SOJ V Lanton PDF

9/24/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 343
VOL. 343, OCTOBER 17, 2000 377

Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion
*
G.R. No. 139465. October 17, 2000
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH

C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Remedial Law; Extradition; Court holds

now that private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.—
We now hold that private respondent is bereft of the right to
notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process. x x x There is no provision in the RP-US Extradition
Treaty and in P.D. No. 1069 which gives an extraditee the right to
demand from the petitioner Secretary of Justice copies of the
extradition request from the US government and its supporting
documents and to comment thereon while the request is still
undergoing evaluation. We cannot write a provision in the treaty
giving private respondent that right where there is none. It is
well-settled that a “court cannot alter, amend, or add to a treaty
by the insertion of any clause, small or great, or dispense with
any of its conditions and requirements or take away any
qualification, or integral part of any stipulation, upon any motion
of equity, or general convenience, or substantial justice.”
Same; Same; Same; Extradition proceeding is not a criminal
proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an
accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.—An extradition
proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which
will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does
not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an
accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the
state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional
rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of
an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee, especially by one
whose extradition papers are still undergoing evaluation.
Same; Same; Same; Differences between an extradition
proceeding and a criminal proceeding.—There are other
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016d61c81a152548a1ab003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/36
differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal

proceeding. An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while
criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial. In
contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in
an
_______________
* EN BANC.
378
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
extradition proceeding allow admission of evidence under less

stringent standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence to be
satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt
for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited “upon
showing of the existence of a prima facie case.” Finally, unlike in
a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being
rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may
adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final
discretion to extradite him.
Same; Same; Same; Private respondent’s plea to due process
collides with important state interests which cannot also be
ignored for they serve the interest of the greater majority.—To be
sure, private respondent’s plea for due process deserves serious
consideration involving as it does his primordial right to liberty.
His plea to due process, however, collides with important state
interests which cannot also be ignored for they serve the interest of
the greater majority. The clash of rights demands a delicate
balancing of interests approach which is a “fundamental postulate
of constitutional law.” The approach requires that we “take
conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests
observable in a given situation or type of situation.” These
interests usually consist in the exercise by an individual of his
basic freedoms on the one hand, and the government’s promotion
of fundamental public interest or policy objectives on the other.
Same; Same; Same; The time for the extraditee to know the
basis of the request for his extradition is merely moved to the filing
in court of the formal petition for extradition.—We have explained
why an extraditee has no right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process. As aforesaid, P.D. No.
1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty affords an

extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence against him
once the petition is filed in court. The time for the extraditee to
know the basis of the request for his extradition is merely moved
to the filing in court of the formal petition for extradition. The
extraditee’s right to know is momentarily withheld during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process to accommodate the
more compelling interest of the State to prevent escape of
potential extraditees which can be precipitated by premature
information of the basis of the request for his extradition. No less
compelling at that stage of the extradition proceedings is the need
to be more deferential to the judgment of a co-equal branch of the
government, the Executive, which has been endowed by our
Constitution with greater power over matters involving our
foreign relations.
379
VOL. 343, OCTOBER 17, 2000 379

MELO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Remedial Law; Extradition; Petitioner is

well versed in the use of a hold departure order which could easily
lay his fear of private respondent’s flight to rest.—And as regards
the apprehension of flight, petitioner is well versed in the use of a
hold departure order which could easily lay his fear of private
respondent’s flight to rest. In accordance with Department
Circular No. 17 issued on March 19, 1998 by then Secretary of
Justice Silvestre H. Bello III, a hold departure order (HDO) may
be issued by the Secretary of Justice “upon the request of the
Head of a Department of the Government; the head of a
constitutional body or a commission or agency performing quasi-
judicial functions; the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for the
Judiciary; or by the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the
House of Representatives for the legislative body” when the
interested party is the Government or any of its agencies or
instrumentalities, “in the interest of national security, public
safety or public health, as may be provided by law” (Paragraph 2
[d], Department Circular No. 17 [Prescribing Rules and
Regulations Governing the Issuance of Hold Departure Orders]).
This provision can easily be utilized by petitioner to prevent
private respondent’s flight.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Remedial Law; Extradition; To grant the

respondent his right to know will not, in any significant way,
weaken or frustrate compliance with treaty objectives.—After
going over the grounds given by the Government in support of the
motion for reconsideration, I regret that I cannot go along with
the new ruling of the Court’s recent majority. I am convinced that
there is greater reason to strike the balance in favor of a solitary
beleaguered individual against the exertion of overwhelming
Government power by beth the Philippines and the United States.
To grant the respondent his right to know will not, in any
significant way, weaken or frustrate compliance with treaty
objectives. But it will result in jurisprudence which reasserts
national dignity and gives meaningful protection to the rights of
any citizen who is presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Same; Same; Same; No provision in the Treaty mandates that
an extraditee should be kept in the dark about the charges against
him until he is brought to trial.—There is no provision in the
Treaty which mandates that an extraditee should be kept in the
dark about the charges against him until he is brought to trial.
The Treaty deals only with the trial proper. It cannot possibly
cover everything. Our law and jurisprudence are
380
not superseded by the mere absence of a specific provision in a

treaty. What is not prohibited should be allowed.
Same; Same; Same; A proposed extraditee should not be
denied a reasonable opportunity to prepare for trial.—A proposed
extraditee should not be denied a reasonable opportunity to
prepare for trial. In an extradition trial, there may be reasons for
the exercise of special care and caution. It is not a casual
occurrence to give up your citizen to another country’s criminal
justice system. I do not want to sound unduly jingoistic but in
certain Western countries, especially those using the jury system,
a second-class citizen or a colored non-citizen may not always get
equal justice inspite of protestations to the contrary. The
prospective extraditee, therefore, deserves every lawful
consideration which his poor third-world country can give him.
URGENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a

decision of the Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Estelito P. Mendoza for private respondent.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
On January 18, 2000, by a vote of 9-6, we dismissed the

petition at bar and ordered the petitioner to furnish private
respondent copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period1
within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.
On February 3, 2000, the petitioner timely filed an
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. He assails the decision
on the following grounds:
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 442-443; Decision, Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Ralph C.

Lantion and Mark B. Jimenez, G.R. No. 139465, January 18, 2000, pp. 39-
40, 322 SCRA 160.
381
VOL. 343, OCTOBER 17, 2000 381

“The majority decision failed to appreciate the following facts and

points of substance and of value which, if considered, would alter
the result of the case, thus:
I. There is a substantial difference between an evaluation

process antecedent to the filing of an extradition petition
in court and a preliminary investigation.
II. Absence of notice and hearing during the evaluation
process will not result in a denial of fundamental fairness.
III. In the evaluation process, instituting a notice and hearing
requirement satisfies no higher objective.
IV. The deliberate omission of the notice and hearing
requirement in the Philippine Extradition Law is intended
to prevent flight.
V. There is a need to balance the interest between the
discretionary powers of government and the rights of an
individual.
VI. The instances cited in the assailed majority decision when

the twin rights of notice and hearing may be dispensed
with in this case results in a non sequitur conclusion.
VII. Jimenez is not placed in imminent danger of arrest by the
Executive Branch necessitating notice and hearing.
VIII. By instituting a ‘proceeding’ not contemplated by PD No.
1069, the Supreme Court has encroached upon the
constitutional boundaries separating it from the other two
co-equal branches of government.
IX. Bail is not a matter of right in proceedings
2
leading to
extradition or in extradition proceedings.”
On March 28, 2000, a 58-page Comment was filed by the

