G.R. No.

137944 April 6, 2000 Mendoza, another brother of [petitioners], during the cadastral survey had a dispute on
[the] ownership of the land.
FERNANDA MENDOZA CEQUEÑA and RUPERTA MENDOZA LIRIO,
petitioners, During the pre-trial conference, parties stipulated the following facts:

vs. 1) The land subject of the case was formerly declared for taxation purposes in the name
of Sinforoso Mendoza prior to 1954 but is now declared in the name of Margarito
HONORATA MENDOZA BOLANTE, respondent. Mendoza.

2) The parties agree[d] as to the identity of the land subject of instant case.
PANGANIBAN, J.: 3) [Petitioners] are the daughters of Margarito Mendoza while the [respondent] is the
Tax receipts and declarations are prima facie proofs of ownership or possession of the only daughter of Sinforoso Mendoza.
property for which such taxes have been paid. Coupled with proof of actual possession 4) Margarito Mendoza and Sinforoso Mendoza [were] brothers, now deceased.
of the property, they may become the basis of a claim for ownership. By acquisitive
prescription, possession in the concept of owner — public, adverse, peaceful and 5) During the cadastral survey of the property on October 15, 1979 there was already a
uninterrupted — may be converted to ownership. On the other hand, mere possession dispute between Honorata M. Bolante and Miguel Mendoza, brother of [petitioners].
and occupation of land cannot ripen into ownership.
6) [Respondent was] occupying the property in question.

The only issue involved [was] who [was] the lawful owner and possessor of the land
The Case subject of the case.

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the March 19, 1999 Decision of the After trial, the court a quo rendered its judgment in favor of [petitioners], the dispositive
Court of Appeals 2 (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 43423. The assailed Decision disposed as portion of which reads as follows:
follows:
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered for the
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the decision of the trial court appealed from is [petitioners] and against the [respondent]:
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, judgment is hereby rendered declaring .
. . Honorata Mendoza Bolante the rightful owner and possessor of the parcel of land 1. Declaring that the parcel of land situated in Bangad, Binangonan, Rizal covered by
which is the subject of this appeal. tax declaration no. 26-0027 in the name of Margarito Mendoza belong to his heirs, the
[petitioners] herein;

2. Ordering [respondent] to vacate the property subject of the case and deliver
The Facts possession thereof to the heirs of Margarito Mendoza.

The Petition herein refers to a parcel of land situated in Barangay Bangad, Binangonan, 3. Ordering the [respondent] to indemnify the [petitioners] in the sum of P10,000.00, as
Province of Rizal, having an area of 1,728 square meters and covered by Tax actual damages.
Declaration No. 26-0027. The undisputed antecedents of this case are narrated by the
Court of Appeals as follows: 4. Ordering the [respondent] to pay the costs.

The facts not disputed revealed that prior to 1954, the land was originally declared for
taxation purposes in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza, father of [respondent] and married Ruling of the Court of Appeals
to Eduarda Apiado. Sinforoso died in 1930. [Petitioners] were the daughters of
Margarito Mendoza. On the basis of an affidavit, the tax declaration in the name of The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court because the genuineness and the due
Sinforoso Mendoza of the contested lot was cancelled and subsequently declared in the execution of the affidavit allegedly signed by the respondent and her mother had not
name of Margarito Mendoza. Margarito and Sinforoso are brothers. [Respondent] is the been sufficiently established. The notary public or anyone else who had witnessed the
present occupant of the land. Earlier, on October 15, 1975, [respondent] and Miguel execution of the affidavit was not presented. No expert testimony or competent witness
ever attested to the genuineness of the questioned signatures.
 We quote below the pertinent portion of the appellate court's ruling: 7

The CA further ruled that the affidavit was insufficient to overcome the denial of While it is true that the affidavit was signed and subscribed before a notary public, the
respondent and her mother. The former testified that the latter, never having attended general rule is that affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence, unless affiants are
school, could neither read nor write. Respondent also said that she had never been called placed on the witness stand (People's Bank and Trust Company vs. Leonidas, 207 SCRA
"Leonor," which was how she was referred to in the affidavit. 164). Affidavits are not considered the best evidence, if affiants are available as
witnesses (Vallarta vs. Court of Appeals, 163 SCRA 587). The due execution of the
Moreover, the appellate court held that the probative value of petitioners' tax receipts affidavit was not sufficiently established. The notary public or others who saw that the
and declarations paled in comparison with respondent's proof of ownership of the document was signed or at least [could] confirm its recitals [were] not presented. There
disputed parcel. Actual, physical, exclusive and continuous possession by respondent was no expert testimony or competent witness who attested to the genuineness of the
since 1985 indeed gave her a better title under Article 538 of the Civil Code. questioned signatures. Worse, [respondent] denied the genuineness of her signature and
Hence, this Petition. 5 that of her mother . . . [Respondent] testified that her mother was an illiterate and as far
as she knew her mother could not write because she had not attended school (p. 7, ibid).
Her testimony was corroborated by Ma. Sales Bolante Basa, who said the [respondent's]
mother was illiterate.
Issues
The petitioners’ allegations are untenable. Before a private document offered as
Insisting that they are the rightful owners of the disputed land, the petitioners allege that
authentic can be received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved
the CA committed these reversible errors: 6
first. 8 And before a document is admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule under the
1. . . . [I]n not considering the affidavit as an exception to the general rule that an Dead Man's Statute, the offeror must show (a) that the declarant is dead, insane or unable
affidavit is classified as hearsay evidence, unless the affiant is placed on the witness to testify; (b) that the declaration concerns a fact cognizable by the declarant; (c) that at
stand; the time the declaration was made, he was aware that the same was contrary to his
interest; and (d) that circumstances render improbable the existence of any motive to
2. . . . [I]n holding that respondent has been in actual and physical possession, coupled falsify. 9
with . . . exclusive and continuous possession of the land since 1985, which are evidence
of the best kind of circumstance proving the claim of the title of ownership and enjoys In this case, one of the affiants happens to be the respondent, who is still alive and who
the presumption of preferred possessor. testified that the signature in the affidavit was not hers. A declaration against interest is
not admissible if the declarant is available to testify as a witness. 10 Such declarant
should be confronted with the statement against interest as a prior inconsistent
statement.
The Court's Ruling
The affidavit cannot be considered an ancient document either. An ancient document is
The Petition has no merit.
one that is (1) more than 30 years old, (2) found in the proper custody, and (3)
unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. 11 It must on its
face appear to be genuine. The petitioners herein failed, however, to explain how the
First Issue: purported signature of Eduarda Apiado could have been affixed to the subject affidavit
if, according to the witness, she was an illiterate woman who never had any formal
Admissibility of the Affidavit
schooling. This circumstance casts suspicion on its authenticity.
Petitioners dispute the CA's ruling that the affidavit was not the best evidence of their
Not all notarized documents are exempted from the rule on authentication. Thus, an
father's ownership of the disputed land, because the "affiant was not placed on the
affidavit does not automatically become a public document just because it contains a
witness stand." They contend that it was unnecessary to present a witness to establish
notarial jurat. Furthermore, the affidavit in question does not state how the ownership
the authenticity of the affidavit because it was a declaration against respondent's interest
of the subject land was transferred from Sinforoso Mendoza to Margarito Mendoza. By
and was an ancient document. As a declaration against interest, it was an exception to
itself, an affidavit is not a mode of acquiring ownership.
the hearsay rule. As a necessary and trustworthy document, it was admissible in
evidence. And because it was executed on March 24, 1953, it was a self-authenticating
ancient document.
Second Issue: to possess the subject land with a just title since she possessed it in the concept of owner.
Under Article 541 of the Code, she could not be obliged to show or prove such title.
Preference of Possession
The respondent's contention is untenable. The presumption in Article 541 of the Civil
The CA ruled that the respondent was the preferred possessor under Article 538 of the Code is merely disputable; it prevails until the contrary is proven. 20 That is, one who
Civil Code because she was in notorious, actual, exclusive and continuous possession is disturbed in one's possession shall, under this provision, be restored thereto by the
of the land since 1985. Petitioners dispute this ruling. They contend that she came into means established by law. 21 Article 538 settles only the question of possession, and
possession through force and violence, contrary to Article 536 of the Civil Code. possession is different from ownership. Ownership in this case should be established in
We concede that despite their dispossession in 1985, the petitioners did not lose legal one of the ways provided by law.
possession because possession cannot be acquired through force or violence. 12 To all To settle the issue of ownership, we need to determine who between the claimants has
intents and purposes, a possessor, even if physically ousted, is still deemed the legal proven acquisitive prescription. 22
possessor.13 Indeed, anyone who can prove prior possession, regardless of its character,
may recover such possession. 14 Ownership of immovable property is acquired by ordinary prescription through
possession for ten years.23 Being the sole heir of her father, respondent showed through
However, possession by the petitioners does not prevail over that of the his tax receipt that she had been in possession of the land for more than ten years since
respondent.1âwphi1 Possession by the former before 1985 was not exclusive, as the 1932. When her father died in 1930, she continued to reside there with her mother. When
latter also acquired it before 1985. The records show that the petitioners' father and she got married, she and her husband engaged in kaingin inside the disputed lot for their
brother, as well as the respondent and her mother were simultaneously in adverse livelihood. 24
possession of the land.
Respondent's possession was not disturbed until 1953 when the petitioners' father
Before 1985, the subject land was occupied and cultivated by the respondent's father claimed the land. But by then, her possession, which was in the concept of owner —
(Sinforoso), who was the brother of petitioners' father (Margarito), as evidenced by Tax public, peaceful, and uninterrupted 25 — had already ripened into ownership.
Declaration No. 26425. 15 When Sinforoso died in 1930, Margarito took possession of Furthermore she herself, after her father's demise, declared and paid realty taxes for the
the land and cultivated it with his son Miguel. At the same time, respondent and her disputed land. Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation, when coupled
mother continued residing on the lot. with proof of actual possession of the property, can be the basis of a claim for ownership
When respondent came of age in 1948, she paid realty taxes for the years 1932-1948. through prescription. 26
16 Margarito declared the lot for taxation in his name in 1953 17 and paid its realty taxes In contrast, the petitioners, despite thirty-two years of farming the subject land, did not
beginning 1952. 18 When he died, Miguel continued cultivating the land. As found by acquire ownership. It is settled that ownership cannot be acquired by mere occupation.
the CA, the respondent and her mother were living on the land, which was being tilled 27 Unless coupled with the element of hostility toward the true owner, 28 occupation
by Miguel until 1985 when he was physically ousted by the respondent. 19 and use, however long, will not confer title by prescription or adverse possession.
Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code, the respondent is the preferred possessor Moreover, the petitioners cannot claim that their possession was public, peaceful and
because, benefiting from her father's tax declaration of the subject lot since 1926, she uninterrupted. Although their father and brother arguably acquired ownership through
has been in possession thereof for a longer period. On the other hand, petitioners' father extraordinary prescription because of their adverse possession for thirty-two years
acquired joint possession only in 1952. (1953-1985), 29 this supposed ownership cannot extend to the entire disputed lot, but
must be limited to the portion that they actually farmed.

