February 2019

Report Series Saudi Arabia:

Macroeconomic Forecast 2019-23
Executive Summary
Ra
 Global financial markets have regained some poise following a
tumultuous end to 2018. Heavy selloffs meant that all major equity
indices posted losses for the year, while credit spreads widened
sharply. The proximate cause was growing anxiety about US-Sino trade
tensions, and how these might affect both China’s economy and US
corporate margins. Other concerns included rising interest rates, the
impact of the US Fed’s balance sheet unwind, the prospect of a “no-
deal” Brexit and Italy’s expansionist fiscal plans.

 Calm has since been restored by a Fed statement indicating that it

would be “patient” with its interest rate policy—wording that markets
have taken to mean that the hiking cycle is over. The Fed statement
also implied a flexible approach to its balance sheet reduction. With
some signs of progress in US-China talks, and with bond markets
keeping the Italian government’s populist instincts at bay, most of the
end-2018 clouds have receded. Risk markets have generally rallied in
response.

 Despite the revival of animal spirits, the US-China trade dispute will not
be easily resolved. China’s economy is slowing sharply and this will have
spillovers, not just for other EMs, but the Eurozone as well.

 The China outlook is also weighing on oil prices. Supply growth has
been partly restricted by OPEC and Russia, but US shale producers
appear more resilient to lower prices than during 2015-16. We still
expect the market to tighten somewhat as OPEC reductions begin to
bite, and there should be some uplift in prices. However, upside is
limited and we expect an average price for Brent this year of $65/b,
edging up to $67/b in 2020 as a weaker USD helps to support demand.

 The medium term economic outlook for Saudi Arabia remains positive.
Structural reforms are continuing, albeit in less high-profile ways, and
the fiscal outlook is manageable given multiple financing options and a
low debt stock. Importantly, the current account is set to remain in
surplus, which removes the spectre of the “twin deficits”. The financial
account is more problematic, but it should be supported by increased
James Reeve capital inflows (both direct and portfolio) this year and beyond.
Chief Economist
Samba Financial Group  Despite this, domestic activity remains weak. The local private sector is
P.O. Box 6038, Dubai gradually adapting to the withdrawal of state largesse, but it has not
U.A.E been easy and investment is still subdued. The departure of an
+971 (0) 547772151 estimated 1.7 million expatriates has also meant significant hits to both
the demand and supply sides of the economy. Real nonoil growth
[email protected] seems unlikely to exceed 2.5 percent this year, though firmer growth is
This and other publications can be likely inPUBLIC
the medium term as the Vision 2030 project spurs a better
Downloaded from www.samba.com allocation of capital and gradual productivity gains.
 February 2019

World Economic Outlook

The Global Economic Backdrop
2016 2017 2018 2019f 2020f A pause for breath after a difficult year
Real GDP (percent change, PPP)
World 3.2 3.7 3.6 3.1 2.9 Global markets have stabilised after a volatile final quarter of
US 1.6 2.3 2.9 1.9 1.5 2018. All developed equities markets ended the year in negative
Japan 1.5 1.7 1.1 1.0 0.8
Euro area 1.8 2.4 2.0 1.5 1.1
territory, while credit markets also saw spreads widen sharply
China 6.8 6.8 6.6 6.1 6.0 on both investment grade and high-yield paper. A number of
Emerging Markets 4.4 5.0 4.5 4.1 4.0 factors have been in play, the chief of which is worries that the
Saudi Arabia 1.7 -0.7 2.3 0.3 2.4 trade dispute between China and the US is likely to erode US
Official policy rate (end period)
corporate earnings and global trade more generally. Economic
US (FFTR) 0.75 1.50 2.50 2.50 2.00 confidence in China has been badly hit by the trade dispute, and
Japan (UOCR) -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 that has had implications for the Eurozone, which is a major
Euro area (refi rate) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 exporter: the German economy actually contracted in the third
quarter, as did Japan’s. Concerns that the UK will exit the EU in
USD/EUR (end period) 1.04 1.20 1.14 1.17 1.22 a disorderly fashion, and worries about Italy’s fiscal policies have
also kept markets on edge.
Oil Price ($/b avg.)
Brent 43 54 71 65 67 Markets have regained some poise since the turmoil of November
Bloomberg; Samba estimates and forecasts and December. A statement by the US Fed that it would be
“patient” with monetary tightening has led many to assume that
the central bank is at the end of its rate-hiking cycle. We agree,
and now expect rates to begin to be cut again in 2020 as the US
economy slows. Markets will also be watching closely to see if the
Fed slows the pace of its balance sheet unwind. This process,
which involves offloading billions of dollars-worth of Treasuries
and mortgage backed securities, is likely to be negative for risk
assets, such as equities. After all, the original balance sheet
expansion was designed to push investors away from safe assets
towards the riskier end of the spectrum.
An early resolution of the US-China trade dispute seems unlikely
There is also cautious optimism that the Sino-US trade dispute
might not be escalated any further. A three-month truce is in
place, providing a window to hammer out a lasting agreement.
We are less optimistic here, noting that the dispute is more about
China’s alleged theft of intellectual property and forced
technology transfer than trade balances. We doubt that such
complex and intractable issues can be settled during the truce
period (which ends in March). After all, there have been plenty of
unproductive rounds of talks on these issues in the past. To
provide meaningful concessions, China would have to reform its
state-interventionist business model.
The trade dispute might therefore be contained, but it is unlikely
to be resolved, and will remain a cause of anxiety for global
markets. China is deploying some domestic stimulus in a bid to
restore confidence, but the authorities must tread carefully.
Simply directing state-owned banks to lend more to

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state-owned firms will exacerbate the mis-allocation of capital

(and associated debt pile up) that has been a feature of the past
decade, and will do little to bolster consumer confidence. A
broader fiscal stimulus is a possibility, but it might need to be
substantial to tempt households to start spending again.
The US remains in comparatively good shape, with high levels of
employment, consumption, and investment. But the investment
surge was largely a product of tax breaks, which will not be
repeated this year, and indeed will mean an outsized fiscal deficit.
Market interest rates remain contained, but the investment
environment is likely to become more challenging, and consumer
confidence could well be eroded as well. We expect the US to
avoid a recession, but growth is set to slow to below 2 percent.
Other pressure points seem likely to diminish in importance. We
think a “hard Brexit” will be avoided, and Brexit itself could be
delayed, while the markets will help to impose discipline on the
Italian authorities. However, the Eurozone is set for another year
of underwhelming growth, thanks mainly to the impact of China’s
slowdown on export demand, the withdrawal of monetary
stimulus (though the ECB is unlikely to actually raise interest
rates), and long-standing structural issues. We expect the zone to
record growth of around 1.5 percent.
EMs will suffer from the US-China dispute, but will find some
solace in a stronger USD
Many Emerging Markets will be affected by weaker Chinese
demand and the trade dispute will weigh on broader East Asian
activity. Some Asian economies will likely benefit from the re-
ordering of US-China supply chains, but on balance activity is
likely to slow. Yet a weaker dollar should provide some support to
commodity demand and overall EM performance: there is a
reasonably strong correlation between the US fiscal deficit and
USD weakness, and almost everyone expects the fiscal position to
weaken this year given the unfunded nature of the 2017 tax cuts.
A softer dollar should also bring some relief to highly leveraged
EMs, such as Turkey and Argentina. That said, if a general “risk
off” environment takes hold then the dollar might see enhanced
safe haven flows.
Weighing these various factors, we think global GDP growth will
slow to 3.1 percent this year. With weaker US activity and China’s
gradual shift to a consumption-oriented economy, growth seems
likely to slow to below 3 percent in 2020.
A weaker dollar should also help oil prices, though there is
limited upside
Oil prices had a rocky end to 2018, pulled lower by concerns of
oversupply in a context of faltering demand. OPEC’s decision
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to cut output sharply has helped to stabilise the situation, as have

