60. People vs.

Agacer
{conspiracy,treachery}

Facts
Florencio, Eddie, Elynor, Franklin and Eric, all surnamed Agacer, are found guilty for the
killing of a common relative, Cesario Agacer. The appellants surrounded the victim and one
of them set a fire to keep Cesario from retreating. Franklin and Eric hit the deceased with
stones, Florencio induces the victim to come closer, was hit with a gunshot from Eddie and
was shot with a bow and arrow by Elynor.They left the crime scene together, onboard a
tractor and a tricycle.

Issues
- Whether or not conspiracy was involved and if all appellants are liable for the murder
- Whether or not appellants are guilty of the aggravating circumstance of treachery

Held/Ratio

YES. In the case at bar, conspiracy is evident in the way the appellants surprised,
surrounded,attacked and abandoned the deceased together. Proof of previous agreement is
not essential because all acted in unison pursuing one goal, which is to kill the victim.
Distinguishing the fatal blow is immaterial in indicting appellants for criminal liability; all are
equally liable for murder since conspiracy is present.

YES. Treachery was present, fulfilling the conditions that first, the victim was not given the
opportunity to defend himself and second, that the means of execution was deliberate
(evident in the fact that the accused carried the weapons employed)

61. People vs. Bayotas

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGELIO BAYOTAS y

CORDOVA, accused-appellant

G.R. No. 102207. September 2, 1994

FACTS:

Rogelio Bayotas, accused and charged with Rape, died on February 4, 1992 due to cardio
respiratory arrest. The Solicitor General then submitted a comment stating that the death of
the accused does not excuse him from his civil liability (supported by the Supreme Court’s
decision in People vs Sendaydiego). On the other hand, the counsel of the accused claimed
that in the Supreme Court’s decision in People vs Castillo, civil liability is extinguished if
accused should die before the final judgement is rendered.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil
liability.

RULING:

The Court decided on this case through stating the cases of Castillo and Sendaydiego. In
the Castillo case, the Court said that civil liability is extinguished only when death of the
accused occurred before the final judgement. Judge Kapunan further stated that civil liability
is extinguished because there will be “no party defendant” in the case. There will be no civil
liability if criminal liability does not exist. Further, the Court stated “it is, thus, evident that…
the rule established was that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same
can be predicated on the sources of obligations other than delict.

In the Sendaydiego case, the Court issued Resolution of July 8, 1977 where it states that
civil liability will only survive if death came after the final judgement of the CFI of
Pangasinan. However, Article 30 of the Civil Code could not possibly lend support to the
ruling in Sendaydiego. Civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of the accused
while his conviction is on appeal. The Court also gave a summary on which cases should
civil liability be extinguished, to wit:

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as the civil liability based solely thereon. Therefore, Bayotas’s death extinguished his
criminal and civil liability based solely on the act complained of.

62. CANCIO VS. ISIP

G.R. No. 133978 November 12, 2002

Facts:
The accused, EmerenciaIsip, was charged with 3 counts of violation of B.P. 22, also known
as the Bouncing Checks Law and 3 cases of Estafa. One of the B.P. 22 cases was
dismissed due to it being deposited before 90 days from the date written on the check. The
other two cases of B.P. 22 were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga
and were then dismissed due to the failure of the prosecution to prosecute the
crime.Meanwhile the three cases of Estafa were filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Pampanga. After failing to present its second witness, the prosecution dismissed the Estafa
case. The prosecution reserved its right to file a separate civil action from the said criminal
cases. The court granted the reservation. The criminal case of Estafa was then dismissed
without prejudice to the civil action. On December 15, 1997, petitioner filed the instant case
for the collection of the sum of money, seeking to recover the amount of the check subject to
the Estafa cases. Respondent then filed a motion to dismiss the complaint contending that
the petition is already barred by the doctrine of Res Judicata.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondents can file a separate civil action regardless of the dismissal of
the criminal case of estafa.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the civil action can prosper. The reservation for civil action
was made by the prosecution on time. According to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure states that civil liability is deemed instituted with the criminal case unless
there is are servation of the right to file a separate civil action.In the case at bar, the
complaint is clearly based on culpa contractual. The cause of action
was the breach of the respondent’s breach of the contractual obligation. Evidently, the
petitioner was seeking to make good the value written on the checks in exchange for cash.
The case was not anchored the criminal aspect of estafa but on the civil aspect of culpa
contractual. As such, it is distinct and independent from the estafa case filed against the
offender and may proceed regardless of the result of the criminal proceedings.

--

CANCIO V. ISIP
FACTS:

Cancio filed cases of violation of BP22 and cases of estafa against Respondent. The BP22
cases were dismissed on the ground of “failure to prosecute.” As to the estafa cases, the
prosecution moved to dismiss after failing to present its second witness. The prosecution
likewise reserved its right to file a separate civil action arising from the said criminal cases.
TheTC granted.Cancio then filed the instant case for collection of sum of money, seeking to
recover the amount of the checks subject of the estafa cases. Respondent filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint contending that petitioner’s action is barred by the doctrine of res
judicata. Respondent further prayed that petitioner should be held in contempt of court for
forum-shopping. The TC found in favor of the respondent.

ISSUE: WON
the dismissal of the estafa cases against respondent bars the institution of a civil action for
collection of the value of the checks subject of the estafa cases;

WON
the filing of said civil action violated the anti-forum-shopping rule.

HELD: NO.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities
on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Art100 of the RPC;and (2)
independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained
of as felony; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and
distinct from the criminal action. Either of these two possible liabilities may been forced
against the offender subject, however, to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that
the offended party “cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission” or under
both causes.Under the present Rules, the civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted with
the criminal action,but the offended party is given the option to file a separate civil action
before the prosecution starts to present evidence. Anent the independent civil actions, under
the present Rules, the independent civil actions may be filed separately and prosecuted
independently even without any reservation in the criminal action. The failure to make a
reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and
independent civil action.In the case at bar, a reading of the complaint filed by petitioner show
that his cause of action is based on culpa contractual, an independent civil action. Cancio’s
cause of action is the respondent’s breach of the contractual obligation. The nature of a
cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause
of action. The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by
the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the
complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.There is also no forum-shopping. The
essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively,to secure a favorable judgment.
Although the cases filed by petitioner arose from the same actor omission of respondent,
they are, however, based on different causes of action. The criminal cases for estafa are
based on culpa criminal while the civil action for collection is anchored on culpa contractual.
Moreover, there can be no forum-shopping in the instant case because the law expressly
allows the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal
action.

63. BARREDO VS. GARCIA

FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner, vs. SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEO ALMARIO,

respondents

No. 48006. July 8, 1942

Facts:

A head-on collision between a taxicab owned by Barredo and a carretela occurred. The
carretela was overturned and one of its passengers, a 16-year old boy, the son of Garcia
and Almario, died as a result of the injuries which he received. The driver of the taxicab, an
employee of Barredo, was prosecuted for the crime and was convicted. When the criminal
case was instituted, Garcia and Almario reserved their right to institute a separate civil action
for damages. Subsequently, Garcia and Almario instituted a civil action for damages against
Barredo, the employer of the taxicab driver.

