Legal Forms Case Digests

Case
LEGAL FORMS AND PLEADINGS [ATTY. RENE B. GOROSPE] Digests
2004 RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE
a. General Considerations
1. XERXES A. ABADIANO vs. SPOUSES JESUS and LOLITA MARTIR

G.R. No. 156310
July 31, 2008
FACTS:
The case stemmed from an action for quieting of title and/or recovery of possession of a parcel
of land filed by herein respondents against Roberto Abadiano, Faustino Montaño, and Quirico
Mandaguit. Petitioner Xerxes A. Abadiano intervened in that case.
Lot No. 1318 of the Kabankalan Cadastre consists of 34,281 square meters covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 20461 issued on November 19, 1923 in the name of the spouses
Inocentes Bañares and Feliciana Villanueva. Before the issuance of OCT No. 20461, however,
Inocentes and the heirs of Feliciana Villanueva (who had predeceased her husband) executed an
Agreement of Partition dated June 1, 1922 over Lot No. 1318. The lot was partitioned and
distributed as follows: (1) 14,976 sq m denominated as Lot No. 1318-A, in favor of Demetrio
Bañares; (2) 10,125 sq m denominated as Lot No. 1318-B, in favor of Ramon and David Abadiano
(grandchildren of Inocentes and Feliciana); and (3) 10,180 sq m denominated as Lot No. 1318-C, in
favor of Amando Bañares. The partition is embodied in a Deed of Partition executed on June 1, 1922
and notarized the following day by Notary Public Jose Peralta with notarial inscriptions "Reg. No.
64, Pag. 69, Libro III."
On June 14, 1957, Demetrio Bañares sold his share of the lot to his son, Leopoldo. The same was
annotated at the back of OCT No. RO-8211 (20461). Subsequently, on February 21, 1962, Leopoldo
Bañares filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Occidental an ex-parte petition
praying for: first, the confirmation of the Agreement of Partition, the Conformity executed by David
Abadiano, and the Deed of Sale between him and his father; and second, the cancellation of OCT No.
RO-8211 (20461) and, in lieu thereof, the issuance of a new certificate of title over the property. In
an Order dated February 22, 1962, the court ordered the cancellation of OCT No. RO-8211 (20461)
and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of Dr. Leopoldo Bañares, Amando Bañares,
and Ramon and David Abadiano. Pursuant thereto, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-31862
was issued by the Register of Deeds for Negros Occidental.
Petitioner insists that this is still the valid and subsisting title over Lot No. 1318 and that no sale
of the portion pertaining to Ramon and David Abadiano ever took place.
On the other hand, respondent spouses alleged that, prior to the issuance of TCT No. T-31862,
Ramon Abadiano, for himself and on behalf of David Abadiano, had already sold their rights and
interests over Lot No. 1318-C11 to Victor Garde. The sale was allegedly evidenced by a document of
sale (Compra Y Venta) dated June 3, 1922 and acknowledged before Notary Public Jose Peralta and
bearing notarial inscription "Doc. No. 64, Pag. No. 60, Book No. III, series of 1922." The sale was
allegedly affirmed by David Abadiano in a document dated September 30, 1939.
SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Ayento. Candelaria. Cruz. De Leon, A. De Leon, M. Feliciano. 1

Hermogenes. Ongoco. Sison. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte.
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Thus, in April 1982, herein respondent-spouses filed the Action to Quiet Title and/or Recovery
of Possession with Damages before the then CFI of Negros Occidental.
The trial court concluded that the Compra Y Venta was valid between the parties, Ramon
Abadiano and Victor Garde. The trial court also brushed aside the defendants’ contention that the
Compra Y Venta contained the same notarial inscription as the Deed of Partition. It said that
assuming this to be true, this may be considered an error which did not nullify the Compra Y Venta;
at most, the document would be non-registrable but still valid.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of sale was a spurious document (YES)
HELD:
The trial court brushed aside the apparent defect that the document presented contained the
same notarial inscription as the Agreement on Partition. Indeed, the Deed of Partition and the
Compra Y Venta, though executed on different days, were notarized on the same day, and both
documents contained the signatures of the same witnesses and the same notarial inscription.
This notwithstanding, the court concluded, "Assuming this to be true, same could be considered
an error which did not nullify, the Deed of Sale or Compra Y Venta. At most, the document would be
a non-registrable, but valid document.
We stress that a notarial document is evidence of the facts in the clear unequivocal manner
therein expressed and has in its favor the presumption of regularity.
In this case, while it is true that the error in the notarial inscription would not have
invalidated the sale – if indeed it took place – the same error would have meant that the
document cannot be treated as a notarial document and thus, not entitled to the
presumption of regularity. The document would be taken out of the realm of public documents
whose genuineness and due execution need not be proved.
Accordingly, respondents not having proven the due execution and genuineness of the
purported Compra Y Venta, the weight of evidence preponderates in favor of petitioner.
From the testimonies of petitioner and the defendants during trial, it would appear that they
were unaware of any of respondents’ actions in relation to the property until the death of their
grandfather, Amando Bañares. When they did find out that respondents were occupying the land,
they immediately took action to occupy what they believed was still rightfully theirs.
On the other hand, respondents failed to prove the genuineness and due execution of the
Contract of Sale. Respondents attached only a photocopy of the Contract of Sale to their complaint.
According to respondent Lolita Martir, the original of said document was in the office of the
Register of Deeds. They allegedly tried to obtain a copy from that office but their request was
refused. No other evidence but these bare assertions, however, was presented to prove that the

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original is indeed in the custody of the Register of Deeds or that respondents’ due and diligent
search for the same was unsuccessful.
Petition GRANTED.

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2. DOLORES L. DELA CRUZ, MILAGROS L. PRINCIPE, NARCISA L. FAUSTINO, JORGE V. LEGASPI

and JUANITO V. LEGASPI vs. ATTY. JOSE R. DIMAANO, JR.
A.C. No. 7781
September 12, 2008
FACTS:
In their complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Jose R. Dimaano, Jr., Dolores L. Dela
Cruz, Milagros L. Principe, Narcisa L. Faustino, Jorge V. Legaspi, and Juanito V. Legaspi alleged that
the respondent notarized a document denominated as Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate with
Waiver of Rights purportedly executed by them and their sister, Zenaida V.L. Navarro.
Complainants further alleged that: (1) their signatures in this document were forged; (2) they did
not appear and acknowledge the document on before respondent as notarizing officer; and (3) their
purported community tax certificates indicated in the document were not theirs.
According to complainants, respondent had made untruthful statements in the

acknowledgment portion of the notarized document when he made it appear, among other things,
that complainants personally came and appeared before him and that they affixed their signatures
on the document in his presence. In the process, complainants added, respondent effectively
enabled their sister, Navarro, to assume full ownership of their deceased parents’ property in
Tibagan, San Miguel, Bulacan, covered by Transfer and sell the same to DPWH.
In his answer, respondent admitted having a hand in the preparation of the document in
question, but admitted having indeed notarized it. He explained that he notarized the document in
good faith relying on the representation and assurance of Zenaida Navarro that the signatures and
the community tax certificates appearing in the document were true and correct. Navarro would
not, according to respondent, lie to him having known, and being neighbors of, each other for 30
years. Finally, respondent disclaimed liability for any damage or injury considering that the falsified
document had been revoked and cancelled.
The Investigating Commissioner of the Office of the Commission on Bar Discipline, Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) in his report found that the respondent had indeed notarized the
questioned document but relying only upon the representation of Navarro that signatures
appearing and the community tax certificates were true and correct. Also, it was found that the
complainants did not appear before the respondent at the time the document is to be notarized. The
respondent did not likewise ascertain if the purported signatures of each of the complainants
appearing in the document belonged to them.
The Commission concluded that with respondents’ admission of having notarized the document
in question against the factual backdrop as thus established, a clear case of falsification and
violation of the Notarial Law had been committed. To this end, the Commission recommended that
the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year; that his notarial
commission, if still existing, be revoked; and that he be disqualified for reappointment as notary
public for two (2) years. The IBP Board of Governor passed a resolution adopting and approving the
report and recommendation of the Commission.

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ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent has committed a violation of the Notarial Law (YES)
HELD:
We agree with the recommendation of the Commission and the premises holding it together.
It bears reiterating that notaries public should refrain from affixing their signature and
notarial seal on a document unless the persons who signed it are the same individuals who
executed and personally appeared before the notaries public to attest to the truth of what are
stated therein, for under Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 or the Notarial Law, an instrument or
document shall be considered authentic if the acknowledgment is made in accordance with the
following requirement:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by
law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where
the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that
the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is
the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and
deed. The certificate shall be made under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a
seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.
Without the appearance of the person who actually executed the document in question,
notaries public would be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature of the
acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party’s free act or
deed. Furthermore, notaries public are required by the Notarial Law to certify that the party to the
instrument has acknowledged and presented before the notaries public the proper residence
certificate (or exemption from the residence certificate) and to enter its number, place, and date of
issue as part of certification. Rule II, Sec. 12 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice now requires a
party to the instrument to present competent evidence of identity.
Sec. 12 provides:
Sec. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. The phrase competent evidence of identity refers to
the identification of an individual based on:
(a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the
photograph and signature of the individual, such as but not limited to, passport, drivers
license, Professional Regulations Commission ID, National Bureau of Investigation clearance,
police clearance, postal ID, voters ID, Barangay certification, Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) e-card, Social Security System (SSS) card, Philhealth card, senior citizen card,
Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) ID, OFW ID, seamans book, alien
certificate of registration/immigrant certificate of registration, government office ID,
certificate from the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons (NCWDP),
Department of Social Welfare and Development certification [as amended by A.M. No. 02-8-
13-SC dated February 19, 2008]; or

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(b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or
transaction who is personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the
individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument, document
or transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows to the notary public
documentary identification.
Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of
their offices, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. It
must be remembered that notarization is not a routinary, meaningless act, for notarization
converts a private document to a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence without
the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution. A notarized document is by
law entitled to full credit upon its face and it is for this reason that notaries public must
observe the basic requirements in notarizing documents. Otherwise, the confidence of the
public on notarized documents will be eroded.

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3. LEONOR CAMCAM, JOSE, FORTUNATO, VIRGINIA, GLORIA, FLORENDO, DELFIN, RODRIGO,

LEUTERIO, NARCISO, ONOFRE, ZENAIDA, AURELIA, TEOFILA, FELICIDAD, MERCEDES,
LYDIA, ALFREDO, BIENVENIDO, EFREN, LILIA, ERLINDA, MELINDA, MARYLOU, MERIAM,
all surnamed SALVADOR vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALD and ARCADIO FRIAS
G.R. No. 142977
September 30, 2008
FACTS:
Leonor Camcam and her husband Laureano Salvador were the registered owners of two parcels
of land, Lot Nos. 19554 and 18738 located in Pangasinan.
On February 9, 1983, Leonor, together with the others, filed a Complaint, against Arcadio Frias,
for annulment of the following documents executed by Leonor in Frias’ favor covering Lot Nos.
19554 and 18738: A Deed of Adjudication with Sale of the entire Lot No. 19554 and of Lot No.
18738, for a P11,000 consideration signed by Leonor; A Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Sale of
ONE-HALF portion EACH together with [Leonors] conjugal share of ONE-HALF EACH with all the
improvements thereon for a P45,000 consideration, signed by Leonor; November 23, 1982 Deed of
Absolute Sale of the other half of Lot No. 18738, for a consideration of P3,000 signed by Leonor.
In November 1982, Frias deceived Leonor into signing the Deed of Adjudication after which he
paid her P9,000 out of the P11,000 consideration, balance payable before the end of the month.
Frias, instead of delivering the balance of P2,000, again deceived Leonor into signing another
document, the Deed of Absolute Sale, he telling her that since two lots were involved, she had to
sign another instrument pertaining to the other lot.
Upon verification with Rodolfo Acosta, the notary public who notarized the deeds, petitioners
discovered that the deeds Leonor signed transferred ownership of the entire area covering the two
lots. New TCTs were given. Further, they discovered that Frias registered the document.
Petitioners alleged that assuming that the documents are valid, it is void with respect to the
shares of Leonors co-heirs-co-petitioners as they were conveyed without their knowledge and
participation.
Frias controverted the testimony of Leonor, said that it was she who convinced him to buy
them.
RTC: Disagreed that Leonor Camcam signed the documents without reading them.
Ordering to cancel TCT No. 143752 and 143753 and instead issue another title, one half of
the property to the brothers and sisters, per capita; and to the nieces and nephews per
stirpes; the other half to the defendants (Frias).
CA: Affirmed with modification.

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ISSUE:
Whether or not the Deed of Adjudication, Deed of Extra Judicial Partition, and Deed of Absolute
Sale are void, considering their physical appearance and conditions indicated strongly the
irregularities of their execution (NO)
HELD:
NO, the documents are valid.
Petitioners contend that from the appearance of these documents, while both were notarized by
the same notary public, yet they have identical notarial documentary identification, i.e., the same
documentary number to be 464, same page number 44, the same book number X and the same
series of 1982, and appeared to have been sworn before the notary public on the same date
November 4, 1982. The SC said that their contention is bereft of merit.
Without passing on the merits of Frias claim that Leonor originally sold to him of Lot No. 18739
as reflected in the first November 4, 1982 document but later conveyed the remaining thereof,
hence, the execution of the second document bearing the same date, an irregular notarization
merely reduces the evidentiary value of a document to that of a private document, which
requires proof of its due execution and authenticity to be admissible as evidence. The irregular
notarization or, for that matter, the lack of notarization does not necessarily affect the
validity of the contract reflected in the document. Tigno v. Aquino enlightens: “failure to observe
the proper form does not render the transaction invalid” and that “even a verbal contract of sale or
real estate produces effects between the parties.”
Petitioners alleged fraud on Frias’ part, hence, they had the burden of establishing the same by
clear and convincing evidence. This they failed to discharge.
By Leonor’s account, she signed the three documents relying on Frias’ word that they were
deeds of mortgage, and she did not read them because she did not know how to read. When asked,
however, on cross-examination about her educational attainment, Leonor answered that she
finished the third year of a nursing course at San Juan de Dios Hospital.
Clarifying her statement that she did not know how to read, Leonor explained that she knew
how to read but her eyesight was blurred. Leonor’s granddaughter-witness who signed as witness
declared, however, that she read the contents to Leonor, thus belying petitioners’ claim that
Leonor signed the same without knowing its true contents.
As for Deed of Extra Judicial Partition which petitioners maintain is spurious, Leonor’s
signature therein being allegedly forged, Leonor herself admitted having signed the same, and
this was corroborated by Gertrudes.
At all events, even assuming that the invocation by Leonor’s co-petitioners of their right of
redemption was timely made, it cannot be considered a valid exercise thereof as it was not
accompanied by a reasonable and valid tender of the entire repurchase price.

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4. SPOUSES LEHNER and LUDY MARTIRES vs. MENELIA CHUA

G.R. No. 174240
March 20, 2013
FACTS:
Subject of the instant controversy are 24 memorial lots located at the Holy Cross Memorial
Park. The property is covered by TCT No. 342914. Respondent, together with her mother, Florencia
R. Calagos, own the disputed property. Their co-ownership is evidenced by a Deed of Sale and
Certificate of Perpetual Care.
Respondent borrowed from petitioner spouses the amount of P150,000.00. The loan was
secured by a real estate mortgage over the abovementioned property. Respondent failed to fully
settle her obligation.
Subsequently, without foreclosure of the mortgage, ownership of the subject lots was
transferred in the name of petitioners via a Deed of Transfer.
Respondent filed with the RTC of Quezon City a Complaint against petitioners, Manila Memorial
Park Inc., the company which owns the Holy Cross Memorial Park, and the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City, praying for the annulment of the contract of mortgage between her and petitioners on
the ground that the interest rates imposed are unjust and exorbitant.
Respondent moved for the amendment of her complaint to include the allegation that she later
discovered that ownership of the subject lots was transferred in the name of petitioners by virtue of
a forged Deed of Transfer and Affidavit of Warranty. Respondent prayed that the Deed of Transfer
and Affidavit of Warranty be annulled.
After trial, the RTC of Quezon City rendered a Decision in favor of petitioners.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court and concluded that the Deed of
Transfer which, on its face, transfers ownership of the subject property to petitioners, is, in fact, an
equitable mortgage. The CA held that the true intention of respondent was merely to provide
security for her loan and not to transfer ownership of the property to petitioners.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the irregularities attendant in the alleged notarization of the subject Deed of
Transfer affected its evidentiary weight (YES)
2) Whether or not the agreement between petitioners and respondent is an equitable mortgage
(YES)

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HELD:
1) YES, when there is a defect in the notarization of a document, the clear and convincing
evidentiary standard normally attached to a duly notarized document is dispensed with.
Petitioners are correct in pointing out that notarized documents carry evidentiary weight
conferred upon them with respect to their due execution and enjoy the presumption of regularity
which may only be rebutted by evidence so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all
controversy as to falsity. However, the presumptions that attach to notarized documents can
be affirmed only so long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization was regular.
A defective notarization will strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a
private instrument. Consequently, when there is a defect in the notarization of a document, the
clear and convincing evidentiary standard normally attached to a duly notarized document is
dispensed with, and the measure to test the validity of such document is preponderance of
evidence.
In the present case, the CA has clearly pointed out the dubious circumstances and irregularities
attendant in the alleged notarization of the subject Deed of Transfer.
Petitioners' heavy reliance on the Certification issued by the notary public who supposedly
notarized the said deed, as well as the Certification issued by the Clerk of Court of the Notarial
Section of the RTC of Makati City, is misplaced for these Certifications were contradicted by the
Certification issued by the Administrative Officer of the Notarial Section of the RTC of Makati City as
well as by the admission, on cross-examination, of the clerk who prepared the Certification of the
Clerk of Court, that their office cannot, in fact, find a copy of the subject Deed of Transfer in their
files and the further admission of the said clerk that the Certification, which was issued by the clerk
of court and relied upon by petitioners, was not based on documents existing in their files, but was
simply based on the Certification issued by the notary public who allegedly notarized the said Deed
of Transfer.
Assuming further that the notarization of the disputed Deed of Transfer was regular, the Court,
nonetheless, is not persuaded by petitioners' argument that such Deed is a sufficient evidence of the
validity of the agreement between petitioners and respondent. While indeed a notarized
document enjoys the presumption of regularity, the fact that a deed is notarized is not a
guarantee of the validity of its contents. The presumption is not absolute and may be
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
In the present case, the presumption cannot be made to apply, because aside from the
irregularity of its notarization, the validity of the contents and execution of the subject Deed of
Transfer was challenged in the proceedings below where its prima facie validity was subsequently
overthrown by the questionable circumstances attendant in its supposed execution. These
circumstances include: (1) the alleged agreement between the parties that the ownership of the
subject property be simply assigned to petitioners instead of foreclosure of the contract of
mortgage which was earlier entered into by them; (2) the Deed of Transfer was executed by reason
of the loan extended by petitioners to respondent, the amount of the latter's outstanding obligation
being the same as the amount of the consideration for the assignment of ownership over the subject

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property; (3) the inadequacy of the consideration; and (4) the claim of respondent that she had no
intention of transferring ownership of the subject property to petitioners.
2) YES, the agreement between petitioners and respondent is, in fact, an equitable
mortgage.
It has been established that the intent of both petitioners and respondent is that the subject
property shall serve as security for the latter's obligation to the former. As correctly pointed out by
the CA, the circumstances surrounding the execution of the disputed Deed of Transfer would show
that the said document was executed to circumvent the terms of the original agreement and
deprive respondent of her mortgaged property without the requisite foreclosure.
Since the original transaction between the parties was a mortgage, the subsequent assignment
of ownership of the subject lots to petitioners without the benefit of foreclosure proceedings,
partakes of the nature of a pactum commissorium.
Pactum commissorium is a stipulation empowering the creditor to appropriate the thing

given as guaranty for the fulfillment of the obligation in the event the obligor fails to live up to his
undertakings, without further formality, such as foreclosure proceedings, and a public sale.
In the instant case, evidence points to the fact that the sale of the subject property, as proven by
the disputed Deed of Transfer, was simulated to cover up the automatic transfer of ownership in
petitioners' favor.
The Court agrees with the CA in not giving credence to petitioners' contention that respondent
offered to transfer ownership of the subject property in their name as payment for her outstanding
obligation. As this Court has held, all persons in need of money are liable to enter into contractual
relationships whatever the condition if only to alleviate their financial burden albeit temporarily.
Hence, courts are duty-bound to exercise caution in the interpretation and resolution of contracts
lest the lenders devour the borrowers like vultures do with their prey.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.

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5. THELMA M. ARANAS vs. TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO, CARMENCITA M.

SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA. TERESITA M. ANDERSON and FRANKLIN L.
MERCADO
G.R. No. 156407
January 15, 2014
FACTS:
Emigdio Mercado died intestate and survived by his second wife, Teresita, and their five
children, and his two children by his first marriage, namely: Franklin and Thelma M. Aranas.
Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned corporate shares in
Mervir Realty and Cebu Emerson. He assigned his real properties in exchange for corporate stocks
of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property to Mervir Realty. Teresita was appointed as
administrator of Emigdio's estate.
Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio for the consideration and approval by
the RTC. She indicated in the inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio had “left no real
properties but only personal properties” worth P6,675,435.25 in including 44,806 shares of stock
of Mervir Realty worth P6,585,585.80; and 30 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth P22,708.25.
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the inventory, Thelma
moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be examined regarding it. RTC
granted Thelma’s motion through an order. Teresita filed a compliance with the order supporting
her inventory with copies of three certificates of stocks covering the 44,806 Mervir Realty shares of
stock; the deed of assignment executed by Emigdio involving real properties with the market value
of P4,440,651.10 in exchange for 44,407 Mervir Realty shares of stock with total par value of
P4,440,700.00; and the certificate of stock issued for 300 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth
P30,000.00.
Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked leave of court to examine Teresita on
the inventory. With the parties agreeing to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court on the
issue of what properties should be included in or excluded from the inventory, the RTC set dates for
the hearing on that issue.
After a series of hearings that ran for almost eight years, the RTC issued an order finding and
holding that the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should be included.
Teresita, with the other heirs, sought the reconsideration on the order on the ground that one of
the real properties affected had already been sold to Mervir Realty and the in the possession and
registered in the name of Mervir Realty. Alleging that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion
in refusing to approve the inventory, and in ordering to include real properties that had been
transferred to Mervir Realty, Teresita filed a petition for certiorari. CA reversed the RTC decision
with regard to the inclusion of the property sold to Mervir Realty and affirmed in alll other respects.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property shall be included in the inventory (YES)

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HELD:
Firstly, the shares in the properties inherited by Emigdio from Severina Mercado should be
included in the inventory because Teresita, et al. did not dispute the fact about the shares being
inherited by Emigdio.
Secondly, with Emigdio and Teresita having been married prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code in August 3, 1988, their property regime was the conjugal partnership of gains. For purposes
of the settlement of Emigdio’s estate, it was unavoidable for Teresita to include his shares in the
conjugal partnership of gains. The party asserting that specific property acquired during that
property regime did not pertain to the conjugal partnership of gains carried the burden of proof,
and that party must prove the exclusive ownership by one of them by clear, categorical, and
convincing evidence. In the absence of or pending the presentation of such proof, the conjugal
partnership of Emigdio and Teresita must be provisionally liquidated to establish who the real
owners of the affected properties were, and which of the properties should form part of the estate
of Emigdio. The portions that pertained to the estate of Emigdio must be included in the inventory.
Moreover, although the title over lot was already registered in the name of Mervir Realty, RTC
made findings that put that title in dispute. Another case involving a dispute that had involved the
ownership of the lot was resolved in favor of the estate of Emigdio, and Transfer Certificate of
covering lot was still in Emigdio’s name. Indeed, the RTC noted in the order ten years after his
death, that the lot had remained registered in the name of Emigdio.
Also, the fact that the deed of absolute sale executed by Emigdio in favor of Mervir Realty
was a notarized instrument did not sufficiently justify the exclusion from the inventory of
the properties involved. A notarized deed of sale only enjoyed the presumption of regularity in
favor of its execution, but its notarization did not per se guarantee the legal efficacy of the
transaction under the deed, and what the contents purported to be. The presumption of
regularity could be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. As the Court has
observed in Suntay vs. Court of Appeals: x x x. Though the notarization of the deed of sale in question
vests in its favor the presumption of regularity, it is not the intention nor the function of the
notary public to validate and make binding an instrument never, in the first place, intended
to have any binding legal effect upon the parties thereto. The intention of the parties still
and always is the primary consideration in determining the true nature of a contract.
It should likewise be pointed out that the exchange of shares of stock of Mervir Realty with the
real properties owned by Emigdio would still have to be inquired into. The fact that the properties
were already covered by Torrens titles in the name of Mervir Realty could not be a valid basis for
immediately excluding them from the inventory in view of the circumstances admittedly
surrounding the execution of the deed of assignment.

