Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of The Philippines vs. Duque III, 535 SCRA 265
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of The Philippines vs. Duque III, 535 SCRA 265
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of The Philippines vs. Duque III, 535 SCRA 265
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The Court and all parties involved are in agreement that the best nourishment for
an infant is mother's milk. There is nothing greater than for a mother to nurture
her beloved child straight from her bosom. The ideal is, of course, for each and
every Filipino child to enjoy the unequaled benefits of breastmilk. But how should
this end be attained?
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to nullify Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 2006-0012 entitled, Revised
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Executive Order No. 51, Otherwise
Known as The "Milk Code," Relevant International Agreements, Penalizing
Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes (RIRR). Petitioner posits that the
RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that are not constitutional and go
beyond the law it is supposed to implement.
Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on
October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president
under the Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code
states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 11 2 of the International Code of
Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World
Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several
Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and
protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not
permitted for breastmilk substitutes.
In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the
Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take
appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all
segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the
advantages of breastfeeding.
On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect
on July 7, 2006.
However, on June 28, 2006, petitioner, representing its members that are
manufacturers of breastmilk substitutes, filed the present Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
The main issue raised in the petition is whether respondents officers of the DOH
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and in violation of the provisions of the
Constitution in promulgating the RIRR.3
On August 15, 2006, the Court issued a Resolution granting a TRO enjoining
respondents from implementing the questioned RIRR.
After the Comment and Reply had been filed, the Court set the case for oral
arguments on June 19, 2007. The Court issued an Advisory (Guidance for Oral
Arguments) dated June 5, 2007, to wit:
2.1 Whether the RIRR is in accord with the provisions of Executive Order
No. 51 (Milk Code);
2.3 Whether Sections 4, 5(w), 22, 32, 47, and 52 of the RIRR violate the
due process clause and are in restraint of trade; and
_____________
1 (1) United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child; (2) the WHO
and Unicef "2002 Global Strategy on Infant and Young Child Feeding;"
and (3) various World Health Assembly (WHA) Resolutions.
The parties filed their respective memoranda.
With regard to the issue of whether petitioner may prosecute this case as the real
party-in-interest, the Court adopts the view enunciated in Executive Secretary v.
Court of Appeals,4 to wit:
xxxx
which was reasserted in Purok Bagong Silang Association, Inc. v. Yuipco,6 where
the Court ruled that an association has the legal personality to represent its
members because the results of the case will affect their vital interests. 7
Petitioner assails the RIRR for allegedly going beyond the provisions of the Milk
Code, thereby amending and expanding the coverage of said law. The defense of
the DOH is that the RIRR implements not only the Milk Code but also various
international instruments10 regarding infant and young child nutrition. It is
respondents' position that said international instruments are deemed part of the
law of the land and therefore the DOH may implement them through the RIRR.
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of
domestic law either by transformation or incorporation.11 The transformation
method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law
through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation
method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is
deemed to have the force of domestic law. 12
Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to
Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that "[n]o treaty or
international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at
least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate." Thus, treaties or conventional
international law must go through a process prescribed by the Constitution for it
to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts. 13
The ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are not treaties as they have not been
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all members of the Senate as required
under Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
However, the ICMBS which was adopted by the WHA in 1981 had been
transformed into domestic law through local legislation, the Milk Code.
Consequently, it is the Milk Code that has the force and effect of law in this
jurisdiction and not the ICMBS per se.
The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of the ICMBS, but it is well to
emphasize at this point that the Code did not adopt the provision in the ICMBS
absolutely prohibiting advertising or other forms of promotion to the general
public of products within the scope of the ICMBS. Instead, the Milk Code
expressly provides that advertising, promotion, or other marketing
materials may be allowed if such materials are duly authorized and
approved by the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC).
Some legal scholars and judges look upon certain "general principles of law" as a
primary source of international law because they have the "character of jus
rationale" and are "valid through all kinds of human societies." (Judge
Tanaka in his dissenting opinion in the 1966 South West Africa Case, 1966 I.C.J.
296). O'Connell holds that certain priniciples are part of international law
because they are "basic to legal systems generally" and hence part of the
jus gentium. These principles, he believes, are established by a process of
reasoning based on the common identity of all legal systems. If there should be
doubt or disagreement, one must look to state practice and determine whether
the municipal law principle provides a just and acceptable solution. x x
x 21 (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
The initial factor for determining the existence of custom is the actual
behavior of states. This includes several elements: duration, consistency,
and generality of the practice of states.
xxxx
xxxx
WHA Resolutions have not been embodied in any local legislation. Have they
attained the status of customary law and should they then be deemed
incorporated as part of the law of the land?
Article 19. The Health Assembly shall have authority to adopt conventions
or agreements with respect to any matter within the competence of the
Organization. A two-thirds vote of the Health Assembly shall be required
for the adoption of such conventions or agreements, which shall come
into force for each Member when accepted by it in accordance with
its constitutional processes.
Article 20. Each Member undertakes that it will, within eighteen months
after the adoption by the Health Assembly of a convention or
agreement, take action relative to the acceptance of such convention
or agreement. Each Member shall notify the Director-General of the
action taken, and if it does not accept such convention or agreement
within the time limit, it will furnish a statement of the reasons for non-
acceptance. In case of acceptance, each Member agrees to make an
annual report to the Director-General in accordance with Chapter XIV.
Article 21. The Health Assembly shall have authority to adopt regulations
concerning: (a) sanitary and quarantine requirements and other
procedures designed to prevent the international spread of disease; (b)
nomenclatures with respect to diseases, causes of death and public health
practices; (c) standards with respect to diagnostic procedures for
international use; (d) standards with respect to the safety, purity and
potency of biological, pharmaceutical and similar products moving in
international commerce; (e) advertising and labeling of biological,
pharmaceutical and similar products moving in international commerce.
