 6, 1983, he collateral attack on the validity of a Torrens
applied for a free patent,12which was granted. title which was barred by prescription for
Thus, on September 26, 1980, Original having been raised more than one year after
Certificate of Title No. P-10878 covering Lot the entry of the decree of registration. The
2344 was issued in his name.13 Sometime in dispositive portion of the decision reads:
1983, Mariano Santiago, through stealth and
P a g e | 51
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby 2344, designated as Lot No. 2344-B

rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and (Exh. "2-C");
against the defendant:
d. ordering the appellees to pay the
1. Declaring the plaintiffs, children and costs.
heirs of the late Simplicio Santiago, the
owners of the property covered by SO ORDERED.26
Original Certificate of Title No. P-10878
of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, Hence, the instant petition.
which is registered in the name of
Simplicio Santiago; The main issues are: (1) whether or not the
free patent and the certificate of title issued to
2. Ordering the defendant Mariano Simplicio Santiago are valid; and (2) whether
Santiago to remove and vacate the 57 or not respondents’ claim over Lots 2344-C
square meter portion of the property and 2344-A is supported by the evidence.
covered by said title (O.C.T. No. P-
10878) on which his house is The settled rule is that a free patent issued
established and surrender the over a private land is null and void, and
possession thereof to the plaintiffs; produces no legal effects whatsoever. Private
ownership of land – as when there is a prima
3. Dismissing/denying all claims and facie proof of ownership like a duly registered
counterclaims for damages by the possessory information or a clear showing of
parties. open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession, by present or previous occupants
No pronouncement as to costs. – is not affected by the issuance of a free
patent over the same land, because the Public
SO ORDERED.24 Land law applies only to lands of the public
domain. The Director of Lands has no
Meanwhile, Mariano died on July 5, 1993 and authority to grant free patent to lands that
was substituted by his heirs.25 have ceased to be public in character and
have passed to private ownership.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals Consequently, a certificate of title issued
which reversed the decision of the trial court pursuant to a homestead patent partakes of
on December 3, 1999. It sustained the nature of a certificate issued in a judicial
respondents’ claim over Lots 2344-A and proceeding only if the land covered by it is
2344-C and ruled that the Free Patent and the really a part of the disposable land of the
Original Certificate of Title issued in favor of public domain.27
Simplicio Santiago are void, because Lot 2344
is a private land which cannot be the subject In the instant case, it was established that Lot
of a Free Patent. The decretal portion thereof 2344 is a private property of the Santiago clan
states: since time immemorial, and that they have
declared the same for taxation.28 Although tax
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the declarations or realty tax payment of property
decision dated August 6, 1991 is are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and nevertheless, they are good indicia of
in its stead another judgment is possession in the concept of owner, for no one
rendered in favor of the appellant and in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
against the appellees as follows: property that is not in his actual or
constructive possession. They constitute at
a. declaring the Free Patent Title under least proof that the holder has a claim of title
O.C.T. No. P-10878 (Exh. "A") null and over the property. The voluntary declaration of
void; a piece of property for taxation purposes
manifests not only one’s sincere and honest
b. declaring the appellants the absolute desire to obtain title to the property and
owner of the 225 square meters of Lot announces his adverse claim against the State
2344, designated as Lot 2344-A and and all other interested parties, but also the
2344-C (Exhs. "2-A" & "2-B", intention to contribute needed revenues to the
respectively; Government. Such an act strengthens
one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of
c. declaring the appellees the absolute ownership.29
owners of 349 square meters of Lot
P a g e | 52
Considering the open, continuous, exclusive The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Lot
and notorious possession and occupation of 2344-C was sold by Simplicio Santiago to
the land by respondents and their Mariano Santiago and Belen Sanchez. The
predecessors in interests, they are deemed to document of sale evidencing the transaction is
have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a duly notarized and, as such, is considered a
government grant without the necessity of a public document and enjoys the presumption
certificate of title being issued. The land was of validity as to its authenticity and due
thus segregated from the public domain and execution. This legal presumption was not
the director of lands had no authority to issue overcome by petitioners.34 Other than their
a patent. Hence, the free patent covering Lot allegation that the deed of sale was a
2344, a private land, and the certificate of title forgery,35 no other evidence was presented to
issued pursuant thereto, are void.30 substantiate their claim. Hence, the
presumption of validity of the deed of sale,
Similarly in Magistrado v. Esplana,31 the ceding Lot 2344-C to Mariano Santiago and
applicant for a free patent declared that the Belen Marcelo, prevails.
lots subject of the application formed part of
the public domain for the sole purpose of Furthermore, respondents’ assertion of
obtaining title thereto as cheaply as possible. ownership is buttressed by their possession of
We annulled the titles granted to the applicant Lot 2344-C. Immediately after the sale in
after finding that the lots were privately owned 1972, Mariano Santiago and Belen Sanchez
and continuously possessed by the applicant built a house on the said lot. The lack of
and his predecessors-in-interest since time opposition on the part of petitioners, indicates
immemorial. Likewise, in Robles v. Court of that they recognized the validity of the sale
Appeals,32 the free patent issued to the and it was only later that they thought of
applicant was declared void because the lot repudiating the authenticity thereof.
involved was shown to be private land which
petitioner inherited from his grandparents. Clearly, therefore, respondents are the lawful
owners of Lot 2344-C and Lot 2344-A, which
Respondents’ claim of ownership over Lot they co-own with Belen Marcelo. Free Patent
2344-C and Lot 2344-A is fully substantiated. No. 0130448 and OCT No. P-10878 are void
Their open, continuous, exclusive, and not only because of the fraudulent inclusion
notorious possession of Lot 2344-C in the therein of respondents’ lots, but also because
concept of owners for more than seventy years Lot 2344 is a private lot, over which the
supports their contention that the lot was Bureau of Lands had no jurisdiction.
inherited by Mariano from her grandmother
Marta, who in turn inherited the lot from her Petitioners contend that respondents’ action to
parents. This fact was also corroborated by annul OCT No. P-10878 is barred by
respondents’ witnesses who declared that the prescription and that, even assuming that it
house where Marta and Mariano’s family was filed within one year from the entry of the
resided was already existing in the disputed decree of registration, it constitutes a
portion of Lot 2344 even when they were still collateral attack on a Torrens title. Further,
children. It is worthy to note that although Lot they averred that respondents have no
2344-C was within the property declared for personality to sue for the annulment of OCT
taxation by the late Simplicio Santiago, he did No. P-10878.
not disturb the possession of Marta and
Mariano. Moreover, while the heirs of The contentions are without merit.
Simplicio tried to make it appear that Mariano
built his house only in 1983, Nestor Santiago A certificate of title issued under an
admitted on cross-examination that Mariano administrative proceeding pursuant to a
Santiago’s house was already existing in the homestead patent covering a disposable public
disputed lot since he attained the age of land within the contemplation of the Public
reason. The fact that Mariano did not declare Land Law or Commonwealth Act No. 141 is as
Lot 2344-C for taxation does not militate indefeasible as a certificate of title issued
against his title. As he explained, he was under a judicial registration proceeding.
advised by the Municipal Assessor that his 57 Under the Land Registration Act, title to the
square meter lot was tax exempt and that it property covered by a Torrens certificate
was too small to be declared for taxation, becomes indefeasible after the expiration of
hence, he just gave his share in the taxes to one year from the entry of the decree of
his uncle, Simplicio, in whose name the entire registration. Such decree of registration is
Lot 2344 was declared for taxation.33 incontrovertible and becomes binding on all
persons whether or not they were notified of,
or participated in, the in rem registration
P a g e | 53
process. There is no specific provision in the proceeding is nevertheless made as an