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b. Disqualifications
1. FE A. YLAYA vs. ATTY. GLENN CARLOS GACOTT

A.C. No. 6475
January 30, 2013
FACTS:
For the Court's consideration is the disbarment complaint filed by Fe A. Ylaya (complainant)
against Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott (respondent) who allegedly deceived the complainant and her late
husband, Laurentino L. Ylaya, into signing a "preparatory" Deed of Sale that the respondent
converted into a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his relatives.
The complainant alleged that she and her late husband are the registered owners of two (2)
parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 162632 and 162633 located at
Barangay Sta. Lourdes, Puerto Princesa City. Prior to the acquisition of these properties, TCT No.
162632 (property) was already the subject of expropriation proceedings filed by the City
Government of Puerto Princesa (City Government) on May 23, 1996 against its former registered
owner, Cirilo Arellano. The expropriation case was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Palawan and Puerto Princesa, Branch 95, and was docketed as Civil Case No. 2902. The RTC already
fixed the price and issued an order for the City Government to deposit P6,000,000.00 as just
compensation for the property.
The respondent briefly represented the complainant and her late husband in the expropriation
case as intervenors for being the new registered owners of the property. The complainant alleged
that the respondent convinced them to sign a "preparatory deed of sale" for the sale of the property,
but he left blank the space for the name of the buyer and for the amount of consideration. The
respondent further alleged that the deed would be used in the sale to the City Government when
the RTC issues the order to transfer the titles. The respondent then fraudulently – without their
knowledge and consent, and contrary to their understanding – converted the "preparatory deed of
sale" into a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001, selling the subject property to Reynold So and
Sylvia Carlos So for P200,000.00.
The complainant denied that she and Laurentino were paid the P200,000.00 purchase price or
that they would sell the property "for such a measly sum" when they stood to get at least
P6,000,000.00 as just compensation.
The complainant also claimed that the respondent notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
June 4, 2001 even though Reynold and Sylvia (his mother’s sister) are his uncle and his aunt,
respectively.
The respondent argued that the complainant’s greed to get the just Compensation caused her to
file this "baseless, unfounded and malicious" disbarment case. He claimed that the sale was their
voluntary transaction and that he "simply ratified the document." He also claimed that Reynold and
Laurentino had originally jointly purchased the properties from Cirilo Arellano on July 10, 2000;
that they were co-owners for some time; and that Laurentino subsequently sold his share to
Reynold under a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001.

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The respondent specifically denied asking the complainant and her late husband to execute any
"preparatory deed of sale" in favor of the City Government. He also denied that the Deed of Absolute
Sale contained blanks when they signed it. That he filed for the spouses Ylaya and Reynold an
opposition to the just compensation the RTC fixed proved that there was no agreement to use the
document for the expropriation case. He also argued that it was clear from the document that the
intended buyer was a natural person, not a juridical person, because there were spaces for the
buyer’s legal age, marital status, and citizenship, and he was even constrained to file a subsequent
Motion to Intervene on behalf of Reynold because the complainant "maliciously retained" the TCTs
to the subject properties after borrowing them from his office. Lastly, he denied violating the Rules
on Notarial Practice.
The IBP commission found the respondent administratively liable for violating Canon 1, Rule
1.01 (A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct) and Canon 16 (A
lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession) of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC (2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice). She recommended his suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months.
The Commission believes that the respondent committed serious error in notarizing the Deed of
Sale and the Memorandum of Agreement between his uncle Reynold So and Laurentino Ylaya based
on Rule IV, Section 3 (c) of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC which provides as follows:
"Sec. 3. Disqualifications – a notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if he:
x x x.
(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or
consanguinity of the principal within the fourth civil degree."
The defense therefore of the respondent that he did not violate the aforementioned Rule
because his uncle Reynold So, the buyer is not the principal in the Subject Deed of Sale but the seller
Laurentino Ylaya is misplaced. Clearly, both the buyer and the seller in the instant case are
considered principals in the contract entered into.
Furthermore, if we are to consider the argument of the respondent that his uncle was not a
principal so as to apply the afore-quoted provision of the Rules, the respondent still violated the
Rules when he notarized the subject Memorandum of Agreement between Laurentino Ylaya and his
uncle Reynold So. Clearly, both complainant and Reynold So were principal parties in the said
Memorandum of Agreement.
On March 14, 2012, the respondent filed a Petition for Review (on appeal) assailing the IBP’s
findings, as follows:
a) In conveniently concluding that the Deed of Absolute Sale was pre-signed and fraudulently
notarized without requiring Fe Ylaya to adduce evidence in a formal hearing thus, violated
the respondent’s right to due process as he was not able to cross-examine her. This is not to
mention that the complainant failed to offer corroborative proof to prove her bare
allegations;
b) In finding the respondent/appellant’s act of notarizing the DOAS as contrary to the notarial
rules.

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ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence presented supports a finding that the respondent is
administratively liable for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC (Canon 1 and Section 3(c), Rule IV of
A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC –NO; Canon 16 – YES)
HELD:
We set aside the findings and recommendations of the IBP Commissioner and those of the IBP
Board of Governors finding the respondent liable for violating Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and Section 3(c),
Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.
After examining the whole record of the case, we agree with the respondent and find the
evidence insufficient to prove the charge that he violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC. Specifically, (1) the
evidence against the respondent fails to show the alleged fraudulent and deceitful acts he has
taken to mislead the complainant and her husband into signing a "preparatory deed of sale" and the
conversion into a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001 in favor of Reynold; and (2) no
prohibition exists against the notarization of a document in which any of the parties
interested is the notary’s relative within the 4th civil degree, by affinity or consanguinity, at
that time the respondent notarized the documents.
While the facts of this case may raise some questions regarding the respondent’s legal practice,
we nevertheless found nothing constituting clear evidence of the respondent’s specific acts of fraud
and deceit. His failure to prove the existence of a co-ownership does not lead us to the conclusion
that the MOA and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001 are spurious and that the
respondent was responsible for creating these spurious documents.
We do not see the documentary pieces of evidence as proof of specific acts constituting deceit or
fraud on the respondent’s part. The documents by themselves are neutral and, at the most, show
the breakdown of the attorney-client relationship between the respondent and the complainant. It
is one thing to allege deceit and misconduct, and it is another to demonstrate by evidence the
specific acts constituting these allegations.
We reiterate that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof is on the complainant; the
Court exercises its disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes her case by clear,
convincing, and satisfactory evidence.
In this case, we find that the complainant’s evidence and the records of the case do not show the
respondent’s deliberate fraudulent and deceitful acts. In the absence of such proof, the complaint
for fraud and deceit under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility must perforce
be dismissed.
We note that the respondent has not squarely addressed the issue of his relationship with
Reynold, whom the complainant alleges to be the respondent’s uncle because Reynold is married to

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the respondent’s maternal aunt. However, this is of no moment as the respondent cannot be held
liable for violating Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC because the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated June 4, 2001 and the MOA dated April 19, 2000 were notarized by the respondent prior to
the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC on July 6, 2004. The notarial law in force in the years 2000 -
2001 was Chapter 11 of Act No. 2711 (the Revised Administrative Code of 1917) which did not
contain the present prohibition against notarizing documents where the parties are related to the
notary public within the 4th civil degree, by affinity or consanguinity. Thus, we must likewise
dismiss the charge for violation of A.M. No. 02-8-13- SC.
We however hold the respondent liable for violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for being remiss in his obligation to hold in trust his client’s properties. We
likewise find him liable for violation of (1) Canon 15, Rule 15.03 for representing conflicting
interests without the written consent of the represented parties, thus, violating the rule on conflict
of interests; and (2) Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him.

Case
2. BERNARD JANDOQUILE vs. ATTY. QUIRINO REVILLA, JR.

A.C. No. 9514
April 10, 2013
FACTS:
Atty. Revilla, Jr. notarized a complaint-affidavit signed by Heneraline L. Brosas, Herizalyn

Brosas Pedrosa and Elmer L. Alvarado. Heneraline Brosas is a sister of Heizel Wynda Brosas, the
wife of Revilla, Atty. Revilla, Jr..
Jandoquile filed a complaint of disbarment against Atty. Revilla on the grounds that:
1) Atty. Revilla, Jr. is disqualified to perform the notarial act because it violates Sec. 3, Rule 4
of the Rules on Notarial Practice which provides that a notary public is disqualified from
performing a notarial act if he is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or
relative by affinity or consanguinity of the principal within the fourth civil degree
2) Atty. Revilla did not require the three affiants in the complaint-affidavit to show their valid
identification cards.
Atty. Revilla did not deny the allegations but he averred that the proper issue must be whether
the single act of notarizing the complaint-affidavit of relatives within the fourth civil degree of
affinity and, at the same time, not requiring them to present valid identification cards is a ground
for disbarment.
Atty. Revilla also averred that he should be considered more as counsel than as a notary public
when he notarized their complaint-affidavit. He did not require the affiants to present valid
identification cards since he knows them personally. Heneraline Brosas and Herizalyn Brosas
Pedrosa are sisters-in-law while Elmer Alvarado is the live-in houseboy of the Brosas family.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not Atty. Revilla violated the DISQUALIFICATION RULE under Section 3(c), Rule IV
of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (YES)
2) Whether or not he acted as a counsel and not as notary public (NO)
3) Whether or not he is correct in not requiring the affiants to present valid I.D. (YES)
4) Whether or not his violation is a sufficient ground for disbarment (NO)
HELD:
1) YES, Atty. Revilla violated the Disqualification Rule. He readily admitted that he notarized the
complaint-affidavit signed by his relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity. Section 3(c), Rule
IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice clearly disqualifies him from notarizing the complaint-
affidavit, from performing the notarial act, since two of the affiants or principals are his relatives
within the fourth civil degree of affinity.

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2) NO, he did not act more as a counsel than as a notary public. When he notarized the
complaint-affidavit, the notarial certificate at the bottom of the complaint-affidavit shows his
signature as a notary public.
3) YES, if the notary public knows the affiants personally, he need not require them to show
their valid identification cards.
This rule is supported by the definition of a "JURAT" under Sec. 6, Rule II. A "jurat" refers to an
act in which an individual on a single occasion: (a) appears in person before the notary public and
presents an instrument or document; (b) is personally known to the notary public or identified
by the notary public through competent evidence of identity; (c) signs the instrument or
document in the presence of the notary; and (d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary
public as to such instrument or document.
In this case, Heneraline Brosas is a sister of Atty. Revilla, Jr.’s wife; Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa is
his wife’s sister-in-law; and Elmer Alvarado is the live-in houseboy of the Brosas family. Atty.
Revilla, Jr. knows the three affiants personally.
However, Atty. Revilla is not without fault because no statement was included therein that he
knows the three affiants personally.
4) NO, Atty. Revilla’s violation of the disqualification rule under Sec. 3(c), Rule IV is not a
sufficient ground to disbar him. He did not commit any deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct or
gross immoral conduct, or any other serious ground for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court. Three months of disqualification as a notary public is sufficient as penalty. In
imposing the less severe punishment, the Court was mindful that removal from the Bar should not
really be decreed when any punishment less severe such as reprimand, temporary suspension or
fine would accomplish the end desired.

Case
c. Refusal to Notarize and False or Incomplete Certificates
1. MERCEDITA DE JESUS vs. ATTY. JUVY MELL SANCHEZMALIT

A.C. No. 6470
July 8, 2014
FACTS:
This is a disbarment complaint filed by Mercedita De Jesus against respondent Atty. Juvy Mell
Sanchez-Malit on the following grounds: grave misconduct, dishonesty, malpractices, and
unworthiness to become an officer of the Court.
The complainant before the Office of the Bar Confidant on June 23, 2004, alleged that on March
1, 2002, respondent had drafted and notarized a Real Estate Mortgage of a public market stall that
falsely named the former as its absolute and registered owner. The mortgagee sued complainant for
perjury and for collection of sum of money.
The respondent had also notarized two contracts that caused complainant legal and financial
problems. One contract was a lease agreement notarized by respondent sometime in September
1999 without the signature of the lessees and a sale agreement over a property covered by a
Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) which complainant entered into with a certain
Nicomedes Tala (Tala) on February 17, 1998.
The complainant subsequently submitted three Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs) notarized by
respondent and an Affidavit of Irene Tolentino, complainant’s secretary/treasurer. The SPAs were
not signed by the principals named therein and bore only the signature of the named attorney-in-
fact, Florina B. Limpioso.
In her Comment, respondent explained that the mortgage contract was prepared in the
presence of complainant and that the latter had read it before affixing her signature. However,
complainant urgently needed the loan proceeds so the contract was hastily done. It was only copied
from a similar file in respondent’s computer, and the phrase “absolute and registered owner” was
inadvertently left unedited.
Besides, there had been a prior mortgage contract over the same property in which
complainant was represented as the property’s absolute owner, but she did not complain.
Moreover, the cause of the perjury charge against complainant was not the representation of
herself as owner of the mortgaged property, but her guarantee that it was free from all liens and
encumbrances.
With respect to the lease agreement, respondent countered that the document attached to the
Affidavit-Complaint was actually new. She gave the court’s copy of the agreement to complainant to
accommodate the latter’s request for an extra copy
As regards the purchase agreement of a property covered by a CLOA, respondent claimed that
complainant was an experienced realty broker and, therefore, needed no advice on the
repercussions of that transaction.

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IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. recommended the immediate

revocation of the Notarial Commission of respondent and her disqualification as notary public for
two years for her violation of her oath as such by notarizing documents without the signatures of
the parties who had purportedly appeared before her.
The IBP Board of Governors, unanimously adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, with the modification that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for one year.
Respondent filed her first Motion for Reconsideration and Second Motion for Reconsideration
but was denied by the IBP Board of Governors.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the additional documents submitted in evidence by complainant are

inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of Section 4, Rule VI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice (NO)
HELD:
The 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no provision declaring the inadmissibility of
documents obtained in violation thereof. Thus, the IBP correctly considered in evidence the
other notarized documents submitted by complainant as additional evidence.
It cannot be said that the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion filed by complainant was a supplemental
pleading. One of the charges of the complainant against respondent is that the latter notarized
incomplete documents, as shown by the SPAs and lease agreement attached to the Affidavit-
Complaint. Complainant is not legally barred from submitting additional evidence to strengthen the
basis of her complaint.
Going now into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court finds that she
committed misconduct and grievously violated her oath as a notary public.
The important role a notary public cannot be overemphasized. The Court has repeatedly
stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act, but one invested with
substantive public interest.
Notarization converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in

evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, a notarized document is, by law, entitled
to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason that a notary public must observe with
utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his notarial duties; otherwise, the
public's confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be undermined.
Where the notary public admittedly has personal knowledge of a false statement or information
contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix the notarial seal on it, the Court

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must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the case may
dictate.
Respondent’s explanation about the unsigned lease agreement executed by complainant

sometime in September 1999 is incredulous. If, indeed, her file copy of the agreement bore the
lessees’ signatures, she could have given complainant a certified photocopy thereof. It even appears
that said lease agreement is not a rarity in respondent’s practice as a notary public.
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed it are the very
same ones who executed it and who personally appeared before the said notary public to attest to
the contents and truth of what are stated therein. Thus, in acknowledging that the parties
personally came and appeared before her, respondent also violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and her oath as a lawyer that she shall do no falsehood.
Certainly, respondent is unfit to continue enjoying the solemn office of a notary public.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit is found guilty of violating Canon 1
and Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility as well as her oath as
notary public. Hence, she is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE YEAR effective
immediately. Her notarial commission, if still existing, is IMMEDIATELY REVOKED and she is
hereby PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public.

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2. EUPROCINA I. CRISOSTOMO, MARILYN L. SOLIS, EVELYN MARQUIZO, ROSEMARIE

BALATUCAN, MILDRED BATANG, MARILEN MINERALES and MELINDA D. SIOTUNG vs.
ATTY. PHILIP Z. A. NAZARENO
A.C. No. 6677
June 10, 2014
FACTS:
In 2001, the complainants in herein case individually purchased housing units in Patricia South
Villa Subdivision in Cavite from Rudex International Development Corporation. Due to some
construction defects in both the housing units and subdivision itself, the complainants in this case
sought the rescission of their respective contracts to sell before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB), seeking refund of the monthly amortizations they had paid. The first
batch of rescission cases was filed by herein complainants Sioting on May 24, 2002, and Crisostomo
and Marquizo on June 10, 2002 while the second batch of cases was filed by complainants
Balatucan on March 3, 2003, Solis and Ederlinda M. Villanueva (represented by Minerales) on May
12, 2003, and Batang on July 29, 2003. In all the foregoing rescission cases, Rudex was represented
by herein respondent Atty. Nazareno.
RUDEX was declared in default in the first batch of cases. In August 2003, RUDEX filed three (3)
petitions for review before the HLURB assailing the order of default. In the certifications against
forum shopping attached to the petitions, RUDEX, through its President Ruben P. Baes, and legal
counsel Atty. Nazareno, stated that RUDEX has not commenced or has knowledge of any similar or
proceeding involving the same issues pending before any court, tribunal, or agency, this,
notwithstanding the fact that RUDEX, under the representation of Atty. Nazareno, previously filed
an ejectment case against Sioting and her husband before the MTC of Imus, Cavite.
On January 29, 2004, RUDEX filed another complaint against Sps. Sioting before the HLURB for
the rescission of their contract to sell and the latter’s ejectment, similar to its pending ejectment
case. Notwithstanding this fact, the certification against forum shopping attached in the complaint
declared that it has not commenced or is not aware of any action or proceeding involving the same
issues pending before any court, tribunal, or agency. The said certification was notarized by
respondent Atty. Nazareno.
On April 1, 2004, six (6) similar complaints for rescission of contracts to sell and ejectment, plus
damages for non-payment of amortizations due, were filed by Atty. Nazareno, on behaf of RUDEX,
against the other complainants before the HLURB. The certifications against forum shopping
attached thereto likewise stated that RUDEX has not commenced or has any knowledge of any
similar pending action before any court, tribunal or agency.
On February 21, 2005, the complainants filed an administrative complaint for disbarment
against Atty. Nazareno, alleging that in the certifications against forum shopping attached to the
rescission and ejectment complaints filed by the respondent on behalf of RUDEX made false
declarations therein that no similar actions or proceedings have been commenced by RUDEX or
remained pending before any court, tribunal, or agency. Complainants asserted that respondent
Atty. Nazareno committed malpractice as a notary public since he only assigned one (1) document
number in all certifications against forum shopping that were separately attached to the six (6)

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complaints for rescission and ejectment. Despite notice, respondent Atty. Nazareno failed to file his
comment and refute the administrative charges against him.
HLURB dismissed the complaints filed by RUDEX for rescission and ejectment on the ground
that the certifications against forum shopping were false due to the existence of similar pending
cases. On the other hand, the IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended the suspension of Atty.
Nazareno for a period of six (6) months due to his administrative violations. On April 15, 2013, the
IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved in a resolution the report and recommendation of
the IBP Investigating Commissioner, but modified the recommended penalty from a suspension of
six (6) months to one (1) month.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Nazareno should be held liable for his administrative violations (YES)
HELD:
Respondent Atty. Nazareno should be held to answer for the administrative charges against him
for making false representations with regard to the certificates against forum shopping
attached to the complaints he filed on behalf of RUDEX.
Under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the submission of false entries in a certification
against forum shopping constitutes indirect or direct contempt of court, and subjects the erring
counsel to corresponding administrative and criminal actions.
Owing to the evident similarity of the issues involved in each set of cases, Atty. Nazareno as
mandated by the Rules of Court and more pertinently, the Canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, should have truthfully declared the existence of the pending related cases in the
certifications against forum shopping attached to pertinent pleadings. Considering that Atty.
Nazareno did not even bother to refute the charges against him despite due notice, the Court finds
no cogent reason to deviate from the IBP’s resolution on his administrative liability.

Case
d. Commission Period and Expiration
1. EFIGENIA M. TENOSO vs. ATTY. ANSELMO S. ECHANEZ

A.C. No. 8384
April 11, 2013
FACTS:
Complainant filed a complaint against Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez alleging that respondent was
engaged in practice as a notary public in Cordon, lsabela, without having been properly
commissioned by the RTC exercising jurisdiction over the Municipality of Cordon.
This alleged act violates Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC). To
support her allegations, complainant attached the following documents to her pleadings:c
a) Two (2) documents signed and issued by RTC Executive Judge bearing the names of
commissioned notaries public within the territorial jurisdiction, respondent's name does not
appear on either list;
b) Copies of ten (10) documents that appear to have been notarized by respondent in the years
2006, 2007, and 2008; and
c) A copy of a certification issued by Judge Cacatian stating that a joint-affidavit notarized by
respondent in 2008 could not be "authenticated as to respondent's seal and signature as NO
Notarial Commission was issued upon him at the time of the document's notarization."
In his two-page Answer, respondent denied the allegations saying, "I have never been notarizing
any document or pleadings" and added that he has "never committed any malpractice, nor deceit nor
have violated the lawyers oath". Also, he surmised that the documents annexed to the Affidavit-
Complaint were "tampered and adulterated," or that "somebody might have forged his signature." He
failed to attend the mandatory conference and likewise failed to file his Position Paper.
In his Report and Recommendation, Investigating Commissioner recommended that

respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months and disqualified from being
commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years for violating Rules 1.01 and 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. In a Resolution on 2008, the IBP Board of Governors affirmed the
findings of the Investigating Commissioner but increased the penalty of suspension from six (6)
months to one (1) year. Respondent did not file a Motion for Reconsideration or any other
subsequent pleading. It then transmitted its recommendation to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent’s bare denials and allegations are sufficient to rebut complainant’s
allegations (NO)

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HELD:
NO, respondent failed to present evidence to rebut complainant's allegations.
Per Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the burden of proof is vested upon the party who
alleges the truth of his claim or defense or any fact in issue. Thus, in Leave Division, Office of
Administrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator v. Gutierrez, where a party resorts to
bare denials and allegations and fails to submit evidence in support of his defense, the
determination that he committed the violation is sustained. Respondent merely posited that
the notarized documents presented by complainant were "tampered and adulterated" or were
results of forgery, but he failed to present any proof. Respondent also resorted to a sweeping and
unsupported statement that he never notarized any document. Accordingly, the reasonable
conclusion is that respondent repeatedly notarized documents without the requisite
notarial commission.
Similarly, the duties of notaries public are dictated by public policy and impressed with public
interest. "Notarization is not a routinary, meaningless act, for notarization converts a private
document to a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of
preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution."
In misrepresenting himself as a notary public, respondent exposed party-litigants, courts,

other lawyers and the general public to the perils of ordinary documents posing as public
instruments. As noted by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent committed acts of deceit
and falsehood in open violation of the explicit pronouncements of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Evidently, respondent's conduct falls miserably short of the high standards of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing required from lawyers. It is proper that he be
sanctioned.
WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez guilty of engaging in notarial practice without a
notarial commission, and accordingly, We SUSPEND him from the practice of law for two (2) years
and DISQUALIFY him from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years. He is warned
that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall merit a more severe sanction.

