473987

Administration & SocietyRoman and Miller

© 2013 SAGE Publications
AAS46710.1177/0095399712473987

Article
Administration & Society

Building Social
2014, V
  ol. 46(7) 775­–795
© 2013 SAGE Publications
DOI: 10.1177/0095399712473987
Cohesion: Family, aas.sagepub.com

Friends, and Corruption

Alexandru V. Roman1 and Hugh T. Miller1

Abstract
While material gain continues to be a leading motivator for corrupt acts,
this study shows that social status and kinship responsibilities should also
be considered possible precursors to corruption. This finding has important
implications for constructing an appropriate understanding of corruption,
designing anticorruption policies, and achieving ethical governance in devel-
oping democracies.

Keywords
public corruption, corrupt behavior, Eastern Europe, networks of association,
kinship

Domestic and global governance appears to be suffering from a new wave of

unethical behavior (Menzel, 2009). Despite the earnest efforts of govern-
ments and academics to understand and curb corruption, there has been lim-
ited meaningful progress (Doig, 2011). The majority of the theoretical and
administrative failures in dealing with corruption, according to Williams
(2000), can be linked to the difficulties of explaining corruption and the com-
plexity of its dynamics. Oversimplified stereotypical assumptions about the
“blameworthy other” obstruct efforts to understand the phenomenon and to
generate practical solutions (Haller & Shore, 2005).
1
Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, USA

Corresponding Author:
Alexandru V. Roman, School of Public Administration, Florida Atlantic University, 777 Glades
Road, Boca Raton, FL 33431, USA.
Email: [email protected]
776 Administration & Society 46(7)

In the present research, we studied in detail 28 Moldovan corruption cases

from official investigation files and conducted 33 interviews with knowl-
edgeable informants. Moldova is commonly known as one of the most cor-
rupt countries in Europe.1 Our research goal was not to point fingers at
corrupt officials but to determine the manner in which public officials become
corrupt. Of particular interest were the motivational constructs behind the
corrupt acts and the role of cultural and social environments.

Studying Corruption
The study of corruption is haunted by myriad theoretical and contextual dif-
ficulties (Williams, 2000). For example, an ineffective police department can
be both a cause and a consequence of corruption. Jain (1998, 2001) argues
that the fragmentation in the present body of literature on corruption is pri-
marily due to the numerous diverging definitions and understandings associ-
ated with the issue. Alemann (2004) proposes that corruption exists at least
in five dimensions: social decline, deviant behavior, logic of exchange, a
system of measurable perceptions, and “shadow politics.” Pardo (2004)
notes that “in any given society, corruption is a changing phenomenon, some
of its aspects and received morality are culturally specific and its conceptu-
alization is affected by personal interest, cultural values and socio-economic
status” (p. 2). In this sense, Heidenheimer (2004) identifies three social per-
ceptions of corruption—white, gray, and black. White corruption refers to
corrupt acts that are socially accepted whereas black corruption is socially
unacceptable.
Rose-Ackerman (1999), Johnston (2001), and Alemann (2004) each note
that the definitions of corruption are evolving over time, and also assert that
the debate over defining corruption is expected to intensify in the future. This
does not mean that defining corruption is a hopeless endeavor. It simply sug-
gests that the definition of corruption should avoid naive oversimplifications
and should be constructed with room for contextual sensitivity. For the pur-
poses of this study, we understand public corruption as, per Huberts and
Nelen (2005), an act (or failure to act) as a result of receiving personal
rewards from interested outside parties. de Graaf and Huberts (2008) note
two important elements of this definition. First, for an act to be deemed cor-
rupt, an outside interest should be present. That is, if the public official acts
or fails to act, he or she is doing so because the behavior benefits someone
else. The lack of an outside interest renders the act as fraud, theft, or unethical
behavior, but not as corruption. The presence of a clear personal award or
benefit, which would otherwise fall outside the terms of employment,
Roman and Miller 777

