POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 1 FOR SEPTEMBER 11, 2019

Department of Education vs San Diego

December 21, 1989 | Cruz, J. | Right to Education

PETITIONER: DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) and

DIRECTOR OF CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT,

RESPONDENTS: ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-

CAPULONG, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, Branch 172

SUMMARY: The private respondent is a BS Zoology graduate of the University of the East.
Petitioner (DepEd) claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times.
When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of its rule
that – “A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3)
successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.” He
then went to the RTC of Valenzuela, to compel his admission to the test invoking his
constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education in his original petition for
mandamus. In an amended petition filed with leave of court, he squarely challenged the
constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The
additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection. The RTC judge declared
such rule as invalid and granted his petition.

SC reversed the ruling and upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to
limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence
and preparation for a medical education.

DOCTRINE: The right to quality education is not absolute, it may be regulated by the State.
The Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course
of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements.
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, (as part of academic freedom), he does
not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public
interest is involved;
It is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the
Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise.

Facts: Private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of BS
Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT 3 times and flunked it as many
times. When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the
basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the RTC of Valenzuela to compel his
admission to the test.

In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to academic
freedom and quality education. By agreement of the parties, the private respondent was
allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his
petition. In an amended petition filed with leave of court, he squarely challenged the
constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule.
The additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection.
Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the Constitution on academic freedom,
due process and equal protection.

Held: No. The Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to
limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their
competence and preparation for a medical education. Such legislation is a valid exercise
of police power by the State in regulating the right to education and securing of the health
and safety of the general community.

Ratio: VALIDITY OF THE EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER

Police power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and
(b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought
to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a
lawful subject and a lawful method.

The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power.
It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical
profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their
lives and health.

The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the
law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical
schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to
be doctors.

STATE MAY REGULATE THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION THROUGH ITS POLICE

POWER
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional
right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved;
and the closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the
responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated
or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will
best promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction.

The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a
guarantee of the Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his
preparation and promise. The private respondent has failed the NMAT five times. While
his persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless
love.

No depreciation is intended or made against the private respondent. It is stressed that a

person who does not qualify in the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any
work or occupation. The only inference is that he is a probably better, not for the medical
profession, but for another calling that has not excited his interest. In the former, he may
be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the latter, he is more likely to succeed and may even
be outstanding.

It is for the appropriate calling that he is entitled to quality education for the full harnessing
of his potentials and the sharpening of his latent talents toward what may even be a
brilliant future.

It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of
education by directing the student to the course for which he is best suited as determined
by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be "swamped with mediocrity," in the
words of Justice Holmes, not because we are lacking in intelligence but because we are
a nation of misfits.

NO VIOLATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION

A law does not have to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable
to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.

There is a substantial distinction exists between medical students and other students who
are not subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The medical profession directly
affects the very lives of the people, unlike other careers which, for this reason, do not
require more vigilant regulation. The accountant, for example, while belonging to an
equally respectable profession, does not hold the same delicate responsibility as that of
the physician and so need not be similarly treated.

There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are
admitted and others who have also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what
the equal protection requires is equality among equals.

VICTORIANO V. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS’ UNION

Plaintiff-Appellee: Benjamin Victoriano

Defendant-Appellant: Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union

SUMMARY: Victoriano was an employee of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. The company
imposed the mandatory membership in the Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union as a condition
of employment for all its permanent employees. Being a member of a Iglesia Ni Cristo –
a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor organization –
Victoriano presented his resignation to the Union. In turn, the Union asked the Company
to dismiss Victoriano from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the
Union as a member. Supreme Court held that R.A. No. 3350 is constitutional on all counts.
It must be pointed out that the free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to
contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter must, therefore, yield to the former.

DOCTRINE: The free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract

rights. In case of conflict, the latter must yield to the former.

FACTS: Victoriano was an employee of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. As such
employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union which had a closed
shop agreement with the Company that membership in the Union shall be required as a
condition of employment for all its permanent employees.

Prior to its amendment, Section 4(a)(4) of Republic Act No. 875 allows the employer to
require as a condition of employment membership in a labor organization, if such
organization is the representative of the employees. However, the provision was later
amended by the enactment of Republic Act No. 3350, which reads: … “but such
agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
members in any such labor organization”.

Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any
labor organization, Victoriano presented his resignation to the Union. In turn, the Union
asked the Company to dismiss Victoriano from the service in view of the fact that he was
resigning from the Union as a member. This prompted Victoriano to file an action to enjoin
the Company and the Union from dismissing him. The Union assails the constitutionality
of RA No. 3350, contending that it infringes on the fundamental right to form lawful
associations guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 3350 violates the Constitutional mandate to protect the
rights of workers and to promote their welfare notwithstanding the fact that it allows some
workers, by virtue of their religious beliefs, to opt out of Union security agreements.

RULING: The petition is without merit.