Case
2. ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY LABORATORY HIGH SCHOOL FACULTY and STAFF vs. ATTY.
ROLANDO C. DELA CRUZ
A.C. No. 6010
August 28, 2006
FACTS:
Faculty members of SLU-LHS filed a disbarment case against Atty. Rolando C. Dela Cruz,
principal of SLU-LHS, predicated on the following grounds:
1) Gross Misconduct
- pending criminal case for child abuse against a highschool student
- pending administrative case filed by the faculty members and parents for his allege
unprofessional and unethical acts of misappropriating money supposedly for teachers
- pending labor case on alleged illegal deduction of salary by respondent
2) Grossly Immoral Conduct
- contracting second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage
3) Malpractice
- deliberately subscribing and notarizing legal documents on different dates from 1988 to
1977 despite expiration of respondent’s commission on December 31, 1987 as certified by
the Clerk of Court of RTC Baguio
Respondent, in his comment, denied the charges of child abuse and illegal deduction of salary
and others which are still pending before the proper courts. He did not discuss anything about the
allegations of immorality in contracting a second marriage and malpractice in notarizing
documents despite the expiration of his commission.
During the mandatory preliminary conference conducted by IBP, respondent expressly

admitted his second marriage despite existence of his first marriage, and the subsequent
nullification of the former. He also admitted having notarized certain documents during the period
when his notarial commission had already expired. However, he offered some extenuating defenses
such as good faith, lack of malice and noble intentions in doing the complained acts.
Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco respectfully recommended that respondent be

administratively penalized for the following acts:
1) for contracting second marriage without taking the appropriate legal steps to have the first
marriage annulled first, he be suspended from the practice of law for 1 year, and
2) for notarizing certain legal documents despite full knowledge of the expiration of his notarial
commission, he be suspended from the practice of law for another 1 year or for a total of 2
years.
IBP Board of Governors approved and adopted the recommendation of Commissioner Pacheco.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the recommendation of IBP is proper

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HELD:
(QUALIFIED) This Court finds the recommendation of the IBP to fault respondent well taken,
except as to the penalty contained therein.
It must be understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring [him] as an attorney is to

remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with
the duties and responsibilities belonging to an office of attorney and, thus, to protect the public and
those charged with the administration of justice, rather than to punish an attorney.
Equally worthy of remark is that the law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of
standards among its members. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed
in the lawyer’s professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide
his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, not only his
professional activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter may reflect unfavourable upon
the good name and prestige of the profession and the courts, may at any time be the subject of
inquiry on the part of the proper authorities.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court cites grossly immoral conduct as a ground for
disbarment.
The Court has laid down with a common definition of what constitutes immoral conduct, vis-à-
vis, grossly immoral conduct. Immoral conduct is "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community" and what is grossly immoral “that is, it must be so corrupt and false
as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree."
Undoubtedly, respondent’s act constitutes immoral conduct. But is it so gross as to warrant his
disbarment? Indeed, he exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a
member of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage while the first marriage
was still in place, is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.
However, measured against the definition, we are not prepared to consider respondent’s act
as grossly immoral. This finds support in the following recommendation and observation of the
IBP Investigator and IBP Board of Governors, thus:
The uncontested assertions of the respondent belie any intention to flaunt the law and the high
moral standard of the legal profession, to wit:
a. After his first failed marriage and prior to his second marriage or for a period of almost
seven (7) years, he has not been romantically involved with any woman;
b. His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and total love for his wife, whom he
described to be very intelligent person;
c. He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife and child;
d. He never disclaimed paternity over the child and husbandry with relation to his wife;
e. After the annulment of his second marriage, they have parted ways when the mother and
child went to Australia;
f. Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate.

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Based on the reasons stated above, we find the imposition of disbarment upon him to be unduly
harsh. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and may be imposed only in a
clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer
of the Court. Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty could accomplish the
end desired. In line with this philosophy, we find that a penalty of two years suspension is more
appropriate. The penalty of one (1) year suspension recommended by the IBP is too light and not
commensurate to the act committed by respondent.
As to the charge of misconduct for having notarized several documents during the years 1988-
1997 after his commission as notary public had expired, respondent humbly admitted having
notarized certain documents despite his knowledge that he no longer had authority to do so.
He, however, alleged that he received no payment in notarizing said documents.
It has been emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act.
On the contrary, it is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are
qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization of a private document converts
the document into a public one making it admissible in court without further proof of its
authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face and, for
this reason, notaries public must observe with the utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of
conveyance would be undermined.
The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated as a
mere casual formality. The Court has characterized a lawyer’s act of notarizing documents
without the requisite commission to do so as "reprehensible, constituting as it does not only
malpractice but also x x x the crime of falsification of public documents."
The Court had occasion to state that where the notarization of a document is done by a member
of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender
may be subjected to disciplinary action or one, performing a notarial act without such commission
is a violation of the lawyer’s oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too,
by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and
purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer’s oath similarly proscribes. These
violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct." By acting as a notary public without the proper commission to do so, the lawyer
likewise violates Canon 7 of the same Code, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession.

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3. HEINZ R. HECK vs. JUDGE ANTHONY E. SANTOS

A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657
February 23, 2004
FACTS:
Heinz R. Heck prayed for the disbarment of Judge Anthony E. Santos, RTC, Branch 19, Cagayan
de Oro City. The complainant alleged that prior to the respondent’s appointment as RTC judge on
April 11, 1989, he violated the notarial law, that he was not duly commissioned as notary public
until January 9, 1984 but still subscribed and forwarded (on a non-regular basis) notarized
documents to the Clerk of Court VI starting January 1980 uncommissioned until the 9th of January
1984.
a) Judge Santos was commissioned further January 16, 1986 to December 31, 1987 and
January 6, 1988 to December 31, 1989 but the records fail to show any entry at the
Clerk of Court after December 31, 1985 until December 31, 1989.
b) Judge Santos failed to forward his Notarial Register after the expiration of his
commission in December 1989.
Complainant prays to disbar Judge Anthony E. Santos and to prohibit him from all future public
service, to forfeit the retirement benefits of Judge Santos, to prohibit Judge Santos from future
practice of Law, to file a criminal suit against Judge Santos, to conduct a speedy investigation and
not to grant/accept any delaying tactics from Judge Santos or any agency and or public servants
involved in this administrative case, to pay all costs and related costs involved in this
administrative case and prays for other relief in accordance with equity and fairness based on the
premises.
Respondent judge denied the charges against him, submitted a certification from Clerk of Court,
Atty. Sabio-Beja, to prove that there was no proper recording of the commissioned lawyers in the
City of Cagayan de Oro as well as the submitted notarized documents/notarial register, that the
complainant has never been privy to the documents notarized and submitted by the respondent
before the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Misamis Oriental, nor his rights prejudiced on
account of the said notarized documents and therefore not the proper party to raise the said issues,
that the complainant was one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 94-334 for Specific Performance &
Sum of Money, filed before the RTC, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City, wherein respondent is the
Presiding Judge. The undersigned resolved the case in favor of the plaintiffs.
The Court resolved to: (a) treat the matter as a regular administrative complaint; and (b) refer
the case to Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz of the CA for investigation, report and
recommendation. The Investigating Justice Edgardo P. Cruz concluded, based on the evidence
presented by the complainant, that the respondent notarized documents in 1980 and 1983 without
being commissioned as a notary public therefor, considering that his earliest commission of record
was on January 9, 1984.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC is applicable (NO)

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2) Whether or not the procedure to be followed in disbarment cases involving a retired judge for
acts committed while he was still a practicing lawyer is the Rules of Court on Disbarment and
Discipline of Attorneys (YES)
3) Whether or not the retirement or resignation of a judge will preclude the filing thereafter of an
administrative charge against him for which he shall still be held answerable if found liable
therefor (NO)
4) Whether or not a judge may be disciplined for acts committed before his appointment to the
judiciary (YES)
5) Whether or not notarizing documents without the requisite commission therefore constitutes
malpractice, if not the crime of falsification of public documents (YES)
6) Whether or not the charge against the respondent is supported by the evidence on record (YES)
7) Whether or not an administrative complaint against a member of the bar prescribes (NO)
8) Whether or not the delay in the institution of the administrative case would merely mitigate the
respondent’s liability (YES)
HELD:
1) Whether or not Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC is applicable
NO.
Before the Court approved this resolution, administrative and disbarment cases against
members of the bar who were likewise members of the court were treated separately. Pursuant to
the new rule, administrative cases against erring justices of the CA and the Sandiganbayan, judges,
and lawyers in the government service may be automatically treated as disbarment cases. The
Resolution, which took effect on October 1, 2002, also provides that it shall supplement Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court, and shall apply to administrative cases already filed where the respondents have
not yet been required to comment on the complaints. The instant case is not covered by the
foregoing resolution, since the respondent filed his Answer/Comment on June 13, 2001.
2) Whether or not the procedure to be followed in disbarment cases involving a retired

judge for acts committed while he was still a practicing lawyer is the Rules of Court on
Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys
YES.
The respondent is being charged not for acts committed as a judge; he is charged, as a member
of the bar, with notarizing documents without the requisite notarial commission therefor. The
investigation may thereafter commence either before the IBP, in accordance with Sections 2 to
Sections 12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys, or before
the SC in accordance with Sections 13 and 14. A complaint for disbarment is cognizable by the Court
itself, and its indorsement to the IBP is not mandatory. The Court may refer the complaint for
investigation, report and recommendation to the Solicitor General, any officer of the court or a
judge of a lower court, on which the Court will thereafter base its final action.
Although the respondent has already retired from the judiciary, he is still considered as a
member of the bar and as such, is not immune to the disciplining arm of the SC, pursuant to Article

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VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution. At the time of the filing of the complaint, the respondent was
still the presiding judge of the RTC, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City. As such, the complaint was
cognizable by the Court itself, as the Rule mandates that in case the respondent is a justice of the
CTA or the lower court, the complaint shall be filed with the Supreme Court.
3) Whether or not the retirement or resignation of a judge will preclude the filing thereafter
of an administrative charge against him for which he shall still be held answerable if found
liable therefor
NO.
The fact that a judge has retired or has otherwise been separated from the service does not
necessarily divest the Court of its jurisdiction to determine the veracity of the allegations of the
complaint, pursuant to its disciplinary authority over members of the bench. The jurisdiction that
was ours at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that
the respondent, had ceased in office during the pendency of his case. The Court retains jurisdiction
either to pronounce the respondent public official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty
thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous
implications... If innocent, respondent public official merits vindication of his name and integrity as
he leaves the government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive
the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation (Gallos vs.
Cordero).
We issued A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC, which took effect on November 3, 2003. In order for an
administrative complaint against a retiring or retired judge or justice to be dismissed outright, the
following requisites must concur: (1) the complaint must have been filed within six months from
the compulsory retirement of the judge or justice; (2) the cause of action must have occurred at
least a year before such filing; and, (3) it is shown that the complaint was intended to harass the
respondent. In this case, the Administrative Complaint dated March 21, 2001 was received by the
Office of the Court Administrator on March 26, 2001. The respondent retired compulsorily from the
service more than a year later, or on May 22, 2002. Likewise, the ground for disbarment or
disciplinary action alleged to have been committed by the respondent did not occur a year before
the respondents separation from the service. The instant complaint was not prima facie shown to
be without merit and intended merely to harass the respondent. Clearly, therefore, the instant case
does not fall within the ambit of the foregoing resolution.
4) Whether or not a judge may be disciplined for acts committed before his appointment to
the judiciary
YES.
A judge may be disciplined for acts committed prior to his appointment to the judiciary. Even
the new Rule itself recognizes this, as it provides for the immediate forwarding to the SC for
disposition and adjudication of charges against justices and judges before the IBP, including those
filed prior to their appointment to the judiciary. It need not be shown that the respondent
continued the doing of the act or acts complained of; it is sufficient that the evidence on record
supports the charge on the respondent, considering the gravity of the offense. The practice of law is
so ultimately affected with public interest that it is both the right and duty of the State to control

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and regulate it in order to promote the public welfare. The Constitution vests this power of control
and regulation in this Court. The SC, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary
power over attorneys, which authority is not only a right but a bounden duty as well. This is why
respect and fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members.
5) Whether or not notarizing documents without the requisite commission therefore

constitutes malpractice, if not the crime of falsification of public documents
YES.
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is invested with
substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as
notaries public. Notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public one,
making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and
due execution. The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be
treated as a mere casual formality. The Court has characterized a lawyer’s act of notarizing
documents without the requisite commission therefore as reprehensible, constituting as it does
not only malpractice, but also the crime of falsification of public documents. For such
reprehensible conduct, the Court has sanctioned erring lawyers by suspension from the practice of
law, revocation of the notarial commission and disqualification from acting as such, and even
disbarment.
Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when
he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary
action. For one, performing a notarial act without such commission is a violation of the lawyer’s
oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he
is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in
deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer’s oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely
within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Nunga vs.
Viray).
The importance of the function of a notary public cannot, therefore, be over-emphasized. No

less than the public faith in the integrity of public documents is at stake in every aspect of that
function.
6) Whether or not the charge against the respondent is supported by the evidence on record
YES.
The respondent did not object to the complainant’s formal offer of evidence, prompting the
Investigating Justice to decide the case on the basis of the pleadings filed. Neither did he claim that
he was commissioned as notary public for the years 1980 to 1983, nor deny the accuracy of the first
certification. The respondent merely alleged in his answer that there was no proper recording of
the commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor of the submitted Notarized
Documents/Notarial Register. Furthermore, as found by the Investigating Justice, the respondent
presented no evidence of his commission as notary public for the years 1980 to 1983, as well as
proof of submission of notarial reports and the notarial register.

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The respondent in this case was given an opportunity to answer the charges and to controvert
the evidence against him in a formal investigation. When the integrity of a member of the bar is
challenged, it is not enough that he deny the charges; he must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence against him.
The respondent’s allegation that the complainant was not a party in any of the documents so
notarized, and as such was not prejudiced thereby, is unavailing. An attorney may be disbarred or
suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor which include
the statutory grounds under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. Any interested person
or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings. There can be no doubt as to the
right of a citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority acts and doings of public officers
which citizens feel are incompatible with the duties of the office and from which conduct the citizen
or the public might or does suffer undesirable consequences.
7) Whether or not an administrative complaint against a member of the bar prescribes
NO.
The qualification of good moral character is a requirement which is not dispensed with upon
admission to membership of the bar. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the legal profession, but its continued possession is essential to maintain ones good
standing in the profession. It is a continuing requirement to the practice of law and therefore does
not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning
one’s mental or moral fitness before he became a lawyer. This is because his admission to practice
merely creates a rebuttable presumption that he has all the qualifications to become a lawyer. The
rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains
to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity
or good demeanor. Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission
to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of law.
An administrative complaint against an erring lawyer who was thereafter appointed as a judge,
albeit filed only after twenty-four years after the offending act was committed, is not barred by
prescription. If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened to disregard
the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant
would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated from
whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for. It is the duty of this Court to protect the
integrity of the practice of law as well as the administration of justice. No matter how much time
has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complained of and the time of the
institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the
disciplining arm of the Court. This categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members
of the bench and bar, to deter them from committing acts which violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the Lawyer’s Oath. This should particularly apply in
this case, considering the seriousness of the matter involved - the respondent’s dishonesty and
the sanctity of notarial documents.

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Thus, even the lapse of considerable time, from the commission of the offending act to the
institution of the administrative complaint, will not erase the administrative culpability of a lawyer
who notarizes documents without the requisite authority therefor.
8) Whether or not the delay in the institution of the administrative case would merely
mitigate the respondent’s liability
YES.
The settled principle is that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the
State on those who show that they possess the qualifications required by law for the conferment of
such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A high sense of
morality, honesty, and fair dealing is expected and required of a member of the bar. The
respondent failed to live up to such standards; he undermined the confidence of the public on
notarial documents and thereby breached Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
requires lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the
law and legal processes. The respondent also violated Rule 1.01 thereof which proscribes lawyers
from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. In representing that he was
possessed of the requisite notarial commission when he was, in fact, not so authorized, the
respondent also violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a
lawyer that he shall do no falsehood.
The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. While we will not
hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers where the
evidence calls for it, we will likewise not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to
accomplish the desired end. Furthermore, a tempering of justice is mandated in this case,
considering that the complaint against the respondent was filed twenty-four years after the
commission of the act complained of; that there was no private offended party who came forward
and claimed to have been adversely affected by the documents so notarized by the respondent; and,
the fact that the respondent is a retired judge who deserves to enjoy the full measure of his well-
earned retirement benefits. The Court finds that a fine of P5,000.00 is justified in this case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Anthony E. Santos is found GUILTY of notarizing documents

without the requisite notarial commission therefor. He is hereby ORDERED to pay a fine in the
amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).

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4. MILA VIRTUSIO vs. ATTY. GRENALYN V. VIRTUSIO

A.C. No. 6753
September 5, 2012
FACTS:
Mila Virtusio (Mila) filed with this Court a Complaint for disbarment against her husband's
distant relative, Atty. Grenalyn V. Virtusio. Mila alleged that Atty. Virtusio convinced her to buy a
house and lot at North Olympus Subdivision in Novaliches, Quezon City, from its developer,
Stateland Investment Corporation (Stateland). Mila agreed for Atty. Virtusio to use her personal
checks in paying the seller with Mila reimbursing her. In all, Mila gave her P441,000.00.
Mila began receiving letters from Stateland, demanding that she make good the dishonored
checks that it got. When she confronted Atty. Virtusio regarding this, the latter assured her that she
would take care of the problem. But the demand letters persisted.
For fear of losing the property, Mila directly dealt with Stateland. She then found out that her
arrearages had come close to P200,000.00, inclusive of penalty and interest. In order not to lose the
property, Mila and her husband decided to settle their overdue obligation with money they
borrowed at high interest. In turn, Stateland turned over to her three checks of Atty. Virtusio.
Mila further alleged that Atty. Virtusio declined to return to her the money the latter
misappropriated despite demand. Only when Mila threatened to file a case against her did Atty.
Virtusio agree to pay her by executing a deed of sale in her favor covering her Mazda car. Atty.
Virtusio pleaded with Mila and her husband to let her keep the car meanwhile since she needed it in
her work. When she refused to give up the car, Mila filed a replevin case against Atty. Virtusio that
the court eventually decided in Mila’s favor. But, as it turned out, Atty. Virtusio had managed to
register the car in her children’s name and sold it to a third person. Mila filed a case of
estafa against Atty. Virtusio apart from the present disbarment case.
Mila claimed that Atty. Virtusio evaded the return of money she misappropriated, impeded the
execution of a final judgment, and engaged in conduct that discredits the legal profession, all in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, rendering her unfit to remain a member of the
bar.
The IBP Investigating Commissioner reported having found that Atty. Virtusio appropriated
portions of the money that Mila gave her for payment to Stateland, thus evidencing her moral
unfitness to practice the profession. The Commissioner recommended the imposition of the penalty
of one year suspension from the practice of law with a two-year disqualification from
reappointment as Notary Public, given that she had notarized documents despite the
expiration of her notarial commission. The IBP Board of Governors approved the report and
recommendation.
In her version of the facts, Atty. Virtusio wants to convince the Court that she committed no
intentional wrongs and that she was but a victim of circumstances. Although she admitted using
Mila’s money rather than pay Stateland with it, she explained that, having been busy attending to
her sick son in Manila, she failed to monitor her check disbursements, entrusting it to an office staff.

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She was only able to audit the same and discover the mismanagement of her funds and its co-
mingling with office funds thereafter, resulting in overlapping of accountabilities and non-funding
of the checks for Stateland when they fell due.
Atty. Virtusio averred that she and Mila entered into a verbal agreement whereby she would
pay her P200,000.00, with P87,500.00 up front, in exchange for Mila’s dismissal of all her actions.
Notwithstanding that the compromise agreement had not been formalized, Atty. Virtusio claimed
that it obliterated her liabilities, given that she substantially settled her obligations to Mila.
Atty. Virtusio also pointed out, that the charges against her were not born of some professional
relation between Mila and her because she had acted as an accommodation party to facilitate the
purchase of a property from Stateland. And, assuming that it has a bearing on her professional
conduct, the same does not amount to grossly immoral conduct. Further, Atty. Virtusio claimed that
she should not be penalized for violation of the notarial law since this offense did not form part of
the original complaint to which she was required to respond. At any rate, she merely committed an
oversight. When she notarized the questioned documents, she believed in good faith that she had
renewed her notarial commission. She asked not to be punished for her mistake since it was
brought about by her sincere commitment to extend free legal service to the disadvantaged
and asked the Court to reconsider the harsh penalty imposed on her in the light of the peculiar
circumstances of her case and the good faith she showed.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the IBP erred in finding Atty. Virtusio guilty of grave misconduct in her dealings
with Mila and in notarizing documents without a renewed commission (NO)
2) Assuming Atty. Virtusio was guilty of some offenses, whether or not the IBP imposed the
appropriate penalties on her (YES)
HELD:
1) NO, the IBP did not commit an error.
Atty. Virtusio is guilty by her acts of gross misconduct that warrants her suspension from the
practice of law.
Atty. Virtusio admitted misusing the money that Mila entrusted to her for payment to Stateland.
Her excuse is that she lost track of her finances and mixed up her office funds with her personal
funds. But this excuse is too thin. Indeed she tried to borrow money from a third person to cover it
up rather than just offer her shallow excuse to Mila. Atty. Virtusio’s use for personal purpose of
money entrusted to her constitutes dishonest and deceitful conduct under the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Atty. Virtusio cannot absolve herself of liability by claiming that she failed to attend to her
finances because she had to look after a sick child at that time. In truth, she spent the money that
Mila entrusted to her because she had no other funds. Indeed, she had to borrow money from a
third party later to remedy her financial problems.

