[2019] UKSC 41

On appeals from: [2019] EWHC 2381 (QB)

and [2019] CSIH 49

JUDGMENT

R (on the application of Miller) (Appellant) v The

Prime Minister (Respondent)
Cherry and others (Respondents) v Advocate
General for Scotland (Appellant) (Scotland)

before

Lady Hale, President

Lord Reed, Deputy President
Lord Kerr
Lord Wilson
Lord Carnwath
Lord Hodge
Lady Black
Lord Lloyd-Jones
Lady Arden
Lord Kitchin
Lord Sales

JUDGMENT GIVEN ON

24 September 2019

Heard on 17, 18 and 19 September 2019

 Appellant Respondent
(Gina Miller) (The Prime Minister)
Lord Pannick QC Sir James Eadie QC
Tom Hickman QC David Blundell
Warren Fitt Christopher Knight
Richard Howell
(Instructed by Mishcon de (Instructed by The
Reya LLP (London)) Government Legal
Department)

Appellant Respondents
(The Advocate General) (Joanna Cherry MP and others)
Lord Keen of Elie QC Aidan O’Neill QC
Andrew Webster QC David Welsh
Sam Fowles
(Instructed by Office of (Instructed by Balfour and
the Advocate General for Manson LLP (Edinburgh))
Scotland)

1st Intervener
James Wolffe QC, Lord Advocate
James Mure QC
Christine O’Neill
(Instructed by the Legal
Department of the Scottish
Government)

2nd Intervener
Ronan Lavery QC
Conan Fegan BL
Richard Smyth
(Instructed by McIvor
Farrell Solicitors)

3rd Intervener
Michael Fordham QC
Celia Rooney
Hollie Higgins
(Instructed by Welsh
Government Legal
Services Department)

4th Intervener
Lord Garnier QC
Tom Cleaver
Anna Hoffmann
(Instructed by Herbert
Smith Freehills LLP
(London))
 5th Intervener
Deok Joo Rhee QC
Catherine Dobson
(Instructed by Howe and
Co)

6th Intervener
Thomas de la Mare QC
Daniel Cashman
Alison Pickup
(Instructed by Public Law
Project)

Interveners:-
(1) The Lord Advocate
(2) Raymond McCord
(3) Counsel General for Wales
(4) Sir John Major KG CH
(5) Baroness Chakrabarti CBE, PC (written submissions only)
(6) Public Law Project (written submissions only)
LADY HALE AND LORD REED GIVING THE JUDGMENT OF THE
COURT:

1. It is important to emphasise that the issue in these appeals is not when and on
what terms the United Kingdom is to leave the European Union. The issue is whether
the advice given by the Prime Minister to Her Majesty the Queen on 27th or 28th
August 2019 that Parliament should be prorogued from a date between 9th and 12th
September until 14th October was lawful. It arises in circumstances which have
never arisen before and are unlikely ever to arise again. It is a “one off”. But our law
is used to rising to such challenges and supplies us with the legal tools to enable us
to reason to a solution.

What is prorogation?

2. Parliamentary sittings are normally divided into sessions, usually lasting for
about a year, but sometimes less and sometimes, as with the current session, much
longer. Prorogation of Parliament brings the current session to an end. The next
session begins, usually a short time later, with the Queen’s Speech. While
Parliament is prorogued, neither House can meet, debate and pass legislation.
Neither House can debate Government policy. Nor may members of either House
ask written or oral questions of Ministers. They may not meet and take evidence in
committees. In general, Bills which have not yet completed all their stages are lost
and will have to start again from scratch in the next session of Parliament. In certain
circumstances, individual Bills may be “carried over” into the next session and pick
up where they left off. The Government remains in office and can exercise its powers
to make delegated legislation and bring it into force. It may also exercise all the
other powers which the law permits. It cannot procure the passing of Acts of
Parliament or obtain Parliamentary approval for further spending.

3. Parliament does not decide when it should be prorogued. This is a prerogative

power exercised by the Crown on the advice of the Privy Council. In practice, as
noted in the House of Commons Library Briefing Paper (No 8589, 11th June 2019),
“this process has been a formality in the UK for more than a century: the
Government of the day advises the Crown to prorogue and that request is acquiesced
to”. In theory the monarch could attend Parliament and make the proclamation
proroguing it in person, but the last monarch to do this was Queen Victoria in 1854.
Under current practice, a proclamation is made by Order in Council a few days
before the actual prorogation, specifying a range of days within which Parliament
may be prorogued and the date on which the prorogation would end. The Lord
Chancellor prepares a commission under the great seal instructing the

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Commissioners accordingly. On the day chosen for the prorogation, the
Commissioners enter the House of Lords; the House of Commons is summoned; the
command of the monarch appointing the Commission is read; and Parliament is
formally prorogued.

4. Prorogation must be distinguished from the dissolution of Parliament. The

dissolution of Parliament brings the current Parliament to an end. Members of the
House of Commons cease to be Members of Parliament. A general election is then
held to elect a new House of Commons. The Government remains in office but there
are conventional constraints on what it can do during that period. These days,
dissolution is usually preceded by a short period of prorogation.

5. Dissolution used also to be a prerogative power of the Crown but is now

governed by the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011. This provides for general
elections to be held every five years and for an earlier election to be held in only two
circumstances: either the House of Commons votes, by a majority of at least two-
thirds of the number of seats (including vacant seats) in the House, to hold an early
election; or the House of Commons votes that it has no confidence in Her Majesty’s
Government and no-one is able to form a Government in which the House does have
confidence within 14 days. Parliament is dissolved 25 days before polling day and
cannot otherwise be dissolved. The Act expressly provides that it does not affect Her
Majesty’s power to prorogue Parliament (section 6(1)).

6. Prorogation must also be distinguished from the House adjourning or going

into recess. This is decided, not by the Crown acting on the advice of the Prime
Minister, but by each House passing a motion to that effect. The Houses might go
into recess at different times from one another. In the House of Commons, the
motion is moved by the Prime Minister. In the House of Lords, it is moved by the
Lord Speaker. During a recess, the House does not sit but Parliamentary business
can otherwise continue as usual. Committees may meet, written Parliamentary
questions can be asked and must be answered.

The run-up to this prorogation

7. As everyone knows, a referendum was held (pursuant to the European Union

Referendum Act 2015) on 23rd June 2016. The majority of those voting voted to
leave the European Union. Technically, the result was not legally binding. But the
Government had pledged to honour the result and it has since been treated as
politically and democratically binding. Successive Governments and Parliament
have acted on that basis. Immediately after the referendum, Mr David Cameron
resigned as Prime Minister. Mrs Theresa May was chosen as leader of the
Conservative party and took his place.