RATIO: R.A. No. 3350 is constitutional on all counts. It must be pointed out that the free
exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict,
the latter must, therefore, yield to the former.

The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and temporal, not spiritual or
religious or holy and eternal. It was intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing
the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, by averting that certain persons be
refused work, or be dismissed from work, or be dispossessed of their right to work and of
being impeded to pursue a modest means of livelihood, by reason of union security
agreements.
More so now in the [1987 and past in constitutions] [...] where it is mandated that "the
State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in
employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed and
regulate the relation between workers and employers.

We believe that in enacting Republic Act No. 3350, Congress acted consistently with the
spirit of the constitutional provision. It acted merely to relieve the exercise of religion, by
certain persons, of a burden that is imposed by union security agreements. It was
Congress itself that imposed that burden when it enacted the Industrial Peace Act
(Republic Act 875), and, certainly, Congress, if it so deems advisable, could take away
the same burden. It is certain that not every conscience can be accommodated by all the
laws of the land; but when general laws conflict with scruples of conscience, exemptions
ought to be granted unless some "compelling state interest" intervenes. In the instant
case, We see no such compelling state interest to withhold exemption.

ACCFA v CUGCO Digest

G.R. No. L-21484 November 29, 1969
Facts:
1. ACCFA, a government agency created under RA 821, as amended was reorganized and its
name changed to Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA) under the RA 3844 or Land Reform
Code. While ACCFA Supervisors' Association (ASA) and the ACCFA Workers' Association
(AWA), are labor organizations (the Unions) composed of the supervisors and the rank-and-
file employees in the ACCFA.
2. A CBA was agreed upon by labor unions (ASA and AWA) and ACCFA. The said CBA was
supposed to be effective on 1 July 1962. Due to non-implementation of the CBA the unions
held a strike. And 5 days later, the Unions, with its mother union, the Confederation of Unions
in Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), filed a complaint against ACCFA before
the CIR on ground of alleged acts of unfair labor practices; violation of the collective bargaining
agreement in order to discourage the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to
self-organization, discrimination against said members in the matter of promotions and refusal
to bargain.
3. ACCFA moved for a reconsideration but while the appeal was pending, RA 3844 was passed
which effectively turned ACCFA to ACA. Then, ASA and AWA petitioned that they obtain sole
bargaining rights with ACA. While this petition was not yet decided upon, EO 75 was also
passed which placed ACA under the Land Reform Project Administration. Notwithstanding the
latest legislation passed, the trial court and the appellate court ruled in favor of ASA and AWA.

ISSUE: W/N ACA is a government entity

RULING: YES.

It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land Reform Code was enacted and the various agencies,
the ACA among them, established to carry out its purposes. There can be no dispute as to the fact
that the land reform program contemplated in the said Code is beyond the capabilities of any private
enterprise to translate into reality. It is a purely governmental function, no less than, the establishment
and maintenance of public schools and public hospitals. And when, aside from the governmental
objectives of the ACA, geared as they are to the implementation of the land reform program of the
State, the law itself declares that the ACA is a government office, with the formulation of policies, plans
and programs vested no longer in a Board of Governors, as in the case of the ACCFA, but in the
National Land Reform Council, itself a government instrumentality; and that its personnel are subject
to Civil Service laws and to rules of standardization with respect to positions and salaries, any vestige
of doubt as to the governmental character of its functions disappears.

The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of
the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to
private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and
only "because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual
or group of individuals,"5continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within
activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing
social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards
a greater socialization of economic forces. Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed
adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the
promotion of social justice.

The Unions have no bargaining rights with ACA. EO 75 placed ACA under the LRPA and by virtue of
RA 3844 the implementation of the Land Reform Program of the government is a governmental
function NOT a proprietary function. Being such, ACA can no longer step down to deal privately with
said unions as it may have been doing when it was still ACCFA. However, the growing complexities
of modern society have rendered the classification of the governmental functions as unrealistic, if not
obsolete. Ministerial and governmental functions continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and
are absorbed within the activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it to
meet the increasing social challenges of the times and move towards a greater socialization of
economic forces.

Philippine Coconut Dessicators v. Phil Coconut Authority

Association of small Landowners v. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform

Petitioners:

G.R. No. 78742 - ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,

JUANITO D. GOMEZ, GERARDO B. ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR., BERNARDO M.
ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR B. CABRITO, ISIDRO T. GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO,
FAUSTO J. SALVA, REYNALDO G. ESTRADA, FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J.
CABE, TEODORO B. MADRIAGA, AUREA J. PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA,
FELICISIMA C. ARRESTO, CONSUELO M. MORALES, BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO,
CIRILA A. JOSE & NAPOLEON S. FERRER
G.R. No. 79310 - ARSENIO AL. ACUNA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO FERRARIS,
DENNIS JEREZA, HERMINIGILDO GUSTILO, PAULINO D. TOLENTINO and PLANTERS'
COMMITTEE, INC., Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental

G.R. No. 79744 - INOCENTES PABICO

G.R. No. 79777 - NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR.,

Respondents:

G.R. No. 78742 - HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM

G.R. No. 79310 - JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN
REFORM COUNCIL,

G.R. No. 79744 - HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF

AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. JOKER ARROYO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, and Messrs. SALVADOR TALENTO, JAIME ABOGADO,
CONRADO AVANCENA and ROBERTO TAAY

G.R. No. 79777 - HON. PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and LAND
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,

July 14, 1989 | Ponente: CRUZ, J.

