A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE JUDICIAL ROLE AND

ITS EFFECT ON THE THEORY ON JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS

IN THE PHILIPPINE HYBRID LEGAL SYTEMS

CESAR LAPUZ VILLANUEVA

Submitted to Prof. Arthur Taylor Von Mehren

in Satisfaction of the Written Work Requirement
of Harvard Law School for the Degree of Master of Law

Spring, 1989
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts
 2

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Background and Scope of Paper.

Subjugated, Christianized, and welded into a nation by Spain in the 16th
century, thereafter governed as a Spanish colony for more than 350 years until
sovereignty was ceded to the United States at the close of the 19th century, and
with independence finally being granted shortly after the Second World War, the
Philippines today has a legal system which is a blend on Malay customary laws
of the Spanish civil law system and the Anglo-American common law system,
with the partial application of the Muslim legal system to the Filipino Muslims of
southern Philippines.1The unique legal system resulting from the blending of
diverse cultures in the Philippines over the centuries has largely been due to the
strategic location of the Philippine archipelago as the gateway to and from
Southeast and Asia into the Pacific Ocean.2
The victory of Commodore Dewey in the battle of Manila Bay on May 1,
1898, followed by the ratification of the Treaty of Paris of 1898 which transferred
the sovereignty over the Philippines from Spain to the United States, marked the
transformation of Philippine legal system, with Anglo-American juridical principles
playing a very important role in the evolution of Philippine jurisprudence. 3 The
blending of the two great western legal systems during the four decades of
American occupation has given the Philippine legal system the characteristics of
elasticity and progressiveness, yet it engendered great confusions; there was
fear that the “cross-breeding of the Castillian lion and the American eagle had
resulted in the evil birth of a phenomenal creature!”4 There has been a
progressive desire, even during the American occupation, which gained
momentum after independence, to refashion the Philippine legal system to
conform to the Filipino ways of thinking, his customs, traditions, and
temperament, and to make it responsive nation’s needs.5
Like most developing countries not of the Western civilization, the
challenge faced by the Philippines is the imperative need to evolve a legal
system that is logically and structurally coherent and responsive to the complex
needs of its diverse society. That would require striking the balance between the
importance of anchoring its laws in the sociological and cultural values of its
people and of adapting such laws to international standards because of the
1
PASCUAL, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PHILIPPINES 7 (1970); See also Gilmore,
Philippine Jurisprudence - - Common Law or Civil Law? 16 A.B.A.89 (1916-1917); Lobingier,
Blending Legal Systems in the Philippines, 21 L.Q. REV. 401 (1905); Abreu, The Blending of the
Anglo-American Law with the Spanish Civil Law in the Philippines, 3 PHIL L. REV. 285 (1914)
2
See description in W. CAMERON FORBES, THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 29-30
(Harvard University Press, 1945).
3
See Gamboa, The Meeting of the Roman Law and the Common Law in the Philippines,
49 PHIL. L.J. 304-305 (1974).
4
LAUREL, ASSERTIVE NATIONALISM 80 (1931)
5
Balbastro, Philippine Legal Philosophy, 41 PHIL. L.J. 635, 636-637 (1966)
 3

imperatives for national development of foreign trade and relations. The

Philippines has been a politically independent country for more than 40 years
now; certainly, the genius of the Philippine legal mind has been able to tame the
legal beast left behind by the colonial masters.
A study of the Philippine hybrid legal system offers a fascinating setting for
comparatists to evaluate the effects of the direct blending of two of the major
western legal systems, and to determine whether the convergence is fulfilling the
need for laws that are “universal in scope and in spirite.” 6 Towards that end, this
paper will study on the effects of the blending of the common law principles in
what originally was an established civil law system7 in the Philippines on its
emerging theory on judicial precedents, using in comparative analysis the
developments in this field in the United States and the Civil law countries of
Spain and France.

B. Stare Decisis, Doctrina Legal, and Jurisprudence Constante

Stability, uniformity, and predictability are the compelling reasons for the
value placed upon judicial precedents. “Although in practice the use of
precedents may often be approximately similar in civilian and in common law
jurisdictions, the essential difference lies in the attitude towards them and the
sanctity with which they are regarded”8
Under the common law doctrine of stare decisis, judicial precedents are
considered law de jure, while in civil law jurisdiction case-law, when recognized
at all, is merely law de facto.9 The variance in the underlying philosophies in the
two legal systems are rooted in the role they ascribed to their judges. In the civil
law system the traditional role of judges in law-making is very limited,10 since law-
making is considered to be the function solely of the legislators; judicial decisions
must therefore “develop within the framework established by legislation.”11 In the
civil law system, judicial decisions are therefore not traditionally considered as
sources of law.
On the other hand, the common law theory on judicial precedents has an
opposite premises. The first principle of hierarchy in the doctrine of stare decisis,
that a “lower court is under a duty to accept the position held on any given issue
by its hierarchical superior,”12flows from the theory in common law that decided
cases are, in their own right, sources of law. “The fact that the lower court thinks

6
RENE DAVID, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 17 (1985),
translated and adapted by John E.C. Brierley.
7
See Gilmore, loc. Cit. note 1, at 90-92
8
Tate, Techniques of Judicial Interpretation in Louisiana, XXII LA L. REV. 727, 743
(1962)
9
Dageett, Dainow, Hebert, and McMahon, A Reappraisal Appraised: A Brief For the Civil
Law of Louisana, XII TUL. L. REV. 13, (1937)
10
Ibid.
11
DAVID, supra note 6, at 136 (underscoring supplied).
12
VON MEHREN, LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 15 (1988)
 4

the decision wrong does not justify its ignoring the precedent.”13 The second
principle which provides that a court is bound by its previous decisions, is not the
logical entailment of theory that judicial decisions are source of law, but flows
from the policy of giving the legal systems structure and coherence in the
absence code system, and also because of the considerations of equality of
treatment, predictability, and economy of effort.14 Although the same
considerations operate in the civil law system, but because of its traditional view
that judicial decisions are not formal sources of law, prior decisions do not enjoy
the same standing in civil law as they do in the common law.15 Although though
lower courts in the civil law system “have at least in theory the freedom to depart
from previous decisions of hierarchically superior courts….. as a practical mater
in the great majority of case lower court n all systems accept the position taken
by their hierarchical superiors,” for fear of reversal.16
Under the English doctrine of state decisi each decision is a binding
authority which Parliament alone may change. This is understandable since
England does not have a rigid constitution, and Parliament can always remedy a
precedent that has gone awry. On the other hand, because of the existence of a
rigid constitution, and the complexities of the federal and multi-state judicial
systems of the United States, the American practice takes into account the
nature of the pending case in order to weight the binding effect of prior
decisions.17 The principle followed by Spain in this jurisprudencia which evolved
through its doctrina legal18 and by France in its jurisprudence constante, give
judicial precedents authoritative weight when established by a number of
decisions.19
The Spanish doctrine of doctrina legal allows appeal to the Supreme Court
from a judicial decision which has violated a judicial practice based on several
decisions of the Supreme Court.20 The term jurisprudencia is reserved to
decisions rendered by the Supreme Court or by the other superior courts to the
exclusion of those rendered by the courts of appeal or the lower courts. 21 The
doctrina legal exists only when a decision of the Supreme Court is confirmed by
a second decision of the same court involving a similar case.22
The underlying principle of judicial precedents in the civil law and common
law systems have been greatly influenced by the role played by the judiciary in
the evolution of the legal system. In the Philippine legal system, the blending of
the civil law and the common law traditions is nowhere more pronounced than in
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid
17
Cf. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. 44, 87 L. Ed. 604, 125 A.L.R. 1368
(1940).
18
See DAVID, supra note 6, at 145.
19
See Loussaouarn, The Relative Importance of Legislation, Custom, Doctrine, and
Precedent in French Law, 18 LA L.REV. 235, 255-260 (1958)
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
 5

the evolution of the role of the judges. In accordance with its Anglo-American
heritage, the judiciary is regarded as “the indestructible citadel of the people’s
rights, the solid bulwark of their liberties, the hallowed repository of their
accumulated beliefs and collective faiths in the supremacy of the Rule of Law.”23
A judge in the Philippines is more than a mere “civil servant” or “bureaucrat” or
“functionary” of the government, nor are his powers considered to be “narrow,
mechanical, and uncreative.”24 On the other hand, reflecting the legal system’s
civil law moorings, the judiciary itself deeply respects the preeminence of the
statutory enactments of the legislature and their primacy in the legal order; 25 nor
would the judiciary impose its judicial conception of wisdom and propriety upon
the function of the legislature to legislate.26
In its theory of judicial precedents, therefore, the Philippine hybrid legal
system has blended together the underlying philosophies of the principle of stare
decisis of the common law system, and the evolving principles of judicial
precedents of the civil law systems. This paper will examine the logical
consistency and functional cohesiveness of the resulting amalgam.

II. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE PHILIPPINE THEORY ON JUDICIAL

PRECEDENTS
The creative role that the judiciary plays today in Philippine society, and
the underlying theory on judicial precedents, can primarily be traced to five
factors that have interplayed in the history of the Philippine legal system and
continue to influence its development: the adoption of the American court
system; the constitutional powers vested in the Supreme Court; the transplanting
of Anglo-American principles in the Philippine legal system; continuing influence
of civil law; and the cultural, social, and economic demands of the Philippine
society, which have grown complexity.