Issue:

Whether or not they can file a separate civil action against Fausto Barredo making him
primarily and directly responsible

Held:
(Foreword: The Barredo case was decided by the Supreme Court prior to the present Civil
Code. However, the principle enunciated in said case, that responsibility for fault or
negligence as quasi-delict is distinct and separate from negligence penalized under the
Revised Penal Code, is now specifically embodied in Art. 2177 of the CivilCode.)

The defendant maintains that Fontanilla’s negligence being punishable by the Penal Code,
his (defendant’s) liability as an employer is only subsidiary, according to said Penal Code,
but Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his property has not been exhausted.
To decide the main issue, we must cut thru the tangle that has, in the minds of many,
confused and jumbled together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes under the Penal Code
and fault or negligence under Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. According to the
Supreme Tribunal of Spain:

“Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or ‘culpa aquiliana’ is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code, with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is
entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime. Upon this principle, and on the wording
and spirit of Article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employers
may be safely anchored.

“It will thus be seen that while the terms of Article 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad
enough to cover the driver’s negligence in the instant case, nevertheless Article 1903 limits
cuasi-delitos TO ACTS OR OMISSIONS ‘NOT PUNISHABLE BY LAW.’ But inasmuch as
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless but even simple
imprudence or negligence, the fault or negligence under Article 1902 of the Civil Code has
apparently been crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the “confusion worse
confounded.’ However, a closer study shows that such a concurrence of scope in regard to
negligent acts does not destroy the distinction between the civil liability arising from a crime
and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act
causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code; or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under
Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. “Some of the differences between crimes under the
Penal Code are:

“1. That crimes affect the public interest, while quasi-delitos are only of private concern.

“2. That consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil
Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.

“3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because for the former are punished only if
there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in
which ‘ any kind of fault or negligence intervenes.’ However, it should be noted that not all
violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention of
ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt.

“The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or

culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction
between civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and
responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that
the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the
Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910
of the Civil Code. Still more concretely the authorities above cited render it inescapable to
conclude that the employer – in this case the defendant-petitioner – is primarily and directly
liable under Article 1903 of the Civil Code.”

64. SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY vs. TANGCO

Safeguard Security Agency, Inc vs Tangco
G.R. No.165732
December 14, 2006

Facts:
On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline) went to Ecology
Bank, Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per advise of the bank's cashier
as she would sign a specimen card. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with
corresponding permit to carry the same outside her residence, approached security guard
Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank, and pulled out her firearm from her bag to deposit
the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her
in the abdomen instantly causing her death.

Lauro Tangco, Evangeline's husband, together with his six minor children (respondents) filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a criminal case of Homicide against Pajarillo,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806 and assigned to Branch 78. Respondents reserved
their right to file a separate civil action in the said criminal case. The RTC of Quezon City
subsequently convicted Pajarillo of Homicide in its Decision dated January 19, 2000. On appeal
to the CA, the RTC decision was affirmed with modification as to the penalty in a Decision dated
July 31, 2000. Entry of Judgment was made on August 25, 2001.
Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents filed with RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, a
complaint for damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and against
Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage
committed by its security guard. Respondents prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages
and attorney's fees.
In their Answer, petitioners denied the material allegations in the complaint and alleged that
Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
Pajarillo; that Evangeline's death was not due to Pajarillo's negligence as the latter acted only in
self-defense. Petitioners set up a compulsory counterclaim for moral damages and attorney's
fees.

Issues:
(a) Whether respondent can file civil liability ex delito under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code?
(b) Whether independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission
complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31
of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article
2176 of the Civil Code?
(c) Whether the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the
criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced
against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended
party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes?

Held:
The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It rejected Pajarillo's claim that he merely
acted in self-defense. It gave no credence to Pajarillo's bare claim that Evangeline was seen
roaming around the area prior to the shooting incident since Pajarillo had not made such report to
the head office and the police authorities. The RTC further ruled that being the guard on duty, the
situation demanded that he should have exercised proper prudence and necessary care by
asking Evangeline for him to ascertain the matter instead of shooting her instantly; that Pajarillo
had already been convicted of Homicide in Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806; and that he also failed
to proffer proof negating liability in the instant case.
The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be jointly and severally liable with
Pajarillo. It ruled that while it may be conceded that Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the
selection of its employees, particularly of Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to show that
Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employee;
that Safeguard's evidence simply showed that it required its guards to attend trainings and
seminars which is not the supervision contemplated under the law; that supervision includes not
only the issuance of regulations and instructions designed for the protection of persons and
property, for the guidance of their servants and employees, but also the duty to see to it that such
regulations and instructions are faithfully complied with.

In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA held that the applicable provisions are
not Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, on quasi-delicts, but the provisions
on civil liability arising from felonies under the Revised Penal Code; that since Pajarillo had been
found guilty of Homicide in a final and executory judgment and is said to be serving sentence in
Muntinlupa, he must be adjudged civilly liable under the provisions of Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code since the civil liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent upon
conviction, because said liability arises from the offense charged and no other; that this is also
the civil liability that is deemed extinguished with the extinction of the penal liability with a
pronouncement that the fact from which the civil action might proceed does not exist; that unlike
in civil liability arising from quasi-delict, the defense of diligence of a good father of a family in the
employment and supervision of employees is inapplicable and irrelevant in civil liabilities based
on crimes or ex-delicto; that Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the liability of an
employer for the civil liability of their employees is only subsidiary, not joint or solidary.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated July 16, 2004 of the Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the civil liability of petitioner Safeguard
Security Agency, Inc. is SOLIDARY and PRIMARY under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

65. ARAFILES vs. PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC

CATALINO P. ARAFILES, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC., ROMY

MORALES, MAX BUAN, JR., and MANUEL C. VILLAREAL JR., respondents

G.R No. 150256. March 25, 2004

FACTS:

About 2:00 am on 14 April 1987, while respondent Morales, a reporter of People’s Journal
Tonight, was at the Western Police District (WPD) Headquarters along United Nations Avenue,
Manila, Emelita Dispuig (Emelita), an employee of the National Institute of Atmospheric Sciences
(NIAS) lodged a complaint against petitioner, a NIAS director, for forcible abduction with rape and
forcible abductionwith attempted rape before the then on duty Partolman Benito Chio at the
General assignments sectionof the headquarters.

In the presence of Morales, Emelita executed a sworn statement narrating the events
surrounding the reported offenses committed against her by petitioner. Following the execution of
the sworn statement, Patrolman Chio made such in the Police Blotter which was perused by
Morales. Morales, thereupon, personally interviewed Emelita for the purpose of reporting the
same in the next issue of People’s Journal Tonight. By his claim, he, after the interview, tried to
contact Arafiles at NIAS office to verify Emelita’s story but failed, the office having already closed.
Morales then wrote an account about Emelita’s complaint and submitted it to his editor. That
same day, 14 April 1987, Morales’ report appeared as headline on People’s Journal Tonight.

About a year following the publication, petitioner filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City against respondents for damages arising therefrom. Respondents prayed for
dismissal of the case alleging that the news item is part of the freedom of the press but the
petitioner believes that it is grossly malicious and overly sensationalized reporting. The court
rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff but was reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals
citing the doctrine of pair comment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the publication of the news item was
not attended with malice to free respondents of liability for damages.