FACTS : Cases have been consolidated because they involve common legal questions. They will
be subject to one common discussion and resolution.

G.R. No. 79777 - The petitioners are Nicolas Manaay and his wife who own a 9-hectare riceland
worked by four tenants and Augustin Hermano, Jr. who owns a 5-hectare riceland worked by four
tenants. They question the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 & 229, and R.A. No.
6657 since their tenants were declared full owners of the mentioned lands.The petitioners are
questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of powers,
due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be
taken for public use without just compensation.

G.R. No. 79310

● Landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental
and Planters’ Committee Inc., with 1400 planter-members, submitted a petition seeking to
prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.They contend that taking
must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally understood,
 i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O.
No. 229.
● Aug. 27, 1987 – A motion for intervention was filed by the National Federation of
Sugarcane Planters, which claim 20 000 members). It was granted by the court.
● Sept. 10, 1987 – A motion for intervention was filed by Manuel Barcelona, et al.,
representing coconut and riceland owners. It was granted by the court.

G.R. No. 79744

● Sept. 3 1986 – The petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding
under Operation Land Transfer accusing the then Secretary of DAR of violation of due
process and the requirement for just compensation. Certificates of Land Transfer were
issued to the private respondents who then refused to pay lease rentals. The petitioner is
asking for the recall and cancellation of these certificates.
● Dec. 24, 1986 – Petitioner claims his petition was denied without hearing.
● Feb. 17, 1987 – A motion for reconsideration was filed which had not been acted upon
when E.O. Nos. 228 & 229 were issued which rendered his motion moot.
● The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are violative of the constitutional
provision that no private property shall be taken without due process or just compensation.

G.R. No. 78742 - Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their
right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the
implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the President had the power to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos.
228 & 229
2. Whether or not the President had the legislative power for issuing the measures
3. Whether or not Proc. No. 131 conforms to the requirements of a valid appropriation as
specified in the Constitution
4. Whether or not Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated because they do not
provide for retention limits required by Article 13, Section 4 of the Constitution
5. Whether or not E.O. No. 229 violates constitutional requirement that a bill should only
have one subject, to be expressed in its title
6. Whether or not the writ of mandamus can issue to compel the performance of a
discretionary act, especially by a specific department of the government.
7. Whether this statute is an exercise of police power or the power of eminent domain
8. Whether or not the statutes are valid exercises of police power
9. Whether or not the equal protection clause was violated
 10. Whether or not the content and manner of the just compensation provided for in the
CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution
11. Whether or not there is contravention of a well- accepted principle of eminent domain by
divesting the landowner of his property even before actual payment to him in full of just
compensation

RULING:

1. YES. P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos during Martial Law has been sustained in Gonzales v.
Estrella. President Aquino is authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
Constitution to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 & 229.

2. YES. The said measures were issued before July 27, 1987, when the Congress was formally
convened and took over legislative power.

3. NO. Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure for that is not its principal purpose and
therefore is not required to conform to the requirements.

4. NO. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law.

5. NO. It is settled that the title of the bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will
suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the
title.

6. NO. The rule is that mandamus will lie to compel the discharge of the discretionary duty itself
but not to control the discretion to be exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue to require
action only but not specific action.

7. It is an exercise of the power of eminent domain because there is payment of just compensation
unlike in the exercise of police power wherein confiscation of property is not compensable.

8. YES. A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is a concurrence of the
lawful subject and the lawful method. As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been
laid down by the Constitution itself, we may say that the first requirement has been satisfied. What
remains to be examined is the validity of the method employed to achieve the constitutional goal.

9. NO. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a
different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties
must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a
substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those
who will not see.
10. NO. It is declared that although money is the traditional mode of payment, other modes of
payment shall be permitted as compensation. The court accepts the theory that payment of the just
compensation is not always required to be made fully in money, they find further that the
proportion of cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment, as
determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the
landowner. The other modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also
not unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or
assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount of just compensation.

(Court: We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue. The Court is as
acutely anxious as the rest of our people to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after the frustrations and deprivations
of our peasant masses during all these disappointing decades. We are aware that invalidation of the said section will result in the
nullification of the entire program, killing the farmer's hopes even as they approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of
discontent and dissent in the restless countryside. That is not in our view the intention of the Constitution, and that is not what we
shall decree today.)