On the other hand, under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not
come into force for members, in the same way that conventions or agreements
under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of
the WHO Constitution reads:
The former Senior Legal Officer of WHO, Sami Shubber, stated that WHA
recommendations are generally not binding, but they "carry moral and political
weight, as they constitute the judgment on a health issue of the collective
membership of the highest international body in the field of health." 29 Even the
ICMBS itself was adopted as a mere recommendation, as WHA Resolution No.
34.22 states:
Art. 62. Each member shall report annually on the action taken with
respect to recommendations made to it by the Organization, and with
respect to conventions, agreements and regulations.
Apparently, the WHA Resolution adopting the ICMBS and subsequent WHA
Resolutions urging member states to implement the ICMBS are merely
recommendatory and legally non-binding. Thus, unlike what has been done
with the ICMBS whereby the legislature enacted most of the provisions into
law which is the Milk Code, the subsequent WHA Resolutions, 30 specifically
providing for exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months, continued
breastfeeding up to 24 months, and absolutely prohibiting advertisements
and promotions of breastmilk substitutes, have not been adopted as a
domestic law.
"Soft law" does not fall into any of the categories of international law set forth in
Article 38, Chapter III of the 1946 Statute of the International Court of Justice. 32 It
is, however, an expression of non-binding norms, principles, and practices that
influence state behavior.33 Certain declarations and resolutions of the UN General
Assembly fall under this category. 34 The most notable is the UN Declaration of
Human Rights, which this Court has enforced in various cases,
specifically, Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v.
Olalia,35 Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,36 Mijares v. Rañada37 and Shangri-la
International Hotel Management, Ltd. v. Developers Group of Companies, Inc.. 38
WHO has resorted to soft law. This was most evident at the time of the Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Avian flu outbreaks.
Although the IHR Resolution does not create new international law
binding on WHO member states, it provides an excellent example of
the power of "soft law" in international relations. International
lawyers typically distinguish binding rules of international law-"hard
law"-from non-binding norms, principles, and practices that
influence state behavior-"soft law." WHO has during its existence
generated many soft law norms, creating a "soft law regime" in
international governance for public health.
The "soft law" SARS and IHR Resolutions represent significant steps in
laying the political groundwork for improved international cooperation on
infectious diseases. These resolutions clearly define WHO member states'
normative duty to cooperate fully with other countries and with WHO in
connection with infectious disease surveillance and response to
outbreaks.
This duty is neither binding nor enforceable, but, in the wake of the
SARS epidemic, the duty is powerful politically for two reasons. First,
the SARS outbreak has taught the lesson that participating in, and
enhancing, international cooperation on infectious disease controls is in a
country's self-interest x x x if this warning is heeded, the "soft law" in the
SARS and IHR Resolution could inform the development of general and
consistent state practice on infectious disease surveillance and outbreak
response, perhaps crystallizing eventually into customary international law
on infectious disease prevention and control. 41
It must be emphasized that even under such an international emergency, the duty
of a state to implement the IHR Resolution was still considered not binding or
enforceable, although said resolutions had great political influence.
Respondents submit that the national policy on infant and young child feeding is
embodied in A.O. No. 2005-0014, dated May 23, 2005. Basically, the
Administrative Order declared the following policy guidelines: (1) ideal
breastfeeding practices, such as early initiation of breastfeeding, exclusive
breastfeeding for the first six months, extended breastfeeding up to two years
and beyond; (2) appropriate complementary feeding, which is to start at age six
months; (3) micronutrient supplementation; (4) universal salt iodization; (5) the
exercise of other feeding options; and (6) feeding in exceptionally difficult
circumstances. Indeed, the primacy of breastfeeding for children is emphasized
as a national health policy. However, nowhere in A.O. No. 2005-0014 is it
declared that as part of such health policy, the advertisement or promotion
of breastmilk substitutes should be absolutely prohibited.
In view of the enactment of the Milk Code which does not contain a total ban on
the advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes, but instead, specifically
creates an IAC which will regulate said advertising and promotion, it follows that a
total ban policy could be implemented only pursuant to a law amending the Milk
Code passed by the constitutionally authorized branch of government, the
legislature.
Thus, only the provisions of the Milk Code, but not those of subsequent WHA
Resolutions, can be validly implemented by the DOH through the subject RIRR.
Third, the Court will now determine whether the provisions of the RIRR are in
accordance with those of the Milk Code.
In support of its claim that the RIRR is inconsistent with the Milk Code, petitioner
alleges the following:
1. The Milk Code limits its coverage to children 0-12 months old, but the
RIRR extended its coverage to "young children" or those from ages two years
old and beyond:
MILK CODE RIRR
WHEREAS, in order to ensure that safe Section 2. Purpose – These Revised
and adequate nutrition for infants is Rules and Regulations are hereby
provided, there is a need to protect and promulgated to ensure the provision of
promote breastfeeding and to inform the safe and adequate nutrition for infants and
public about the proper use of breastmilk young children by the promotion, protectio
substitutes and supplements and related and support of breastfeeding and by
products through adequate, consistent and ensuring the proper use of breastmilk
objective information and appropriate substitutes, breastmilk supplements and
regulation of the marketing and distribution related products when these are medically
of the said substitutes, supplements and indicated and only when necessary, on the
related products; basis of adequate information and through
appropriate marketing and distribution.
SECTION 4(e). "Infant" means a person
falling within the age bracket of 0-12 Section 5(ff). "Young Child" means a
months. person from the age of more than twelve
(12) months up to the age of three (3)
years (36 months).
