G.R. NO. 36142.

March 31, 1973

JOSUE JAVELLANA, petitioner,

vs.

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE,
respondents.

Facts:

The Plebiscite Case

On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which was amended by Resolution No. 4 of said body, adopted on June 17, 1969,
calling a Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines.

Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132, approved on August 24, 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election
of delegates to the said Convention was held on November 10, 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on June 1, 1971.

While the Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law.

On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The next day, November 30, 1972, the President
of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree No. 73, “submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor,” as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of
the Proposed Constitution on January 15, 1973.

On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said
“respondents or their agents from implementing Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court,” upon the grounds, inter alia, that
said Presidential Decree “has no force and effect as law because the calling … of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the
prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the
Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress …,” and “there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there
being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof.”

On December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of free and open debate
on the Proposed Constitution.

On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No formal action to
this effect was taken until January 7, 1973, when General Order No. 20 was issued, directing “that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on January 15, 1978, be
postponed until further notice.” Said General Order No. 20, moreover, “suspended in the meantime” the “order of December 17, 1972, temporarily suspending the
effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution.”

Because of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite, the Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the
aforementioned cases, for neither the date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially. Then, again,
Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduled to meet in regular session on January 22, 1973, and since the main objection to Presidential Decree
No. 73 was that the President does not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor, which Congress unquestionably could do,
particularly in view of the formal postponement of the plebiscite by the President reportedly after consultation with, among others, the leaders of Congress and
the Commission on Elections the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on these cases.

“In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No.
L-35948 filed an “urgent motion,” praying that said case be decided “as soon as possible,
preferably not later than January 15, 1973.”

The next day, January 13, 1973, which was a Saturday, the Court issued a resolution requiring the respondents in said three (3) cases to comment on said
“urgent motion” and “manifestation,” “not later than Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973.” Prior thereto, or on January 15, 1973, shortly before noon, the petitioners
in said Case G.R. No. L-35948 riled a “supplemental motion for issuance of restraining order and inclusion of additional respondents,” praying: “… that a
restraining order be issued enjoining and restraining respondent Commission on Elections, as well as the Department of Local Governments and its head,
Secretary Jose Roño; the Department of Agrarian Reforms and its head, Secretary Conrado Estrella; the National Ratification Coordinating Committee and its
Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; their deputies, subordinates and substitutes, and all other officials and persons who may be assigned such task, from collecting,
certifying, and announcing and reporting to the President or other officials concerned, the so-called Citizens’ Assemblies referendum results allegedly obtained
when they were supposed to have met during the period comprised between January 10 and January 15, 1973, on the two questions quoted in paragraph 1 of
this Supplemental Urgent Motion.”

On the same date January 15, 1973 the Court passed a resolution requiring the respondents in said case G.R. No. L-35948 to file “file an answer to the said
motion not later than 4 P.M., Tuesday, January 16, 1973,” and setting the motion for hearing “on January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m.” While the case was being
heard, on the date last mentioned, at noontime, the Secretary of Justice called on the writer of this opinion and said that, upon instructions of the President, he
(the Secretary of Justice) was delivering to him (the writer) a copy of Proclamation No. 1102, which had just been signed by the President. Thereupon, the writer
returned to the Session Hall and announced to the Court, the parties in G.R. No. L-35948 inasmuch as the hearing in connection therewith was still going on and
the public there present that the President had, according to information conveyed by the Secretary of Justice, signed said Proclamation No. 1102, earlier that
morning.

The Ratification Case

On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided the sequel of plebiscite cases, Javellana filed this suit against the respondents to restrain
them from implementing any of the provisions of the proposed Constitution not found in the present 1935 Constitution. This is a petition filed by him as a Filipino
citizen and a qualified and registered voter and as a class suit, for himself and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated. Javellana also alleged that the
President had announced the immediate implementation of the new constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including.

Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed constitution upon ground that the President as Commander-in-
Chief of the AFP is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies; without power to approve proposed constitution; without power to proclaim the ratification
by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution; and the election held to ratify the proposed constitution was not a free election, hence null and void.

Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No. 1102 and any order, decree, and proclamation which have the same import and
objective.

