Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Metro Manila

ASIALINK FINANCE G. R. No. ______________

CORPORATION (REP. BY RYAN
V. DEL MUNDO
Petitioner,

-versus-
FEBIE BARTOLIN YANO AND
JESUS and CALOTA
MADRIAGA,
Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -//

COMMENT and/or OPPOSITION

to Petitioner’s
Petition for Review on Certiorari

Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the

adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are
thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. And
while the Supreme Court, in some instances, allows a
relaxation in the application of the rules, this, [the
Supreme Court] stress, was never intended to forge a
bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with
impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and
application of the rules applies only in proper cases
and under justifiable causes and circumstances.
While it is true that litigation is not a game of
technicalities, it is equally true that every case
must be prosecuted in accordance with the
prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and
speedy administration of justice.1

1
Garbo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107698, July 5, 1996.
1
 COME NOW, Respondents, Spouses Jesus and Carlota
Madriaga, through the undersigned counsel and unto this
Honorable Supreme Court, most respectfully submit this
Comment And/Or Opposition to Petitioner’s Petition for
Review on Certiorari, stating among others, that:

PRELIMINARY

1. This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the

Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to review and set aside the Resolutions2 issued
by the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the appeal
of the petitioner on the ground of failure to comply
with the directive of the Court of Appeals.

2. This petition arose from a case of sum of money with

damages filed the petitioner (then complainant)
against the respondents (then defendants) before the
Regional Trial Court – Branch 8, Malaybalay City,
Bukidnon. For several times, from the trial court up to
the Court of Appeals, petitioner failed to abide with the
technical rules of procedure without proffering any
legitimate and valid grounds to exempt the petitioner
from the technicalities. Basically, the petitioner seeks
the liberal application of the rules and the benevolence
of this Court reasoning that the case files for this case
was misplaced. Petitioner also invokes substantial
justice and that the petitioner’s rights would be
prejudiced if the matter at hand would be decided on
technicalities instead on the merits.

3. The present petition must be outrightly dismissed for

failure on the part of the petitioner to offer new
grounds to reverse and set aside the Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals. The present petition is but a rehash
of the baseless grounds alleged by the petitioner in the
courts below.

4. To amplify the stand of the respondents’ spouses

Madriaga for the denial of this petition, the following
2
Dated 28 January 2019, dismissing the appeal of the petitioner on the ground of
failure to comply with the directive of the Court of Appeals, and 22 May 2019 denying
the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner asking reconsideration of the 28
January 2019 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
2
 considerations are in order:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. Sometime on 09 October 2013, petitioner filed a

complaint for sum money with damages against
respondents. Respondents were then served with
summons to file an answer. At first, respondents
spouses Madriaga were not able to file an Answer
believing in good faith that they were no longer
required to do so since they have already transferred
the possession of the subject vehicle. Thereafter,
respondents spouses Madriaga filed their Answer with
Counterclaims and Affirmative Defenses. On the part
of respondent Yano, she could not be declared in
default since she could not be served summons either
through personal service and service by registered
mail because she could no longer be located on her last
known address. Owing to this development, petitioner
filed a motion to for leave to serve summons by
publication on 11 July 2015 which was granted by the
trial court in an Order dated 30 September 2015.
Petitioner then filed a motion for the extension of time
to comply with the order to serve summons by
publication which was granted by the trial court on 11
November 2015 giving the petitioner until 09
December 2015 to cause the service of summons thru
publication. Almost a year after the granting of the 11
November 2015 Order, specifically on 04 November
2016, the petitioner still failed to comply with the
service of summons through publication. The trial
court had no choice but to dismiss the complaint for
failure to prosecute. This is the first of the several
dismissals of the petitioner’s complaint.