private respondent Mark B. Jimenez, opposing petitioner’s
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
On April 5, 2000, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to
Allow Continuation and Maintenance of Action and Filing
of Reply. Thereafter, petitioner filed on June 7, 2000 a
Manifestation with the attached Note 327/00 from the
Embassy of Canada and Note No. 34 from the Security
Bureau of the Hongkong SAR Government Secretariat. On
August 15, 2000, private respondent filed a Manifestation
and Motion for Leave to File Rejoinder in the event that
petitioner’s April 5, 2000 Motion would be granted. Private
_______________
2 Rollo, p. 495; Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, p. 4.
382

respondent also filed on August 18, 2000, a Motion to

Expunge from the records petitioner’s June 7, 2000
Manifestation with its attached note verbales. Except for
the Motion to Allow Continuation and Maintenance of
Action, the Court denies these pending motions and hereby
resolves petitioner’s Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
The jugular issue is whether or not the private
respondent is entitled to the due process right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process.
We now hold that private respondent is bereft of the
right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of
the extradition process.
3
3
First. P.D. No. 1069 which implements the RP-US
Extradition Treaty provides the time when an extraditee
shall be furnished a copy of the petition for extradition as
well as its supporting papers, i.e., after the filing of the
petition for extradition in the extradition court, viz.:
“Sec. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing; Service

of Notices.—(1) Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the
presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon
the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the day and
hour fixed in the order... Upon receipt of the answer, or should the
accused after having received the summons fail to answer within
the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or set
another date for the hearing thereof.
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of
arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served each upon the accused
and the attorney having charge of the case.”
It is of judicial notice that the summons includes the

petition for extradition which will be answered by the
extraditee.
There is no provision in the RP-US Extradition Treaty
and in P.D. No. 1069 which gives an extraditee the right to
demand from the petitioner Secretary of Justice copies of
the extradition request
_______________
3 “Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have

Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country” signed into law on January 13,
1977.
383
VOL. 343, OCTOBER 17, 2000 383

from the US government and its supporting documents and

to comment thereon while the request is still undergoing
evaluation. We cannot write a provision in the treaty giving
private respondent that right where there is none. It is
well-settled that a “court cannot alter, amend, or add to a
treaty by the insertion of any clause, small or great, or
dispense with any of its conditions and requirements or
take away any qualification, or integral part of any
stipulation, upon any motion of 4
equity, or general
convenience, or substantial justice.”
Second. All treaties, including the RP-US Extradition

Treaty, should be interpreted in light of their intent.
Nothing less than the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory provides
that “a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty
5
in their context and in light of its object
and purpose.” (emphasis supplied) The preambular
paragraphs of P.D. No. 1069 define its intent, viz.:
“WHEREAS, under the Constitution[,] the Philippines adopts the

generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations;
WHEREAS, the suppression of crime is the concern not only of
the state where it is committed but also of any other state to
which the criminal may have escaped, because it saps the
foundation of social life and is an outrage upon humanity at large,
and it is in the interest of civilized communities that crimes
should not go unpunished;
WHEREAS, in recognition of this principle the Philippines
recently concluded an extradition treaty with the Republic of
Indonesia, and intends to conclude similar treaties with other
interested countries; x x x.” (emphasis supplied)
It cannot be gainsaid that today, countries like the

Philippines forge extradition treaties to arrest the dramatic
rise of interna-
_______________
4 Note, The United States v. The libelants and Claimants of the

Schooner Amistad, 10 L. Ed. 826 (1841), citing The Amiable Isabella, 6
Wheat. 1.
5 Article 31(1), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
384

tional and transnational crimes like terrorism and drug

trafficking. Extradition treaties provide the assurance that
the punishment of these crimes will not be frustrated by
the frontiers of territorial sovereignty. Implicit in the
treaties should be the unbending commitment that the
perpetrators of these crimes will not be coddled by any
signatory state.
It ought to follow that the RP-US Extradition Treaty

calls for an interpretation that will minimize if not prevent
the escape of extraditees from the long arm of the law and
expedite their trial. The submission of the private
respondent, that as a probable extraditee under the RP-US
Extradition Treaty he should be furnished a copy of the US
government request for his extradition and its supporting
documents even while they are still under evaluation by
petitioner Secretary of Justice, does not meet this
desideratum. The fear of the petitioner Secretary of Justice
that the demanded notice is equivalent to a notice to flee
must be deeply rooted on the experience of the executive
branch of our government. As it comes from the branch of
our government in charge of the faithful execution of our
laws, it deserves the careful consideration of this Court. In
addition, it cannot be gainsaid that private respondent’s
demand for advance notice can delay the summary process
of executive evaluation of the extradition request and its
accompanying papers. The foresight of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes did not miss this danger. In 1911, he held:
“It is common in extradition cases to attempt to bring to bear all

the factitious niceties of a criminal trial at common law. But it is
a waste of time . . . if there is presented, even in somewhat
untechnical form according to our ideas, such reasonable ground
to suppose him guilty as to make it proper that he should be tried,6
good faith to the demanding government requires his surrender.”
(emphasis supplied)
_______________
6 Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508, 511 (1911), citing Grin v. Shine,
187 US 181, 184, 47 L. Ed. 130, 133, 23 S. Ct. Rep. 98, 12 Am. Crim. Rep.
366. See Pierce v. Creecy, 210 U.S. 387, 405, 52 L. Ed. 1113, 1122, 28 S.
Ct. 714.
385
VOL. 343, OCTOBER 17, 2000 385

We erode no right of an extraditee when we do not allow

time to stand still on his prosecution. Justice is best served
when done without delay.
Third. An equally compelling factor to consider is the
understanding of the parties themselves to the RP-US
Extradition Treaty as well as the general interpretation of
the issue in question by other countries with similar treaties
with the Philippines. The rule is recognized that while

courts have the power to interpret treaties, the meaning
given them by the departments of government particularly
charged with their
7
negotiation and enforcement is accorded
great weight. The reason for the rule is laid 8
down in
Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines, et al., where we
stressed that a treaty is a joint executive-legislative act
which enjoys the presumption that “it was first carefully
studied and determined to be constitutional before it was
adopted and given the force of law in the country.”
Our executive department of government, thru the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the Department
of Justice (DOJ), has steadfastly maintained that the RP-
US Extradition Treaty and P.D. No. 1069 do not grant the
private respondent a right to notice and hearing during
9
the
evaluation stage of an extradition process. This
understanding of the treaty is shared by the 10
US
government, the other party to the treaty. This
interpretation by the two governments cannot be given
scant significance. It will be presumptu-
_______________
7 Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 US 187, 192 (1961); Factor v. Laubenheimer,

290 U.S. 276, 295 (1933), citing Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 52, 73 L. Ed.
610, 49 S. Ct. 223; Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 468, 57 L. Ed. 1274,
1283, 33 S. Ct. 945, 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 397.
8 210 SCRA 256, 261 (1992).
9 Rollo, p. 399.
10 See Original Records, pp. 467-482, Annex “B” of petitioner’s Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration entitled “Observations of the United States In
Support of the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration by the Republic of the
Philippines” signed by James K. Robinson, Asst. Attorney General and
Bruce C. Swartz, Deputy Asst. Attorney General, Criminal Division, US
Department of Justice and Sara Criscitelli, Asst. Director, Office of
International Affairs, Criminal Division, Washington, D.C.
386

ous for the Court to assume that both governments did not
understand the terms of the treaty they concluded.
Yet, this is not all. Other countries with similar
extradition treaties with the Philippines have expressed the
same interpretation adopted
11
by the Philippine
12
and US
governments. Canadian and Hongkong authorities, thru
appropriate note verbales communicated to our