Issues:

Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable question.

Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified validly conforming to the applicable constitutional and statutory
provisions.

Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people.

Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief.

Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional Convention in force.

Rulings:

It is a justiciable and a non-political question.

To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force depends upon whether or not the said new constitution has been ratified in accordance with the
requirements of the 1935 Constitution. It is well settled that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the constitution should be settled applying the provisions
of the constitution in force at the time of the alleged ratification of the old constitution.

The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified in accordance with the provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is justiciable as
jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we patterned our 1935 Constitution) shall show.

The Constitution was not validly ratified as held by six (6) members of the court.

The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in those lacking the qualifications and having the disqualifications mentioned in the
Constitution the right of suffrage.

The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the proceedings in the Citizen’s assemblies void. Proceedings held in such Citizen’s Assemblies were
fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the qualifications prescribed in Article V Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution were allowed to vote in said
Assemblies. And, since there is no means by which the invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age can be separated or segregated from those of the
qualified voters, the proceedings in the Citizen’s Assemblies must be considered null and void.
Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is void. Article XV of the 1935 Constitution envisages with the term “votes cast” choices made on ballots –
not orally or by raising hands – by the persons taking part in plebiscites. This is but natural and logical, for, since the early years of the American regime, we had
adopted the Australian Ballot System, with its major characteristics, namely, uniform official ballots prepared and furnished by the Government and secrecy in the
voting, with the advantage of keeping records that permit judicial inquiry, when necessary, into the accuracy of the election returns.

The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the supervision of COMELEC is void. The point is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies as
were held took place without the intervention of the COMELEC and without complying with the provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or even of those of
Presidential Decree No. 73. The procedure therein mostly followed is such that there is no reasonable means of checking the accuracy of the returns filed by the
officers who conducted said plebiscites. This is another patent violation of Article X of the 1935 Constitution which form part of the fundamental scheme set forth
in the 1935 Constitution, as amended, to insure the “free, orderly, and honest” expression of the people’s will. For this, the alleged plebiscite in the Citizen’s
Assemblies is null and void, insofar as the same are claimed to have ratified the revised Constitution

No majority vote has been reached by the Court.

Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that “the people have already accepted the 1973 Constitution.”

Two (2) members of the Court hold that there can be no free expression, and there has even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the
Philippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under Martial Law. Justice Fernando states that “(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine
stated in some American decisions to the effect that independently of the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution once accepted acquiesced in by the
people must be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage prepared to state that such doctrine calls for application in view of the shortness of time
that has elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining what is the mind of the people in the absence of the freedom of debate that is a concomitant feature of martial
law.”

Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule on the question. Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice
Teehankee in their statement that “Under a regime of martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicle restricted, (they) have no
means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted the Constitution.”

The Court is not prepared to concede that the acts the officers and offices of the Executive Department, in line with Proclamation No. 1102, connote recognition
of or acquiescence to the proposed Constitution.

A department of the Government cannot “recognize” its own acts. Recognition normally connotes the acknowledgment by a party of the acts of another.
Individual acts of recognition by members of Congress do not constitute congressional recognition, unless the members have performed said acts in session duly
assembled. This is a well-established principle of Administrative Law and of the Law of Public Officers. The compliance by the people with the orders of martial
law government does not constitute acquiescence to the proposed Constitution. Neither does the Court prepared to declare that the people’s inaction as regards
Proclamation No. 1102, and their compliance with a number of Presidential orders, decrees and/or instructions, some or many of which have admittedly had
salutary effects, issued subsequently thereto, amounts to a ratification, adoption or approval of said Proclamation No. 1102. The intimidation is there, and
inaction or obedience of the people, under these conditions, is not necessarily an act of conformity or acquiescence.

As regards the applicability to these cases of the “enrolled bill” rule, it is well to remember that the same refers to a document certified to the President for his
action under the Constitution by the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Reps, and attested to by the respective Secretaries of both Houses,
concerning legislative measures approved by said Houses. Whereas, Proclamation No. 1102 is an act of the President declaring the results of a plebiscite on the
proposed Constitution, an act which Article X of the 1935 Constitution denies the executive department of the Government.