2. Thereafter, it was only on 14 November 2016, ten (10)

days after the dismissal of the complaint, did the
petitioner filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in
Default saying that petitioner has already caused the
service of summons through publication. Notably, the
publication was only made on 21 and 28 of December,
2015, and 04 January 2016 which dates are beyond the
date set by the trial court. This is despite the extension
given by the trial court. So, what did the petitioner do
3
 for almost one year that it was only on 04 November
2016 that it manifested that it had already complied
with the directive of the trial court to cause service of
summons through publication?

3. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of

the trial court’s 04 November 2016 Order which the
trial court granted in an Order dated 28 December
2016. In the same Order, the trial court then set the
dates for the preliminary conference and pre-trial
conference on 05 April 2017 and 10 May 2017,
respectively. Despite notice of the said dates, the
petitioner failed to attend not only on the preliminary
conference but also on the pre-trial conference. Worst,
petitioner failed to file and serve its pre-trial brief and
the judicial affidavits of its witnesses. For the second
time around, the trial court dismissed the complaint of
the petitioner for failure on the part of the petitioner
(both its counsel and representative) to appear during
the preliminary conference and pre-trial conference,
and the petitioner’s failure to file a pre-trial brief and
judicial affidavits of its witnesses through an Order
dated 10 May 2017.

4. A Motion for Reconsideration (with Prayer to Admit

Pre-Trial Brief and Judicial Affidavit) for the second
dismissal was filed by the petitioner asking for the
liberal interpretation of the rules and consider
substantial justice since the petitioner has more than
sufficient evidence to prove its complaint.

5. Respondents spouses Madriaga vehemently opposed

the motion through a comment3 arguing that this is not
the first time that the complaint was dismissed and
there have been several instances that the petitioner
failed to comply with the rules or of the directives of
the court. The factual background of the case also does
not warrant the liberal application of the rules and the
invocation by the petitioner of substantial would not
save the it of its own failings. Thereafter, the trial court
denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for

3
Please see attached Comment/Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration
(with Prayer to Admit Pre-Trial and Judicial Affidavits)
4
 the second dismissal order through an Order dated 31
July 2017.

6. The petitioner then elevated the case to the Court of

Appeals. The Court of Appeals then ordered the
petitioner to inform the said court of the last known
address of respondent Yano. Since the notices of the
Court of Appeals addressed to respondent Yano were
always returned to sender, the Court of Appeals
ordered the petitioner to show proof that personal
service and service through mail of the Appellant’s
brief is impossible. Thereafter, after showing of such
proof, petitioner shall then deposit a copy of the
appellant’s brief intended for respondent Yano to the
branch clerk of court of the trial court which shall be
deemed to be actual service to respondent Yano. This
were made through a Resolution dated 10 May 2018 of
the Court of Appeals.

7. Despite the clear directive from the Court of Appeals,

petitioner failed to comply with the court’s order
within the time given. It took the petitioner at least
nine (9) months and ten (10) days before it started to
comply with the said directive. The Court of Appeals,
through a Resolution dated 28 January 2019,
dismissed the appeal of the petitioner. What could be
the reason now why such a very belated compliance?
Petitioner now reasons that because of the declaration
of martial law, there were safety issues and that there
is a proliferation of rebels and existence of insurgency
in the island of Mindanao as evidenced by the
extension of the state of martial law. What safety
issues is petitioner talking about? There might be
safety issues owing the declaration of a state of martial
law but it does not mean that the petitioner would not
be able to effectively comply with the orders of the
Court of Appeals. It could not be denied that in spite
of the declaration of the state of martial law,
everything is normal. Worthy to note is the fact that
the petitioner has a number of branches and numerous
employees in the island of Mindanao and despite the
martial law, none of its branches in Mindanao was
closed and there were no reports whatsoever of
employees being harassed by rebels or were there
5
 safety endangered. This allegation of the petitioner is
but creations of its mind and has no bases whatsoever,
and a mere afterthought. It is basic that one who
alleges something must show proof. Absent any proof,
any allegation is no evidence. Assuming, however, for
the sake of argument, that indeed there were security
issues, then why did the petitioner not inform the
Court of Appeals of such predicament, so that the
appellate court would be able to extend the time within
which the petitioner must comply with the court’s
order? Surely, it would not be too much to ask from
the petitioner to file a manifestation or a motion for
the extension to comply with the court’s directive. All
these taken altogether is a manifestation on the part of
the petitioner of its lack of interest to prosecute.
Petitioner made it a habit to prolong the proceedings
and to thereafter ask for a reconsideration invoking
liberality of the interpretation of the technical rules
and the principle of substantial justice. Petitioner
waited and waited for its appeal to be dismissed before
taking any action. In addition, Mindanao is still under
the state of martial law until now, why was petitioner
now able follow the directives of the court? Have the
security threats ceased? This petitioner did not bother
to explain.