Page 4
8. The machinery for leaving the European Union is contained in article 50 of
the Treaty on European Union. This provides that any member state may decide to
withdraw from the Union “in accordance with its own constitutional requirements”.
That member state is to notify the European Council of its intention. The Union must
then negotiate and conclude an agreement with that member state, “setting out the
arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future
relationship with the Union”. The European Union treaties will cease to apply to that
state when the withdrawal agreement comes into force or, failing that, two years
after the notification unless the European Council, in agreement with the member
state, unanimously decides to extend this period.

9. On 2nd October 2016, Mrs May announced her intention to give notice under
article 50 before the end of March 2017. Mrs Gina Miller and others challenged her
power to do so without the authority of an Act of Parliament. That challenge
succeeded: R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017]
UKSC 5; [2018] AC 61. Parliament responded by passing the European Union
(Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017, which received royal assent on 16th March
2017 and authorised the Prime Minister to give the notification. Mrs May did so on
29th March 2017.

10. That Parliament was dissolved on 3rd May 2017 and a general election was
held on 8th June 2017. The result was that Mrs May no longer had an overall
majority in the House of Commons, but she was able to form a Government because
of a “confidence and supply” agreement with the Democratic Unionist Party of
Northern Ireland. Negotiations for a withdrawal agreement with the European
Council proceeded.

11. Meanwhile, Parliament proceeded with some of the legislative steps needed
to prepare United Kingdom law for leaving the Union. The European Union
(Withdrawal) Act 2018 came into force on 26th June 2018. In brief, it defined “exit
day” as 29th March 2019, but this could be extended by statutory instrument (section
20). From that day, it repealed the European Communities Act 1972, the Act which
had provided for our entry into what became the European Union, but it preserved
much of the existing EU law as the law of the United Kingdom, with provision for
exceptions and modifications to be made by delegated legislation. Crucially, section
13 requires Parliamentary approval of any withdrawal agreement reached by the
Government. In summary it provides that a withdrawal agreement may only be
ratified if (a) a Minister of the Crown has laid before Parliament a statement that
political agreement has been reached, a copy of the negotiated withdrawal
agreement and a copy of the framework for the future relationship; (b) the House of
Commons has approved the withdrawal agreement and future framework; (c) the
House of Lords has, in effect, taken note of them both; and (d) an Act of Parliament
has been passed which contains provision for the implementation of the withdrawal
agreement.
Page 5
12. A withdrawal agreement, setting out terms for a “smooth and orderly exit
from the European Union” and a political declaration, setting out a framework for
the future relationship, to be negotiated by the end of 2020, were concluded on 25th
November 2018. However, the agreement was rejected three times by the House of
Commons, on 15th January 2019 (by 432 to 202 votes), on 12th March 2019 (by
391 to 242 votes) and on 29th March 2019 (by 344 to 286 votes).

13. On 20th March 2019, the Prime Minister had asked the European Council to
extend the notification period. This was granted only until 12th April 2019.
However, on 8th April 2019, the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2019 was
passed. This required a Minister of the Crown to move a motion, that day or the
next, that the House of Commons agrees to the Prime Minister seeking an extension
to a specified date and, if the motion was passed, required the Prime Minister to seek
that extension. Pursuant to that Act, the Prime Minister sought an extension, which
on 10th April 2019 was granted until 31st October 2019. The regulation changing
the “exit day” was made the next day (European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (Exit
Day) (Amendment No 2) Regulations 2019 (SI 2019/859)). Thus the current
position, under both article 50 of the Treaty on European Union and the European
Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 is that the United Kingdom will leave the Union on
31st October 2019 whether or not there is a withdrawal agreement (but this is now
subject to the European Union (Withdrawal) (No 2) Act 2019: see para 22 below).

14. Mrs May resigned as leader of the Conservative party on 7th June 2019 and
stood down as Prime Minister on 24th July, after the Conservative party had chosen
Mr Boris Johnson as its leader. Mr Johnson has on many occasions made it clear
that he believes that the European Council will only agree to changes in the
withdrawal agreement if they think that there is a genuine risk that the United
Kingdom will leave without any such agreement. He appointed Mr Michael Gove
Cabinet Office Minister with a view to preparing for a “no deal” exit. Yet it was also
clear that a majority of the House of Commons would not support withdrawal
without an agreement.

This prorogation

15. On 28th August 2019, Mr Jacob Rees-Mogg, Lord President of the (Privy)
Council and Leader of the House of Commons, Baroness Evans of Bowes Park,
Leader of the House of Lords, and Mr Mark Spencer, Chief Whip, attended a
meeting of the Privy Council held by the Queen at Balmoral Castle. An Order in
Council was made ordering that “the Parliament be prorogued on a day no earlier
than Monday the 9th day of September and no later than Thursday the 12th day of
September 2019 to Monday the 14th day of October 2019” and that the Lord
Chancellor “do cause a Commission to be prepared and issued in the usual manner
for proroguing the Parliament accordingly”. We know that in approving the
Page 6
prorogation, Her Majesty was acting on the advice of the Prime Minister. We do not
know what conversation passed between them when he gave her that advice. We do
not know what conversation, if any, passed between the assembled Privy
Counsellors before or after the meeting. We do not know what the Queen was told
and cannot draw any conclusions about it.

16. We do know the contents of three documents leading up to that advice,

annexed to a witness statement from Jonathan Jones, Treasury Solicitor and Head
of the Government Legal Department. His evidence is that his department had made
clear to all relevant departments, including the Prime Minister’s Office, the
requirement to make thorough searches for and to produce all information relevant
to Mrs Miller’s claim.

17. The first document is a Memorandum dated 15th August 2019 from Nikki da
Costa, Director of Legislative Affairs in the Prime Minister’s Office, to the Prime
Minister and copied to seven other people, including Sir Mark Sedwill, Cabinet
Secretary, and Dominic Cummings, Special Adviser. The key points made in the
Memorandum are:

• This had been the longest session since records began. Because of this,
they were at the very end of the legislative programme of the previous
administration. Commons and Lords business managers were asking for new
Bills to ensure that Parliament was using its time gainfully. But if new Bills
were introduced, the session would have to continue for another four to six
months, or the Bills would fall at the end of the session.