2. The Milk Code recognizes that infant formula may be a proper and possible
substitute for breastmilk in certain instances; but the RIRR provides
"exclusive breastfeeding for infants from 0-6 months" and declares that "there
is no substitute nor replacement for breastmilk":
3. The Milk Code only regulates and does not impose unreasonable
requirements for advertising and promotion; RIRR imposes an absolute ban on
such activities for breastmilk substitutes intended for infants from 0-24 months
old or beyond, and forbids the use of health and nutritional claims. Section 13
of the RIRR, which provides for a "total effect" in the promotion of products
within the scope of the Code, is vague:
4. The RIRR imposes additional labeling requirements not found in the Milk
Code:
(iii) a statement that the product shall be (e) Instructions for appropriate prepara-
used only on the advice of a health worker tion, and a warning against the health
as to the need for its use and the proper
methods of use; and hazards of inappropriate preparation; and
(iv) instructions for appropriate preparation, (f) The health hazards of unnecessary or
and a warning against the health hazards improper use of infant formula and other
of inappropriate preparation. related products including information that
powdered infant formula may contain
pathogenic microorganisms and must be
prepared and used appropriately.
(b) Information provided by manufacturers SECTION 16. All health and nutrition
and distributors to health professionals claims for products within the scope of the
regarding products within the scope of this Code are absolutely prohibited. For this
Code shall be restricted to scientific and purpose, any phrase or words that
factual matters and such information shall connotes to increase emotional, intellectua
not imply or create a belief that bottle- abilities of the infant and young child and
feeding is equivalent or superior to other like phrases shall not be allowed.
breastfeeding. It shall also include the
information specified in Section 5(b).
(e) Manufacturers and distributors of The following are the underlying principles
products within the scope of this Code may from which the revised rules and
assist in the research, scholarships and regulations are premised upon:
continuing education, of health
professionals, in accordance with the rules i. Milk companies, and their
and regulations promulgated by the representatives, should not form part of
Ministry of Health. any policymaking body or entity in relation
to the advancement of breasfeeding.
7. The Milk Code regulates the giving of donations; RIRR absolutely prohibits
it.
The Court shall resolve the merits of the allegations of petitioner seriatim.
1. Petitioner is mistaken in its claim that the Milk Code's coverage is limited only
to children 0-12 months old. Section 3 of the Milk Code states:
SECTION 3. Scope of the Code – The Code applies to the marketing, and
practices related thereto, of the following products: breastmilk substitutes,
including infant formula; other milk products, foods and beverages,
including bottle-fed complementary foods, when marketed or otherwise
represented to be suitable, with or without modification, for use as a partial
or total replacement of breastmilk; feeding bottles and teats. It also applies
to their quality and availability, and to information concerning their use.
Clearly, the coverage of the Milk Code is not dependent on the age of the child
but on the kind of product being marketed to the public. The law treats infant
formula, bottle-fed complementary food, and breastmilk substitute as separate
and distinct product categories.
Section 4(h) of the Milk Code defines infant formula as "a breastmilk substitute x
x x to satisfy the normal nutritional requirements of infants up to between four to
six months of age, and adapted to their physiological characteristics"; while under
Section 4(b), bottle-fed complementary food refers to "any food, whether
manufactured or locally prepared, suitable as a complement to breastmilk or
infant formula, when either becomes insufficient to satisfy the nutritional
requirements of the infant." An infant under Section 4(e) is a person falling within
the age bracket 0-12 months. It is the nourishment of this group of infants or
children aged 0-12 months that is sought to be promoted and protected by the
Milk Code.
But there is another target group. Breastmilk substitute is defined under Section
4(a) as "any food being marketed or otherwise presented as a partial or total
replacement for breastmilk, whether or not suitable for that purpose." This
section conspicuously lacks reference to any particular age-group of
children. Hence, the provision of the Milk Code cannot be considered
exclusive for children aged 0-12 months. In other words, breastmilk substitutes
may also be intended for young children more than 12 months of age. Therefore,
by regulating breastmilk substitutes, the Milk Code also intends to protect and
promote the nourishment of children more than 12 months old.
Evidently, as long as what is being marketed falls within the scope of the Milk
Code as provided in Section 3, then it can be subject to regulation pursuant to
said law, even if the product is to be used by children aged over 12 months.
There is, therefore, nothing objectionable with Sections 2 42 and 5(ff)43 of the RIRR.
2. It is also incorrect for petitioner to say that the RIRR, unlike the Milk Code,
does not recognize that breastmilk substitutes may be a proper and possible
substitute for breastmilk.
The entirety of the RIRR, not merely truncated portions thereof, must be
considered and construed together. As held in De Luna v. Pascual,44 "[t]he
particular words, clauses and phrases in the Rule should not be studied as
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a
harmonious whole."
Section 7 of the RIRR provides that "when medically indicated and only when
necessary, the use of breastmilk substitutes is proper if based on complete
and updated information." Section 8 of the RIRR also states that information and
educational materials should include information on the proper use of infant
formula when the use thereof is needed.
Hence, the RIRR, just like the Milk Code, also recognizes that in certain
cases, the use of breastmilk substitutes may be proper.
3. The Court shall ascertain the merits of allegations 3 45 and 446 together as they
are interlinked with each other.