delineates an act as corrupt. Second, personal rewards refer to nonmonetary

rewards as well. An act can still be considered corrupt even if there is no
financial bribe involved. The benefits sought by the public official might not
be monetary or might not even be immediate. This dimension is especially
important in terms of Eastern European cultures, where bargaining, personal
favors, blood relationships, and gift giving are a part of everyday social life.
We are open to the possibility that strictly personal benefits may be more
characteristic of thinking in Western individualistic societies.
To study corruption in developing democracies in Eastern Europe, there
are two additional factors that need to be considered. First, Barsukova
(2009) regards social practices of bargaining, giving gifts, and helping
members in social networks as inseparable from corruption. In East
European cultures, there is a thin line between these relational practices and
corrupt acts. Second, significant though weakly monitored governmental
economic activity along with large public procurement outlays create a
favorable environment for development of corruption (Acemoglu &
Verdier, 2000; Kopits & Craig, 1998; Markovska & Isaeva, 2007; Thai,
2008). It is important to note that Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Fijnaut and
Huberts (2002), Akçay (2006), and de Graaf and Huberts (2008) distinguish
between corruption in low-income countries and high-income countries; in
lower income countries, they claim, there is a higher probability of devel-
oping corrupt environments.
From survey research, Spinei, Carasciuc, Obreia, and Lazari (2008) deter-
mined that Moldovan households perceived corruption as the second biggest
obstacle for business and the third most difficult problem faced by the coun-
try. About 60% of households and businesses interviewed considered that
poverty at the national level is due to corruption and not the other way around
(Spinei et al., 2008, p. 12). Moldovans believe that the top three reasons for
increased corruption are low salaries, lack of prosecution of corrupt officials,
and the deficit of genuine attention and interest from the government in solv-
ing the issue. The same study identified medical institutions (68.9%), police
(67.1%), and education institutions (63.7%) as the top three areas where
bribes were demanded most often. Customs offices, prosecution institutions,
and courts followed closely behind. To fulfill administrative needs or solve a
problem that involves public officials, the three key corrupt means used by
businesses were identified as financial bribes (60.6%), kinship or other type
of relations (22.3%), and gifts (14.4%). To achieve their own corrupt ends,
household used bribes (41.6%), kinship or other relations (41.8%), and gifts
(12.4%; Spinei et al., 2008). Furthermore, 53% of businesses and 39% of
households claimed to have paid bribes and 81% of businesses and 76% of
778 Administration & Society 46(7)

households declared themselves willing to pay if it is needed. Also, 73.6% of

businesses and 68.3% of households believe that it is easier to get something
done by making use of unofficial means (Spinei et al., 2008).

Research Method and Data

Research Techniques

Using a qualitative approach similar to that of de Graaf and Huberts (2008)

who studied 10 cases, we studied in-depth 28 corruption cases involving
public officials. In addition, we conducted 33 interviews with knowledgeable
informants. Comments were annotated to accommodate unexpected insights
garnered in the interviews. Personal dimensions of the corrupt public offi-
cials were determined through the analysis of interrogation records, court
transcripts, and on-file descriptions of coworkers and investigators. When
available, we also listened to or watched recordings on the case.

Detailed Description of the Data

The case data were from the criminal and public records made available by
the Supreme Court of Justice of Republic of Moldova and by the Center for
Combating Economic Crimes and Corruption. The two institutions are the
leading national entities in the anticorruption initiatives, investigation, and
prosecution. Thirty closed cases from 2003 to 2009 were made available to
us. All the cases had received a decision from the Supreme Court of
Justice—the suspects were all convicted. Due to legal, privacy, and security
concerns, no active cases were made available. From the 30 cases, 8 were
found to be insufficiently complete or did not present the minimum informa-
tion to be able to reconstruct the needed profile of the public official and so
were not included in the study. Of the 22 remaining files, 6 were cases where
two public officials were found to be engaged in corrupt activities. Given
that each suspect was examined in detail in the file, each individual was
treated as a separate case, bringing the total to 28.
Each file contained detailed information on the operational investigations
and completions of the arrests, descriptions of reasons for undertaking the
investigations, profiles of the suspects, and declarations of the corrupt offi-
cials (speaking while still classified as suspects) and witnesses. Sometimes
files also contained audiotapes, recorded phone conversations, and/or video
recordings. Public sources such as newspaper archives and Internet resources
were helpful only in a limited number of cases.
Roman and Miller 779