signs of a slowdown in US shale output. Shale production has
been dented by softening capital expenditure during the final few
months of 2018 as oil prices fell, and by higher steel, labour and
even sand costs. The number of drilling rigs in operation fell to the
lowest in eight months in early February.
However, we still expect significant growth in US shale production
this year. Prices have picked up again, which should spur some
revival in investment, while pipeline constraints are likely to be
largely resolved in the next few months. Meanwhile, the number
of drilled-but-uncompleted wells grew by 30 percent in 2018.
These are wells that are ready to pump as soon as the pipeline
issues are fixed. Lastly, it is notable that US drillers Hess, Chevron
and ConocoPhillips have all said that they will maintain or
increase spending in 2019, indicating that they are unfazed by
lower prices. The technological firepower that larger players bring
to the US shale space suggests that producers will be able to
weather lower prices more easily than they did in 2016 (when
shale output fell).
Other countries are also well placed to boost supply this year,
notably Iraqi Kurdistan, Brazil and Libya. While the latter is
typically volatile it is on a broadly upward path.
For all this, we do still expect some uplift to prices from where we
are now. The US waivers on imports from Iran are set to be
withdrawn in May. OPEC has proved it is disciplined enough to
keep meaningful amounts of supply off the market. And
Venezuelan oil supply seems to be in something of a death spiral
as the economy implodes and investment in the sector dries up.
Most importantly a weakening US dollar will make oil cheaper for
most consumers, helping to support demand. We therefore think
that Brent will average $65/barrel in 2019. Cuts to US interest
rates should mean further USD weakness in 2020 when we expect
Brent to average $67b.
Medium term outlook depends partly on technology advances in
the shale sector
The outlook for prices beyond 2020 is much hazier. Output from
some of the more mature US shale plays, such as Eagle Ford,
already appears to be well past its peak, and even productivity in
the prolific Permian basin is slowing. But this might be to overlook
the technology that big players will bring to the Permian in the
years ahead, which could well boost productivity once more. On
the demand side, the key issues are the extent to which the Paris

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climate goals are actively enforced, and the speed with which
Chinese consumers embrace electric (or possibly hydrogen-
fuelled) cars. But note that even if Chinese take up of EVs is
strong, oil demand is not about to fall away: it will still be a vital
ingredient for aviation, trucking and heating. While
acknowledging a great deal of uncertainty, we expect a gradual
increase in oil prices over the medium term, but capped at around
$70/b.

The Outlook for Saudi Arabia

Reform agenda still on track, but adjusting to economic realities
Postponing the Aramco IPO does not signal that
the reform agenda has stalled. Saudi Arabia’s economic reform programme has continued,
though there were fewer outward signs of progress in 2018 than
anticipated. For many, the decision to delay the totemic part-
privatisation of Saudi Aramco was symptomatic of a general drift
in the reform agenda. We think this view is mistaken. First, the
Aramco sale would have been more important as a financial
enabler for the Public Investment Fund (PIF), than as an end in
itself. Granted, selling a stake in Aramco would have been an
important signal of intent, but the PIF has been designated as the
main agent of state-sponsored change in the Kingdom. In the
meantime the PIF has proved itself able to raise funds in
international markets, and it will be able to raise more through
the proposed sale of its stake in Sabic. Second, the reform push is
continuing with less eye-catching legal and business environment
initiatives which are likely to be more important in the long run
than the sale of 5 percent of Saudi Aramco.
The reform agenda seeks to restructure the
Saudi economy so that productivity growth More broadly, the government has adjusted the pace of reform
becomes the driver of income gains, rather than in response to the disruptions caused by the Vision 2030
the simple accumulation of (cheap) labour and transformation. But this does not signal a retreat so much as a
capital. Naturally, such a fundamental shift will pragmatic response to new challenges that are emerging (and an
be difficult for many firms, and the government approach that has been advocated by the IMF). A transformation
is adjusting the pace of reform accordingly of this size and scope that did not have an element of flexibility
would be unlikely to succeed in the long run.
Fiscal achievements should not be overlooked
It is sometimes forgotten that a key element of the
transformation was putting the fiscal position on a sustainable
footing. This is still a work in progress, but the degree of
accountability, oversight and transparency that has been
achieved over the past few years has been considerable. During