We cannot sustain the petitioners' contention that their ownership of the disputed land
Third Issue: was established before the trial court through the series of tax declarations and receipts
issued in the name of Margarito Mendoza. Such documents prove that the holder has a
Possession of Better Right claim of title over the property. Aside from manifesting a sincere desire to obtain title
Finally, the petitioners challenge the CA ruling that "actual and physical coupled with thereto, they announce the holder's adverse claim against the state and other interested
the exclusive and continuous possession [by respondent] of the land since 1985" proved parties. 30
her ownership of the disputed land. The respondent argues that she was legally presumed
However, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. 31 At
most, they constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership or possession of the property
for which taxes have been paid. 32 In the absence of actual public and adverse
possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership.33 In
sum, the petitioners' claim of ownership of the whole parcel has no legal
basis.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 221071 Eddie and Verona Juana Pascua-Dizon (Verona) (collectively, the Spouses Dizon) got
married on March 8, 1995.7 Verona was a housewife.8 She and her mother, together
EDDIE E. DIZON and BRYAN R. DIZON, Petitioners, with Bryan and James, resided in the house erected on a 240-square-meter lot (disputed
vs. property) at No. 42 Mahogany Street, Nova Tierra Subdivision, Lanang, Davao City.9
The disputed property was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
YOLANDA VIDA P. BELTRAN, Respondent. 35170710 issued in 2002. The registered owners were "[Verona], married to [Eddie]."

DECISION In 2008, Verona filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City a petition
for the issuance of Temporary and Permanent Protection Orders against Eddie and
James. 11
REYES, J.:

On ,April 9, 2008, the Spouses Dizon entered into a Compromise Agreement, 12

Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari, 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of whereby they contemplated selling the disputed property in the amount of not less than
Court, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary Restraining order and/or writ of ₱4,000,000.00, which price shall be increased by ₱100,000.00 for every succeeding year
preliminary injunction, filed by Eddie E. Dizon (Eddie) and Bryan James R. Dizon until the same is finally sold. They would thereafter equally divide the proceeds from
(Bryan) (collectively, the petitioners) to challenge the Decision2 rendered on January the sale.
23, 2015 and Resolution3 issued on September 7, 2015 by the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 05256-MIN. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:
On September 27, 2009, Eddie left the Philippines to work on board a ship.13 Sometime
in October of 2009, Verona was confined at the Adventist Hospital in Bangkal, Davao
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 13 June City. She was transferred to Ricardo Limso Medical Center on November 30, 2009. 14
2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 14, is REVERSED and SET She died on December 8, 2009 due to cardio-respiratory arrest, with "leukonoid reaction
ASIDE. The Decision dated 11 November 2011 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities secondary to sepsis or malignancy (occult)" as antecedent cause. 15
of Davao City, Branch 1, in Civil Case No. 21 [,]755-A-10, is REINSTATED. The
Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 14, is hereby ORDERED to issue a writ of
execution for the en Corcemen1 of the MTCC Decision dated 11 November 2011. Eddie claimed that he was unaware of Verona's hospital confinement. On December 9,
2009, his brother Jun Dizon (Jun), called him through the Telephone and informed him
about Verona's death. Eddie intended to promptly return to the Philippines before
SO ORDERED. 4 Verona's burial. Hence, he advised Jun to ask Verona's relatives to wait for his arrival.
16

The assailed resolution denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

It took a while before Eddie's employer finally permitted him to go home. Verona was
already buried before Eddie's arrival on December 21, 2009. 17
Antecedents

Thereafter, a copy of a Deed of Absolute Sale (Deed),18 dated December, 1, 2009, was
shown to Eddie. Its subject was the disputed property conveyed to herein respondent,
Eddie started working as a seafarer in the 1980s. 5He has two children, namely, Bryan
Yolanda Vida P. Beltran (Vida), for ₱1,500,000.00. 19
and James Christopher R. Dizon (James).6
Eddie alleged that the Deed was falsified, and his and Verona's signatures thereat were ₱1,000.00 monthly rent from July 12, 2010 until the said property is vacated, ₱20,000.00
forgeries.20 In January of 2010, Eddie filed two complaints against Vida. One was a as attorney's fees and cost of suit. Vida was, however, ordered to pay therein defendants
civil case for nullification of the Deed, and for payment of damages and attorney's ₱414,459.78 as remaining balance relative to the sale. 31
fees.21 The other was a criminal complaint for falsification of public document.22 He
also caused the annotation of a notice of lis penden upon TCT No. T-351707.23
The MTCC rationalized as follows:

On April 6, 20 l 0, TCT No. T-351707 was cancelled, and in its place, TCT No. T-146-
2010002236 was issued in Vida's name.24 Eddie belatedly discovered about the The claim of [the petitioners] as to the falsity of the sale is a collateral attack on the
foregoing fact sometime in May 2010 after Davao Light and Power Company cut off generated title itself, which can only be impugned in a direct proceeding litigated for
the electrical connection purportedly upon the advice of the new owner of the disputed that matter. The fact that [Eddie] presigned the [Deed] prior to the death of [Verona], in
property. 25 the presence of counsels[,] which remained unrebutted[,] was in fact giving consent to
the act of disposing the property to answer for any exigency or impending situation that
will arise later[,] which may or may not be entirely connected with the medical
Ruling of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities requirements of his ailing spouse[,] whose health condition at that time of the execution
[of the Deed] ha[d] apparently started to deteriorate. Records show [that] [Vida] incurred
a hefty sum of One Million Eighty-Five Thousand Five Hundred and Forty pesos and
In June of 2010, Vida filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Davao twenty-one centavos (₱1,085,540.21) for both medical and burial expenses of the
City an action for unlawful detainer26 against the petitioners, James and their unnamed deceased of which [Eddie] failed to support in violation of the Civil Code on the rights
relatives, house helpers and acquaintances residing in the disputed property. 27 and, [sic] obligation of the husband and wife to render mutual support.