• Choosing when to end the session - ie prorogue - was a balance

between “wash up” - completing the Bills which were close to Royal Assent
- and “not wasting time that could be used for new measures in a fresh
session”. There were very few Bills suitable for “wash-up”, so this pointed to
bringing the session to a close in September. Asking for prorogation to
commence within the period 9th to 12th September was recommended.

• To start the new session with a Queen’s Speech would be achievable

in the week beginning 14th October but any earlier “is extremely pressured”.

• Politically, it was essential that Parliament was sitting before and after
the EU Council meeting (which is scheduled for 17th - 18th October). If the
Queen’s Speech were on 14th October, the usual six-day debate would
culminate in key votes on 21st and 22nd October. Parliament would have the
opportunity to debate the Government’s overall approach to Brexit in the run

Page 7
 up to the EU Council and then vote on it once the outcome of the Council
was known.

• It must be recognised that “prorogation, on its own and separate of a

Queen’s Speech, has been portrayed as a potential tool to prevent MPs
intervening prior to the UK’s departure from the EU on 31st October”. The
dates proposed sought to provide reassurance by ensuring that Parliament
would sit for three weeks before exit and that a maximum of seven days were
lost apart from the time usually set aside for the conference recess.

• The usual length of a prorogation was under ten days, though there had
been longer ones. The present proposal would mean that Parliament stood
prorogued for up to 34 calendar days but, given the conference recess, the
number of sitting days lost would be far less than that.

• The Prime Minister ticked “Yes” to the recommendation that his PPS
approach the Palace with a request for prorogation to begin within the period
Monday 9th September to Thursday 12th September and for a Queen’s
Speech on Monday 14th October.

18. The second document is the Prime Minister’s handwritten comments on the
Memorandum, dated 16th August. They read:

“(1) The whole September session is a rigmarole introduced

[words redacted] t [sic] show the public that MPs were earning
their crust.

(2) So I don’t see anything especially shocking about this

prorogation.

(3) As Nikki nots [sic], it is OVER THE CONFERENCE

SEASON so that the sitting days lost are actually very few.”

19. The third document is another Memorandum from Nikki da Costa, dated 23rd
August, again to the Prime Minister and copied to five people, including Sir Mark
Sedwill and Dominic Cummings. This sets out the proposed arrangements,
including a telephone call between the Prime Minister and Her Majesty at 6.00 pm
on Tuesday 27th August, formally to advise prorogation, the Privy Council meeting
the next day, a cabinet meeting by conference call after that, and a press notice after

Page 8
that. Draft remarks for the Cabinet meeting and a draft letter to MPs (approved by
the Chief Whip) were annexed.

20. We also have the Minutes of the Cabinet meeting held by conference call at
10.05 am on Wednesday 28th August, after the advice had been given. The Prime
Minister explained that it was important that they were “brought up to speed” on the
decisions which had been taken. It was also “important to emphasise that this
decision to prorogue Parliament for a Queen’s Speech was not driven by Brexit
considerations: it was about pursuing an exciting and dynamic legislative
programme to take forward the Government’s agenda”. He also explained that the
timetable did not conflict with the statutory responsibilities under the Northern
Ireland (Executive Formation etc) Act 2019 (as it happens, the timetable for
Parliamentary sittings laid down in section 3 of that Act requires that Parliament sit
on 9th September and, on one interpretation, no later than 14th October). He
acknowledged that the new timetable would impact on the sitting days available to
pass the Northern Ireland Budget Bill and “potentially put at risk the ability to pass
the necessary legislation relating to decision-making powers in a no deal scenario”.
In discussion at the Cabinet meeting, among the points made was that “any
messaging should emphasise that the plan for a Queen’s Speech was not intended to
reduce parliamentary scrutiny or minimise Parliament’s opportunity to make clear
its views on Brexit. … Any suggestion that the Government was using this as a tactic
to frustrate Parliament should be rebutted.” In conclusion, the Prime Minister said
that “there were no plans for an early General Election. This would not be right for
the British people: they had faced an awful lot of electoral events in recent years”.

21. That same day, the Prime Minister sent a letter to all MPs updating them on
the Government’s plans for its business in Parliament, stressing his intention to
“bring forward a new bold and ambitious domestic legislative agenda for the
renewal of our country after Brexit”.

22. On 3rd September Parliament returned from its summer recess. The House
of Commons passed a motion that MPs should take control of the order paper - in
other words decide for themselves what business they would transact. On 4th
September what became the European Union (Withdrawal) (No 2) Act 2019 passed
all its stages in the House of Commons. On 6th September the House of Lords
suspended its usual rules so that the Bill could be passed. It received Royal Assent
on Monday 9th September. The import of the Act is to require the Prime Minister
on 19th October to seek, by a letter in the form scheduled to the Act, an extension
of three months from the European Council, unless by then Parliament has either
approved a withdrawal agreement or approved leaving without one.

Page 9
These proceedings

23. Meanwhile, on 30th July 2019, prompted by the suggestion made in academic
writings in April and also by some backbench MPs, and not denied by members of
the Government, that Parliament might be prorogued so as to avoid further debate
in the run-up to exit day, a cross party group of 75 MPs and members of the House
of Lords, together with one QC, had launched a petition in the Court of Session in
Scotland claiming that such a prorogation would be unlawful and seeking a
declaration to that effect and an interdict to prevent it. This was met by averments
that the petition was hypothetical and premature and that there was no reasonable or
even hypothetical apprehension that the UK Government intended to advise the
Queen to prorogue the Westminster Parliament with the intention of denying before
Exit Day any further Parliamentary consideration of withdrawal from the Union.
This denial was repeated in revised Answers dated 23rd and 27th August. On 27th
August the Petition was amended to claim that it would be unlawful to prorogue
Parliament with the intention to deny “sufficient time for proper consideration” of
withdrawal. On 2nd September, the Answers were amended to deny that there was
any reasonable apprehension of that.

24. On 30th August, the Lord Ordinary, Lord Doherty, refused an application for
an interim interdict to prevent the now very far from hypothetical prorogation and
set the date of 3rd September for the substantive hearing: [2019] CSOH 68. On 4th
September, he refused the petition, on the ground that the issue was not justiciable
in a court of law: [2019] CSOH 70. The Inner House (Lord Carloway, Lord
President, Lord Brodie and Lord Drummond Young) heard the appeal later that
week, delivered their decision with a summary of their reasons on 11th September,
and their full judgments were published on Friday, 13th September: [2019] CSIH
49. They allowed the appeal, holding that the advice given to Her Majesty was
justiciable, that it was motivated by the improper purpose of stymying Parliamentary
scrutiny of the executive, and that it and the prorogation which followed it were
unlawful and thus null and of no effect. They gave permission to appeal to this court.