HELD:

Every citizen has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but it was not considered that
the respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or abused the
freedom of the press. The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance so as to
enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the
preparation of stories, press reporters and usually have to race with their deadlines; and
consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to appoint
of suppression for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words.

66. INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGANCES vs. ARGOS

67. COJUANGCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, THE PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE
and FERNANDO O. CARRASCOSO, JR., respondents.

G.R. No. 119398. July 2, 1999

FACTS:

Eduardo Cojuangco, a businessman and a sportsman, was the owner of several race horces,
which he entered in the sweepstakes races from March 6, 1986 to September 18, 1989. The said
race horses won first, second and third places which granted Cojuangco with prizes from PCSO.
Cojuangco sent PCSO demand letters claiming the prizes but Carracoso replied stating that he
was advised by the PCGG to withhold the prizes in the meantime. The RTC held that PCSO and
Carrascoso had no authority to withhold the winnings since no writ of sequestration was issued
by the PCGG. The trial court also said that Carrascoso’s initiative of not issuing the prizes were
manifestations of Bad Faith. The Court of Appeals, however, held that Carrascoso was merely
carrying out the instructions of PCGG backed by the intention to protect public interest. The
appellate court said that Carrascoso was in good faith since he replied to demand letters, he
released the winnings upon PCGG’s advice and he had no objection to the partial execution.

ISSUE:

Whether the award for damages against Carrascoso is warranted by evidence and the law.

RULING:

The Court ruled that Carrascoso acted in good faith. Bad faith, to be recognized by court, should
be constituted by dishonest purpose, moral obliquity, and conscious doing of a wrong. The Court
further stated that a public official shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary damages for
acts done in the performance of their official duties unless there is no clear showing of bad faith,
malice and gross negligence. But Carrascoso should still be liable under Article 32(6) which
states “rights against deprivation of property without due process of law”. There was a violation of
Cojuangco’s constitutional right even if done in good faith since no writ for the sequestration of
his racehorse winnings. Therefore, Cojuangco’s petition was granted and Carrasco is obliged to
pay nominal damages worth P/ 50,000.00.

---

GR No. 119398 | July 2, 1999 | J. Panganiban

Doctrine: To hold public officers personally liable for moral and exemplary damages and for
attorney’s fees for acts done in the performance of official functions, the plaintiff must prove
that these officers exhibited acts characterized by evident bad faith, malice, or gross
negligence. But even if their acts had not been so tainted, public officers may still be held
liable for nominal damages if they had violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Facts:

Petitioner Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the ROC
seeking to set aside CA’s decision, after it reversed a favorable decision of the RTC that
ordered the private respondents to pay him moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees
and costs of the suit, and denied his Motion for Reconsideration.
Cojuangco, a known businessman-sportsman owned several racehorses which he entered
in sweepstakes races. Several of his horses won the races on various dates, and won prizes
together with the 30% due for trainer/grooms. He sent letters of demand for the collection of
the prizes due him but private respondents PCSO and its then chairman Fernando
Carrascoso Jr. consistently replied that the demanded prizes are being withheld on advice of
PCGG. Consequently, Cojuangco filed this case before the Manila RTC but before the
receipt summons, PCGG advised private respondents that “it poses no more objection to its
remittance of the prized winnings”. This was immediately communicated to petitioner’s
counsel Estelito Mendoza by Carrascoso but the former refused to accept the prizes at this
point, reasoning that the matter had already been brought to court.

The trial court ruled that the private respondents had no authority to withhold the subject
racehorse winnings since no writ of sequestration was issued by PCGG. Ordering the private
respondents to pay in solidum the claimed winnings, the trial court further held that, by not
paying the winnings, Carrascoso had acted in bad faith amounting to the persecution and
harassment of petitioner and his family. While the case was pending with the CA, the
petitioner moved for partial execution pending appeal to which the private respondents
posed no objection to.

CA reversed the trial court’s finding of bad faith, holding that the former PCSO chairman was
merely carrying out the instruction of the PCGG. It likewise noted that Carrascoso’s acts of
promptly replying to demands and not objecting to partial execution negated bad faith.

Issue:

W/N the award for damages against respondent Carrascoso is warranted by evidence the
law

Held:

YES AND NO. Petitioner is only entitled to nominal damages.

Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty
due to some motive or interest of ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. There is
sufficient evidence on record to support Respondent Court’s conclusion that Carrascoso did
not act in bad faith. His letters to PCGG indicated his uncertainties as to the extent of the
sequestration against the properties of the plaintiff. There is also denying that plaintiff is a
very close political and business associate of the former President Marcos. Sequestration
was also a novel remedy. Under these equivocalities, Carrascoso could not be faulted in
asking further instructions from the PCGG, on what to do and more so, to obey the
instructions given. Besides, EO2 has just been issued by President Aquino, “freezing all
assets and properties in the Philippines (of) former President Marcos and/or his wife…their
close friends, subordinates, business associates…”

The extant rule is that public officers shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary
damages for acts done in the performance of official duties, unless there is a clear showing
of bad faith, malice or gross negligence. Attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation cannot be
imposed either, in the absence of clear showing of any of the grounds provided therefor
under the Civil Code. The trial court’s award of these kinds of damages must perforce be
deleted.

Nevertheless, this Court agrees with the petitioner and the trial that Respondent Carrascoso
may still be held liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstruct, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights
and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:

xxx xxx xxx

(6) The rights against deprivation of property without due process of law;

Under the aforecited article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or
bad faith. To be liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of
petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of one’s
duties.

We hold that petitioner’s right to the use of his property was unduly impeded. While
Respondent Carrascoso may have relied upon the PCGG’s instructions, he could have
further sought the specific legal basis therefor. A little exercise of prudence would have
disclosed that there was no writ issued specifically for the sequestration of the racehorse
winnings of petitioner. There was apparently no record of any such writ covering his
racehorses either. The issuance of a sequestration order requires the showing of a prima
facie case and due regard for the requirements of due process. The withholding of the prize
winnings of petitioner without a properly issued sequestration order clearly spoke of a
violation of his property rights without due process of law.

Art. 2221 of the Civil Code authorizes the award of nominal damages to a plaintiff whose
right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or
recognizing that right, not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered.
68. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. CASTILLO

69. CITY OF PASIG vs. COMELEC

CITY OF PASIG, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE
MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, respondents

G.R. No. 125646. September 10, 1999

MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, CITY OF PASIG, respondent

G.R. No. 128663. September 10, 1999

Facts:

On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be segregated
from its mother Barangays and converted into a separate one, the City Council of Pasig passed
and approved an ordinance, creating Barangay Karangalan scheduling the plebiscite on the
creation of said barangay on June 22, 1996. Upon learning of the ordinance, the Municipality of
Cainta filed a petition on June 19, 1996 to the Commission on Elections to suspend or cancel the
scheduled plebiscite. According to the Municipality of Cainta, the proposed barangay involve
areas included in the pending case before the RTC Antipolo Rizal, Br. 74 for settlement of
boundary dispute, hence the plebiscite should be suspended or cancelled until after the said
case shall have been finally decided by the court.

Meanwhile, on September 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued another ordinance, creating
Barangay Napico in Pasig City. Plebiscite for this purpose was set for March 15, 1997. Again the
Municipality of Cainta filed another petition on March 12, 1997 to suspend or cancel the plebiscite
on the same ground as for the proposed creation of Barangay Karangalan.