Case files were one source of data; interviews with informants were
another source. To capture the cultural dimensions of corruption and to gar-
ner background for the cases, 33 interviews were conducted. There was no
specific reason for conducting this number of interviews. Interviewing ceased
when we believed that a theoretical saturation had been achieved due to the
diminished marginal utility of each successive interview in generating new
information, insights, or themes. Of the 33 informants, 5 were business own-
ers, 4 were anticorruption agencies’ employees, 3 were former employees of
anticorruption agencies, 5 were fiscal/judicial/custom employees, 8 were
journalists, and 8 were public officials not directly related to fiscal, judicial,
custom, or anticorruption entities.
Trust between the researcher and the informant was key to gathering use-
ful information. Given the sensitivity of the issues, the interviews were struc-
tured such that the respondents portrayed their social perceptions and
discussed specifics only if they felt comfortable doing so. Interviewees were
selected using a snowball sampling method. Several months prior to the pos-
sible interview, candidates were contacted about their willingness to partici-
pate. If they accepted, they were asked to refer other potentially willing
participants. Of great importance is the fact that due to the sensitivity of the
topic, many would talk about corruption in detail only if they knew the
researcher through a third party. Trust and familiarity with the interviewer,
even if through a third person, were critical in the interviewees’ acceptance
rate and in the authenticity of the discussion and storytelling. It was common
for the respondents to express the desire to take a glimpse at the researcher’s
notes at the conclusion of the interviews, even if they were enthusiastic and
open during the discussion. The requests were correlated with the amount of
notes the researcher was taking and with the degree of trust the respondent
expressed. The more the notes and the lesser the trust, the higher the probabil-
ity of the interviewee asking to examine the notes.
In the course of the investigation, it became apparent that the cases made
available to us might have been biased due to prosecution practices. During
the initial stages of case analysis, it became obvious that of the 28 cases being
studied, none could be classified as “elite” or “political” corruption cases;
and perhaps only 2 cases could have been labeled as “important.” This real-
ization contrasted sharply with what some of the respondents were suggest-
ing. One of the high-ranking officials, during the interview attempted to
explain the discrepancy:

The ones whose files you are looking through represent the ones who
simply did not have enough money to get the accusations dismissed.
780 Administration & Society 46(7)

The anticorruption guys need to show that they are working. That is
why most of your cases are small . . . I will tell you for a fact that one
year off your sentence is 5,000 Euros. So if you are facing a three-year
sentence you’ll have to pay 15,000 Euros to get it dismissed. There will
be a price difference depending on who you will approach. Some just
don’t have that kind of money.

This raises the possibility that the corruption cases that wind up being
investigated are those that fall outside very powerful networks. If so, it would
be more than ironic that in certain ways, the agencies that are supposed to
combat corruption could be the most corrupt. Moreover, several interview
respondents pointed out that a large number of suspected corruption cases
never make it to trial. Among them, the majority are politics-related cases,
whose resolution can drag on for years or they would be eventually dropped
due to a supposed lack of evidence. One investigator claimed that one of his
colleagues lost his job because he initiated an investigation of a powerful
individual. According to the official, there is an unwritten code of “whom
you can and whom you cannot touch.” Thus, within the Eastern context, the
predominance in terms of prosecution record of small corruption cases in
which low-ranking bureaucrats are involved raises the possibility that powerful—
and corrupt—networks dominate the countries.

Descriptive Analysis of Case Files

Table 1 provides a detailed breakdown of the 28 cases that qualified for the
study and the summary of the coding process. In 14 cases, the corrupt official
was employed by the police or judicial departments; in 3 cases, by the cus-
toms or fiscal authorities; in 6 instances, the official had an administrative/
public service position; and in the remaining 5 instances, the official was
employed by the public education system. Of the 28 officials, 23 were males
and 5 were females. In 1 of the 6 two-suspects cases, the officials were hus-
band and wife, and in another, a father and son. In 12 of the cases, the corrupt
official was 30 years old or younger at the moment of committing the corrupt
act. In 12 of the studied cases, there was no bribe present. From the 16 cases
in which bribes were present, in 10 cases, the bribe was shared with or
intended for someone else in the corrupt individual’s social network.
The implications of the corrupt acts were coded in Table 1 as follows: if
bribes or the financial impact of the action were easily identifiable, then the
severity of the act was categorized according to the financial implications.
Any bribe or favor that was valued at less than US$1,000 was coded as a low
 Table 1. Refined Grid of Key Variables for 28 Cases.
First accusation/ Bribe Financial/favor
Year Gender Age Position/department/area criminal offense presence implications Motivator Education