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Saudi Arabia: Fiscal Developments and the 2019 Budget the oil price boom there was little meaningful budgetary
(SR bn) 2017 2018 2019
Total Revenues 691 894 974
oversight, and spending was often unaudited and wasteful. Since
% change 33.2 29.4 8.9 2016 spending has been rationalised and agencies must account
Taxes: 87 166 183 for their disbursements. Meanwhile, the revenue base is being
income & capital gains 14 16 16
diversified, though oil revenue is still the mainstay of the budget.
goods & services 39 113 132
international trade 19 16 17 Subsidies on petrol have also been reduced, helping to reverse
other 15 20 17 the tide of domestic consumption growth and free up more oil for
Grants 0 0 1 export.
Other Revenue 604 729 791
of which, oil * 436 611 673 The fiscal position improved markedly in 2018. Data released by
Total Expenditure 930 1032 1106
the Ministry of Finance (MoF) alongside the 2019 budget suggest
% change 11.7 11.0 7.2
Current 722 827 860 a deficit of 5.2 percent of our estimate of 2018 GDP (4.6 percent
employees' comp. 420 474 456 of the government’s GDP estimate). The deficit was some
goods & services 136 140 175 SR100bn smaller than that recorded in 2017.
financing 9 17 21
subsidies 5 12 32 Unsurprisingly, oil revenue played a key role, growing by 40
grants 6 3 3 percent. This reflects both the increase in prices and production,
social benefits 48 75 73
other expenses 98 106 100 and a slightly higher take from Saudi Aramco (we estimate 70
Capital 208 205 246 percent compared with 68 percent in 2017). The latter appears to
Balance -239 -138 -132 reflect a new tariff structure that sees the government’s marginal
% GDP ** -9.3 -4.6 -4.2
* Samba estimate
royalty rate increase whenever oil prices breach $70/barrel (and
** Govt. estimate of GDP the scope broadened to capture condensate production). This
Sources: Ministry of Finance; Samba
device helped to offset the impact of a reduced overall tax on
Aramco—50 percent from 85 percent. The measure is pro-cyclical
in that higher oil prices will generate a larger ratio for the
government, though our own oil price forecast suggests that
prices will not breach $70/barrel (in annual average terms).
Nonoil revenue surged last year
The most striking feature of the fiscal results was the big increase
in tax revenue, which almost doubled to SR166bn, or 19 percent
of the total. This is still below the Vision 2030 target for the year
(SR450bn) but it is nevertheless a welcome rise from less than 10
percent of the total in the early part of this decade. The drivers
were VAT, which accounted for a much-better-than-expected
SR45bn; the expat levy (SR28bn); and excise duties (SR12bn).
These taxes have economic consequences (see below) but their
fiscal value is clearly high.
The largest category of revenue is labelled simply “other revenue”
and would appear to include oil earnings, though we have
stripped out our estimate of these. The remainder presumably
includes the proceeds from the energy and electricity price
reforms. The IMF estimates that the removal of subsidies will
have generated SR30bn in 2018, and will rise to more than
SR50bn in 2019. Additional elements of the “other revenue”

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Fuel and Electricy Price Reforms: Estimated Fiscal Savings account are likely to include fees and charges levied by
(SRbn)
government agencies for various services, and possibly
By Customer 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Households 23 31 32 32 33 35 investment returns from SAMA, the PIF, and the Human
Non-Households 7 23 45 61 69 77 Resources Development Fund. PIF, for example, has plans to raise
Total 30 54 77 93 102 112 its total assets to SR1.5trn ($400bn) by 2020 and to offer total
shareholder returns of 4-5 percent. These targets could be judged
By Product
Fuel products 23 45 68 85 93 102 optimistic, but even if returns were, say, 3 percent from SR1trn,
Electricity 7 8 9 9 9 9 this would give the government a useful SR30bn a year.
Total 30 53 77 94 102 111
Source: IMF Current spending grew sharply
Current spending saw a sharp 15 percent increase last year (also
well above budget), driven by 13 percent growth in
compensation for public sector employees. This reflects the
Royal Order of January 2018, intended to offset the impact of
inflation on public sector salaries (an initiative that was also rolled
out in most large private sector firms). The order provides a
SR1,000/month payment to public sector employees (regardless
of salary), a reduced amount for public sector pensioners, and
bonus payments for military personnel serving on the Yemen
border. The precise cost of these measures has not been
revealed. Given that the Order was unveiled after the budget was
published, and given that the difference between budgeted and
actual spending on public sector remuneration was SR36bn, it
presumably cost around this mark.
The government has declared that the order will remain in place
for 2019 despite the fact that inflationary pressures are set to
subside (see below). This is contrary to the advice of the IMF,
which worries that outlays of this type can become embedded
and difficult to unwind in the event of a fall in oil prices.
Procurement spending rose for first time since 2014
One area of spending which is much easier to unwind is
procurement. While below budget, this item did actually increase
year-on-year for the first time since 2014. That said, spending on
this category was just SR140bn—some 60 percent below the 2014
figure (and lower still in real terms). Procurement spending is (or
was) one of the key ways by which the government distributes oil
revenue throughout society. In that sense it was a cornerstone of
the “old” Saudi economic model, which encouraged Saudi firms
to provide goods and services to the government for large
margins—thanks in part to abundant cheap labour—but with
little value added. The Vision 2030 project aims to replace this
model with one that puts productivity at the heart of private
sector development. The change is fundamental and has meant
difficult adjustments for many private sector firms (see below).

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Capital spending to be driven increasingly by SOEs

Capital spending has also been compressed in recent years, and
Keeping procurement and capital spending in was flat in 2017 at SR205bn, some 15 percent below the ten-year
check has been the main method of controlling average. Nevertheless, capital spending is set to increase over
overall spending the medium term. The authorities recently unveiled plans to
overhaul infrastructure and to develop certain industries in
partnership with the private sector. The authorities say that some
$425bn will be spent on these endeavours by 2030, though it is
not clear how much of this will be government money (see
below).
In addition, the central government is in the process of
recapitalizing a number of government funding bodies, which will
in turn support capex through lending. These include support to
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), export financing,
subsidized housing loans, a “broadband stimulus” fund, and
measures to support (selected) companies that are struggling to
adjust to the higher-cost environment. This is essentially indirect
capital spending, and will take time to feed through. From a fiscal
accounting perspective this spending will need to be as
transparent as possible.
There are also large infrastructure projects (so-called giga
projects) that are planned, such as the Neom city development,
the Red Sea tourism development, and the Qiddiya
entertainment city project. Sceptics might point to the “economic
cities” programme of the late 2000s, much of which failed to
materialise; however we feel that considerable political capital
has been invested in the above projects and they are likely to
proceed, albeit on a fairly flexible time horizon.
2019 budget shows slight tightening, and an optimistic oil price
assumption
Turning to the 2019 budget itself, the government’s stance is set
to tighten somewhat with a 7 percent increase in projected
spending—to SR1106bn—versus the 11 percent actual increase
in 2018. Revenue is assumed to increase by 9 percent (to
SR974bn), and the deficit is projected to narrow slightly to
SR132bn, or 4.2 percent of the government’s GDP projection.
The main element of revenue remains oil, though this is not
explicit and is again subsumed in “other revenue”. If one assumes
that there is no change in the nonoil element of this category (our
estimate was SR118bn for last year), then oil revenue would
appear to have been projected at SR673bn. Assuming an oil
production cut of 3 percent for the year, and the same ratio from
The 2019 budget revenue assumption
Aramco as last year, this would point to an average oil price of
appears to rest on an oil price of around
$80/b around $80/barrel (Brent), which is some way above our
projection of $65/barrel (this can only be a guesstimate because

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of the assumptions made).