Department of Foreign Affairs, stated in unequivocal
language that it is not an international practice to afford a
potential extraditee with a copy of the extradition papers
during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. We
cannot disregard such a convergence of views unless it is
manifestly erroneous.
Fourth. Private respondent, however, peddles the
postulate that he must be afforded the right to notice and
hearing as required by our Constitution. He buttresses his
position by likening an extradition proceeding to a criminal
proceeding and the evaluation stage to a preliminary
investigation.
We are not persuaded. An extradition proceeding is sui
generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into
operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does
not involve
13
the determination of the guilt or innocence of an
accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the
court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a
rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to
determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be
invoked by an extraditee especially by one14 whose
extradition papers are still undergoing evaluation. As held
by the US Supreme Court in United States v. Galanis:
_______________
11 See Original Records, pp. 506-507, Note 327/00 dated March 10, 2000
from the Embassy of Canada.
12 See Original Records, p. 509, Note No. (34) in SBCR 1/27 16/80 Pt. 27
dated March 22, 2000 from the Security Bureau of the Hongkong SAR
Government Secretariat.
13 Defensor-Santiago, Procedural Aspects of the Political Offence
Doctrine, 51 Philippine Law Journal 238, p. 258 (1976).
14 Elliot, No Due Process Right to a Speedy Extradition, Martin v.
Warden, Atlanta Pen., 993 F.2d 824 (11th Cir. 1993), 18 Suffolk Transna-
387
VOL. 343, OCTOBER 17, 2000 387

“An extradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and the

constitutional safeguards that accompany a criminal trial in this
country do not15
shield an accused from extradition pursuant to a
valid treaty.”
There are other differences between an extradition

proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An extradition
proceeding is summary in nature 16
while criminal
proceedings involve a full-blown trial. In contradistinction
to a criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in an
extradition proceeding allow
17
admission of evidence under
less stringent standards. In terms of the quantum of
evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case 18
requires proof
beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive
may be ordered extradited
19
“upon showing of the existence
of a prima facie case.” Finally, unlike in a criminal case
where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered
final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge
an individual extraditable but20
the President has the final
discretion to extradite him. The United States adheres to
a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State exercises
wide discretion in balancing the equities of the case and the
demands of the nation’s foreign 21
relations before making the
ultimate decision to extradite.
As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character
and the evaluation stage in an extradition proceeding is not
akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process
safeguards in the latter do not necessarily apply to the
former. This we hold for the procedural due process
required by a given set of circumstances “must begin tional
Law Review 347, 353 (1995), citing Jhirad v. Ferrandina,
536 F.2d 478, 482 (2d Cir.).
_______________
15 Wiehl, Extradition Law at the Crossroads: The Trend Toward

Extending Greater Constitutional Procedural Protections To Fugitives
Fighting Extradition from the United States, 19 Michigan Journal of
International Law 729, 741 (1998), citing United States v. Galanis, 429 F.
Supp. 1215 (D. Conn. 1977).
16 Section 9, P.D. No. 1069.
17 Ibid.
18 Section 2, Rule 133, Revised Rules of Court.
19 Section 10, P.D. No. 1069.
20 See Article III of the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
21 Note, Executive Discretion in Extradition, 62 Col. Law Rev., pp.
1314-1329.
388

with a determination of the precise nature of the

government function involved as well as the private interest
22
that has been affected by governmental action.” The
concept of due process is flexible for “not all situations
calling for procedural
23
safeguards call for the same kind of
procedure.”
Fifth. Private respondent would also impress upon the
Court the urgency of his right to notice and hearing
considering the alleged threat
24
to his liberty “which may be
more priceless than life.” The supposed threat to private
respondent’s liberty is perceived to come from several
provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty and P.D. No.
1069 which allow provisional arrest and temporary
detention.
We first deal with provisional arrest. The RP-US
Extradition Treaty provides as follows:
“PROVISIONAL ARREST
1. In case of urgency, a Contracting Party may request the

provisional arrest of the person sought pending
presentation of the request for extradition. A request for
provisional arrest may be transmitted through the
diplomatic channel or directly between the Philippine
Department of Justice and the United States Department
of Justice.
2. The application for provisional arrest shall contain:
a) a description of the person sought;

b) the location of the person sought, if known;
c) a brief statement of the facts of the case, including, if
possible, the time and location of the offense;
d) a description of the laws violated;
e) a state ment of the existence of a warrant of arrest or
finding of guilt or judgment of conviction against the
person sought; and
f) a statement that a request for extradition for the person
sought will follow.
_______________
22 Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972), citing Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961), 6 L. Ed. 2d 1230, 1236, 81 S.
Ct. 1743 (1961).
23 Morissey v. Brewer, supra.
24 Comment on Petitioner’s Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, p. 37.
389
VOL. 343, OCTOBER 17, 2000 389

3. The Requesting State shall be notified without delay of

the disposition of its application and the reasons for any
denial.
4. A person who is provisionally arrested may be discharged
from custody upon the expiration of sixty (60) days from
the date of arrest pursuant to this Treaty if the executive
authority of the Requested State has not received the
formal request for extradition and the supporting
documents required in Article 7.” (emphasis supplied)
In relation to the above, Section 20 of P.D. No. 1069

provides:
“Sec. 20. Provisional Arrest.—(a) In case of urgency, the

requesting state may, pursuant to the relevant treaty or
convention and while the same remains in force, request for the
provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for
extradition made in accordance with Section 4 of this Decree.
(b) A request for provisional arrest shall be sent to the

Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, Manila,
either through the diplomatic channels or direct by post or
telegraph.
(c) The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation or
any official acting on his behalf shall upon receipt of the
request immediately secure a warrant for the provisional
arrest of the accused from the presiding judge of the Court
of First Instance of the province or city having jurisdiction
of the place, who shall issue the warrant for the
provisional arrest of the accused. The Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation through the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs shall inform the requesting state of the
result of its request.
(d) If within a period of 20 days after the provisional arrest
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs has not received the
request for extradition and the documents mentioned in
Section 4 of this Decree, the accused shall be released
from custody.” (emphasis supplied)
Both the RP-US Extradition Treaty and P.D. No. 1069

clearly provide that private respondent may be
provisionally arrested only pending receipt of the request for
extradition. Our DFA has long received the extradition
request from the United States and has turned it over to
the DOJ. It is undisputed that until today, the United
States has not requested for private respondent’s
provisional arrest. Therefore, the threat to private

respondent’s liberty has passed. It is more imagined than
real.
390

Nor can the threat to private respondent’s liberty come

from Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069, which provides:
“Sec. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing; Service

of Notices.—(1) Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the
presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon
the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the day and
hour fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a warrant for the
immediate arrest of the accused which may be served anywhere
within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the
immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best
serve the ends of justice . . .
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of
arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served each upon the accused
and the attorney having charge of the case.” (emphasis supplied)
It is evident from the above provision that a warrant of