The COMELEC ordered the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan to be held in
abeyance until the boundary dispute is settled because it presents a prejudicial question which
must first be decided. The City of Pasig filed the petition (G.R. No. 125646) to the Supreme
Court, arguing that there is no prejudicial question since the same contemplates a civil and
criminal action and does not come into play where both cases are civil, as in the instant case.
In the case of Barangay Napico, the COMELEC dismissed the petition for being moot because
the plebiscite was already held and the creation ratified and approved by the residents. Hence,
the Municipality of Cainta filed a petition (G.R. No. 128663) to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan and Napico
should be suspended or cancelled in view of the pending boundary dispute between the two local
governments.

Ruling:

The Court ruled that the pending civil case on boundary dispute presents a prejudicial question
which must first be decided before the creation of the proposed barangays. While the City of
Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial question since the same contemplates a civil and
criminal action and does not come into play where both cases are civil, as in the instant case, still
in the interest of good order, the Court can suspend action on one case pending the final
outcome of another case closely interrelated or linked to the first.

The decision on whose territorial jurisdiction the areas fall has material bearing to the creation of
the proposed Barangays. A requisite for the creation of a barangay is properly identified territorial
jurisdiction for these define the limits of the exercise of the governmental powers of the LGU.
Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires (beyond the legal capacity). Moreover, considering the
expenses entailed in the holding of plebiscites, it is far more prudent to hold in abeyance the
conduct of the same until the resolution of the boundary dispute.

In the case of Barangay Napico, the Court does not agree that the petition of the Municipality of
Cainta has been rendered moot and academic because the plebiscite was already held. The
issues raised are still pending and must first be resolved.

Therefore, the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be held in abeyance;
and the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 ratifying the creation of Barangay Napico should be
annulled and set aside, and any plebiscite thereto is hold in abeyance pending final resolution of
the boundary dispute.

70. BELTRAN vs. PEOPLE

BELTRAN v PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES (DIGEST)

G.R. No. 137567; 20 June 2000

TOPICS: Prejudicial Question, Bigamy, Concubinage, and Nullity of Marriage

FACTS:

Meynardo and Charmaine were married in 1973. After 24 years of marriage, Meynardo filed
a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with Charmaine on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Charmaine, however, alleged that it was Meynardo who left the conjugal home,
and is now living with Milagros, his paramour.

Charmaine filed a case for concubinage against Meynardo before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Makati City.

Meynardo filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings in the Metropolitan Trial Court, saying that the
pendency of the petition for nullity of his marriage with Charmaine poses a prejudicial
question to the criminal case.

The lower court denied the motion as well as the motion for reconsideration filed by
Meynardo, hence he filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court to stop the lower court from trying his
case. The RTC denied his petition and the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether the pendency of a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage poses a prejudicial
question to a prosecution for concubinage filed by the wife?

RULING:

No. The pendency of a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage does not pose a
prejudicial question to a prosecution for concubinage.

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
It has two essential elements:

(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action;
and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.

The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriage is not a
prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial
to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination
of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts
upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of
the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined.

In the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared
can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the
marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not
his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred in affirming
the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a civil action
for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case for
concubinage.

71. MERCED vs. DIEZ

ABUNDIO MERCED, petitioner, vs. HON. CLEMENTINO V. DIEZ. ETC. ET AL.,

respondents

No. L-15315. August 26, 1960

Facts:

On January 30, 1958, Abundio Merced, already married to Eufrocina Tan, filed a complaint
for annulment of his second marriage with Elizabeth Ceasar on the ground that he was
threatened and intimidated into signing an affidavit that he and Elizabeth had been living as
husband and wife which was used by the Elizabeth in securing their marriage of exceptional
character, without the need for marriage license; that he was again threatened by Elizabeth
and her relatives to enter into the marriage on August 21, 1957; and that he never lived with
her. Merced prays for annulment of the marriage and for moral damages in the amount of
P2,000.
In her answer to the civil case, Elizabeth Ceasar denied the allegations of the complaint and
avers that neither she nor her relatives know of plaintiff’s previous marriage. According to
her, it was Merced who insisted on the marriage. As a counterclaim she asked for P50, 000
for moral damages. She later on filed a criminal complaint for bigamy against Merced.

Merced filed a motion to hold to trial of said criminal case in abeyance until final termination
of the civil case on the ground that the latter involves facts which if proved will determine the
innocence of the accused. This motion was granted, but upon a motion for reconsideration
by the fiscal, the order for suspension was set aside and denied on the ground that in People
vs Mendoza, judicial declaration of nullity of a second and bigamous marriage is not
necessary.

Issue:

Whether or not an action to annul the second marriage is a prejudicial question in a

prosecution for bigamy.

Ruling:

The civil case presents a prejudicial question which must first be resolved before the criminal
case.

The elements of prejudicial question are the following: (1) it must be determinative of the
case before the court; (2) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.

For the first element, in order that the Merced be held guilty of the crime of bigamy, the
marriage which she contracted for the second time with Elizabeth Ceasar, must first be
declared valid. But its validity has been questioned in the civil action. This civil action must
be decided before the prosecution for bigamy can proceed. In order that a person may be
held guilty of the crime of bigamy, the second and subsequent marriage must have all the
essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.
One of the elements is consent, without it, a marriage would be illegal and void. Since
Merced claims that he was forced into the marriage, the validity of the second marriage is
determinative of the guilt of Merced in the crime of bigamy.

The denial of the suspension of the criminal case was based on the case of People vs.
Mendoza. The same cannot be applied in this case because of different set of facts. In this
case, Mendoza was first married with Josefa, then married Olga, and after the death of
Josefa, married Carmencita. Olga filed a case of bigamy because of the third marriage. The
Court held that he is not guilty of bigamy since the marriage with Olga was void, having been
contracted when Josefa was still alive, whereas the marriage with Carmencita is valid
because it was contracted when the first wife was already dead.
For the second element, (NOTE: IN THIS CASE, THE CIVIL CASE AND THE CRIMINAL
CASE WERE BOTH FILED IN THE SAME COURT) Spanish jurisprudence, requires that the
essential element determinative of the criminal action must be cognizable by another court.
This requirement is due to the fact that Spanish courts jurisdictions’ are exclusively divided
into civil or criminal. In the Philippines, where our courts are vested with both civil and
criminal jurisdiction, the principle of prejudicial question is to be applied even if there is only
one court before which the civil action and the criminal action are to be litigated. But in this
case the court when exercising its jurisdiction over the civil action for the annulment of
marriage is considered as a court distinct and different from itself when trying the criminal
action for bigamy.

72. DONATO vs. LUNA

LEONILO DONATO, petitioner, vs. HON ARTEMON LUNA and

PAZ ABAYAN, respondents.