A. Adoption of American Court System.

In his instruction of April 7, 1900 to the United States Philippine
Commission (later designated by Congress as “Philippine Commission”),
President McKinley, after declaring among other things that due consideration
and weight be given to local customs, habits, and conditions in the establishment
of the government for the people of the Philippines, enjoined that “there are
certain great principles of government which have been made the basis of our
governmental system…..[and] also certain practical rules of government which
we have found to be essential to the preservation of these great principles of
liberty and law, and that these principles and these rule of government must be
established and maintained in their islands for the sake of their liberty and
23
BATACAN, THE SUPREME COURT IN PHILIPPINE HISTORY 4 (1972)
24
See MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 38 (1985).
25
See Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734 (1970); Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (1968);
Peralta v. Commission on Elections, 82 SCRA 30 (1978)
26
Uy Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385 (1925)
 6

happiness, however much they may conflict with customs or laws or procedure
with which the they familiar.”27 These words presaged radical changes in the
legal, as well as in the political, institutions then existing in the Philippines, and
greatly influenced the expanding role that has since been played by the judiciary
and judicial precedents in Philippine society.28
With the Spanish judicial system in the Philippines being antiquated,
corrupt, and venal,29 the Philippine Commission recognized the demand for a
more enlightened and efficient system of judicature, and sought a higher
standard and more perfect model as a basis for the organization of the courts for
the new government of the Philippines.30 A new judicial system was installed
patterned after the American model, with justice of the peace courts of limited
jurisdiction in municipal levels; courts of first instance of general jurisdiction in
newly created judicial districts; and a Supreme Court at the apex as the final
arbiter of law and the Constitution. The Supreme Court was organized consisting
of a Chief Justice (who was always a Filipino) and six associates justices, any
five of whom, when convened, constituted a quorum. The concurrence of at
least four members of the Court was necessary in order to pronounce a
judgment. Up to the time of the commonwealth, the Court was been composed
of 4 American justices and 3 Filipino justices.31
Later, under the 1935 Constitution of the commonwealth period, the
membership was increased to 11 justices, 32 which could either sit en banc or in
two divisions.33 In that period, an intermediate appellate court, known as the
Court of Appeals, was established to take over the work of the Supreme Court of
examining of law are raised on cases appealed to the Supreme Court. 34
Originally composed of 11 justices, the Court of Appeals’s membership increased
to 24 in 1968, to 37 in 1937, and to 45 in 1978.35 The court may sit en banc or in
15 divisions of 3 justices each.36
The inherent weakness of the then existing Spanish procedural laws in the
Philippines necessitated their being “entirely swept away”37 and eventually led to
the adoption of codes of civil and criminal procedures based entirely on American
models.38 The Philippine judicial system functioned therefore almost entirely in
the case and structure of the American system, except for the jury system which
was not extended to the Philippines. The effect of this development was best
27
See Samson, The Judiciary, 2 PHIL. L. J. 59 (1915)
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid.
30
See Harvey, The Administration of Justice in the Philippine Islands, 1 PHIL. L.J. 330
(1914).
31
Ibid, at 339.
32
Article VIII, Section 1.
33
Article VIII, Section 2.
34
See Commonwealth Acts 3 (1935) and 259 (1948).
35
See COURT OF APPEALS INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES at 3 (U.P. Law
Center 1979).
36
Ibid, at 5.
37
Lobingier, loc. Cit. note 1, at 403.
38
Ibid. See also Gilmore, loc. Cit. note 1, at 93.
 7

described by the Supreme Court in Alzua v. Johnson:39 “ Its manifest purpose

and object was to replace the old judicial system, with its incidents and traditions
drawn from Spanish sources, with a new system modeled in all its essential
characteristics upon the judicial systems of the United States. It cannot be
doubted, therefore, that any incident of the former system which conflicts with the
essential rests, must be held to be abrogated by the law organizing the new
system.”40 Thus, in Alzua, despite the rule of civil liability of judicial offices as laid
down the Spanish civil law systems, the common law doctrine pertaining to the
judiciary was made to prevail that “judges of superior and general jurisdiction are
not liable to respond in civil action for damages for what they may do in the
exercise of their functions when acting within their legal powers and
jurisdiction.”41

B. Constitutional Power of Judicial Review

The casting of the Philippine juridical system in the mold of the American
judicature, and the transplanting of American constitutionalism in Philippine soil,
necessarily brought with them the doctrine of judicial review predicated upon the
supremacy of the constitution, in cases of conflict between constitutional
provisions and legislative or executive acts.42 Chief Justice Fernando in one of
his books describes the early development of the power of judicial review in the
Philippine legal system:

“At the time when the United States acquired the Philippines
from Spain at the end of the [19th] century, one of the principles of
constitutional law binding on the territorial government established
by her in the Philippines was … [the] concept of judicial review. It
was natural from American lawyer, who were admitted to the
practice in the Philippines, to challenge the validity of statutes or
executive orders, whenever the interests of their clients so
demanded. The Filipino justices and judges who with their
American brethren administered justice were soon made aware that
the power to pass on the constitutionality of such statutes and
executive orders was part of their judicial function. The Filipino
lawyers vied with the American members of the bar in raising the
39
21 Phil. 308 (1912).
40
Ibid, at 333. (underscoring supllied).
41
Ibid, at 326-329
42
Constitutionalism in the Philippines dates back to the ratification of the Treaty of Paris
of 1898 transferring Spanish sovereignty over the archipelago to the United States. Prior to the
1935 Constitution, Philippine constitutional law grew from a series of organic documents enacted
by the United States government, namely: (1) President McKinley’s Instructions to the Second
Philippine Commission (Public Laws of the Philippines xiii, February 2, 1900); (2) the Philippine
Bill of 1902 (Public Laws of the Philippines xiii, February 2, 1900); (2) the Philippine Bill of 1902
(Pubic Laws of the Philippines xiii, February 2, 1900. Act July 1, 1902, ch. 1369, 32 Stat. 691);
and (3) the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 (11 Public Laws of the Philippines 237. Act August
29, 1916 ch. 416, 39 Stat. 545).
 8

question of constitutionality whenever appropriate. The American

practice therefore of appealing to courts through the form of law
suits, decisions reached by either the executive or legislative
branches of the government became part of the accepted doctrines
in the Philippines early in the period of American sovereignty.”43

By the time of the adoption of the 1935 Constitution that ushered the
commonwealth period, the power of judicial review was already a well-
established principles in the Philippine legal system. It was recognized that the
power of judicial review is not solely the prerogative of the Supreme Court but all
other lower courts, and this was later clearly inferred from constitutional
provisions which conferred upon the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over
judgments and decrees of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality
or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order instructions, ordinance, or regulation is in question.44
With the power of judicial review, the Philippine theory on judicial
precedents began its metamorphic growth very early during the American regime
in the field of constitutional law. Similar to its American conception, constitutional
law as understood in Philippine law, is not just the text of the constitution itself,
but the body of rules resulting from the interpretation by a high court of cases in
which the validity, in relation to the constitutional instrument, of some acts of
governmental power have been challenged.45 “The task of the student of
constitutional law, therefore, cannot be reduced to mere exegesis of the
constitutional text [but] [he] must plow through the thousands of pages of courts
decisions in order to find the mass of ‘judge-made’ laws that have grown from the
text.”46 This particular concept of “judicial review” derived from American legal
tradition was not very far from the nature of the laws as treated in civil law
tradition with which the then Filipino jurists trained in the Spanish civil law system
were familiar. The constitution, even though “dominating the structure” in
common law, 47 is legislation in the Romanist tradition since its primary purpose
“is not to resolve disputes but to establish general rules of organization and
conduct for those in power and for government administrators.”48

43
FERNANDO, THE POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 11-12 (1968)
44
J.M. Tuason and Co. v. Court of Appeals, 13 SCRA 696, 703-704 (1961); Vera v.
Arca, 28 SCRA 351, 361-362 (1969); see 1987 Constitution, Article VIII, Sec. 5(2) (a); 1973
Constitution, Article X, Sec. 5(2) (a); 1935 Constitution, Article VIII, Sec. 2(1).
45
I BERNAS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vi
(1987) citing CORWIN, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATS OF AMERICA 1 (1963)
46
Ibid.
47
DAVID, supra note 6, at 4422.
48
Ibid. “The interpretation of the American Constitution is …an example of the operation
of some of the more advanced Romano-Germanic theories of interpretation being adopted and
used in a Common law country. There was no hesitation in the Untied States about rejecting,
with respect to the Constitution, the classical maxim according to which statutes, a series of
errata and addenda to the Common law, were to be restrictively interpreted.” Ibid, at 443.
 9

The value of judicial precedents as sources of law the followed an uneven

terrain since the establishment of the Supreme Court by the American Military
Government in 1900. The casting of the judiciary in structure similar to that of
the American judicial system, maintenance of a majority of American justices in
the Supreme Court for the crucial first 35 years until the establishment of the
Commonwealth Government, appointment of many American jurists to courts of
first instance, especially the courts of the City of Manila, and the assumption of
the judicial power of review by the judiciary under the constitutional framework
early laid out in the Philippine governmental system, have all inexorably
contributed to leaving a clear imprint on the value of judicial decisions as sources
of law. From the creative and aggressive role that the judiciary played in
constitutional law, where its judgments became “the law” it was a natural
development for judges and justices to assume similar creative role in the other
fields of law. Thus, from the very first volume of the Philippine Reports, the
Supreme Court, even though not referring specifically to the doctrine of stare
decisis, began to rely on rulings on earlier of its decisions to resolve pending
cases.49 Such a development was further enhanced by the rigorous
transplanting of Anglo-American statutes in the Philippine legal systems.50

C. Transplant of Anglo-American Laws and Principles.

American Justice Malcolm, in the case of In re Shop51 after surveying the
Spanish codes and statutes that were allowed to remain in force, declared that at
the commencement of American sovereignty in the Philippines “[t]here was no
properly called Common Law or Case Law of Spain to accompany and amplify
[the Spanish] statutes, although there were, of course, the customs of the people
of the Islands, which constituted, in a sense, unwritten law. Spanish
jurisprudence does not recognize the principle of stare decisis; consequently,
there could be no Common Law in any sense analogous to the English or
American Common Law.”52 In addition he held that “[t]he Spanish statute law, as
amplified by Spanish commentaries but without background of Spanish
precedents or case law, was by the change of sovereignty, severed from Spanish
jurisprudence and made effective in this jurisdiction to the same extent as if {the
United States] Congress had enacted new laws for the Philippines modeled upon
those same Spanish statutes. This retention of the local private law was merely

