G.R. No.

L-16749 January 31, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.

ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and
Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.

M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.

Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.

LABRADOR, J.:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr.,
presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among
things the final accounts of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen
the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria
Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case
of death without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in
accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was
executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:

3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs.
Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is
now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.

4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my
above named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.

xxx xxx xxx

7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to
Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was
baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted
by me, and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines,
the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency
the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao
Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos
(P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as any interest
which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..

xxx xxx xxx

12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA
LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665
Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest,
remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of
whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my
death and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account and project
of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the
residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.

Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar
as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been
declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E.
Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the
laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to
Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full
ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern the
estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of California alone, but the entire
law thereof because several foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and
even if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires
that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria
Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is
deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.

The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the
State of California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the
provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator
has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion
over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d
952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor
Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but these were
denied. Hence, this appeal.

The most important assignments of error are as follows:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE
INHERITANCE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE
EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE
APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,
PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED
EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.

IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION
SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL
OWNERSHIP.

There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State
of California at the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the time of his death he
was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted by the executor himself in
appellee's brief:

In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that the
deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y.,
U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1,
1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of
San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.

In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there for the
following nine years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and was teaching school in
Sacramento, California.

Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913. However, in
1928, he again departed the Philippines for the United States and came back here the
following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country,
and came back to the Philippines the following year, 1939.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted
and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other
evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.1äwphï1.ñët

Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military Forces in
the Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United
States but returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6",
CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l",
"MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)

In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after the
making of his last will and testament (now in question herein) which he executed at his
lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of
Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)

In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded
by the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and
since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for short visits
(perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired a home or
properties in that state, which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and
make home in the State of California.
 Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary
presence to the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote something
more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)

As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he
resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines,
for the latter was a territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to
have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951
he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to
abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in accordance with the
following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.

The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place of
permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning.
Thus one may be domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he may reside in a
place where he has no domicile. The man with two homes, between which he divides his
time, certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went on business which would
require his presence for several weeks or months, he might properly be said to have
sufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he
treated his settlement as continuing only for the particular business in hand, not giving up his
former "home," he could not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice
requires the exercise of intention as well as physical presence. "Residence simply requires
bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in
that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term
used with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the most
permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the only proper one.
(Goodrich, p. 29)

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country where said property may be found.

The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the
term "national law"is used therein.

There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United
States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force
only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can
not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than
the private law of the State of California.

The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property?
The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the
California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he
desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant
invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is
deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.

The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have
checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case
cited in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is
argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of
California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case, should govern the
determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in
force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand,
insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine
of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred
back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.

The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:

The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers
a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law
of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"

On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that
is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law.
But once having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is
difficult to see why the reference back should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws.
This would have resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has so often been
criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely to the
internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no
compelling logical reason why the original reference should be the internal law rather than to
the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but
those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at
the second reference and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of
the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule of
reference.

Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that greater
uniformity will result from adoption of their respective views. And still more strange is the fact
that the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the
two states whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether
the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the
litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan
court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been against the woman; if the suit had been
brought in the Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the
woman. The same result would happen, though the courts would switch with respect to
which would hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.

The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is in
question, and where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the
Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case,
is applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a
 person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court; and every
divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of
Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)

X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable property

in Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises as to how this property is to be
distributed among X's next of kin.

Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict
of laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for an application of the law of the
deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thing
for the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute of distributions, or
whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An
examination of French law, however, would show that if a French court were called upon to
determine how this property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution to the
national law of the deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on
the surface of things the Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a)
either to apply the French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French
court and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is
what a French court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoidoctrine, it will follow the latter
course, thus applying its own law.

This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the
forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back
again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this
judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)

After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing a
particular case, the further question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws
contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question which, while it has
been considered by the courts in but a few instances, has been the subject of frequent
discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively
designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the
"Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the question postulated and the operation
of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning the main
controversy to be decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)

Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of the
doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must
take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of
laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction
prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been
repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)

The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a
country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp.
529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:

The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be
understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or
country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a
country' means the whole of its law.
 xxx xxx xxx

Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at
Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following theses:

(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign laws.

(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:

(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals
abroad as regards their personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall
be determined by the law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the
act in question occurred.

(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one
of them is necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a
question to the same system of law.

xxx xxx xxx

If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an
Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he
must first inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal property upon death
in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the
distribution in accordance with the law of nationality — that is the English law — he must
accept this reference back to his own law.

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied
in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of
California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle
cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such
of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of
resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in
accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most
matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.