In all other respects and with regard to the other respondent in said case, petitions therein should be given due course, there being more than prima facie
showing that the proposed Constitution has not been ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, either strictly, substantially, or has been
acquiesced in by the people or majority thereof; that said proposed Constitution is not in force and effect; and that the 1935 Constitution is still the Fundamental
Law of the Land, without prejudice to the submission of said proposed Constitution to the people at a plebiscite for its ratification or rejection in accordance with
Articles V, X and XV of the 1935 Constitution and the provisions of the Revised Election Code in force at the time of such plebiscite.

Being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect.

Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people’s acceptance thereof; 4
members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third
question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and 2 members of the Court, voted
that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result, there are not enough votes to declare that the new
Constitution is not in force.

Javellana vs. Executive Secretary

50 scra 33 | March 31, 1973

Ponente: Concepcion, C.J

The court was severely divided on the following issues raised in the petition: but when the crucial question of whether the petitioners are entitled to relief, six
members of the court (Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra) voted to dismiss the petition. Concepcion, together Justices
Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, voted to grant the relief being sought, thus upholding the 1973 Constitution.

Sequence of events that lead to the filing of the “Plebiscite” then “Ratification” Cases.

FACTS:

The Plebiscite Case

On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which was amended by Resolution No. 4 of said body, adopted on June 17, 1969,
calling a Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines.

Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132, approved on August 24, 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election
of delegates to the said Convention was held on November 10, 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on June 1, 1971.

While the Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law.

the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. Then, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree No. 73,
“submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
and appropriating funds therefor,” as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on January 15, 1973.

Then Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said “respondents or
their agents from implementing Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court,” upon the grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential
Decree “has no force and effect as law because the calling … of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the
ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged
exclusively in Congress …,” and “there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of
speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof.”

The President had issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed
Constitution. He then announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect
was taken until January 7, 1973, when General Order No. 20 was issued, directing “that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on January 15, 1978, be postponed
until further notice.” Said General Order No. 20, moreover, “suspended in the meantime” the “order of December 17, 1972, temporarily suspending the effects of
Proclamation No. 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution.”

Because of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite, the Court deemed it fit to refrain from deciding the aforementioned cases,
for neither the date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially. The Congress then scheduled to meet in
regular session and since the main objection to Presidential Decree No. 73 was that the President does not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and
appropriate funds therefor, which Congress unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal postponement of the plebiscite by the President reportedly
after consultation with, among others, the leaders of Congress and the Commission on Elections the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on
these cases.

The petitioners in Case G.R. No.
L-35948 filed an “urgent motion,” praying that said case be decided “as soon as possible, preferably not later than January 15,
1973.”

Then the Court issued a resolution requiring the respondents in said three (3) cases to comment on said “urgent motion” and “manifestation,” “not later than
Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973.” Prior thereto, or on January 15, 1973, shortly before noon, the petitioners in said Case G.R. No. L-35948 riled a “supplemental
motion for issuance of restraining order and inclusion of additional respondents,” praying:

“… that a restraining order be issued enjoining and restraining respondent Commission on Elections, as well as the Department of Local Governments and its
head, Secretary Jose Roño; the Department of Agrarian Reforms and its head, Secretary Conrado Estrella; the National Ratification Coordinating Committee and
its Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; their deputies, subordinates and substitutes, and all other officials and persons who may be assigned such task, from
collecting, certifying, and announcing and reporting to the President or other officials concerned, the so-called Citizens’ Assemblies referendum results allegedly
obtained when they were supposed to have met during the period comprised between January 10 and January 15, 1973, on the two questions quoted in
paragraph 1 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion.”

On the same date, the Court passed a resolution requiring the respondents in said case G.R. No. L-35948 to file “file an answer to the said motion not later than
4 P.M., Tuesday, January 16, 1973,” and setting the motion for hearing “on January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m.” While the case was being heard, on the date last
mentioned, at noontime, the Secretary of Justice called on the writer of this opinion and said that, upon instructions of the President, he (the Secretary of Justice)
was delivering to him (the writer) a copy of Proclamation No. 1102, which had just been signed by the President. Thereupon, the writer returned to the Session
Hall and announced to the Court, the parties in G.R. No. L-35948 inasmuch as the hearing in connection therewith was still going on and the public there present
that the President had, according to information conveyed by the Secretary of Justice, signed said Proclamation No. 1102, earlier that morning.