Vida alleged that she is the registered owner of the disputed property. While the Deed xxxx
evidencing the conveyance in her favor was executed on December 1, 2009, Eddie pre-
signed the same on April 9, 2008 before he left to work abroad. The Spouses Dizon's
respective lawyers witnessed the signing. After Verona's death, Vida tolerated the While evidences were presented to prove the existence of fraud in the execution of the
petitioners' stay in the disputed property. On May 18, 2010, Vida sent a formal letter instrument[,] the same cannot be appreciated in this summary action for want of
requiring the petitioners to vacate the disputed property, but to no avail. 28 jurisdiction.

The petitioners sought the dismissal of Vida's complaint arguing that at the time the x x x [A] notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with
Deed was executed, Verona was already unconscious. Eddie, on the other hand, could respect to its due execution, and documents acknowledged before a notary public have
not have signed the Deed as well since he left the Philippines on September 27, 2009 in their favor the presumption of regularity. x x x.
and returned only on December 21, 2009. Further, Verona's signature appearing on the
Deed was distinctly different from those she had affixed in her petition for the issuance
of a temporary protection order and Compromise Agreement, elated March 26, 2008 xxxx
and April 9, 2008, respectively. Besides, the purchase price of ₱l,500,000.00 was not in
accord with the Spouses Dizon's agreement to sell the disputed property for not less than
₱4,000,000.00. 29
x x x The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not defendants unlawfully withheld the
property sold to [Vida.]

On November 11, 2011, the MTCC rendered a Decision30 directing the petitioners and
their co-defendants to turn over to Vida the possession of the disputed property, and pay
xxxx deciding the issue of ownership[, the latter shall be resolved only to determine the issue
of possession[.]["] x x x

While it is true that defendants herein filed both civil and criminal cases for the
Nullification of the [Deed] and Falsification alleging forgeries, the issues therein are In the pleadings of the [petitioners] filed before the court a quo, and even in their
entirely different from this ejectment case. The criminal case, [sic] only proves the memorandum on appeal, they vigorously raise[d] the question of ownership of [Vida]
existence of probable cause to determine criminal culpability. The nullification tackles based on the alleged notarized [Deed] signed by [Eddie] in favor of [Vida] where the
the validity or invalidity of the sale on grounds of falsity. latter derived her so-called ownership over the subject premises[.] Truly indeed upon
examination by any sensible man[,] it would reveal that the signature[s] of [the Spouses
Dizon] appearing at the bottom of the al1eged Deed [were] falsified x x x. Thus, a
The prevailing doctrine is that suits or actions for the annulment of sale; title or document challenged by a party in litigation as falsified may be proved without resorting
document do not abate any ejectment action respecting the same property x x x. to an opinion of handwriting experts. x x x.

xxxx In another case[,] the Supreme Court held that: "x-x- A finding of forgery does not
entirely depend on the testimony of handwriting experts. Although it is useful[,] the
judge still exercises independent judgment on the issue of authenticity of the signatures
under scrutiny by comparing the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine
x x x [C]onsidering the conjugal nature of the property and the subsequent dissolution
signatures of the person whose signature is theorized upon to have been forged. x x x
of the conjugal partnership upon the death of [Verona] on December 08, 2009, with the
execution of conveyance in favor of [Vida], this Court deemed it equitable and just for
[Vida], to return to [Eddie], [sic] the remaining balance of the sale representing the net
amount less the total actual medical and burial expenses of [Verona] from the proceeds This court x x x took occasion in comparing and examining the signature of [Verona] in
of the sale, in the amount of FOUR HUNDRED, FOURTEEN THOUSAND FOUR the [Deed] x x x vis-a-vis her signature appearing in the compromise agreement
HUNDRED, FIFTY-NINE PESOS AND SEVENTY-NINE centavos (P414,459.79) in executed [with Eddie] x x x[.] [The comparison] lucidly showed that the signatures of
the absence of evidence to that effect and for reasons of equity.32 [Verona] [were] x x x very different from each other and [the differences are] detectable
by a human eye. x x x.

Ruling of the RTC

xxxx

The petitioners filed an appeal33 before the RTC. During its pendency, Vida filed a
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. On June 13, 2012, the RTC reversed the Another thing that caught the curiosity of this court is the stipulation contained in the
MTCC ruling, dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer and denied Vida's motion compromise agreement x x x wherein [the Spouses Dizon] agreed x x x that the "x-x-
for the issuance of a writ of execution.34 The RTC explained that: net selling price of the said conjugal property should be sold not lower than FOUR
MILLION (P4,000,000.00) PESOS for the year 2008 x x x."

Under Republic Act No. 7691 expanding the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, [MTCCs], Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, xxxx
amending Batas Pambansa [Blg.] 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980,["] paragraph 2, of Section 33 therein provides that the court
of first level has "x-x- Exclusive Original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and x x x [T]here was never proof adduced that the compromise agreement adverted to was
unlawful detainer: Provided, that when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question rescinded or modified by the [Spouses Dizon]. To the view of this Court[,] the
of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot he resolved without consideration of the said [Deed] x x x has an indicia of fraud x x x [and] the signature[s]
of the [Spouses Dizon] as falsified. [A] [f]alsified document cannot give right or
ownership to a party who uses it.
xxxx

xxxx
x x x Nothing is more settled than the rule that "[i]n an unlawful detainer case, the sole
issue for resolution is the physical or material possession of the property involved,
independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties. However, where the issue
x x x To justify an action for unlawful detainer[,] the permission or tolerance must have of ownership is· raised, the courts may pass upon the issue of ownership in order to
been present at the beginning of the possession[.]-x-x-x- Since the complaint did not determine who has the right to possess the property. The Court stresses, however, that
satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the [MTCC] this adjudication is only an initial determination of ownership for the purpose of settling
had no jurisdiction over the case. x x x.35 (Emphasis and underlining in the original) the issue of possession, the issue of ownership being inseparably linked thereto. The
lower court's adjudication of ownership in the ejectment case is merely provisional and
would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the
Ruling of the CA property. It is, therefore, not conclusive as to the issue of ownership, which is the subject
matter of a separate case for annulment of [the Deed] filed by [the petitioners].

Vida assailed the foregoing via a petition for review, which the CA granted in the herein
assailed decision and resolution. The CA's reasons are cited below: x x x [T]he RTC[,] in resolving the issue of possession in the unlawful detainer 'case[,]
has not only provisionally passed upon the issue of ownership of the [disputed] property
but it in fact made a determinative and conclusive finding on the ownership thereof,
[Vida] was able to sufficiently allege and consequently established the requisites of contrary to the settled rule that in [an] unlawful detainer case, the only issue to be
unlawful detainer. resolve[d] by the court is the physical or material possession or the property involved x
x x.

First, [Vida] alleged that she is the registered owner of the [disputed] property and she
merely tolerated the continuous possession of the [petitioners] [of] the [disputed] x x x [W]hile the Court may make provisional determination of ownership in order to
property after she purchased it and had it titled in her name. Second, [the petitioners'] determine who between [Vida] and [the petitioners] had the better right to possess the
possession became illegal upon notice by [Vida] to [the petitioners] of the termination property, yet, the court is proscribed from making a conclusive finding on this issue. x
of the [petitioners'] right of possession as shown by the Notice to Vacate dated 18 May x x [T]he RTC has already made a preemptive finding on the validity or invalidity of
2010 sent by [Vida's] counsel to [the petitioners]. Third, [the petitioners] refused to the document, [but] the resolution thereof properly pertains to a separate proceeding
vacate the [disputed] property x x x thereby depriving [Vida] of the enjoyment thereof. pending before it in a separate case. x x x.
And fourth, [Vida] instituted the complaint dated 03 June 2010 for unlawful detainer
within one (1) year from demand to vacate the premises. x x x.
xxxx

xxxx
x x x [T]his Court agrees with the contention of [Vida] that the RTC's pronouncement
that the signatures in the [Deed] were forged and [Vida's] title issued pursuant thereto is
x x x While the said [Deed] was questioned by [the petitioners] for being a nullity in a void is a collateral attack on [Vida's] title which violates the [principle of] indefeasibility
separate case, yet, it should be emphasized that the determination of the validity or the of the Torrens title. x x x.
nullity of the [Deed] should be properly threshed out in that separate proceeding and not
in the summary action for unlawful detainer. x x x.
xxxx Vida has a cause of action for unlawful detainer against the petitioners considering that
the Deed she relied upon in filing her complaint was falsified, hence, null; and