49
See De Santos, The Philippine Doctrine of Precedents, 5 UE L..J. 235, 242-244 (1963)
50
See Gilmore, loc. Cit. note 1, at 93.
51
41 Phil. 213 (1920)
52
Ibid. at 226; see also MALCOLM, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS 704-708 (Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Co. 1916).
 10

in accordance with the principle of International Law in that regard….” 53

Therefore a hospitable soil on which Anglo-American principles could take roots.
Outside the fields of constitutional and administrative laws, for about a
decade the Attorney-General and the courts of the Philippines followed Anglo-
American precedents in the nature of common law without apparently
considering to what extent those authorities were binding.54 In the 1908 case of
U.S. v. Cuna, 55 the Supreme Court, speaking through American Justice Carson,
declared: “Neither English nor American common law is in force in these Islands;
nor are the doctrines derived therefrom binding upon our courts, save only
insofar as they are founded on sound principles applicable to local conditions,
and are not in conflict with existing law.”56 Later in Alzua V. Johnson 57 the same
justice modified the strict pronouncement in Cuna and in effect adopted the
inverse principle when he held:
“[W]hile it is true that the body of the common law as known to
Anglo-American jurisprudence is not a force in these Island, ‘nor the
doctrines derived therefrom binding upon our courts, save only inso far as
they are founded on sound principles applicable to local conditions, and
not in conflict with existing law’ (U.S. v. Cuna, 12 Phil. Rep., 241);
nevertheless, many of the rules, principles, and doctrines of the common
law have, to all intents and purposes, been imported into this jurisdiction,
as a result of the enactment of new laws and the organization and
establishment of new institutions by the Congress of the United States or
under its authority; for it will be found that many of these laws can only be
construed and applied through the aid of the common law from which they
are derived, and that , to breathe the breath of life into many of the
institutions, recourse must be had to the rules, principles and doctrines of
the common law under whose protecting aegis the prototypes of these
institutions had their birth.”58

53
Ibid, at 228. See contra Gilmore, loc. cit. note 1, at 92: “Technically, perhaps, it may
be said that this perpetuated only the Spanish Statute law without its background of Spanish
precedents or case law and that by the change of sovereignty Spanish statute Law was severed
from the Spanish jurisprudence with which it was surrounded. Practically, however, this was not
the case. The course of judicial history, certainly during the first ten years of American
occupation, clearly indicates that the judges and lawyers concerned with the administration of
justice regarded the extension of the Spanish written law as carrying with it its surrounding body
of judicial interpretation and commentary, even though such interpretation and commentary was
only of persuasive and instructive value. The principle that the adoption of statute for another
jurisdiction carries with it the judicial interpretation given to it, may reasonably be said to continue,
as an accompaniment of the surviving Spanish statute law in the Philippines, this surrounding
body or judicial interpretation and commentary. That such was the case in evidenced by the
frequent reference in the earlier Philippine decisions to this material.”
54
See MALCOLM, loc. cit. note 52, at 699.
55
12 Phil. 241.
56
Ibid, at 244. The doctrine was reiterated in Arnedo v. LLorente, 18 Phil. 257 (1911).
57
21 Phil. 308 (1912).
58
Ibid, at 331-332 (underscoring supplied).
 11

This basic doctrine was reiterated in subsequent cases which directed that
Anglo-American case-law presented the authoritative guide for the proper
construction and application of the terms and provisions of statutes borrowed
from Anglo-American models,59 unless, local conditions warrant differently,60 or
when the situation is covered by express provision of law.61 The judicial practice
went beyond this, since even for the Spanish codes and statutes that remained in
force Anglo-American precedents were being applied by the courts.62 By
adopting American statutes, there necessarily developed a Philippine case-law.63
Justice Malcolm, as ponente is In re Shoop,64 after rendering an
exhaustive expositional review of the Philippine legal system as it then stood,
went even further when he wrote:
“….. A survey of recent cases in the Philippine Report, and
particularly those of the last three years, shows an increasing
reliance upon English and American authorities in the formation of
what may be termed a Philippine Common Law, as supplemental to
the statute law of this jurisdiction. An analysis will show that a great
preponderance of the jurisprudence of this jurisdiction is based
upon Anglo-American case law precedents, -- exclusively applying
those statutory law which have been enacted since the change of
sovereignty and which conform more or less to American statutes,
and – to a large extent in applying those and expanding the
remnants of the Spanish codes and written laws.

“x x x.

“The foregoing two groups of cases in combination, those

under the subjects covered by Spanish statutes and those under
the subjects covered by American-Philippine legislation and
effected by the change of sovereignty, show conclusively that
Anglo-American case law has entered practically every one of the
leading subjects in the field of law, and in the large majority of such
subjects has formed the sole basis for the guidance of this court in
developing the local jurisprudence. The practical is that the past
twenty years have developed a Philippine common law, or case
law, based almost exclusively, except where conflicting with local
customs and institutions, upon Anglo-American Law. The

59
U.S. v. De Guzman, 30 Phil. 416, at 419 (1915); U.S., 195 U.S. 100, 11 Phil. 669
(1904); Serra v. Mortiga, 204 U.S. 470, 11 Phil. 762 (1907).
60
Cuyugan v. Santos, 34 Phil. 100 at 107 (1916).
61
Ruz v. Pahati, 98 Phil. 788 (1956).
62
In re Shoo[p. 41 Phil. 213, at 239-242 (1942); also Gilmore, loc. cit. note 1, at 134.
63
IN Re Shoop. 41 Phil. 213, at 233-238 (1920); see also Cuyugan, Origin and
Development of Philippine Jurisprudence, 3 PHIL. L.J> 191, 206-213 (1917)
64
41 Phil. 213 (1920)
 12

Philippine common law supplements and amplifies our statute

law.”65
The attitude of the American-dominated Supreme Court during that period
was understandable. The Philippine Supreme Court then felt inside bound by
rulings of the United States Supreme Court in construing and applying statutory
enactments modelled upon or borrowed from Anglo-American originals. 66 But
even then, it was recognized early on in the case of Javellana v. Mirasol67 that
“[i]t is to be assumed that our lawmakers, whether Americans or Filipinos by
nationality, have legislated with knowledge of conditions here existing; and even
those laws which have been bodily taken from American sources not infrequently
acquire a characteristic coloring from the change of environment.” 68 In People v.
Vera69 the Supreme Court recognized that “to keep pace with … new
developments of times and circumstances, fundamental principles should be
interpreted having in view existing local conditions and environments.”70

With the establishment of the Philippine Republic on July 4, 1946 and its
Supreme Court fully constituted of Filipino justices no longer legally bound by the
pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court, Anglo-American doctrines
not otherwise adopted by previous decisions were merely treated as persuasive.
The proposition of a “Philippine common law” did not flourish and is even denied
by some Philippine jurists today.71 But the value of judicial precedents had taken
permanent roots in Philippine jurisdiction. The continued borrowing from
American sources persists to the present time. But a subtradition of
“Romanization” that had began even during the American regime, started to
manifest itself after the grant of independence.

A good illustration is the common law principle on citizenship of jus soli

which in a long line of cases from the advent of American regime was applied in
Philippine jurisdiction under the thesis that the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States extended here. Although there was one case72
in 1939 which ruled that the principle of jus soli was not applicable in Philippine
jurisdiction because the provisions of section 2 of the organic Jones Law 73
provided otherwise, nevertheless the application of the principle persisted in
Supreme Court decision until the advent of the Second World War. After the war
65
at 225-247
66
Bryan v. American Bank, 7 Phil. 255, at 257 (1906) U.S. v. Pico, 18 Phil. 386, at 398
(1911); see also I TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES 9 (1984) citing Cuyugan v.
Santos, 34 Phil. 100 (1916)
67
40 Phil. 761 (1920)
68
Ibid, at 775.
69
65 Phil. 56 (1937).
70
Ibid, at 137
71
I PARAS, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES 47 (1984) Gamboa, supra note 3, 15
314.
72
Chua v. Secretary of Labor, 68 PHl. 649 (1939).
73
Act of United States Congres of August 29, 1916.
 13

and the granting of the independence, the young Philippine Republic, through its
Supreme Court in Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor74 discarded the principle of
jus soli or citizenship by birth and affirmed the civil law principle of jus sanguinis
or citizenship by blood:

“Citizenship, the main integrate element of which is

allegiance, must not be taken lightly. Dual allegiance must be
discouraged and prevented. But the application of the principle of
jus soli to persons born in this country of alien parentage would
encourage dual allegiance which in the long run would be
detrimental to both countries of which such persons might claim to
be citizens.”75