The budget also projects a sharp (10 percent) increase in tax
revenue from goods and services. This reflects some lowering of
Budgeted cuts to public sector the VAT threshold and an increase in the rate that expatriates
remuneration might be tricky to achieve must pay on their dependents. Projections for the latter are
hazardous given the ongoing exodus of expatriates (see below).
Public sector remuneration budgeted to decline
Spending is dominated by public sector remuneration, which is
scheduled to decline by almost 4 percent compared with last
year’s actual. This might be challenging: we assume that the
rollover of the cost of living allowance is incorporated in the
budget, since both were announced on the same day, and we also
note that public sector bonuses are being reinstated this year.
Procurement is budgeted to increase by 25 percent, which may
be an implicit acknowledgement of the difficulties many
businesses have experienced in adjusting to the reduction in
these outlays over the past few years. Finally, capital spending
also receives a hefty boost, growing by a projected 20 percent,
which will be welcome news to the beleaguered contracting
sector.
If oil revenue does not increase as projected, or if public sector
pay is more difficult to rein in than planned, then this might lead
the authorities to cut capital and/or procurement spending in a
bid to contain the deficit. However, our sense is that spending
growth will continue—though at a slightly softer pace than
budgeted—and the authorities will be prepared to accept a
higher budget deficit if necessary. Based on our oil revenue
assumption and GDP projection (which is weaker than the
government’s) and assuming also that spending is dialled back
slightly, we anticipate a budget deficit of around SR261bn or 9.8
percent of GDP.
This would be unwelcome, but far from disastrous: recall that
We see the fiscal deficit widening to the deficit was 9.2 percent of GDP in 2017 and almost 16 percent
almost 10 percent of GDP this year. But in 2015. Moreover, the government has multiple financing
this counter-cyclical stance appears options including local banks, autonomous government
appropriate, and fiscal financing options institutions, and foreign markets, while the current debt load
are in any case plentiful itself is a modest 25 percent of GDP. In any case, the fiscal
expansion appears warranted to ease the burden on the local
private sector as the economy gradually transforms.
Longer term spending projections also raise questions, though
fiscal financing should not be a problem
Looking at the medium term, the authorities expect the fiscal
position to be in balance by 2023. Their revenue assumptions

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appear conservative, at least in 2022-23, but their spending plans

might be difficult to achieve. The authorities project cuts to
spending in both 2022 and 2023, based on the premise that a
well-entrenched privatisation programme will have reduced
pressure on both operating and capital expenditure. However, we
note that the UK, which had the most extensive privatisation
programme in the 1980s, still saw government spending increase
during that decade. It is certainly plausible that spending will
slow, and indeed shrink as a share of GDP as the private sector
becomes more important as both an employer and engine of
growth, but outright cuts to government spending seem unlikely.
Saudi Arabia: Fiscal Outlook
(SR bn) 2018 2019f 2020f 2021f 2022f 2023f
Revenue 895.0 836.2 906.1 975.8 1061.7 1144.2
% change 29.3 -6.6 8.4 7.7 8.8 7.8
Expenditure 1032.0 1097.0 1147.4 1189.4 1225.8 1263.9
% change 11.3 6.3 4.6 3.7 3.1 3.1
Balance -137.0 -260.8 -241.3 -213.6 -164.1 -119.8
% GDP -5.2* -9.8 -8.7 -7.4 -5.5 -3.9
The longer term fiscal financing outlook is still *Samba estimate
Source: Samba
comfortable in our view
Instead, we expect spending growth to continue, averaging
around 4 percent a year, albeit on a narrowing path. By 2023 we
forecast that the deficit will be worth around SR120bn or 3.9
percent of GDP. We are not unduly troubled by this: governments
are able to run persistent deficits with a lot less debt “headroom”
than Saudi Arabia, and a deficit of 4 percent of GDP is in any case
comfortable. Based on this fiscal projection we see total
Saudi Arabia: Central Government Debt
government debt rising to 48 percent of GDP by 2023, a sharp
(percent GDP; MoF, IMF, Samba)
60.0 increase from virtually nothing in 2013, but still within bounds,
50.0 and effectively collateralised by the world’s second largest and
40.0
cheapest-to-extract crude oil reserves (note that we have
20.5
19.6 excluded revenue stemming from the anti-corruption drive from
30.0 16.9
14.2 our calculations).
20.0 11.4
8.6
23.1 27.2 Saudi Arabia: Fiscal Financing Outlook
10.0 17.8 21.9
11.9 15.7 (SRbn) 2018e 2019f 2020f 2021f 2022f 2023f
0.0 Fiscal financing requirement 137 261 241 214 161 117
Financed by:
2018e 2019f 2020f 2021f 2022f 2023f Domestic debt issuance 56 102 121 98 122 88
External debt issuance 71 94 113 113 113 113
domestic external Total issuance 127 196 233 211 234 201
Amortization 3 2 44 27 89 91
Implied change in government deposits -13 -67 -52 -30 -15 -7
memoranda:
Central Govt domestic debt 312 416 494 630 686 827
% GDP 11.9 15.7 17.8 21.9 23.1 27.2
Central Govt external debt 226 301 395 486 582 623
% GDP 8.6 11.4 14.2 16.9 19.6 20.5
Sources: MOF, SAMA, Samba

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Box 1: Nonoil fiscal deficit very large, but narrowing

Taking a step back, it is worth considering the nonoil fiscal
position. In the days of $100/b oil, the notion of the nonoil fiscal
deficit seemed a largely academic pre-occupation. But with the
downturn in oil prices and the authorities’ stated objective to
“wean the country off oil” it can be seen as a useful gauge of fiscal
sustainability and vulnerability (the nonoil balance excludes
interest payments on debt since these payments can be said to
be pre-determined by previous deficits). Saudi Arabia’s nonoil
primary fiscal deficit in 2018 was large, at just under 41 percent
of nonoil GDP. This compares with Norway at around 5 percent
and Russia at around 8 percent of nonoil GDP. But Saudi Arabia
has the advantage of having much larger oil reserves than these
countries, which allows it greater scope to run such a deficit. And,
importantly, the nonoil deficit should now be on a downward
path: based on our government spending assumptions we see the
deficit narrowing to 33 percent of nonoil GDP by 2023.
Meanwhile, government spending is set to continue to claim a
The pressure on Saudi Arabia to bring the large share of the nonoil economy, with a projected ratio of 57
nonoil fiscal deficit under control is less intense percent of nonoil GDP (excluding interest payments) in 2023,
than in other oil producers because of the down only slightly from the 2018 ratio. This reflects our belief that
sheer size of the Kingdom’s reserves. That said, the transition from the state-centred system of economic
the nonoil deficit is many times bigger than expansion towards a more private driven model will be a gradual
that of Norway and Russia, for example process. However, we are encouraged by the “direction of travel”
and note that primary spending accounted for almost 63 percent
of nonoil GDP during the 2011-13 oil boom years, when
government spending was largely unfettered.
Exchange rate peg offers little room for manoeuvre
Monetary policy will continue to be governed by the exchange
rate peg, meaning that policy interest rates (primarily the reverse
repo) will need to move in tandem with the Fed Funds Target
Rate. Clearly, the US and Saudi economies are at very different
stages of the cycle, and the rise in Saudi rates has been
unwarranted on domestic economic grounds. But our
assumptions about Fed policy suggest that the next moves will be
With pressure on the balance of payments, downwards, with the Reverse Repo likely to fall back to 2
Saudi interest rates will follow US equivalents percent by end-2020.
closely. Rates should begin to move lower in SAMA has other tools to influence domestic liquidity, such as
2020, which will be a relief for local businesses adjusting banks’ reserve requirements, but the central bank will
be mindful of the need to ensure that market interest rates
remain attractive enough to keep capital in the country (see also
balance of payments, below).