arrest for the temporary detention of the accused pending
the extradition hearing may only be issued by the presiding
judge of the extradition court upon filing of the petition for
extradition. As the extradition process is still in the
evaluation stage of pertinent documents and there is no
certainty that a petition for extradition will be filed in the
appropriate extradition court, the threat to private
respondent’s liberty is merely hypothetical.
Sixth. To be sure, private respondent’s plea for due
process deserves serious consideration involving as it does
his primordial right to liberty. His plea to due process,
however, collides with important state interests which
cannot also be ignored for they serve the interest of the
greater majority. The clash of rights demands a delicate
balancing of interests approach 25which is a “fundamental
postulate of constitutional law.” The approach requires
that we “take conscious and detailed consideration of the
interplay of interests
26
observable in a given situation or
type of situation.” These interests usually consist in the
exercise by an individual of his
_______________
25 Malayan Insurance Co. v. Smith, Bell & Co. (Phil.), Inc., et al., 101
SCRA 61 (1980), citing Republic v. Purisima, 78 SCRA 470 (1977).
26 Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, 170 SCRA 1, 9 (1989), citing Lagunzad v.
Vda. de Gonzales, 92 SCRA 476 (1979), citing Separate Opinion of the late
Chief Justice Castro in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA
835, p. 899 (1969).
391
VOL. 343, OCTOBER 17, 2000 391

basic freedoms on the one hand, and the government’s

promotion of fundamental27
public interest or policy
objectives on the other.
In the case at bar, on one end of the balancing pole is the
private respondent’s claim to due process predicated on
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides
that “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law . . .” Without a bubble
of doubt, procedural due process of law lies at the
foundation of a civilized society which accords paramount
importance to justice and fairness. It has to be accorded the
weight it deserves.
This brings us to the other end of the balancing pole.
Petitioner avers that the Court should give more weight to
our national commitment under the RP-US Extradition
Treaty to expedite the extradition to the United States of
persons charged with violation of some of its laws.
Petitioner also emphasizes the need to defer to the
judgment of the Executive on matters relating to foreign
affairs in order not to weaken if not violate the principle of
separation of powers.
Considering that in the case at bar, the extradition
proceeding is only at its evaluation stage, the nature of the
right being claimed by the private respondent is nebulous
and the degree of prejudice he will allegedly suffer is weak,
we accord greater weight to the interests espoused by the
government thru the petitioner Secretary of Justice. In
Angara v. Electoral Commission, we held that the
“Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold
lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative
28
and the judicial departments of the government.” Under
our constitutional scheme, executive
29
power is vested in the
President of the Philippines. Executive power includes,
among others, the power to contract or guarantee foreign
loans and the power to enter into treaties or international
30
30
agreements. The task of safeguarding that these treaties
are duly honored devolves upon the executive department
_______________
27 Bio Umpar Adiong v. Commission on Elections, 207 SCRA 712, 716

(1992).
28 63 Phil. 139, 157 (1936).
29 Section 1, Article VII, 1987 Constitution.
30 Id., sections 20-21.
392

which has the competence

31
and authority to so act in the
international arena. It is traditionally held that the
President has power and 32
even supremacy over the
country’s foreign relations. The executive department is
aptly accorded deference on matters of foreign relations
considering the President’s most comprehensive and most
confidential information about the international scene of
which he is regularly briefed by our diplomatic and
consular officials. His access to 33ultra-sensitive military
intelligence data is also unlimited. The deference we give
to the executive department is dictated by the principle of
separation of powers. This principle is one of the
cornerstones of our democratic government. It cannot be
eroded without endangering our government.
The Philippines also has a national interest to help in
suppressing crimes and one way to do it is to facilitate the
extradition of persons covered by treaties duly entered by
our government. More and more, crimes are becoming the
concern of one world. Laws involving crimes and crime
prevention are undergoing universalization. One manifest
purpose of this trend towards globalization is to deny easy
refuge to a criminal whose activities threaten the peace
and progress of civilized countries. It is to the great
interest of the Philippines to be part of this irreversible
movement in light of its vulnerability to crimes, especially
transnational crimes.
In tilting the balance in favor of the interests of the State,
the Court stresses that it is not ruling that the private
respondent has no right to due process at all throughout the
length and breadth of the extrajudicial proceedings.
Procedural due process requires a determination of what
process is due, when it is due, and the degree of what is
due. Stated otherwise, a prior determination should be

made as to whether procedural protections are at all due
and when they are due, which in turn depends on the extent
to which an
_______________
31 Department of Foreign Affairs v. National Labor Relations

Commission, 262 SCRA 39, 48 (1996), citing International Catholic
Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990).
32 Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 (1989). See also Salazar v.
Achacoso, 183 SCRA 145 (1990).
33 U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 57 S. Ct. 216, 81
L. Ed. 255 (1936).
393
VOL. 343, OCTOBER 17, 2000 393

34
individual will be “condemned to suffer grievous loss.” We
have explained why an extraditee has no right to notice
and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process. As aforesaid, P.D. No. 1069 which implements the
RP-US Extradition Treaty affords an extraditee sufficient
opportunity to meet the evidence against him once the
petition is filed in court. The time for the extraditee to know
the basis of the request for his extradition is merely moved
to the filing in court of the formal petition for extradition.
The extraditee’s right to know is momentarily withheld
during the evaluation stage of the extradition process to
accommodate the more compelling interest of the State to
prevent escape of potential extraditees which can be
precipitated by premature information of the basis of the
request for his extradition. No less compelling at that stage
of the extradition proceedings is the need to be more
deferential to the judgment of a co-equal branch of the
government, the Executive, which has been endowed by our
Constitution with greater power over matters involving our
foreign relations. Needless to state, this balance of
interests is not a static but a moving balance which can be
adjusted as the extradition process moves from the
administrative stage to the judicial stage and to the
execution stage depending on factors that will come into
play. In sum, we rule that the temporary hold on private
respondent’s privilege of notice and hearing is a soft
restraint on his right to due process which will not deprive
him of fundamental fairness should he decide to resist the
request for his extradition to the United States. There is no

denial of due process as long as fundamental fairness is
assured a party.
We end where we began. A myopic interpretation of the
due process clause would not suffice to resolve the
conflicting rights in the case at bar. With the global village
shrinking at a rapid pace, propelled as it is by technological
leaps in transportation and communication, we need to
push further back our horizons and work with the rest of
the civilized nations and move closer to the univer-
_______________
34 Morrisey v. Brewer, supra note 22, p. 481, citing Joint Anti-Fascist

Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168, 95 L. Ed. 817, 852, 71
S. Ct. 624 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., Concurring), quoted in Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287, 296, 90 S. Ct. 1011 (1970).
394

sal goals of “peace, equality,

35
justice, freedom, cooperation
and amity with all nations.” In the end, it is the individual
who will reap the harvest of peace and prosperity from
these efforts.
WHEREFORE, the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
is GRANTED. The Decision in the case at bar promulgated
on January 18, 2000 is REVERSED. The assailed Order
issued by the public respondent judge on August 9, 1999 is
SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued by
this Court on August 17, 1999 is made PERMANENT. The
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25 is enjoined from
conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Mendoza, Purisima, Pardo,

Gonzaga-Reyes and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., We join the Dissent of
JJ. Melo and Ynares-Santiago.
Melo, J., Please see dissent.
Vitug, J., I join in the dissent and reiterate my
separate opinion in the original ponencia.
Panganiban, J., For the reasons stated in my
opinion prom, on Jan. 18, 2000, I concur that Respondent
Jimenez is not entitled to notice and hearing during the
preliminary stage of extradition.
Quisumbing, J., In the result.

Buena, J., I join in the dissent of Justice Consuelo
Y. Santiago.
Ynares-Santiago, J., See separate dissent.
_______________
35 Section 2, Article II, 1987 Constitution.
395
VOL. 343, OCTOBER 17, 2000 395

DISSENTING OPINION
MELO, J.:
With all due respect, I dissent.