8. To recapitulate, the petitioner only complied with the

Court of Appeals’ 10 May 2018 order only on 19
February 2019. That would be at least 9 months gap. It
seems like the petitioner has the proclivity towards
prolonging compliance for at least 9 months before
taking any steps to fulfill the same. It should be noted
further that the petitioner only made compliance with
the Court of Appeals’ 10 May 2018 directive after the
date of the order4 dismissing the petitioner’s appeal,
specifically only on 19 February 2019. There is even a
chance that petitioner only made action when it
already learned of the said dismissal order.

9. Furthermore, petitioner did not explain, in violation of

the Rules of Court, why did it send the copy of the
appellant’s brief to the counsel of respondent’s

4
28 January 2019 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
6
 spouses Madriaga via LBC and not through registered
mail.

10.As previously stated, due to this non-compliance of the

petitioner of the Court of Appeal’s directive to deposit
a copy of the appellant’s brief intended to respondent
Yano to the trial court’s branch clerk of court, the
appeal of the petitioner was dismissed. Is it really that
hard or burdensome on the part of the petitioner to
deposit a copy of the appellant’s brief intended for
respondent Yano to the branch clerk of court?

11.Thereafter, the petitioner filed a Motion For

Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 28 January
2019 arguing again liberal interpretation of the rules,
substantial justice considerations, that the case must
be tried on the merits and not on technicalities, and
that there is a jurisprudential trend that always favors
substantive rules over technical rules. Respondents
spouses Madriaga fervently objected to the
reconsideration5 of the dismissal order since the
petitioner does not deserve the liberal interpretation of
the rules. The Court of Appeals gave scant
consideration of the explanations of the petitioner in
its Motion for Reconsideration and decided to deny the
same in a Resolution dated 22 May 2019. Hence, this
present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

12.Petitioner then filed with this Court a Motion for

Extension to File Petition for Review. However, in the
said motion, there was no mention that the docket and
other lawful fees were paid or will be paid within the
time prescribed. Eventually, the petitioner filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUES

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

DISMISSING THE APPEAL OF THE PETITIONER BASED ON
TECHNICALITIES

5
Please see attached Comment/Objection to Motion for Reconsideration (for the 28
January 2019 Resolution)
7
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
NOT CONSIDERING THE “TREND” OF JURISPRUDENCE
FOR THE LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RULES

DISCUSSIONS/ARGUMENTS

1. Both of the issues must be answered in the negative.

The present petition is but a vain attempt of the
petitioner to excuse itself from its own lackadaisical
prosecution of its case that led the same to the abyss
of dismissed cases. The principles of liberality of the
application of the rules and substantial justice are not
magical incantations that, when raised, would
automatically lead to the consideration of a party’s
cause.

LIBERAL INTERPRETATION
OF THE RULES ON APPLY TO
THOSE WHO DESERVE IT

2. First of all, although procedural rules may be relaxed,

the relaxation is an exception to the general rule. Being
an exception, it is up to the party invoking the said
exception to proffer explanation. Our rules of
procedure do not exist for nothing. These rules were
formulated to be faithfully complied in order to have
an orderly administration of justice. A party cannot be
permitted to trample upon the technical rules of
procedure and completely disregard the same just
because the said party’s substantive rights will be
impaired. The jurisprudence cited by the petitioner do
not also support its invocation of liberality.