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GDP growth was weak in 2018

There was a mild rebound in nonoil GDP
growth last year. The recovery should The nonoil economy expanded in 2018, but activity was
gather pace in 2019, though growth will generally subdued. The Ministry of Finance posted a provisional
remain well below potential estimate of 2.6 percent growth for the economy as a whole, with
the nonoil sector growing by 2 percent. This would have meant a
very sharp increase in activity in the fourth quarter, given that
GDP in the first nine months was just 1.4 percent higher. PMI data
do not indicate that there was any such expansion and for the
moment we are sticking with our estimate of 1.5 percent nonoil
growth. GSTAT will release full year data in the next few months.
Disappearing expatriates hit demand and supply
For most of 2018 the private sector remained cautious in the face
of higher costs, persistent—albeit moderating—payment delays,
higher interest rates, and the ongoing exodus of expatriates. A
strong USD has been an accessory to the downturn by increasing
competition from cheap imports in some sectors. More helpful
has been the flipside of the strong dollar: a general slide in global
commodities prices, which has softened input costs in many
sectors.
The mass departure of expatiates in the face of higher fees and
Saudiisation initiatives is probably the strongest headwind
affecting both the supply and demand sides of the economy
(though many would say a necessary one). Some 1.3m non-Saudi
workers left the Kingdom in the six quarters to Q3-18. If one
includes non-documented workers and the families of (mainly
white collar) expatriates, then the total exodus is probably in the
region of 1.7 million people. Granted, expatriates tend to
consume much less than nationals, but the disappearance of so
many people will clearly have taken its toll on Retail,
Construction, and Transport in particular.
Looking at the supply side of the equation, the data show that
Saudi nationals have not filled the gaps left by departing
foreigners. There was a net gain of just 71,000 in Saudi
employment during those six quarters, and a net decline in the
most recent three. The main positive of 2017 was the rise in
female Saudi employment, with a net 93,000 Saudi women
finding work, mainly in retail. However, this trend appears to have
reversed in 2018, with a net loss of 17,000.
Competition fierce in Retail sector
But there is circularity here given that the retail sector has been
hardest hit on the demand side by the expatriate exodus.
Consumer staples have borne the brunt of the downturn, since
these are products that expatriates need as much as Saudi

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nationals. The cut-throat price-cutting that was a feature of mid-

year appears to have moderated, but consumers (both Saudis and
expats) are still very price sensitive and heavy discounting
remains the norm; indeed, a number of firms have introduced
lower-priced “value” ranges to tempt consumers. In other retail
Intense discounting in the retail sector has segments, such as consumer electronics, hardware, branded
eased somewhat, but competition remains clothing, home and office supplies, which are less directly
fierce affected by the expat decline, there is more optimism. Many
retailers believe that Saudi consumers have adjusted to VAT and
the removal of subsidies (helped by benefit payments from the
government) and expect a gentle upturn in sales this year. It is
notable that Wholesale and Retail Trade registered a near 1
percent year-on-year expansion in the third quarter following two
consecutive quarterly declines.
Construction still struggling to adjust to new realities
One sector where optimism is in short supply is Construction. This
expatriate-heavy sector has declined every quarter since the
beginning of 2016, weighed down by charges for expatriate
workers (and their subsequent scarcity) and higher transport
costs. The sector is in the midst of a major shakeout, with a
number of smaller and mid-range players disappearing. The
pickup in government investment spending appears not to have
benefitted the medium and small segments, possibly because
larger firms are keen to keep more of the contract “in house”
rather than pushing it out to subcontractors. It is also true that
there are considerable time-lags between public spending
commitments and the breaking of ground.
Manufacturing, which is driven mainly by petrochemicals exports
to East Asia, had a few quarters of robust growth (averaging 5.3
percent in H1-18), but this eased to 3.4 percent in the third
quarter. This is still decent, but the slowdown may well reflect the
gloomier outlook for global trade and the travails of EMs
generally in the second half of last year.
Finance and Insurance is one sector that has fared well during the
downturn, helped by a rising interest rate environment and
decent returns from government bonds. While the overall
corporate outlook remains muted, retail prospects look
promising given the strong growth in mortgage lending. Auto
lending also has good potential given growing female demand,
though a lack of female driving schools is a constraint.
Public consumption has been the motor of growth
Looking at the economy from the expenditure side, we see a
somewhat soft (but still growing) private consumption picture,
contrasted with much firmer public consumption. Private

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consumption was robust in the fourth quarter of 2017, prior to

the introduction of VAT, as consumers front-loaded purchases,
but has since been much more hesitant, easing to just 1.6 percent
annual growth in real terms in the third quarter. Real incomes
have been squeezed by higher prices, and there has been a
notable uptick in consumer loan growth.
By contrast, public consumption has picked up markedly in the
past two quarters as the government ramped up spending on
social transfers and—after years of retrenchment—procurement.
The private/public dichotomy can be seen in import data. Import
spending grew by 7.2 percent in real terms in the third quarter,
according to the GDP data. Yet monthly letter of credit data show
private sector imports sliding by 8 percent in the third quarter.
Meanwhile, investment (gross fixed capital formation) grew by a
solid 8.9 percent in the third quarter, year-on-year. This is not
split into public and private, but the engine was undoubtedly the
public sector. There was a 48 percent year-on-year increase in
government capital spending in the second quarter which, given
lags, would have begun to show up in the third quarter.
There are a number of positives for the 2019 outlook, but lower
oil price backdrop will also weigh
Given the above, the outlook for 2019 appears mixed. Oil prices
have shifted lower and while we think that the government will
stick with its spending plans (more or less) lower prices are still
likely to cloud household and business spending plans. The
scheduled rise in expat fees will add to business costs, though the
government has hinted these might be adjusted. The expatriate
exodus should slow this year with overall numbers possibly
stabilizing, which will be a relief to a number of sectors. The
rollover of the inflation allowance should also support
consumption, particularly as there is no further increase in VAT
(for this year at least). Meanwhile, the burgeoning home-
ownership market will be an important long-term driver for
certain consumption segments. Public investment should remain
reasonably firm, and the lagged impact from 2018 should begin
to show up more clearly in 2019. Whether this is enough to pull
the construction sector out of the doldrums remains to be seen.
The full inclusion of the Tadawul in the MSCI EM index will
attract both passive and active inflows (how much of each is
moot), which should provide a fillip to Saudi consumption
through the wealth effect. If sustained, these flows could also
have a long term transformative effect by helping to make the
Saudi stock market—which is already deep and liquid—the
primary place for firms to raise capital.