Public Land Law or the Land Registration Act incident thereof.39
(Act 496), now Presidential Decree 1529, fixing
a similar one-year period within which a In this case, while the original complaint filed
public land patent can be considered open to by the petitioners was for recovery of
review on the ground of actual fraud (such as possession, or accion publiciana,and the
that provided for in Section 38 of the Land nullity of the title was raised merely as
Registration Act, and now Section 32 of respondents’ defense, we can rule on the
Presidential Decree 1529), and clothing a validity of the free patent and OCT No. P-
public land patent certificate of title with 10878 because of the counterclaim filed by
indefeasibility. Nevertheless, this Court has respondents. A counterclaim can be
repeatedly applied Section 32 of Presidential considered a direct attack on the title.
Decree 1529 to a patent issued by the Director In Development Bank of the Philippines v.
of Lands, approved by the Secretary of Natural Court Appeals,40 we ruled on the validity of a
Resources, under the signature of the certificate of title despite the fact that the
President of the Philippines. The date of the nullity thereof was raised only as a
issuance of the patent corresponds to the date counterclaim. It was held that a counterclaim
of the issuance of the decree in ordinary is considered a complaint, only this time, it is
cases. Just as the decree finally awards the the original defendant who becomes the
land applied for registration to the party plaintiff. It stands on the same footing and is
entitled to it, the patent issued by the Director to be tested by the same rules as if it were an
of Lands equally and finally grants and independent action. Moreover, since all the
conveys the land applied for to the facts necessary in the determination of the
applicant. 36 title’s validity are now before the Court, it
would be in the best interest of justice to settle
The one-year prescriptive period, however, this issue which has already dragged on for 19
does not apply when the person seeking years.41
annulment of title or reconveyance is in
possession of the lot. This is because the There is no merit in petitioners’ contention
action partakes of a suit to quiet title which is that only the State may bring an action for
imprescriptible.37 In David v. Malay,38 we held reconveyance of the lots in dispute. To
that a person in actual possession of a piece of reiterate, Lot 2344 is a private property in
land under claim of ownership may wait until open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
his possession is disturbed or his title is possession of the Santiago family. The
attacked before taking steps to vindicate his nullification of its free patent and title would
right, and his undisturbed possession gives not therefore result in its reversion to the
him the continuing right to seek the aid of a public domain. Hence, the State, represented
court of equity to ascertain and determine the by the Solicitor General, is not the real party
nature of the adverse claim of a third party in interest. Parenthetically, in Robles v. Court
and its effect on his title. of Appeals,42 a case involving the personality
to sue for the reconveyance of a private land,
In the case at bar, inasmuch as respondents we ruled that inasmuch as there was no
are in possession of the disputed portions of reversion of the disputed property to the
Lot 2344, their action to annul Original public domain, the State is not the proper
Certificate of Title No. P-10878, being in the party to bring a suit for reconveyance.
nature of an action to quiet title, is therefore
not barred by prescription. It should be clarified, however, that
notwithstanding the Court’s declaration that
Section 48 of P.D. 1529, the Property Lot No. 2344 is a private property and not a
Registration Decree, provides that a certificate part of the public domain, the parties’ title to
of title shall not be subject to collateral attack the said lot is imperfect and is still subject to
and can not be altered, modified, or canceled the rules on confirmation of title under
except in a direct proceeding. An action is an Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act.
attack on a title when the object of the action Nevertheless, this imperfect title is enough to
is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the defeat the free patent and certificate of title
judgment or proceeding pursuant to which the issued over the said lot. Hence, the ruling of
title was decreed. The attack is direct when the Court of Appeals declaring the
the object of an action is to annul or set aside respondents as the absolute owners of Lot
such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On Nos. 2344-A and C; and declaring petitioners
the other hand, the attack is indirect or as absolute owners of Lot No. 2344-B, should
collateral when, in an action to obtain a be modified.
different relief, an attack on the judgment or
P a g e | 54
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 42761
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Patent
No. 0130448 and Original Certificate of Title
No. P-10878, both in the name of Simplicio
Santiago are declared null and void.
Respondent Heirs of Mariano Santiago are
declared owners and holders of imperfect title
over Lot No. 2344-A and Lot No. 2344-C; while
petitioner Heirs of Simplicio Santiago are
declared owners and holders of imperfect title
over Lot No. 2344-B. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna,