the RTC correctly ruled that in an unlawful detainer case, the MTCC can resolve the
Verily, unless and until [Vida's] title over the [disputed] property is annulled in a issue of ownership.39
separate proceeding instituted by [the petitioners], the same is valid and [Vida] has the
right to possess the subject property, being an attribute of her ownership over it. x x x. In support thereof, the petitioners point out that relative to the falsification case filed by
Eddie against Vida, the Office of the Davao City Prosecutor issued a Resolution, 40
dated June 11, 2010, stating that no expert eye is needed to ascertain that the signatures
xxxx appearing in the Deed were different from the standard signatures of the Spouses Dizon.
Further, on September 20, 2010, another resolution41 was issued finding probable cause
to indict Vida for the crime of falsification of public documents. Thereafter, the MTCC
issued a Warrant of Arrest42 against Vida.
x x x [T]o stay the immediate execution of judgment in ejectment proceedings, the
defendant-appellant must: (a) perfect his appeal, (b) file a supersedeas bond, and (c)
periodically deposit the rentals falling due during the pendency of the appeal.
The petitioners also insist that no Deed was executed conveying the disputed property
in Vida's favor. When the Deed was purportedly executed on December l, 2009, Verona
was already unconscious, while Eddie was abroad. Having been simulated, the Deed
x x x [T]he supersedeas bond was paid by [the petitioners] only on 02 May 2012. x x x
was void and inexistent. It produced no effect and cannot create, modify or extinguish a
[T]he bond filed by [the petitioners] in order to stay the: immediate execution of the
juridical relation. Hence, Vida had no right to transfer the title in her name using the
MTCC Decision was filed out of time as it was not filed within the period to appeal.
falsified Deed. Perforce, her complaint for unlawful detainer against the petitioners had
no leg to stand on and should be dismissed.

x x x [T]he failure of the [petitioners] in this case to comply with any of the conditions
provided under Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court is a ground for the outright
Citing Spouses De Guzman v. Agbagala,43the petitioners claim that the rule on non-
execution of the judgment, the duty of the court in this respect being "ministerial and
collateral attack of a Torrens title does not apply in a case where the title is void from
imperative." x x x.
the start. An action to declare the nullity of a void title does not prescribe and is
susceptible to direct, as well as to collateral attack. 44

Thus, as the supersedeas bond was filed out of time or beyond the period to appeal,
[Vida's] motion for immediate execution should have been acted upon by the RTC and
Anent the belated posting of the supersedeas bond, the petitioners stress that fault cannot
the writ of execution should have been issued as a matter of right. 36 (Citations omitted
be ascribed to them. They waited for the MTCC's order approving and fixing the
and italics in the original)
amount. When the order was finally issued, the petitioners were required to post the
bond before the RTC and deposit the monthly rental as well. The petitioners complied
before the RTC rendered its Decision dated June 13, 2012.45
The CA, through the herein assailed resolution,37 denied the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. 38
As counterclaims, the petitioners impute malice and bad faith against Vida in filing the
complaint for unlawful detainer. The petitioners, thus, pray for the award of
Issues ₱1,000,000.00 as moral damages, ₱500,000.00 as exemplary damages, ₱50,000.00 as
attorney's fees, and ₱2,000.00 for each appearance of their counsel.46
The instant petition is anchored on the issues of whether or not:
In Vida's Comment,47 she argues that the petitioners' claim of forgery is yet to be proven
in court by clear, positive and convincing evidence. Having been notarized, the Deed
enjoys the presumption of due execution, and shall remain valid unless annulled in a Petitioner herein invokes seasonably the exceptions to immediate execution of
proper proceeding. Besides, the allegation of forgery and nullity of the Deed are judgments in ejectment cases cited m Hualam Construction and Dev't. Corp. v. Court of
immaterial in a summary action for unlawful detainer. Allowing the foregoing claims to Appeals and Laurel v. Abalos, thus:
be litigated amounts to a collateral attack on Vida's title.

Where supervening events (occurring subsequent to the judgment) bring about a

Vida also points out that the petitioners paid the supersedeas bond only on May 2, 2012, material change in the situation of the parties which makes the execution inequitable, or
beyond the period to perfect an appeal.48 where there is no compelling urgency for the execution because it is not justified by the
prevailing circumstances, the court may stay immediate execution of the judgment.

Ruling of the Court

Noteworthy; the foregoing exceptions were made in reference to Section 8, Rule 70 of
the old Rules of Court which has been substantially reproduced as Section 19, Rule 7054
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, even if the appealing defendant was
On matters of procedure not able to file a supersedeas bond, and make periodic deposits to the appellate court,
While the petitioners explicitly raise only two substantive issues, in the body of the immediate execution of the MTC decision is not proper where the circumstances of the
petition, they discuss procedural matters anent their payment of the sudersedeas bond case fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions. x x x. 55 (Citations omitted and
and an alleged error on the part of the CA in concluding that the RTC should have issued underlining ours)
a writ of execution relative to the MTCC's decision in Vida's favor. 49

In Laurel, et al. v. Hon. Abalos, etc., et al., 56 therein respondent filed an action for
The petitioners admit that they posted the supersedeas bond beyond the period to perfect reformation of the deed of sale against therein petitioners pending the appeal of the
an appeal, but claim that it was the MTCC, which belatedly fixed the amount. Pending unlawful detainer case before the RTC. The RTC thereafter denied therein petitioners'
the appeal they had filed before the RTC, they promptly posted the bond after the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution relative to the MTCC judgment, and
amount was determined by the MTCC.50 required therein respondent to post a supersedeas bond. According to the Court, the
peculiar environmental circumstances obtaining in the case justify the non-immediate
execution of the MTCC's judgment pending appeal. The Court further expounded as
follows:
In Spouses Chua v. CA,51the Court ruled that:

[T]his Court took pains at length to explain that this provision (regarding immediate
Petitioners need not require the MTC to fix the amount of the supersedeas bond. They
execution of the judgment of inferior courts in cases of unlawful detainer) can be availed
could have computed this themselves. As early as 1947, we have held in Aylon vs. Jugo
of only if no question of title is involved and the ownership or the right to the possession
and De Pablo that the supersedeas bond is equivalent to the amount of rentals, damages
of the property is an admitted fact. Through Mr. Justice Labrador, this Court said in De
and costs stated in the judgment.52
los Reyes vs. Castro, et al.:

If the cited case were to be applied, the petitioners' failure to post the supersedeas bond
.... The provision for the immediate execution of a judgment of the justice of the peace
within the allowable period shall result in the immediate execution of the MTCC
court in actions of unlawful detainer under Section 8 of Rule 72 of the [old] Rules of
judgment. Nonetheless, in City of Naga v. Hon. Asuncion, et al.,53the Court has carved
Court, is not applicable to an action of detainer like the present, where there is no
exceptions to immediate execution of judgments in ejectment cases, viz.:
immediate urgency for the execution because it is not justified by the circumstances.
This view is based on the history of the action of forcible entry. This action originated Prosecutor had likewise made a preliminary determination of probable cause that
in the English common law where it was originally in the form of a criminal proceeding forgery was committed. Eddie, thus, insists that no valid conveyance was made by
whereby ands or properties seized through the use of force could immediately be Verona to Vida. In the mind of the Court, the foregoing are persuasive; reasons
returned. x x x. justifying the non-immediate execution of the MTCC judgment despite the petitioners'
belated posting of the supersedeas bond. Hence, the CA erred in declaring that the RTC
improperly denied Vida's motion for the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal.
It is 'the opinion of the writer that inasmuch as the prope1iy now subject of litigation
was originally sold only with right to repurchase to the plaintiff, so that the plaintiff was
not really and originally the owner and possessor of the property, and since there are On substantive issues
reasonable grounds to believe that the contract entered into between them was not one
of lease but one of loan with mortgage of the property, the right of the plaintiff to the
immediate possession of the property is not apparent, clear or conclusive, and neither Being interrelated, the two substantive issues raised shall be discussed jointly.
should his right to the immediate execution of the property [be] allowed until Essentially, the petitioners allege that the MTCC should have dismissed Vida's
opportunity to settle the question of ownership is had. In other words, the writer of the complaint for unlawful detainer for lack of basis as the Deed she relied upon is falsified
opinion holds that while Section 8 of Rule 72 is applicable also in cases of unlawful and void. It is also claimed that the CA erred in not upholding the RTC's ruling that the
detainer, the immediate execution it provides for may be availed of only if no question latter can take cognizance of the issue of ownership in an unlawful detainer case.
of title is involved and the ownership and the right to the possession of the property is
an admitted fact.
The Court finds merit in the petitioners' arguments.