3. The case of Dela Cruz vs. Court of Appeals6 dealt with

which among the MTC and RTC has jurisdiction over
the complaint filed for ejectment. The Supreme Court
ruled that even if it is to be assumed that indeed the it
is the RTC which has jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
suspended the rules of procedure on the ground that
since the complaint for ejectment was pending for 9
years and also because of the imprecise language in the
complaint. It is to be noted that the complaint in the

6
G.R. No. 139442, December 6, 2006
8
 jurisprudence cited was correctly filed in the MTC.
Therefore, the present jurisprudence has no
application to the present petition.

4. Next, the case of Canton vs. City of Cebu7 is not also

applicable in the present petition since the Canton case
is about failure to comply with Section 2, Rule 42 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and actually the
petition in the Canton case was dismissed by the
Supreme Court. The High Court even stated that:
“[r]ules of procedure must be used to facilitate, not
to frustrate, justice. However, petitioners and their
counsel should bear in mind that the right to appeal
is not a natural right. The right to appeal is a
statutory privilege, and it may be exercised only in
the manner and in accordance with the provisions of
the law. A party who seeks to appeal must comply
with the law’s requirements; otherwise, he forfeits his
privilege. Rules of procedure may be relaxed only to
relieve a litigant of an injustice which is not
commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed
procedure.

5. In the cited case of Aguam vs. CA8 the appeal before

the Court of Appeals was dismissed on the ground of
failure to file appellant’s brief within the time. The
Supreme Court held, “[i]n the higher interest of justice,
considering that the delay in filing a motion for
extension to file appellant's brief was only for nine
(9) days, and normally, the Court of Appeals would
routinely grant such extension, and the appellant's
brief was actually filed within the period sought, the
better course of action for the Court of Appeals was to
admit appellant's brief. In the present petition,
however, the petitioner’s delay in complying with the
Court of Appeals’ directive is not for 9 days or 9 weeks,
but for 9 months.

6. As to the case of Sps. Espejo vs. Ito9 cited by the

7
G.R. 152898, February 12, 2007
8
G.R. No. 137672, May 31, 2000
9
G.R. No. 176511, August 4, 2009
9
 petitioner, the same dealt with the failure of the
spouses Espejo to have their petition with the Court of
Appeals to be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate
originals or true copies of the judgments or final
orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the
clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, the requisite
number of plain copies thereof and of the pleadings
and other material portions of the record as would
support the allegations of the petition. The same case
is not applicable to the present appeal. The Supreme
Court ruled to grant the petition since the petitioner
was able to immediately comply with their procedural
lapses, thus:

It should be noted that in this case,

petitioners immediately acted to rectify their
earlier procedural lapse by submitting10 (on 03
January 2007), together with their Motion for
Reconsideration of the 19 December 2006
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, a Motion to
Admit a copy of their Complaint for Unlawful
Detainer. Submission of a document together
with the motion for reconsideration constitutes
substantial compliance with the requirement that
relevant or pertinent documents be submitted
along with the petition, and calls for the
relaxation of procedural rules.

7. Now proceeding to the next case cited, BF Citiland

Corporation vs. Marilyn B. Otake11 does not in any
way help the petitioner in its cause. The Otake case is
about the wrong mode of appeal filed by BF Citiland
Corporation from the certiorari petition in the RTC to
the CA. Despite having pursued the wrong mode of
appeal, the Supreme Court suspended the rules
explaining that, “[i]n the present case, a dismissal on a
technicality would only mean a new round of litigation
between the same parties for the same cause of action,
over the same subject matter. Thus, notwithstanding
petitioner’s wrong mode of appeal, the Court of Appeals

10
Petitioners in this case were able to file mend their procedural lapse within less
than 15 days from the issuance of the dismissal of the appeal
11
G.R. No. 173351, July 29, 2010
10
 should not have so easily dismissed the petition.” Based
on the said ruling, the procedural lapse of the
petitioner was only on the wrong mode of appeal and
it was the first time that it did. The same consideration
is not existing in the case of the present petitioner
since its lapses are countless from the RTC up to the
CA. The petitioner lacks interest in failure to prosecute
its case.