Health is a legitimate subject matter for regulation by the DOH (and certain other
administrative agencies) in exercise of police powers delegated to it. The sheer
span of jurisprudence on that matter precludes the need to further discuss
it..48 However, health information, particularly advertising materials on apparently
non-toxic products like breastmilk substitutes and supplements, is a relatively
new area for regulation by the DOH.49
Seventy years later, the 1987 Administrative Code tasked respondent DOH to
carry out the state policy pronounced under Section 15, Article II of the 1987
Constitution, which is "to protect and promote the right to health of the people
and instill health consciousness among them."52 To that end, it was granted
under Section 3 of the Administrative Code the power to "(6) propagate health
information and educate the population on important health, medical and
environmental matters which have health implications." 53
xxxx
xxxx
Further, DOH is authorized by the Milk Code to control the content of any
information on breastmilk vis-à-vis breastmilk substitutes, supplement and related
products, in the following manner:
SECTION 5. x x x
xxxx
xxxx
The DOH is also authorized to control the purpose of the information and to
whom such information may be disseminated under Sections 6 through 9 of the
Milk Code54 to ensure that the information that would reach pregnant women,
mothers of infants, and health professionals and workers in the health care
system is restricted to scientific and factual matters and shall not imply or create
a belief that bottlefeeding is equivalent or superior to breastfeeding.
It bears emphasis, however, that the DOH's power under the Milk Code
to control information regarding breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes is not
absolute as the power to control does not encompass the power to absolutely
prohibit the advertising, marketing, and promotion of breastmilk substitutes.
The following are the provisions of the Milk Code that unequivocally indicate that
the control over information given to the DOH is not absolute and that absolute
prohibition is not contemplated by the Code:
c) Section 5(a) which provides that the government shall ensure that
objective and consistent information is provided on infant feeding;
f) Section 8(b) which states that milk companies may provide information
to health professionals but such information should be restricted to factual
and scientific matters and shall not imply or create a belief that
bottlefeeding is equivalent or superior to breastfeeding; and
It is in this context that the Court now examines the assailed provisions of the
RIRR regarding labeling and advertising.
Sections 1355 on "total effect" and 2656 of Rule VII of the RIRR contain some
labeling requirements, specifically: a) that there be a statement that there is no
substitute to breastmilk; and b) that there be a statement that powdered infant
formula may contain pathogenic microorganisms and must be prepared and used
appropriately. Section 1657 of the RIRR prohibits all health and nutrition claims for
products within the scope of the Milk Code, such as claims of increased
emotional and intellectual abilities of the infant and young child.
These requirements and limitations are consistent with the provisions of Section
8 of the Milk Code, to wit:
SECTION 8. Health workers -
xxxx
and Section 10(d)59 which bars the use on containers and labels of the terms
"humanized," "maternalized," or similar terms.
These provisions of the Milk Code expressly forbid information that would imply
or create a belief that there is any milk product equivalent to breastmilk or which
is humanized or maternalized, as such information would be inconsistent with the
superiority of breastfeeding.
It may be argued that Section 8 of the Milk Code refers only to information given
to health workers regarding breastmilk substitutes, not to containers and labels
thereof. However, such restrictive application of Section 8(b) will result in the
absurd situation in which milk companies and distributors are forbidden to claim
to health workers that their products are substitutes or equivalents of breastmilk,
and yet be allowed to display on the containers and labels of their products the
exact opposite message. That askewed interpretation of the Milk Code is
precisely what Section 5(a) thereof seeks to avoid by mandating that all
information regarding breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes be consistent,
at the same time giving the government control over planning, provision, design,
and dissemination of information on infant feeding.
Thus, Section 26(c) of the RIRR which requires containers and labels to state
that the product offered is not a substitute for breastmilk, is a reasonable means
of enforcing Section 8(b) of the Milk Code and deterring circumvention of the
protection and promotion of breastfeeding as embodied in Section 2 60 of the Milk
Code.
SECTION 5. x x x
xxxx
The label of a product contains information about said product intended for the
buyers thereof. The buyers of breastmilk substitutes are mothers of infants, and
Section 26 of the RIRR merely adds a fair warning about the likelihood of
pathogenic microorganisms being present in infant formula and other related
products when these are prepared and used inappropriately.
Petitioner’s counsel has admitted during the hearing on June 19, 2007 that
formula milk is prone to contaminations and there is as yet no technology that
allows production of powdered infant formula that eliminates all forms of
contamination.62
Ineluctably, the requirement under Section 26(f) of the RIRR for the label to
contain the message regarding health hazards including the possibility of
contamination with pathogenic microorganisms is in accordance with Section 5(b)
of the Milk Code.
the Milk Code invested regulatory authority over advertising, promotional and
marketing materials to an IAC, thus:
xxxx
Yet, oddly enough, Section 12 of the RIRR reiterated the requirement of the Milk
Code in Section 6 thereof for prior approval by IAC of all advertising, marketing
and promotional materials prior to dissemination.
Even respondents, through the OSG, acknowledged the authority of IAC, and
repeatedly insisted, during the oral arguments on June 19, 2007, that the
prohibition under Section 11 is not actually operational, viz:
xxxx
We have to read Section 11 together with the other Sections because the
other Section, Section 12, provides for the inter agency committee that is
empowered to process and evaluate all the advertising and promotion
materials.
xxxx
What AO 2006-12, what it does, it does not prohibit the sale and
manufacture, it simply regulates the advertisement and the promotions of
breastfeeding milk substitutes.
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
x x x Don't you think that the Department of Health overstepped its rule
making authority when it totally banned advertising and promotion under
Section 11 prescribed the total effect rule as well as the content of
materials under Section 13 and 15 of the rules and regulations?
Your Honor, please, first we would like to stress that there is no total
absolute ban. Second, the Inter-Agency Committee is under the
Department of Health, Your Honor.
xxxx
It's not an absolute ban, Your Honor, because we have the Inter-Agency
Committee that can evaluate some advertising and promotional materials,
subject to the standards that we have stated earlier, which are- they
should not undermine breastfeeding, Your Honor.
xxxx
x x x Section 11, while it is titled Prohibition, it must be taken in relation
with the other Sections, particularly 12 and 13 and 15, Your Honor,
because it is recognized that the Inter-Agency Committee has that power
to evaluate promotional materials, Your Honor.