xxxx
In Consolacion D. Romero and Rosario S.D. Domingo v. Engracia D. Singson,59where
there were similar allegations of forgery and the issue of ownership was raised in the
Where supervening events (occurring subsequent to the judgment) bring about a ejectment case, the Court pronounced:
material change in the situation of the parties which makes the execution inequitable, or
where there is no compelling urgency for the execution because it is not justified by the
prevailing circumstances, the court may stay immediate execution of the judgment.
In arriving at its pronouncement, the CA passed upon the issue or claim of ownership,
which both parties raised. While the procedure taken is allowed - under Section 16, Rule
7060 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the issue of ownership may be resolved only
The assertion by Laput of "ownership" of the house she is occupying, the appeal pending to determine the issue of possession - the CA nonetheless committed serious and patent
in the [CA] from the decision in Civil Case 1517 which declared null and void from the error in concluding that based solely on respondent's TCT 12575 issued in her name,
beginning the deed of sale in favor of the petitioners, the latter's unexplained silence in she must be considered the singular owner of the subject property and thus entitled to
the face of the manifestation filed by Laput informing this Court of the supervening possession thereof - pursuant to the principle that "the person who has a Torrens Title
occurrences, and their failure to submit their comment as required by this Court, are over a land is entitled to possession thereof." Such provisional determination of
strong and sufficient additional reasons, cumulatively, to justify the :dismissal of the ownership should have been resolved in petitioners' favor.
present petition.57 (Citations, emphasis and italics omitted, and underlining ours)

When the deed of sale in favor of respondent was purportedly executed by the parties
By analogy, in the unlawful detainer case from which the instant petition arose, Eddie thereto and notarized on June 6, 2006, it is perfectly obvious that the signatures of the
was originally a co-owner of the disputed property, and he remains in possession thereof. vendors therein, Macario and Felicidad, were forged. They could not have signed the
Vida, on the other, is not even a resident of Davao City.58 Moreover, prior to Vida's same, because both were by then long deceased: Macario died on February 22, 1981,
filing of the unlawful detainer case, Eddie had already instituted actions for nullification while Felicidad passed away on September 14, 1997. This makes the June 6, 2006 deed
of the Deed and falsification of public documents. The Office of the Davao City
of sale null and void; being so, it is "equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil effect; In the case at bar, when the Deed was executed on December 1, 2009, Eddie claimed
and it does not create, modify or extinguish a juridical relation." that he was abroad while Verona was already unconscious. Vida did not directly refute
these allegations and instead pointed out that the Deed was pre-signed in April of 2008.
The foregoing circumstances reduced the Deed into the category of a private instrument
And while it is true that respondent has in her favor a Torrens title over the subject as can be drawn from the Court's discussion in Adelaida Meneses (deceased) v.
property, she nonetheless acquired no right or title in her favor by virtue of the null and Venturozo,62 viz.:
void June 6, 2006 deed. "Verily, when the instrument presented is forged, even if
accompanied by the owner's duplicate certificate of title, the registered owner does not
thereby lose his title, and neither does the assignee in the forged deed acquire any right As notarized documents, [Deeds] carry evidentiary weight conferred upon them with
or title to the property." respect to their clue execution and enjoy the presumption of regularity which may only
be rebutted by evidence so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all controversy as
to falsity. The presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only so
xxxx long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization was regular. A defective notarization
will strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a private instrument.
Consequently, when there is a defect in the notarization of a document, the clear and
convincing evidentiary standard normally attached to a duly-notarized document is
Insofar as a person who fraudulently obtained a property is concerned, the registration
dispensed with, and the measure to test the validity of such document is preponderance
of the property in said person's name would not be sufficient to vest in him or her the
of evidence.63 (Citations omitted and underlining ours)
title to the property. A certificate of title merely confirms or' records title already
existing and vested. The indefeasibility of the Torrens title should not be used as a means
to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real property. Good faith must concur
with registration because, otherwise, registration would be an exercise in futility. A Further, in Dela Rama, et al. v. Papa, et al.,64the Court elucidated that:
Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud, notwithstanding the long-standing rule
that registration is a constructive notice of title binding upon the whole world. The legal
principle is that if the registration of the land is fraudulent, the person in whose name Papas['] admissions, refreshing in their self-incriminatory candor, beat legal
the land is registered holds it as a mere trustee. significance.1âwphi1 With respect to deeds of sale or conveyance, what spells the
difference between a public document and a private document is the acknowledgment
in the former that the parties acknowledging the document appear before the notary
Since respondent acquired no right over the subject property, the same remained in the public and specifically manifest under oath that they are the persons who executed it,
name of the original registered owners, Macario and Felicidad. Being heirs of the and acknowledge that the same are their free act and deed. x x x
owners, petitioners and respondent thus became, and remain co-owners - by succession
- of the subject property. As such, petitioners may exercise all attributes of ownership
over the same, including possession - whether de facto or dejure; respondent thus has xxxx
no right to exclude them from this right through an action for ejectment.

The presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only so long as it
With the Court's determination that respondent's title is null and void, the matter of direct is beyond dispute that the notarization was regular. We cannot ascribe that conclusion
or collateral attack is a foregone conclusion as well. "An action to declare the nullity of at bar to the deed of sale. Respondent failed to confirm before the RTC that he had
a void title does not prescribe and is susceptible to direct, as well as to collateral, attack;" actually appeared before the notary public, a bare minimum requirement under Public
petitioners were not precluded from questioning the validity of respondent's title in the Act No. 2103. Such defect will not ipso facto void the deed of sale. However, it
ejectment case.61 (Citations and emphasis omitted and underlining ours) eliminates the presumptions that are carried by notarized public documents and subject
the deed of sale to a different level of scrutiny than that relied on by the [CA]. This
consequence is with precedent. In Tigno v. Sps. Aquino, where the public document in
question had been notarized by a judge who had no authority to do so, the Court
dispensed with the clear and convincing evidentiary standard normally attached to duly
notarized documents, and instead applied preponderance of evidence as the measure to
test the validity of that doctiment.65 (Citations omitted and underlining ours)

In the instant petition, Vida impliedly admits the irregularity of the Deed's notarization
as both of the vendors were not personally present.1avvphi1 Consequently, clue
execution can no longer be presumed. Besides, the extant circumstances surrounding
the controversy constitute preponderant evidence suggesting that forgery was
committed. Eddie promptly filed a criminal case for falsification of documents and a
civil case to nullify the Deed. Later, the Office of the Davao City Prosecutor found
probable cause to indict Vida for falsification. Consequently, the issue of ownership
cannot be disregarded in the unlawful detainer case. It bears stressing though that while
the RTC aptly resolved the issue of ownership, it is at best preliminary and shall not be
determinative of the outcome of the two other cases filed by Eddie against Vida.

Other matters

The Court observes that the MTCC ruling, which the CA affirmed, is based partly on
equitable grounds. Notably, the MTCC referred to Verona's medical expenses of
₱l,085,540.21, which Vida had shouldered.66 The Court commiserates with Vida, if
indeed she remains unpaid by Eddie for Verona's medical and burial expenses. However,
a creditor cannot resort to procedural shortcuts to collect in kind for sums of money
owed by a debtor.

In sum, the Court agrees with the RTC that the dismissal of Vida's complaint for
unlawful detainer is in order.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution, dated
January 23, 2015 and September 7, 2015, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 05256-MIN, are SET ASIDE. The Decision dated June 13, 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch. 14, in Civil Case No. 34,450-2012, is
REINSTATED. Consequently, Yolanda Vida P. Beltran's complaint for unlawful
detainer is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 173021 October 20, 2010 respondent is claiming ownership thereof and is seeking to recover its possession from
petitioners.

DELFIN LAMSIS, MAYNARD MONDIGUING, JOSE VALDEZ, JR. and Heirs

of AGUSTIN KITMA, represented by EUGENE KITMA, Petitioners, According to respondent Margarita Semon Dong-E (Margarita), her family’s ownership
and occupation of Lot No. 1 can be traced as far back as 1922 to her late grandfather,
vs. Ap-ap.5 Upon Ap-ap’s death, the property was inherited by his children, who obtained
MARGARITA SEMON DONG-E, Respondent. a survey plan in 1964 of the 186,090-square meter property, which included Lot No. 1.6
On the same year, they declared the property for taxation purposes in the name of "The
Heirs of Ap-ap."7 The 1964 tax declaration bears a notation that reads: "Reconstructed
from an old Tax Declaration No. 363 dated May 10, 1922 per true of same presented."8
DECISION

The heirs of Ap-ap then executed, for a P500.00 consideration, a Deed of Quitclaim9 on
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
February 26, 1964 in favor of their brother Gilbert Semon (Margarita’s father).