In reaching the result in Tan Chong the Supreme Court held that the
principle of stare decisis does not mean blind adherence to precedents; that the
“doctrine or rule laid down, which has been followed for years, no matter how
sound it may be, if found to be contrary to law, must be abandon any doctrine or
rule found to be in violation of the law in force.”76
Although the Philippine doctrine on judicial precedents is no longer bound
by Anglo-American common law developments,77 the reality of the situation
makes the latter very persuasive on Philippine jurisprudence.78 On this score, a
leading Filipino commentator has observed: “The official theory is that American
decisions, being expressions of foreign law, are not binding on our courts, but our
judges, nevertheless, behave as though they were. Many an argument has been
able to push through a point across the threshold of judicial belief because it is
buttressed with citation of American authorities. One is led to the suspicion that
by a curious extension of the party amendment, what the American judges say is
in fact taken as the equal of local decisions in authoritativeness. There is much
to support such a suspicion in the decisions of our Supreme Court.”79
The trend will continue long into the future mainly because the Philippine
legislature has taken the stance of granting the judiciary broad powers of “law-
making” in various statutory enactments, such as the “general enabling” clauses
of the Civil Code on Anglo-American doctrines. In adopting the remedy of
reformation of instruments, Article 1360 provides that “[t]he principles of the
general law on the reformation of instruments are hereby adopted insofar as they
are not in conflict wit the provisions of this Code.” On trusts, Article 1442
provides that “[t]he principles of the general law of trusts, insofar as they are not
in conflict with this Code, the Code of Commerce, the Rules of Court and special

74
79 Phil. 249 (1947)
75
Ibid, at 257.
76
Ibid.
77
U.S. v. Cuna, 12 PHIl. 241 (1908).
78
Alzua v. Johnson, 21 Phi. 308 (1912)
79
Fernandez, Sixty Years of Philippine Law, 35 PHIL. L.J. 1389, 1397 (1960)
 14

laws are hereby adopted. On estoppel, Article 1432 provides that “[t]he
principles of estoppel are hereby adopted insofar as they are not in conflict with
the provisions of this Code, the Code of Commerce, the Rules of Court and
special laws. Article 32 grants a cause of action to an individual to seek
damages from “[a]ny public officer or employee, or any private individual, who
directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or
impairs any of the following rights and liberties,” and then goes on to enumerate
practically all the civil liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights of the Constitution.
Article 33, adopted from principles in Anglo-American jurisprudence, provides
that “[i]n case of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and district from the criminal action, may be brought
by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.” In addition,
“general principles” are codified in the Civil Code, giving judges greater judicial
leeway, such as the principle of “abuse of rights.”80

D. Tenacity of Civil Law Influence

When sovereignty over the Philippine Islands was transferred from Spain
to the United States, there was already an established civil law system existing in
the colony. Many Filipino lawyers, mostly Spanish mestizos, were practising law
in Manila. By then there was an established law school in civil law at the
University of Santos Tomas in Manila which was founded in 1734. The college of
Law of the University of the Philippines was established only in 1910, which
followed the American legal educational system.81 It was only in 1916 that a
private law school was established that gave instructions in English exclusively. 82
And although the trend during the early decades of American sovereignty was
the adoption of statutes borrowing Anglo-American models, the hear of the law
which most affected the ordinary Filipino – the private laws – remained the
Spanish Code of 1889.
The underlying philosophy of the civil law system for coherence, structure,
and high-level generalization83 was to the Filipino jurists a tantalizing feature that
could not be given-up compared to the almost haphazard growth of common law
doctrines through case-law. The deeply-rooted and historically conditioned
attitudes about the nature of the law, and the proper role of legal actors persisted
through the legal system of the Philippine even as it began to adopt many Anglo-
American laws and doctrines. The method of exegesis still had its strong
influence in the system growing out of the Filipino jurists’ underlying belief that
80
ART. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with just, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
ART. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
ART. 21. Any person who willfully cause loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage
81
Malcolm, The College of Law University of the Philippines, 1 PHIL L.J. 4 (1914-15).
82
Benitez, The Private Law Schools, 2 PHIL L.J. 31317 (1916).
83
VON MEHREN, supra note 12, at 3.
 15

the starting point for legal reasoning should normally take the form of legislation.
But similar to the development in continental Europe, and more pronounced in
the Philippines because of the continuing influence of Anglo-American principles,
legislative enactments, whether in the form of codes or special legislations were
recognized not to be able to cover all situations.
Even at present, Philippine cods still tend to be treated, not as complete,
but as self-sufficient, in the sense that they contain comprehensive body of rules
and principles and embody a system for applying these norms too all cases
arising within the areas they propose to cover. No matter what type of problem
arose, if the text failed to supply an answer, the judge would fashion a solution
derived from the code, from the relation of its part, from its structure or from its
general principles. The respect that Filipino jurists have for the primacy of
legislative enactments even in areas where the judiciary has previously ruled
upon has not given rise to the phenomenon in common law jurisdiction where the
“codes” have be considered as not meant to abolish, but rather, to consolidate
and restate the common law, and provisions thereof “construed in the light of
common law decisions on the same subject. 84
This civil law tradition finds expression in Philippine case-law when the
Supreme Court itself directs that courts should generally be cautious in overruling
legislative judgments;85 holding that it is sworn duty of judges “to apply the law
without fear or favor, to follow its mandate – not to tamper with it;”86 that courts
“cannot adopt a policy different from that of the law,” since “[w]hat the law grants,
the courts cannot take away;”87 that as long as the laws do not violate any
constitutional provisions, the courts can merely interpret and apply them
regardless of whether or not they are wise or salutary, and if such laws turn out
to be unwise or detrimental, remedy should be sought with the legislature.88
Legal education in the Philippines has no doubt influenced the
“Romanized” development of the Philippine legal system. Philippine law
instruction, which is generally done through lectures and recitation, has the
preoccupation “to get the students of law to pas the bar examinations.”89
“In the Philippines, what should merely be a device to
measure the fitness and capability of a law graduate to join the
ranks to the professional lawyers has been transformed into a
monster that holds in its viselike grip law school administrators,
professors, students and just about everybody concerned with law.
The lifetime glory and honor it bestow on one who emerges
topnotcher and the prestige and increased enrollment it can

84
SAUVEPLANNE, CODIFIED AND JUDGE MADE LAW 11-12 (1981); also DAVID,
supra note 6, at 450.
85
Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 719 (1919)
86
Government of the Philippines v. Anti-Chinese League, 84 Phil. 468, 472 (1949); also
Barretto Gonzales v. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 67, 72 (1933).
87
Ibid.
88
Quintos v. Lacson, 97 Phil. 290, 293 (1955)
89
Cortes, The Law Teacher in Philippine Society, 5 PHIL. L.J. 1, 7 (1976)
 16

generate for a triumphant law school are the allurements that

obsess both students and institutions.”90

The great and perhaps grave influence of the bar examinations, which for
several involved questions, which for several decades involved questions mostly
of objective type consisting of definition of terms and enumerations, has tended
to cast the law curriculum and the manner of instruction geared towards doctrinal
exposition.91 Although the subjects of the bar examinations are prescribed by the
Supreme Court, it is the Department of Education that prescribes the law
curriculum that has encouraged a rote method of study, since there is little
incentive for law students to undertake legal exploration and scholarship when
what becomes the uppermost pre-occupation is to “prepare for the bar
examination” by mastering legal provisions, doctrines, and principles.92 There is
an on-going issue on whether the practical skills should be learned when one
goes to practice or should be taught in the law schools. Although in recent years
there has been examination relating to Supreme Court decisions, the same has
taken a mode of memorizing the facts and holding of particular decided cases to
arrive at the correct answers.

E. Socio-Economic Demand in Modern Philippine Society

The imperative of socio-economic developments in the Philippine likewise
has greatly influenced the evolution of the theory of judicial precedents. The
Supreme Court has held that “[t]he doctrine [of stare decisis], however, is flexible;
so that when, in the light of changing conditions, a rule has ceased to be of
benefit and use to society, the courts may rightly depart from it. Stare decisis is a
principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest
decisions, however recent and questionable, when such adherence involves
collision with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder,
and verified by experience.”93
What is clearly apparent with both the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions is
that more that just being transplants of the American-type constitution, the
Philippine constitutional developments have blossomed from the people’s
90
Romero, Challenges to Legal Education, 52 PHIL., L.J. 487, 495 (1977).
“Unfortunately, the popular gauge for rating law schools is the performance in the bar
examinations of their graduates. Hence, the paramount concern of practically all law schools is to
make a good showing in those examinations. Any law school that is an exception to this, would
merely prove the rule.” Cortes, The Law Curricular Assessment and Recommendations in the
Light of the Need of a Developing Society, 47 PHIL. L.J. 446, 457 (1972).
91
See, Labrador, The Bar Examinations As An Instrument of Legal Education, 12
ATENEO L.J. 329 (1963), comments of Laurel, at 332, and Ledesma, at 333.
92
“When law examinations, for instance, are so geared to memory and mastery of legal
provisions, one begins to doubt whether the examiners and professors, one begins to be thinking
men or simply robot memorizers.” Juco, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Philosophy of
Law in Changing World¸13 ATENEO L.J. 40, 51 (1963)
93
I TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES 39 (1934) citing Helvering v.
Hallock. 106, 60 S. Ct. 44, 84 L. ED. 604.
 17

experience in the struggle to build a lasting republic more attuned to the needs of
a developing country. The people’s hopes and aspiration for a just and humane
society are now deeply enshrined in constitutional precepts and directives: the
promotion of “a just and dynamic of the nation and ensure the prosperity and
independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies
that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard
of living, and an improved quality of life for all,”94 the promotion of social justice in
all phases of national development,95 declaration of the family as the basic social
institution,96 and protection of human rights;97 providing the goal for a national
economy that shall achieve “a more equitable distribution of opportunities,
income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services
produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding
productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the
underprivileged,”98 mandating a comprehensive rural and agrarian policy, 99 and
urban land reform and housing,100 providing for the welfare of indigenous cultural
communities,101 and providing for broad policy relating to education, science,
technology, arts, culture, and sports.102 At the forefront of such constitutional
mandate is not only the legislative and executive branches, but also the judiciary,
particularly the Supreme Court, which, in the exercise of its power of judicial
review and even in resolving controversies among private parties in activities
considered to be within the public interest, must promote the constitutional
directives which have to do less with the “structure” of government, and more
with the “mission” of the state. The value of judicial precedents can be gleaned
from the fact that development in various fields is expected to go beyond the
language of statutory enactments, but rather in the “spirit and direction” they will
pursue, as expressed in decisions of the courts. Dramatic examples over the
decade have been shown in the fields of investments in private companies, labor
laws, agrarian relations, and other social welfare legislations.
Another example where the judiciary has broken new grounds by drawing
on Anglo-American doctrines beyond the language of the Civil Code, is in the
field of torts. The doctrine on quasi-delict has been expanded by the Supreme
Court beyond the area of negligent acts to be that “so long as an act or omission
had caused damage or injury to another, whether done intentionally or
negligently, and whether punishable or not, the obligation to make good the
damage done obtains.”103 Under this expanded doctrine, “there is no longer any