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FDI inflows will be partly governed by the privatisation

programme, which is facing obstacles
Foreign direct investment inflows are likely to be modest in the
face of a gradual tightening in global iquidity and the slow
GDP growth will be supported by the rollover rollout of the Saudi privatization programme. The authorities
of the inflation allowance, and a pickup in plan to sell four flour milling companies and Saudia Medical
public investment; however, the lower oil price Services Facilities this year, in what will be a good test of investor
environment and higher expat fees will keep a perceptions of the local business environment. The privatisation
lid on activity programme has faced hurdles including gaps in the legal
framework (which are being addressed), the lack of corporate
structures and balance sheets in the public sector, and hazy
revenue projections in some target companies. There are also
clear challenges and trade-offs regarding the retention of
workers. For these reasons, the privatisation programme is likely
to progress slowly, though as the legal underpinning is expanded
and refined, and as the entities earmarked for sale are
corporatized, so the programme should become a magnet for
significant FDI inflows in the years ahead.
Of course, FDI inflows can accelerate without a privatisation
programme. Much of the Vision 2030 blueprint rests on FDI being
channelled into energy, mining, manufacturing (such as defence
equipment), logistics and transport, and other sectors. Some of
these sectors, such as power, will require restructuring—and if
not privatisation then at least corporatisation—but others, such
as defence manufacturing are effectively virgin territory.
In late January Saudi officials unveiled plans for $425bn of total
investment by 2030, known as the National Industrial
Development and Logistics Programme. At a ceremony to launch
the programme, government officials announced deals worth
SR204bn ($54bn), including agreements with the US defence firm,
Boeing, and the French equivalent, Thales, as well as plans for a
The authorities are gearing up for a big push petrochemicals plant with Pan-Asia, the Chinese chemicals
on infrastructure and industrial development company. Funding and other details were not immediately
available.
Overall, these are ambitious plans, and will require not just
substantial foreign capital but careful sequencing and co-
ordination across government agencies.

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Nonoil growth is expected to gather pace, but will remain

subdued
Weighing these various factors, we expect nonoil growth of 2.3
percent this year, a moderate acceleration on our estimate of 1.5
percent growth in 2018. This rate is still below the economy’s
long-term potential and points to significant spare capacity.
Overall GDP growth is likely to be only just positive given the
Kingdom’s commitments to OPEC. We think risks are balanced,
with the potential for lower-than-expected oil prices offset by
the potential impact of higher-than-expected portfolio inflows.
The longer term outlook is still determined primarily by the fiscal
stance. The government is having to balance its plans for fiscal
adjustment (a narrowing fiscal deficit path) with the need to
soften the adjustment process for the local population. We have
noted above that we think that this will require a slightly more
accommodative stance than that projected by the Ministry of
Finance, though not materially so. We also expect that towards
Medium term growth prospects are still largely
the end of the forecast period (2022-23) foreign investment
dependent on the fiscal stance, but foreign
investment will play an increasingly important inflows will be helping to galvanise private sector activity,
role allowing government spending growth to moderate. A gradual
increase in oil prices will help the overall mood, while lower
interest rates from 2020 onwards will be welcome. It is difficult to
predict how the global trade environment might evolve, but on a
cyclical basis it should be providing support to nonoil export
demand by 2020, particularly if the dollar weakens in line with the
worsening US fiscal position.
Overall, we expect the Saudi nonoil economy to gather pace
gradually, reaching just under 5 percent growth by 2023. This is
the rate that is needed to make a significant dent in
unemployment. Saudi oil production growth is likely to remain
constrained by US shale output and the gradual structural shift
away from oil consumption, meaning that overall GDP growth will
be slower, reaching around 3.7 percent by 2023.

Saudi Arabia: GDP

(percent change) 2017 2018e 2019f 2020f 2021f 2022f 2023f
Real GDP -0.7 2.3 0.3 2.4 3.0 3.5 3.7
Real Nonoil GDP 1.1 1.5 2.3 3.0 4.2 4.7 4.9
Sources: General Authority for Statistics, Samba

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Prices set to fall

Consumer price inflation averaged 2.5 percent in 2018, much
lower than expectations at the beginning of the year. The
introduction of VAT in January 2018 had a one-off impact on the
consumer price index, pushing inflation that month up to 3
percent (from deflation in December 2017). Since then, however,
price pressures have moderated, and the second half of 2018 saw
monthly declines in the CPI. The second-round effects of the VAT
increase have been contained because of most firms’ desire to
maintain market share at the expense of tighter margins. The PMI
shows that firms’ output prices have been reduced in all but one
of the past seven months. More recently, firms have themselves
been helped by weaker commodity prices, which has taken some
pressure off margins, while the strong dollar has also helped to
reduce the price of many imported consumer products. Finally,
rents have eased in a weak property market.
Looking ahead, there is no reason to think that price pressures
are likely to revive any time soon. In fact, the base effect from
VAT means that there are likely to be sharp declines in year-on-
year inflation in the first part of 2019. These base effects will
weigh heavily on the average CPI and for 2019 as a whole we now
expect deflation of -0.3 percent, and even that assumes that
there is a return to month-on-month increases in the CPI, which
is far from certain. Price growth should resume in 2020 as the
impact of VAT falls out of the comparison (note that we do not
expect any further increases to VAT for the forecast period) and
we expect inflation of around 2.5 percent that year, boosted also
by a weaker USD. Inflation is expected to be around 3 percent by
2023 as the economy strengthens.
Saudi Arabia: Consumer Prices
(percent change) 2018 2019f 2020f 2021f 2022f 2023f
General index (2007=100) 107.3 106.9 109.6 112.9 116.4 120.0
percent change 2.5 -0.3 2.5 3.0 3.1 3.1
Sources: SAMA, Samba.