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Further, Atty. Virtusio executed a deed of sale covering her car in Mila’s favor rather than return
the money she defalcated. But, again acting with guile, she withheld possession of the car and
transferred its registration in the name of her children.
2) YES, Atty. Virtusio is guilty by her above acts of gross misconduct that warrants her
suspension for one year from the practice of law following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court.
With regard to her notarial act, the court cannot also countenance Atty. Virtusio’s notarization
of documents after her notarial commission had expired. A lawyer who notarizes a document
without a proper commission violates his lawyer’s oath to obey the law. He makes it appear
that he is commissioned when he is not. He thus indulges in deliberate falsehood that the lawyer’s
oath forbids. This violation falls squarely under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Canon 7 as well. A proper sanction is authorized.
Considering, however, that based on the evidence Atty. Virtusio had notarized only two
documents without a proper notarial commission, the Court finds her suspension from notarial
practice for one year adequate.
The fact that Mila had agreed after some financial settlement to withdraw her complaint against
Atty. Virtusio cannot exempt the latter from the prescribed sanction. She has outraged the country’s
professional code and this demands a measure of justice. Moreover, disbarment is a disciplinary
action taken for the public good. Consequently, it is as a rule not subject to some compromise
entered into with the complainant.

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5. ARTURO L. SICAT vs. ATTY. GREGORIO E. ARIOLA, JR.

A.C. No. 5864
April 15, 2005
FACTS:
Complainant Arturo L. Sicat, a Board Member of the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Rizal,

charged respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, the Municipal Administrator of Cainta, Rizal, with
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility by committing fraud, deceit and falsehood in his
dealings, particularly the notarization of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed by
a one Juanito C. Benitez.
According to complainant, respondent made it appear that Benitez executed the said document
on January 4, 2001 when in fact the latter had already died on October 25, 2000. He alleged that
prior to the notarization, the Municipality of Cainta had entered into a contract with J.C. Benitez
Architect and Technical Management, represented by Benitez, for the construction of low-cost
houses. The cost of the architectural and engineering designs amounted to P11,000,000 and two
consultants were engaged to supervise the project. For the services of the consultants, the
Municipality of Cainta issued a check dated January 10, 2001 in the amount of P3,700,000, payable
to J.C. Benitez Architects and Technical Management and/or Cesar Goco. The check was received
and encashed by the latter by virtue of the authority of the SPA notarized by respondent Ariola.
Complainant further charged respondent with the crime of falsification penalized under Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code by making it appear that certain persons participated in an act or
proceeding when in fact they did not.
Respondent explained that, as early as May 12, 2000, Benitez had already signed the SPA. He
claimed that due to inadvertence, it was only on January 4, 2001 that he was able to notarize it.
Nevertheless, the SPA notarized by him on January 4, 2001 was not at all necessary because Benitez
had signed a similar SPA in favor of Goco sometime before his death, on May 12, 2000. Because it
was no longer necessary, the SPA was cancelled the same day he notarized it, hence, legally, there
was no public document that existed.
Respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping since
similar charges had been filed with the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon. According to him, the complaints were later dismissed based on findings
that the assailed act referred to violations of the implementing rules and regulations of PD 1594, PD
1445, RA 7160 and other pertinent rules of the Commission on Audit (COA). He stressed that no
criminal and administrative charges were recommended for filing against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent’s act was a serious breach of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (YES)

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HELD:
We find that respondent never disputed complainant’s accusation that he notarized the SPA
purportedly executed by Benitez on January 4, 2001. He never took issue with the fact that on said
date, Benitez was already dead. His act was a serious breach of the sacred obligation imposed upon
him by the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which prohibited
him from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. As a lawyer and as an
officer of the court, it was his duty to serve the ends of justice, not to corrupt it. Oath-bound, he was
expected to act at all times in accordance with law and ethics, and if he did not, he would not only
injure himself and the public but also bring reproach upon an honorable profession.
Lawyers commissioned as notaries public should not authenticate documents unless the
persons who signed them are the very same persons who executed them and personally
appeared before them to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. Notaries
public must observe with utmost fidelity, the basic requirement in the performance of their duties,
otherwise the confidence of the public in the integrity of notarized deeds and documents will be
undermined.
Here, the records show that Benitez died on October 25, 2000. However, respondent notarized
the SPA, purportedly bearing the signature of Benitez, on January 4, 2001 or more than two months
after the latter’s death. The notarial acknowledgement of respondent declared that Benitez
appeared before him and acknowledged that the instrument was his free and voluntary act.
Clearly, respondent lied and intentionally perpetuated an untruthful statement. Notarization
is not an empty, meaningless and routinary act. It converts a private document into a public
instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its
authenticity and due execution.
Neither will respondent’s defense that the SPA in question was superfluous and
unnecessary, and prejudiced no one, exonerate him of accountability. His assertion of
falsehood in a public document contravened one of the most cherished tenets of the legal
profession and potentially cast suspicion on the truthfulness of every notarial act. As the Municipal
Administrator of Cainta, he should have been aware of his great responsibility not only as a notary
public but as a public officer as well. A public office is a public trust. Respondent should not have
caused disservice to his constituents by consciously performing an act that would deceive them and
the Municipality of Cainta. Without the fraudulent SPA, the erring parties in the construction project
could not have encashed the check amounting to P3,700,000 and could not have foisted on the
public a spurious contract ― all to the extreme prejudice of the very Municipality of which he was
the Administrator.
According to the COA Special Task Force almost all acts of falsification of public documents as
enumerated in Article 171 in relation to Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code were evident in the
transactions of the Municipality of Cainta with J.C. Benitez & Architects Technical Management for
the consultancy services in the conduct of Detailed Feasibility Study and Detailed Engineering
Design of the Proposed Construction of Cainta Municipal Medium Rise Low Cost Housing, in the
contract amount of P11,000,000. The agent resorted to misrepresentation, manufacture or
fabrication of fictitious document, untruthful narration of facts, misrepresentation, and
counterfeiting or imitating signature for the purpose of creating a fraudulent contract. All these
were tainted with deceit perpetrated against the government resulting to undue injury. The first

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and partial payment, in the amount of P3,700,000.00 was made in the absence of the required
outputs.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, Jr., is found guilty of gross misconduct and
is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.

Case
6. VICTORINA BAUTISTA vs. ATTY. SERGIO E. BERNABE

A.C. No. 6963
February 9, 2006
FACTS:
Complainant alleged that on January 3, 1998, respondent prepared and notarized a Magkasanib
na Salaysay purportedly executed by Donato Salonga and complainant’s mother, Basilia de la Cruz.
Both affiants declared that a certain parcel of land in Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan, was being
occupied by Rodolfo Lucas and his family for more than 30 years. Complainant claimed that her
mother could not have executed the joint affidavit on January 3, 1998 because she has been dead
since January 28, 1961.
Respondent denied that he falsified the Magkasanib na Salaysay. He disclaimed any knowledge
about Basilia’s death. He alleged that before he notarized the document, he requested for Basilia’s
presence and in her absence, he allowed a certain Pronebo, allegedly a son-in-law of Basilia, to sign
above the name of the latter as shown by the word "by" on top of the name of Basilia. Respondent
maintained that there was no forgery since the signature appearing on top of Basilia’s name was the
signature of Pronebo.
Respondent filed a manifestation attaching thereto the affidavit of desistance of complainant

which reads in part:
Ako na si, VICTORINA BAUTISTA CAPA, x x x matapos makapanumpa ng naaayon sa batas ay

malaya at kusang loob na nagpapahayag ng mga sumusunod:
1. Na ako ang siyang tumatayong nagrereklamo laban kay Abogado, SERGIO EXQUIVEL
BERNABE, sa isang kaso sa Tanggapan ng Integrated Bar of the Philippines na may Blg. CBD
CASE NO. 04-1371;
2. Na ang nasabing habla ay hindi ko kagustuhan sapagkat iyon ay pinapirmahan lamang sa
akin ni ELISEO OLOROSO at ng kanyang Abogado na si Atty. MARCIAL MORFE MAGSINO at sa
katunayan hindi ako nakaharap sa Notaryo Publiko na si Abogado CARLITOS C. VILLARIN;
3. Na ang pagpapapirma sa akin ay isang panlilinlang at ako ay ginawang kasangkapan para
sirain ang magandang pangalan nitong si Abogado SERGIO ESQUIVEL BERNABE;
4. Na dahil sa ganitong pangyayari, aking hinihiling sa Tanggapan ng Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) na ang reklamo ko laban sa nasabing Abogado SERGIO ESQUIVEL BERNABE
ay mapawalang bisa.
The IBP suspended the respondent from practicing law for 1 month and revoked his notarial
commission for a period of 1 year.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent violated the Notarial Practices Act (YES)

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HELD:
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP. The records sufficiently established
that Basilia was already dead when the joint affidavit was prepared on January 3, 1998.
Respondent’s alleged lack of knowledge of Basilia’s death does not excuse him. It was his
duty to require the personal appearance of the affiant before affixing his notarial seal and
signature on the instrument.
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the
very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and
truth of what are stated therein. The presence of the parties to the deed will enable the notary
public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the affiant.
By affixing his signature and notarial seal on the instrument, he led us to believe that Basilia
personally appeared before him and attested to the truth and veracity of the contents of the
affidavit when in fact it was a certain Pronebo who signed the document. Respondent’s conduct is
fraught with dangerous possibilities considering the conclusiveness on the due execution of a
document that our courts and the public accord on notarized documents. Respondent has clearly
failed to exercise utmost diligence in the performance of his function as a notary public and
to comply with the mandates of the law.
Respondent was also remiss in his duty when he allowed Pronebo to sign in behalf of Basilia. A
member of the bar who performs an act as a notary public should not notarize a document unless
the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared
before him. The acts of the affiants cannot be delegated to anyone for what are stated therein
are facts of which they have personal knowledge. They should swear to the document
personally and not through any representative. Otherwise, their representative’s name should
appear in the said documents as the one who executed the same. That is the only time the
representative can affix his signature and personally appear before the notary public for
notarization of the said document. Simply put, the party or parties who executed the instrument
must be the ones to personally appear before the notary public to acknowledge the
document.
For breach of the Notarial Law and Code of Professional Responsibility, the notarial
commission of respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe, is REVOKED. He is DISQUALIFIED from
reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two years. He is also SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of one year, effective immediately. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the
same or of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of
receipt of this Decision in order to determine when his suspension shall take effect.

Case
7. SPOUSES CLARO and NIDA BAUTISTA vs. BERLINDA F. SILVA

A.C. No. 6470
July 8, 2014
FACTS:
A parcel of land located in Valenzuela, Metro Manila was registered in the names of Spouses
Berna and Pedro Silva. Sometime in March 1998, Pedro Silva, for himself and as attorney-in-fact of
his wife Berlina Silva thru a SPA purportedly executed by Berlina Silva in his favor, signed and
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the said lot in favor of defendant-spouses Claro and Nida
Bautista. As a consequence, a new TCT was issued in the names of spouses Bautista.
Based on the evidence presented, the RTC also found that the signature appearing on the SPA as
that of Berlina Silva is a forgery, and that consequently the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Pedro
in favor of Spouses Bautista is not authorized by Berlinda.
The RTC rendered judgment declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale null and void and ordering that
the resulting TCT in the name of Spouses Bautista be cancelled and the former TCT in the name of
Spouses Silva reinstated.
Spouses Bautista filed an appeal with the CA which affirmed in toto the RTC decision.
Hence, the herein petition is filed by Spouses Bautista praying that the CA Decision and
Resolution be annulled and set aside on the following grounds:
1) The petitioners are considered as purchasers in good faith and for value having relied upon
a Special Power of Attorney which appears legal, valid and genuine on its face.
2) Gratia argumenti that the special power of attorney is a forgery and the deed of sale
executed by the husband is null and void, the nullity thereof does not include the one half
share of the husband.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Spouses Bautista are purchasers in good faith when they relied in the SPA with
notarial acknowledgment of the seller (NO)
HELD:
The petition fails for lack of merit.
That the SPA is a forgery is a finding of the RTC and the CA on a question of fact. The same is
conclusive upon the Court, especially as it is based on the expert opinion of the NBI which
constitutes more than clear, positive and convincing evidence that respondent did not sign the SPA,
and on the uncontroverted Certification of Dorado that respondent was in Germany working as a
nurse when the SPA was purportedly executed in 1987.

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The SPA being a forgery, it did not vest in Pedro any authority to alienate the subject
property without the consent of respondent. Absent such marital consent, the deed of sale was a
nullity.
But then petitioners (Spouses Bautista) disclaim any participation in the forgery of the SPA or
in the unauthorized sale of the subject property. They are adamant that even with their knowledge
that respondent was in Germany at the time of the sale, they acted in good faith when they bought
the subject property from Pedro alone because the latter was equipped with a SPA which contains a
notarial acknowledgment that the same is valid and authentic. In the alternative, petitioners offer
that should respondent be declared entitled to reconveyance, let it affect her portion only but not
that of Pedro.
A buyer for value in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice that some
other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays full and fair price for the same, at
the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in
the property. He buys the property with the well-founded belief that the person from whom he
receives the thing had title to the property and capacity to convey it.
To prove good faith, a buyer of registered and titled land need only show that he relied on the
face of the title to the property. He need not prove that he made further inquiry for he is not
obliged to explore beyond the four corners of the title. Such degree of proof of good faith,
however, is sufficient only when the following conditions concur: first, the seller is the
registered owner of the land; second, the latter is in possession thereof; and third, at the time of
the sale, the buyer was not aware of any claim or interest of some other person in the property, or
of any defect or restriction in the title of the seller or in his capacity to convey title to the property.
Absent one or two of the foregoing conditions, then the law itself puts the buyer on notice
and obliges the latter to exercise a higher degree of diligence by scrutinizing the certificate of
title and examining all factual circumstances in order to determine the seller's title and capacity to
transfer any interest in the property. Under such circumstance, it is no longer sufficient for said
buyer to merely show that he relied on the face of the title; he must now also show that he
exercised reasonable precaution by inquiring beyond the title. Failure to exercise such degree
of precaution makes him a buyer in bad faith.
In the present case, petitioners were dealing with a seller (Pedro) who had title to and
possession of the land but, as indicated on the face of his title, whose capacity to sell was
restricted, in that the marital consent of respondent is required before he could convey the
property. To prove good faith then, petitioners must show that they inquired not only into the
title of Pedro but also into his capacity to sell.
According to petitioners, to determine Pedro's capacity to sell, they conducted the following
forms of inquiry: first, they inspected the photocopy of the SPA presented to them by Pedro; second,
they brought said copy to Atty. Lorenzo Lucero (the notary public who prepared the deed of sale)
and asked whether it was genuine; and third, they inspected the original copy of the SPA after they
advanced payment of P55,000.00 to Pedro. Essentially, petitioners relied on the SPA, specifically on
its notarial acknowledgment which states that respondent appeared before the notary public and
acknowledged having executed the SPA in favor of Pedro.

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When the document under scrutiny is a special power of attorney that is duly notarized,
we know it to be a public document where the notarial acknowledgment is prima facie
evidence of the fact of its due execution. A buyer presented with such a document would have no
choice between knowing and finding out whether a forger lurks beneath the signature on it. The
notarial acknowledgment has removed that choice from him and replaced it with a presumption
sanctioned by law that the affiant appeared before the notary public and acknowledged that he
executed the document, understood its import and signed it. In reality, he is deprived of such choice
not because he is incapable of knowing and finding out but because, under our notarial system, he
has been given the luxury of merely relying on the presumption of regularity of a duly notarized
SPA.
In sum, all things being equal, a person dealing with a seller who has possession and title to the
property but whose capacity to sell is restricted, qualifies as a buyer in good faith if he proves that
he inquired into the title of the seller as well as into the latter's capacity to sell; and that in his
inquiry, he relied on the notarial acknowledgment found in the seller's duly notarized special
power of attorney. He need not prove anything more for it is already the function of the notarial
acknowledgment to establish the appearance of the parties to the document, its due execution and
authenticity. However, said rule should not apply when there is an apparent flaw afflicting
the notarial acknowledgment of the SPA as would cast doubt on the due execution and
authenticity of the document; or when the buyer has actual notice of circumstances outside the
document that would render suspect its genuineness.
In the present case, petitioners knew that Berlina was in Germany at the time they were
buying the property and the SPA relied upon by petitioners has a defective notarial
acknowledgment. The SPA was a mere photocopy and we are not convinced that there ever was
an original copy of said SPA as it was only this photocopy that was testified to by petitioner Nida
Bautista and offered into evidence by her counsel. We emphasize this fact because it was actually
this photocopy that was relied upon by petitioners before they entered into the deed of sale with
Pedro. As admitted to by petitioner Nida Bautista, upon inspection of the photocopy of the SPA, they
gave Pedro an advanced payment of P55,000.00; this signifies that, without further investigation on
the SPA, petitioners had agreed to buy the subject property from Pedro.
But then said photocopy of the SPA contains no notarial seal. A notarial seal is a mark,
image or impression on a document which would indicate that the notary public has officially
signed it. There being no notarial seal, the signature of the notary public on the notarial certificate
was therefore incomplete. The notarial certificate being deficient, it was as if the notarial
acknowledgment was unsigned. The photocopy of the SPA has no notarial acknowledgment to
speak of. It was a mere private document which petitioners cannot foist as a banner of good faith.
All told, it was not sufficient evidence of good faith that petitioners merely relied on the
photocopy of the SPA as this turned out to be a mere private document. They should have
adduced more evidence that they looked beyond it. They did not. Instead, they took no precautions
at all. They verified with Atty. Lucero whether the SPA was authentic but then the latter was not the
notary public who prepared the document. Worse, they purposely failed to inquire who the notary
public who prepared the SPA was. Finally, petitioners conducted the transaction in haste. It took
them all but three days or from March 2 to 4, 1988 to enter into the deed of sale, notwithstanding
the restriction on the capacity to sell of Pedro. In no way then may petitioners qualify as buyers for
value in good faith.

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That said, we come to the issue on whether petitioners may retain the portion of Pedro Silva in
the subject property. Certainly not. It is well-settled that the nullity of the sale of conjugal
property contracted by the husband without the marital consent of the wife affects the entire
property, not just the share of the wife. We see no reason to deviate from this rule.

Case
e. Notarial Jurisdiction
1. BELLA A. GUERRERO vs. RESURRECCION A. BIHIS

G.R. No. 174144
April 17, 2007
“The Scriptures tell the story of the brothers Jacob and Esau siblings who fought bitterly over the
inheritance of their father Isaac's estate. Jurisprudence is also replete with cases involving
acrimonious conflicts between brothers and sisters over successional rights. This case is no exception.”
FACTS:
On February 19, 1994, Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, mother of petitioner Bella A. Guerrero
and respondent Resurreccion A. Bihis, died at the Metropolitan Hospital in Tondo, Manila.
On May 24, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last will and testament of the
decedent.
The petition alleged the following: petitioner was named as executrix in the decedent's will and
she was legally qualified to act as such; the decedent was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of
her death; at the time of the execution of the will, the testatrix was 79 years old, of sound and
disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence and was capacitated to dispose
of her estate by will.
Respondent opposed her elder sister's petition on the following grounds: the will was not
executed and attested as required by law; its attestation clause and acknowledgment did not
comply with the requirements of the law; the signature of the testatrix was procured by fraud and
petitioner and her children procured the will through undue and improper pressure and influence.
RTC: Appointed petitioner as special administratrix of the decedent's estate. Respondent

opposed petitioner's appointment but subsequently withdrew her opposition. Petitioner took her
oath as temporary special administratrix and letters of special administration were issued to her.
RTC: In a resolution dated July 6, 2001, the trial court denied the probate of the will ruling that
Article 806 of the Civil Code was not complied with because the will was "acknowledged" by the
testatrix and the witnesses at the testatrix's residence at No. 40 Kanlaon Street, Quezon City before
Atty. Macario O. Directo who was a commissioned notary public for and in Caloocan City.
CA: Dismissed the appeal and affirmed the resolution of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will "acknowledged" by the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses before
a notary public acting outside the place of his commission satisfied the requirement under Article
806 of the Civil Code (NO)

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HELD:
NO, the acknowledgement is void for the Notary Public acted outside its jurisdiction.
Petitioner admits that the will was acknowledged by the testatrix and the witnesses at the
testatrix's residence in Quezon City before Atty. Directo and that, at that time, Atty. Directo was a
commissioned notary public for and in Caloocan City. She, however, asserts that the fact that the
notary public was acting outside his territorial jurisdiction did not affect the validity of the notarial
will.
Article 806 of the Civil Code provides: “Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public
by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or
file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.”
One of the formalities required by law in connection with the execution of a notarial will is that
it must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. This formal
requirement is one of the indispensable requisites for the validity of a will. In other words, a
notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the instrumental
witnesses is void and cannot be accepted for probate.
An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent
officer and declaring it to be his act or deed. In the case of a notarial will, that competent officer is
the notary public.
The acknowledgment of a notarial will coerces the testator and the instrumental witnesses to
declare before an officer of the law, the notary public that they executed and subscribed to the
will as their own free act or deed. Such declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury,
thus paving the way for the criminal prosecution of persons who participate in the execution of
spurious wills, or those executed without the free consent of the testator. It also provides a further
degree of assurance that the testator is of a certain mindset in making the testamentary
dispositions to the persons instituted as heirs or designated as devisees or legatees in the will.
Acknowledgment can only be made before a competent officer, that is, a lawyer duly
commissioned as a notary public.
Notarial Law provides:

“SEC 237. Form of commission for notary public. -The appointment of a notary public shall be in
writing, signed by the judge, and substantially in the following form: xxx”
“SEC 240. Territorial jurisdiction. - The jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall be co-
extensive with the province. The jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of Manila shall be co-
extensive with said city. No notary shall possess authority to do any notarial act beyond the
limits of his jurisdiction.”
A notary public's commission is the grant of authority in his favor to perform notarial
acts. It is issued "within and for" a particular territorial jurisdiction and the notary public's
authority is co-extensive with it. In other words, a notary public is authorized to perform notarial

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acts, including the taking of acknowledgments, within that territorial jurisdiction only. Outside the
place of his commission, he is bereft of power to perform any notarial act; he is not a notary
public. Any notarial act outside the limits of his jurisdiction has no force and effect.
As this Court categorically pronounced in Tecson vs. Tecson:

“An acknowledgment taken outside the territorial limits of the officer's jurisdiction is void as if
the person taking it were wholly without official character.”
Since Atty. Directo was not a commissioned notary public for and in Quezon City, he lacked the
authority to take the acknowledgment of the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses. In the same
vein, the testatrix and her witnesses could not have validly acknowledged the will before him.
Thus, Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura's last will and testament was, in effect, not acknowledged
as required by law.
Moreover, Article 5 of the Civil Code provides:

“ART. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void,
except when the law itself authorizes their validity.”
The violation of a mandatory or a prohibitory statute renders the act illegal and void unless the
law itself declares its continuing validity. Here, mandatory and prohibitory statutes were
transgressed in the execution of the alleged "acknowledgment." The compulsory language of
Article 806 of the Civil Code was not complied with and the interdiction of Article 240 of the
Notarial Law was breached. Ineluctably, the acts of the testatrix, her witnesses and Atty. Directo
were all completely void.
Had he exercised his notarial commission properly, the intent of the law to effectuate the
decedent's final statements as expressed in her will would not have come to naught. Hence, Atty.
Directo should show cause why he should not be administratively sanctioned as a member of the
bar and as an officer of the court.