There is laches when a party is aware, even in the early stages of the proceedings, of a
Sometime between 1976 and 1978,10 Gilbert Semon together with his wife Mary
possible jurisdictional objection, and has every opportunity to raise said objection, but
Lamsis, allowed his in-laws Manolo Lamsis and Nancy Lamsis-Kitma, to stay on a
fails to do so, even on appeal.
portion of Lot No. 1 together with their respective families.11 They were allowed to
erect their houses, introduce improvements, and plant trees thereon. When Manolo
Lamsis and Nancy Lamsis-Kitma died sometime in the 1980s, their children, petitioners
This is a Petition for Review1 assailing the March 30, 2006 Decision2 of the Court of Delfin Lamsis (Delfin) and Agustin Kitma (Agustin), took possession of certain portions
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78987 as well as its May 26, 2006 Resolution3 which of Lot No. 1. Delfin possessed 4,000 square meters of Lot No. 1, while Agustin occupied
denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the assailed 5,000 square meters thereof.12 Nevertheless, the heirs of Gilbert Semon tolerated the
Decision reads: acts of their first cousins.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of When Gilbert Semon died in 1983,13 his children extrajudicially partitioned the
merit and the judgment dated January 8, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio property among themselves and allotted Lot No. 1 thereof in favor of Margarita.14 Since
City in Civil Case No. 4140-R is AFFIRMED in toto. then, Margarita allegedly paid the realty tax over Lot No. 115 and occupied and
improved the property together with her husband; while at the same time, tolerating her
first cousins’ occupation of portions of the same lot.
SO ORDERED.4

This state of affairs changed when petitioners Delfin and Agustin allegedly began
Factual antecedents expanding their occupation on the subject property and selling portions thereof.16
Delfin allegedly sold a 400-square meter portion of Lot No. 1 to petitioner Maynard17
Mondiguing (Maynard) while Agustin sold another portion to petitioner Jose Valdez
(Jose).18
This case involves a conflict of ownership and possession over an untitled parcel of land,
denominated as Lot No. 1, with an area of 80,736 square meters. The property is located
along Km. 5 Asin Road, Baguio City and is part of a larger parcel of land with an area
of 186,090 square meters. While petitioners are the actual occupants of Lot No. 1,
With such developments, Margarita filed a complaint19 for recovery of ownership, favorably on her and her siblings’ ancestral land claim over a portion of the 186,090-
possession, reconveyance and damages against all four occupants of Lot No. 1 before square meter property.27 The said resolution states:
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 4140-R and raffled to Branch 59. The complaint prayed for the annulment of the
sales to Maynard and Jose and for petitioners to vacate the portions of the property which The land subject of the instant application is the ancestral land of the herein applicants.
exceed the areas allowed to them by Margarita.20 Margarita claimed that, as they are Well-established is the fact that the land treated herein was first declared for taxation
her first cousins, she is willing to donate to Delfin and Agustin a portion of Lot No. 1, purposes in 1922 under Tax Declaration No. 363 by the applicant’s grandfather Ap-Ap
provided that she retains the power to choose such portion.21 (one name). Said application was reconstructed in 1965 after the original got lost during
the war. These tax declarations were issued and recorded in the Municipality of Tuba,
Benguet, considering that the land was then within the territorial jurisdiction of the said
Petitioners denied Margarita’s claims of ownership and possession over Lot No. 1. municipality. That upon the death of declarant Ap-Ap his heirs x x x transferred the tax
According to Delfin and Agustin, Lot No. 1 is a public land claimed by the heirs of declaration in their name, [which tax declaration is] now with the City assessor’s office
Joaquin Smith (not parties to the case).22 The Smiths gave their permission for Delfin of Baguio.
and Agustin’s parents to occupy the land sometime in 1969 or 1970. They also presented
their neighbors who testified that it was Delfin and Agustin as well as their respective
parents who occupied Lot No. 1, not Margarita and her parents. The land consisting of four (4) lots with a total area of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX
THOUSAND NINETY (186,090) SQUARE METERS, is covered by Psu-198317 duly
approved by the Director of Lands on October 4, 1963 in the name of Ap-Ap (one name).
Delfin and Agustin also assailed the muniments of ownership presented by Margarita as In 1964, the same land was the subject of a petition filed by Gilbert Semon, as petitioner,
fabricated, unauthenticated, and invalid. It was pointed out that the Deed of Quitclaim, before the Court of First Instance of the City of Baguio in the reopening of Judicial
allegedly executed by all of Ap-ap’s children, failed to include two - Rita Bocahan and Proceedings under Civil Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211 for the registration and the
Stewart Sito.23 Margarita admitted during trial that Rita Bocahan and Stewart Sito were issuance of Certificate of Title of said land. The land registration case was however
her uncle and aunt, but did not explain why they were excluded from the quitclaim. overtaken by the decision of the Supreme Court declaring such judicial proceedings null
and void because the courts of law have no jurisdiction.

According to Maynard and Jose, Delfin and Agustin were the ones publicly and openly
in possession of the land and who introduced improvements thereon. They also It has been sufficiently substantiated by the applicants that prior to and at the time of the
corroborated Delfin and Agustin’s allegation that the real owners of the property are the pendency of the land registration case and henceforth up to and including the present,
heirs of Joaquin Smith.24 the herein applicants by themselves and through their predecessor-in-interest have been
in exclusive, continuous, and material possession and occupation of the said parcel of
land mentioned above under claim of ownership, devoting the same for residential and
In order to debunk petitioners’ claim that the Smiths owned the subject property, agricultural purposes. Found are the residential houses of the applicants as well as those
Margarita presented a certified copy of a Resolution from the Land Management Office of their close relatives, while the other areas planted to fruit trees, coffee and banana,
denying the Smiths’ application for recognition of the subject property as part of their and seasonal crops. Also noticeable therein are permanent stone and earthen fences,
ancestral land.25 The resolution explains that the application had to be denied because terraces, clearings, including irrigation gadgets.
the Smiths did not "possess, occupy or utilize all or a portion of the property x x x. The
actual occupants (who were not named in the resolution) whose improvements are
visible are not in any way related to the applicant or his co-heirs."26 On the matter of the applicant[s’] indiguinity [sic] and qualifications, there is no doubt
that they are members of the National Cultural Communities, particularly the Ibaloi
tribe. They are the legitimate grandchildren of Ap-Ap (one name) who lived along the
To bolster her claim of ownership and possession, Margarita introduced as evidence an Asin Road area. His legal heirs are: Orani Ap-Ap, married to Calado Salda; Rita Ap-
unnumbered resolution of the Community Special Task Force on Ancestral Lands Ap, married to Jose Bacacan; Sucdad Ap-Ap, married to Oragon Wakit; and Gilbert
(CSTFAL) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), acting
Semon, a former vice-mayor of Tuba, Benguet, [who] adopted the common name of
their father Semon, as it is the customary practice among the early Ibalois. x x x
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court31

On the matter regarding the inheritance of the heirs of Ap-Ap, it is important to state
[that] Gilbert Semon consolidated ownership thereof and became the sole heir in 1964, After summarizing the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court found that it
by way of a "Deed of Quitclaim" executed by the heirs in his favor. As to the respective preponderates in favor of respondent’s long-time possession of and claim of ownership
share of the applicants[’] co-heirs, the same was properly adjudicated in 1989 with the over the subject property.32 The survey plan of the subject property in the name of the
execution of an "Extrajudicial Settlement/ Partition of Estate with Waiver of Rights." Heirs of Ap-ap executed way back in 1962 and the tax declarations thereafter issued to
the respondent and her siblings all support her claim that her family and their
predecessors-in-interest have all been in possession of the property to the exclusion of
others. The court likewise gave credence to the documentary evidence of the transfer of
With regard to the overlapping issue, it is pertinent to state that application No. Bg-L- the land from the Heirs of Ap-ap to respondent’s father and, eventually to respondent
066 of Thomas Smith has already been denied by us in our Resolution dated November herself. The series of transfers of the property were indications of the respondent’s and
1997. As to the other adverse claims therein by reason of previous conveyances in favor her predecessors’ interest over the property. The court opined that while these pieces of
of third parties, the same were likewise excluded resulting in the reduction of the area documentary evidence were not conclusive proof of actual possession, they lend
originally applied from ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX THOUSAND NINETY credence to respondent’s claim because, "in the ordinary course of things, persons will
(186,090) SQUARE METERS, more or less to ONE HUNDRED TEN THOUSAND not execute legal documents dealing with real property, unless they believe, and have
THREE HUNDRED FORTY TWO (110,342) SQUARE METERS, more or less. the basis to believe, that they have an interest in the property subject of the legal
Considering the foregoing developments, we find no legal and procedural obstacle in documents x x x."33
giving due course to the instant application.