Current account will help to support the balance of payments

Saudi Arabia’s balance of payments remains an important issue,
but the focus is on the financial account (see below). The current
account moved back into surplus in 2017 and the position
strengthened in 2018, reaching $84bn or 12 percent of GDP
The current account’s return to surplus is
important for the overall balance of payments according to our calculations. This is a major relief since the “twin
outlook deficits” on the fiscal and current accounts in 2015-16 alerted
short-sellers to the vulnerability of the Kingdom’s financial
position and put sustained downward pressure on the currency.
2018 was an up-and-down year for oil prices, but the average
price was some 30 percent higher than 2017. This combined
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with a 3 percent gain for oil production pushed oil earnings up to

$233bn according to our estimates—the highest since 2014. This
estimate assumes that domestic consumption declined by 2
percent in line with rising petrol prices, which freed up a bit more
crude for export. This is a trend that we expect to continue for the
forecast period. Nonoil exports, which are mainly comprised of
petrochemicals, are assumed to have reached $58bn, powered
mainly by decent demand from East Asia for most of the year. This
seems unlikely to be sustained in 2019, however.
Import growth is mainly a product of government spending
Import spending was choppy last year, but is likely to have come
in at about $123bn, just 3 percent higher than 2017. As noted
elsewhere, the main impulse was government spending; private
sector import demand appears to have diminished. Private
spending should edge up this year, but is unlikely to grow
significantly in the current oil price environment.
The invisibles account is always in deficit, a product of heavy
services and remittances outflows. Services debits are largely tied
to import costs such as shipping and insurance, but should
become more discrete over time as businesses import more
services from abroad. Offsetting that is the promising trend in
tourism receipts. Currently, these are fairly minor, but they
should provide a good inflow as religious tourism infrastructure is
improved and expanded.
Income receipts are also set to be an important element of the
current account, reflecting the burgeoning role of the PIF as it
becomes more like a sovereign wealth fund, albeit with an
important domestic investment role too. Projecting returns from
the PIF’s activities is hazardous, but for the current account as a
whole income inflows are likely to outweigh income outflows
associated with sovereign debt servicing (though these are also
set to increase).
Remittances outflows set to ease, though not disappear
Remittances have been a big outflow on the Saudi current
account. They have remained quite high despite the
disappearance of so many expatriates, but this is probably the
impact of departing expatriates taking all their remaining savings
with them as they leave the country. Thus, while we estimate
remittance outflows in excess of $30bn in 2018, they are likely to
diminish quite quickly as we move through 2019. However, the
economy is always likely to require a certain number of
expatriates and remittances outflows are likely to stabilize at
around $20bn by the end of the forecast period.

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 February 2019

Current account surplus will shrink in 2019, but remain

comfortable
For 2019 the current account surplus is likely to dip to around
$53bn, or 7.5 percent of GDP, mainly on account of the downturn
in oil prices. Assuming our oil price forecast is broadly accurate,
then the current account will start to return larger surpluses from
2020 onwards, particularly as remittances outflows become less
of a drag. By 2023 the current account surplus should be pushing
$100bn or 11 percent of GDP.
Saudi Arabia: Current Account
($ billion) 2018e 2019f 2020f 2021f 2022f 2023f
Trade balance 167.7 132.3 144.1 157.1 170.6 176.7
Exports 290.6 260.3 278.0 297.3 319.4 337.8
percent change 31.8 -10.4 6.8 7.0 7.4 5.8
of which,
oil 232.7 204.2 220.7 231.5 241.7 248.5
nonoil 57.8 56.1 57.2 65.8 77.7 89.3
Imports -122.9 -128.0 -133.9 -140.2 -148.8 -161.1
percent change 3.0 4.2 4.6 4.7 6.1 8.3
Invisibles balance -83.9 -79.0 -76.9 -74.6 -76.6 -80.3
Services credit 18.5 19.7 22.2 25.5 29.9 35.9
Services debit -79.1 -82.4 -86.2 -90.2 -95.8 -103.7
Services balance -60.6 -62.7 -64.0 -64.7 -65.9 -67.9
Income credit 18.4 20.2 23.2 26.7 29.9 33.5
Income debit -6.3 -8.2 -10.7 -13.7 -17.5 -22.4
Income balance 12.0 12.0 12.5 13.0 12.4 11.1
Transfers balance -35.3 -28.3 -25.4 -22.9 -23.1 -23.6
of which,
workers' remittances -32.1 -25.7 -23.1 -20.8 -21.0 -21.4
Current account balance 83.8 53.3 67.2 82.6 93.9 96.4
percent GDP 12.0 7.5 9.1 10.6 11.5 11.3
Sources: SAMA, IMF, Samba

Financial account flows have been volatile

The country’s financial account has come under the spotlight over
the past year or so, and rightly so. Prior to the oil price slump in
2014 outflows on the financial account were often sizeable, but
were of little macro-economic consequence because of the large
surpluses on the current account. However, more attention was
paid to the financial account as oil prices fell and the current
account slipped into deficit. With deficits on both the current and
financial accounts, official net foreign assets were steadily drawn
down: from a high of $739bn in August 2014 official NFA fell to
$478bn in September 2017, a loss of $261bn.
The situation has since stabilised and indeed NFA have begun to
edge up again, reaching just under $490bn at end-2018. However,
without sovereign and quasi-sovereign (PIF) debt inflows, the
NFA position would have continued to deteriorate.

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The financial account has been in deficit, but there is little clarity
on nature of flows
The financial account therefore warrants close inspection.
However, analysis is hampered by a lack of detail on the different
flows (SAMA’s balance of payments layout follows the IMF
template, but is not disaggregated beyond the basic divisions).
Three quarters of official data show that the financial account
recorded a cumulative deficit of $44bn. Given that the deficit was
a hefty $27bn in the third quarter alone, it could well be that the
full-year deficit will eclipse that of 2017, though full year net
foreign asset data point to stabilisation in the fourth quarter.
Most of the outflows have been through the “other investment”
channel, though net errors and omissions are likely to have been
around $38bn for the full year.
Saudi Arabia: Balance of Payments
($ billion) 2018e 2019f 2020f 2021f 2022f 2023f
Current account balance 83.8 53.3 67.2 82.6 93.9 96.4
Direct investment -19.0 -12.6 -10.2 -6.9 -4.6 -3.2
Abroad (net) -22.0 -17.6 -17.2 -16.9 -16.6 -16.2
in KSA (net) 3.0 5.0 7.0 10.0 12.0 13.0
Portfolio investment 2.0 43.3 23.7 27.4 32.8 21.7
Abroad (net) -13.0 -11.7 -11.3 -11.0 -10.7 -10.4
in KSA (net)* 15.0 55.0 35.0 38.4 43.5 32.1
Other investment -28.0 -33.7 -27.3 -27.4 -21.8 -17.0
Abroad (net) -45.0 -43.7 -39.3 -35.4 -31.8 -27.0
in KSA (net) 17.0 10.0 12.0 8.0 10.0 10.0
Financial account balance -45.0 -3.0 -13.9 -6.9 6.4 1.4
Net errors and omissions** -38.1 -34.5 -26.3 -22.1 -7.4 -8.6
Overall balance 0.7 15.8 27.0 53.6 93.0 89.2
Change in reserves (- = increase) -0.7 -15.8 -27.0 -53.6 -93.0 -89.2
Official NFA 489.6 505.4 532.4 586.0 678.9 768.2
percent GDP 70.1 71.6 72.0 75.4 83.3 89.7
import cover (months) 47.8 47.4 47.7 50.2 54.8 57.2
* includes sov debt inflows
** includes capital account, which is minor
Sources: SAMA, IMF, Samba