25. Meanwhile, as soon as the prorogation was announced, Mrs Gina Miller
launched proceedings in the High Court in England and Wales, seeking a declaration
that the Prime Minister’s advice to her Majesty was unlawful. Those proceedings
were heard by a Divisional Court (Lord Burnett of Maldon, Lord Chief Justice of
England and Wales, Sir Terence Etherton, Master of the Rolls, and Dame Victoria
Sharp, President of the Queen’s Bench Division) on 5th September and their
judgment was delivered on 11th September: [2019] EWHC 2381 (QB). They
dismissed the claim on the ground that the issue was not justiciable. They granted a
“leap-frog” certificate so that the case could come directly to this court.

Page 10
26. This Court heard the appeals in Cherry and in Miller over 17th to 19th
September. In addition to the written and oral submissions of the principal parties,
we had written and oral submissions from the Lord Advocate, for the Scottish
Government; from the Counsel General for Wales, for the Welsh Government; from
Mr Raymond McCord, who has brought proceedings in Northern Ireland raising
various issues relating to Brexit, but has not been permitted to proceed to challenge
the lawfulness of the prorogation given that the Scottish and English challenges were
already well-advanced; and from Sir John Major, a former Prime Minister with first-
hand experience of prorogation. We have also received written submissions from
Baroness Chakrabarti, shadow Attorney General, for Her Majesty’s Opposition, and
from the Public Law Project. We are grateful to everyone for the speed with which
they have produced their submissions and all the other documents in the case. In
view of the grave constitutional importance of the matter, and the disagreement
between the courts in England and Wales and Scotland, we convened a panel of 11
Justices, the maximum number of serving Justices who are permitted to sit.

27. Both cases raise the same four issues, although there is some overlap between
the issues:

(1) Is the question of whether the Prime Minister’s advice to the Queen
was lawful justiciable in a court of law?

(2) If it is, by what standard is its lawfulness to be judged?

(3) By that standard, was it lawful?

(4) If it was not, what remedy should the court grant?

Is the question of whether the Prime Minister’s advice to the Queen was lawful
justiciable in a court of law?

28. Counsel for the Prime Minister in the Miller proceedings, and the Advocate
General as representing the United Kingdom Government in the Cherry
proceedings, have argued that the court should decline to consider the challenges
with which these appeals are concerned, on the basis that they do not raise any legal
question on which the courts can properly adjudicate: that is to say, that the matters
raised are not justiciable. Instead of the Prime Minister’s advice to Her Majesty
being reviewable by the courts, they argue that he is accountable only to Parliament.
They conclude that the courts should not enter the political arena but should respect
the separation of powers.

Page 11
29. As we have explained, that argument was rejected by the Inner House in the
Cherry proceedings, but was accepted by the Divisional Court in the Miller
proceedings. In the view of the Divisional Court, the Prime Minister’s decision that
Parliament should be prorogued at the time and for the duration chosen, and his
advice to Her Majesty to that effect, were inherently political in nature, and there
were no legal standards against which to judge their legitimacy.

30. Before considering the question of justiciability, there are four points that we
should make clear at the outset. First, the power to order the prorogation of
Parliament is a prerogative power: that is to say, a power recognised by the common
law and exercised by the Crown, in this instance by the sovereign in person, acting
on advice, in accordance with modern constitutional practice. It is not suggested in
these appeals that Her Majesty was other than obliged by constitutional convention
to accept that advice. In the circumstances, we express no view on that matter. That
situation does, however, place on the Prime Minister a constitutional responsibility,
as the only person with power to do so, to have regard to all relevant interests,
including the interests of Parliament.

31. Secondly, although the courts cannot decide political questions, the fact that
a legal dispute concerns the conduct of politicians, or arises from a matter of political
controversy, has never been sufficient reason for the courts to refuse to consider it.
As the Divisional Court observed in para 47 of its judgment, almost all important
decisions made by the executive have a political hue to them. Nevertheless, the
courts have exercised a supervisory jurisdiction over the decisions of the executive
for centuries. Many if not most of the constitutional cases in our legal history have
been concerned with politics in that sense.

32. Two examples will suffice to illustrate the point. The 17th century was a
period of turmoil over the relationship between the Stuart kings and Parliament,
which culminated in civil war. That political controversy did not deter the courts
from holding, in the Case of Proclamations (1611) 12 Co Rep 74, that an attempt to
alter the law of the land by the use of the Crown’s prerogative powers was unlawful.
The court concluded at p 76 that “the King hath no prerogative, but that which the
law of the land allows him”, indicating that the limits of prerogative powers were
set by law and were determined by the courts. The later 18th century was another
troubled period in our political history, when the Government was greatly concerned
about seditious publications. That did not deter the courts from holding, in Entick v
Carrington (1765) 19 State Tr 1029; 2 Wils KB 275, that the Secretary of State
could not order searches of private property without authority conferred by an Act
of Parliament or the common law.

33. Thirdly, the Prime Minister’s accountability to Parliament does not in itself
justify the conclusion that the courts have no legitimate role to play. That is so for
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two reasons. The first is that the effect of prorogation is to prevent the operation of
ministerial accountability to Parliament during the period when Parliament stands
prorogued. Indeed, if Parliament were to be prorogued with immediate effect, there
would be no possibility of the Prime Minister’s being held accountable by
Parliament until after a new session of Parliament had commenced, by which time
the Government’s purpose in having Parliament prorogued might have been
accomplished. In such circumstances, the most that Parliament could do would
amount to closing the stable door after the horse had bolted. The second reason is
that the courts have a duty to give effect to the law, irrespective of the minister’s
political accountability to Parliament. The fact that the minister is politically
accountable to Parliament does not mean that he is therefore immune from legal
accountability to the courts. As Lord Lloyd of Berwick stated in the Fire Brigades
Union case (R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Fire Brigades
Union [1995] 2 AC 513, 572-573):

“No court would ever depreciate or call in question ministerial

responsibility to Parliament. But as Professor Sir William
Wade points out in Wade and Forsyth, Administrative Law, 7th
ed (1994), p 34, ministerial responsibility is no substitute for
judicial review. In R v Inland Revenue Comrs, Ex p National
Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982]
AC 617, 644 Lord Diplock said:

‘It is not, in my view, a sufficient answer to say that

judicial review of the actions of officers or departments
of central government is unnecessary because they are
accountable to Parliament for the way in which they
carry out their functions. They are accountable to
Parliament for what they do so far as regards efficiency
and policy, and of that Parliament is the only judge; they
are responsible to a court of justice for the lawfulness of
what they do, and of that the court is the only judge.’”