In contrast, the trial court found nothing on record to substantiate the allegations of the
Now therefore, we hereby [resolve] that the application for Recognition of Ancestral petititioners that they and their parents were the long-time possessors of the subject
Land Claim filed by the Heirs of Gilbert Semon, represented by Juanito Semon, be property. Their own statements belied their assertions. Petitioner Maynard and Jose both
granted [and] a Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim (CALC) be issued to the herein admitted that they could not secure title for the property from the Bureau of Lands
applicants by the Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, because there were pending ancestral land claims over the property.34 Petitioner
Visayas Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City, through the Regional Executive Director, Agustin’s Townsite Sales Application over the property was held in abeyance because
DENR-CAR, Diego Silang Street, Baguio City. The area of the claim stated herein of respondent’s own claim, which was eventually favorably considered by the
above is however subject to the outcome of the final survey to be forthwith executed. CSTFAL.35

Carried this 23rd day of June 1998.28 The dispositive portion of the trial court’s Decision reads:

The resolution was not signed by two members of the CSTFAL on the ground that the WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
signing of the unnumbered resolution was overtaken by the enactment of the Republic [respondent] and against the [petitioners] -
Act (RA) No. 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA). The IPRA
removed the authority of the DENR to issue ancestral land claim certificates and
transferred the same to the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).29 The
Ancestral Land Application No. Bg-L-064 of the Heirs of Gilbert Semon was transferred (1) Declaring the transfer of a portion of Lot 1 of PSU 198317 made by the [petitioner]
to the NCIP, Cordillera Administrative Region, La Trinidad, Benguet and re-docketed Delfin Lamsis to Menard Mondiguing and Jose Valdez, Jr. null and void;
as Case No. 05-RHO-CAR-03.30 The petitioners filed their protest in the said case
before the NCIP. The same has been submitted for resolution.
(2) Ordering the [petitioners] Delfin Lamsis, Agustin Kitma, Menard Mondiguing and
Jose Valdez, Jr., to vacate the area they are presently occupying that is within Lot 1 of
PSU 198317 belonging to the [respondent] and to surrender possession thereof to the Petitioners’ arguments
[respondent];

Petitioners assign as error the CA’s appreciation of the evidence already affirmed and
(3) To pay [respondent] attorney’s fees in the amount of P10,000.00; and considered by the trial court. They maintain that the change in the presiding judges who
heard and decided their case resulted in the appreciation of what would otherwise be
inadmissible evidence.44 Petitioners ask that the Court exempt their petition from the
general rule that a trial judge’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses is accorded
(4) To pay the costs of suit. great respect on appeal.

SO ORDERED.36 To support their claim that the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling in favor of
respondent, they assailed the various pieces of evidence offered by respondent. They
maintain that the Deed of Quitclaim executed by the Heirs of Ap-ap is spurious and
It appears that no motion for reconsideration was filed before the trial court. lacks the parties’ and witnesses’ signatures. Moreover, it is a mere photocopy, which
Nevetheless, the trial court issued an Order37 allowing the petitioners’ Notice of was never authenticated by the notary public in court and no reasons were proferred
Appeal.38 regarding the existence, loss, and contents of the original copy.45 Under the best
evidence rule, the Deed of Quitclaim is inadmissible in evidence and should have been
disregarded by the court.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals39

Respondent did not prove that she and her husband possessed the subject property since
The sole issue resolved by the appellate court was whether the trial court erred in ruling time immemorial. Petitioners argue that respondent admitted possessing and cultivating
in favor of respondent in light of the adduced evidence. Citing the rule on preponderance only the land that lies outside the subject property.46
of evidence, the CA held that the respondent was able to discharge her burden in proving
her title and interest to the subject property. Her documentary evidence were amply
supported by the testimonial evidence of her witnesses. Petitioners next assail the weight to be given to respondent’s muniments of ownership,
such as the tax declarations and the survey plan. They insist that these are not indubitable
proofs of respondent’s ownership over the subject property given that there are other
In contrast, petitioners only made bare allegations in their testimonies that are claimants to the land (who are not parties to this case) who also possess a survey plan
insufficient to overcome respondent’s documentary evidence. over the subject property.47

Petitioners moved for a reconsideration40 of the adverse decision but the same was Petitioners then assert their superior right to the property as the present possessors
denied. thereof. They cite pertinent provisions of the New Civil Code which presume good faith
possession on the part of the possessor and puts the burden on the plaintiff in an action
to recover to prove her superior title.48
Hence this petition, which was initially denied for failure to show that the CA committed
any reversible error.41 Upon petitioners’ motion for reconsideration,42 the petition was
reinstated in the Court’s January 15, 2007 Resolution.43 Petitioners next assert that they have a right to the subject property by the operation of
acquisitive prescription. They posit that they have been in possession of a public land
publicly, peacefully, exclusively and in the concept of owners for more than 30 years. issue should have been raised at the appellate level at the very least so as to avail of the
Respondent’s assertion that petitioners are merely possessors by tolerance is doctrine that the ground lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case may be
unsubstantiated.49 raised at any stage of the proceedings even on appeal.59

Petitioners also maintain that the reivindicatory action should be dismissed for lack of Respondent maintains that there is no room for the application of litis pendentia because
jurisdiction in light of the enactment of the IPRA, which gives original and exclusive the issues in the application for ancestral land claim are different from the issue in a
jurisdiction over disputes involving ancestral lands and domains to the NCIP.50 They reivindicatory action. The issue before the NCIP is whether the Government, as grantor,
assert that the customary laws of the Ibaloi tribe of the Benguet Province should be will recognize the ancestral land claim of respondent over a public alienable land; while
applied to their dispute as mandated by Section 65, Chapter IX of RA 8371, which states: the issue in the reivindicatory case before the trial court is ownership, possession, and
"When disputes involve ICCs/IPs,51 customary laws and practices shall be used to right to recover the real property.60
resolve the dispute."

Given that the elements of lis pendens are absent in case at bar, the allegation of forum-
In the alternative that jurisdiction over an accion reivindicatoria is held to be vested in shopping is also bereft of merit. Any judgment to be rendered by the NCIP will not
the trial court, the petitioners insist that the courts should dismiss the reivindicatory amount to res judicata in the instant case.61
action on the ground of litis pendentia.52 They likewise argue that NCIP has primary
jurisdiction over ancestral lands, hence, the courts should not interfere "when the dispute
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring special knowledge, Issues
experience and services of the administrative tribunal x x x In cases where the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannot arrogate unto itself the
authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
The petitioners present the following issues for our consideration:
administrative body of special competence."53 The courts should stand aside in order
to prevent the possibility of creating conflicting decisions.54

1. Whether the appellate court disregarded material facts and circumstances in affirming
the trial court’s decision;
Respondent’s arguments