11. NO. The CARP Law conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the
government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR
of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains
with the landowner.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:

1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED
against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions.
2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment
of compensation to their respective owners.
3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and
recognized.
4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall
enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein
prescribed.
5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without
pronouncement as to costs.

Philippine Long Distance Tel Co. v. NTC

Pamatong v. COMELEC

Valmonte v. Belmonte
 Legaspi v. CSC

Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission

No. L-72119

May 29, 1987

Facts: Petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi files for Mandamus to compel respondent Civil Service
Commission to release information on the civil service eligibilities of persons employed as
sanitarians (Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas) in the Health Department of Cebu City.

OSG contends that petitioner has no locus standing as he failed to show his actual interest.
The Court ruled however that the petition on mandamus is anchored upon the right of the
people for information on matters of public concern which is a public right.

1. The petitioner being a citizen (hence, part of the public) warrants standing in his
part; and

2. The State and its agents are mandated by the Constitution by virtue of Sec. 7 Article
III and Sec. 28, Article II.

Issue: WON respondent should release the information.

Held: Yes.

· The constitutional right to information on matters of public information is grounded on Sec.

7, Article III and Sec. 28, Article II of the 1987 Constitution. These are self-executory.

In the case at bar, the government agency Civil Service Commission does not have the
discretion to prohibit the access to information sought. It only has the authority to regulate
the manner of examination (e.g. ensuring that the records are not damaged or destroyed).

These constitutional guarantees, however, are not absolute as they are “subject to the
limitations as may be provided by law” (Art. III Sec. 7 2nd sentence). The information sought
must be not be exempted by law.
In the case at bar, the information is within the enumerations provided by law. Why/ How?

1. the information sought relates to a public office which can be considered as a legitimate
concern of citizens (public office as public trust);
2. Respondent failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the
petitioner’s right to know who are, and who are not civil service eligible; and
3. Civil service exams results are released in the public.

Ratio:

§ Government agencies such as the Civil Service Commission do not have the discretion in
refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern.

What is within the bounds of the agencies then? They still have the authority to regulate the
manner of examining public records.
-The authority to regulate the manner of examining public records does not
carry with it the power to prohibit.
-The Court provided a distinction between discretion/ prohibition and
authority to regulate.
o Refusal to discloseà only the Legislature may impose (Sec. 6, Article
III)
o Authority to regulate the manner of examinationà done by
government agency which has the custody of public records.

- In case of denial by the agency, it must prove that the information is not of
public concern or if it is of public concern, it is within the exemptions (e.g.
national security). Further, every denial is subject to review by courts.

§ Is the information sought by the petitioner considered “public concern/ interest”

within those mentioned in the articles? YES!
- The constitutional guarantees are not absolute as the law may exempt certain
types of information from public scrutiny such as those affecting national
security.
- There is no rigid test as the term “public concern/ interest” is broad. It is for
the courts to determine if the information falls within “public concern” or
“public interest.”

§ Legal historical background of the right to public information

· Right to information on matters of public concern first gained recognition
in the 1973 Constitution (Section 6 of Article IV-Bill of Rights).
 · This was retained by Article III Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution. Further,
such guarantee was enhanced with the adoption of Section 18, Article II
(Policy of Full Public Disclosure).

TAŇADA V. TUVERA

April 24, 1985 | Escolin, J. | Right to be Informed

PETITIONER: LORENZO M. TAŇADA

RESPONDENTS: HONORABLE JUAN C. TUVERA

SUMMARY: Taňada seek a writ of mandamus to compel Tuvera and other public
officials to publish in the OffIcial Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation
and administrative orders. However, respondents, countered that publication in the
Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws

DOCTRINE: All unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application,

and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

FACTS: Taňada seek a writ of mandamus to compel Tuvera and other public officials to
publish in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders. However, respondents, countered that publication in the Official
Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws
themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the
presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to
take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity.

ISSUE/s: Whether or not publication is not indispensable for the laws to take effect.

RULING: The Court ruled in the negative.

RATIO: Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. he conclusion is easily
reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important
legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the
Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations,
except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of
decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be
deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such
documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published
by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President
of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general
applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published.
...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate
notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they
shall have no binding force and effect.

Lantaco v. Llamas
Baldoza v. Dimaano
 Chavez v. PCGG

Chavez v. PCGG
December 9, 1998 | G.R. No. 130716

Petitioner: FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ

Respondents: PCGG and MAGTANGGOL GUNIGUNDO, (in his capacity as chairman of the PCGG)
Petitioner-in-intervention: GLORIA A. JOPSON, CELNAN A. JOPSON, SCARLET A. JOPSON, and TERESA
A. JOPSON

DOCTRINE
The Right to information is not limited to consummated transactions, it includes exploratory stage of the transaction.