April 15, 1988

Facts:

On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner’s arraignment, private respondent filed with
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court a civil action for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978. Said civil case was based on
the ground that private respondent consented to entering into the marriage, which was
petitioner Donato’s second one, since she had no previous knowledge that petitioner was
already married to Rosalinda Maluping on June 30, 1978. Petitioner’s answer in the civil
case for nullity interposed the defense that his second marriage was void since it was
solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation, and undue
influence were employed by private respondent to obtain petitioner’s consent to the
marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the subsequent marriage, petitioner and private
respondent had lived together and deported themselves as husband and wife without the
benefit of wedlock for a period of at least five years as evidenced by a joint affidavit executed
by them on September 26, 1978, for which reason, the requisite marriage license was
dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the New Civil Code pertaining to marriages of
exceptional character. Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of Criminal Case,
petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of said case contending Civil Case
seeking the annulment of his second marriage filed by private respondent raises a prejudicial
question which must first be determined or decided before the criminal case can proceed.

Issue:
Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the Court of First Instance should
be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court on the ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question

Ruling:

The respondent judge ruled in the negative and the Supreme Court sustains him. A
prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of
question is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of
which pertains to another tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct or separate from the crime but
so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and
for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only in the said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that
in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined. The issue before the Juvenile and Domestic
Relation Court is not determinative of petitioner’s guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. It
was petitioner’s second wife, who filed the complainant for annulment of the second
marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit. Pursuant to the
doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner cannot apply the rule on prejudicial
question since a case for annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial question
to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that the petitioner’s consent to
such marriage was obtained by means of duress, violence, and intimidation in order to
establish that his act in the subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as such the
same cannot be the basis for conviction. The preceding elements do not exist in case at bar.
Another event which militates against petitioner’s contentions is the fact that it was only
when the civil case was filed on September 28, 1979, or more than the lapse of one year
from the solemnization of the second marriage that petitioner came up with the story that his
consent to the marriage was secured through the use of force, violence, intimidation, and
undue influence. Petitioner also continued to live with private respondent until November
1978, when the latter left their abode upon learning that Leonilo Donato was already
previously married.

73. TENEBRO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner, v.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

G.R. No. 150758. February 18, 2004.

Facts:
Petitioner Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on
April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of
Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption
until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously
married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a
photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous
marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas,
stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.

On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain
Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 15. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether
the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that
petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.

Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.

The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of bigamy. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused for the crime of bigamy despite
clear proof that the marriage between the accused and private complainant had been
declared null and void ab initio and without legal force and effect

Ruling:

As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the

subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the
subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid

marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio
completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this
second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.

Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during
the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been
consummated. Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the
essential requisites for validity. In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the
validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years
of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required license before
Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at
least two witnesses. The decision of the Court of Appeals convicting petitioner Veronico
Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy is AFFIRMED.

--

423 SCRA 272 (467 Phil. 723) – Civil Law – Family Code – Bigamy – Exists even if one
marriage is declared void

Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas in 1990. The two lived together
continuously and without interruption until the later part of 1991, when Tenebro informed
Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes in 1986. Petitioner
thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going
to cohabit with Villareyes. In 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage with a certain
Nilda Villegas. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas
countered that his marriage with Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact there being no record
of such. He further argued that his second marriage, with Ancajas, has been declared void
ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot be charged for bigamy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.

HELD: The prosecution was able to establish the validity of the first marriage. As a second
or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to
Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely
regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted
during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second
marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes “any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of
a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings”. A plain reading of the law, therefore, would
indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

Read full text

Separate Opinion of Justice Vitug

Justice Vitug pointed out that void ab initio marriages (except those falling under the
principle of psychological incapacity) should be allowed to be used as a valid defense for
bigamy. Void ab initio marriages require no judicial decree to establish their nullity. It is true
that the Revised Penal Code does not require the first or second marriage to be declared
void to avoid a criminal case of bigamy but this should only be applicable to voidable
marriages – because again, void ab initio marriages really do not need such judicial decree.

74. Van Dorn v. Romillo

VAN DORN vs. ROMILLO, G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, VS. HON. MANUEL ROMILLO JR., as Presiding
Judge of

Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD

UPTON, respondents

October 8, 1985

FACTS:

Alice Reyes, the petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard
Upton is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hong Kong in 1972 and they
established residence in the Philippines. They had two children and they were divorced in
Nevada, USA in 1982. The petitioner remarried in Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn. The
private responded filed against petitioner stating that the petitioner’s business is a conjugal
property of the parties and that respondent is declared with right to manage the conjugal
property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is
barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court, where
respondent acknowledged that they had no community property as of June 11, 1982.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the private respondent as petitioner’s husband is entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets?

RULING:

The petition is granted. Complaint is dismissed.

The policy against absolute divorce cover only Philippine nationals. However, aliens may
obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines provided they are valid
according to their national law.

From the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves marriage, the divorce in
Nevada released private respondent from the marriage between them with the petitioner.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner.
He would have no standing to sue in the case as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before said court
from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

--

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, v. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR. AND
RICHARD UPTON, respondents.

No. L-68470. October 8, 1985.

Facts:

Petitioner Alicia Reyes Van is citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard
Upton is a citizen of the United States, were married on 1972 at Hongkong. On 1982, they
got divorced in Nevada, United States; and the petitioner remarried to Theodore Van Dorn.

On July 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner, asking that the petitioner be
ordered to render an accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila, and be declared with right
to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that
the cause of action is barred by previous judgement in the divorce proceeding before
Nevada Court where respondent acknowledged that they had no community property. The
lower court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the property involved is located
in the Philippines, that the DivorceDecree has no bearing in the case. Respondent avers that
Divorce Decree abroadcannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not the divorce obtained the spouse valid to each of them.

(2) Whether or not Richard Upton may assert his right on conjugal properties.

Held:

As to Richard Upton the divorce is binding on him as an American Citizen. As he is bound by

the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said
Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Only Philippine Nationals
are covered by the policy against absolute divorce the same being considered contrary to
our concept of public policy and morality. Alicia Reyes under our National law is still
considered married to private respondent. However, petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

75. PILAPIL vs. HON IBAY-SOMERA, VICTOR AND GEILING et al

G.R. No. 80116

June 30, 1989

FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a German
national, were married in Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, such
connubial disharmony eventuated in Geiling initiating a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in
Germany. The Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce
on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.

More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints
for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging in one that, while still married to said
Geiling, Pilapil “had an affair with a certain William Chia.” The Assistant Fiscal, after the
corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal Victor approved a
resolution directing the filing of 2 complaint for adultery against the petitioner. The case
entitled “PP Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia” was assigned to the court presided by the
respondent judge Ibay-Somera.

A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was denied by the respondent. Pilapil
filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO, seeking the
annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.

As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes that the marital
relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.

ISSUE:
Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing of the complaint for adultery,
considering that it was done after obtaining a divorce decree?

WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner’s MTQ is SET ASIDE and another
one entered DISMISSING the complaint … for lack of jurisdiction. The TRO issued in this
case … is hereby made permanent.

NO
Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a
sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established,
with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely
a formal, requirement.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it
necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation
to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a logical consequence since the
raison d’etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party
had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal
case.

Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a

criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused
be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the
latter.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country,
the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons Under the same
considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner,
had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

76. Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio v Republic

Silverio v. Republic

October 22, 2007 (GR. No. 174689)

PARTIES:
petitioner: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio
respondent: Republic of the Philippines

FACTS:
On November 26, 2002, Silverio field a petition for the change of his first name “Rommel
Jacinto” to “Mely” and his sex from male to female in his birth certificate in the RTC of
Manila, Branch 8, for reason of his sex reassignment. He alleged that he is a male
transsexual, he is anatomically male but thinks and acts like a female. The Regional Trial
Court ruled in favor of him, explaining that it is consonance with the principle of justice and
equality.
The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals alleging
that there is no law allowing change of name by reason of sex alteration. Petitioner filed a
reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
WON change in name and sex in birth certificate are allowed by reason of sex reassignment.