 1 2008 Male 38 Police/judicial Yes Yes Low Financial University degree

 2 2008 Female 56 Education Yes Yes Low Financial University degree
 3 2003 Male 39 Police/judicial Yes Yes High Financial University degree
 4 2005 Female 25 Customs/fiscal Yes Yes Low Financial University degree
 5 2005 Male 25 Police/judicial No Yes Medium Financial High school degree
 6 2008 Male 60 Administration/services Yes Yes High Financial University degree
 7 2008 Male 30 Administration/services Yes Yes High Financial University degree
 8 2008 Male 28 Police/judicial Yes Yes Medium Financial University degree
 9 2002 Male 27 Administration/service Yes No High Financial University degree
10 2008 Male 53 Education No Yes High Financial University degree
11 2006 Male 24 Police/judicial No Yes Low Financial University degree
12 2007 Male 26 Police/judicial No Yes Low Financial University degree
13 2002 Female 26 Administration/service Yes No High Financial University degree
14 2003 Female 51 Police/judicial Yes No High Kinship High school degree
15 2008 Female 46 Education No Yes Low Kinship University degree
16 2007 Male 34 Police/judicial Yes No Medium Kinship University degree
17 2006 Male 48 Administration/service No No Low Kinship High school degree
18 2007 Male 54 Education No No Low Kinship University degree
19 2007 Male 53 Education No No Low Kinship University degree
20 2006 Male 35 Customs/fiscal Yes Yes Low Kinship University degree
21 2008 Male 54 Police/judicial Yes No Low Kinship University degree
22 2008 Male 26 Police/judicial Yes No High Kinship University degree
23 2005 Male 28 Police/judicial No No Low Kinship University degree
24 2009 Male 29 Customs/fiscal No Yes Low Status University degree
25 2008 Male 26 Police/judicial No No High Status University degree
26 2004 Male 55 Police/judicial Yes Yes Low Status High school degree
27 2004 Male 43 Police/judicial Yes Yes Low Status High school degree
28 2007 Male 52 Administration/service Yes No Low Status University degree

781
782 Administration & Society 46(7)

impact, US$1,001 to US$5,000 medium, and US$5,001 and above as high

impact. In cases in which a bribe was missing and clear financial implications
of the act were hard to generate, we coded attempts to nullify punishments for
crimes (e.g., rape, theft) as high impact, while cases involving routine favors
and preferences to relatives as low to medium impact.
Taken together, the results of document analysis indicate that the percep-
tions, acceptance, and demands for corruption are linked to financial, kin-
ship, and status concerns. This is consistent with some previous academic
accounts that delineated cultural and social contexts as critical for under-
standing corruption in postcommunist democracies (Barsukova, 2009; Earle,
2000; Grødeland, 2010; Sajo, 2003; Tumarkin, 2000). The findings also sup-
port Ones and Connelly’s (2008) conclusion (using Hofstede’s, 1980, 2001,
cultural dimensions) that national personality may have consequential impli-
cations with respect to corruption.
Importantly, the data suggest that the presence of a bribe does not neces-
sarily implicate material gain as the motivation for the corrupt act. Gift giv-
ing is a strong tradition within the context of Eastern/postcommunist
cultures. Thus, even if the public official would undertake the corrupt act out
of kinship concerns, the benefiting third party would feel obligated to show
gratitude through a gift or financial offers. It was not unusual for the corrupt
official to complete the corrupt act due to kinship or status reasons while
soliciting a bribe simply to pay off another official within the network.
However, on two occasions, there was no bribe involved though the motiva-
tor was financial in origin. The corrupt officials were aiming for long-term
financial benefits by taking actions that would benefit a third party in the
long run. In case of a successful arrangement, the officials would get a com-
mission out of the third party’s future profits. Thus, the presence of a bribe
is neither sufficient nor necessary for an act to be motivated by material
considerations.

Heuristic Findings
The case analysis has yielded five propositions with respect to the correlates
of corruption in Moldova. Knowing the extent to which these propositions
are generalizable requires further research, but we would posit the following
propositions as worthy of further scholarly attention:

1. Kinship associations trump financial interests most of the time.

2. Citizens do not believe that the system has the capacity to function
properly.
Roman and Miller 783

3. Corrupt behavior is rarely an outcome of individual decision mak-

ing; it is rather a byproduct of the larger social context/system.
4. Holding public office implies “ownership” of the position, to which
certain perquisites are attached.
5. There are high levels of trust among corrupt public officials.

The next section will discuss each of the five propositions in more detail.

Discussion

1. Kinship associations trump financial interests most of the time.

This finding contradicts most prior literature, which typically assumes that
the nature of corruption in developing and poor countries is primarily moti-
vated by material gain (de Graaf & Huberts, 2008). Driven by the assumption
that agents are rational, it is expected that better economic situations would
lead to less corruption (Fishman & Gatti, 2002; Forgues-Puccio & Blackburn,
2010; Gundlach & Paldam, 2009; Paldam, 2001; Rauch & Evans, 2000;
Treisman, 2000). Instead, with higher income and improved economic devel-
opments, the manifestations of corruption may well change, but embedded-
ness of corruption in social relations does not.
Given that more than 50% of the cases in our data set were not motivated
by material gain, it is difficult to uphold the assumption that corruption is
primarily driven by poverty. In only 13 cases was the motivator material gain.
In 6 out of the 13 cases, material gain was coded as high. However, in none
of these cases did the amount at stake exceed US$15,000. In 4 cases, the
financial reward was less than US$250. Meanwhile, kinship relations and
family pressure motivated 10 of the corrupt acts. Status considerations were
the motives behind 5 corruption cases.
In eight of the cases when corruption was kinship-driven, a dominant
theme was the inability to refuse blood relatives. In one of the files, the cor-
rupt official was quoted saying “I could not refuse him; he is my cumătru [a
Romanian term].” A cumătru is someone who becomes a relative either by
blood relation or through receiving the denomination through associations
built by religious customs. From here arose the term cumătrism. Such rela-
tionships are traditionally established for the sole purpose of “having some-
one there.” For example, many young couples would like to become
associated with someone who is already successful and has established a cer-
tain area of influence. This type of an association would allow a young
784 Administration & Society 46(7)