FACTS
1. Francisco I. Chavez, as taxpayer, citizen and former government official who initiated the prosecution of
the Marcoses and their cronies, demands that PCGG make public any and all negotiations and
agreements pertaining to PCGG’s task of recovering the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth.
2. Chavez alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of “paramount public interest”. Hence, the
people in general have a right to know the transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the
government.
3. PCGG claim that Chavez’s action is premature, because there is no showing that he has asked the PCGG
to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements.
4. PCGG also claim that it may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms and
conditions of the Agreements have not become effective and binding.
5. Chavez invoked his right under:
a. “Sec. 7 [Article III]. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall
be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.”
ISSUE:
1. W/N PCGG may be compelled to disclose to the public the details of any agreement with the Marcoses.

DISPOSITION:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The General and Supplemental Agreements dated December 28, 1993,
which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby declared NULL AND VOID for being contrary to law and
the Constitution. Respondent PCGG, its officers and all government functionaries and officials who are or may be
directly or indirectly involved in the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their associates
are DIRECTED to disclose to the public the terms of any proposed compromise settlement, as well as the final
agreement, relating to such alleged ill-gotten wealth, in accordance with the discussions embodied in this Decision. No
pronouncement as to costs.

RULING & RATIO

YES
1. There are no specific laws prescribing the exact limitations within which the right may be exercised or
the correlative state duty may be obliged. However, the following are some of the recognized restrictions:
a. (1) national security matters and intelligence information,
b. (2) trade secrets and banking transactions,
c. (3) criminal matters, and
d. (4) other confidential information.
2. National Security Matters
 a. This jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding that there is a governmental privilege
against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other
national security matters. But where there is no need to protect such state secrets, the privilege
may not be invoked to withhold documents and other information, provided that they are
examined “in strict confidence” and given “scrupulous protection.”
3. The word “Transactions” in the Constitution, cover both steps leading to a contract, and already a
consummated contract.
a. Hence, it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government
representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have
decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth.

Macalintal v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 157013. July 10, 2003| AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. | SUFFRAGE ART. 2

PETITIONERS: ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL

RESPONDENTS: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his

official capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. EMILIA T. BONCODIN, Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management, Respondents

FACTS:

Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the following grounds,
among others:

1. That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be allowed to
participate in absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the
Philippines is void because it dispenses of the requirement that a voter must be a resident of the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he intends to vote for at least 6 months
immediately preceding the election;

2. That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim winning
candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for
president and vice-president, is unconstitutional because it violates the Constitution for it is
Congress which is empowered to do so.

ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintal’s arguments are correct.

HELD: No.

1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically reside in the
Philippines within the period required for non-absentee voters. Further, as understood in election
laws, domicile and resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of his domicile
(insofar as election laws is concerned). The domicile is the place where one has the intention to
return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the
Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines for purposes of being qualified as a voter
(absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he is not qualified
as an absentee voter.

2. The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of Congress to allow
COMELEC to include the proclamation of the winners in the vice presidential and presidential
race. To interpret it that way would mean that Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power.
The canvassing and proclamation of the presidential and vice presidential elections is still lodged
in Congress and was in no way transferred to the COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.

Rubi v. Provincial Board

US v. Pompeya

August 6, 1915| JOHNSON, J. | Public Order

PETITIONER: THE UNITED STATES

RESPONDENTS: SILVESTRE POMPEYA

SUMMARY:

The acting prosecuting attorney of the Province of Iloilo presented a complaint in the CFI
charging Silvestre Pompeya with violation of municipal ordinance on the subject of patrol
duty, Executive Order No. 1, series of 1914, based on section 40 (m) of the Municipal
Code.

DOCTRINE:

Police power of the state has been defined as the power of the government, inherent in
every sovereign, and cannot be limited; power vested in the legislature to make such laws
as they shall judge to be for the good of the state and its subjects; power to govern men
and things, extending to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all
persons, and the protection of all property within the state; authority to establish such
rules and regulations for the conduct of all persons as may be conducive to the public
interest. Defines police power as "the defenses, regulations, and domestic order of the
country, whereby the inhabitants of a state, like members of a well-governed family, are
bound to conform their general behaviour to the rules of propriety, good neighborhood,
and good manners, and to be decent, industrious, and inoffensive in their respective
stations. The police power of the state may be said to embrace the whole system of
internal regulation, by which the state seeks not only to preserve public order and to
prevent offenses against the state, but also to establish, for the intercourse of citizen with
citizen, those rules of good manners and good neighborhood, which are calculated to
prevent a conflict of rights, and to insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment of his own,
so far as is reasonably consistent, with a like enjoyment of the rights of others. Police
power of the state includes not only the public health and safety, but also the public
welfare, protection against impositions, and generally the public's best interest.

The police power of the state has been exercised in controlling and regulating private
business, even to the extent of the destruction of the property of private persons, when
the use of such property became a nuisance to the public health and convenience

FACTS:

1. Accused Pompeya did willfully, illegally, and criminally and without justifiable
motive fail to render service on patrol duty; an act performed in violation of the law.