94
1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 9.
95
Ibid, Sec. 10; also Article XIII, Secs. 1 and 2.
96
Ibid, Article XIII, Section 12.
97
Ibid, Article XIII, Sections 17, 18, and 19.
98
Ibid, Article XII, Sec. 1.
99
Ibid, Section 21; also Article XIII, Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8.
100
Ibid. Article XIII, Sections 9 and 10
101
Ibid, Section 22.
102
Ibid, Article XIV.
103
SANGCO, PHILIPPINE LAW ON TORTS & DAMAGES 49-50 (1978).
 18

substantial distinction left between the civil and the common law concept of tort
liability”104 in its application in the Philippines.
In addition, the complexities of the modern world have thrust upon the
legal system a radical restructuring that has seen the emergence of the
administrative bodies fusing together legislative, judicial, and executive powers to
make them more responsive to meet the various needs of the society. Candidly,
this development in administrative law makes a mockery of the principles of
separation of powers which seems to be the touchstone to Fillipino jurists’
position that judges cannot involve themselves in lawmaking. More and more,
“the role of the courts, and the problem with which they are faced, is to
accommodate the administrative process to the traditional judicial system, to
accommodate private rights and the public interests in the powers reposed in
administrative action, democratic safeguards and standards of fair play with the
effective conduct of government.”105
The growth in the administrative field is phenomenal, and consequently,
the legal theories to integrate it into the general structure of the three great
branches of government have not fully “matured” to crate an integrated efficient
system. In the Philippines, even purely private rights are now within the
justiciable jurisdiction of administrative agencies, such as intra-corporate
disputes with the Securities and Exchange Commission, and employer-employee
relationship with the National Labor Relations Commission. A governing
structural policy is being evolved by both legislature, the Supreme Court in its
precedents, and by leading Filipino jurists. Since the development of a unifying
theoretical basis in administrative law is piece-meal and empirical, the process
has been rather slow. One of the weaknesses of the present system is the lack
of a national reporter system of the decisions of administrative bodies, such as
those of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Labor
Relations Commission, so as to develop a system of administrative precedents.
Since decisions of all administrative bodies, on issues of law and doctrine,
are ultimately appealable to the Supreme Court, the doctrines established by the
Supreme Court are everyday providing a unifying structure of precedents to
make the administrative system “uniform, stable and predictable,” instead of “an
endless, disjointed, and complex rules to be sought in report of case as
numerous as the sands of the sea.”106

III. ANALYSIS OF THE THEORY

A. Adoption of the Principles of Stare Decisis.
104
Ibid.
105
GONZALES, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – A TEXT 6-7 (1979)
106
Paraphrasing Henry in his description of common law in Jurisprudence Constante and
Stare Decisis Contrasted, 15 A.B.A.J. 11, at 12 (1929)
 19

Article 6 of the old Spanish Code of 1889 provided that if no “written law”
(ley) is applicable to a situation, the “customs of the place” (costumbre del lugar),
and in default thereof, the “general principles of law” (principios generales de
derecho), shall be applied.107 In order to determine the general principles of law,
Spanish commentator Sachez Roman opined that “judicial decisions cannot be
resorted to…[since] a lower court of Span is at liberty to disregard the decisions
of a higher court.”108 Another Spanish commentator, Manresa, formulates the rule
that court are governed in the following successive order: written law, customs of
the place, judicial decision, and by general principles of law;109 and it was posited
that the “urging that general principles of law, Manresa rather implies that the
practice of the courts is the contrary.”110
As discussed previously, the almost unbridled resort by judges and the
Supreme Court to common law principles built upon judicial precedents in the
United States established early on the principles of judicial precedents in the
Philippine legal system despite Article 6 of the Code. Ironically, the principle on
judicial precedents found permanent anchoring in a new Civil Code which was
adopted in the fourth year of independence in 1949. Article 8 of the new Civil
Code provides: “Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal systems of the Philippines.”
It is urged that by virtue of Article 8 of the new Civil Code, the legislature
intended to incorporate into the Philippine legal system the Common law doctrine
of precedents.111 This is not an accurate statement of the implication of Article 8
since long before its adoption the principle on judicial precedents was already an
established doctrine in the Philippines. The most that the inclusion of Article 8
did was to confirm in statutory from a well-entrenched principle in the Philippine
legal system. But whether it is the doctrine of stare decisis as it is known and
applied in the United States or England that was adopted in the Philippine legal
system, the provision did not settle this issue.
Time and again, the Supreme Court has referred to the term stare decisis
and accepted its applicability in Philippine jurisdiction.112 However, such
pronouncements on the applicability of the doctrine are blunted by other
pronouncements of the Supreme Court that it refuses “blind adherence to
precedents.”113 In Philippine Trust Co. v. Mitchell, 114 the Supreme Court held
that the “rule of stare decisis is entitled to respect. Stability in the law, particularly
in the business field, is desirable. But idolatrous reverence for precedent, simply
as precedent, no longer rules. More important than anything else is that the

107
See I PADILLA, CIVIL CODE 15 (1932)
108
2 Derecho Civil, at 79-81, cited in In re Shoop, 41 Phil. 213, at 227 (1920).
109
1 Manresa, at 77-79 cited in In re Shoop, ibid.
110
In re Shoop, ibid, at 227.
111
De Santos, supra note 49, at 236
112
E. g. Kuenzle & Streiff v. Collector of Customs, 12 Phil. 117 (syllabus); J.M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. v. Mariano, 85 at SCRA 644, 647 (1978)
113
Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor, 79 Phil. 249, at 257 (1947).
114
59 Phil. 30, 36 (1933).
 20

court should be right.”115 Although the Supreme Court tends to adhere to the
doctrine of stare decisis, the premise of which is that judicial decisions are a
source of law, it declares that its decisions “although in themselves not laws,” are
only evidence of what the law means.116 On other hand, the Supreme Court
considers its decisions as “law” or with the same binding effect when it declares
that “[i]n effect judicial decisions assume the same authority as the statute itself
and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they
are applicable, the criteria which must control the actuations (sic) not only of
those called upon to abide thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce
obedience thereto.”117 At the very least, one can say that Article 8 give de jure
standing to judicial precedents.
Leading Philippine commentators today hold that judicial decisions are not
to be considered as forming and independent source of law in the sense of
creating new law, as understood in England and other case-law countries.
“Jurisprudence, in our system of government, cannot be considered as an
independent source of law; it cannot create law. A law established by
jurisprudence would be a judge-made law, in which there is separation of
powers, inasmuch as the sole function of our courts is to apply or interpret the
laws.”118 Thus, judicial decisions are considered only to have the function of filing
the gaps in the law, clarifying ambiguities, or harmonizing apparent
inconsistencies in it.119
But even as Philippine commentators deny the concept of judge-made
law, they at the same time acknowledge the creative role of the Philippine judge.
“While a judge cannot create abstract rules of law, because that would be an
invasion of legislative power, he certainly can formulate and declare the law as
applied concretely to the case before him. Courts are not limited to the automatic
and mechanical function of interpreting the law. They have, furthermore, a
double function: First, to fill the deficiencies of legislation and provide a rule for
the facts of a given case for which there is neither positive provisions of law nor
established custom; and second, to adapt and adjust rigid and inflexible provision
of law, rendered inadequate by time and circumstances, to the changing
conditions of life and society, so that the law may accomplish its social mission.
Because of this, jurisprudence must necessarily be flexible, capable of receiving
impressions from without, so that it can be an advance guard in the equitable
application of law and an active instrumentality in the progressive development of
the law.”120 This stance follows the concept of “free scientific research”
advocated by Francois Geny in France.121

115
Ibid, at 36.
116
People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607, 612 (1974) also People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270,
272-273 (1975). Early in Gomez v. Hipolito, 2 Phil. 732 (1903), the Court denied the existence of
case-law; see also Johnson and Trent, JJ. Dissents in Lamb v. Philipps, 22 Phil. 456, 558 (1912).
117
Caltex (Philippines), Inc. v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247, 257 (1966).
118
I TOLENTINO, supra note 93, at 38. See also I PARAS supra note 71, at 44;
PASCUAL, loc. cit. not 1, at 22; Gamboa, loc. cit. note 3, at 314; and Juco, supran note 92, at 45.
119
PASCUAL, loc. cit. note 1, at 22.
120
I TOLENTINO, supra note 93, at 38.
 21

Article 6 of the old Spanish Civil Code, which provided that when there
was no statute exactly applicable to the pint in controversy, the custom of the
place shall be applied, and, in the absence thereof, the general principles of law,
was not retained in the draft of new Civil Code. Instead a broader provision was
included on the subject which read:

“Where there is no law clearly applicable to the point at

issue, or if the law is doubtful, ambiguous or conflicting, and
previous judicial decisions do not throw light upon the question, the
general or local customs shall govern. In the absence thereof, the
judge shall apply that the rule which he believes the lawmaking
body would lay down but he shall be guided by the general
principles of law and justice. The spirit of analogous laws may be
considered. He may bear in mind foreign legislation and decisions
as well as the opinions of jurists. He may likewise take into
consideration legal maxims.”