8. To continue, the petitioner also cited the case of

Barangay Sangalang vs. Barangay Maguihan12
wherein the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal
since the petitioner therein chose the wrong mode of
appeal when it appealed the RTC decision rendered in
the latter’s appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court
rules, thus:

Thus, notwithstanding petitioner’s wrong

mode of appeal, the CA should not have so easily
dismissed the petition, considering that the
parties involved are local government units and
that what is involved is the determination of
their respective territorial jurisdictions. In the
same vein, the CA’s strict reliance on the
requirements under Section 13 of Rule 44 of the
1997 Rules of Procedure relating to subject index
and page references in an appellant’s brief is, to
stress, putting a premium on technicalities. While
the purpose of Section 13, Rule 44, is to present
to the appellate court in the most helpful light,
the factual and legal antecedents of a case on
appeal, said rule should not be strictly applied
considering that petitioner’s brief before the CA
contained only 9 pages, the records of the case
consisted only of a few documents and
pleadings, and there was no testimonial
evidence.

9. The same considerations as to the above-mentioned

case is not existing in the present petition.

12
G.R. No. 159792, December 23, 2009
11
 10.As to the case of Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals13 the
Supreme Court applied the rules liberally since the
petitioner is a co-owner of the subject parcel of land of
the said case and there was lack of partition among
them, and that there was negligence on the part of
petitioner’s counsel. The High Court ruled, [v]erily, the
negligence of petitioner’s counsel cannot be deemed as
negligence of petitioner herself in the case at bar. A
notice to a lawyer who appears to have been
unconscionably irresponsible cannot be considered as
notice to his client. Under the peculiar circumstances of
this case, it appears from the records that counsel was
negligent in not adequately protecting his clients
interest, which necessarily calls for a liberal construction
of the Rules.

11.The same case is not all-fours with the present petition

and the principle of liberality as applied in the Sanchez
case cannot be applied in the present petition.

12.Going now to the jurisprudence which should be

applied in the present petition, the following cases are
helpful, thus:

13.In Philippine Steel Coating Corporation vs. Eduard

Quinones14 the Supreme Court dismissed the petition
for review of the petitioner affirming the ruling of the
trial court dismissing the complaint of the petitioner
for failure to appear during the pre-trial conference and
failure to file pre-trial brief despite notice. The Supreme
held that, “Ultra Mar essentially argues that it should
have been allowed to present its evidence because its
non-appearance at the pre-trial conference and
failure to file pre-trial brief were attributable to its
counsel's gross negligence for which it should not be
made to suffer the consequences. Ultra Mar further
postulates that it has a meritorious defense which
could lead the RTC to rule otherwise had it been
presented.

14.The High Court continued in ruling that, “[h]ence, the

13
G.R. No. 152766, June 20, 2003
14
G.R. 194533, April 19, 2017
12
 failure of a party to appear at pre-trial has adverse
consequences: if the absent party is the plaintiff then
he may be declared non-suited and his case is
dismissed; if the absent party is the defendant, then
the plaintiff may be allowed to present his evidence
ex parte and the court to render judgment on the
basis thereof. By way of exception, the non-appearance
of a party and counsel may be excused if (1) a valid
cause is shown; or (2) there is an appearance of a
representative on behalf of a party fully authorized in
writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit
to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter
into stipulations or admissions of facts and of
documents. What constitutes a valid cause is subject to
the court's sound discretion and the exercise of such
discretion shall not be disturbed except in cases of
clear and manifest abuse.

15.As regards the failure on the part of the petitioner to

comply with the directive of the Court of Appeals to
deposit a copy of the appellant’s brief with the branch
clerk of court, jurisprudence15 tells us that by and of
itself, a party’s failure to comply with the CA’s
directive without justifiable cause is also a ground for
the dismissal of an appeal under Section 1 (h), Rule
50 of the Rules.