HELD:
No. A change of name is a privilege and not a right. It may be allowed in cases where the
name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or difficult to pronounce or write; a nickname is
habitually used; or if the change will avoid confusion. The petitioner’s basis of the change of
his name is that he intends his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed
himself into thru surgery. The Court says that his true name does not prejudice him at all,
and no law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex
reassignment. The Court denied the petition.

---

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR No. 174689
October 22, 2007

CORONA, J.:

When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and
female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from
inside the bamboo. “Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!,” the voices said. She
pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out
came two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the
man “Malakas” (Strong) and the woman “Maganda” (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and
Maganda)

When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize
the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a
person’s sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in
the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?

FACTS:
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the
change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila, Branch 8,
alleging that he is a male transsexual, that is, “anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts
as a female” and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling
trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent
psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to
transform himself to a “woman” culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex
reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. From then on, petitioner lived as a female and
was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate
changed from “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely,” and his sex from “male” to “female.”

On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, stating that
granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity;
that with his sexual re-assignment, petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a
woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a
man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him. Likewise,
the court believes that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the
community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the
much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her fiancé and the realization of
their dreams.

On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of
entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. On February 23, 2006, the Court of
Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the Republic, and set aside the decision of the trial
court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the change of petitioner’s name and sex in his birth certificate is
allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court
and RA 9048.

HELD:
A PERSON’S FIRST NAME CANNOT BE CHANGED ON THE GROUND OF SEX
REASSIGNMENT

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides: No person
can change his name or surname without judicial authority.

This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular,
Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name
or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which
can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and
regulations.

RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general
concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is
now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of
the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of
Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of
Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and
subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the corresponding venue, form and procedure. In
sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily
administrative in nature, not judicial.

RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:

SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of
first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community;
or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He
intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself
into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil
status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex
reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his
declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public
interest.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable
cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he
will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or
even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.

In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first
name was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed
with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper
remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA
9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since
the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the
Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first
name was concerned.

NO LAW ALLOWS THE CHANGE OF ENTRY IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE AS TO SEX

ON THE GROUND OF SEX REASSIGNMENT

The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the
court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides: No
entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far
as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters
can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial
order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the
correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections
in entries in the civil register.

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a “clerical or typographical error” is: “Clerical or
typographical error” refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in
writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and
innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible
to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by
reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must
involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner.

Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere
clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include
even those that occur after birth. However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can
justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.

To correct simply means “to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from” while to
change means “to replace something with something else of the same kind or with
something that serves as a substitute.” The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error.
All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct.
No correction is necessary.

Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as
legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as
births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations,
annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss
or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of
name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch
upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly
sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events
mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly
or impliedly.

“Status” refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of
capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family
membership.

The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term status… include such
matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general,
family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation,
marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession.

A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a

person’s legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code
provides: All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by
special laws.

But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its
effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.

Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:

SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or midwife
in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the
newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such
declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil
registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at
the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.

In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date
and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of
parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e)
place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the
regulations to be issued.

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they
existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by
the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant.
Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a
person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.

When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary
meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words “sex,” “male” and “female”
as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other
laws) should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no
legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as “the sum of peculiarities
of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female” or “the distinction between
male and female.” Female is “the sex that produces ova or bears young” and male is “the
sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova.” Thus, the words “male” and
“female” in everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex
reassignment. Furthermore, “words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a
well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context
compels to the contrary.” Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted
in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term “sex” as used
then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-
to-female transsexual to be included in the category “female.”

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of
entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition
for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.

NEITHER MAY ENTRIES IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE AS TO FIRST NAME OR SEX BE

CHANGED ON THE GROUND OF EQUITY

The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of
justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or
prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.

The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first
step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most
sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman. One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who
must be a male and a female. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially
reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union
of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-
operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women
such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under
the Revised Penal Code and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These laws underscore the public policy in
relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be
granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that “[n]o judge or court shall decline to
render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law.” However, it is
not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or
interpret the law, not to make or amend it.

In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine
what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need
for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims
asserted are statute-based.

To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for
correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds
may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If
the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the
privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact
legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.

It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be
recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to
fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no
law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of
government, Congress.

Petitioner pleads that “[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment
and [the] realization of their dreams.” No argument about that. The Court recognizes that
there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly
recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an
ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be
addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

77. Ty v Court of Appeals

Article 40 – Exception to the Rule

In 1977, Reyes married Anna Maria Villanueva in a civil ceremony. They had a church
wedding in the same year as well. In 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of QC
declared their marriage as null and void; the civil one for lack of marriage license and the
subsequent church wedding due to the lack of consent of the parties. In 1979, prior to the
JDRC decision, Reyes married Ofelia. Then in 1991, Reyes filed for an action for declaration
of nullity of his marriage with Ofelia. He averred that they lack a marriage license at the time
of the celebration and that there was no judicial declaration yet as to the nullity of his
previous marriage with Anna. Ofelia presented evidence proving the existence of a valid
marriage license including the specific license number designated. The lower court however
ruled that Ofelia’s marriage with Reyes is null and void. The same was affirmed by the CA
applying the provisions of the Art 40 of the FC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of the previous of marriage of Reyes can be
invoked in the case at bar.
HELD: Art. 40 of the FC provides that, “The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.” This means that before one can enter into a second marriage he
must first acquire a judicial declaration of the nullity of the previous marriage and such
declaration may be invoked on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage as void. For purposes other than remarriage, other evidences may be presented
and the declaration can be passed upon by the courts. In the case at bar, the lower court
and the CA cannot apply the provision of the FC. Both marriages entered by Reyes were
solemnized prior to the FC. The old CC did not have any provision that states that there
must be such a declaration before remarriage can be done hence Ofelia’s marriage with
Reyes is valid. The provisions of the FC (took effect in ’87) cannot be applied retroactively
especially because they would impair the vested rights of Ofelia under the CC which was
operational during her marriage with Reyes.

78. Eugenio v J. Velez

TOMAS EUGENIO, SR., petitioner, vs. HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, respondent.

G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990.

Facts:

On Sept. 27, 1988, respondent-brothers Vargas(es) filed a petition for habeas corpusagainst
Eugenio for forcibly taking Vitaliana (respondents’ sister)from her residence in 1987 and
confined by the former in his palacial residence in Misamis Oriental. The respondent-
brothers, however, were not knowledgeable of Vitaliana’s death on August 28, 1988 due to
heart failure, prior to their filing of the writ of habeas corpus. Hence, Eugenio did not release
the body of Vitaliana claiming that the writ of habeas corpus is invalid because it was filed
after the death of Vitaliana. the respondent-brothers claimed that there was no existing
marital relationship between Eugenio and Vitaliana and therefore they have the custody over
the body of the latter. The RTC said that since there was no surviving spouse or children of
Vitaliana and that petitioner was merely a common law spouse , her brothers and sisters
have the custody. Also, it was held that Eugenio was legally married to another woman.