The proposed provision was eliminated by the Congress when it enacted

the new Civil Code, leaving no express provision with respect to suppletory rules
in case of deficiency in the law. On this matter, Tolentino, a leading Filipino civil
law commentator, and who for a brief period was a member of the Code
Commission, holds that “[i]n spite of this, however, such suppletory rules must be
considered as existing. Even in countries where there is no express enumeration
of the rules may be applied in the absence of positive law, custom and
jurisprudence are always considered as suppletory rules, contributing to the
evolution of law and its adjustment to changing conditions. The opinions of
jurisconsults and commentators are also constantly referred to in judicial
decisions; they serve to fill gaps in the application of the law.”122

Such a conclusion is to be clearly implied from the provision of Article 9 of

the new Civil Code which states that “No judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.”123 In
addition, Articles 11 and 12 of the Civil Code,124 which regulate customs, clearly
support the role that jurisprudence must play in evolving the customary laws and
integrating them into the legal system because of the positive requirement that
“[a] custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence.”125
121
Loussaouarn, supra note 19, at 240-244, citing GENY METHODE
D’INTERPRETATION ET SOURCES NE DROIT PRIVE POSTIF(2D e. 1954).
122
I TOLENTINO, supra note 93, at 41-42 (underscoring supplied).
123
However, Article 9 does not require a court to decide “each and every question of law
raised by one party regardless of its materiality to the litigation. Novino v. Court of Appeals, 8
SCRA 279, 280 (1963).
124
ART. 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not
countenanced. ART. 12. A custom must be proven as a fact, according to the rules of evidence.
125
Article 12, Ibid.
 22

B. Characteristics of the Theory

To paraphrase Gilmore as he described the legal system of the
Philippines, “[t]he basis of a thing is usually understood to be the foundation upon
which it rests.”126 From the foregoing discussions one may have the impression
that there is no unifying theory to the Philippine concept of judicial precedents;
one cannot even state outright that it is the American version of stare decisis,
because the Philippine concept seems, as one reads the Supreme Court
decisions and commentaries, to reject one of its bases that decisions are
independent sources of law.
The seeming paradox of the position of many Philippine jurists that judicial
decisions are not sources of law should not be viewed as mere archaic legal
rhetoric, but rather indicates the nuance, if not electric approach, of the Philippine
theory on judicial precedents. An understanding of this apparent “double-talk”
would be best be achieved by analyzing the three other main characteristics that
the Philippine principle on judicial precedents. Aside from the first characteristics
already discussed above that the Philippine theory on judicial precedents has
found codified expression in Article 8 of the Civil Code, its other characteristics
are: its application is hierarchical; its scope is modal; and its form is doctrinal.
These characteristics are: its application is hierarchical; its scope is modal; and
its forms is doctrinal. These characteristics give the Philippine principle on
judicial precedents more flexibility than the doctrine of stare decisis, but achieve
the goals of jurisprudence constante for the pre-eminence of statutory law.

1. Hierarchical Application. In 1947, in the case of Miranda v. Imperial,127

the Supreme Court declared.

“Only the decisions of this Honorable Court establish

jurisprudence or doctrines in this jurisdiction. However, this does
not prevent that a conclusion or pronouncement of the Court of
Appeals which covers a point of law still undecided in our
jurisprudence may serve as juridical guideto the inferior courts, and
that such conclusion or pronouncement be raised as a doctrine if
after it has been subjected to test in the crucible of analysis and
revision, this Supreme Court should find that it has merits and
qualities sufficient for its consecration as a rule of jurisprudence.”128

The principle then that court decisions shall constitute binding law is
applicable strictly only to the decision of the Supreme Court; Court of Appeals
126
Gilmore, loc cit. note 1, at 90
127
77 Phil. 1066 (1947).
128
Ibid, at 1073. Original decision in Spanish; see translation in I PADILLA, CIVIL CODE
ANOOTATED 42 (1975).
 23

decisions on issues not covered by the Supreme Court jurisprudence served

merely as a juridical guide; and the decisions of all other courts are not
considered binding precedents at all.
Miranda does not disclose the legal or historical basis for the doctrine.
What becomes readily apparent from the hierarchical application of Miranda,
although nothing at all is mentioned in the decision of this point, is that it tracks
the structural pattern of the doctrina legal of Spain, where only the Supreme
Court establishes binding precedents.129 However, unlike the doctrina legal
structure, the Miranda application grants to the decisions of the Court of Appeals
persuasive juridical effect, much like that of jurisprudence constante.
Subsequently, in 1950, the newly enacted Civil Code in its Article 8
provided without distinction that “judicial decisions” shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippine; nevertheless, the hierarchical application of Miranda
stuck. In Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila130 the Supreme Court
stressed that “the Supreme Court, by tradition and in our system of judicial
administration, has the last word on what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any
justiciable controversy. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions
all other courts should take their bearings.” 131 Later, in Tugade v. Court of
Appeals,132 where a long line of Court of Appeals precedents were being pressed
upon the Supreme Court, it declared: “It is the Tribunal, not respondent Court of
Appeals, that speaks authoritatively.”133
Why this hierarchical application of the first principle of the stare decisis?
That the highest court in the land would have the “last word” is not denied; but
why would the Supreme Court withhold the applicability of the doctrine to
decisions of other courts on the next lower echelon of the hierarchy, such as the
Court of Appeals? Indeed it has been expressed that lower courts, when
necessitated by the changing demands of the times and public policy, should be
allowed to depart from decisions of superior tribunals as a “direct ways of
provoking a re-examination of an important legal question, and giving the Court
of last resort an opportunity of either reaffirming the old doctrine or abandoning it,
and adopting a new one.”134 The case of Barrera v. Barrera135 explains the
rationale of the hierarchical application of the binding effects of judicial
precedents:

129
See Ramos, Book Review, 22 REVISTA JURIDICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE
PUERTO RICO 442 (1935) (reviewing HERZOG, LE DROIT JURISPRUDENTIEL ET LE
TRIBUNAL SUPREME EN ESPAGNE [1942]).
130
23 SCRA 948 (1968).
131
Ibid, at 961 (underscoring supplied).
132
85 SCRA 226 (1978).
133
Ibid, at 230. See also Fong Choy v. Republic, 25 SCRA 24, 25 (1968); Insular Life
Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees Association v. Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., 37 SCRA 244,
279 (1971)
134
Cf. Juco, supra note 92, at 50-51 citing dissent in People v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551,
560 (1958).
135
34 SCRA 98 (1970)
 24

“The delicate task of ascertaining the significance that

attaches to a constitutional or statutory provisions, an executive
order, a procedural norm or a municipal ordinance is committed to
the judiciary. It thus discharges a role no less crucial than that
appertaining to the other two departments in the maintenance of
the rule of law. To assure stability in legal relations and avoid
confusion, it has to speak with one voice. It does so with finality,
logically and rightly, through the highest judicial organ, this Court.
What is says then should be definitive and authoritative, binding on
those occupying the lower ranks in the judicial hierarchy. They
have to defer and to submit.”136

The implication of the Barrera rationale is that although the power of

judicial review of possessed by a lower court, its determinationa are at best de
facto and may at most constitute the aw of the case” and bind only the litigants;
no precedential weight is given to such decisions, except in the case of the Court
of Appeals where its determination is persuasive to lower courts. It may be
argued that the doctrine would give the rise to inconsistency of rulings in the
lower echelons of the judicature and an uneven or unequal dispensation of
justice for parties who may be similarly situated. This seems more apparent than
real, since in the ordinary course parties would eventually go up to the Supreme
Court on issues of constitutionality and validity of legislative and executive acts.
This may seem to encourage appeals, but the Philippine judicial system is the
four-tier system, which follows the modern view that appellate jurisdiction should
be assumed on a discretionary basis in accordance with the principle that
litigants would not be accorded that one appeal as a matter of right.137
Under the Revised Rules of Court, a review by the Supreme Court of
decisions of the Court of Appeals “is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons
therefore.”138 The grounds given for review by the Supreme Court are:
“ (a) Where the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
substance, not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, or
has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or with
appliacable decisions of the Supreme Court;

“ (b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far
sanctioned such departure by a lower court, as to call for an
exercise of the power of supervisions.”139

136
Ibid, at 107 (underscoring supplied).
137
Puno, Innovations and Reforms in the Judicial System, 85 SCRA xxvii, at xxix (1978).
138
Rule 45, Section 4.
139
Ibid.
 25

Pursuing the point further, it is true that even without the Miranda
hierarchal application, the same practical result would be achieved because of
the fear of lower courts of reversal. However, the Miranda hierarchal application
has the effect of making the precedential mechanism in the Philippine legal
system “efficient” in the sense that the legal community would not have to sort
through the cacophony of divergent judicial pronouncements at the lower level of
the judiciary. Even at the Court of Appeals level, only precedents from a long
line of decisions tend to be persuasive, especially when said court speaks with
“several voices” having 15 divisions. This really makes a lot of economic sense
for a country and its legal community that does not have large financial
resources. There has never been a consistent reporter system of decisions of
Court of Appeals and other decisions of courts of first instance of which there are
423 salas throughout the archipelago.
The Miranda hierarchal application actually becomes a self-enforcing
mechanism that brings legal issues through the hierarchical mechanism. The
role of the Court of Appeals which speaks with 15 divisions therefore becomes a
“weeding out” process so that only important issued ultimately reach the
Supreme Court. By giving the decisions of the Court of Appeals the character of
persuasive precedential value the Miranda hierarchical application provides a
“testing ground” for legal issues to be clarified and ventilated in the “crucible of
analysis and revisions.” By the time the issues shall have reached the Supreme
Court there would have been a solid judicial background to lay down proven
doctrines. The set-up adds pliability to judicial precedents similar to that
achieved in the doctrine of jurisprudence constante where a sense of de facto
stage is reached at the Court of Appeals level by a line of decision tending to
uphold a common doctrine, from which the legal community may draw juridical
guide, with fore-knowledge that “doctrines may still be changed, depending upon
the final determination of the Supreme Court.
Beyond the power of judicial review, the Constitution itself has sanctified
the precedential value of the decisions of the Supreme Court when it provides
that “no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered
en banc or in a division140 may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting
en banc.”141
Outside the exercise of their power of judicial review, the creative role of
judges is not lost. Judges, who cannot be in agreement with every decision of
the Supreme court, are not required “to keep locked up within their breasts their
own views and in fact should not be discouraged, for the progress of the law may
very well depend on a more searching inquiry as to the continuing validity of
certain assumptions and re-suppositions uncritically accepted.”142 The proper
route is for lower courts to express in the opinion portion of the decision their