2. For this violation the accused was sentenced to a fine of P2 and payment of the
costs of the trial, from which judgment said accused appealed to the CFI.

3. The defendant was arraigned and presented the demurrer on the ground that the
acts charged therein do not constitute a crime.

4. The municipal ordinance alleged to be violated is unconstitutional because it is

repugnant to the Organic Act of the Philippines, which guarantees the liberty of the
citizens.
5. Section 40 of Act No. 82 (the Municipal Code) relates to the power of municipal
councils. Act No. 1309 amends said section (section 40, paragraph "m") which reads as
follows: "(m) With the approval of the provincial governor, when a province or municipality
is infested with ladrones or outlaws (the municipal council is empowered):

"1. To authorize the municipal president to require able-bodied male residents of the
municipality, between the ages of eighteen and fifty years, to assist, for a period not
exceeding five days in any one month, in apprehending ladrones, robbers, and other
lawbreakers and suspicious characters, and to act as patrols for the protection of the
municipality, not exceeding one day in each week. The failure, refusal, or neglect of any
such able-bodied man to render promptly the service thus required shall be punishable
by a fine not exceeding one hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than three
months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court: Provided,
That nothing herein contained shall authorize the municipal president to require such
service of officers or men of the Army of Navy of the United States, civil employees of the
United States Government, officers and employees of the Insular Government, or the
officers or servants of companies or individuals engaged in the business of common
carriers on sea or land, or priests, ministers of the gospel, physicians, practicantes,
druggists or practicantes de farmacia, actually engaged in business, or lawyers when
actually engaged in court proceedings.".

ISSUE/s:

W/N the ordinance upon which complaint was based (paragraph "m" of section 40 of the
Municipal Code) which was adopted in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 1309 is
constitutional.

W/N the facts stated in the complaint are sufficient to show (a) a cause of action under
the said law; and (b) w/n said law is in violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill in
depriving citizens of their rights therein guaranteed.

RULING:

The court opined and held, that the power exercised under the provisions of Act No. 1309
falls within the police power of the state and that the state was fully authorized and justified
in conferring the same upon the municipalities of the Philippine Islands and that,
therefore, the provisions of said Act are constitutional and not in violation nor in derogation
of the rights of the persons affected thereby.

RATIO:

1. With reference to the first question presented by the appeal, relating to the
sufficiency of the complaint, it will be noted that Act No. 1309 authorized the municipal
governments to establish ordinances requiring (a) all able bodied male residents,
between the the ages of 18 and 55 [50], and (b) all householders, under certain
conditions, to do certain things.

2. It will also be noted that the law authorizing the president of the municipality to call
upon persons, imposes certain conditions as prerequisites: (1) The person called upon to
render such services must be an able-bodied male resident of the municipality; (2) he
must be between the ages of 18 and 55 [50], and (3) certain conditions must exist
requiring the services of such persons.

3. The right or power conferred upon the municipalities by Act No. 1309 falls within
the police power of the state (U.S .vs. Ling Su Fan, 10 Phil. Rep., 104.) Police power of
the state has been defined as the power of the government, inherent in every sovereign,
and cannot be limited; (License Cases, 5 How. (U.S.), 483). The power vested in the
legislature to make such laws as they shall judge to be for the good of the state and its
subjects. (Commonwealth vs. Alger, 7 Cush. (Mass.), 53, 85). The power to govern men
and things, extending to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all
persons, and the protection of all property within the state. (Thorpe vs. Rutland, etc., Co.,
27 Vt., 140, 149.) The authority to establish such rules and regulations for the conduct of
all persons as may be conducive to the public interest. (People vs. Budd., 117 N.Y., 1,
14; U.S., vs. Ling Su Fan, supra.) Blackstone, in his valuable commentaries on the
common laws, defines police power as "the defenses, regulations, and domestic order of
the country, whereby the inhabitants of a state, like members of a well-governed family,
are bound to conform their general behaviour to the rules of propriety, good
neighborhood, and good manners, and to be decent, industrious, and inoffensive in their
respective stations." (4 Blackstone's Co., 162.)

4. The police power of the state may be said to embrace the whole system of internal
regulation, by which the state seeks not only to preserve public order and to prevent
offenses against the state, but also to establish, for the intercourse of citizen with citizen,
those rules of good manners and good neighborhood, which are calculated to prevent a
conflict of rights, and to insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment of his own, so far as
is reasonably consistent, with a like enjoyment of the rights of others. Police power of the
state includes not only the public health and safety, but also the public welfare, protection
against impositions, and generally the public's best interest.
5. The police power of the state has been exercised in controlling and regulating
private business, even to the extent of the destruction of the property of private persons,
when the use of such property became a nuisance to the public health and convenience.
(Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wal (U.S.), 36 Minnesota vs. Barber, 136 U.S., 313; Powell
vs. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S., 678; Walling vs. People, 166 U.S., 446; U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan,
10 Phil. Rep., 104.)