Case
2. JUDGE LILY LYDIA A. LAQUINDANUM vs. ATTY. NESTOR Q. QUINTANA

A.C. No. 7036
June 29, 2009
FACTS:
This administrative case against Atty. Nestor Q. Quintana stemmed from a letter addressed to
the Court filed by Executive Judge Lily Lydia A. Laquindanum of the RTC of Midsayap, Cotabato
requesting that proper disciplinary action be imposed on him for performing notarial functions in
Midsayap, Cotabato, which is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court that
issued his notarial commission, and for allowing his wife to do notarial acts in his absence.
Judge Laquindanum wrote a letter to Atty. Quintana directing him to stop notarizing documents
within the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Midsayap, Cotabato (which is outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the commissioning court that issued his notarial commission for Cotabato City and
the Province of Maguindanao) since certain documents notarized by him had been reaching her
office.
However, despite such directive, respondent continuously performed notarial functions in

Midsayap, Cotabato.
Under Sec. 11, Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Atty. Quintana could not extend his
notarial acts beyond Cotabato City and the Province of Maguindanao because Midsayap, Cotabato is
not part of Cotabato City or the Province of Maguindanao. Midsayap is part of the Province of
Cotabato. The City within the province of Cotabato is Kidapawan City, and not Cotabato City.
Judge Laquindanum also alleged that, upon further investigation of the matter, it was
discovered that it was Atty. Quintana’s wife who performed notarial acts whenever he was out of
the office and that Atty. Quintana continued to notarize documents in the years 2006 to 2007
despite the fact that his commission as notary public had already expired on December 31, 2005,
without having renewed the same.
Judge Laquindanum likewise presented a Deed of Donation, which was notarized by Atty.
Quintana in 2004. Honorata Rosil appears as one of the signatories of the document as the donor’s
wife. However, Honorata Rosil died on March 12, 2003.
Atty. Quintana's defenses

 Atty. Quintana alleged that he filed a petition for notarial commission before the RTC of
Midsayap, Cotabato. However, the same was not acted upon by Judge Laquindanum for three
weeks. On the one hand, Judge Laquindanum explained that the reason why she did not act on
his petition was that he had not paid his IBP dues, which is a requirement before a notarial
commission may be granted.
 Atty. Quintana contended that he did not violate any provision of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice, because he was equipped with a notarial commission. He maintained that he did not
act outside the province of Cotabato since Midsayap, Cotabato, where he practices his legal
profession and subscribes documents, is part of the province of Cotabato. He claimed that as a
lawyer of good moral standing, he could practice his legal profession in the entire Philippines.

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 With regard to the documents signed by his wife, he explained that those were the result of an
entrapment operation of Judge Laquindanum: to let somebody bring and have them notarized
by his wife, when they knew that his wife is not a lawyer. He also denied the he authorized his
wife to notarize documents. According to him, he slapped his wife and told her to stop doing it
as it would ruin his profession.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Quintana violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (YES)
HELD:
YES, Atty. Quintana violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice when he committed the
following acts:
1) he notarized documents outside the area of his commission as a notary public;
2) he performed notarial acts with an expired commission;
3) he let his wife notarize documents in his absence; and
4) he notarized a document where one of the signatories therein was already dead at that
time.
He notarized documents outside the area of his commission as a notary public.

He performed notarial acts with an expired commission.
Apparently, respondent has extended his notarial acts in Midsayap and Kabacan, Cotabato,
which is already outside his territorial jurisdiction to perform as Notary Public.
Section 11 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides, thus:

Jurisdiction and Term – A person commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts in
any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period of two (2)
years commencing the first day of January of the year in which the commissioning court is made,
unless earlier revoked [or] the notary public has resigned under these Rules and the Rules of
Court.
Under the rule, respondent may perform his notarial acts within the territorial jurisdiction of
the commissioning Executive Judge Concha, which is in Cotabato City and the Province of
Maguindanao only. But definitely he cannot extend his commission as notary public in Midsayap or
Kabacan and in any place of the province of Cotabato as he is not commissioned thereat to do such
act.
Respondent claims that he, being a lawyer in good standing, has the right to practice his
profession including notarial acts in the entire Philippines. This statement is barren of merit. While
it is true that lawyers in good standing are allowed to engage in the practice of law in the
Philippines, however, not every lawyer even in good standing can perform notarial functions
without having been commissioned as notary public as specifically provided for under the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice. He must have submitted himself to the commissioning court by filing his
petition for issuance of his Notarial Practice commission. Since respondent herein did not submit
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himself to the procedural rules for the issuance of the notarial commission, he has no reason at all
to claim that he can perform notarial acts in the entire country for lack of authority to do so.
He let his wife notarize documents in his absence.
"A notary public is personally accountable for all entries in his notarial register; He cannot
relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the buck to their secretaries" A person who is
commissioned as a notary public takes full responsibility for all the entries in his notarial register.
Respondent cannot take refuge claiming that it was his wife’s act and that he did not authorize his
wife to notarize documents. He is personally accountable for the activities in his office as well as the
acts of his personnel including his wife, who acts as his secretary.
He notarized a document where one of the signatories therein was already dead at that time.
Sec. 2 (b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides, thus:
A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or
document (1) is not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined
by these Rules.
Clearly, in notarizing a Deed of Donation without even determining the presence or

qualifications of affiants therein, respondent only shows his gross negligence and ignorance of
the provisions of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the notarial commission of Atty. Nestor Q. Quintana, if still existing, is hereby
REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as notary public for a period of 2
years. He is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective immediately, with
a WARNING that the repetition of a similar violation will be dealt with even more severely.

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f. Notarial Seal and Register
1. FATHER RANHILIO C. AQUINO, LINA M. GARAN, ESTRELLA C. LOZADA, POLICARPIO L.

MABBORANG, DEXTER R. MUNAR, MONICO U. TENEDERO, ANDY R. QUEBRAL, NESTOR T.
RIVERA, EDUARDO C. RICAMORA, ARTHUR G. IBAEZ, AURELIO C. CALDEZ and DENU A.
AGATEP vs. ATTY. EDWIN PASCUA
A.C. No. 5095
November 28, 2007
FACTS:
Father Aquino filed a complaint against Atty. Pascua, a notary public, alleging that Atty. Pascua
falsified two documents. Father Aquino further alleged that Atty. Angel Beltran, Clerk of Court,
certified that none of the above entries appear in the Notarial Register of Atty. Pascua; the last entry
was Doc. No. 1200 executed on Dec. 28, 1998; and that, therefore, he could not have notarized
Documents Nos. 1213 and 1214 on December 10, 1998.
Atty. Pascua admitted having notarized the two documents but they were not entered in his
Notarial Register due to the oversight of his legal secretary. The affidavit-complaints referred to in
the notarized documents were filed by Atty. Pascua with the Civil Service Commission. Impleaded
as respondents therein were Lina M. Garan and the other above-named complainants. Herein
petitioners filed with this Court a Motion to Join the Complaint and Reply to Respondents Comment
maintaining that Atty. Pascua’s omission was not due to inadvertence but a clear case of
falsification. The Court granted the motion.
The case against Atty. Pascua was referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant for investigation,
report and recommendation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Pascua is liable (YES)
HELD:
The Office of the Bar Confidant issued its report and recommendation that the notarial
commission of Atty. Pascua be revoked and he be suspended from practice of law for 6 months,
stating that:
"A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason,
notaries public must observe the utmost care to comply with the formalities and the basic
requirement in the performance of their duties (Realino vs. Villamor, 87 SCRA 318). Under the
notarial law, the notary public shall enter in such register, in chronological order, the nature of each
instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him, the person executing, swearing to, or
acknowledging the instrument, xxx xxx. The notary shall give to each instrument executed, sworn
to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also

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state on the instrument the page or pages of his register on which the same is recorded. No blank
line shall be left between entries (Sec. 246, Article V, Title IV, Chapter II of the Revised Administrative
Code). Failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register
touching his notarial acts in the manner required by law is a ground for revocation of his
commission (Sec. 249, Article VI).
In the instant case, there is no question that the subject documents allegedly notarized by Atty.
Pascua were not recorded in his notarial register. Atty. Pascua claims that the omission was not
intentional but due to oversight of his staff. Whichever is the case, Atty. Pascua cannot escape
liability. His failure to enter into his notarial register the documents that he admittedly
notarized is a dereliction of duty on his part as a notary public and he is bound by the acts of
his staff.
As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary public, Atty. Pascua is mandated to subscribe to the

sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed
with public interest. A member of the Bar may be disciplined or disbarred for any misconduct in
his professional or private capacity. The Court has invariably imposed a penalty for notaries public
who were found guilty of dishonesty or misconduct in the performance of their duties."
The Court resolves to adopt the findings of facts and conclusion of law by the Office of the Bar
Confidant. In the present case, considering that this is Atty. Pascua’s first offense, we believe that
the imposition of a three-month suspension from the practice of law upon him is in order. Likewise,
since his offense is a ground for revocation of notarial commission, the same should also be
imposed upon him.

Case
2. SPOUSES BENJAMIN SANTUYO and EDITHA SANTUYO vs. ATTY. EDWIN A. HIDALGO
A.C. No. 5838
January 17, 2005
FACTS:
In a verified complaint-affidavit dated September 18, 2001, spouses Benjamin Santuyo and
Editha Santuyo accused respondent Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo of serious misconduct and dishonesty
for breach of his lawyer’s oath and the notarial law.
Complainants stated that sometime in December 1991, they purchased a parcel of land covered
by a deed of sale. The deed of sale was allegedly notarized by respondent lawyer and was entered in
his notarial register as Doc. No. 94 on Page No. 19 in Book No. III, Series of 1991. Complainant
spouses averred that about six years after the date of notarization, they had a dispute with one
Danilo German over the ownership of the land. The case was estafa through falsification of a public
document.
During the trial of the case, German presented in court an affidavit executed by respondent
denying the authenticity of his signature on the deed of sale. The spouses allegedly forged his
notarial signature on said deed.
According to complainants, respondent overlooked the fact that the disputed deed of sale
contained all the legal formalities of a duly notarized document, including an impression of
respondent’s notarial dry seal. Not being persons who were learned in the technicalities
surrounding a notarial act, spouses contended that they could not have forged the signature of
herein respondent. They added that they had no access to his notarial seal and notarial register, and
could not have made any imprint of respondents seal or signature on the subject deed of sale or
elsewhere.
In his answer to the complaint, respondent denied the allegations against him. According to
respondent, he once worked as a junior lawyer at Carpio General and Jacob Law Office where he
was asked to apply for a notarial commission. While he admitted that he notarized several
documents in that office, these, however, did not include the subject deed of sale. He explained that,
as a matter of office procedure, documents underwent scrutiny by the senior lawyers and it was
only when they gave their approval that notarization was done. He claimed that, in some occasions,
the secretaries in the law firm, by themselves, would affix the dry seal of the junior associates on
documents relating to cases handled by the law firm.
Respondent however admitted knowing complainant Editha Santuyo, he said he met the latter’s
husband and co-complainant only on November 5, 1997, or about six years from the time that he
purportedly notarized the deed of sale. Moreover, respondent stressed that an examination of his
alleged signature on the deed of sale revealed that it was forged; the strokes were smooth and mild.
He suspected that a lady was responsible for forging his signature.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation. It
ruled that respondent was also negligent because he allowed the office secretaries to perform his
notarial functions, including the safekeeping of his notarial dry seal and notarial register.

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ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Hidalgo is liable for violating the Notarial Law (YES)
HELD:
After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, complainants did not categorically state
that they appeared before respondent to have the deed of sale notarized. Their appearance before
him could have bolstered this allegation that respondent signed the document and that it was not a
forgery as he claimed. The records show that complainants themselves were not sure if respondent,
indeed, signed the document; what they were sure of was the fact that his signature appeared
thereon. They had no personal knowledge as well as to who actually affixed the signature of
respondent on the deed. Furthermore, complainants did not refute respondent’s contention that he
only met complainant Benjamin Santuyo six years after the alleged notarization of the deed of sale.
Considering that the responsibility attached to a notary public is sensitive, respondent should
have been more discreet and cautious in the execution of his duties as such and should not have
wholly entrusted everything to the secretaries; otherwise he should not have been commissioned
as notary public.
For having wholly entrusted the preparation and other mechanics of the document for
notarization to the secretary, there can be a possibility that even the respondent’s signature which
is the only one left for him to do can be done by the secretary or anybody for that matter as had
been the case herein.
As it is, respondent had been negligent not only in the supposed notarization but
foremost in having allowed the office secretaries to make the necessary entries in his
notarial registry which was supposed to be done and kept by him alone; and should not have
relied on somebody else.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo is hereby found GUILTY of negligence in the
performance of his duties as notary public and is hereby SUSPENDED from his commission as a
notary public for a period of two years, if he is commissioned, or if he is not, he is disqualified from
an appointment as a notary public for a period of two years from finality of this resolution, with a
warning that a repetition of similar negligent acts would be dealt with more severely.

Case
3. MARIANO AGADAN, EDEN MOLLEJON, ARSENIO IGME, JOSE NUMBAR, CECILIA

LANGAWAN, PABLO PALMA, JOSELITO CLAVERIA, MIGUEL FLORES and ALBERT
GAYDOWEN vs. ATTY. RICHARD BALTAZAR KILAAN
A.C. No. 9385
November 11, 2013
FACTS:
Complainants Agadan, et. al. filed a complaint against Atty. Kilaan for falsification of documents,
dishonesty, and deceit. They alleged that Atty. Kilaan intercalated (added) certain entries in the
application for issuance of Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) to operate public utility jeepney
by substituting the name of the applicant from Gary Adasing to that of Joseph Batingwed; and that
he submitted false and insufficient documentary requirements in support of Batingwed’s
application for CPC.
The complainants further alleged that the VERIFICATION in Batingwed’s application for CPC
was notarized by Atty. Kilaan but upon verification of Atty. Kilaan’s Notarial Registry, the said
notarial entry actually refers to a DEED OF SALE and not the Verification of Batingwed’s
application.
Atty. Kilaan denied intercalating the entries in the application for CPC of Batingwed. He passed
on the blame to his secretary for the inaccuracies in the entries in his Notarial Register. He
asserted that being a private practitioner, he is burdened with cases thus he delegated to his
secretary the job of recording the documents which he notarized in his Notarial Register. He prayed
for leniency considering that his family depended on his income and considering also that he is a
first time offender.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Kilaan violated the Notarial Law and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
(YES)
HELD:
YES, Atty. Kilaan violated the Notarial Law and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. It is
the notary public who is personally accountable for the accuracy of the entries in his Notarial
Register. The Court is not persuaded by respondent’s explanation that he is burdened with cases
thus he was constrained to delegate the recording of his notarial acts in his Notarial Register to his
secretary. it is the record of all the
official acts of the notary
Sec. 245 of the Notarial Law provides that: “Every notary public shall keep a register to be known
as the NOTARIAL REGISTER, wherein record shall be made of all his official acts as notary...”
In this connection, Sec. 249(b) states that: “The following derelictions of duty on the part of a
notary public shall, in the discretion of the proper judge of first instance, be sufficient ground for the

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revocation of his commission: The failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his
notarial register touching his notarial acts in the manner required by law.”
From the language of the subsection, it is abundantly clear that the notary public is personally
accountable for all entries in his notarial register. Respondents cannot be relieved of
responsibility for the violation of the aforesaid sections by passing the buck to their secretaries.
The Notarial Law and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, moreover, require a duly
commissioned notary public to make the proper entries in his NOTARIAL REGISTER and to refrain
from committing any dereliction or any act which may serve as cause for the revocation of his
commission or the imposition of administrative sanctions.
Under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, the respondent’s failure to make the proper entry or
entries in his Notarial Register of his notarial acts, his failure to require the presence of a principal
at the time of the notarial acts, and his failure to identify a principal on the basis of personal
knowledge by competent evidence are grounds for the revocation of a lawyer’s commission as a
notary public.
A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, most common of which are
the acknowledgement and affirmation of documents or instruments. In the performance of
these notarial acts, the notary public must be mindful of the significance of the notarial seal affixed
on documents. The NOTARIAL SEAL converts a document from a private to a public
instrument, after which it may be presented as evidence without need for proof of its genuineness
and due execution. Thus, notarization should not be treated as an empty, meaningless or routinary
act. A notary public exercises duties calling for carefulness and faithfulness. Notaries must inform
themselves of the facts they certify to; most importantly, they should not take part or allow
themselves to be part of illegal transactions.

Case
4. CARLITO ANG vs. ATTY. JAMES JOSEPH GUPANA

A.C. No. 4545
February 5, 2014
FACTS:
The case stemmed from an affidavit–complaint filed by complainant Carlito Ang against
respondent.
Ang alleged that on May 31, 1991, he and the other heirs of the late Candelaria Magpayo,
namely Purificacion Diamante and William Magpayo, executed an Extra–judicial Declaration of
Heirs and Partition.
He was given his share of 2,003 square meters designated as Lot No. 2066–B–2–B–4, together
with all the improvements thereon. However, when he tried to secure a TCT in his name, he found
out that said TCT No. (T–22409)–6433 had already been cancelled and in lieu thereof, new
TCTs had been issued in the names of William Magpayo, Antonio Diamante, Patricia Diamante,
Lolita D. Canque, Gregorio Diamante, Jr. and Fe D. Montero.
Ang alleged that there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent had a direct
participation in the commission of forgeries and falsifications because he was the one who
prepared and notarized the Affidavit of Loss and Deed of Absolute Sale that led to the transfer and
issuance of the new TCTs.
Ang pointed out that the Deed of Absolute Sale which was allegedly executed by Candelaria
Magpayo on April 17, 1989, was antedated and Candelaria Magpayo’s signature was forged as
clearly shown by the Certification issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cebu. Further, the certified true copy of page 37, Book No. XII, Series of 1989 of
respondent’s Notarial Report indubitably showed that Doc. No. 181 did not refer to the Deed of
Absolute Sale, but to an affidavit. As to the Affidavit of Loss, which was allegedly executed by the
late Candelaria Magpayo on April 29, 1994, it could not have been executed by her as she died three
years prior to the execution of the said affidavit of loss.
In his Comment, respondent denied any wrongdoing and argued that Ang is merely using the
present administrative complaint as a tool to force the defendants in a pending civil case and their
counsel, herein respondent, to accede to his wishes.
Respondent averred that Ang had filed civil case before RTC of Mandaue. He anchored his claim
on the Extra–judicial Declaration of Heirs and Partition and sought to annul the deed of sale and
prayed for reconveyance of the subject parcel of land. During the pre–trial conference, Ang
admitted that he is not an heir of the late Candelaria Magpayo but insisted on his claim for a share
of the lot because he is allegedly the son of the late Isaias Ang, the common–law husband of
Candelaria Magpayo. Because of his admission, the notice of lis pendens annotated in the four
certificates of title of the land in question were ordered cancelled and the land effectively became
available for disposition.

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Ang sought reconsideration of the order, but a compromise was reached that only one TCT will
be annotated with a notice of lis pendens. Respondent surmised that these developments in the Civil
Case meant that Ang would lose his case so Ang resorted to the filing of the present administrative
complaint. Thus, respondent prayed for the dismissal of the case for being devoid of any factual or
legal basis, or in the alternative, holding resolution of the instant case in abeyance pending
resolution of Civil Case No. Man–2202 allegedly because the issues in the present administrative
case are similar to the issues or subject matters involved in said civil case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is administratively liable for violation of his notarial duties when he
failed to require the personal presence of Candelaria Magpayo when he notarized the Affidavit of
Loss (YES)
HELD:
After reviewing the records of the case, the Court finds that respondent did not act unethically
when he sold the property in dispute as the sellers’ attorney–in–fact because there was no more
notice of lis pendens annotated on the particular lot sold. However, the Court finds respondent
administratively liable for violation of his notarial duties when he failed to require the
personal presence of Candelaria Magpayo when he notarized the Affidavit of Loss which
Candelaria allegedly executed on April 29, 1994.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the party acknowledging must appear before the notary
public or any other person authorized to take acknowledgments of instruments or
documents. In the case at bar, the jurat of the Affidavit of Loss stated that Candelaria subscribed to
the affidavit before respondent on April 29, 1994, at Mandaue City. Candelaria, however, was
already dead since March 26, 1991. Hence, it is clear that the jurat was made in violation of the
Notarial Law. Indeed, respondent averred in his position paper before the IBP that he did not in
fact know Candelaria personally before, during and after the notarization, thus admitting that
Candelaria was not present when he notarized the documents.
For this reason notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of
conveyance would be undermined.
A notary public’s function should not be trivialized and a notary public must discharge his
powers and duties which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity. It
devolves upon respondent to act with due care and diligence in stamping fiat on the questioned
documents. Respondent’s failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted in undermining the
integrity of a notary public and in degrading the function of notarization. Hence, he should be liable
for his infraction, not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.
As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to subscribe to the sacred

duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy impressed with public
interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in an

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acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. Simply put, such responsibility is incumbent upon

respondent and failing therein, he must now accept the commensurate consequences of his
professional indiscretion.
Respondent likewise violated Rule 9.01, Canon 9, of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that “A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task
which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.” Respondent averred
in his position paper that it had been his consistent practice to course through clerical staff
documents to be notarized.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. James Joseph Gupana is found administratively liable for
misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year. Further, his notarial
commission, if any, is REVOKED and he is disqualified from reappointment as Notary Public for a
period of two years, with a stern warning that repetition of the same or similar conduct in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
It is also his clerical staff who records entries in

his Notarial Register.
In merely relying on the clerical staff to

determine the completeness of documents
brought to him for notarization, limiting his
participation in the notarization process -- the
respondent is liable for misconduct.