34. Fourthly, if the issue before the court is justiciable, deciding it will not offend
against the separation of powers. As we have just indicated, the court will be
performing its proper function under our constitution. Indeed, by ensuring that the
Government does not use the power of prorogation unlawfully with the effect of
preventing Parliament from carrying out its proper functions, the court will be giving
effect to the separation of powers.

35. Having made those introductory points, we turn to the question whether the
issue raised by these appeals is justiciable. How is that question to be answered? In
the case of prerogative powers, it is necessary to distinguish between two different
Page 13
issues. The first is whether a prerogative power exists, and if it does exist, its extent.
The second is whether, granted that a prerogative power exists, and that it has been
exercised within its limits, the exercise of the power is open to legal challenge on
some other basis. The first of these issues undoubtedly lies within the jurisdiction of
the courts and is justiciable, as all the parties to these proceedings accept. If authority
is required, it can be found in the decision of the House of Lords in the case of
Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374. The
second of these issues, on the other hand, may raise questions of justiciability. The
question then is not whether the power exists, or whether a purported exercise of the
power was beyond its legal limits, but whether its exercise within its legal limits is
challengeable in the courts on the basis of one or more of the recognised grounds of
judicial review. In the Council of Civil Service Unions case, the House of Lords
concluded that the answer to that question would depend on the nature and subject
matter of the particular prerogative power being exercised. In that regard, Lord
Roskill mentioned at p 418 the dissolution of Parliament as one of a number of
powers whose exercise was in his view non-justiciable.

36. Counsel for the Prime Minister rely on that dictum in the present case, since
the dissolution of Parliament under the prerogative, as was possible until the
enactment of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, is in their submission analogous
to prorogation. They submit that prorogation is in any event another example of
what Lord Roskill described as “excluded categories”, and refer to later authority
which treated questions of “high policy” as forming another such category (R v
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Ex p Everett [1989] QB
811, 820). The court has heard careful and detailed submissions on this area of the
law, and has been referred to many authorities. It is, however, important to
understand that this argument only arises if the issue in these proceedings is properly
characterised as one concerning the lawfulness of the exercise of a prerogative
power within its lawful limits, rather than as one concerning the lawful limits of the
power and whether they have been exceeded. As we have explained, no question of
justiciability, whether by reason of subject matter or otherwise, can arise in relation
to whether the law recognises the existence of a prerogative power, or in relation to
its legal limits. Those are by definition questions of law. Under the separation of
powers, it is the function of the courts to determine them.

37. Before reaching a conclusion as to justiciability, the court therefore has to

determine whether the present case requires it to determine where a legal limit lies
in relation to the power to prorogue Parliament, and whether the Prime Minister’s
advice trespassed beyond that limit, or whether the present case concerns the
lawfulness of a particular exercise of the power within its legal limits. That question
is closely related to the identification of the standard by reference to which the
lawfulness of the Prime Minister’s advice is to be judged. It is to that matter that we
turn next.

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By what standard is the lawfulness of the advice to be judged?

38. In principle, if not always in practice, it is relatively straightforward to

determine the limits of a statutory power, since the power is defined by the text of
the statute. Since a prerogative power is not constituted by any document,
determining its limits is less straightforward. Nevertheless, every prerogative power
has its limits, and it is the function of the court to determine, when necessary, where
they lie. Since the power is recognised by the common law, and has to be compatible
with common law principles, those principles may illuminate where its boundaries
lie. In particular, the boundaries of a prerogative power relating to the operation of
Parliament are likely to be illuminated, and indeed determined, by the fundamental
principles of our constitutional law.

39. Although the United Kingdom does not have a single document entitled “The
Constitution”, it nevertheless possesses a Constitution, established over the course
of our history by common law, statutes, conventions and practice. Since it has not
been codified, it has developed pragmatically, and remains sufficiently flexible to
be capable of further development. Nevertheless, it includes numerous principles of
law, which are enforceable by the courts in the same way as other legal principles.
In giving them effect, the courts have the responsibility of upholding the values and
principles of our constitution and making them effective. It is their particular
responsibility to determine the legal limits of the powers conferred on each branch
of government, and to decide whether any exercise of power has transgressed those
limits. The courts cannot shirk that responsibility merely on the ground that the
question raised is political in tone or context.

40. The legal principles of the constitution are not confined to statutory rules, but
include constitutional principles developed by the common law. We have already
given two examples of such principles, namely that the law of the land cannot be
altered except by or in accordance with an Act of Parliament, and that the
Government cannot search private premises without lawful authority. Many more
examples could be given. Such principles are not confined to the protection of
individual rights, but include principles concerning the conduct of public bodies and
the relationships between them. For example, they include the principle that justice
must be administered in public (Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417), and the principle of
the separation of powers between the executive, Parliament and the courts (Ex p Fire
Brigades Union, pp 567-568). In their application to the exercise of governmental
powers, constitutional principles do not apply only to powers conferred by statute,
but also extend to prerogative powers. For example, they include the principle that
the executive cannot exercise prerogative powers so as to deprive people of their
property without the payment of compensation (Burmah Oil Co Ltd v Lord Advocate
[1965] AC 75).

Page 15
41. Two fundamental principles of our constitutional law are relevant to the
present case. The first is the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty: that laws
enacted by the Crown in Parliament are the supreme form of law in our legal system,
with which everyone, including the Government, must comply. However, the effect
which the courts have given to Parliamentary sovereignty is not confined to
recognising the status of the legislation enacted by the Crown in Parliament as our
highest form of law. Time and again, in a series of cases since the 17th century, the
courts have protected Parliamentary sovereignty from threats posed to it by the use
of prerogative powers, and in doing so have demonstrated that prerogative powers
are limited by the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty. To give only a few
examples, in the Case of Proclamations the court protected Parliamentary
sovereignty directly, by holding that prerogative powers could not be used to alter
the law of the land. Three centuries later, in the case of Attorney General v De
Keyser’s Royal Hotel Ltd [1920] AC 508, the court prevented the Government of
the day from seeking by indirect means to bypass Parliament, in circumventing a
statute through the use of the prerogative. More recently, in the Fire Brigades Union
case, the court again prevented the Government from rendering a statute nugatory
through recourse to the prerogative, and was not deflected by the fact that the
Government had failed to bring the statute into effect. As Lord Browne-Wilkinson
observed in that case at p 552, “the constitutional history of this country is the history
of the prerogative powers of the Crown being made subject to the overriding powers
of the democratically elected legislature as the sovereign body”.