JJ., concur.

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PROPERTY CASES: CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY

upon the constitutionality of Executive Order suffered during the Japanese

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,

CRUZ, J., concurring: The judiciary interprets the laws and, in

With regret, I find myself unable to share the I

be the object of an ordinary queda desde el primer momento

recommendations, shall Secondly, examination of our statute books

CRUZ, J., concurring: The judiciary interprets the laws and, in

With regret, I find myself unable to share the I

Article 422 of the Civil Code relaciones juridicas a que

(1) For property belonging to and SECTION 1. The Secretary of

VIUDA DE TAN TOCO, plaintiff-appellant, Municipalities are political bodies

thereof to conduct and manage a administrative agencies for the state,

affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ................................................

It is SO ORDERED. provincial roads, city streets, municipal

lands distinctly for public purposes, such as .................. .................. Scho

.................. .................. 13 12 San

Fernando, JJ., concur. the City of Manila which he

The facts necessary for a clear understanding

The accompanying bill seeks to SENATOR FERNANDEZ: Mr.

Manila has no more objection to further, That in the event of lease

municipalities in their must either decide

direct the corporation, its funds, Approval of this bill will

CONCEPCION, Jr., J.: (1) The pertinent portions of the Revised

2. ordering the defendant to

of Reconveyance over the on June 14, 1982 in G. R. No. L-

SO ORDERED. (pp. 11-12, Rollo) Finally, defendants are hereby

Considering that an entry of Hence, the present petition on the issue

VILLA-REAL, J.: a large parcel of land belonging to the

Government of the Philippine Islands. So evident bad faith, constructed a house on a

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby 2344, designated as Lot No. 2344-B

process. There is no specific provision in the proceeding is nevertheless made as an

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the

Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna,

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