The Ratification Case

On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed Case G.R. No. L-36142 against the Executive Secretary and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and
Finance, to restrain said respondents “and their subordinates or agents from implementing any of the provisions of the propose Constitution not found in the
present Constitution” referring to that of 1935. The petition therein, filed by Josue Javellana, as a “Filipino citizen, and a qualified and registered voter” and as “a
class suit, for himself, and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated,” was amended on or about January 24, 1973. After reciting in substance the facts
set forth in the decision in the plebiscite cases, Javellana alleged that the President had announced “the immediate implementation of the New Constitution, thru
his Cabinet, respondents including,” and that the latter “are acting without, or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed Constitution” upon the
ground: “that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies”; that the same
“are without power to approve the proposed Constitution …”; “that the President is without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed
Constitution”; and “that the election held to ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void.”

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable, or political and therefore non-justiciable, question?

2. Whether the Constitution has proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (with substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to
the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions?

3. Whether the aforementioned proposed Constitution has acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people? (acquiesced – “permission” given by
silence or passiveness. Acceptance or agreement by keeping quiet or by not making objections.)

4. Whether petitioners are entitled to relief?

5. Whether the aforementioned proposed Constitution is in force?

HELD:

1. On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the
Court, hold that the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 presents a justiciable and non-political question. Justices Makalintal and Castro did not vote
squarely on this question, but, only inferentially, in their discussion of the second question. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that “inasmuch as it is
claimed there has been approval by the people, the Court may inquire into the question of whether or not there has actually been such an approval, and, in the
affirmative, the Court should keep hands-off out of respect to the people’s will, but, in negative, the Court may determine from both factual and legal angles
whether or not Article XV of the 1935 Constitution been complied with.” Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that the
issue is political and “beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry.

2. On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court
also hold that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the 1935
Constitution, which provides only one way for ratification, i.e., “in an election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and
duly registered voters.

Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that “(A)s to whether or not the 1973 Constitution has been validly ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in
the light of traditional concepts regarding the meaning and intent of said Article, the referendum in the Citizens’ Assemblies, specially in the manner the votes
therein were cast, reported and canvassed, falls short of the requirements thereof. In view, however, of the fact that I have no means of refusing to recognize as
a judge that factually there was voting and that the majority of the votes were for considering as approved the 1973 Constitution without the necessity of the usual
form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications, I am constrained to hold that, in the political sense, if not in the orthodox legal sense, the people may be deemed
to have cast their favorable votes in the belief that in doing so they did the part required of them by Article XV, hence, it may be said that in its political aspect,
which is what counts most, after all, said Article has been substantially complied with, and, in effect, the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionally ratified.”

Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that under their view there has been in effect substantial compliance with the
constitutional requirements for valid ratification.

3. On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned proposed Constitution, no majority vote has been reached by the Court.

Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that “the people have already accepted the 1973 Constitution.”

Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that there can be no free expression, and there has even been no expression, by the
people qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under Martial Law. Justice Fernando states that
“(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some American decisions to the effect that independently of the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution once
accepted acquiesced in by the people must be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage prepared to state that such doctrine calls for application
in view of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining what is the mind of the people in the absence of the freedom of debate that is a
concomitant feature of martial law.” 88

Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule on the question. Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice
Teehankee in their statement that “Under a regime of martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicle restricted, (they) have no
means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted the Constitution.”

4. On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS
the petition. Justice Makalintal and Castro so voted on the strength of their view that “(T)he effectivity of the said Constitution, in the final analysis, is the basic
and ultimate question posed by these cases to resolve which considerations other than judicial, an therefore beyond the competence of this Court, 90 are
relevant and unavoidable.” 91

Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and myself voted to deny respondents’ motion to dismiss and to give due
course to the petitions.