That said, there are reasons for optimism in the longer run
Prima facie, therefore, the financial account remains a problem;
but there are a number of caveats that suggest that the situation
is not as troubling as first seems. First, the current account is in
surplus and is likely to remain there for the next five years and
beyond. This removes the spectre of the “twin deficits” and
provides the momentum for NFA accumulation. Second, the
Tadawul’s full inclusion in the MSCI EM and FTSE Russell global
indices will see substantial portfolio inflows, this year at least.
Third, PIF activity is likely to mean “short term pain for long term
gain”. Thus, we see that foreign direct investment outflows were
a cumulative $17bn in the first three quarters of 2018,
presumably most of which was PIF-related. All being well, these
investments will yield significant inflows (captured on the current
account) in due course. Related to this, one would also expect

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investment by foreign firms in the Kingdom to grow in the years

ahead.
Fourth, the gradual improvement in the fiscal account will have
an impact on the balance of payments, since domestic deficit
financing often leads to outflows either on the current account or
financial account. For example, once a domestic creditor is paid
by the government, he or she may well spend at least some of the
money on imports or invest it abroad. This syndrome is likely to
become less of an issue as the budget position improves with
time. Fifth, and closely related to this, private outflows should
diminish as confidence improves and the domestic economy
offers more investment opportunities. This is not assured, but
even if only some of the Vision 2030 agenda is enacted then more
capital is likely to stay at home. One could also add the fact that
the authorities have demonstrated that they can tap external
capital markets, which will provide supportive inflows to the
balance of payments, though obviously these do generate
outflows on the current account and add to the external debt
stock.
While risks persist, we do expect NFA accumulation to continue
(and the exchange rate peg to remain in place)
Assuming the financial account outflows remain contained, and
the current account remains firmly in surplus, as we expect it to,
then official NFA should continue to be accumulated. By 2023 we
expect SAMA’s NFA to be approaching $770bn, or 90 percent of
GDP. Given this, it should be clear that we expect the exchange
rate peg to the dollar to remain in place.

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Saudi Arabia: Baseline Macroeconomic Forecast 2017 2018 2019f 2020f 2021f 2022f 2023f

Nominal GDP ($ bn) 684 698 706 740 777 816 856
GDP per capita ($ '000) 20,897 21,844 22,159 22,598 23,104 23,645 24,198
Real GDP (% change) -0.7 2.2 0.4 2.4 3.0 3.3 3.7
Hydrocarbon GDP -4.3 3.5 -2.7 1.5 1.0 1.5 1.5
Non-hydrocarbon GDP 1.1 1.3 2.5 3.0 4.2 4.4 4.9
Money supply, M2 (SR bn) 1791 1841 1951 2049 2192 2390 2605
% change 9.5 2.8 6.0 5.0 7.0 9.0 9.0
Commercial bank loans to private sector (SR bn) 1327 1366 1429 1514 1651 1849 2108
% change -0.7 2.9 4.6 6.0 9.0 12.0 14.0
3 month interbank rate (end year, percent) 1.9 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.4
CPI inflation (% change, average) -0.8 2.5 -0.4 2.5 3.0 3.1 3.1
Hydrocarbon exports ($ bn) 170.2 232.7 204.2 220.7 231.5 241.7 248.5
% change 25.0 36.7 -12.3 8.1 4.9 4.4 2.8
Current account balance ($ bn) 14.7 83.8 53.3 67.2 82.6 94.6 97.0
(% GDP) 2.1 12.0 7.5 9.1 10.6 11.6 11.3
Fiscal revenue (SR bn) 692.0 895.0 836.2 906.1 975.8 1061.7 1144.2
(% change) 33.2 29.3 -6.6 8.4 7.7 8.8 7.8
Fiscal spending (SR bn) 927.0 1032.0 1097.0 1147.4 1189.4 1222.4 1260.8
(% change) 11.7 11.3 6.3 4.6 3.7 2.8 3.1
of which, capital 205.0 205.0 221.4 230.3 239.5 249.0 261.5
(% change) 53.0 0.0 8.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 5.0
current 722.0 827.0 875.6 917.1 949.9 973.4 999.3
(% change) 3.7 14.5 5.9 4.7 3.6 2.5 2.7
Fiscal balance (SR bn) -235.0 -137.0 -260.8 -241.3 -213.6 -160.8 -116.6
(% GDP) -9.2 -5.2 -9.8 -8.7 -7.4 -5.4 -3.8
Public sector gross deposits with banking system (SR bn) 737.7 724.8 658.0 605.8 575.7 560.3 553.6
(% GDP) 28.8 27.7 24.8 21.8 20.0 18.9 18.2
Other public sector domestic deposits (SR bn) 1147.0 1225.7 1225.7 1225.7 1225.7 1225.7 1225.7
(% GDP) 44.7 46.8 46.3 44.2 42.5 41.3 40.3
Total public sector gross deposits with banking system (SR bn) 1884.7 1950.5 1883.7 1831.5 1801.4 1786.0 1779.3
(% GDP) 73.5 74.5 71.1 66.0 62.5 60.2 58.5

Memoranda:
Oil price (Brent; $/barrel) 54.0 71.0 64.5 67.3 69.0 70.0 70.0
Crude oil production ('000 b/d) 9,968 10,318 10,004 10,150 10,252 10,405 10,561
SAMA's net Foreign Assets ($ bn) 488.9 489.6 505.4 532.4 586.0 679.9 770.6
(% GDP) 71.5 70.1 71.6 72.0 75.4 83.4 90.0
Central government domestic debt (SR bn) 259.5 312.3 415.6 494.2 630.3 686.1 826.6
(% GDP) 10.1 11.9 15.7 17.8 21.9 23.1 27.2
Central government external debt ($ bn) 47.2 60.2 80.2 105.2 129.6 155.1 166.1
(% GDP) 6.9 8.6 11.4 14.2 16.9 19.6 20.5
Sources: SAMA; Ministry of Finance; General Statistics Authority; IMF; Samba.

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James Reeve
[email protected]

Disclaimer
This publication is based on information generally available to the public
from sources believed to be reliable and up to date at the time of
publication. However, SAMBA is unable to accept any liability
whatsoever for the accuracy or completeness of its contents or for the
consequences of any reliance which may be place upon the information
it contains. Additionally, the information and opinions contained herein:

1. Are not intended to be a complete or comprehensive study or to

provide advice and should not be treated as a substitute for specific
advice and due diligence concerning individual situations;
2. Are not intended to constitute any solicitation to buy or sell any
instrument or engage in any trading strategy; and/or
3. Are not intended to constitute a guarantee of future performance.

Accordingly, no representation or warranty is made or implied, in fact or

in law, including but not limited to the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose notwithstanding the
form (e.g., contract, negligence or otherwise), in which any legal or
equitable action may be brought against SAMBA.

Samba Financial Group

P.O. Box 833, Riyadh 11421 Saudi Arabia

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