We can proudly say that the general rule is that there is a prohibition,
however, we take exceptions and standards have been set. One of which
is that, the Inter-Agency Committee can allow if the advertising and
promotions will not undermine breastmilk and breastfeeding, Your Honor. 63
Sections 11 and 4(f) of the RIRR are clearly violative of the Milk Code.
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
(b) Each container shall have a clear, conspicuous and easily readable
and understandable message in Pilipino or English printed on it, or on a
label, which message can not readily become separated from it, and
which shall include the following points:
(iii) a statement that the product shall be used only on the advice of
a health worker as to the need for its use and the proper methods
of use; and
Section 12(b) of the Milk Code designates the DOH as the principal implementing
agency for the enforcement of the provisions of the Code. In relation to such
responsibility of the DOH, Section 5(a) of the Milk Code states that:
Thus, the DOH has the significant responsibility to translate into operational
terms the standards set forth in Sections 5, 8, and 10 of the Milk Code, by
which the IAC shall screen advertising, promotional, or other marketing
materials.
It is pursuant to such responsibility that the DOH correctly provided for Section 13
in the RIRR which reads as follows:
Such standards bind the IAC in formulating its rules and regulations on
advertising, promotion, and marketing. Through that single provision, the DOH
exercises control over the information content of advertising, promotional and
marketing materials on breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes, supplements
and other related products. It also sets a viable standard against which the IAC
may screen such materials before they are made public.
In Equi-Asia Placement, Inc. vs. Department of Foreign Affairs,64 the Court held:
In this case, correct information as to infant feeding and nutrition is infused with
public interest and welfare.
Contrary to petitioner's claim, Section 22 of the RIRR does not prohibit the giving
of information to health professionals on scientific and factual matters.
What it prohibits is the involvement of the manufacturer and distributor of the
products covered by the Code in activities for the promotion, education and
production of Information, Education and Communication (IEC) materials
regarding breastfeeding that are intended for women and children. Said
provision cannot be construed to encompass even the dissemination of
information to health professionals, as restricted by the Milk Code.
5. Next, petitioner alleges that Section 8(e) 68 of the Milk Code permits milk
manufacturers and distributors to extend assistance in research and in the
continuing education of health professionals, while Sections 22 and 32 of the
RIRR absolutely forbid the same. Petitioner also assails Section 4(i) 69 of the RIRR
prohibiting milk manufacturers' and distributors' participation in any policymaking
body in relation to the advancement of breastfeeding.
Section 4(i) of the RIRR provides that milk companies and their representatives
should not form part of any policymaking body or entity in relation to the
advancement of breastfeeding. The Court finds nothing in said provisions which
contravenes the Milk Code. Note that under Section 12(b) of the Milk Code, it
is the DOH which shall be principally responsible for the implementation and
enforcement of the provisions of said Code. It is entirely up to the DOH to decide
which entities to call upon or allow to be part of policymaking bodies on
breastfeeding. Therefore, the RIRR's prohibition on milk companies’ participation
in any policymaking body in relation to the advancement of breastfeeding is in
accord with the Milk Code.
Petitioner is also mistaken in arguing that Section 22 of the RIRR prohibits milk
companies from giving reasearch assistance and continuing education to health
professionals. Section 2270 of the RIRR does not pertain to research
assistance to or the continuing education of health professionals; rather, it
deals with breastfeeding promotion and education for women and children.
Nothing in Section 22 of the RIRR prohibits milk companies from giving
assistance for research or continuing education to health professionals; hence,
petitioner's argument against this particular provision must be struck down.
It is Sections 971 and 1072 of the RIRR which govern research assistance. Said
sections of the RIRR provide that research assistance for health workers and
researchers may be allowed upon approval of an ethics committee, and
with certain disclosure requirements imposed on the milk company and on
the recipient of the research award.
The Milk Code endows the DOH with the power to determine how such research
or educational assistance may be given by milk companies or under what
conditions health workers may accept the assistance. Thus, Sections 9 and 10 of
the RIRR imposing limitations on the kind of research done or extent of
assistance given by milk companies are completely in accord with the Milk Code.
Petitioner complains that Section 3273 of the RIRR prohibits milk companies from
giving assistance, support, logistics or training to health workers. This provision is
within the prerogative given to the DOH under Section 8(e) 74 of the Milk Code,
which provides that manufacturers and distributors of breastmilk
substitutes may assist in researches, scholarships and the continuing education,
of health professionals in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated
by the Ministry of Health, now DOH.
It was within the discretion of the DOH when it provided in Section 52 of the RIRR
that any donation from milk companies not covered by the Code should be
coursed through the IAC which shall determine whether such donation should be
accepted or refused. As reasoned out by respondents, the DOH is not mandated
by the Milk Code to accept donations. For that matter, no person or entity can be
forced to accept a donation. There is, therefore, no real inconsistency between
the RIRR and the law because the Milk Code does not prohibit the DOH from
refusing donations.
In the present case, neither the Milk Code nor the Revised Administrative Code
grants the DOH the authority to fix or impose administrative fines. Thus, without
any express grant of power to fix or impose such fines, the DOH cannot provide
for those fines in the RIRR. In this regard, the DOH again exceeded its authority
by providing for such fines or sanctions in Section 46 of the RIRR. Said provision
is, therefore, null and void.
The DOH is not left without any means to enforce its rules and regulations.