In his motion for reconsideration, petitioner posits that:
(1) the evaluation process antecedent to the filing of an
extradition petition in court is substantially different from
a preliminary investigation; the absence of notice and
hearing during such process will not result in a denial of
fundamental fairness and satisfies no higher objective;
instituting another layer of notice and hearing, even when
not contemplated in the treaty and in the implementing
law would result in excessive due process; (2) the deliberate
omission of the notice and hearing requirement in the
Philippine Extradition Law is intended to prevent flight;
(3) there is need to balance the interests between the
discretionary powers of government and the rights of an
individual; (4) the instances cited in the majority opinion
when the twin rights of notice and hearing may be
dispensed with will result in a non sequitur conclusion; (5)
by instituting a proceeding not contemplated by
Presidential Decree No. 1069, the Court has encroached
upon the constitutional boundaries separating it from the
other two co-equal branches of government; and lastly, (6)
bail is not a matter of right in proceedings leading to
extradition or in extradition proceedings.
It need not be said that the issues of the case at bar
touch on the very bonds of a democratic society which value
the power of one—the single individual. Basic principles on
democracy are underpinned on the individual. Popular
control is hinged on the value that we give to people as self-
determining agents who should have a say on issues that

affect their lives, particularly on making life-plans.
Political equality is founded on the assumption that
everyone (or at least every adult) has an equal capacity for
self-determination, and, therefore, an equal right to
influence collective decisions, and to have their interests
considered when these decisions are made (Saward, M.,
Democratic Theory and Indices of Democratization; in
Defining and Measuring Democracy, David Beetham, ed.,
Human Rights Centre, University of Essex,
Colchester/Charter 88 Trust, London, 1993, p. 7).
396

Affording due process to a single citizen is not contrary to

the republican and democratic roots of our State, and is in
fact true to its nature. Although there can be excessive
layers of appeals and remedies, no due process rights may
be deemed excessive. It is either the rights are given or not.
The case at bar calls for the grant. Be it remembered that
this is the first time that respondent Jimenez has come to
court to raise the issues herein.
I am going to consider petitioner’s arguments point by
point.
Petitioner argues that the Court should have considered
that preliminary investigation and the evaluation are
similar in the sense that the right to preliminary
investigation and the right to notice and hearing during
the evaluation process are not fundamental rights
guaranteed by the Constitution. In Go vs. Court of Appeals
(206 SCRA 138 [1992]), we held that where there is a
statutory grant of the right to preliminary investigation,
denial of the same is an infringement of the due process
clause. Hence, if a citizen is deprived of a right granted by
statute, it still amounts to a violation of the due process
clause. By analogy, the denial of the right to appeal (which
is not a natural right nor is part of due process) constitutes
a violation of due process if the right is granted by the
Constitution or by statute.
The source of private respondent’s basic due process
rights is Section 1, Article III of the Constitution which is a
self-executory provision, meaning, it is by itself directly or
immediately applicable without need of statutory
implementation, hence may be invoked by proper parties
independently or even against legislative enactment. In
contrast, a non-self-executory provision is one that remains

dormant unless it is given vitality by legislative
implementation. The latter gives the legislature the
opportunity to determine when, or whether such provision
shall be effective thus making it subordinate to the will of
the lawmaking body, which could make it entirely
meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed
implementing statute.
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution is a breathing,
pulsating provision, so to speak. The sovereign itself has
given it life. It is properly invoked by respondent Jimenez
particularly as a citizen of our country. The Extradition
Law need not expressly provide for its applicability.
397
VOL. 343, OCTOBER 17, 2000 397

Petitioner also posits that instituting another layer of

notice and hearing, even when not contemplated in the
treaty and in the implementing law would result in
excessive due process.
I disagree. As earlier stated, admittedly, there can be
excessive layers of appeals and remedies. However, the
observance of due process can hardly be tagged as
excessive. Either it is afforded the citizen or not. In the first
place, due process during the evaluation stage forms part of
administrative due process. The notice and hearing
afforded when the petition for extradition is filed in court
form part of judicial due process. Ultimately, these
requisites serve as restrictions on actions of judicial and
quasi-judicial agencies of government (Nachura,
Outline/Reviewer in Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 48) and are
collectively called requisites of procedural due process.
Moreover, it cannot be overemphasized that this is the first
instance that respondent Jimenez has invoked his basic
due process rights, and it is petitioner who has elevated the
issue to this Court. There is thus nothing excessive in our
act of heeding respondent now.
Petitioner also emphasizes that the technical
assessment and review to determine sufficiency of
documents are matters that can be done without need of
intervention by a third party and that the issues that may
be raised during the proceedings (whether the offense is a
military offense or political offense or whether the request
is politically motivated) can be done through research
without need of intervention by a party. Petitioner,
however, admits that the politically motivated request

would pose some difficulties. Then he proceeds to say that
the determination of whether a request is politically
motivated naturally puts at issue the good faith of the
other country in making a request, and that to make this
determination, one has to be fully aware of the political
surroundings upon which the request is made, and finally,
that this function can only be done by the Department of
Foreign Affairs. But what actually happened in the instant
case? The DFA perfunctorily skimmed through the request
and threw the same to the Department of Justice to
exercise its function. Now, petitioner would prohibit the
prospective extraditee from being heard notwithstanding
the fact that the DFA forsook and deserted its bounded
duty and responsibilities and, instead, converted itself into
what it calls a
398

mere post office. Assuming arguendo that the request was

indeed politically motivated, who would then give an
objective assessment thereof when all the interests of the
DOJ is to prepare a petition for extradition, and to
complete the documents in support thereof? It is willing to
assist the requesting state by advising that the papers are
not in proper order (thus resulting in delay because of the
long wait for the proper papers) but is not willing to afford
the prospective extraditee, its own citizen, enjoyment of his
basic rights to preserve his liberty and freedom.
Petitioner also stresses that the paramount interest
involved in the instant case is not delay but the danger of a
fugitive’s flight. As mentioned above, immediacy is
apparently not a primary concern. Petitioner has given the
requesting state time to complete its documents,
particularly by practically affording the U.S. Government
an opportunity to submit the official English translation of
Spanish documents and to have other documents properly
authenticated. He even had time to file the instant case. To
be straightforward, petitioner himself (particularly the
former Secretary of Justice) has taken his time.
And as regards the apprehension of flight, petitioner is
well versed in the use of a hold departure order which
could easily lay his fear of private respondent’s flight to
rest. In accordance with Department Circular No. 17 issued
on March 19, 1998 by then Secretary of Justice Silvestre H.
Bello III, a hold departure order (HDO) may be issued by

the Secretary of Justice “upon the request of the Head of a
Department of the Government; the head of a
constitutional body or a commission or agency performing
quasi-judicial functions; the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court for the Judiciary; or by the President of the Senate or
the Speaker of the House of Representatives for the
legislative body” when the interested party is the
Government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, “in
the interest of national security, public safety or public
health, as may be provided by law” (Paragraph 2 [d],
Department Circular No. 17 [Prescribing Rules and
Regulations Governing the Issuance of Hold Departure
Orders]). This provision can easily be utilized by petitioner
to prevent private respondent’s flight.
Also in relation to flight, petitioner advances the
applicability of the balance-of-interest test, which, as
discussed in American Com-
399
VOL. 343, OCTOBER 17, 2000 399

munications Association vs. Douds (339 U.S. 282), refers to

a situation where particular conduct is regulated in the
interest of public order, and the regulation results in an
indirect, conditional, partial abridgment of speech,
resulting in the duty of the courts to determine which of
the conflicting interests demand the greater protection
under the particular circumstances presented. In other
words, if in a given situation it should appear that there is
urgent necessity for protecting the national security
against improvident exercise of freedom, but the interests
of the State are not especially threatened by its exercise,
the right must prevail.
The two other tests which evolved in the context of
prosecution of crimes involving the overthrow of the
government also gain applicability on other substantive
evils which the State has the right to prevent even if these
evils do not clearly undermine the safety of the Republic
(Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 219). By analogy, let us consider
the legislation subject of this controversy—the Philippine
Extradition Law. The substantive evil that the State would
like to prevent is the flight of the prospective extraditee. A
lot lies in how we respond to the following considerations:
If the prospective extraditee were given notice and