140
Under Article VIII, Section 4 (1) of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice and 14 Associate Justices may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in
divisions of three, five or seven members.
141
1987 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 4(3).
142
Barrera v. Barrera, 34 SCRA 98, 106 (1970).
 26

views on matters they disagree with in Supreme Court doctrines, but must still
render judgment in accordance with the Supreme Courts precedents.143
With the constitutional grant to the Supreme Court of control and
supervision over all inferior courts, the doctrine that Supreme Court decisions are
binding precedents over all other courts is further reinforced, especially when the
Supreme Court is granted the power “to discipline judges of lower courts, or
order their dismissal,”144 which power the Supreme Court has exercised in
instances where judges have by their decisions shown “gross incompetence or
gross ignorance of the law or gross misconduct.”145
Therefore, if one is to oversimplify the matter, insofar as decisions of the
Supreme Court are concerned the first principle of hierarchy of the doctrine of
stare decisis has been adopted in the Philippine jurisdiction, under the
mechanism of doctrine legal of the Spanish civil law system. The principle of
jurisprudence constante permeates the decisions of the Court of Appeals.
2. Modal Scope. The Philippine doctrine on judicial precedents has
certainly been much influenced by the second principle of stare decisis that “a
court is bound by its own previous decisions,”146 but more in accord with America
tendency to depart from precedent when warranted by policy considerations.
The Supreme Court has decreed –

“The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that

once a question of law has been examined and decided, ti should
be deemed settled and closed further argument…. The principle of
stare decisis does not mean blind adherence to precedents. The
doctrine or rule laid down, which has been followed for years, no
matter how sound it may be, if found to be contrary to law, must be
abandoned. The principle of stare decisis does not and should not
apply when there is conflict between the law and the precedent.
The duty of the Court is to abandon any doctrine or rule found to be
in violation of the law in force.”147

In the Philipipne legal set-up, the power to interpret laws is strictly

construed to be a judicial power. Necessarily, the legislature cannot bind courts
to a particular construction of an existing law. In Endencia v. David, 148 the
Supreme Court held:

143
Ibid; People v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551, 560 (1958).
144
1987 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 11.
145
People v. Valenzuela, 135 SCRA712 (1985)l Cathay Pacific Airways v. Romillo, Jr.,
142 SCRA 262 (1986).
146
VON MEHREN, supra note 12, at 15. See also DAVID, supra note 6, at 435-36.
147
Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor, and Lam Swee Sang v. Commonwealth , 79 Phil.
249, 258 (1947) citing Prall v. Burckhart, 299 III. 19, 132 N.E. 280.
148
93 Phil. 696 (1953)
 27

“We have already said that the Legislature under our form of
government is assigned the task and the power to make and enact
laws, but not to interpret them. This si more true with regard to the
interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not within
the sphere of the Legislative department. If the Legislature may
declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of the
Constitution means, especially after the courts have in actual case
ascertained its meaning by interpretation and applied it in a
decision, this would surely caused confusion and instability in
judicial processes and court decisions. Under such a system, a
final court determination of a case based on a judicial interpretation
of the law or of the Constitution may be undermined or even
annulled by a subsequent and different interpretation of the law or
of the Constitution by the Legislative department. That would be
neither wise nor desirable, besides being clearly violative of the
fundamental principles of our constitutional system of government,
particularly those governing the separation of powers.”149

The legislature is, however, allowed to define the terms it used in a

statute, said definitions being considered as part of the law itself. 150 This is
opposite the development in France where interpretative function was to be
exercised by the legislature itself through the system of refere ligislatif, which
system has fallen into disuse because of the great difficulties and delays
involved.151
In situations when long-established precedents would be overtuned, the
Supreme Court has adopted the doctrine of qualifying the effect of the change of
stance by providing that the new doctrine would apply only prospectively to future
cases. This is the Supreme Court has done even when the overturning of
precedent pertains to the interpretation of a statute, notwithstanding its previous
declaration that its interpretation of a stature “constitutes part of the law as of the
date it was originally passed, since this Court’s construction merely establishes
the contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted law carried into
effect.”152
What remains uncovered by the doctrine are those situations not covered
by the principle of res adjudicate simply because no action has risen, and yet, the
parties have arranged their affairs or transacted their business relying upon the
uniform decisions and rulings of the Supreme Court as to the correct transaction
of the law.153 There is no simple answer to this issue; even with statutory
enactment, there is always no vested right by citizens that the law will not be
changed. However, even the legislature when it enacts a new law changing the
149
Ibid, at 700-702.
150
I PARAS, supra note 71, at 47.
151
Loussaouarn, supra note 19, at 239.
152
Senarillos v. Hermosisima, 100 Phil. 501, 504 (1956).
153
E.g., dissent in Philippine Trust Co. v. Mitchell, 59 Phil. 30, 41 (1933).
 28

old order usually protects vested interests; or allows an interim period for parties
to readjust their transactions or relations.
But in criminal cases the attitude of the Supreme Court has been more
solicitious towards the defendant. The doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court
in criminal law is deemed to constitute a part of the law as of the date it was
originally passed, but a reversal of that doctrine is also considered a part of the
interpreted law on the date the law was passed.154 (Thus, theoretically the law
can have as many interpretation on the date it was passed as many times as the
Supreme Court should change its interpretation). To illustrate, in 1958 in People
v. Lucero155 the Supreme Court held that a civilian who has been appointed agent
by provincial governor with written authority to carry firearm would not violate the
law governing illegal possession of firearms. The doctrine was reaffirmed in
1959 in People v. Macarandang.156 In 1967, in People v. Mapa,157 the Supreme
Court abandoned the doctrine and affirmed the conviction of defendant Mapa.
In 1974, the Supreme Court in People v. Jabinal,158 acquitted the defendant
(although he was in the same position of Mapa of carrying a firearm pursuant to
his appointment as special agent by the provincial governor), on the ground that
when he was appointed agend in 1962, the prevailing doctrine on the matter was
that laid down in Macarandang (1959) and Lucero (1958) and the reversal of the
doctrine came only in 1967 in Mapa; since the Macarandang arrested in 1962 he
should benefit from such doctrine; the Mapa doctrine can only be given
prospective effect and “should not apply to parties who had relied on the old
doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.”159 The reliance doctrine was also applied
subsequently in People v. Licera.160 There is no doubt that the “reliance” doctrine
of the Supreme Court is just and equitable, but it was applied uneven-handedly;
Mapa became the scape goat since iat the time of his apprehension the
prevailing doctrine was also the Macarandang doctrine and he relied on it just as
in the case of defendant Jabinal and Licera.
The principle of reliance discussed above has been applied y the
Supreme Court in situations where relations or transactions were established
pursuant to a state or executive order that is unconstitutional prior to the time the
same is declared void by the courts.161 The Philippines as in the American
tradition, adopts the orthodox view that an “unconstitutional act, whether
legislative or executive , is not a law, confers no rights, imposes no duties, and
affords no protection.”162 However, this orthodox view has been qualified by the

154
See People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 (1974)
155
103 Phil. 500 (1959).
156
106 Phil. 713 (1959).
157
20 SCRA 1164 (1967).
158
55 SCRA 607 (1974).
159
Ibid, at 612.
160
65 SCRA 2701 (1975).
161
Article 7 of the Civil Code provides that “When the courts celare a law to be
inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.”
162
J. Fernando concurring in Fernandez v. Cuerva, 21 SCRA 1095, 1106 (1967) citing
Norton v. Shelby Country (1886) 118 U.S. 425, 442, 30 L.Ed. 178, 6 R.C.L. 117 (1886).
 29

Supreme Court with the “operative fact” doctrine giving legal effect to a legislative
or executive act where theoretically none exist:

“The growing awareness of the role of the judiciary as the

governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a
legislative or executive measure is valid leads to a more
appreciative attitude of the emerging concept that a declaration of
nullity may have legal consequences which the more orthodox view
would deny. That for a period of time such a statute, treaty,
executive order, or ordinance was in ‘actual existence’ appears to
be indisputable. What is more appropriate and logical that to
consider it as an operative fact.”163

In the area of procedural law, the Supreme Court has, in the interest of
public policy or justice, waived its own rules of procedure.164
An interesting point that has arisen in connection with the adherence of
the principle that decisions of the Supreme Court are binding precedents, and
therefore constitute “law” is the doctrine that judicial precedents only have
prospective effect and cannot be made to operate restropectively.165 Such
doctrine would contradict directly the stance that a court’s interpretation of a law
constitutes part of the law as of the date it was originally passed since the court’s
construction merely establishes contemporaneous legislative intent that the law
carried into effect.166 The prospective effect being placed upon judicial
precedents in not by itself a clear recognition of the proposition that thy create
new laws, but rather is borne out by the necessity of carrying the public policy
that there must be an end to particular litigation: the “law of the case” doctrine or
res adjudicata167 “There would be no end to a suit if every litigant to criticisms on
their opinions, or speculate of chances from changes in its members. An itch to
reopen questions foreclosed on a first appeal would result in the foolishness of
the inquisitive youth who pulled up his corn to see how it grew.”168 Under the
principle of of res adjudicate, a subsequent reinterpretation of the law is
applicable prospectively only to new cases, whether civil or criminal, but not to
old ones that have finally and conclusively been determined.169 “Public policy
and sound practice demand hat at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of