Issue:
Whether the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana be given to her full blood brothersand
sisters or her common law spouse.

Ruling:

The Philippines do not recognize common law marriages. And even if it was recognized, the
co-ownership requires that the man and the woman must not in any way be incapacitated to
contract marriage. In this case, Eugenio was legally married to another woman, which bars
him from being legally capacitated to contract marriages. Thye Civil Code of the Philippines
defines “spouse” as a lawfully wedded spouse not including common law spouses. Hence,
the custody of Vitaliana’s body is given to her brothers and sisters.

79. Navarro v Domagtoy

259 SCRA 129 – Civil Law – Family Code – Law on Marriage – Presumptive Death; Absent
Spouse
Rodolfo Navarro was the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. He submitted
evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge
Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency
in office and ignorance of the law. First, on September 27, 1994, said judge solemnized the
wedding between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom
is merely separated from his first wife. On his part, Domagtoy claimed that he merely relied
on an affidavit acknowledged before him attesting that Tagadan’s wife has been absent for
seven years. The said affidavit was alleged to have been sworn to before another judge.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador
Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court’s jurisdiction on October 27, 1994.
Domagtoy counters that he solemnized the marriage outside of his jurisdiction upon the
request of the parties.
ISSUE: Whether or not Domagtoy acted without jurisdiction.
HELD: Yes. Domagtoy’s defense is not tenable and he did display gross ignorance of the
law. Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife’s
presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ihis former wife.
Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of Domagtoy to have
accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has
resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. On the second issue, the request to
hold the wedding outside Domagtoy’s jurisdiction was only done by one party, the bride,
NOT by both parties. More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is
the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of
marriage is the “authority of the solemnizing officer.” Under Article 7, marriage may be
solemnized by, among others, “any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s
jurisdiction.” Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage
ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in
the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
80. Pugeda v Trias

Pugeda v. Trias
Nature of the Case: Motion for Reconsideration

Doctrine: Upon the issuance of the certificate of sale to the husband of a lot of the Friar
Lands, said lot ipso facto forms part of the conjugal properties of the husband and wife and
this status remains unaltered even after his death and the subsequent transfer of the land in
the name of the widow or by the setting aside of the trial court's decision holding said
property as conjugal by the Court of Appeals based on newly discovered evidence.

Facts:
Movants argued that, (1) the lots purchased by Miguel Trias under the operation of the Friar
Lands Act which at the time of his death were not yet fully paid and were subsequently
transferred in the name of the widow who paid the balance out of the proceeds of the fruits
of said lands and thereafter the title was issued in her name, belong to her as her exclusive
paraphernal property not conjugal;

(2) that the decision of the trial court was set aside by the Court of Appeals; and

(3) that the lots were never partitioned as conjugal assets of spouses Mariano Trias and
Maria C. Ferrer. Movants cited the case of Arayata vs. Joya, et al., 51 Phil. 654. The
Supreme Court denied the motion and declared the decision as final.

Ruling:

Upon the issuance of the certificate of sale to the husband of a lot of the Friar Lands, said lot
ipso facto forms part of the conjugal properties of the husband and wife and this status
remains unaltered even after his death and the subsequent transfer of the land in the name
of the widow or by the setting aside of the trial court's decision holding said property as
conjugal by the Court of Appeals based on newly discovered evidence. The doctrine in the
Arayata vs. Joya, et al. case refers to the superior right of the widow recognized in Section
16 of Act 1120 (Friar Lands Act) over transfers made by the husband without the approval of
the Director of Lands; hence, not applicable in the instant case. Adjudication may be made
pro indiviso in a project of partition without the need of actual division or partition of the
properties among the heirs.

81. People v Borromeo

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

ELIAS BORROMEO, defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-61873 October 3l, 1984

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the court finding accused Elias Borromeo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in holding that he
and Susana Taborada (the deceased) were legally and validly married because there was
no marriage contact executed in their wedding, hence he could be liable only for homicide,
not parricide.

Other than the stand of appellants counsel against the existence of marriage in order to
lessen or mitigate the penalty imposable upon his client, accused Elias Borromeo himself
admitted that the deceased-victim was his legitimate wife.

ISSUE:

Was there a valid marriage between the accused-appellant and the deceased-victim?

RULING:

There is no better proof of marriage than the admission of the accused of the existence of
such marriage. (Tolentino vs. Paras).

Persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is
the common order of the society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves
out as being, they would be living in constant violation of decency and law.

The presumption in favor of the matrimony is one of the strongest known in law. The reason
for this presumption is well settled in Perido vs. Perido, thus:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage is not
only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the
public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony

82. Martiatequi v CA
Mariategui vs. CA

GR NO. 57062, January 24, 1992

FACTS:

Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3 marriages during his
lifetime. He acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while he was still a bachelor. He had 4 children
with his first wife Eusebia Montellano, who died in 1904 namely Baldomera, Maria del
Rosario, Urbano and Ireneo. Baldomera had 7 children namely Antero, Rufina, Catalino,
Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo on the other hand had a
son named Ruperto. On the other hand, Lupo’s second wife is Flaviana Montellano where
they had a daughter named Cresenciana. Lupo got married for the third time in 1930 with
Felipa Velasco and had 3 children namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina. Jacinto testified that
his parents got married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig Rizal. The spouses deported
themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such.

Lupo’s descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition whereby they adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of the Muntinlupa Estate and
was subjected to a voluntary registration proceedings and a decree ordering the registration
of the lot was issued. The siblings in the third marriage prayed for inclusion in the partition of
the estate of their deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated
Dec. 1967.

ISSUE:
Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid in the absence of a marriage license.

HELD:

Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipa’s marriage, no
evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no
record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its
validity are present.

Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between
Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as
husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful
wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that
things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of
life.

Hence, Felipa’s children are legitimate and therefore have successional rights.
83. Tenebro v CA

84. RP v Dayot
Republic v. Dayot G.R. No. 175581/179474 March 28, 2008

FACTS:
Jose was introduced to Felisa in 1986. He later came to live as a boarder in Felisa’s house,
the latter being his landlady. Later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay
City Hall, so she could claim a package sent to her by her brother from Saudi. There, a man
bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to
sign the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do
so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both of them killed
by her brother who had learned about their relationship. He signed the papers and gave
them to the man. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had contracted
marriage with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, she said she does not know of such. Jose
claimed that their marriage was contracted with fraud. Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and
defended the validity of their marriage. Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose
was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual on August 31,
1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she
filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose
and Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. The
Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct ans
suspended him for one year without emolument. The RTC ruled against Jose claiming that
his story is impossible. RTC cited Article 87 of the New Civil Code which requires that the
action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the injured party within four years
after the discovery of the fraud.

ISSUE:
W/N the issue of validity of marriage due to fraud is prescriptible

HELD:
SC held that an action for nullifying a marriage is imprescriptible. It may be raised anytime.
Jose and Felisa’s marriage was celebrated without a marriage license. No other conclusion
can be reached except that it is void ab initio.