AGUSTIN v. EDU

February 2, 1970 | Fernando, J. | Inherent Powers of the State -Public Safety;

Police Power
PETITIONER: LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN

RESPONDENTS: HON. ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation

Commissioner; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Minister of National
Defense; HON. ALFREDO L. JUINIO, in his capacity as Minister of Public Works,
Transportation and Communications; and HON: BALTAZAR AQUINO, in his
capacity as Minister of Public Highways.

SUMMARY: Petitioner Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is

assailing the validity of Letter of Instruction No. 229 which requires all motor vehicles
to have early warning devices particularly to equip them with a pair of reflectorized
triangular early warning devices. Agustin is arguing that this order is
unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars are
already equipped with blinking lights which is already enough to provide warning to
other motorists. And that the mandate to compel motorists to buy a set of
reflectorized early warning devices is redundant and would only make
manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires. The court ruled against petitioner.

DOCTRINE: Promote public safety and welfare in the exercise of Police Power.

FACTS: Petitioner Agustin assails the validity of the Letter of Instruction No. 229 which
requires an early warning device to be carried by users of motor vehicles as being
violative of the constitutional guarantee of due process and transgresses the fundamental
principle of non-delegation of legislative power.

Herein respondent Romeo Edu in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner

set forth the implementing rules and regulations of the said instruction.

Petitioner made known that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035,
already properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights
fore and aft, which could very well serve as an early warning device in case of the
emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended, as well as the
implementing rules and regulations in Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land
transportation Commission.”

Furthermore, he contends that the law is "one-sided, onerous and patently illegal and
immoral because [they] will make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the
expense of car owners who are compelled to buy a set of the so-called early warning
device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per set." are unlawful and unconstitutional and
contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and
confiscatory on the part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical alternative
road safety device, or a better substitute to the specified set of Early Warning Device
(EWD)."

This instruction, signed by President Marcos, aims to prevent accidents on streets and
highways, including expressways or limited access roads caused by the presence of
disabled, stalled or parked motor vehicles without appropriate early warning devices. The
hazards posed by these disabled vehicles are recognized by international bodies
concerned with traffic safety. The Philippines is a signatory of the 1968 Vienna
Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organizations and the
said Vienna Convention was ratified by the Philippine Government under PD 207.

ISSUE/s: WON the Letter of Instruction No. 229 is valid in view of the importance of
Public Safety– YES

RULING: SC dismissed the Petition and restraining order was lifted.

RATIO: Letter of Instruction No. 229 is valid because it pursued what was already
espoused in the case of Calalang v. Williams, where in it found nothing that is
objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was: “To promote safe transit upon,
and avoid obstruction on roads and streets designated as national roads . . .”

Moreover, the Letter of Instruction was issued in the exercise of the police power
which is “nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every
sovereignty.” Again, in the leading case of Calalang v. Williams, Justice Laurel identified
police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and
property could thus ‘be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order for the
general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.’ This doctrine was later reiterated
again in Primicias v. Fugoso which referred police power as ‘the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety,
and general welfare of the people.’ The concept was set forth in negative terms by
Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as ‘that inherent and plenary power
in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and
welfare of society.’

Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate
the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the
language of Justice Cardozo: ‘Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be
interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What are critical or urgent
changes with the time.’ The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and
far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and
imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend
thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the
enactment of such salutary measures calculated to communal peace, safety, good order,
and welfare.”

Dissenting: Teehankee

1. It is oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory to require owners of motor vehicles

with built-in and more effective and efficient E.W.D.'S.

2. Public necessity has yet to be shown.

3. The big financial burden to be imposed on all motorists is staggering.

4. No real effort has been made to show that there can be practical and less burdensome
alternative road safety devices for stalled vehicles than the prescribed E.W.D., such as the
common petroleum lamps "kinke" which can be placed just as effectively in front of stalled
vehicles on the highways; and

5. There is no imperative need for imposing such a bet requirement on all vehicles. In using
their power, they should have gotten rid of dilapidated trucks and vehicles first.