42. The sovereignty of Parliament would, however, be undermined as the

foundational principle of our constitution if the executive could, through the use of
the prerogative, prevent Parliament from exercising its legislative authority for as
long as it pleased. That, however, would be the position if there was no legal limit
upon the power to prorogue Parliament (subject to a few exceptional circumstances
in which, under statute, Parliament can meet while it stands prorogued). An
unlimited power of prorogation would therefore be incompatible with the legal
principle of Parliamentary sovereignty.

43. In our view, it is no answer to these points to say, as counsel for the Prime
Minister argued, that the court should decline to consider extreme hypothetical
examples. The court has to address the argument of counsel for the Prime Minister
that there are no circumstances whatsoever in which it would be entitled to review
a decision that Parliament should be prorogued (or ministerial advice to that effect).
In addressing that argument, it is perfectly appropriate, and necessary, to consider
its implications. Nor is it any answer to say that there are practical constraints on the
length of time for which Parliament might stand prorogued, since the Government
would eventually need to raise money in order to fund public services, and would
for that purpose require Parliamentary authority, and would also require annual
legislation to maintain a standing army. Those practical constraints offer scant
reassurance.

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44. It must therefore follow, as a concomitant of Parliamentary sovereignty, that
the power to prorogue cannot be unlimited. Statutory requirements as to sittings of
Parliament have indeed been enacted from time to time, for example by the Statute
of 1362 (36 Edward III c 10), the Triennial Acts of 1640 and 1664, the Bill of Rights
1688, the Scottish Claim of Right 1689, the Meeting of Parliament Act 1694, and
most recently the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation etc) Act 2019, section 3.
Their existence confirms the necessity of a legal limit on the power to prorogue, but
they do not address the situation with which the present appeals are concerned.

45. On the other hand, Parliament does not remain permanently in session, and it
is undoubtedly lawful to prorogue Parliament notwithstanding the fact that, so long
as it stands prorogued, Parliament cannot enact laws. In modern practice, Parliament
is normally prorogued for only a short time. There can be no question of such a
prorogation being incompatible with Parliamentary sovereignty: its effect on
Parliament’s ability to exercise its legislative powers is relatively minor and
uncontroversial. How, then, is the limit upon the power to prorogue to be defined,
so as to make it compatible with the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty?

46. The same question arises in relation to a second constitutional principle, that
of Parliamentary accountability, described by Lord Carnwath in his judgment in the
first Miller case as no less fundamental to our constitution than Parliamentary
sovereignty (R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017]
UKSC 5; [2018] AC 61, para 249). As Lord Bingham of Cornhill said in the case of
Bobb v Manning [2006] UKPC 22, para 13, “the conduct of government by a Prime
Minister and Cabinet collectively responsible and accountable to Parliament lies at
the heart of Westminster democracy”. Ministers are accountable to Parliament
through such mechanisms as their duty to answer Parliamentary questions and to
appear before Parliamentary committees, and through Parliamentary scrutiny of the
delegated legislation which ministers make. By these means, the policies of the
executive are subjected to consideration by the representatives of the electorate, the
executive is required to report, explain and defend its actions, and citizens are
protected from the arbitrary exercise of executive power.

47. The principle of Parliamentary accountability has been invoked time and
again throughout the development of our constitutional and administrative law, as a
justification for judicial restraint as part of a constitutional separation of powers (see,
for example, R v Secretary of State for the Environment, Ex p Nottinghamshire
County Council [1986] AC 240, 250), and as an explanation for non-justiciability
(Mohammed (Serdar) v Ministry of Defence [2017] UKSC 1; [2017] AC 649, para
57). It was also an animating principle of some of the statutes mentioned in para 44,
as appears from their references to the redress of grievances. As we have mentioned,
its importance as a fundamental constitutional principle has also been recognised by
the courts.

Page 17
48. That principle is not placed in jeopardy if Parliament stands prorogued for
the short period which is customary, and as we have explained, Parliament does not
in any event expect to be in permanent session. But the longer that Parliament stands
prorogued, the greater the risk that responsible government may be replaced by
unaccountable government: the antithesis of the democratic model. So the same
question arises as in relation to Parliamentary sovereignty: what is the legal limit
upon the power to prorogue which makes it compatible with the ability of Parliament
to carry out its constitutional functions?

49. In answering that question, it is of some assistance to consider how the courts
have dealt with situations where the exercise of a power conferred by statute, rather
than one arising under the prerogative, was liable to affect the operation of a
constitutional principle. The approach which they have adopted has concentrated on
the effect of the exercise of the power upon the operation of the relevant
constitutional principle. Unless the terms of the statute indicate a contrary intention,
the courts have set a limit to the lawful exercise of the power by holding that the
extent to which the measure impedes or frustrates the operation of the relevant
principle must have a reasonable justification. That approach can be seen, for
example, in R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51; [2017] 3 WLR 409,
paras 80-82 and 88-89, where earlier authorities were discussed. A prerogative
power is, of course, different from a statutory power: since it is not derived from
statute, its limitations cannot be derived from a process of statutory interpretation.
However, a prerogative power is only effective to the extent that it is recognised by
the common law: as was said in the Case of Proclamations, “the King hath no
prerogative, but that which the law of the land allows him”. A prerogative power is
therefore limited by statute and the common law, including, in the present context,
the constitutional principles with which it would otherwise conflict.

50. For the purposes of the present case, therefore, the relevant limit upon the
power to prorogue can be expressed in this way: that a decision to prorogue
Parliament (or to advise the monarch to prorogue Parliament) will be unlawful if the
prorogation has the effect of frustrating or preventing, without reasonable
justification, the ability of Parliament to carry out its constitutional functions as a
legislature and as the body responsible for the supervision of the executive. In such
a situation, the court will intervene if the effect is sufficiently serious to justify such
an exceptional course.

51. That standard is one that can be applied in practice. The extent to which
prorogation frustrates or prevents Parliament’s ability to perform its legislative
functions and its supervision of the executive is a question of fact which presents no
greater difficulty than many other questions of fact which are routinely decided by
the courts. The court then has to decide whether the Prime Minister’s explanation
for advising that Parliament should be prorogued is a reasonable justification for a
prorogation having those effects. The Prime Minister’s wish to end one session of
Page 18
Parliament and to begin another will normally be enough in itself to justify the short
period of prorogation which has been normal in modern practice. It could only be in
unusual circumstances that any further justification might be necessary. Even in
such a case, when considering the justification put forward, the court would have to
bear in mind that the decision whether to advise the monarch to prorogue Parliament
falls within the area of responsibility of the Prime Minister, and that it may in some
circumstances involve a range of considerations, including matters of political
judgment. The court would therefore have to consider any justification that might
be advanced with sensitivity to the responsibilities and experience of the Prime
Minister, and with a corresponding degree of caution. Nevertheless, it is the court’s
responsibility to determine whether the Prime Minster has remained within the legal
limits of the power. If not, the final question will be whether the consequences are
sufficiently serious to call for the court’s intervention.