---

Republic of the Philippines vs Jose A. Dayot

GR No. 175581 March 28, 2008

Fact of the Case:

On November 24, 1986 Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall. In lieu of
a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit attesting that both of them are legally
capacitated and that they cohabited for at least five years when in fact they only barely
known each other since February 1986.On 1993, Jose filed a complaint for Annulment
and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage contending that their marriage was sham, as to no
ceremony was celebrated between them; that he did not execute the sworn statement that
he and Felisa had cohabited for at least five years; and that his consent was secured
through fraud. His sister, however, testified as witness that Jose voluntarily gave his consent
during their marriage. The complaint was dismissed onRegional Trial Court stating that Jose
is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of marriage license. It
is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, and that it took Jose
seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity; The RTC ruled that Jose’s action had
prescribe. It cited Art 87 of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment
must be commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery of fraud. Jose
appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered a decision declaring their marriage void ab
initio for absence of marriage license. Felisa sought a petition for review praying that the
Court of Appeal’s Amended decision be reversed and set aside.

Issue:
(1) Whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital
cohabitation, where the parties have in truth
fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement.,
effectively renders the marriage voib an
initio for lack of marriage.
(2) Whether or not the action for nullity prescribes as the case here where Jose
filed a complaint after seven years from contracting marriage.

Held:
(1)Yes.The intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of marriage, will not salvage
the parties’ marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a violation of the law. The Court
protects the fabric of the institution of marriage and at the same time wary of deceptive
schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in the law. The case cannot fall under
irregularity of the marriage license, what happens here is an absence of marriage license
which makes their marriage void for lack of one of the essential requirement of a valid
marriage.
(2) No. An action for nullity is imprescriptible. Jose and Felisa’s marriage was celebrated san
a marriage license. The right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe.

85. Cariño v Cariño

SANTIAGO CARINO, petitioner vs. SUSAN CARINO, defendant
 G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001

Facts:

During the lifetime of SP04 Santiago S. Carino, he contracted two marriages, the first with
Susan Nicdao Carino with whom he had two offsprings (Sahlee and Sandee) and with
Susan Yee Carino with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation. In
1988, Santiago passed away under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and
burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and
financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Nicdao
was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 and Yee received a total of P21,000.00. Yee filed
an action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao, contending that the marriage of the
latter with Santiago is void ab initio because their marriage was solemnized without the
required marriage license. The trial court ruled in favor of Yee, ordering Nicdao to pay Yee
half of acquired death benefits. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the marriage of Santiago Carino and Susan Nicdao is void for lack of
marriage license.

Ruling:

Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of Nicdao and Carino
was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage and the absence
thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. In the case at bar,
the marriage does not fall within any of those exceptions and a marriage license therefore
was indispensable to the validity of it. This fact is certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan, Metro Manila. Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of Nicdao
and Carino has been sufficiently overcome and cannot stand. The marriage of Yee and
Carino is void ab initio as well for lack of judicial decree of nullity of marriage of Carino and
Nicdao at the time it was contracted. The marriages are bigamous; under Article 148 of the
Family Code, properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall
belong to the co-ownership. The decision of the trial court and Court of Appeals is affirmed.

86. Republic v CA and Castro

REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 103047, September 2, 1994236 SCRA 257

FACTS:

Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony without the
knowledge of the former’s parents. All the documents required for the celebration of the
marriage which includes procurement of marriage license, was attended by Cardenas. It was
stated in the marriage contract that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued. The
cohabitation of Castro and Cardenas lasted only for four (4) months after which they parted
ways. Castro sought the advice of a lawyer for a possible annulment of her marriage with
Cardenas before leaving for the States to follow her daughter who was adopted by her
brother with the consent of Cardenas. The Civil Registrar of Pasig issued a certification
stating that Castro and Cardenas were allegedly married in the Pasay Court on June 21,
1970 under an alleged marriage license no.3196182 which was allegedly issued on June 20,
1970 but such cannot be located since it does not appear in their records. It was then that
she found out that there was no marriage license issued prior to the celebration of her
marriage with Cardenas. Castro filed a petition seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Edwin Cardenas. The Regional Trial Court denied her petition. It ruled that
“inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that
there was no marriage license issued.”

Castro appealed to respondent appellate court contending that the certification from the local
civil registrar sufficiently established the absence of a marriage license. The respondent
appellate court reversed the ruling of the trial court declaring that the marriage between the
contracting parties is null and void and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel the
marriage contract. However, the Republic of the Philippines, the petitioner herein, brought a
petition for review on certiorari which alleged that the certification and the uncorroborated
testimony of Castro are not sufficient to overthrow the legal presumption regarding the
validity of a marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent
are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued prior to the celebration of
marriage.

RULING:

Yes. The Court ruled that the certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the
civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to
keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by
any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a
certificate of "due search and inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office did not issue
marriage license no.3196182 to the contracting parties. The fact that private respondent
Castro offered only her testimony in support of her petition is, in itself, not aground to deny
her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due
to the peculiar circumstances of the case. The finding of the appellate court that the
marriage between the contracting parties is null and void for lack of a marriage license does
not discount the fact that indeed, a spurious marriage license, purporting to be issued by the
civil registrar of Pasig, may have been presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer. It
was held that under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial
evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the
subject marriage license. Therefore, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of any
reversible error committed by respondent appellate court.

87. Ninal v Bayadog

ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE
NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners, v. NORMA
BAYADOG, respondent.

G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000

Facts:

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. She was shot by
Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter, Pepito
and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof,
Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a
marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident

After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of
Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The
case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage
would affect petitioner’s successional rights.

Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since
they are not among the persons who could file an action for annulment of marriage under
Article 47 of the Family Code.

Issues:

(a) Whether or not Pepito and Norma’ living together as husband and wife for at least five
years exempts them from obtaining a marriage license under Article 34 of the Family Code
of the Philippines.

(b) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the
declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her
specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is
already dead

Ruling:

(a) On the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for
five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the
basis of cohabitation as “husband and wife” where the only missing factor is the special
contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should
be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. The five-year
period should be the years immediately before the day the marriage and it should be a
period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity—meaning no third party was involved at
any time within the five years, and continuity—that is, unbroken. Otherwise, if that five-year
cohabitation period is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be
sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and
placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.

(b) The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage.
Voidable and void marriages are not identical. Consequently, void marriages can be
questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only
during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and
their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.

88.
89.
90. Republic v Obrecido

REPUBLIC VS ORBECIDOG.R. No. 154380October 5, 2005

FACTS:
In 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myro Villanueva in Lam-an,Ozamis City.In 1986,
Orbecido discovered that his wife had had been naturalized as an American
citizen.Sometime in 2000, Orbecido learned from his son that his wife had obtained a
divorce decree and married an American.Orbecido filed with the Trial Court a petition for
“Authority to Remarry”invoking Article 26 Paragraph 2 of the Family Code, the Court granted
the petition.The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General,sought
for reconsideration but it was denied by the Trial Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the allegations of the respondent was proven as a fact according to the rules
of evidence.

HELD:
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved.Furthermore, respondent
must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically
required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is
capacitated to enter into another marriage.However, in the present petition there is no
sufficient evidence submitted and onrecord, we are unable to declare, based on
respondent’s bare allegations that his wife,who was naturalized as an American citizen, had
obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now
capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s
submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the
Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED.The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and
Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur,
Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.