(1)
hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition proceedings, would this result in his
flight? Would there be a dangerous or natural
tendency that the prospective extraditee might flee
from the country? Is flight the probable effect of
affording him his basic due process rights?
(2) If the prospective extraditee were afforded these
basic due process rights, would this create a clear
and present danger that it will inevitably result in
his flight?
(3) Should the Court balance the interest of the
government (which refers to the prevention of the
flight of the prospective extraditee from the country
and the breach of international commitments) and
that of the individual (referring to possible
indefinite incarceration)? For whom do we tilt the
balance?
Both the treaty and the Extradition Law clearly provide for
the incarceration of the prospective extraditee. Although
the matter has been fully discussed in the then majority
opinion of the Court
400

now being reconsidered, it is significant to survey such

provisions, as follows:
(1) The prospective extraditee faces provisional arrest

pending the submission of the request for
extradition based on Paragraph (1), Article 9 of the
RP-US Extradition Treaty which provides that a
contracting party may request the provisional
arrest of the person sought pending presentation of
the request, but he shall be automatically
discharged after 60 days if no request is submitted
(paragraph 4). The Extradition Law provides for a
shorter period of 20 days after which the arrested
person could be discharged (Section 20[d]). And as
observed in my ponencia, although the Extradition
Law is silent in this respect, the provisions mean
that once a request for extradition is forwarded to
the Requested State, the prospective extraditee
may be continuously detained, or if not,
subsequently rearrested (Paragraph [5], Article 9,

RP-US Extradition Treaty), for he will only be
discharged if no request is later submitted.
(2) The prospective extraditee may also be subject to
temporary arrest during the pendency of the
extradition petition in court (Section 6, Presidential
Decree No. 1069). With the patent insistence of the
requesting state to have the RP-US Extradition
Treaty strictly enforced, as well as the noticeable
zeal and attention of the Department of Justice on
the extradition of respondent Jimenez, one cannot
but conclude that the filing of a petition for
extradition by the Department of Justice is an
absolute certainty. This is especially obvious from
the fact that the Department of Justice has even
allowed the requesting state to correct the
deficiencies of the documents in support of the
request.
Petitioner likens the evaluation procedure to the

cancellation of passports held by persons facing criminal
prosecution. This situation is discussed in the vintage case
of Suntay vs. People (101 Phil. 833 [1957]) where an
accused in a criminal case for seduction applied for and was
granted a passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs
and later left the Philippines for the United States. We
held that due to the accused’s sudden departure from the
country in such a convenient time which could readily be
interpreted to mean as a deliberate attempt on his part to
flee from justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs had the
discretion to withdraw or cancel the
401
VOL. 343, OCTOBER 17, 2000 401

accused’s passport even without a hearing, considering that

such cancellation was based upon an undisputed fact—the
filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport
holder.
The situation in the case at bar is different precisely
because we are looking at a situation where we have a
Filipino countryman facing possible exile to a foreign land.
Forget the personality and controversial nature involved.
Imagine the inconvenience brought about by
incarceration when, on the extreme, the prospective
extraditee could prevent it by pointing out that, for
instance, the request is politically motivated. We are not

only referring to private respondent, who petitioner himself
describes as one who luckily has access to media. The
ruling in the case at bar also affects the lives of ordinary
Filipinos who are far from the limelight. Shall we allow
them to be subjected to incarceration just because they
have no access to information about imminent dangers to
their liberty? What should stop us from protecting our own
Filipino brethren?
In Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals (180 SCRA 756 [1989]),
we held that deportation proceedings do not partake of the
nature of a criminal action, however, considering that said
proceedings are harsh and extraordinary administrative
matters affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, the
constitutional right of such person to due process should
not be denied. Thus, the provisions of the Rules of Court
particularly on criminal procedure are applicable to
deportation proceedings. And this protection was given to
Lao Gi, a former Filipino citizen whose citizenship was set
aside on the ground that it was founded on fraud and
misrepresentation, resulting in a charge for deportation
filed against him, his wife, and children. If an alien subject
to the State’s power of deportation (which is incidentally a
police measure against undesirable aliens whose presence
in the country is found to be injurious to the public good
and domestic tranquility of the people) is entitled to basic
due process rights, why not a Filipino?
On the other hand, let us put the executive department’s
international commitments in perspective.
The very essence of a sovereign state is that it has no
superior. Each sovereign state is supreme upon its own
limits. It is, there-
402

fore, fundamental in Private International Law that it is

within the power of such state at any time to exclude any
or all foreign laws from operating within its borders to the
extent that if it cannot do this, it is not sovereign. Hence,
when effect is given to a foreign law in any territory, it is
only because the municipal law of that state temporarily
abdicates its supreme authority in favor of the foreign law,
which for the time being, with reference to that particular
matter, becomes itself, by will of the state, its municipal
law (Paras, Phil. Conflict of Laws, 1996 ed., p. 5). However,
to be precise, the instant case involves principles of public

international law which describe a sovereign state as
independent and not a dependency of another state
(Salonga & Yap, Public International Law, 1992 ed., p. 7).
If this were a case before international tribunals,
international obligations would undoubtedly reign supreme
over national law. However, in the municipal sphere, the
relationship between international law and municipal law
is determined by the constitutional law of individual states
(Ibid., pp. 11-12). In the Philippines, the doctrine of
incorporation is observed with respect to customary
international law in accordance with Article II, Section 2 of
the 1987 Constitution which in essence provides that the
Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land.”
The Extradition Treaty on the other hand is not
customary international law. It is a treaty which may be
invalidated if it is in conflict with the Constitution. And
any conflict therein is resolved by this Court, which is the
guardian of the fundamental law of the land. No foreign
power can dictate our course of action, nor can the
observations of a handful of American lawyers have any
legal bearing, as if they were law practitioners in this
country.
One last point. Petitioner argues that one can search the
RP-US Extradition Treaty in vain for any provision saying
that notice and hearing should be had during the
evaluation process. But it is also silent on other points—on
the period within which the evaluation procedure should be
done; on the propriety of the act of the Requested State
advising the Requesting State what papers are proper to be
submitted in support of the extradition request (specifically
on authentication and on translation); yet these mat-
403
VOL. 343, OCTOBER 17, 2000 403

ters are not in question. And as regards the matter of bail,

suffice it to state that the Court is not harboring the idea
that bail should be available in extradition proceedings. It
merely rhetorically presented one of the legal implications
of the Extradition Law. This matter is not even in issue.
In closing, it is significant to reiterate that in the United
States, extradition begins and ends with one entity—the
Department of State—which has the power to evaluate the
request and the extradition documents in the beginning,
and in the person of the Secretary of State, the power to act