2. Whether petitioners have acquired the subject property by prescription;

Respondent opines that the appellate court did not commit any reversible error in
affirming the trial court’s decision. The present petition is a mere dilatory tactic to
frustrate the speedy administration of justice.55
3. Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to decide the case in light of the effectivity of
RA 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 at the time that the complaint
was instituted;
Respondent also asserts that questions of fact are prohibited in a Rule 45 petition.56
Thus, the appreciation and consideration of the factual issues are no longer
reviewable.57
4. If the trial court retains jurisdiction, whether the ancestral land claim pending before
the NCIP should take precedence over the reivindicatory action.62
The issue of lack of jurisdiction is raised for the first time in the petition before this
Court. It was never raised before the trial court or the CA. Thus, respondent insists that
petitioners are now barred by laches from attacking the trial court’s jurisdiction over the
case. Citing Aragon v. Court of Appeals,58 respondent argues that the jurisdictional
Our Ruling The fact that respondent’s documents traverse several decades, from the 1960s to the
1990s, is an indication that she and her family never abandoned their right to the
property and have continuously exercised rights of ownership over the same.
Whether the appellate court disregarded material facts and circumstances in affirming
the trial court’s decision
Moreover, respondent’s version of how the petitioners came to occupy the property
coincides with the same timeline given by the petitioners themselves. The only
Both the trial and the appellate courts ruled that respondent has proven her claims of difference is that petitioners maintain they came into possession by tolerance of the
ownership and possession with a preponderance of evidence. Petitioners now argue that Smith family, while respondent maintains that it was her parents who gave permission
the two courts erred in their appreciation of the evidence. They ask the Court to review to petitioners. Given the context under which the parties’ respective statements were
the evidence of both parties, despite the CA’s finding that the trial court committed no made, the Court is inclined to believe the respondent’s version, as both the trial and
error in appreciating the evidence presented during trial. Hence, petitioners seek a appellate courts have concluded, since her version is corroborated by the documentary
review of questions of fact, which is beyond the province of a Rule 45 petition. A evidence.
question of fact exists if the uncertainty centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts.63 "Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded
probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether the proofs on Whether petitioners have acquired the subject property by prescription
one side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in
issue, are without doubt questions of fact."64
Assuming that the subject land may be acquired by prescription, we cannot accept
petitioners’ claim of acquisition by prescription. Petitioners admitted that they had
Since it raises essentially questions of fact, this assignment of error must be dismissed occupied the property by tolerance of the owner thereof. Having made this admission,
for it is settled that only questions of law may be reviewed in an appeal by certiorari.65 they cannot claim that they have acquired the property by prescription unless they can
There is a question of law when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of prove acts of repudiation. It is settled that possession, in order to ripen into ownership,
facts. Questions of law can be resolved without having to re-examine the probative value must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Possession not
of evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted.66 The instant case in the concept of owner, such as the one claimed by petitioners, cannot ripen into
does not present a compelling reason to deviate from the foregoing rule, especially since ownership by acquisitive prescription, unless the juridical relation is first expressly
both trial and appellate courts agree that respondent had proven her claim of ownership repudiated and such repudiation has been communicated to the other party. Acts of
as against petitioners’ claims. Their factual findings, supported as they are by the possessory character executed due to license or by mere tolerance of the owner are
evidence, should be accorded great respect. inadequate for purposes of acquisitive prescription. Possession by tolerance is not
adverse and such possessory acts, no matter how long performed, do not start the
running of the period of prescription.68
In any case, even if petitioners’ arguments attacking the authenticity and admissibility
of the Deed of Quitclaim executed in favor of respondent’s father are well-taken, it will
not suffice to defeat respondent’s claim over the subject property. Even without the In the instant case, petitioners made no effort to allege much less prove any act of
Deed of Quitclaim, respondent’s claims of prior possession and ownership were repudiation sufficient for the reckoning of the acquisitive prescription. At most, we can
adequately supported and corroborated by her other documentary and testimonial find on record the sale by petitioners Delfin and Agustin of parts of the property to
evidence. We agree with the trial court’s observation that, in the ordinary course of petitioners Maynard and Jose; but the same was done only in 1998, shortly before
things, people will not go to great lengths to execute legal documents and pay realty respondent filed a case against them. Hence, the 30-year period necessary for the
taxes over a real property, unless they have reason to believe that they have an interest operation of acquisitve prescription had yet to be attained.
over the same.67

Whether the ancestral land claim pending before the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) should take precedence over the reivindicatory action
 for the dismissal of an action, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of
parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b)
The application for issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title pending before the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
NCIP is akin to a registration proceeding. It also seeks an official recognition of one’s facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases
claim to a particular land and is also in rem. The titling of ancestral lands is for the is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which
purpose of "officially establishing" one’s land as an ancestral land.69 Just like a party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case."76 The third element
registration proceeding, the titling of ancestral lands does not vest ownership70 upon is missing, for any judgment in the certification case would not constitute res judicata
the applicant but only recognizes ownership71 that has already vested in the applicant or be conclusive on the ownership issue involved in the reivindicatory case. Since there
by virtue of his and his predecessor-in-interest’s possession of the property since time is no litis pendentia, there is no reason for the reivindicatory case to be suspended or
immemorial. As aptly explained in another case: dismissed in favor of the certification case.

It bears stressing at this point that ownership should not be confused with a certificate Moreover, since there is no litis pendentia, we cannot agree with petitioners’ contention
of title. Registering land under the Torrens system does not create or vest title because that respondent committed forum-shopping. Settled is the rule that "forum shopping
registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one
evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. Corollarily, case will amount to res judicata in the other."77
any question involving the issue of ownership must be threshed out in a separate suit x
x x The trial court will then conduct a full-blown trial wherein the parties will present
their respective evidence on the issue of ownership of the subject properties to enable
the court to resolve the said issue. x x x72 (Emphasis supplied) Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to decide the case in light of the effectivity of
RA 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 at the time that the complaint
was instituted

Likewise apropos is the following explanation:

For the first time in the entire proceedings of this case, petitioners raise the trial court’s
alleged lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter in light of the effectivity78 of the
The fact that the [respondents] were able to secure [TCTs over the property] did not IPRA at the time that the complaint was filed in 1998. They maintain that, under the
operate to vest upon them ownership of the property. The Torrens system does not create IPRA, it is the NCIP which has jurisdiction over land disputes involving indigenous
or vest title. It has never been recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership x x x If the cultural communities and indigenous peoples.
[respondents] wished to assert their ownership, they should have filed a judicial action
for recovery of possession and not merely to have the land registered under their
respective names. x x x Certificates of title do not establish ownership.73 (Emphasis
supplied) As a rule, an objection over subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time of the
proceedings. This is because jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties or vested by
the agreement of the parties. Jurisdiction is vested by law, which prevails at the time of
the filing of the complaint.
A registration proceeding is not a conclusive adjudication of ownership. In fact, if it is
later on found in another case (where the issue of ownership is squarely adjudicated)
that the registrant is not the owner of the property, the real owner can file a reconveyance
case and have the title transferred to his name.74 An exception to this rule has been carved by jurisprudence. In the seminal case of Tijam
v. Sibonghanoy,79 the Court ruled that the existence of laches will prevent a party from
raising the court’s lack of jurisdiction. Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect, for
an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
Given that a registration proceeding (such as the certification of ancestral lands) is not diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert
a conclusive adjudication of ownership, it will not constitute litis pendentia on a a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to
reivindicatory case where the issue is ownership.75 "For litis pendentia to be a ground assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it."80 Wisely, some cases81 have
cautioned against applying Tijam, except for the most exceptional cases where the It is only before this Court, eight years after the filing of the complaint, after the trial
factual milieu is similar to Tijam. court had already conducted a full-blown trial and rendered a decision on the merits,
after the appellate court had made a thorough review of the records, and after petitioners
have twice encountered adverse decisions from the trial and the appellate courts — that
In Tijam, the surety could have raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction in the trial court petitioners now want to expunge all the efforts that have gone into the litigation and
but failed to do so. Instead, the surety participated in the proceedings and filed pleadings, resolution of their case and start all over again. This practice cannot be allowed.
other than a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. When the case reached the
appellate court, the surety again participated in the case and filed their pleadings therein.
It was only after receiving the appellate court’s adverse decision that the surety awoke Thus, even assuming arguendo that petitioners’ theory about the effect of IPRA is
from its slumber and filed a motion to dismiss, in lieu of a motion for reconsideration. correct (a matter which need not be decided here), they are already barred by laches
The CA certified the matter to this Court, which then ruled that the surety was already from raising their jurisdictional objection under the circumstances.
barred by laches from raising the jurisdiction issue.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The March
In case at bar, the application of the Tijam doctrine is called for because the presence of 30, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78987 and its May 26,
laches cannot be ignored. If the surety in Tijam was barred by laches for raising the issue 2006 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration are AFFIRMED.
of jurisdiction for the first time in the CA, what more for petitioners in the instant case
who raised the issue for the first time in their petition before this Court.
SO ORDERED.

At the time that the complaint was first filed in 1998, the IPRA was already in effect but
the petitioners never raised the same as a ground for dismissal; instead they filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the value of the property did not meet the
jurisdictional value for the RTC. They obviously neglected to take the IPRA into
consideration.

When the amended complaint was filed in 1998, the petitioners no longer raised the
issue of the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction. Instead, they proceeded to trial, all the time
aware of the existence of the IPRA as evidenced by the cross-examination82 conducted
by petitioners’ lawyer on the CSTFAL Chairman Guillermo Fianza. In the cross-
examination, it was revealed that the petitioners were aware that the DENR, through the
CSTFAL, had lost its jurisdiction over ancestral land claims by virtue of the enactment
of the IPRA. They assailed the validity of the CSTFAL resolution favoring respondent
on the ground that the CSTFAL had been rendered functus officio under the IPRA.
Inexplicably, petitioners still did not question the trial court’s jurisdiction.

When petitioners recoursed to the appellate court, they only raised as errors the trial
court’s appreciation of the evidence and the conclusions that it derived therefrom. In
their brief, they once again assailed the CSTFAL’s resolution as having been rendered
functus officio by the enactment of IPRA.83 But nowhere did petitioners assail the trial
court’s ruling for having been rendered without jurisdiction.