US v. Gomez Jesus

UNITED STATES v. DOMINADOR GOMEZ JESUS

August 4, 1915 | Johnson, J. | Police Power

PETITIONER: The United States

RESPONDENT: Dominador Gomez Jesus

SUMMARY: That some time prior to 28 August 1909, the defendant had been admitted, or had been licensed,
to practice medicine in the Philippine Islands. That some time prior to the said date, the defendant had been
accused, arrested, tried, and found guilty of a violation of the Opium Law. That in the month of August 1909,
the defendant was cited to appear before the “Board of Medical Examiners for the Philippine Islands,” to show
cause why his license to practice medicine should not be revoked, in accordance with the provisions of Section
8 of Act No. 310. That on the date set, the Board proceeded to make an investigation. That after the conclusion
of said investigation, the Board reached the conclusion (a) that the defendant had been guilty of an “offense
involving immoral or dishonorable conduct”, and (b) adopted a resolution revoking his license to practice
medicine. That later, and after the license of the defendant to practice medicine had been revoked, he did
practice medicine in the Philippine Islands for which he charged a fee and that said treating, operating, and
prescribing medicine for said various persons were not in cases of emergency, or in the administration of
family remedies. That the defendant is not a medical officer of the US Army, the US Navy, the US Marine
Hospital service, nor a physician or surgeon from other countries called in consultation, nor a medical student,
practicing medicine under the direct supervision of a preceptor who is a registered doctor of medicine. The
lower court found the defendant guilty and sentenced him to pay a fine of P200, with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of failure to pay the same or any part thereof, and to pay the costs. From that sentence the defendant
appealed.

DOCTRINE: Police Power of the State is so extensive and comprehensive.

FACTS:

That some time prior to 28 August 1909, the defendant had been admitted, or had been licensed, to practice medicine
in the Philippine Islands. That some time prior to the said date, the defendant had been accused, arrested, tried, and
found guilty of a violation of the Opium Law. That in the month of August 1909, the defendant was cited to appear
before the “Board of Medical Examiners for the Philippine Islands,” to show cause why his license to practice
medicine should not be revoked, in accordance with the provisions of Section 8 of Act No. 310. That on the date set,
the Board proceeded to make an investigation of the revocation of the license of the defendant to practice medicine,
based upon the fact that he had been theretofore convicted of an “offense involving immoral or dishonorable conduct”.
That after the conclusion of said investigation, the Board reached the conclusion (a) that the defendant had been guilty
of an “offense involving immoral or dishonorable conduct”, and (b) adopted a resolution revoking his license to
practice medicine. That defendant was duly notified of the action of said Board. That later, and after the license of
the defendant to practice medicine had been revoked, he did practice medicine in the Philippine Islands by treating,
operating upon, prescribing for the physical ailments of various persons, for which he charged a fee, and that said
treating, operating, and prescribing medicine for said various persons were not in cases of emergency, or in the
administration of family remedies. That the defendant is not a medical officer of the US Army, the US Navy, the US
Marine Hospital service, nor a physician or surgeon from other countries called in consultation, nor a medical student,
practicing medicine under the direct supervision of a preceptor who is a registered doctor of medicine. The lower
court found the defendant guilty as charged in the complaint and sentenced him to pay a fine of P200, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of failure to pay the same or any part thereof, and to pay the costs. From that sentence the
defendant appealed.
ISSUE:

WoN the State has the right to require those who desire to practice medicine and surgery, etc., certain standards of
morality and general and special scholarship, as prerequisite to practice said profession.

RULING: SC affirmed the sentence of the lower court, with costs.

RATIO:

The power of the state is generally denominated the police power. It has been held that the state cannot be deprived
of its right to exercise this power. The police power and the right to exercise it constitute the very foundation, or at
least one of the cornerstones of the state. For the state to deprive itself or permit itself to be deprived of the right to
enact laws to promote the general prosperity and welfare of its inhabitants, and promote public health, public morals,
and public safety, would be to destroy the very public morals. The people themselves cannot do it, much less their
servants. Governments are organized with a view to the preservation of these things. They cannot deprive themselves
of the power to provide for them.

In order to enforce the police power of the state, it may under, under certain conditions, become necessary to deprive
its citizens of property and of a right providing for the continuance of property, when the property of the exercise of
the right may tend to destroy the public health, the public morals, the public safety, and the general welfare and
prosperity of its inhabitants. The power is called the police power of the state. The police power is so extensive and
so comprehensive that the courts have refused to give it an exact definition; neither have they attempted to define its
limitations. Upon the police power of the state depends the security of social order, the life and health of the citizens,
the comfort of an existence in a thickly populated community, the employment of private and social life, and the
beneficial use of property. It extends to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons and
the protection of all property within the state. Persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens
in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state. This power, or the right to exercise it, as
need may require, cannot be bargained away by the state. It is within the power of the legislature to prescribe the
qualifications for the practice of professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public
morals, and the public safety, and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such
right altogether. The practice of medicine and surgery is a vocation which nearly concerns the comfort, health, and
life of every person in the land. The requirement of the Philippine Legislature that those who may engage in such
professions shall be possessed of both knowledge and skill before entering the same is no new principle of law. It is
an exercise of the right of the state, under police power. No one has a right to practice medicine without having the
necessary qualifications of learning and skill; and the statute only requires that whoever assumes, by offering the
community his services as a physician, that he possesses such learning and skill, shall present evidence of it by a
certificate or license from a body designated by the state as competent to judge his qualifications.

Ermita-Malate Motel and Motel Operators Assn. v. City Mayor