couple to possibly tap into the resources of the association network at some
point in the future. The new relationship, however, also obligates the couple
to be responsive to the cumătru’s suggestions and demands. Such a web of
relations becomes essential to developing a career or getting something done
and will be established within relatively similar income and social levels.
Rarely do individuals within higher socioeconomic status accept entering
into such associations with others who are not part of their approximate status
network. Both parties in the relationship need to feel that they have some-
thing to gain by initiating it.
Status and kinship concerns seem to be important to the process of the pub-
lic official becoming corrupt. In the five cases motivated by status concerns, the
public officials explained their acts as a consequence of the power to undertake
those acts and the desire to make use of their ability to exert influence. In
instances when bribes were present, the accused regularly were quoted in their
files as interpreting their ability “to dictate” bribes as proof of their social sta-
tus. They took pride in the fact that outside parties would approach them and
ask for favors. The interviews suggested that kinship might be even more pow-
erful than material gains in fostering corruption. As one of the interviewees
stated, “Everyone has a cumătru somewhere. Before you know it . . . you can’t
get anything done without going through a cumătru of a cumătru.”
Most of the officials did not think they were doing anything wrong. Only
in three cases did the officials express the concern that one day they might
have to face charges. Such responses are consistent with the prior research
reports (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Ermann & Lundman, 2002; Grødeland,
2010; Spinei et al., 2008). Corrupt officials denied that they were responsible,
or that they had hurt anyone. Within this theme, there were two dominant
tendencies: (a) the officials thought that there was nothing wrong with what
they did because everyone does it or expects it; they were just the ones who
got caught and (b) the amount involved was trivial and they were simply
“helping to get the job done, push something through.”

2. Corruption is accepted as both “bad” and “necessary.” Citizens

do not believe that the system has the capacity to function prop-
erly; thus, they are willing to bribe to get what they need; yet,
citizens do not support the system because they believe it is too
corrupt.

For Moldova, like for many other members of the communist bloc, the fall
of the Soviet Union led to a chaotic transition toward a market economy.
Within this environment, the individuals who were charismatic, motivated,
Roman and Miller 785

ambitious, and assertive proved to be successful. They would end up in state

agencies, which remain a direct route to influence and financial means.
Given the cumbersome bureaucratic apparatus, these types of individuals
found a niche by getting things done in a timely manner. Within this context,
the line between what is appropriate and what is not becomes thin, as indi-
cated by a respondent in one of the interviews:

Current public official (C.P.O.):If you are a business and you need
something done, it could take you 6 months. You will need to stop
by several offices, wait in line, and then wait for a decision. I can get
you through the same process in less than a week. During my lunch,
I go in, get the things signed and accepted, and move on.
Interviewer:Why?
C.P.O.:Money of course. I am not an idiot. But I don’t charge a lot. I
just charge 200 Euros, that’s it. Sometimes I do it for free if we are
talking about someone I know.
Interviewer:Do you think this is OK?
C.P.O:It is probably borderline . . . But it is OK. I wouldn’t be telling
you if I didn’t think it is OK [laughs]. It is not like I am doing some-
thing wrong. I am speeding the process for them by doing it in their
place. The same thing a lawyer does, only because I know everyone
and I work with them already I do it much quicker. I am also using
my time . . . so . . .
Interviewer:Isn’t this part of your job description though?
C.P.O.:Only one step of it is. The other three or five are not. This is
where I come in and get all the signatures collected in 1 week rather
than 6 months. The way I see it, without me, many businesses would
have halted. I could name at least three instances when I helped
someone avoid bankruptcy by saving them time.