163
Ibid, at 1106; also Manila Motor Co. v. Flores, 99 Phil. 738 (1956); de Agbayani v.
Philippine National Bank, 36 SCRa 429 (1971).
164
E.g.E.g. Ordovesa v. Raymundo, 63 Phil. 275.
165
People v. Pinuila, 103 Phil 992; Pomeroy v. Director of Prisons, 107 Phil. 50.
166
Senarillos v. Hermosisima, 100 Phil. 501, 504 (1956); see also, I TOLENTINO, supra
note 93, at 38-39.
167
People v. Olarte, 19 SCRA 494, 499 (1967).
168
Zarate v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 747 (1919).
169
People v. Olarte, 19 SCRA 494 (1967).
 30

courts should become final at some definite date fixed by the law. The very
object for which courts were instituted was to put an end to controversies.”170
Thus, in the case of Tan Chong,171 when after a long line of decisions
covering several decades, the Supreme Court abandoned the principle of jus soli
on Philippine citizenship, it decreed that its new doctrine “is not intended or
designed to deprive, as it cannot divest, of their Filipino citizenship those who
had been declared to be Filipino citizens, or upon whom such citizenship had
been conferred, by the courts because of the doctrine or principle of res
adjuciata.”172

3. Doctrinal Treatment of Precedents. Legal education in the

Philippines is eclectic in the sense that there is a dual emphasis on the
exposition of general principles from which the results in concrete cases are
derived by a process of deductive reasoning, best enunciated through the lecture
method of instruction and the rote method of class participation by students. At
the same time, the importance of decision-taking process of policy and factual
consideration is also given importance by study of the various decisions of the
Supreme Court as they apply, amplify, or expand the meaning or coverage of the
law; in this process a modified case-method is employed by lecturers. But even
in the latter process, the study of the decisions of the Supreme Court tends to
follow method of evolving the decisions into general precepts, much like the
function of the codal provisions; consequently, although the factual setting are
important, they are not vital because the whole purpose of the “story telling” of
the facts is to answer the query: “What lesson does the case teach?”
Decisions by Philippine courts follow the American style of elaborate
statements of the facts and discussions of precedents; in collegiate courts such
as the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the name of the author of the
opinion (the ponente) is given, as are the names of other justices; dissenting and
concurring opinions are frequent. The decisions of the Supreme Court are
published in official and commercial reporters.173 There are various digesting
services.174 But what will be peculiar is the similar effort for legal writers and
scholars to “fit” and systematize the ratio decidendi (and even obiter dicta) of
Supreme Court decisions into “appropriate” codal or statutory provisions. The
existence of code systems makes its irresistible for facts of cases to be glossed
over as the doctrines they establish are “fitted” into appropriate codal sections.
The systematization process is therefore more doctrinal. Although it will not be
admitted, there is less emphasis on the “exactitude” of the cited precedents to
the facts of the case being argued. In this respect, the doctrine of a precedent is
170
Layda v. Legaspi, 39 Phl. 83, at (1918); Dy Cay v. Crossfield & O’Brien, 38 Phil. 521
(1918; Contrera v. Felix, 78 Phil. 570 (1947).
171
79 Phil. 249, 258 (1947).
172
Ibid.
173
The “Philippine Reports” and the “Supreme Court Reports Annotated”
174
E.g. , SCRA INDEX, Philippine Reports Digest, Republic Reports Digests. Annual
“sSurveys” of the Supreme Court decisions in important fields are published yearly by various
legal and law school publications.
 31

treated much the same way the method of exegesis employed in the language of
the statute for application to a set of facts involved in a pending case. The
techniques employed when arguing from judicial precedential doctrines often are
by way of analogy, reasoning a fortiori, or a contrario.
Judicial precedents are therefore thought to serve the same
“constitutional” function as codes, so that a whole body of doctrine may, as in the
case of codes, be “treated, although not complete, but as self-sufficient, in the
sense that they contain comprehensive body of rules and principles and embody
a system for applying these norms to al cases arising within the areas they
propose to cover.”175 As a consequences, the Supreme Court has rather
become flexible in its treatment of precedents. This puts an element of surprise
into the principle of judicial precedents, which is contrary to stability.
Ideally, a hybrid legal system, such as that of the Philippines, is better able
to cope with the weaknesses inherent in, and be able to draw from the strengths
offered by, both the civil law and common law systems. Both systems have
philosophical mechanisms to promote certain important but contending and often
conflicting aims: predictability by the doctrine pf stare decisis, and flexibility and
growth by the rules of equity and the techniques for limiting and distinguishing
precedent in the common law system; whereas, in the code systems of civil law,
predictability and stability are assured by the “written law” of the codes, while
flexibility and growth are permitted, internally, by general clauses tempering rigid
rules, and externally by interpretation, made more supple by the absence of a
formal rule of stare decisis.176

IV. REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The present ambivalent theoretical precepts in Philippine legal system of
the power of the judiciary in “lawmaking” has lead to an irregular terrain that can
only be explained by the legal predilections of individual judges who may or may
not choose to wield the power, and leading commentators, mostly civilists, whose
drawback to some of the archaic principles of civil law does not take into
consideration the clear tends in leading civil law countries such as Spain, France,
and Germany which have adopted radical principles as to the proper role of
judicial precedents as formal sources of law. The lack of a clear-out legal
philosophy on this matter in a legal system breeds only inconsistent results and
leads to the danger pointed out by Rene David that without the guidance of a
clear underlying legal philosophy, what becomes the essential factor is the
willingness, or hesitation, of each judge to admit that distinctions may be drawn,
or whether he considers himself bound by an archaic principle, or whether he is
175
Cf. GLENDON, GORDON & OSAKWE, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 126-
128 (1982)
176
Ibid, 139-140
 32

even aware of the need that the law should evolve and whether he is to be
guided by progressive or conservative ideas.177
The elements of a more vigorous and innovative legal system punctuated
by a clearly-defined principle of judicial precedents are all practically existing in
the Philippines. Many Filipino jurists recognize and apply the various parts of the
principles. But what is lacking is a unified system does in fact exist. Unless the
clear outlines of this theory are recognized de jure, then the best of the Philippine
legal minds continue to work in the shadows of outmoded principles.
There should be a redefinition of the principle of “separation of power,” at
least insofar as lawmaking power is concerned, to one that emphasizes more the
“separation of primary responsibility” rather that the exercise of such power. 178 At
the very least such a doctrine should dispense with the notion that courts and
administrative agencies never put anything into the law which was not there at
the time they use it and that all they do is apply the received rule.179 The Filipinos
do not have the French history where the legislators mistrusted the judges and
have withheld from the latter any participation in lawmaking. Indeed the present
legal set-up has been the product of entrusting unto the judicial safeguard the
very fundamental law of the land –– the Constitution. By and large the judiciary
has acquitted itself rather well.

As these papers has shown, the Philippine legal system has straddled the
main features of the principles of stare decisis, doctrina legal, and jurisprudence
constante in evolving a composite doctrine on judicial precedents. What has
clearly emerged from the beginning of this century is a Philippine principle of
judicial precedents that has the following structural characteristics: (a) Unity and
stability, achieved by the compulsory rules that a single decision of the Supreme
Court is sufficient to establish a legal rule or doctrine binding on lower courts
throughout the archipelago: b) Predictability, achieved by the practice that such
doctrines are generally followed by the Supreme Court in subsequent cases; and
(c) Flexibility and growth, achieved by the rule that the Supreme Court would not
feel bound to abandon a doctrine if it determines its falsity or impracticality, but
that in instances where it must abandon a doctrine, the Supreme Court
“manages” or “qualifies” the adverse effects to do justice to those who have
relied upon the doctrine prior to its abandonment.
Underpinning this eclectic principle is the respect and primacy that the
Supreme Court gives to statutory enactments by legislature. In areas in which
177
DAVID, supra note 6, at 437
178
The existence and seeming indispensability of administrative agencies exercising all
three of the great governmental powers is the clearest indication of the necessity of redefining the
principle of separation of power to perhaps two tier principle: structural and constitutional
coherence on he first tier covering the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches; and a
composite and flexible structure on the second tier, which is to govern administrative agencies,
and perhaps even lower courts. But the discussion of such doctrine would constitute a separate
paper altogether and cannot be covered here.
179
See contra Fernandez, Sixty Years of Philippine Law, 35 PHIL. L.J. 1389, 1391
(1960)
 33

the legislature has laid down its policies, judicial decisions are seen to develop,
but are not confined, within the legal framework established by legislation. But in
areas or situations where there is legislative lacunae the judiciary in effect
becomes the “lawmaker”. This is engendered by the “general principles” clauses
in the Civil Code and other statutory enactments which allows greater discretion
on the part of the judiciary to develop the law.
The weak link in the Philippine judicial system is the middle part of the
chain involving the Court of Appeals and other high courts, including the
administrative agencies, since there is no reliable reporter system covering their
decisions. A development of a strong reporter system in this field will encourage
a system of jurisprudence constante on that level of the judicial system. This is
necessary, for often the Supreme Court cannot find the time to address all issues
important in the lives of people, especially when it can only act on the basis of
justiciable controversies. Transactions and lives cannot pause to await the slow
grind of the Supreme Court decisional process; evolving a reliable system of
precedents in the upper middle level of the judicial echelon would facilitate
commercial, economic and social developments.