or not to act on the court’s determination of extraditability.
Let us hope that after the extradition petition has been
filed and heard by the proper court, the executive
department, represented in our country by the Department
of Foreign Affairs, will this time dutifully discharge its
function, like its American counterpart, in making the final
and ultimate determination whether to surrender the
prospective extraditee to the foreign government
concerned. Anyway, petitioner himself has argued that it is
the entity knowledgeable of whether the request was
politically motivated in the first place. The possibility of the
prospective extraditee’s exile from our land lies in its
hands.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DENY the instant motion for
reconsideration.
DISSENTING OPINION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On January 18, 2000, 1 was one of the nine (9) members of

the Court who voted to dismiss the petition of the Secretary
of Justice. My vote was intended to grant any Filipino
citizen, not Mr. Mark Jimenez alone, a fair and early
opportunity to find out why he should be forcibly extradited
from his homeland to face criminal trial in a foreign
country with all its unfamiliar and formidable
consequences.
After going over the grounds given by the Government
in support of the motion for reconsideration, I regret that I
cannot go along with the new ruling of the Court’s recent
majority. I am convinced that there is greater reason to
strike the balance in favor of
404

a solitary beleaguered individual against the exertion of

overwhelming Government power by both the Philippines
and the United States. To grant the respondent his right to
know will not, in any significant way, weaken or frustrate
compliance with treaty objectives. But it will result in
jurisprudence which reasserts national dignity and gives
meaningful protection to the rights of any citizen who is

presumed innocent until proven guilty.
The basic considerations behind my vote to deny the
petition have not changed inspite of the detailed
explanations in the motion for reconsideration. On the
contrary, I recognize the grant of the respondent’s request
even more justified and compelling.
In the first place, I find nothing unreasonable, illegal or
repugnant for a man about to be brought to trial to ask for
the charges raised against him. It is a perfectly natural and
to-be-expected request. There is also nothing in the RP-US
Extradition Treaty that expressly prohibits the giving of
such information to an extraditee before trial. On the other
hand, its grant is in keeping with basic principles of
fairness and even-handed justice.
I find petitioner’s reasons for rejecting the exercise of
the right to know as more illusory than real. Delay is not
an issue. Delays were incurred in the United States before
the request for extradition was finalized. Delays in the
Philippines are inevitable unless a skilled prosecutor and a
competent Judge will ably control the course of the trial in
a court with clogged dockets. It is these delays that should
be addressed. Why should a few days given to an “accused”
to study the charges against him be categorized as
unwarranted and intolerable delay?
I reject the argument that public interest, international
commitments and national dignity would be compromised
if Mr. Mark B. Jimenez is shown the extradition treaty so
he can more adequately prepare his defense. Merely raising
insuperable grounds does not insure their validity. I find
the above concerns totally inapplicable under the
circumstances of this case.
I beg the Court’s indulgence as I discuss one by one the
reasons for the Court’s change of mind and the grounds for
the grant of the motion for reconsideration.
405
VOL. 343, OCTOBER 17, 2000 405

I dissent from the first ground which implies that a claim

shall be rejected and a protection may not be allowed if it is
not found in the express provisions of the RP-US
Extradition Treaty. It should be the other way around. Any
right not prohibited by the Treaty which arises from
Philippine law, custom or traditions of decency and fairness
should be granted and not denied. The referral by the
Department of Foreign Affairs to the Department of Justice

and the high profile collaboration between the two powerful
Departments, found in Presidential Decree No. 1069, is not
also provided for in the Treaty. Does that mean it is
prohibited?
There is no provision in the Treaty which mandates that
an extraditee should be kept in the dark about the charges
against him until he is brought to trial. The Treaty deals
only with the trial proper. It cannot possibly cover
everything. Our law and jurisprudence are not superseded
by the mere absence of a specific provision in a treaty.
What is not prohibited should be allowed.
The respondent is not asking for any favor which
interferes with the evaluation of an extradition request.
While two powerful institutions, the Department of Foreign
Affairs and the Department of Justice, are plotting the
course of a citizen’s life or liberty, I see no reason why the
person involved should not be given an early opportunity to
prepare for trial. There is no alteration or amendment of
any Treaty provision. Section 6 of Presidential Decree No.
1069, which provides for service of the summons and the
warrant of arrest once the extradition court takes over, is a
minimum requirement for the extraditee’s protection. Why
should it be used against him? Why should it be treated as
a prohibition against the enjoyment of rights to which a
citizen may be entitled under a liberal interpretation of our
laws, treaties and procedures?
With all due respect, I find the second reason in the
Court’s Resolution, ostensibly based on the intent behind
the RP-US Extradition Treaty, to be inapplicable,
exaggerated and unfair. Does the grant of an early
opportunity to prepare for one’s defense really diminish our
country’s commitment to the suppression of crime? How can
a person’s right to know what blows will strike him next be
a State’s coddling of a perpetrator of a crime? Why should
the odious crimes of terrorism and drug trafficking be used
as inflammatory arguments to decide cases of more
subjective and problem-
406

atical offenses like tax evasion or illegal election campaign

contributions? Terrorism and drug trafficking are capital
offenses in the Philippines. There should be no legal
obstacles to speedily placing behind bars a Filipino
terrorist or drug dealer or summarily deporting a non-

citizen as an undesirable alien. But this should in no way
lessen a greater care and more humane handling of an
offense not as clear-cut or atrocious. The use of epithetical
arguments is unfair.
In this particular case, it is not the respondent’s request
for copies of the charges which is delaying the extradition
process. Delay is caused by the cumbersome procedures
coupled with ostentatious publicity adopted by two big
Departments—the Department of Foreign Affairs and the
Department of Justice—to evaluate what is really a simple
question: whether or not to file extradition proceedings.
But we are unfairly laying the blame on Mark Jimenez and
using it as an excuse to deny a basically reasonable request
which is to him of paramount importance.
I find this case not so much a violation of any
international commitment as it is an unnecessary exertion
of the strong arm of the law and an unfortunate display of
dominant Government power.
The third factor mentioned by the majority of the Court
is based on a mistaken premise. It assumes that furnishing
a potential extraditee with a copy of the extradition request
is prohibited by the Treaty. It is not. The silence of the
Treaty on the matter does not mean it cannot be done. To
view silence as prohibition is completely anathema to
statutory construction of constitutional protections.
Canada, Hong Kong, and the United States may not
furnish copies of the charges during the evaluation stage.
But this could be due to their use of an entirely different
and abbreviated evaluation process. Absent clear and
specific prohibitions in a treaty, the procedure by which
rights are enforced and wrongs redressed is primarily one of
national regulation and control. There is no universal
uniform procedure required of all countries. Every State
has the prerogative of devising its own guidelines in
securing essential justice. The fact that certain countries do
not follow the practice does not mean that we cannot adopt
measures that are fair, protective of private interests to life
and liberty, and not really damaging
407
VOL. 343, OCTOBER 17, 2000 407

to Philippine and American governmental concerns. Is

there anything in the request of Mark Jimenez which is
offensive to the principles of ordered liberty and justice
treated as fundamental? It is the Government which is