This suggests that the slow bureaucratic apparatus juxtaposed with the
needs of the economic players for quick decisions creates a favorable envi-
ronment for public officials who conduct themselves as entrepreneurs. The
idea of entrepreneurship within the bureaucratic apparatus is rather well
developed in the literature (see Kalu, 2003; Kingdon, 2011; Mintrom &
Norman, 2009; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Teske, 1994). However, unlike the
entrepreneurship discussed in that literature, here public officials do not pur-
sue policy change or administrative efficiency; they rather pursue personal
and kinship interests. Yet, the entrepreneurial approach and the ability to
manipulate what otherwise is a rigid bureaucratic system “gets the job done.”
786 Administration & Society 46(7)

This form of entrepreneurship alludes to the controversial idea that at times,

corruption is necessary to “grease the wheels” (Aidt, 2003; Bayley, 1966;
Leff, 1964; Leys, 1965; Lui, 1985).
Somewhat paradoxically, although most Eastern Europeans might per-
ceive corruption as a serious problem and would be inclined to take a norma-
tive stand against it, they are also likely to see it as something natural and
unavoidable for their context. As suggested by Persson, Rothstein, and
Teorell (2012), corruption should perhaps be framed as a problem of “col-
lective action,” meaning that while many in the post-Soviet bloc might agree
that corruption is normatively undesirable, in collective, few see any ratio-
nale for being different, that is noncorrupt. As Karklins (2005) puts it, most
believe, warranted or not, that it does not “pay” to be honest.

3. Corrupt behavior is rarely an outcome of individual decision

making; it is rather a byproduct of the larger organizational sys-
tem or social context. Sometimes external pressures can be so
high that the individual has no choice but to behave as expected
(i.e., corruptly).

We could not find evidence of a rational process of cost-benefit analysis.

Corrupt officials believed that in the worst case, they simply would have to
bribe someone else to avoid consequences. Others have suggested that in
Eastern Europe, corrupt officials are not intimidated by the idea of getting
caught and that anticorruption public policy is not taken seriously by the
government, public officials, or citizens (Barsukova, 2009; Grødeland,
2010; Markovskaya, Pridemore, & Nakajima, 2003; Spinei et al., 2008).
Only in two instances had the investigators determined with confidence
that the case in hand represented a one-time action on the part of the public
official. Both of those cases were motivated by kinship. Corrupt officials
were typically part of a corrupt network or had a matter-of-fact view of his or
her corrupt acts. All the corrupt officials seemed unaware or unwilling to
acknowledge the risk associated with their actions. They found that the risks
in terms of maintaining relationships with the third parties and the corrupt
acts were minimal. The associations between officials, third parties, or inter-
mediaries (if present) are representative of a social system that accepts,
expects, and, to a certain extent, requires corruption (Barsukova, 2009;
Brovkin, 2003; Tumarkin, 2000). It is often the case that the official might
not have a choice in the matter. Once an official accepts that he or she works
within a corrupt network, he or she then has to undertake corrupt behavior or
leave. One of the interview respondents recalled,
Roman and Miller 787

I remember my first week on the job. I was chewed up by my boss

because I did not shake this guy up. We impounded several tons of his
merchandise. It was for something small. Once he provided the neces-
sary proof, I took the seal off. My boss could not believe I did it. He
told me that I could have gotten at least a couple of grand out of him
. . . The next week I told them to give me a desk job.

In all the cases, the supervision of corrupt officials was poor, nonexis-
tent, or there were indications of financial kickbacks for superiors (in 30%
of the cases, a bribe was shared). In 75% of the cases, the hierarchy was not
well established and the corrupt official was rarely reported or evaluated.
None of the organizations put strong emphasis on political or professional
integrity. Corrupt officials were only vaguely aware of organizational ethi-
cal expectations.
The accused argued that “when working in the field” they had little guidance
or supervision. More than 90% of the cases involved street-level public officials
who were in direct contact with the citizens. The officials either blamed superi-
ors and the organization or claimed that they “simply made a mistake” and that
they were not aware that “it is not all right” to do what they did.
When corrupt officials attempted to justify themselves by saying “every-
body else does it,” they were figuratively correct. The density of corrupt
occurrences per type of public organization is relatively high in Moldova.
These acts take place in well-established networks of association. Compared
with the de Graaf and Huberts (2008) study, in the case of Moldova, there are
a higher number of cases involving more than one official; corrupt acts often
utilized stable intermediaries. While all the officials with corruption files
attempted to justify their behavior with “everyone else is doing it” responses,
no one offered to “rat out” a colleague. The interviews and content analysis
suggested three main reasons for the unwillingness of the incriminated offi-
cials to betray others within their networks. (a) There were no gains from it,
as in many instances even the investigators assigned to the corruption case
were happy to put a “check mark” on the case as “done,” showing no interest
in pursuing further ramifications. Moreover, the corrupt administrator did not
believe that anyone would actually do anything. (b) The corrupt public ser-
vants were more concerned about “burning bridges” than about receiving a
sentence. From the 11 cases in which the officials had a previous criminal
offense, in two cases they were eventually reemployed by the same institu-
tion. (c) The corrupt individuals were afraid that others have someone within
the anticorruption investigation department and that “ratting out” would have
serious repercussions for them.
788 Administration & Society 46(7)

4. Corrupt behavior is often justified by the belief that such

behavior is pardonable due to “ownership” of the position. For
instance, the reason that one becomes a police officer is because
everyone, including the individual, expects that one can demand
bribes regularly once in position. Expectation of corruption is
attached to a position. The higher the benefits, the more attrac-
tive the position becomes (e.g., teacher vs. parliament member).