Case
g. Place of Notarization and Personal Presence
1. JUDGE GERVACIO A. LOPENA vs. ATTY. ARTEMIO P. CABATOS

A.C. No. 3441
August 11, 2005
FACTS:
Respondent was administratively charged by the complainant Judge of the MCTC of Tagbilaran-
Clarin, Bohol of SERIOUS BREACH OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS and GRAVE MISCONDUCT allegedly
committed as follows:
1) Respondent knowingly falsified a Deed of Donation purportedly executed by one Crispina

Panis by notarizing the same on June 24, 1981 when the donor had died on January 15, 1981,
and
2) Respondent "showed a grave disrespect to the courts and the administration of justice" by
holding, together with his followers, a parade/rally around the principal streets of
Tagbilaran City, directed against complainant who had convicted respondent's close
relatives in three criminal cases and denied the applications for probation of two of the
convicts.
Acting on this Court's Resolution, respondent submitted his COMMENT, by letter, claiming that
he had been away from his place of birth, Panaytayon, Tubigon, Bohol since 1958, hence, when he
notarized the questioned deed of donation, he "really did not recognize the person of Cristina Panis,"
but he was led by one Gregorio Ricafort to believe that "the old woman before him at the time was
the said Crispina Panis." Respondent informed that his notarization of the questioned document in
fact resulted to his indictment in court for reckless imprudence resulting in falsification of public
document, which case was pending trial.
As for the charge of having conducted a rally/parade, respondent claimed that the same was
staged by PDP Laban and BAYAN of Bohol as a protest against complainant who showed bias in
presiding over the trial of the criminal cases against members of the Cabatos family and
"disregarding the evidence in convicting them."
By Comment/Reply to respondent's COMMENT, complainant countered that one of the

witnesses to the questioned document was respondent's father, Geronimo Cabatos, a permanent
resident of Panaytayon who knew as he was related by blood to Crispina Panis, hence, it is
incredible for respondent not to know of Panis' death on January 15, 1981 or that "he did not know
the person, even if he had been away from his place of birth since 1958." It was then referred to the
IBP.
Respondent, filed a Motion to Dismiss manifesting that the criminal complaint lodged against
him in connection with his notarization of the questioned document was dismissed, he having
proved: i) that when he notarized the subject Deed of Donation - one among six similar documents
executed in favor of Barangay Panaytayon, Tubigon, Bohol, for purposes of a school site - someone
represented to respondent as "Crispina Panis;" ii) that she turned out to be the daughter of Crispina

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Panis, and that she had been instructed by Gregorio Ricafort who prepared the document to affix
the same Crispina Panis in the document; iii) that the donation turned out to be the will and resolve
of the heirs of Crispina Panis. Respondent accordingly prayed for the dismissal of the case.
The IBP later received a REITERATIVE MANIFESTATION (RE: COMPLAINANT'S MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS) alleging, among other things, b) that respondent never personally
knew the late Crispina Panis nor his relationship to her, considering that from 1958 (when
respondent set foot on secondary education) respondent left his native place and resided in a
convent with a parish priest (now Msgr. Saturnino Felicitas) as an altar boy and convent helper,
until respondent graduated from two college courses; c) that, in fact, the fact of death of said
Crispina Panis was known to respondent only when he became one of the accused in a complaint
for "falsification of public document" filed with the MCTC.
Recommendation of the IBP Commissioner:
In the case before us, the respondent himself admitted that he did not exert any effort to find
out if the person who acknowledged to have executed the Deed of Donation was really Crispina
Panis. He merely relied on the assurance of Mr. Gregorio Ricafort that the person who appeared
before him as Notary Public was the real Crispina Panis.
Moreover, it was easy for the respondent to require the person who claimed to have executed
the questioned Deed of Donation to produce his Community Tax Certificate (formerly Residence
Certificate) and any other documents to identify him or her. This he did not do.
It can therefore be validly concluded that respondent Atty. Cabatos failed to exercise with
utmost care and diligence his duties as Notary Public.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent failed to discharge his duties as a Notary Public (YES)
HELD:
YES.
Why did respondent rely on Ricafort's alleged leading him to believe that the "old woman" before
him was Crispina Panis who purportedly executed the document for notarization, when one of the
witnesses to the execution of the document was his (respondent's) father, Geronimo Cabatos, from
whom he could have verified the identity of Crispina Panis, if indeed he did not know her? That
respondent was, if true, exonerated from the criminal case filed against him in connection with his
notarization of the questioned document does not exonerate him from the present administrative case.
Nor does, if respondent's information in his Motion to Dismiss is true, that the person who had been
instructed by Ricafort to affix the signature of Crispina Panis was the latter's daughter exonerate him.
By such information, he in fact impliedly admits that the document had already been signed when it
was brought to him for notarization.

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That a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed it are the
same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents of the
truth of what are stated therein bears reiterating. On pain of sounding like a broken record, this
Court has repeatedly held that the purpose of the injunction is to enable the notary public to
verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party - in this case Crispina Panis
- and to ascertain that the document is the party's free act of deed.
Respondent having thus failed to faithfully discharge his sacred duties as a notary public,
under the facts and circumstances of the case, the revocation of his notarial commission and
disqualification from being commissioned as notary public for a period of One Year is in order.
As for the charge against respondent of showing "grave disrespect to the courts and the
administration of justice" by holding a parade/rally, along with his followers, during which he
imputed bias to complainant whom he branded as "worse than President Marcos," it has not been
sufficiently substantiated.
WHEREFORE, the notarial commission of respondent, Atty. Artemio P. Cabatos, if still existing,
is hereby REVOKED and he is hereby DISQUALIFIED to be commissioned as a notary public for a
period of One (1) Year, and WARNED that a similar violation by him shall be dealt with more
severely. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all courts of the country, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant. Let this Resolution be also made of record in the
personal files of respondent. SO ORDERED.

Case
2. CHITA PANTOJA-MUMAR vs. ATTY. JANUARIO C. FLORES

A.C. No. 5426
April 3, 2007
FACTS:
Respondent prepared an Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale for the complainant and 11
other co-heirs covering three-hectare property in Pangdan, Cambanay, Danao City owned by the
late Jose Pantoja, Sr. The deed was executed in favor of the spouses Filomena and Edilberto Perez,
who were later able to secure a torrens title over the property under their names.
Complainant alleged that respondent forged her signature which originally did not appear on
the first page of the document before it was borrowed. She added that respondent had also falsified
a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) to make it appear that one of her co-heirs had authorized
another to sign the deed for her. According to the complainant, respondent dated the questioned
document “December 29, 1987” when in fact the first page containing all the signatures of the heirs
was borrowed only on June 13, 1988. Even the spouses Perez declared in writing that they had
bought the subject property on June 13, 1988. The complainant stressed that the spouses Perez
were able to secure a certificate of title to the subject property because of the forged document.
Respondent alleged that the allegations in the complaint are self-serving and not supported by
evidence. To prove his point, respondent enclosed the original duplicate of the SPA which was
notarized on November 4, 1987, and the transcript of stenographic notes in Civil Case No. DNA-574,
particularly the testimony of Clarita Manulat, who testified on the circumstances surrounding the
execution of the SPA and handcarried it to Pasig on June 20, 1987.
Regarding Maximina’s thumbmark, respondent recalled that on December 29, 1987, he, Clarita
Manulat, and vendee Filomena Perez went to the residence of Celedonia Pantoja as previously
agreed upon. Only the complainant was not present. After the other heirs finished signing the
document, Mrs. Pantoja asked permission from respondent if she could bring the document inside
the bedroom because she would be coaxing her daughter to affix her thumbmark. Mrs. Pantoja told
them that Maximina was "reclusive and suffering from mental imbalance."
According to respondent, the so-called thumbmark of Maximina which appears on the cedula is
the fake one. He surmised that this thumbmark was probably affixed on the cedula by one of her
sisters, since Maximina would not come out of her room and had to be coaxed by her mother to affix
her thumbmark on the document. Respondent also enclosed a copy of the transcript of his
testimony in Civil Case No. DNA-574.
In reply, complainant pointed out that respondent had admitted that he did not see Maximina
affix her thumbmark on the assailed Deed, yet he notarized it; respondent had also admitted that he
had committed a breach of his office as a notary public on cross-examination in Civil Case No DNA-
574. Respondent’s belief that Maximina Pantoja was suffering from some mental ailment and yet
still notarized it only proves his misconduct.
In her Report dated January 16, 2006, the Investigating Commissioner found that while the
validity of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale is yet to be resolved in the civil case, the

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acts and omissions of respondent as notary public have been duly established. According to the
Investigating Commissioner:
1. The document, although already signed by some of the co-heirs/co-owners on or before
December 29, 1987, was not finalized because the transaction was not pursued; however,
the date of notarization was indicated therein to be December 29, 1987;
2. Respondent notarized the document on or after June 13, 1988, without the authority and/or
in the absence of some of the supposed signatories;
3. Respondent did not see one of the co-heirs, Maximina Pantoja, actually affix her thumbmark
to the document; and
4. Respondent notarized the document even if Complainant, also a co-heir, did not sign it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not herein respondent committed a breach of the Notarial Law and the Code of
Professional Responsibility (YES)
HELD:
YES. The Board of Governors of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline approved Resolution No.
XVII-2006-281 suspending Atty. Januario Flores from the practice of law for two (2) years and
Respondent’s notarial commission is Revoked and Disqualified from reappointment for two (2)
years.
It cannot be overemphasized that notarization of documents is not an empty, meaningless or

routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are
qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. It is through the act of notarization that a
private document is converted into a public one, making it admissible in evidence without need
of preliminary proof of authenticity and due execution. Indeed, a notarial document is by law
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and for this reason, notaries public must observe
utmost care in complying with the elementary formalities in the performance of their
duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be
undermined. Hence, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed
the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to
the contents and truth of what are stated therein. A notary public is duty-bound to require the
person executing a document to be personally present, to swear before him that he is that
person and ask the latter if he has voluntarily and freely executed the same.
Thus, in notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale without ascertaining that all the vendors-
signatories thereto were the very same persons who executed it and personally appeared before
him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein, respondent undermined the
confidence of the public on notarial documents; he thereby breached Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which requires lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for the law and legal processes, and Rule 1.01 thereof, which proscribes
lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

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It must be stressed that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as
such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution for only the most imperative
reasons, and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer
as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Accordingly, disbarment should not be decreed
where any punishment less severe – such as a reprimand, suspension, or fine – would accomplish
the end desired. Considering that this is the respondent’s first administrative offense, the Court
modifies the IBP’s recommendation of a two-year suspension from the practice of law to one year.
His notarial commission, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from
reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two (2) years. He is, likewise, SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year effective immediately.

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3.
4. HERNANDO R. PEÑALOSA alias HENRY PEÑALOSA vs. SEVERINO C. SANTOS(deceased),
Substituted by his heirs: OLIVER SANTOS and ADYLL M. SANTOS, and ADELA DURAN
MENDEZ SANTOS
G.R. No. 133749
August 23, 2001
FACTS:
Respondents Severino C. Santos (deceased) and Adela Mendez Santos are registered owners of
a residential house and lot in dispute located at Scout Rallos Street, Quezon City. Severino and Adela
decided to sell their property and for this purpose, negotiated with petitioner Hernando (or Henry)
Peñalosa. The property was then occupied by a lessee, Eleuterio Perez, who was given preference to
buy it under the same terms offered by the buyer. Perez proposed less favorable terms and
expectedly, Severino rejected his offer.
Petitioner Henry Peñalosa and respondent Severino Santos attempted to enter into an
agreement whereby the latter, for a consideration of P1,800,000.00, would sell to the former the
property subject of the instant case. Henry signed a document stating that the first deed was
executed between him and Severino, for the sole purpose of helping the latter eject Perez, the
occupant of the property. The deed of absolute sale (first deed) evidencing this transaction was
signed by Henry but not by Severino, because according to the latter, Henry took time to decide on
the matter. Thereafter, Henry and Severino executed another deed of absolute sale for a higher
consideration of P2,000,000.00 (second deed). This second deed was signed by both parties and
duly notarized. It states that Severino sells and transfers the house and lot to Henry, who had paid
the full price.
Severino claimed that he made it clear to Henry that he agreed to sell the property under the
second deed for P2,000,000.00, provided that payment be immediately effected. Henry then gave
Severino P300,000.00 as earnest money, purportedly with the understanding that the former was
to pay the balance within 60 days. Otherwise, said amount would be forfeited in favor of
Severino. The latter also maintained that he signed the second deed only for the purpose of
facilitating Henry’s acquisition of a bank loan to finance payment of the balance of the purchase
price and added that execution of the second deed was necessary to enable Henry to file a court
action for ejectment of the tenant.
After execution of the second deed, Henry filed a loan application with the Philippine American
Life Insurance Company (Philam Life). Meanwhile, on the strength of the first deed and as new
owner of the property, Henry wrote a letter to the lessee, Eleuterio Perez, demanding that the latter
vacate the premises within 10 days. Failing in this effort, Henry brought a complaint for
ejectment. Claiming that he still had a subsisting contract of lease over the property, Perez
countersued and assailed the validity of the sale transaction between Henry and Severino and
impleaded the former as co-defendant of Severino.
While the aforesaid court cases were pending resolution, Philam Life informed Severino
through a letter, that Henry’s loan application had been approved. However the release of proceeds
is conditioned upon submission of certain documents which Severino refused to surrender, one of

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which is the the owner’s duplicate title, and insisted on being paid immediately in cash. The
loan/mortgage contract with Philam Life did not materialize.
Subsequently, judgment was rendered by the ordering the tenant Perez to vacate and surrender
possession of the property to Henry. In said judgment, Henry was explicitly recognized as the new
owner of the property by virtue of the contract of sale after full payment of the purchase price of
P2,000,000.00, receipt of which was duly acknowledged by Severino. Upon finality of said
judgment, Henry and his family moved into the disputed house and lot on after making repairs and
improvements.
Later, Severino sent a letter to Henry, through counsel, demanding that Henry vacate the
house and lot, on the ground that Henry did not conclusively offer nor tender a price certain for
the purchase of the property. When Henry refused to vacate the property, Severino brought this
action for quieting of title, recovery of possession and damages.
Essentially, Severino averred that the second deed was void and inexistent because: a) there
was no cause or consideration therefor, since he did not receive the P2,000,000.00 stated in the
deed; b) his wife, Adela, in whose name the property was titled, did not consent to the sale nor sign
the deed; c) the deed was not registered with the Register of Deeds; d) he did not acknowledge
the deed personally before the notary public; e) his residence certificate, as appearing in the
deed, was falsified; and f) the deed is fictitious and simulated because it was executed only for the
purpose of placing Henry in possession of the property because he tendered earnest money.
On the other hand, Henry asserted that he was already the owner of the property being claimed
by Severino, by virtue of a final agreement reached with the latter. Contrary to Severino’s claim, the
price of the property was pegged at P2,000,000.00, as agreed upon by the parties under the second
deed. Prior to the filing of the action, his possession of the property remained undisturbed for three
(3) years.
The trial court declared the Deed of Absolute Sale which was signed by the plaintiff Severino C.
Santos as vendor and the defendant as vendee and which was entered in the notarial register of
notary public Dionilo Marfil of Quezon City as inexistent and void from the beginning; and
consequently, sustained plaintiff’s title to the property.
The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second deed is valid and constitutes evidence of the final agreement
between the parties regarding the sale transaction entered into by them (YES)
HELD:
YES. In this case, after carefully poring over the records, we are convinced that the lower courts
misappreciated the evidence presented by the parties and that, indeed, a reversal of the assailed
judgment is in order.

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The circumstances relied upon by the trial court in its decision are not proper grounds for
holding that the second deed is simulated. Simulation is a declaration of a fictitious will,
deliberately made by agreement of the parties, in order to produce, for purposes of deception, the
appearance of a juridical act which does not exist or is different from that which was really
executed. Its requisites are: a) an outward declaration of will different from the will of the parties;
b) the false appearance must have been intended by mutual agreement; and c) the purpose is to
deceive third persons. None of these requisites is present in this case.
In this case, the parties already undertook certain acts which were directed towards fulfillment
of their respective covenants under the second deed, indicating that they intended to give effect
to their agreement.
In particular: Severino authorized petitioner to bring an action for ejectment against the
overstaying tenant and allowed petitioner to pursue the ejectment case to its final conclusion;
petitioner applied for a loan, which was approved by Philam Life, to complete payment of the
stipulated price; petitioner, after making extensive repairs with the knowledge of Severino, moved
into the premises and actually occupied the same for three years before this action was brought;
and moreover, petitioner, tendering P300,000.00 in earnest money, which under Article 1482 of the
New Civil Code, is part of the purchase price and proof of perfection of the contract.
The fact that Severino executed the two deeds in question, primarily so that petitioner could
eject the tenant and enter into a loan/mortgage contract with Philam Life, is a strong indication
that he intended to transfer ownership of the property to petitioner. Furthermore, Severino
explicitly asserted in his sworn answer to the complaint that the sale was a legitimate
transaction. He further alleged that the ejectment case filed by petitioner against the tenant
was a legitimate action by an owner against one who refuses to turn over possession of his
property.
Except to allege that he was not physically present when the second deed was notarized before
the notary public, Severino did not assail the truth of its contents nor deny that he ever signed the
same. It should be emphasized that the non-appearance of the parties before the notary public
who notarized the deed does not necessarily nullify nor render the parties transaction void
ab initio. We have held previously that the provision of Article 1358 of the New Civil Code on the
necessity of a public document is only for convenience, not for validity or enforceability. Failure
to follow the proper form does not invalidate a contract. Where a contract is not in the form
prescribed by law, the parties can merely compel each other to observe that form, once the contract
has been perfected. This is consistent with the basic principle that contracts are obligatory in
whatever form they may have been entered into, provided all essential requisites are present.
Respondents contention that the second deed was declared void by court because Adela, in
whose name the property was titled, did not sign the same, is unavailing. The records are replete
with admissions made by Adela that she had agreed with her husband to sell the property
which is conjugal in nature and that she was aware of this.
With references to petitioner’s failure to pay the purchase price, respondents did not mention
that he did not intend at all to sell the property to petitioner and instead, stressed the fact that the
purchase price had not yet been paid. However, it is well-settled that non-payment of the

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purchase price is not among the instances where the law declares a contract to be null and
void.
The contract in this case is absolute in nature and is devoid of any proviso that title to the
property is reserved in the seller until full payment of the purchase price. Neither does the second
deed give Severino a unilateral right to resolve the contract the moment the buyer fails to pay
within a fixed period.
In sum, the only conclusion which can be deduced from the aforesaid circumstances is that
ownership of the property has been transferred to petitioner. Article 1477 of the Civil Code
states that ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual or
constructive delivery thereof.

Case
5.
6. MARY JANE D. VELASCO vs. ATTY. CHARLIE DOROIN and ATTY. HECTOR CENTENO
A.C. No. 5033
July 28, 2008
FACTS:
This case refers to a disbarment complaint filed by Mary Jane D. Velasco against respondent
lawyers for forgery and falsification constitutive of malpractice.
In her Affidavit-Complaint, complaint alleged that she was appointed as administratrix in

Special Proceedings Case No. Q-96-27628 pending consideration before the Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 87, entitled "In the matter of the Settlement of the Estate of the Late Eduardo
Doroin, Monina E. Doroin, petitioner" The deceased, Eduardo Doroin, died on January 21, 199, in
Papua New Guinea. In this Special Proceedings case, respondents were collaborating counsels for
Oppositor, Josephine Abarquez.
On March 21, 1996, Atty. Doroin fooled complainant by deceitful means into making her sign an
Extra-Judicial Settlement and Deed of Partition, allotting complainant the sum of P1,216,078.00
giving the paramour of complainant’s father, Josephine Abarquez, the share of P7,296,468.00 and
also allotting complainant’s two (2) alleged illegitimate brothers and an alleged illegitimate sister, a
similar sum of P 1,216,075.00 each alleging that such sharing is in accordance with law.
But no share was assigned to complainant’s mother, who was the legal wife of Dr. Eduardo
Doroin.
To partially satisfy complainant’s share of P1,216,078.00, Atty. Doroin required complainant to

sign a paper which was an alleged Confirmation of Authority to Sell the property of complainant’s
father located at Kingspoint Subdivision, Bagbag, Novaliches, Quezon City, covered by TCT No.
34885. Complainant told Atty. Doroin that she will first consult a lawyer regarding the legality of
the said Confirmation of Authority to Sell before she signs the same. Eventually, she was not able to
sign the said Confirmation because complainant’s lawyer, Atty. Marapao, failed to confer and
negotiate with Atty. Doroin regarding the same.
When the complainant visited the lot situated at Kingspoint Subdivision sometime in June 1996,
there was no house constructed thereon, but when she visited it again on January 1999, there was
already a four-door townhouse constructed. Complainant was informed by the caretaker at the site
that the owner is one Evangeline Reyes-Tonemura. Complainant also learned later on that the
property, which was one of the properties submitted to the Court handling the Special Proceedings
case in the Inventory of Property dated April 3, 1996, was sold by Atty. Doroin to Evangeline Reyes-
Yonemura, by forging the signature of complainant’s late father. Atty. Hector B. Centeno, a Notary
Public of Quezon City, knowing that complainant’s father was already dead as of January 21, 1996,
made it appear in the said Deed of Absolute Sale, that complainant’s father appeared before him in
Quezon City on January 17, 1997.
The Commission found that respondents violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when they caused "extreme and great damage to the complainant". Board of

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Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline with the modification that respondent
lawyers be suspended indefinitely instead of being disbarred.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Charlie Doroin and Atty. Hector Centeno are guilty of violating their
lawyer’s oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which would merit
their disbarment (YES)
HELD:
We agree with the findings of the Board of Governors of the IBP, but modify the penalty to be
imposed on respondent Atty. Hector Centeno.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that: "A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer
has the privilege and right to practice law during good behaviour and can only be deprived of it for
misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has
afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or right, an attorney’s right to practice
law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct rendering him
unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof generally rests upon the complainant, and for
the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by
clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.
In the case at bar, complainant claims that respondent lawyers forged the deed of sale and
forced her to sign the deed of extrajudicial settlement by explaining to her that it was "in
accordance with law."
The complained actuations of the respondent lawyers constitute a blatant violation of

the lawyer’s oath to uphold the law and the basic tenets of the Code of Professional
Responsibility that no lawyer shall engage in dishonest conduct. Elementary it is in succession
law that compulsory heirs like the widowed spouse shall have a share in the estate by way of
legitimes and no extrajudicial settlement can deprive the spouse of said right except if she gives it
up for lawful consideration, but never when the spouse is not a party to the said settlement.
The Court is mindful that disbarment is a grave penalty. Considering that the license to practice
law, though it is not a property right, sustains a lawyer’s primary means of livelihood and to strip
someone of such license amounts to stripping one of a career and a means to keep himself alive, we
agree with the modification submitted by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines that an indefinite
suspension would be the more appropriate penalty on Atty. Charlie Doroin. However, we cannot be
as lenient with Atty. Hector Centeno who, aside from committing a dishonest act by depriving a

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person of her rightful inheritance, also committed a criminal offense when he falsificated a public
document and thereafter absconded from the criminal proceeding against him after having posted
bail.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Atty. Charlie Doroin is suspended indefinitely, and Atty. Hector Centeno
is hereby DISBARRED.

Case
7. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY vs. SERVANDO ARGUELLES(deceased) &

CLAUDIO ARGUELLES and MARILOU TRINIDAD, for herself and as guardian ad litem of
her minor children namely, LLOYD, MARK, ADRIAN and GEORGIA, all surnamed
TRINIDAD, TRISTAN TRINIDAD and EDGARDO TRINIDAD, JR.
G.R. No. 176984
August 29, 2012
FACTS:
Respondent brothers, Servando and Claudio Arguelles (the Arguelleses), were registered
owners of a parcel of land in Imus, Cavite. They entered into a conditional sale of the land to
Edgardo Trinidad and his wife Marilou (the Trinidads). In accordance with the terms of the sale, the
Trinidads gave the Arguelleses P50,000.00 as down payment. The balance was to be paid in
monthly installments.
The Trinidads occupied and began developing the property in 1986. They paid the real estate
taxes due on it from 1987 to 1997. With a deed of sale in their favor, the Trinidads eventually had
the land titled in their names. They applied with Metropolitan Bank & Trust (Metrobank) for a loan,
offering the land as collateral. Satisfied that the Trinidads owned the property, Metrobank accepted
it as collateral and lent them money. Subsequently, Metrobank granted the couple several more
loans, totaling more than P11 million, all secured by the land.
On January 7, 1997 the Arguelleses filed a complaint against the Trinidads with the RTC of Imus,
Cavite for the cancellation of TCT in the latter’s names. Subsequently, the complaint was amended
to implead Metrobank and sought the cancellation of the real estate mortgages over the property in
its favor. The Arguelleses denied having executed a deed of sale in favor of the Trinidads. They
alleged that they entrusted their owner’s duplicate copy of title to Atty. Alejandro Saulog, Sr., who
assisted the parties in executing a conditional sale covering the land. The Trinidads used a fictitious
deed of sale, notarized by a certain Atty. Saulog, Jr. to effect the transfer of title in their names.
In answer, the Trinidads claimed that they paid for the land by installments, completing the
payment on June 24, 1986 with the result that the Arguelleses executed the deed of sale in their
favor.
In its decision, the RTC ruled in favor of the Arguelleses and cancelled both the title in the name
of the Trinidads and the mortgages in Metrobank’s favor. On appeal to the CA, the latter affirmed
the decision of the RTC.
The Trinidads filed their motion for reconsideration while Metrobank appealed the CA Decision
to this Court. Upon the denial of their motion, the Trinidads filed their own petition with this Court
as well. Both cases were then consolidated on November 21, 2007. During the pendency of these
cases, Servando Arguelles passed away and was substituted by his heirs.