16.The case of Malixi vs. Baltazar16 is instructive as to the

importance of our rules of procedure. In the said case,
the Supreme Court held that:

Procedural rules are essential in the

administration of justice. The importance
of procedural rules in the adjudication of
disputes has been reiterated in numerous
cases. In Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al.:

Procedural rules are not to be

disdained as mere technicalities that
may be ignored at will to suit the

15
Zamboanga Forest Managers Corporation vs. New Pacific Timber and Supply
Co., G.R. No.173342, October 13, 2010
16
G.R. 208224, November 22, 2017
13
 convenience of a party. Adjective law
is important in insuring the effective
enforcement of substantive rights
through the orderly and speedy
administration of justice. These rules
are not intended to hamper litigants or
complicate litigation but, indeed, to
provide for a system under which
suitors may be heard in the correct
form and manner and at the
prescribed time in a peaceful
confrontation before a judge whose
authority they acknowledge. The
other alternative is the settlement of
their conflict through the barrel of a
gun.

Moreover, in Le Soleil Int'l. Logistics Co.,

Inc,. et al. v. Sanchez, et al.:

Time and again, we have stressed that

procedural rules do not exist for the
convenience of the litigants; the rules
were established primarily to provide
order to, and enhance the efficiency
of, our judicial system.

xxx

Technical rules serve a purpose. They are

not made to discourage litigants from
pursuing their case nor are they fabricated
out of thin air. Every section in the Rules of
Court and every issuance of this Court with
respect to procedural rules are
promulgated with the objective of a more
efficient judicial system.

xxx

Despite the number of cases wherein this

Court relaxed the application of procedural
rules, this Court has repeatedly reminded
litigants that:
14
 [T]he bare invocation of "the interest
of substantial justice" is not a magic
wand that will automatically compel
this Court to suspend procedural rules.
"Procedural rules are not to be belittled
or dismissed simply because their non-
observance may have resulted in
prejudice to a party's substantive
rights. Like all rules, they are required
to be followed except only for the most
persuasive of reasons when they may
be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an
injustice not commensurate with the
degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure
prescribed." The Court reiterates that
rules of procedure . . . "have oft been
held as absolutely indispensable to the
prevention of needless delays and to
the orderly and speedy discharge of
business.... The reason for rules of this
nature is because the dispatch of
business by courts would be
impossible, and intolerable delays
would result, without rules governing
practice. . . . Such rules are a necessary
incident to the proper, efficient and
orderly discharge of judicial
functions." Indeed, in no uncertain
terms, the Court held that the said
rules may be relaxed only in
"exceptionally meritorious cases."

17.Moreover, the case of Magsino vs. Ocampo17 citing

several jurisprudences, discussed the importance of
following the technical rules of procedure. The
Supreme Court asked this question: Now must this
Honorable Court sacrifice the law for technical rules
of procedure? Must it countenance mediocrity, nay,
ignorance, by sticking unflaggingly to such rules?
Can this honorable Court afford to pass up the rare

17
G.R. 166944, August 18, 2014
15
 opportunity to decide a constitutional issue with right
of a party to due process of law on the line?

18.The Supreme Court in the said case, citing several

jurisprudences, has the following to say, thus:

Like all rules, procedural rules should be

followed except only when, for the most
persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed
to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the
prescribed procedure.

The rules were instituted to be faithfully

complied with, and allowing them to be
ignored or lightly dismissed to suit the
convenience of a party like the petitioner
was impermissible. Such rules, often
derided as merely technical, are to be
relaxed only in the furtherance of justice
and to benefit the deserving. Their liberal
construction in exceptional situations
should then rest on a showing of justifiable
reasons and of at least a reasonable attempt
at compliance with them. We have repeatedly
emphasized this standard. In Bergonia v.
Court of Appeals, (4th Division),41 for
instance, we declared:

The petitioners’ plea for the application

of the principles of substantial justice
in their favor deserves scant
consideration. The petitioners should
be reminded that technical rules may be
relaxed only for the furtherance of
justice and to benefit the deserving.
While the petitioners adverted to
several jurisprudential rulings of this
Court which set aside procedural rules,
it is noted that there were underlying
considerations in those cases which
warranted a disregard of procedural
technicalities to favor substantial
16
 justice. Here, there exists no such
consideration.