Section 12(b) (3) of the Milk Code authorizes the DOH to "cause the prosecution
of the violators of this Code and other pertinent laws on products covered by this
Code." Section 13 of the Milk Code provides for the penalties to be imposed on
violators of the provision of the Milk Code or the rules and regulations issued
pursuant to it, to wit:
(a) Any person who violates the provisions of this Code or the rules and
regulations issued pursuant to this Code shall, upon conviction, be
punished by a penalty of two (2) months to one (1) year imprisonment or a
fine of not less than One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) nor more than
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) or both. Should the offense be
committed by a juridical person, the chairman of the Board of Directors,
the president, general manager, or the partners and/or the persons directly
responsible therefor, shall be penalized.
(b) Any license, permit or authority issued by any government agency to
any health worker, distributor, manufacturer, or marketing firm or
personnel for the practice of their profession or occupation, or for the
pursuit of their business, may, upon recommendation of the Ministry of
Health, be suspended or revoked in the event of repeated violations of this
Code, or of the rules and regulations issued pursuant to this Code.
(Emphasis supplied)
8. Petitioner’s claim that Section 57 of the RIRR repeals existing laws that are
contrary to the RIRR is frivolous.
Section 57 reads:
SECTION 57. Repealing Clause - All orders, issuances, and rules and
regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with these revised rules and
implementing regulations are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 57 of the RIRR does not provide for the repeal of laws but only orders,
issuances and rules and regulations. Thus, said provision is valid as it is within
the DOH's rule-making power.
In fine, only Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 are ultra vires, beyond the authority of the
DOH to promulgate and in contravention of the Milk Code and, therefore, null and
void. The rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in consonance with the Milk
Code.
Petitioner refers to Sections 4(f), 82 4(i),83 5(w),84 11,85 22,86 32,87 46,88 and 5289 as the
provisions that suppress the trade of milk and, thus, violate the due process
clause of the Constitution.
The framers of the constitution were well aware that trade must be subjected to
some form of regulation for the public good. Public interest must be upheld over
business interests.90 In Pest Management Association of the Philippines v.
Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority,91 it was held thus:
In this case, petitioner failed to show that the proscription of milk manufacturers’
participation in any policymaking body (Section 4(i)), classes and seminars for
women and children (Section 22); the giving of assistance, support and logistics
or training (Section 32); and the giving of donations (Section 52) would
unreasonably hamper the trade of breastmilk substitutes. Petitioner has not
established that the proscribed activities are indispensable to the trade of
breastmilk substitutes. Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the aforementioned
provisions of the RIRR are unreasonable and oppressive for being in restraint of
trade.
Petitioner also failed to convince the Court that Section 5(w) of the RIRR is
unreasonable and oppressive. Said section provides for the definition of the term
"milk company," to wit:
xxxx
Since all the regulatory provisions under the Milk Code apply equally to both
manufacturers and distributors, the Court sees no harm in the RIRR providing for
just one term to encompass both entities. The definition of "milk company" in the
RIRR and the definitions of "distributor" and "manufacturer" provided for under
the Milk Code are practically the same.
The Court is not convinced that the definition of "milk company" provided in the
RIRR would bring about any change in the treatment or regulation of "distributors"
and "manufacturers" of breastmilk substitutes, as defined under the Milk Code.
Except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in
consonance with the objective, purpose and intent of the Milk Code, constituting
reasonable regulation of an industry which affects public health and welfare and,
as such, the rest of the RIRR do not constitute illegal restraint of trade nor are
they violative of the due process clause of the Constitution.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on August 15, 2006 is LIFTED insofar
as the rest of the provisions of Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 is concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
1
Section 11, Rule 3, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provides:
xxxx
3
Petition, rollo, p. 12.
4
G.R. No. 131719, May 25, 2004, 429 SCRA 81.
5
Id. at 96-97.
6
G.R. No. 135092, May 4, 2006, 489 SCRA 382.
7
Id. at 396.
8
Annex "G", Petitioner's Memorandum dated July 19, 2007.
9
Annexes "H", "I", and "J" of Petitioner's Memorandum executed by Wyeth
Philippines, Inc., Bristol Myers Squibb (Phil.), Inc., and Abbott
Laboratories, Inc., respectively.
10
a) The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); b) the
International Code of Marketing Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS); c) the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CSCR);
d) the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW); e) the Global Strategy for Infant and Young Child
Nutrition (Global Strategy); and f) various resolutions adopted by the
World Health Assembly.
12
Id.
14
According to Fr. Bernas, the Austrian Constitution (Art. 9) and the
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (Art. 25) also use the
incorporation method.
15
G.R. No. 139325, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 397.
16
Id. at 421.
Ed., p. 526.
18
Id. at 525.
20
Tañada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546, 592 (1997).
22
Supra note 13, at 10-13.
23
Minucher v. Court of Appeals, 445 Phil. 250, 269 (2003).
24
Article 57. The various specialized agencies, established by
intergovernmental agreement and having wide international
responsibilities, as defined in their basic instruments, in economic, social,
cultural, educational, health, and related fields, shall be brought into
relationship with the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of
Article 63.
Such agencies thus brought into relationship with the United Nations are
hereinafter referred to as specialized agencies.
Article 63. The Economic and Social Council may enter into agreements
25
with any of the agencies referred to in Article 57, defining the terms on
which the agency concerned shall be brought into relationship with the
United Nations. Such agreements shall be subject to approval by the
General Assembly.
Article 18. The functions of the Health Assembly shall be: (a) to
26
27
Article 21. The Health Assembly shall have authority to adopt regulations
concerning: x x x (e) advertising and labeling of biological, pharmaceutical
and similar products moving in international commerce. (Emphasis
supplied)
28
Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make
recommendations to Members with respect to any matter within the
competence of the Organization. (Emphasis supplied)
29
See David Fidler, Developments Involving SARS, International Law, and
Infectious Disease Control at the Fifty-Sixth Meeting of the World Health
Assembly, June 2003, ASIL.