The officials would join the organization open to the idea of income outside
of salary. Within organizational and social context open to corrupt behavior,
the public officials would initially start timidly, until they became comfort-
able enough with the process to achieve stable opportunities. In 11 cases, this
was not the first criminal offense for the public official. In 5 of the 11 cases,
the previous sentence was a result of abuse of power or a corruption charge.
One of the case files revealed the following exchange:

Investigator:It says here that you didn’t have a job for 4 years after the
university? Why?
Suspected official (S.O.):I only wanted to work for [name of institution
removed].
Investigator:Really? So you didn’t do anything for 4 years . . . you
waited to get in with them? Why?
S.O.:I am not going somewhere and work on salary. There I could make
good money . . . and I could be someone. People respect you if you
work there. Guys don’t go there because they want to help anyone.
If you get in, you have connections and you are guaranteed money.
Investigator:What did you do for money for 4 years?
Suspected official:My wife worked.

In close to 90% of the cases, the public officials perceived as customary

and in line with social expectations to anticipate benefits, material, or nonma-
terial, outside their salary. The officials attributed the ability to pull strings
and to command bribes as something that made their positions desirable. The
office was treated as private property and a source of income or influence. In
more than 40% of the cases, the officials were young and have been in their
positions for a relatively short period of time. The convicted police officials
in their statements attributed the desirability of their titles to their respectable
social status.

5. There are high levels of trust among corrupt public officials.

Roman and Miller 789

Similar to how individuals in “noncorrupt” organizations trust each other—so

do those involved in corrupt schemes. Interestingly, higher levels of trust might
be present among the corrupt than the “noncorrupt.” Members within each
network of association share common values, perspectives, and interests. This
form of trust is similar to what scholars (Uslaner, 2002; Uslaner & Conley,
2003) call “particularized trust”—a relationship that describes people who have
faith only in members of the group that they associate with. “They avoid strang-
ers and base their social circles upon family, close friends, and members of their
own groups, be they ethnic or religious” (Uslaner & Conley, 2003, p. 335).
The only type of loyalty that was identified was loyalty to a kinship net-
work or close social circle. In the case of police departments, the loyalty to
their colleagues is pronounced. Corrupt police officers referred to their col-
leagues as “my guys” or “my brothers,” but this style of loyalty may fit into
the larger body of literature that, for example, identifies the “code of silence”
as a reflection of solidarity, especially within the military and police depart-
ments (Haberfeld, Ivkovic, & Klockars, 2006; Ivkovic & Shelley, 2010;
Shelley & Ivkovic, 2008; Skolnick, 2002).
Trust was also found to be essential for the third parties involved in the
corruption cases. They were interested in developing and maintaining a rela-
tionship with administrators who could get things done, even if there was not
an imminent need. The third party, or someone else the third party knows,
will eventually need something done. The corrupt officials often developed
long-term enduring business-type relationships with the briber or the third
party. The administrative services, medical services, and education spheres
were found to be especially vulnerable to such chain (transaction-type)
arrangements. In more than 35% of the cases, the material award that the cor-
rupt official received was linked to a specific action. In other cases, the gifts
and favors received were not necessarily for specific services, but rather to
maintain the channel.
Strikingly different from what was uncovered by de Graaf and Huberts
(2008) in the Netherlands, the enduring relationships that were present in
public corruption cases in Moldova were not enduring out of respect, love, or
friendship but out of cultural or kinship motives or pressures. In one case in
which the corrupt act was motivated by kinship, the official was quoted in his
file stating. “I don’t even like the guy. I had to do it because he was a relative.
I had to help him out; otherwise, they’d be talking about how I haven’t helped
him when in need. Everybody thought that I can do everything I wanted . . . I
had to do it.” While kinship concerns would often entail such sentiments as
love, respect, and friendship, the feelings of duty and obligation that arise
from cultural norms and expectations dominate such considerations.
790 Administration & Society 46(7)