The petitioners ought to be reminded that

the bare invocation of "the interest of
substantial justice" is not a magic wand that
will automatically compel this Court to
suspend procedural rules. Procedural rules
are not to be belittled or dismissed simply
because their nonobservance may have
resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantive
rights. Like all rules, they are required to be
followed except only for the most persuasive
of reasons when they may be relaxed to
relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed.

Nor should the rules of procedure be held to

be for the benefit of only one side of the
litigation, for they have been instituted for
the sake of all.

The petitioner did not deserve the liberal

application of the rules of procedure that
he was seeking.

19.All told, the factual milieu of this case, the misdeeds

of the petitioner, and the explanations the petitioner
proffered for such misdeeds do not merit the reversal
of the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals. The Court
of Appeals, therefore, did not err in dismissing the
appeal of the petitioner.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises,

Defendants most respectfully pray that:
1. Petitioner’s Petition for Review on Certiorari be
DENIED for lack of merit; and

2. The Court of Appeals Resolution dated 28 January

2019 and Resolution dated 22 May 2019 be AFFIRMED.
17
OTHER RELIEF IN EQUITY IS LIKEWISE PRAYED FOR.

Malaybalay City for Metro Manila. 13 September 2019.

LAGAMON AND ASSOCIATES LAW

Counsel for defendants’ spouses Madriaga
2nd Floor, Jamstar Building
Corner San Isidro-Judge P. Carillo Streets
Barangay 5, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon
Telephone Number (088) 813 3349

by:

ALBERTO R. LAGAMON
Roll of Attorneys No. 52899
IBP Lifetime Member No. 08176
PTR No. 8153242/03 January 2019/Malaybalay City
MCLE Compliance No. V-0009310
TIN 106-037-743

DENCE CRIS L. RONDON

Member of the Bar
Roll of Attorneys’ No. 67495
PTR No. 8154304/03 JAN. 2019/BUK.
IBP O.R. No. 62183/04-JAN-2019/BUK.
Tax Identification No. 496-556-017-000
MCLE Compliance No. 0011647
09177038190

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 NOTICE

THE HONORABLE CLERK OF COURT

Supreme Court
Metro Manila

ATTY. NORMAN N. LORENZO

Counsel for Asialink Finance Corporation
Unit 9-B 9th Floor Strata 2000 Building
Emerald Avenue, Ortigas Center
Pasig City

FEBIE BARTOLIN YANO

Purok 5, South Poblacion
Maramag, Bukidnon

Please submit the foregoing Comment And/Or

Opposition to Petitioner’s Petition for Review on Certiorari
for the consideration of the Honorable Supreme Court
immediately upon receipt hereof, sans appearance of
counsel and/or further oral argument.

Thank you.

ALBERTO R. LAGAMON

Copy furnished by registered mail:

THE CLERK OF COURT

Regional Trial Court – Branch 8
Malaybalay City, Bukidnon

ATTY. NORMAN N. LORENZO RR: ________________________

Counsel for Asialink Finance Corporation
Unit 9-B 9th Floor Strata 2000 Building
Emerald Avenue, Ortigas Center
Pasig City

FEBIE BARTOLIN YANO RR: ________________________

Purok 5, South Poblacion
Maramag, Bukidnon

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 EXPLANATION

The personal filing to the Supreme Court and the

service hereof to petitioner’s counsel and on respondent
Yano have been made via registered mail due to
impracticability of effecting personal filing and service
considering the distance of the addressees.

ALBERTO R. LAGAMON

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