When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will directing
the manner of distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the
time of his death will be looked to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as
completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is logical
that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate
succession, the same rules should determine the validity of an attempted testamentary
dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the
borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the
Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the recognition as in the case
of intestate succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has
said on the point: 'The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the
domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had its origin in
that international comity which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when
business intercourse and the process of accumulating property take but little notice of
boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever.
(Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national
law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed
two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other
jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its
citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we
must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of
our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in accordance with the express mandate
thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-
laws rule for those domiciled abroad.

It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place where
the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16
that the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As
explained in the various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil
Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the
reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in
California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled
in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile
can not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable
of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two
states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The
Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the
decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of
California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code
of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent
recognizing them.

The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105;
Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs.
Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in the
case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen
of a state in the United States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each
case that there exists in the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with
Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the
appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil
Code of California, not by the internal law of California..

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower
court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides.
Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.

G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in
Civil Case No. 37089 therein. 1äwphï1.ñët

The facts of the case are as follows:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his
first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis,
George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis
Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children:
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children:
Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.

On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after
all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be
divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen;
(b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam
Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the
remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A.
Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis,
and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares. 1äwphï1.ñët

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His
will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.

The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein
including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the
three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various
amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of
P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed
the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of
their respective legacies.

On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its
"Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter
alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock
amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition,
the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided
the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate
children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions
to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate
children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.

Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is
evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor. 1

After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on
April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account,
report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied
the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.

Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11,
1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply —
Texas law or Philippine law.

In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied
by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually
pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present
case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the
time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the
domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference
back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts
rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where
the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the
Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be
presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi.
As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their
case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article
16 of the Civil Code.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent,
in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b)
the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the
capacity to succeed. They provide that —

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that —

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws
 or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.

prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct.
Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next
preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil
Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil
Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16
a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further
indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees
that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of
legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For
it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's
national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas
estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to
govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a
separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil.
867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law
cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code
states said national law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and
that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under
Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So
ordered.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-3693 July 29, 1950

MARGARET QUERUBIN, recurrente-apelante, vs. SILVESTRE

QUERUBIN,recurrido-apelado.

Manuel A. Argel en representacion del recurrente y apelante.

Maximino V. Bello en representacion del recurrido y apelado.

PABLO, J.:

Silvestre Querubin es de Caoayan, Ilocos Sur, de padres filipinos. En

1926 se marcho a los Estados Unidos con el objeto de estudiar pero
con el proposito de volver despues a su pais natal. Obtuvo el titulo
de "Master of Arts and Sciences" en la "University of Southern
California," institucion domiciliada en los Angeles, California, en
donde el recurrido empezo a vivir desde 1934. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

En 20 de octubre de 1943, Silvestre Querubin contrajo matrimonio

con la recurrente, Margaret Querubin, en Albuquerque, New Mexico.
Como fruto de este matrimonio nacio Querubina Querubin, quien, al
tiempo de la vista de la causa en el Juzgado de primera instancia de
Ilocos Sur, tenia cuatro a�os de edad poco mas o menos. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

La recurrente entablo en 1948 una demanda de divorcio contra el

recurrido, fundada en "crueldad mental." En 7 de febrero de 1948 el
divorcio fue concedido al marido en virtud de una contrademanda
presentada por el y fundada en la infidelidad de su esposa. En 5 de
abril de 1949, y a peticion del demandado y contrademandante,
(recurrido enesta actuacion de habeas corpus) el Juzgado superior
de Los Angeles dicto una orden interlocutoria disponiendo lo
siguiente:

It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that the interlocutory

judgment of divorce hereinbefore entered on February 27, 1948, in
Book 1891, page 319, be and the same is hereby modified in the
following particulars in connection with the custody of the minor
child of the parties only: chanrobles virtual law library

(1) The care, custody and control of the minor child of the parties,
Querubina Querubin, is hereby awarded to defendant and cross-
complainants; chanrobles virtual law library

(2) Said child is to be maintained in a neutral home, subject to the

right of reasonable visitation on the part of both parties to this
action;chanrobles virtual law library

(3) Each party shall have the right to take said child away from said
neutral home but plaintiff and cross-defendant is restrained from
taking said child to her place of residence; chanrobles virtual law library
(4) Each party is restrained from molesting the other, or in any way
interfering with the other's right of reasonable visitation of said
child;
chanrobles virtual law library

(5) Each party is restrained from removing the child from the State
of California without first securing the permission of the court; said
parties are further restrained from keeping the child out of the
County of Los Angeles for more than one day without first securing
the consent of the court.