Conclusion
Aside from material gain, de Graaf and Huberts (2008) hypothesize that
friendship, love, status, and need to impress others were important motives
to commit corrupt acts. In our study, although status is identified as a motiva-
tor in five instances, kinship considerations predominated. Our original defi-
nition of corruption followed the lead of de Graaf and Huberts, which
required the presence of a clear personal award or benefit to count as corrup-
tion. We no longer regard this definition as adequate in light of the diffuse
beneficiaries of corrupt acts. Personal reward cannot be ruled out, but in
some social contexts, especially in nonindividualistic cultures, the instru-
mental logic of personal benefits does not reflect the complexities of the
networks of social obligations faced by the corrupt officials.
In other respects, too, the relationship between material considerations and
corruption might not be as powerful as is often assumed to be the case for low-
income societies. Rather than slipping down a slope once in office, officials in
the post-Soviet bloc are coming into government positions with the expecta-
tion of corrupt acts as a normal aspect of their job and a “supplement” to
income. Cultural and social environments sustain the beliefs that such consid-
erations are normal for public servants. One of the respondents put it this way:

I don’t even think about it. Everywhere I go I have to pay someone or

owe them a favor later. I have to pay to make money. I have to pay at
my kid’s school and they already charge me an outrageous contract
[private school] . . . I am not even going to say anything about what
happens if you have a serious illness. I actually forgot when was the
last time I asked myself why I pay. You just pay. Sometimes it is not
even big money, it is a favor or they let you know that they’ll need you
later. If you don’t pay you don’t show respect for their status.

Interview respondents further suggested that there are “price tags” on

certain public office positions. For the public officials and for those who
strive for a public career, the office is seen as a private source of income
and influence. Weber (1978) discusses this scenario as prebendal and feudal
administration:

The purely economic conception of the office as a private source of

income for the official can also lead to the direct purchases of offices
. . . All assignments of services and usufructs in kind as endowments
for officials tend to loosen the bureaucratic mechanism, and especially
Roman and Miller 791

to weaken hierarchic subordination which is most strictly developed in

the discipline of modern officialdom. (pp. 966-967)

The bureaucracies in Eastern Europe do not neatly fit with the Weberian
model.

Not all postcommunist countries meet the modernity standard set by

Weber. The lack of a clear division between public and private in post-
communist countries generates forms of expediency and rationality
that are not conducive to modernity and present an obstacle to the
rationality of the “rule of law.” (Ledeneva, 2009, p. 259)

Knowledge and expertise are not at the base of bureaucratic domination in

this case. Networks of affiliation, often kinship networks, steer the decision-
making process. All of those interviewed, the majority being public servants,
admitted that they have paid a bribe at least once in their careers and they
have at least once made use of someone they know. All of them also sug-
gested that they accepted or were obligated to undertake favors for someone
within their network of associations.
Our research suggests that both public policy and studies on corruption, espe-
cially in the contexts of developing countries, can easily overlook some critical
motivators of corrupt acts. Kinship and status concerns, strongly embedded in
Eastern European cultural norms, are found to be as important if not more
important than material gains in motivating corrupt acts. An overemphasis on
material awards as a leading motivator of corrupt acts could lead to stereotype-
enforcing constructs. Understanding the context of the historical and national
backgrounds is axiomatic to the design of effective anticorruption policies.
Our study suggests several intriguing dimensions for future research
efforts. Due to commonalities within post-Soviet bloc countries, it would be
interesting to see if our findings are replicable in countries such as Ukraine,
Russia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Belorussia. Also, during our interviews, it
became obvious that the prosecuted cases investigated in this study, none of
which could be characterized as elite, are not fully representative of the extant
condition. Hence, research that uncovers the dynamics of corruption at elite
levels of society would constitute a significant addition to the present body of
literature.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
792 Administration & Society 46(7)

Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or pub-
lication of this article.

Note
1. In 2011, Moldova received a Corruption Perception Index (CPI) score of only
2.9 out of 10, where the lower the score, the more corrupt the country is per-
ceived (Transparency International, 2011). It shared the 112th place with Algeria,
Egypt, Kosovo, Senegal, and Vietnam, among 178 countries that were ranked.
The CPI score for 2010 was 2.9 (similar to Argentina, Algeria, Kazakhstan, and
Senegal, ranked 105th) while the 2009 score was 3.3 (ranked 89th and tied with
Lesotho, Malawi, Mexico, Morocco, and Rwanda).

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Author Biographies
Alexandru V. Roman is a PhD candidate at the School of Public Administration at
Florida Atlantic University. He currently serves as the director of research for the
Public Procurement Research Center at Florida Atlantic University.

Hugh T. Miller is professor of public administration at Florida Atlantic University.

His most recent book is Governing Narratives: Symbolic Politics and Policy Change
published by the University of Alabama Press in 2012.