In Resolution No. 34.22 (May 21, 1981), the WHA, acting under Article
30
(a) In Resolution No. 35.26 (May 1982), the WHA urged member
states to implement the ICBMS as a "minimum requirement".
(b) In Resolution No. 39.28 (May 16, 1986), the WHA requested
the WHO Director General to direct the attention of member states
to the fact that any food or drink given before complementary
feeding is nutritionally required may interfere with the initiation or
maintenance of breastfeeding and therefore should neither be
promoted nor encouraged for us by infants during this period.
(c) In Resolution No. 43.3 (May 14, 1990), the WHA urged
member states to protect and promote breastfeeding as an
essential component of nutrition policies so as to enable infants to
be exclusively breastfed during the first four to six months of life.
(d) In Resolution No. 45.34 (May 14, 1992), the WHA urged
member states to implement the targets of the Innocenti
Declaration specifically, to give effect to the ICMBS.
(e) In Resolution No. 46.7 (May 10, 1993), the WHA urged
member states to strive to eliminate under-nutrition, malnutrition
and nutritional deficiency among children.
(f) In Resolution No. 47.5 (May 9, 1994), the WHA urged member
states to ensure that there are no donations of supplies of
breastmilk substitutes and other products covered by the ICMBS in
any part of the health care system.
(g) In Resolution No. 49.15 (May 25, 1996), the WHA urged
member states to ensure that complementary foods are not
marketed for or used in ways that undermine exclusive and
sustained breastfeeding.
(h) In Resolution No. 54.2 (May 2002), the WHA, noting that
"despite the fact that the International Code of Marketing of
Breastmilk Substitutes and relevant subsequent World Health
Assembly resolutions state that there should be no advertising or
other forms of promotion of products within its scope, new modern
communication methods including electronic means, are currently
increasingly being used to promote such products; and conscious
of the need for the Codex Alimentarius Commission to take the
International Code and subsequent relevant Health Assembly
resolutions into consideration in dealing with health claims in the
development of food standards and guidelines x x x," urged
member states to develop new approaches to protect, promote and
support exclusive breastfeeding for six months as a global public
health recommendation.
(i) In Resolution No. 55.25 (May 15, 2002), the WHA requested
the Codex Alimentarius Commission to ensure that labelling of
processed foods for infants and young children be consistent with
the WHO policy under the ICBMS.
(j) In Resolution No. 58.32 (May 25, 2005), the WHA urged
member states to continue to protect and promote exclusive
breastfeeding for six months.
(k) In Resolution No. 59.21 (May 27, 2006), the WHA reiterated its
support for the Gobal strategy for Infant and Young Child Feeding.
31
David Fidler, supra note 29.
32
Article 38. 1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: a)
international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states; b) international custom, as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c) the general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations; d) subject to the provisions of Article
59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law.
33
Supra note 29.
34
Louis Henkin, et al., International Law, Cases and Materials, 2nd Ed.,
supra note 21, at 114-136.
35
Supra note 19.
36
90 Phil. 70 (1951).
37
Supra note 15.
38
G.R. No. 159938, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 405.
39
Edward Kwakwa, Some Comments on Rulemaking at the World
Intellectual Property Organization, www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite;
September 13, 2007, 12:33, citing the 1999 WIPO Resolution Concerning
Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks, 2000 WIPO
Recommendation Concerning Trademark Licenses, and 2001 WIPO
Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Marks and
other Industrial Property Rights in Signs on the Internet.
40
Id.
41
Supra note 29.
42
Section 2. Purpose – These Revised Rules and Regulations are hereby
promulgated to ensure the provision of safe and adequate nutrition for
infants and young children by the promotion, protection and support of
breastfeeding and by ensuring the proper use of breastmilk substitutes,
breastmilk supplements and related products when these are medically
indicated and only when necessary, on the basis of adequate information
and through appropriate marketing and distribution. (Underscoring
supplied)
43
Section 5(ff). "Young Child" means a person from the age of more than
twelve (12) months up to the age of three (3) years (36
months). (Underscoring supplied)
44
G.R. No. 144218, July 14, 2006, 495 SCRA 42, 55.
45
See pp. 19-21.
46
See p. 21.
48
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 US 11 (1905); Beltran v. Secretary of
Health G.R. No. 133640, November 25, 2005, 476 SCRA 168, 196; St.
Lukes’s Medical Center Employees Association- AFW v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 162053, March 7, 2007; Tablarin v.
Gutierrez, G.R. No. L-78164, July 31, 1987, 152 SCRA 730, 741; Pollution
Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93891, March 11, 1991,
195 SCRA 112, 123-124; Rivera v. Campbell, 34 Phil. 348, 353-354
(1916); Lorenzo v. Director of Health, 50 Phil. 595, 597 (1927).
49
As early as People v. Pomar, 46 Phil. 440, 445 (1924), we already noted
that "advancing civilization is bringing within the scope of police
power of the state today things which were not thought of as being
with in such power yesterday. The development of civilization, the
rapidly increasing population, the growth of public opinion, with [an
increasing] desire on the part of the masses and of the government to look
after and care for the interests of the individuals of the state, have brought
within the police power of the state many questions for regulation which
formerly were not so considered."
50
Act No. 2711, approved on March 10, 1917.
51
Known then as Public Health Service
52
Section 1, Chapter I, Title IX, Executive Order No. 292.
53
Id. at Section 3.
54
SECTION 6. The General Public and Mothers –
(b) No facility of the health care system shall be used for the
purpose of promoting infant formula or other products within the
scope of this Code. This Code does not, however, preclude the
dissemination of information to health professionals as provided in
Section 8(b).