Conclusions on justiciability

52. Returning, then, to the justiciability of the question of whether the Prime
Minister’s advice to the Queen was lawful, we are firmly of the opinion that it is
justiciable. As we have explained, it is well established, and is accepted by counsel
for the Prime Minister, that the courts can rule on the extent of prerogative powers.
That is what the court will be doing in this case by applying the legal standard which
we have described. That standard is not concerned with the mode of exercise of the
prerogative power within its lawful limits. On the contrary, it is a standard which
determines the limits of the power, marking the boundary between the prerogative
on the one hand and the operation of the constitutional principles of the sovereignty
of Parliament and responsible government on the other hand. An issue which can be
resolved by the application of that standard is by definition one which concerns the
extent of the power to prorogue, and is therefore justiciable.

The alternative ground of challenge

53. In addition to challenging the Prime Minister’s advice on the basis of the
effect of the prorogation which he requested, Mrs Miller and Ms Cherry also seek
to challenge it on the basis of the Prime Minister’s motive in requesting it. As we
have explained, the Prime Minister had made clear his view that it was
advantageous, in his negotiations with the EU, for there to be a credible risk that the
United Kingdom might withdraw without an agreement unless acceptable terms
were offered. Since there was a majority in Parliament opposed to withdrawal
without an agreement, there was every possibility that Parliament might legislate to
prevent such an outcome. In those circumstances, it is alleged, his purpose in seeking
a prorogation of such length at that juncture was to prevent Parliament from
exercising its legislative functions, so far as was possible, until the negotiations had
been completed.
Page 19
54. That ground of challenge raises some different questions, in relation to
justiciability, from the ground based on the effects of prorogation on Parliament’s
ability to legislate and to scrutinise governmental action. But it is appropriate first
to decide whether the Prime Minister’s advice was lawful, considering the effects of
the prorogation requested and applying the standard which we have set out. It is only
if it was, that the justiciability of the alternative ground of challenge will need to be
considered.

Was the advice lawful?

55. Let us remind ourselves of the foundations of our constitution. We live in a

representative democracy. The House of Commons exists because the people have
elected its members. The Government is not directly elected by the people (unlike
the position in some other democracies). The Government exists because it has the
confidence of the House of Commons. It has no democratic legitimacy other than
that. This means that it is accountable to the House of Commons - and indeed to the
House of Lords - for its actions, remembering always that the actual task of
governing is for the executive and not for Parliament or the courts. The first
question, therefore, is whether the Prime Minister’s action had the effect of
frustrating or preventing the constitutional role of Parliament in holding the
Government to account.

56. The answer is that of course it did. This was not a normal prorogation in the
run-up to a Queen’s Speech. It prevented Parliament from carrying out its
constitutional role for five out of a possible eight weeks between the end of the
summer recess and exit day on the 31st October. Parliament might have decided to
go into recess for the party conferences during some of that period but, given the
extraordinary situation in which the United Kingdom finds itself, its members might
have thought that parliamentary scrutiny of government activity in the run-up to exit
day was more important and declined to do so, or at least they might have curtailed
the normal conference season recess because of that. Even if they had agreed to go
into recess for the usual three-week period, they would still have been able to
perform their function of holding the government to account. Prorogation means that
they cannot do that.

57. Such an interruption in the process of responsible government might not

matter in some circumstances. But the circumstances here were, as already
explained, quite exceptional. A fundamental change was due to take place in the
Constitution of the United Kingdom on 31st October 2019. Whether or not this is a
good thing is not for this or any other court to judge. The people have decided that.
But that Parliament, and in particular the House of Commons as the democratically
elected representatives of the people, has a right to have a voice in how that change
comes about is indisputable. And the House of Commons has already demonstrated,
Page 20
by its motions against leaving without an agreement and by the European Union
(Withdrawal) (No 2) Act 2019, that it does not support the Prime Minister on the
critical issue for his Government at this time and that it is especially important that
he be ready to face the House of Commons.

58. The next question is whether there is a reasonable justification for taking
action which had such an extreme effect upon the fundamentals of our democracy.
Of course, the Government must be accorded a great deal of latitude in making
decisions of this nature. We are not concerned with the Prime Minister’s motive in
doing what he did. We are concerned with whether there was a reason for him to do
it. It will be apparent from the documents quoted earlier that no reason was given
for closing down Parliament for five weeks. Everything was focussed on the need
for a new Queen’s Speech and the reasons for holding that in the week beginning
the 14th October rather than the previous week. But why did that need a prorogation
of five weeks?

59. The unchallenged evidence of Sir John Major is clear. The work on the
Queen’s Speech varies according to the size of the programme. But a typical time is
four to six days. Departments bid for the Bills they would like to have in the next
session. Government business managers meet to select the Bills to be included,
usually after discussion with the Prime Minister, and Cabinet is asked to endorse the
decisions. Drafting the speech itself does not take much time once the substance is
clear. Sir John’s evidence is that he has never known a Government to need as much
as five weeks to put together its legislative agenda.

60. Nor does the Memorandum from Nikki da Costa outlined in para 17 above
suggest that the Government needed five weeks to put together its legislative agenda.
The memorandum has much to say about a new session and Queen’s Speech but
nothing about why so long was needed to prepare for it. The only reason given for
starting so soon was that “wash up” could be concluded within a few days. But that
was totally to ignore whatever else Parliament might have wanted to do during the
four weeks it might normally have had before a prorogation. The proposal was
careful to ensure that there would be some Parliamentary time both before and after
the European Council meeting on 17th - 18th October. But it does not explain why
it was necessary to curtail what time there would otherwise have been for Brexit
related business. It does not discuss what Parliamentary time would be needed to
approve any new withdrawal agreement under section 13 of the European Union
(Withdrawal) Act 2018 and enact the necessary primary and delegated legislation.
It does not discuss the impact of prorogation on the special procedures for
scrutinising the delegated legislation necessary to make UK law ready for exit day
and achieve an orderly withdrawal with or without a withdrawal agreement, which
are laid down in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. Scrutiny committees
in both the House of Commons and the House of Lords play a vital role in this. There
is also consultation with the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly. Perhaps
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most tellingly of all, the memorandum does not address the competing merits of
going into recess and prorogation. It wrongly gives the impression that they are
much the same. The Prime Minister’s reaction was to describe the September sitting
as a “rigmarole”. Nowhere is there a hint that the Prime Minister, in giving advice
to Her Majesty, is more than simply the leader of the Government seeking to
promote its own policies; he has a constitutional responsibility, as we have explained
in para 30 above.