El recurrido salio de San Francisco en 7 de noviembre de 1949,

arribando a Manila en 25 del mismo mes. En 27 de susodicho mes
llego a Caoayan, Ilocos Sur, donde vive actualmente, llevandose
consigo a la ni�a Querubina, a quien trajo a Filipinas porque, en su
calidad de padre, queria evitar que llegase a conocimiento de ella la
conducta indecorosa de su propia madre. El recurrido queria que su
hija fuera educada en un ambiente de elevada moralidad. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

A peticion de la recurrente Margaret, el Juzgado superior de los

Angeles, California, en 30 de noviembre de 1949 modifico su orden
de 5 de abril de 1949, disponiendo lo siguiente:

Under interlocutory decree of March 7, 1949, the child, a girl now 3

1/2 years old, was granted to deft husband, but the child was to be
kept in a neutral home; both parties were given reasonable
visitation and both were restrained from removing the child out of
the state. Deft has taken the child with him to the Philippine
Islands. At time of trial custody was apparently denied pft because
she was then living with another man. She is now married to this
man and they have a well equipped home. Ptf appears to be a
devoted mother. She has one child, the issue of her present
marriage, and is also caring for a child that was abandoned by
certain friends of hers. Ptf's husband is regularly and permanently
employed. Witnesses testified in behalf of the ptf in reference to her
motherly qualities and the condition of her home. She visited the
child in question sufficiently when the child was in the neutral home
and brought her toys and other articles. Service of the order to
show cause was made on deft's attorneys of record. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The interlocutory decree is modified so as to provide that custody of
the child shall be awarded to ptf and deft shall have the right of
reasonable visitation. Deft shall pay ptf for the support of the child
$30 each month on the 1st day thereof, commencing Jan. 1950.

En el dia de la vista de esta causa de habeas corpus en Ilocos Sur,

el recurrido declaro que nunca intento cambiar su ciudadania; que
cuando vino al pais tenia unos P2,000 de ahorro; que tres semanas
despues de su arribo recibio oferta para ense�ar con sueldo P250
mensual en el colegio establecido por el Dr. Sobrepe�a en Villasis,
Pangasinan; que nunca se le ha privado de patria potestad por
sentencia judicial, ni declarado ausente de Filipinas, ni sujeto a
interdiccion civil. Segun el juzgado a quo, el recurrido es de
irreprochable conducta. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

En 10 de febrero de 1950 la recurrente Margaret Querubin, por

medio de su abogado, presento en el Juzgado de primera instancia
de Ilocos Sur una solicitud de habeas corpus reclamando la custodia
de su hija Querubina, alegando como fundamento el decreto
interlocutorio del juzgado de California que concedio a ella dicha
custodia. Despues de la vista correspondiente, el Juzgado a quo, en
28 de febrero de 1950 denego la solicitud. La recurrente acude en
apelacion ante este Tribunal. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

La recurrente sostiene que bajo el articulo 48 de la Regla 39, el

decreto Exhibit A-1 del Juzgado de los Angeles, California, debe
cumplirse en Filipinas. Su parte dispositiva dice textualmente:

The interlocutory decree is modified so as to the provide that

custody of the child shall be awarded to ptf and deft shall have the
right to reasonable visitation. Deft shall pay ptf for the support of
the child $30 each month on the 1st day thereof, commencing Jan.
1950.

Un decreto interlocutorio sobre la custodia de un menor no es una

decision final. Por su naturaleza no es firme. Esta sujeto a cambios
como cambian las circunstancias. En el primer decreto se dio al
padre la custodia de la menor. A peticion del padre, se dicto el
decreto de 5 de abril prohibiendo a la madre que llavase a la menos
a su casa porque estaba otra vez en relaciones adulterinas con otro
hombre. Cuando ya no estaba el recurrido en Los Angeles, porque
ya habian venido a Filipinas, se enmendo la ultima orden y se
dispuso que la custodia estuviese encomendada a la recurrente,
pagando a ella el recurrido $30 al mes para la manutencion de la
menor. La pension no es fija y se aumenta o disminuye como
aumentan o disminuyen las necesidades del pensionista o como
exijan las condiciones economicasdel que la da. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Porque el decreto interlocutorio, Exhibit A-1, no constituye decision

final, no cabe pedir su cumplimiento en Filipinas. En los mismos
Estados Unidos no puede pedirse el cumplimiento de una orden
interlocutoria en el juzgado de otro estado.