5. On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force: Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people’s acceptance thereof;

Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the
third question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and

Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force;
with the result that there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.
ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting
votes of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being the vote of the
majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect.

Aglipay v. Ruiz, GR No. L-45459, March 13, 1937

Facts:

Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition against respondent Ruiz, the Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing
and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd Intl Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic. The petitioner invokes that such issuance
and selling, as authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil. Legislature, contemplates religious purpose – for the benefit of a particular sect or church. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?

Held/Reason:

The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the respondent does not contemplate any favor upon a particular sect or church, but
the purpose was only ‘to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist’ and the government just took advantage of an event considered of international
importance, thus, not violating the Constitution on its provision on the separation of the Church and State. Moreover, the Court stressed that ‘Religious freedom,
as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs’. Emphasizing that, ‘when the
Filipino people ‘implored the aid of Divine Providence’, they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating
influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and
denominations.’

CASE DIGEST : AGLIPAY VS RUIZ

G.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937 GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner, vs. JUAN RUIZ, respondent.

Facts : In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration
in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he
considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of
the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage stamps for printing The
more important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the Constitution by the respondent in issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the
Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress. It is alleged that this action of the respondent is violative of the provisions of section 23, subsection 3, Article VI, of
the Constitution of the Philippines, which provides as follows: No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for
the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, secretarian, institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest,
preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to
any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.

ISSUE : WON the stamp is constitutional

HELD : Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of
special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the violation
of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or
church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications was not inspired by any sectarian denomination. The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were
money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church It appears from the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the
petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to this country." The
officials concerned merely, took advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people What is
emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and
sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the
Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. We are of the opinion that the Government should not be embarassed in its activities
simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate
legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordinate to mere incidental results not contemplated But, upon very serious reflection,
examination of Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that there has been no constitutional infraction in the
case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to misuse postage
stamps with new designs "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government." Even if we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor
judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor
judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming
within a constitutional inhibition.
William C. Reagan, Petitioner vs Commission of Internal Revenue

William C. Reagan, Petitioner vs

Commission of Internal Revenue

Facts:

The petitioner is a citizen of the United State and an employee of Bendix Radio, Divison of Bendix Aviation Corporation, which provided technical
assistance to the United States Air Force was assigned at the Clark Air Base Pampanga, honor about July 7, 19. Nine months, before his tour duty expires,
petitioner imported a tax free 1960 Cadillac car which valued at $6443.83. More than two months after the car was imported, petitioner requested the Clark Air
Base Commander for a permit to sell the car. The request was granted with the condition that he would sell it to a member of the United States Armed Forces or
an employee of the U.S. Military Bases.

On July 11, 1960, petitioner sold the car to Willie Johnson for $6600, a private in US Marine Corps, Sangby Point, Cavite as shown by a bill of sale
executed at Clark Air Base. On the same date William Johnson Jr. sold the car to Fred Meneses for P32,000 as evidence by a deed of sale executed in Manila.

The respondent after deducting the landed cost of the car and the personal exemption which the petitioner was entitled, fixed as his net income arising
from such transaction the amount of P17912.34 rendering him liable for income tax of P2979.00. After paying the sum, he sought refund from the respondent
claiming that he is exempted. He filed a case within the Court of Tax Appeals seeking recovery of the sum P2979.00 plus legal rate of interest.

Issue:

Whether or not the said income tax of P2979.00 was legally collected by respondent from petitioner.

Ruling:

The Philippine is an independent and sovereign country or state. Its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. Its laws govern therein and
everyone to whom it applies must submit to its term. It does not prelude from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional rights over
certain portions of its territory. Such areas sustain their status as native soil and still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished but it does not
disappear.

The Clark Air Base is one of he bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the Military Bases Agreement which states that a
“national of the US serving or employed in the Philippines in connection with the construction, maintenance, operation, or defense of the bases and residing in
the Philippines only by reason such unemployment is not to be taxed on his income unless derived in the bases which one clearly derived the Phil.

Therefore the Supreme Court sustained the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals rendering the petitioner liable of the income tax arising from the sale
of his automobile that have taken place in Clark Air Field which is within our territory to tax.