61. It is impossible for us to conclude, on the evidence which has been put before
us, that there was any reason - let alone a good reason - to advise Her Majesty to
prorogue Parliament for five weeks, from 9th or 12th September until 14th October.
We cannot speculate, in the absence of further evidence, upon what such reasons
might have been. It follows that the decision was unlawful.

Remedy

62. Mrs Miller asks us to make a declaration that the advice given to Her Majesty
was unlawful and we can certainly do that. The question is whether we should do
more than that, in order to make it crystal clear what the legal consequences of that
holding are. The Inner House did go further and declared, not only that the advice
was unlawful, but that “any prorogation which followed thereon, is unlawful and
thus null and of no effect”. The essential question is: is Parliament prorogued or is
it not?

63. The Government argues that we cannot answer that question, or declare the
prorogation null and of no effect, because to do so would be contrary to article 9 of
the Bill of Rights of 1688, an Act of the Parliament of England and Wales, or the
wider privileges of Parliament, relating to matters within its “exclusive cognisance”.
The prorogation itself, it is said, was “a proceeding in Parliament” which cannot be
impugned or questioned in any court. And reasoning back from that, neither can the
Order in Council which led to it.

64. Article 9 provides:

“That the Freedome of Speech and Debates or Proceedings in

Parlyament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any
Court or Place out of Parlyament.”

The equivalent provision in the Claim of Right of 1689, an Act of the Parliament of
Scotland, is this:

Page 22
 “That for redress of all greivances and for the amending
strenthneing and preserveing of the lawes Parliaments ought to
be frequently called and allowed to sit and the freedom of
speech and debate secured to the members.”

65. The first point to note is that these are Acts of Parliament. It is one of the
principal roles of the courts to interpret Acts of Parliament. A recent example of this
Court interpreting article 9 is R v Chaytor [2010] UKSC 52; [2011] 1 AC 684. The
case concerned the prosecution of several Members of Parliament for allegedly
making false expenses claims. They resisted this on the ground that those claims
were “proceedings in Parliament” which ought not to be “impeached or questioned”
in any court outside Parliament. An enlarged panel of nine Justices held
unanimously that MPs’ expenses claims were not “proceedings in Parliament” nor
were they in the exclusive cognisance of Parliament. There is a very full discussion
of the authorities in the judgments of Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers and Lord
Rodger of Earlsferry which need not be repeated here.

66. That case clearly establishes: (1) that it is for the court and not for Parliament
to determine the scope of Parliamentary privilege, whether under article 9 of the Bill
of Rights or matters within the “exclusive cognisance of Parliament”; (2) that the
principal matter to which article 9 is directed is “freedom of speech and debate in
the Houses of Parliament and in parliamentary committees. This is where the core
or essential business of Parliament takes place” (para 47). In considering whether
actions outside the Houses and committees are also covered, it is necessary to
consider the nature of their connection to those and whether denying the actions
privilege is likely to impact adversely on the core or essential business of Parliament;
(3) that “exclusive cognisance refers not simply to Parliament, but to the exclusive
right of each House to manage its own affairs without interference from the other or
from outside Parliament” (para 63); it was enjoyed by Parliament itself and not by
individual members and could be waived or relinquished; and extensive inroads had
been made into areas previously within exclusive cognisance.

67. Erskine May, Parliamentary Practice (25th 2019, para 13.12) is to similar
effect:

“The primary meaning of proceedings, as a technical

parliamentary term, which it had at least as early as the 17th
century, is some formal action, usually a decision, taken by the
House in its collective capacity. While business which involves
actions and decisions of the House are clearly proceedings,
debate is an intrinsic part of that process which is recognised
by its inclusion in the Formulation of article IX. An individual
member takes part in a proceeding usually by speech, but also
Page 23
 by various recognised forms of formal action, such as voting,
giving notice of a motion, or presenting a petition or report
from a committee, most of such actions being time-saving
substitutes for speaking.”

68. The prorogation itself takes place in the House of Lords and in the presence
of Members of both Houses. But it cannot sensibly be described as a “proceeding in
Parliament”. It is not a decision of either House of Parliament. Quite the contrary: it
is something which is imposed upon them from outside. It is not something upon
which the Members of Parliament can speak or vote. The Commissioners are not
acting in their capacity as members of the House of Lords but in their capacity as
Royal Commissioners carrying out the Queen’s bidding. They have no freedom of
speech. This is not the core or essential business of Parliament. Quite the contrary:
it brings that core or essential business of Parliament to an end.

69. This court is not, therefore, precluded by article 9 or by any wider

Parliamentary privilege from considering the validity of the prorogation itself. The
logical approach to that question is to start at the beginning, with the advice that led
to it. That advice was unlawful. It was outside the powers of the Prime Minister to
give it. This means that it was null and of no effect: see, if authority were needed, R
(UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51, para 119. It led to the Order in
Council which, being founded on unlawful advice, was likewise unlawful, null and
of no effect and should be quashed. This led to the actual prorogation, which was as
if the Commissioners had walked into Parliament with a blank piece of paper. It too
was unlawful, null and of no effect.

70. It follows that Parliament has not been prorogued and that this court should
make declarations to that effect. We have been told by counsel for the Prime
Minister that he will “take all necessary steps to comply with the terms of any
declaration made by the court” and we expect him to do so. However, it appears to
us that, as Parliament is not prorogued, it is for Parliament to decide what to do next.
There is no need for Parliament to be recalled under the Meeting of Parliament Act
1797. Nor has Parliament voted to adjourn or go into recess. Unless there is some
Parliamentary rule to the contrary of which we are unaware, the Speaker of the
House of Commons and the Lord Speaker can take immediate steps to enable each
House to meet as soon as possible to decide upon a way forward. That would, of
course, be a proceeding in Parliament which could not be called in question in this
or any other court.

71. Thus the Advocate General’s appeal in the case of Cherry is dismissed and
Mrs Miller’s appeal is allowed. The same declarations and orders should be made
in each case.

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