acting in an uncustomary, frigid and unfeeling manner in
this case.
Regarding the fourth reason for the majority decision, I
agree that an extradition proceeding is sui generis. It may
not yet involve the determination of innocence or guilt. But
certainly, such is the only result of extradition. A person’s
good name, dignity, reputation and honor are at stake. In
no way should these values be treated lightly simply
because proceedings have not yet reached the criminal trial
proper. The preliminary procedure request by the
respondent may be different from preliminary
investigations under our law. But the right to some kind of
proper notice is fundamental.
A proposed extraditee should not be denied a reasonable
opportunity to prepare for trial. In an extradition trial,
there may be reasons for the exercise of special care and
caution. It is not a casual occurrence to give up your citizen
to another country’s criminal justice system. I do not want
to sound unduly jingoistic but in certain Western countries,
especially those using the jury system, a second-class
citizen or a colored non-citizen may not always get equal
justice inspite of protestations to the contrary. The
prospective extraditee, therefore, deserves every lawful
consideration which his poor third-world country can give
him. Instead of being influenced by non-applicable
doomsday pronouncements regarding terrorists, drug
dealers, and internationally syndicated criminals being
pampered, all we need to apply is plain common-sense
coupled with a compassionate and humane approach.
The fifth factor influencing the Court regarding threats
to respondent’s liberty should not be dismissed as fancied
or imaginary. The insistent denial of a simple right to be
informed is the best argument that the Treaty is being
interpreted in an unduly strict manner contrary to our
established rules on transparency and candidness. At this
early stage, we are already interpreting the RP-US
Extradition Treaty in a most restrictive manner. The terms
of any law or treaty can be interpreted strictly or liberally.
What reasons do we have to adopt a rigidly strict
interpretation when what is involved is human liberty?
408

While extradition treaties should be faithfully observed and

interpreted, with a view to fulfilling the nation’s obligations
to other powers, this should be done1 without sacrificing the
constitutional rights of the accused.
I repeat that what Mark Jimenez requests is only an
opportunity to know the charges against him. We are not
judging a game where the Government may spring a
surprise on him only at the trial. I find nothing revolting in
the respondent’s request. And this brings me to the sixth
ground given by the latest Resolution of the Court.
We have to be cautious in relying on the so-called
balancing of the sovereign powers of the State against
private interests of a wretched solitary individual. What
chance does any person have against this kind of argument
unless the Court approaches the problem in a libertarian
manner?
I do not see any “important State interests” or any
“government’s promotion of fundamental public interests or
policy objectives” being prejudiced. The respondent’s right
to know the charges against him early does not clash in any
way with any paramount national interest. The invocation
of State interests by the Secretary of Justice is more
illusive and rhetorical than real.
There is nothing nebulous in an extraditee’s request to
prepare for trial. Whether or not the degree of prejudice to
be suffered by the respondent is weak depends on the
particular circumstance of each case. A blanket denial in
all cases cannot be based in an all-embracing invocation of
public interest or sovereign power. Neither should
separation of powers be pleaded. Whether or not to
extradite is a judicial function. The protection of human
rights has never been denied on grounds of comity among
the three great departments of Government. The power to
enter into treaties is an executive function but its
implementation on whether or not certain protections may
be accorded is judicial.
The invocation of executive prerogatives against a
judicial interference has to be carefully studied. I admit
that the balancing of individual liberty and governmental
authority is a delicate and formidable task. It should,
however, be accepted that the balance is
_______________
1 31A Am Jur 2d Extradition § 19.
409
VOL. 343, OCTOBER 17, 2000 409

an ever-shifting one. There should be no setting down of a

permanent rule of denial even under changed
circumstances.
With all due respect, I disagree with the Court’s
majority as it uses principles which to me are not
applicable under the circumstances of this petition. Unless
there are compelling reasons, which do not exist in this
case, the balance should not be tilted in favor of interference
with a legitimate defense of life or liberty.
The considerations towards the end of the Court’s
Resolution about the national interest in suppressing
crime, the irreversible globalization of non-refuge to
criminals, and, more specifically, the mention of
transnational crimes, are hardly relevant to the subject
matter of this case.
Illegal campaign contributions and tax evasions are not
transnational crimes. Mr. Mark B. Jimenez is not a refugee2
criminal until he is proven guilty and then runs away. The
Court is prejudging his guilt when in fact it is an American
court that still has to try him.
The kind of protection advocated by the Court should be
not directed towards hypothetical cases of terrorism or
international drug trafficking. There are more than enough
valid measures to insure that criminals belonging to
international syndicates do not escape apprehension and
trial. Hypothetical fears of non-applicable crimes should
not be conjured in this particular case for a blanket denial
of the right to information under all circumstances. To
grant the respondent’s request would have no truly
dangerous consequences to the administration of justice.
I respectfully urge the Court to rescue libertarian
principles from the overzealous and sometimes inexplicable
efforts of executive officers to tread upon them. Let us not
unnecessarily distance ourselves from the felt and accepted
needs of our citizens in this novel and, for us, uncharted
field of extradition. The Court is tasked to defend
individual liberty in every major area of governance
including international treaties, executive agreements, and
their attendant commitments.
_______________
2 Hughes v. Pflanz, 138 Fed. 980.
410

Transfarm & Co., Inc. vs. Daewoo Corporation
In view of the foregoing, I vote to DENY the motion for

reconsideration and to DISMISS the petition.
Urgent motion for reconsideration granted, judgment
and order reversed and set aside.
Note.—Simple justice demands, and the law requires no

less, that a defendant must know what the complaint
against him is all about. (Virata vs. Sandiganbayan, 272
SCRA 661 [1997])
——o0o——
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9/24/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 343

VOL. 343, OCTOBER 17, 2000 377

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH

Constitutional Law; Remedial Law; Extradition; Court holds

differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal

378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion

extradition proceeding allow admission of evidence under less

1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty affords an

VOL. 343, OCTOBER 17, 2000 379

MELO, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Constitutional Law; Remedial Law; Extradition; Petitioner is

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Constitutional Law; Remedial Law; Extradition; To grant the

380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion

not superseded by the mere absence of a specific provision in a

URGENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a

The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.

On January 18, 2000, by a vote of 9-6, we dismissed the

1 Rollo, pp. 442-443; Decision, Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Ralph C.

VOL. 343, OCTOBER 17, 2000 381

“The majority decision failed to appreciate the following facts and

I. There is a substantial difference between an evaluation

VI. The instances cited in the assailed majority decision when

On March 28, 2000, a 58-page Comment was filed by the

2 Rollo, p. 495; Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, p. 4.

382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

respondent also filed on August 18, 2000, a Motion to

“Sec. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing; Service

It is of judicial notice that the summons includes the

3 “Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have

VOL. 343, OCTOBER 17, 2000 383

from the US government and its supporting documents and

Second. All treaties, including the RP-US Extradition

“WHEREAS, under the Constitution[,] the Philippines adopts the

It cannot be gainsaid that today, countries like the

4 Note, The United States v. The libelants and Claimants of the

384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

tional and transnational crimes like terrorism and drug

It ought to follow that the RP-US Extradition Treaty

“It is common in extradition cases to attempt to bring to bear all

VOL. 343, OCTOBER 17, 2000 385

We erode no right of an extraditee when we do not allow

with the Philippines. The rule is recognized that while

7 Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 US 187, 192 (1961); Factor v. Laubenheimer,

386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

appropriate note verbales communicated to our

VOL. 343, OCTOBER 17, 2000 387

“An extradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and the

There are other differences between an extradition

15 Wiehl, Extradition Law at the Crossroads: The Trend Toward

388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

with a determination of the precise nature of the

1. In case of urgency, a Contracting Party may request the

a) a description of the person sought;

VOL. 343, OCTOBER 17, 2000 389

3. The Requesting State shall be notified without delay of

In relation to the above, Section 20 of P.D. No. 1069