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ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of sale that the Arguelles supposedly executed in favor of the spouses
Trinidad and used by the latter in transferring the title of the property in their names is authentic
(YES)
HELD:
The courts below concluded that the subject deed of sale is not authentic because the notary
public who notarized the document could not recall if the Arguelleses personally appeared and
signed the deed of sale before him and that there are two copies of the deed of sale - one dated 1986
and the other 1991, were presented.
Both the RTC and the CA held that the presumption of regularity of a public document did not
attach to the subject deed of sale, given that the notary public, Atty. Saulog, Jr. failed to establish the
authenticity of the signatures on it. He could not remember if the Arguelleses, were the same
persons who appeared and acknowledged the document before him.
But it is too much to expect a notary public who had but a brief time with the Arguelleses
during the notarial ceremony to remember their faces 12 years later. What matters is Atty.
Saulog, Jr.’s testimony respecting the ritual of notarization that he invariably followed. He gave
unbending assurance that he ascertained the identities of the parties to documents who
appeared before him, including the Arguelleses, by requiring them to show documentary proofs
of the same and to sign the documents in his presence.
Besides, the theory of the Arguelleses is that it was Atty. Saulog, Jr. who facilitated the
preparation of the falsified deed of sale for the benefit of the Trinidads. But, if this were so, it would
have made more sense for Atty. Saulog, Jr. to testify in defense of the genuineness of the transaction
by claiming that he recalled the faces of those who appeared before him 12 years ago and that they
were no other than the Arguelleses.
The Arguelleses point out that the residence certificates on the acknowledgment portion of the
deed of sale did not belong to them since these did not tally with their 1991 residence certificates.
Further, they presented evidence that Atty. Saulog, Jr. did not have a notarial commission in 1991.
But two copies of the deed of sale were presented in this case, identical in every way except that
the first, the Trinidad’s original copy of the deed of sale, carried the date June 24, 1986 while the
second, a certified copy of the deed of sale from the Register of Deeds bore the date June 24,
1991. Evidently, it is the first document, original, unblemished, and bearing the year 1986
that is the correctly dated copy. On the other hand, the year typewritten on the second document,
the certified copy, had been crudely altered by erasure with the digits "91" superimposed to make
the year read "1991." In other words, the deed of sale was executed in 1986, not 1991.
The Arguelleses merely claim that their residence certificate numbers on the copies of the deed
of sale did not reflect their 1991 residence certificates. They do not state, however, that those
numbers do not represent their 1986 residence certificates, the correct year when the deed of sale

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was executed. Further, they do not also claim that Atty. Saulog, Jr. did not have a notarial
commission in 1986 – the year that the clean deed of sale was actually notarized.
With the Court’s above conclusion, there is no further need to determine whether or not the
real estate mortgages that the Trinidads executed in favor of Metrobank are binding on the
Arguelleses. They are, based on such conclusion.

Case
8.
9. MANUEL MALLARI and MILLIE MALLARI vs. REBECCA ALSOL
G.R. No. 150866
March 6, 2006
FACTS:
Stalls No. 7 and 8 of the Supermarket Section of the Cabanatuan City Public Market were
awarded to and occupied by Abelardo Mallari, father of Manuel Mallari (petitioner) and Rebecca
Alsol (respondent). Before Abelardo’s death, he gave the stalls to Manuel and Rebecca. Manuel and
his wife occupied Stall No. 7 while respondent and her husband occupied Stall No. 8.
Respondent’s daughter became sick and the Alsol family had to stay in Manila for two months
for the medical treatment. They returned to Cabanatuan City only to find out that petitioners were
already occupying Stall No. 8. The partition between Stalls No. 7 and 8 had been removed and
respondent’s merchandise and things were already gone.
Petitioners refused respondent’s demand to vacate Stall No. 8. Respondent sought the help of
the City Market Committee. The Committee granted Stall No. 7 to Manuel and Stall No. 8 to
respondent. On June 4, 1990, respondent and the City Government of Cabanatuan, represented by
City Mayor Honorato C. Perez, executed a Contract of Lease, granting respondent the right to occupy
Stall No. 8.
However, petitioners still refused to vacate Stall No. 8. Instead, they filed an action for
annulment of the Lease Contract before the RTC of Cabanatuan City, which dismissed the case for
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and on the additional ground that the Committee is not
the proper party to the case.
Respondent filed an action for recovery and possession before the trial court. The court
rendered judgment in favor of the respondent. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals sustained
respondent’s right to occupy Stall No. 8 by virtue of the Lease Contract she entered with the City
Government.
Petitioners now insist that the Lease Contract is not valid because the City Treasurer should
have signed the Lease Contract and not Mayor Perez. Petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals
erred in applying RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which took
effect on January 1, 1992 or long after the execution of the Lease Contract on June 4, 1990.
Petitioners further allege that granting Mayor Perez has the authority to sign the Lease Contract,
Mayor Perez did not appear before the notary public who notarized the Lease Contract. Hence, the
Lease Contract did not produce any right in favor of respondent.
ISSUES:
1) Whether respondent is the proper awardee of Stall No. 8;

2) Whether or not the Lease Contract executed between respondent and the City Government is
valid (YES)

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HELD:
1) Ruling on whether respondent is the proper awardee of Stall No. 8 is premature.
CA pointed out that when the Committee awarded Stall No. 8 to respondent, petitioners filed an
appeal before the Secretary of Finance questioning the award. The appeal was still pending when
the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed Decision. Hence, the Court may not at this time rule
on this issue. Any resolution on this question will preempt whatever ruling the Secretary of Finance
may issue on the pending appeal.
2) The Lease Contract is valid despite Mayor Perez’s failure to appear before the notary
public.
The Court agrees with petitioners that RA 7160 is not the applicable law. Instead, the Court of
Appeals should have applied BP 337 or the old Local Government Code. Still, even under BP 337, city
mayors have the authority to sign contracts on behalf of city governments. Hence, Mayor Perez has
the authority to sign the Lease Contract on behalf of the City Government.
With regard to the issue on notarization, it is true such an act converts a private document into
a public document. However, the non-appearance of the parties before the notary public who
notarized the document does not necessarily nullify nor render the parties’ transaction void ab
initio.
Thus: x x x Article 1358 of the New Civil Code provides that the necessity of a public document is
only for convenience, not for validity or enforceability. Failure to follow the proper form does
not invalidate a contract. Where a contract is not in the form prescribed by law, the parties can
merely compel each other to observe that form, once the contract has been perfected. This is
consistent with the basic principle that contracts are obligatory in whatever form they may
have been entered into, provided all essential requisites are present.
Hence, the Lease Contract is valid despite Mayor Perez’s failure to appear before the notary
public.

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10. ST. MARY’S FARM, INC. vs. PRIMA REAL PROPERTIES, INC., RODOLFO A. AGANA, JR., and
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAS PIÑAS, METRO MANILA
G.R. No. 158144
July 31, 2008
FACTS:
Plaintiff was the registered owner of an originally 25,598 square meters of land. In compliance
with a final court decision, plaintiff passed and approved on a board resolution authorizing
defendant Agana to cede to T.S. Cruz Subdivision 4,000 square meters of the land. Allegedly, after
the consummation of this transaction, defendant Agana did not return to plaintiff the borrowed the
title and, instead, allegedly forged a board resolution of the plaintiff corporation supposedly to the
effect that plaintiff had authorized him to sell the remaining 21,598 square meters of the subject
property. A series of transactions took place between defendant Agana and defendant Prima Real
Properties, Inc. (Prima) which transactions culminated to the signing of an absolute deed of sale
transferring the ownership of the subject land from plaintiff to defendant Prima. After the
consummation of the sale, defendant Prima effected the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title
in the name of plaintiff and in lieu thereof another TCT in the name of defendant Prima was issued
by defendant Villanueva in his capacity as Register of Deeds. Subsequently, defendant Prima duly
purchased from T.S. Cruz Subdivision the aforementioned 4,000 square meters portion of the
subject property.
Trial court found that the respondent was a buyer in good faith and for value, relying on the
authority of Agana to sell the property in behalf of the petitioner company, as evidenced by a
notarized board resolution. As such, the trial court ruled that the petitioner was bound by the acts
of its agent and must necessarily bear whatever damage may have been caused by this alleged
breach of trust.
On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Prima reasonably relied on the authority of Agana to sell the property (YES)
HELD:
Challenging the due execution of the board resolution bearing the Secretary’s Certification,
petitioner wants us to consider the same as inadmissible on the ground that Atty. Agcaoili did not
appear before a notary public for notarization.
We do not agree, we have already held that the non-appearance of the party before the
notary public who notarized the deed does not necessarily nullify or render the parties’
transaction void ab initio. However, the non-appearance of the party exposes the notary
public to administrative liability which warrants sanction by the Court. This fact
notwithstanding, we agree with the respondent court that it is not enough to overcome the

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presumption of the truthfulness of the statements contained in the board resolution. To overcome
the presumption, there must be sufficient, clear and convincing evidence as to exclude all
reasonable controversy as to the falsity of the certificate. In the absence of such proof, the
document must be upheld. Notarization converts a private document into a public document,
making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity.
On the basis of this notarized board resolution, respondent Prima had every reason to rely
on Agana’s authority to sell the subject property.
It is of no moment that the checks were made payable to Agana and not to the company which,
according to the petitioner, should have alerted the respondent to inquire further into the extent of
Agana’s authority to transfer the subject property. This was no longer necessary considering that
respondent had every reason to rely on Rodolfo Agana’s authority to sell, evidenced by the
notarized Certification.
When the document under scrutiny is a special power of attorney that is duly notarized, we
know it to be a public document where the notarial acknowledgment is prima facie evidence
of the fact of its due execution. A buyer presented with such a document would have no choice
between knowing and finding out whether a forger lurks beneath the signature on it. The notarial
acknowledgment has removed that choice from him and replaced it with a presumption
sanctioned by law that the affiant appeared before the notary public and acknowledged that
he executed the document, understood its import and signed it. In reality, he is deprived of
such choice not because he is incapable of knowing and finding out but because, under our
notarial system, he has been given the luxury of merely relying on the presumption of
regularity of a duly notarized SPA. And he cannot be faulted for that because it is precisely that
fiction of regularity which holds together commercial transactions across borders and time.

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h. Competent Evidence of Identity
1. CHARLES B. BAYLON vs. ATTY. JOSE A. ALMO

A.C. No. 6962
June 25, 2008
FACTS:
This case stemmed from the administrative complaint filed by the complainant at the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) charging the respondent with fraud and deceit for notarizing a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) bearing the forged signature of the complainant as the supposed principal
thereof.
Complainant averred that Pacita Filio, Rodolfo Llantino, Jr. and his late wife, Rosemarie Baylon,
conspired in preparing an SPA authorizing his wife to mortgage his real property located in Signal
Village, Taguig. He said that he was out of the country when the SPA was executed on June 17, 1996,
and also when it was notarized by the respondent on June 26, 1996. To support his contention that
he was overseas on those dates, he presented (1) a certification from the Government of Singapore
showing that he was vaccinated in the said country on June 17, 1996; and (2) a certification from
the Philippine Bureau of Immigration showing that he was out of the country from March 21, 1995
to January 28, 1997. To prove that his signature on the SPA was forged, the complainant presented
a report from the National Bureau of Investigation stating to the effect that the questioned
signature on the SPA was not written by him.
The complainant likewise alleged that because of the SPA, his real property was mortgaged to
Lorna Express Credit Corporation and that it was subsequently foreclosed due to the failure of his
wife to settle her mortgage obligations.
In his answer, the respondent admitted notarizing the SPA, but he argued that he initially
refused to notarize it when the complainant’s wife first came to his office on June 17, 1996, due to
the absence of the supposed affiant thereof. He said that he only notarized the SPA when the
complainant’s wife came back to his office on June 26, 1996, together with a person whom she
introduced to him as Charles Baylon. He further contended that he believed in good faith that the
person introduced to him was the complainant because said person presented to him a Community
Tax Certificate bearing the name Charles Baylon. To corroborate his claims, the respondent
attached the affidavit of his secretary, Leonilita de Silva.
After due proceedings, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline recommended to the IBPBoard of
Governors that the respondent be strongly admonished for notarizing the SPA; that his notarial
commission be revoked; and that the respondent be barred from being granted a notarial
commission for one year.
On October 22, 2005, the IBP-Board of Governors declared Atty. Jose A. Almo is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for one (1) year and Respondents notarial commission is Revoked and
Disqualified (sic) from reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years.

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ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Almo is liable for violating the Notarial Law (NO)
HELD:
We agree with the finding of the IBP that the respondent had indeed been negligent in the
performance of his duties as a notary public in this case.
The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. In Santiago v.

Rafanan, we explained:
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive

public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.
Notarization converts a private document into a public document thus making that document
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at
large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a
private instrument.
Mindful of his duties as a notary public and taking into account the nature of the SPA which in
this case authorized the complainant’s wife to mortgage the subject real property, the respondent
should have exercised utmost diligence in ascertaining the true identity of the person who
represented himself and was represented to be the complainant. He should not have relied on the
Community Tax Certificate presented by the said impostor in view of the ease with which
community tax certificates are obtained these days. As a matter of fact, recognizing the established
unreliability of a community tax certificate in proving the identity of a person who wishes to have
his document notarized, we did not include it in the list of competent evidence of identity that
notaries public should use in ascertaining the identity of persons appearing before them to have
their documents notarized.
Moreover, considering that respondent admitted in the IBP hearing on February 21, 2005 that
he had already previously notarized some documents for the complainant, he should have
compared the complainant’s signatures in those documents with the impostor’s signature before he
notarized the questioned SPA.
WHEREFORE, the notarial commission, if still extant, of respondent Atty. Jose A. Almo is hereby
REVOKED. He is likewise DISQUALIFIED to be reappointed as Notary Public for a period of two
years.

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i. Judges as Notaries Public Ex Officio
1. AQUILES RIOSA vs. TABACO LA SUERTE CORPORATION

G.R. No. 203786
October 23, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner Aquiles was the owner of and in actual possession of a 52 square meter commercial
lot located in Tabaco City, Albay. He acquired the said property through a deed of cession and
quitclaim executed by his parents. On three (3) occasions, he obtained loans from Sia Ko Pio in the
total amount of P50,000.00. As a security for the payment of loans, Sia Ko Pio requested from him a
photocopy of the deed of cession and quitclaim. Sia Ko Pio presented to him a document
purportedly a receipt for the P50,000.00 loan with an undertaking to pay the total amount of
P52,000.00 including the P2,000.00 attorney’s fees. Without reading the document, he affixed his
signature thereon. In September 2001, to his surprise, he received a letter from La Suerte
informing him that the subject lot was already registered in its name.
Aquiles claimed that by means of fraud, misrepresentation and deceit employed by Sia Ko Pio,
he was made to sign the document which he thought was a receipt and undertaking to pay the loan,
only to find out later that it was a document of sale. Aquiles averred that he did not appear before
the notary public to acknowledge the sale, and that the notary public, a municipal judge, was
not authorized to notarize a deed of conveyance.
Petitioner Aquiles filed his Complaint for Annulment/Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute
Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title, Reconveyance and Damages against respondent Tabaco La
Suerte Corporation (La Suerte).
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Base, an ex oficio notary public, has capacity to notarize the deed of
absolute sale (NO)
HELD:
NO, Judge Base, who acted as ex-oficio notary public, is not allowed under the law to
notarize documents not connected with the exercise of his official duties.
There are possible grounds for leniency in connection with this matter, as Supreme Court
Circular No. I-90 permits notaries public ex officio to perform any act within the competency of a
regular notary public provided that certification be made in the notarized documents attesting to
the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such municipality or circuit. Indeed, it is only when
there are no lawyers or notaries public that the exception applies.

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In this case, no such certification was attached to the alleged notarized document. Also,
the Court takes note of Aquiles’ averment that there were several lawyers commissioned as notary
public in Tabaco City. With Judge Base not being authorized to notarize a deed of conveyance, the
notarized document cannot be considered a valid registrable document in favor of La Suerte.
Although it is true that the absence of notarization of the deed of sale would not invalidate the
transaction evidenced therein, yet an irregular notarization reduces the evidentiary value of a
document to that of a private document, which requires proof of its due execution and
authenticity to be admissible as evidence.

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JUDICIAL FORMS AND PLEADINGS
a. Object of Pleadings
1. ROLANDO T. CATUNGAL, JOSE T. CATUNGAL, JR., CAROLYN T. CATUNGAL and ERLINDA

CATUNGAL-WESSEL vs. ANGEL S. RODRIGUEZ
G.R. No. 146839
March 23, 2011
FACTS:
This controversy arose from a Complaint for Damages and Injunction with Preliminary
Injunction/Restraining Order filed by herein respondent Angel S. Rodriguez against the spouses
Agapita and Jose Catungal (the spouses Catungal), the parents of petitioners.
In the said Complaint, it was alleged that Agapita T. Catungal owned a parcel of land in her name
situated in the Barrio of Talamban, Cebu City. The said property was allegedly the exclusive
paraphernal property of Agapita.
On April 23, 1990, Agapita, with the consent of her husband Jose, entered into a Contract to
Sell with respondent Rodriguez. Subsequently, the Contract to Sell was purportedly "upgraded" into
a Conditional Deed of Sale.
The provisions of the Conditional Deed of Sale pertinent to the present dispute are quoted below:
1. The VENDOR for and in consideration of the sum of TWENTY[-]FIVE MILLION PESOS
(P25,000,000.00) payable as follows:
a. FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) downpayment upon the signing

of this agreement, receipt of which sum is hereby acknowledged in full from the
VENDEE.
b. The balance of TWENTY[-]FOUR MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS

(P24,500,000.00) shall be payable in five separate checks, made to the order of JOSE
CATUNGAL, the first check shall be for FOUR MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (4,500,000.00) and the remaining balance to be paid in four checks in the
amounts of FIVE MILLION PESOS (P5,000,000.00) each after the VENDEE have
successfully negotiated, secured and provided a Road Right of Way consisting of 12
meters in width cutting across Lot 10884 up to the national road, either by widening
the existing Road Right of Way or by securing a new Road Right of Way of 12 meters
in width. If however said Road Right of Way could not be negotiated, the VENDEE
shall give notice to the VENDOR for them to reassess and solve the problem by
taking other options and should the situation ultimately prove futile, he shall take
steps to rescind or cancel the herein Conditional Deed of Sale.

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5. That the VENDEE has the option to rescind the sale. In the event the VENDEE exercises
his option to rescind the herein Conditional Deed of Sale, the VENDEE shall notify the
VENDOR by way of a written notice relinquishing his rights over the property.
In accordance with the Conditional Deed of Sale, Rodriguez purportedly secured the necessary
surveys and plans and through his efforts, the property was reclassified from agricultural land into
residential land which he claimed substantially increased the property’s value. He likewise alleged
that he actively negotiated for the road right of way as stipulated in the contract.
Rodriguez further claimed that on August 31, 1990, the spouses Catungal requested an advance
of P5,000,000.00 on the purchase price for personal reasons. Rodriguez refused to pay the advance,
then he learned that the Catungals were offering the property for sale to third parties.
Thereafter, Rodriguez received letters all signed by Jose Catungal who was a lawyer, demanding
that the former make up his mind about buying the land. Should Rodriguez fail to exercise his
option to buy the land, the Catungals warned that they would consider the contract cancelled and
that they were free to look for other buyers.
Contending that the Catungals’ unilateral rescission of the Conditional Deed of Sale was
unjustified, arbitrary and unwarranted, Rodriquez filed a complaint for damages with TRO.
The spouses Catungal filed their Answer with Counterclaim alleging that they had the right to
rescind the contract in view of (1) Rodriguez’s failure to negotiate the road right of way despite the
lapse of several months since the signing of the contract, and (2) his refusal to pay the additional
amount of P5,000,000.00 asked by the Catungals.
The Catungals amended their Answer twice, retaining their basic allegations but amplifying
their charges of contractual breach and bad faith on the part of Rodriguez and adding the argument
that in view of Article 1191 of the Civil Code, the power to rescind reciprocal obligations is granted
by the law itself to both parties and does not need an express stipulation to grant the same to the
injured party. In the Second Amended Answer with Counterclaim, the spouses Catungal added a
prayer for the trial court to order the Register of Deeds to cancel the annotations of the two
contracts at the back of their OCT.
Rodriguez filed an Amended Complaint, adding allegations to the effect that the Catungals were
guilty of several misrepresentations which purportedly induced Rodriguez to buy the property at
the price of P25,000,000.00. Among others, it was alleged that the spouses Catungal
misrepresented that their Lot 10963 includes a flat portion of land which later turned out to be a
separate lot owned by Teodora Tudtud who sold the same to one Antonio Pablo. That instead of
assisting Rodriguez in his efforts to negotiate the road right of way, the spouses Catungal allegedly
intentionally and maliciously defeated Rodriguez’s negotiations for a road right of way in order to
justify rescission of the said contract and enable them to offer the property to other buyers.
The trial court ruled in favor of Rodriguez.
The Catungals appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. CA affirmed the decision of RTC.

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During the pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals, Agapita Catungal passed away and
thus, her husband, Jose, filed on February 17, 1999 a motion for Agapita’s substitution by her
surviving children.
In a Motion for Reconsideration, counsel for the Catungals, Atty. Borromeo, argued for the first
time that paragraphs 1(b) and 5 of the Conditional Deed of Sale, whether taken separately or
jointly, violated the principle of mutuality of contracts under Article 1308 of the Civil Code and thus,
said contract was void ab initio.
In his Comment, Rodriguez highlighted that (a) petitioners were raising new matters that
cannot be passed upon on appeal; (b) the validity of the Conditional Deed of Sale was already
admitted and petitioners cannot be allowed to change theories on appeal; (c) the questioned
paragraphs of the Conditional Deed of Sale were valid; and (d) petitioners were the ones who
committed fraud and breach of contract and were not entitled to relief for not having come to court
with clean hands.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners should be allowed to raise their theory of nullity of the Conditional
Deed of Sale for the first time on appeal (NO)
HELD:
The Court is not persuaded on the petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals should have
reversed the trial courts’ Decision on the ground of the alleged nullity of paragraphs 1(b) and 5 of
the Conditional Deed of Sale notwithstanding that the same was not raised as an error in their
appellants’ brief.
This is not an instance where a party merely failed to assign an issue as an error in the brief nor
failed to argue a material point on appeal that was raised in the trial court and supported by the
record. Neither is this a case where a party raised an error closely related to, nor dependent on the
resolution of, an error properly assigned in his brief. This is a situation where a party completely
changes his theory of the case on appeal and abandons his previous assignment of errors in
his brief, which plainly should not be allowed as anathema to due process.
Petitioners should be reminded that the object of pleadings is to draw the lines of battle
between the litigants and to indicate fairly the nature of the claims or defenses of both parties.
In Philippine National Construction Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, SC held that "when a party
adopts a certain theory in the trial court, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, for
to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the
basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.”
The Court has also previously ruled that "courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to
decide a question not in issue. Thus, a judgment that goes beyond the issues and purports to

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adjudicate something on which the court did not hear the parties, is not only irregular but also
extrajudicial and invalid. The rule rests on the fundamental tenets of fair play.”
During the proceedings before the trial court, the spouses Catungal never claimed that the
provisions in the Conditional Deed of Sale, stipulating that the payment of the balance of the
purchase price was contingent upon the successful negotiation of a road right of way (paragraph
1[b]) and granting Rodriguez the option to rescind (paragraph 5), were void for allegedly making
the fulfillment of the contract dependent solely on the will of Rodriguez.
Verily, the first time petitioners raised their theory of the nullity of the Conditional Deed of Sale
in view of the questioned provisions was only in their Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of
Appeals’ Decision, affirming the trial court’s judgment. In sum, the Court of Appeals did not err in
disregarding the citations of authorities or in denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the
assailed August 8, 2000 Decision in view of the proscription against changing legal theories on
appeal.