(c) Facilities of the health care system shall not be used for the
display of products within the scope of this Code, or for placards or
posters concerning such products.
(e) In health education classes for mothers and the general public,
health workers and community workers shall emphasize the
hazards and risks of the improper use of breastmilk substitutes
particularly infant formula. Feeding with infant formula shall be
demonstrated only to mothers who may not be able to breastfeed
for medical or other legitimate reasons.
55
See p. 20.
56
See p. 21.
57
SECTION 16. All health and nutrition claims for products within the
scope of the Code are absolutely prohibited. For this purpose, any phrase
or words that connotes to increase emotional, intellectual abilities of the
infant and young child and other like phrases shall not be allowed.
58
See p. 30.
59
SECTION 10. Containers/Label –
xxxx
60
SECTION 2. Aim of the Code – The aim of the Code is to contribute to
the provision of safe and adequate nutrition for infants by the protection
and promotion of breastfeeding and by ensuring the proper use of
breastmilk substitutes and breastmilk supplements when these are
necessary, on the basis of adequate information and through appropriate
marketing and distribution.
61
SECTION 26. Content – Each container/label shall contain such
message, in both Filipino and English languages, and which message
cannot be readily separated therefrom, relative the following points:
xxxx
62
TSN of the hearing of June 19, 2007, pp. 114-120.
TSN of June 19, 2007 hearing, pp. 193-194, 198, 231, 237-240, 295-
63
300.
64
G.R. No. 152214, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 295.
65
Id. at 314.
66
SECTION 7. Health Care System –
xxxx
(b) No facility of the health care system shall be used for the
purpose of promoting infant formula or other products within the
scope of this Code. This Code does not, however, preclude the
dissemination of information to health professionals as provided in
Section 8(b).
67
SECTION 8. Health Workers. -
xxxx
68
SECTION 8. Health Workers -
xxxx
69
SECTION 4. Declaration of Principles – The following are the underlying
principles from which the revised rules and regulations are premised upon:
xxxx
(i) Milk companies, and their representatives, should not form part
of any policymaking body or entity in relation to the advancement of
breastfeeding.
70
SECTION 22. No manufacturer, distributor, or representatives of
products covered by the Code shall be allowed to conduct or be involved
in any activity on breastfeeding promotion, education and production of
Information, Education and Communication (IEC) materials on
breastfeeding, holding of or participating as speakers in classes or
seminars for women and children activities and to avoid the use of these
venues to market their brands or company names.
71
SECTION 9. Research, Ethics Committee, Purpose - The DOH shall
ensure that research conducted for public policy purposes, relating to
infant and young child feeding should, at all times, be free form any
commercial influence/bias; accordingly, the health worker or researcher
involved in such must disclose any actual or potential conflict of interest
with the company/person funding the research. In any event, such
research and its findings shall be subjected to independent peer review. x
x x.
72
SECTION 10. Public Disclosure – For transparency purposes, a
disclosure and/or disclaimer of the sponsoring company should be done
by the company itself, health worker, researcher involved through verbal
declaration during the public presentation of the research and in print upon
publication.
73
SECTION 32. Primary Responsibility of Health Workers – It is the
primary responsibility of the health workers to promote, protect and
support breastfeeding and appropriate infant and young child feeding. Part
of this responsibility is to continuously update their knowledge and skills
on breastfeeding. No assistance, support, logistics or training from milk
companies shall be permitted.
74
Supra note 68.
75
SECTION 51. Donations Within the Scope of This Code - Donations of
products, materials, defined and covered under the Milk Code and these
implementing rules and regulations, shall be strictly prohibited.
76
159-A Phil. 142 (1975).
77
G.R. No. 159149, June 26, 2006, 492 SCRA 638.
79
Yazaki Torres Manufacturing, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130584,
June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA 86, 97.
80
Supra note 78, at 156.
81
Petitioner's Memorandum.
82
SECTION 4. Declaration of Principles – The following are the underlying
principles from which the revised rules and regulations are premised upon:
xxxx
83
SECTION 4. Declaration of Principles – x x x
(i) Milk companies, and their representatives, should not form part
of any policymaking body or entity in relation to the advancement of
breastfeeding.
84
SECTION 5. x x x x (w) "Milk Company" shall refer to the owner,
manufacturer, distributor, of infant formula, follow-up milk, milk formula,
milk supplement, breastmilk substitute or replacement, or by any other
description of such nature, including their representatives who promote or
otherwise advance their commercial interests in marketing those products;
x x x.
85
SECTION 11. Prohibition – No advertising, promotions, sponsorships, or
marketing materials and activities for breastmilk substitutes intended for
infants and young children up to twenty-four (24) months, shall be allowed,
because they tend to convey or give subliminal messages or impressions
that undermine breastmilk and breastfeeding or otherwise exaggerate
breastmilk substitutes and/or replacements, as well as related products
covered within the scope of this Code.
86
Supra note 70.
87
Supra note 73.
88
SECTION 46. Administrative Sanctions. – The following administrative
sanctions shall be imposed upon any person, juridical or natural, found to
have violated the provisions of the Code and its implementing Rules and
Regulations:
89
SECTION 52. Other Donations By Milk Companies Not Covered by this
Code - Donations of products, equipments, and the like, not otherwise
falling within the scope of this Code or these Rules, given by milk
companies and their agents, representatives, whether in kind or in cash,
may only be coursed through the Inter Agency Committee (IAC), which
shall determine whether such donation be accepted or otherwise.
90
Eastern Assurance & Surety Corporation v. Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board, 459 Phil. 395, 399 (2003).
91
G.R. No. 156041, February 21, 2007