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b. Formal Requirements, Procedural Rules and Technicalities
1. SOUTH COTABATO COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION and GAUVAIN J. BENZONAN vs.

HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, ROLANDO
FABRIGAR, MERLYN VELARDE, VINCE LAMBOC, FELIPE GALINDO, LEONARDO MIGUEL,
JULIUS RUBIN, EDEL RODEROS, MERLYN COLIAO and EDGAR JOPSON
G.R. No. 173326
December 15, 2010
FACTS:
An inspection was conducted at the premises of DXCP Radio Station on January 13, 2004, where
the following violations of labor standards laws were noted: (1) underpayment of minimum wage;
(2) underpayment of 13th month pay; (3) non-payment of five (5) days service incentive leave pay;
(4) non-remittance of SSS premiums; (5) non-payment of rest day premium pay of some employee;
(6) non-payment of holiday premium pay; and (7) some employees are paid on commission basis
aside from their allowances.
The Notice of Inspection Results was explained and given to Tony Ladorna on behalf of the
appellants and another copy was given to Felipe S. Galindo, Technical Supervisor of DXCP. The
Notice required DXCP to effect restitution and/or correction of the aforementioned violations
within five (5) calendar days from receipt of notice.
A summary investigation was scheduled on March 3, 2004 where only the appellees appeared.
Another hearing was held on April 1,2004, where appellees appeared, while a certain Nona Guido
appeared on behalf of Atty. Thomas Jacobo. Ms. Gido sought to reschedule the hearing, which was
denied by the hearing officer. On May 20, 2004, the Regional Director issued an Order directing
appellants to pay appellees the aggregate amount of P759,752.00.
The petitioners appealed their case to DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas. This was dismissed wherein
the Secretary ruled that contrary to their claim, petitioners were not denied due process because
they were given reasonable opportunity to present their evidence. The Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but it was also denied by the DOLE Secretary.
The petitioners brought the case to the Court of Appeals but it was also denied due to several
procedural infirmities:
1. The petition was not properly verified and the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was not
executed by the plaintiff or principal party in violation of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7 of the
Rules of Court, as the affiant was not duly authorized to represent the corporation. Such
procedural lapse renders the entire pleading with no legal effect and is dismissible;
2. Annexes A,B,C,E and its attachments and F are not certified true copies contrary to Section 1,
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; and
3. The petitioners’ counsel failed to indicate the date of issue of his IBP Official Receipt as
provided for under Bar Matter 287 dated September 26, 2000.

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Petitioners then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and the Court of Appeals ruled in its assailed
Resolution dated May 22, 2006 that petitioners’ subsequent submission made them substantially
comply with the second and third procedural errors that were mentioned by the Court of Appeals in
its Resolution dated July 20, 2005. However, the Court of Appeals ruled that with regard with the
first procedural error, petitioners justification does not does not deserve merit reasoning that while
it may be true that there are two petitioners and that petitioner Gauvain Benzonan signed the
verification and certificate of non-forum shopping of the petition, the records revealed that
petitioner Benzonan did not initiate the petition in his own capacity to protect his personal interest
in the case but was in fact acting for and in the corporation’s behalf, petitioner Benzonan should
have been clothed with the Corporation’s board resolution authorizing him to institute the petition.
The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that petitioners’ attachment of the Secretary’s Certificate in
their Motion for Consideration to cure the first procedural mistake was insufficient since their
submission merely authorized Benzonan to represent the corporation and cause the preparation
and filing of a Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA was correct when it dismissed the petition on account of procedural
mistakes (NO)
HELD:
The Court based its decision in a doctrine laid down in the case of Cagayan Valley Drug
Corporation vs. CIR where it was held that the President of a Corporation is among those corporate
officers and employees, who can sign the verification and certification against forum shopping
in behalf of the corporation even without a board resolution issued for the purpose. The
Supreme Court held that there has been substantial compliance with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7 of
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure on the part of the petitioners because the president is in a
position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition. Petitioner
Benzonan clearly satisfies the aforementioned jurisprudential requirement because he is the
President of Petitioner South Cotabato Communications Corporation. Moreover, he is also named as
co-respondent in the labor case which is the subject matter of the special civil action for certiorari
in the Court of Appeals.
Clearly, it was error on the part of the Court of Appeals to dismiss petitioners’ special civil
action for certiorari despite substantial compliance with the rules on procedure. For unduly
upholding technicalities at the expense of a just resolution of the case, normal procedure dictates
that the Court of Appeals should be tasked with properly disposing the petition.

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2. EMMANUEL BABAS, DANILO T. BANAG, ARTURO V. VILLARIN, SR., EDWIN JAVIER, SANDI
BERMEO, REX ALLESA, MAXIMO SORIANO, JR., ARSENIO ESTORQUE and FELIXBERTO
ANAJAO vs. LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 186091
December 15, 2010
FACTS:
Respondent Lorenzo Shipping Corporation (LSC) is a duly organized domestic corporation

engaged in the shipping industry; it owns several equipments necessary for its business. On 1997,
LSC entered into a General Equipment Maintenance Repair and Management Services Agreement
(Agreement) with Best Manpower Services, Inc. (BMSI). Under the Agreement, BMSI undertook to
provide maintenance and repair services to LSC's container vans, heavy equipment, trailer chassis,
and generator sets. BMSI further undertook to provide checkers to inspect all containers received
for loading to and/or unloading from its vessels. Simultaneous with the execution of the Agreement,
LSC leased its equipment, tools, and tractors to BMSI. The period of lease was coterminous with the
Agreement.
BMSI then hired petitioners on various dates to work at LSC as checkers, welders, utility men,
clerks, forklift operators, motor pool and machine shop workers, technicians, trailer drivers, and
mechanics. Six years later, or on May 1, 2003, LSC entered into another contract with BMSI, this
time, a service contract.
In 2003, petitioners filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for regularization against LSC and
BMSI. LSC terminated the Agreement, consequently, petitioners lost their employment. BMSI
asserted that it is an independent contractor. It averred that it was willing to regularize petitioners;
however, some of them lacked the requisite qualifications for the job. BMSI was willing to reassign
petitioners who were willing to accept reassignment. BMSI denied petitioners' claim for
underpayment of wages and non-payment of 13th month pay and other benefits.
LSC, on the other hand, averred that petitioners were employees of BMSI and were assigned to
LSC by virtue of the Agreement. BMSI is an independent job contractor with substantial capital or
investment in the form of tools, equipment, and machinery necessary in the conduct of its business.
The Agreement between LSC and BMSI constituted legitimate job contracting. Thus, petitioners
were employees of BMSI and not of LSC.
After due proceedings, the LA rendered a decision dismissing petitioners' complaint. The LA
found that petitioners were employees of BMSI. It was BMSI which hired petitioners, paid their
wages, and exercised control over them. Petitioners appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), arguing that BMSI was engaged in labor-only contracting. It then reversed the
earlier decision stating that, true enough, parties signed a Lease Contract wherein respondent BMSI
leased several excess equipment of LSC to enable it to discharge its obligation under the
Agreement. So without the equipment which respondent BMSI leased from respondent LSC, the
former would not be able to perform its commitments in the Agreement. Consequently, respondent
Lorenzo Shipping Corp. is ordered to reinstate Petitioners to their former positions as regular
employees and pay their wage differentials and benefits under the CBA. If reinstatement is not
feasible, both respondents Lorenzo Shipping Corp. and Best Manpower Services are adjudged
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jointly and solidarily to pay Petitioners separation pay of one month for every year of service, a
fraction of six months to be considered as one year.
LSC went to the CA via certiorari. On October 10, 2008, the CA rendered the now challenged
Decision, reversing the NLRC. In holding that BMSI was an independent contractor, the CA relied on
the provisions of the Agreement, wherein BMSI warranted that it is an independent contractor, with
adequate capital, expertise, knowledge, equipment, and personnel necessary for the services
rendered to LSC. According to the CA, the fact that BMSI entered into a contract of lease with LSC
did not ipso facto make BMSI a labor-only contractor; on the contrary, it proved that BMSI had
substantial capital. The CA was of the view that the law only required substantial capital or
investment. Since BMSI had substantial capital, as shown by its ability to pay rents to LSC, then it
qualified as an independent contractor.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it on January 21, 2009. Hence,
this appeal by petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent was engaged in Labor-Only Contracting (YES)
HELD:
YES.
Before resolving the petition, we note that only seven (7) of the nine petitioners signed the
Verification and Certification. Petitioners Maximo Soriano, Jr. (Soriano) and Felixberto Anajao
(Anajao) did not sign the Verification and Certification, because they could no longer be located by
their co-petitioners.
In Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association (TMPCWA), et al. vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, citing Loquias vs. Office of the Ombudsman, we stated that the petition satisfies the
formal requirements only with regard to the petitioner who signed the petition, but not his co-
petitioner who did not sign nor authorize the other petitioner to sign it on his behalf. Thus, the
petition can be given due course only as to the parties who signed it. The other petitioners who
did not sign the verification and certificate against forum shopping cannot be recognized as
petitioners and have no legal standing before the Court. The petition should be dismissed outright
with respect to the non-conforming petitioners.
Thus, we dismiss the petition insofar as petitioners Soriano and Anajao are concerned.
In declaring BMSI as an independent contractor, the CA, in the challenged Decision, heavily
relied on the provisions of the Agreement, wherein BMSI declared that it was an independent
contractor, with substantial capital and investment. De Los Santos vs. NLRC instructed us that the
character of the business, i.e., whether as labor-only contractor or as job contractor, should be
measured in terms of, and determined by, the criteria set by statute. The parties cannot dictate by
the mere expedience of a unilateral declaration in a contract the character of their business.

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Labor-only contracting, a prohibited act, is an arrangement where the contractor or

subcontractor merely recruits, supplies, or places workers to perform a job, work, or service for
a principal. In labor-only contracting, the following elements are present: (a) the contractor or
subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment to actually perform the job, work, or
service under its own account and responsibility; and (b) the employees recruited, supplied, or
placed by such contractor or subcontractor perform activities which are directly related to the main
business of the principal.
On the other hand, permissible job contracting or subcontracting refers to an arrangement

whereby a principal agrees to put out or farm out with the contractor or subcontractor the
performance or completion of a specific job, work, or service within a definite or predetermined
period, regardless of whether such job, work, or service is to be performed or completed within or
outside the premises of the principal.
A person is considered engaged in legitimate job contracting or subcontracting if the

following conditions concur:
(a) The contractor carries on a distinct and independent business and undertakes the
contract work on his account under his own responsibility according to his own manner
and method, free from the control and direction of his employer or principal in all matters
connected with the performance of his work except as to the results thereof;
(b) The contractor has substantial capital or investment; and
(c) The agreement between the principal and the contractor or subcontractor assures the
contractual employees' entitlement to all labor and occupational safety and health
standards, free exercise of the right to self-organization, security of tenure, and social
welfare benefits.
Given the above standards, we sustain the petitioners' contention that BMSI is engaged in
labor-only contracting.
First, petitioners worked at LSC's premises, and nowhere else. Other than the provisions of the
Agreement, there was no showing that it was BMSI which established petitioners' working
procedure and methods, which supervised petitioners in their work, or which evaluated the same.
There was absolute lack of evidence that BMSI exercised control over them or their work, except for
the fact that petitioners were hired by BMSI.
Second, LSC was unable to present proof that BMSI had substantial capital. The record before us
is bereft of any proof pertaining to the contractor's capitalization, nor to its investment in tools,
equipment, or implements actually used in the performance or completion of the job, work, or
service that it was contracted to render. What is clear was that the equipment used by BMSI were
owned by, and merely rented from, LSC.
In Mandaue Galleon Trade, Inc. vs. Andales, we held, the law casts the burden on the contractor
to prove that it has substantial capital, investment, tools, etc. Employees, on the other hand, need
not prove that the contractor does not have substantial capital, investment, and tools to engage in

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job-contracting.
Third, petitioners performed activities which were directly related to the main business of LSC.
The work of petitioners as checkers, welders, utility men, drivers, and mechanics could only be
characterized as part of, or at least clearly related to, and in the pursuit of, LSC's business. Logically,
when petitioners were assigned by BMSI to LSC, BMSI acted merely as a labor-only contractor.
Lastly, as found by the NLRC, BMSI had no other client except for LSC, and neither BMSI nor LSC
refuted this finding, thereby bolstering the NLRC finding that BMSI is a labor-only contractor.
Indubitably, BMSI can only be classified as a labor-only contractor. The CA, therefore, erred
when it ruled otherwise. Consequently, the workers that BMSI supplied to LSC became regular
employees of the latter. Having gained regular status, petitioners were entitled to security of tenure
and could only be dismissed for just or authorized causes and after they had been accorded due
process.
Herein petitioners, having been unjustly dismissed from work, are entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to full back wages, inclusive of allowances,
and to other benefits or their monetary equivalents computed from the time compensation was
withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement. Their earnings elsewhere during the periods of
their illegal dismissal shall not be deducted therefrom.
Accordingly, we hold that the NLRC committed no grave abuse of discretion in its decision.
Conversely, the CA committed a reversible error when it set aside the NLRC ruling.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

Case
3. PRINCE TRANSPORT, INC. and MR. RENATO CLAROS vs. DIOSDADO GARCIA, LUISITO
GARCIA, RODANTE ROMERO, REX BARTOLOME, FELICIANO GASCO, JR., DANILO ROJO,
EDGAR SANFUEGO, AMADO GALANTO, EUTIQUIO LUGTU, JOEL GRAMATICA, MIEL
CERVANTES, TERESITA CABANES, ROE DELA CRUZ, RICHELO BALIDOY, VILMA PORRAS,
MIGUELITO SALCEDO, CRISTINA GARCIA, MARIO NAZARENO, DINDO TORRES, ESMAEL
RAMBOYONG, ROBETO MANO, ROGELIO BAGAWISAN, ARIEL SANCHEZ, ESTAQULO
VILLAREAL, NELSON MONTERO, GLORIA ORANTE, HARRY TOCA, PABLITO MACASAET and
RONALD GARCITA
G.R. No. 167291
January 12, 2011
FACTS:
The present petition arose from various complaints filed by herein respondents charging
petitioners with illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and illegal deductions and praying for the
award of premium pay for holiday and rest day, holiday pay, service leave pay, 13 th month pay,
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioners are not guilty of unfair labor practice in the absence of
evidence to show that they violated respondents right to self-organization. The Labor Arbiter also
held that Lubas is the respondents employer and that it (Lubas) is an entity which is separate,
distinct and independent from PTI. Nonetheless, the Labor Arbiter found that Lubas is guilty of
illegally dismissing respondents from their employment.
Respondents filed a Partial Appeal with the NLRC praying, among others, that PTI should also
be held equally liable as Lubas.
The NLRC modified the Decision of the Labor Arbiter partially granting the appeal and
sustaining the decision appealed from subject to modifications regarding money claims of
complainants.
In a special civil action for certiorari, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of NLRC ruling
that petitioners are guilty of unfair labor practice; that Lubas is a mere instrumentality, agent
conduit or adjunct of PTI; and that petitioners act of transferring respondents employment to Lubas
is indicative of their intent to frustrate the efforts of respondents to organize themselves into a
union.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the petition filed with the Court of Appeals is fatally defective because the
attached verification and certificate against forum shopping was signed only by respondent
Garcia (NO)

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2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in giving due course to the petition with respect to
respondents who failed to file an appeal to the NLRC considering that these respondents did not
sign the verification (NO)
HELD:
NO. (in both issues)
While the general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the
plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only one of them is insufficient, the Court has stressed that
the rules on forum shopping, which were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to
subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective. Strict compliance with the provision
regarding the certificate of non-forum shopping underscores its mandatory nature in that the
certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded. It
does not, however, prohibit substantial compliance therewith under justifiable circumstances,
considering especially that although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.
In a number of cases, the Court has consistently held that when all the petitioners share a
common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of
them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the rules. In the
present case, there is no question that respondents share a common interest and invoke a common
cause of action. Hence, the signature of respondent Garcia is a sufficient compliance with the
rule governing certificates of non-forum shopping. In the first place, some of the respondents
actually executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing Garcia as their attorney-in-fact in filing a
petition for certiorari with the CA.
The Court, likewise, does not agree with petitioners' argument that the CA should not have
given due course to the petition filed before it with respect to some of the respondents, considering
that these respondents did not sign the verification attached to the Memorandum of Partial Appeal
earlier filed with the NLRC. Petitioners assert that the decision of the Labor Arbiter has become
final and executory with respect to these respondents and, as a consequence, they are barred from
filing a petition for certiorari with the CA.
With respect to the absence of some of the workers’ signatures in the verification, the
verification requirement is deemed substantially complied with when some of the parties
who undoubtedly have sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of the
allegations in the petition had signed the same. Such verification is deemed a sufficient
assurance that the matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and
correct, and not merely speculative. Moreover, respondents' Partial Appeal shows that the appeal
stipulated as complainants-appellants Rizal Beato, et al., meaning that there were more than one
appellant who were all workers of petitioners.
In any case, the settled rule is that a pleading which is required by the Rules of Court to be
verified, may be given due course even without a verification if the circumstances warrant the
suspension of the rules in the interest of justice. Indeed, the absence of a verification is not
jurisdictional, but only a formal defect, which does not of itself justify a court in refusing to allow

Case
and act on a case. Hence, the failure of some of the respondents to sign the verification
attached to their Memorandum of Appeal filed with the NLRC is not fatal to their cause of
action.


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LEGAL FORMS AND PLEADINGS [ATTY. RENE B. GOROSPE] Digests

2004 RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE

1. XERXES A. ABADIANO vs. SPOUSES JESUS and LOLITA MARTIR

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Ayento. Candelaria. Cruz. De Leon, A. De Leon, M. Feliciano. 1

Whether or not the deed of sale was a spurious document (YES)

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Ayento. Candelaria. Cruz. De Leon, A. De Leon, M. Feliciano. 2

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Ayento. Candelaria. Cruz. De Leon, A. De Leon, M. Feliciano. 3

2. DOLORES L. DELA CRUZ, MILAGROS L. PRINCIPE, NARCISA L. FAUSTINO, JORGE V. LEGASPI

According to complainants, respondent had made untruthful statements in the

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Ayento. Candelaria. Cruz. De Leon, A. De Leon, M. Feliciano. 4

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Ayento. Candelaria. Cruz. De Leon, A. De Leon, M. Feliciano. 5

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Ayento. Candelaria. Cruz. De Leon, A. De Leon, M. Feliciano. 6

3. LEONOR CAMCAM, JOSE, FORTUNATO, VIRGINIA, GLORIA, FLORENDO, DELFIN, RODRIGO,

CA: Affirmed with modification.

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Ayento. Candelaria. Cruz. De Leon, A. De Leon, M. Feliciano. 7

NO, the documents are valid.

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Ayento. Candelaria. Cruz. De Leon, A. De Leon, M. Feliciano. 8

4. SPOUSES LEHNER and LUDY MARTIRES vs. MENELIA CHUA

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Ayento. Candelaria. Cruz. De Leon, A. De Leon, M. Feliciano. 9

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Ayento. Candelaria. Cruz. De Leon, A. De Leon, M. Feliciano. 10

Pactum commissorium is a stipulation empowering the creditor to appropriate the thing

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Ayento. Candelaria. Cruz. De Leon, A. De Leon, M. Feliciano. 11

5. THELMA M. ARANAS vs. TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO, CARMENCITA M.

Whether or not the property shall be included in the inventory (YES)

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Ayento. Candelaria. Cruz. De Leon, A. De Leon, M. Feliciano. 12

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Ayento. Candelaria. Cruz. De Leon, A. De Leon, M. Feliciano. 13

1. FE A. YLAYA vs. ATTY. GLENN CARLOS GACOTT

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Ayento. Candelaria. Cruz. De Leon, A. De Leon, M. Feliciano. 14

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Ayento. Candelaria. Cruz. De Leon, A. De Leon, M. Feliciano. 15

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Ayento. Candelaria. Cruz. De Leon, A. De Leon, M. Feliciano. 16

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Ayento. Candelaria. Cruz. De Leon, A. De Leon, M. Feliciano. 17

2. BERNARD JANDOQUILE vs. ATTY. QUIRINO REVILLA, JR.

Atty. Revilla, Jr. notarized a complaint-affidavit signed by Heneraline L. Brosas, Herizalyn

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Ayento. Candelaria. Cruz. De Leon, A. De Leon, M. Feliciano. 18

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Ayento. Candelaria. Cruz. De Leon, A. De Leon, M. Feliciano. 19

c. Refusal to Notarize and False or Incomplete Certificates

1. MERCEDITA DE JESUS vs. ATTY. JUVY MELL SANCHEZMALIT

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Ayento. Candelaria. Cruz. De Leon, A. De Leon, M. Feliciano. 20

IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. recommended the immediate

Whether or not the additional documents submitted in evidence by complainant are

Notarization converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Ayento. Candelaria. Cruz. De Leon, A. De Leon, M. Feliciano. 21

Respondent’s explanation about the unsigned lease agreement executed by complainant

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Ayento. Candelaria. Cruz. De Leon, A. De Leon, M. Feliciano. 22

2. EUPROCINA I. CRISOSTOMO, MARILYN L. SOLIS, EVELYN MARQUIZO, ROSEMARIE

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Ayento. Candelaria. Cruz. De Leon, A. De Leon, M. Feliciano. 23

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Ayento. Candelaria. Cruz. De Leon, A. De Leon, M. Feliciano. 24

d. Commission Period and Expiration

1. EFIGENIA M. TENOSO vs. ATTY. ANSELMO S. ECHANEZ

In his Report and Recommendation, Investigating Commissioner recommended that

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Ayento. Candelaria. Cruz. De Leon, A. De Leon, M. Feliciano. 25

NO, respondent failed to present evidence to rebut complainant's allegations.

In misrepresenting himself as a notary public, respondent exposed party-litigants, courts,

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Ayento. Candelaria. Cruz. De Leon, A. De Leon, M. Feliciano. 26

During the mandatory preliminary conference conducted by IBP, respondent expressly

Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco respectfully recommended that respondent be