The rule is of common knowledge that the definitive judgment of a

court of another state between the same parties on the same cause
of action, on the merits of the case is conclusive, but it must be a
definitive judgment on the merits only. Where the judgment is
merely interlocutory, the determination of the question by the court
which rendered it did not settle and adjudge finally the rights of the
parties." (National Park Bank vs. Old Colony Trust Co., 186 N.Y.S.,
717.)chanrobles virtual law library

As already stated the Minnesota decree, to the extent that it is final

and not subject to modification, is entitled to the protection of the
full faith and credit clause of the federal Constitution and must be
enforced in this state. If, however, a part of the Minnesota decree in
not final, but is subject to modification by the court which rendered
it, then neither the United States Constitution nor the principle of
comity compels the courts of this state to enforce that part of the
decree; for no court other than the one granting the original decree
could undertake to administer relief without bringing about a conflict
of authority. (Levine vs. Levine, 187 Pac., 609.) chanrobles virtual law library

A judgment rendered by a competent court, having jurisdiction in

one state, is conclusive on the merits in the courts of every other
state, when made the basis of an action and the merits cannot be
reinvestigated. Our own Supreme Court so holds.
Cook vs. Thornhill, 13 Tex. 293, 65 Am. Dec. 63. But before such a
judgment rendered in one state is entitled to acceptance, in the
courts of another state, as conclusive on the merits, it must be a
final judgment and not merely an interlocutory decree. Freeman on
Judgment, Sec. 575; Baugh vs. Baugh, 4 Bibb (7 Ky.) 556;
Brinkley vs. Brinkley, 50 N.Y. 184, 10 Am. Rep. 460;
Griggs, vs. Becker, 87 Wis. 313, 58 N.W. 396. (Walker vs. Garland
et al., 235 S.W., 1078.)

En general, un decreto de divorcio encomendando la custodia de un

hijo del matrimonio a uno de los conyuges se respeta por los
juzgados de otros estados "at the time and under the circumstances
of its rendition but that such a decree has no controlling effects in
another state as to facts or conditions arising subsequently to the
date of the decree; and the courts of the latter state may, in proper
proceedings, award the custody otherwise upon proof of matters
subsequent to the decree which justify the change in the interest of
the child." (20 A.L.R., 815.) chanrobles virtual law library

En el caso presente las circunstancias han cambiado. Querubina ya

no esta en los Angeles sino en Caoayan, Ilocos Sur. Esta bajo el
cuidado de su padre. Hay una distancia enorme desde Los Angeles y
el presente domicilio de la menor y el costo del pasaje hasta aquella
ciudad seria muy elevado, y aun es posible que este fuera del
alcance de la recurrente. No hay pruebas de que ella esta en
condiciones de pagar los gastos de viaje de la menor y del que la
acompa�e. Ella no es un paquete de cigarrillos que se puede enviar
por correo a Los Angeles. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

No consta que las circunstancias que se daban en noviembre de

1949 en Los Angeles, prevalecian en el mismo estado hasta el
momento en que se vio la causa en el Juzgado de primera instancia
de Ilocos Sur. Tampoco hay pruebas de que la recurrente dispone
de suficientes fondos para costear el viaje de la ni�a Querubina
desde Caoayan, Ilocos Sur, hasta Los Angeles, California, y para
responder de su alimentacion, cuidado y educacion, y constando en
autos que el padre, mas que nadie, esta interesado en el cuidado y
educacion de su hija, y que tiene ahorros de mas de P2,000
depositados en un banco, creemos que el Juzgado a quo no erro al
denegar la solicitud.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

El Juzgado no podia, sin prueba satisfactoria, disponer sin

remordimiento de conciencia la entrega de la ni�a al abogado de la
recurrente: es su obligacion velar por la seguridad y bienestar de
ella. No se trata solo de resolver el derecho preferente del padre y
de la madre en la custodia. La vital y trascendental cuestion del
porvenir de la ni�a es superior a toda consideracion. El Estado vela
por sus ciudadanos. El articulo 171 del Codigo Civil dispone que "Los
Tribunales podran privar a los padres de la patria potestad, o
suspender el ejercicio de esta, si trataren a sus hijos con dureza
excesiva, o si les dieren ordenes, consejos o ejemplos corrutores."
En Cortes contra Castillo y otra (41 Jur. Fil., 495), este Tribunal
declaro que no erro el Juzgado de primera instancia al nombrar a la
abuela, como tutora de dos menores, en vez de su madre que fue
condenada por adulterio. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

El articulo 154 del Codigo Civil dispone que "El padre, y en su

defecto la madre, tienen potestad sobre sus hijos legitimos no
emancipados." Con todo, si se hace indebido ejercicio de esta
facultad, los tribunales, como ya hemos dicho, pueden privarie de
ella y encomendar el cuidadano del menor a otras instituciones,
como dispone el articulo 6 de la Regla 100, que es reproduccion del
articulo 771 de la Ley No. 190. En el asunto de Lozano contra
Martinez y De Vega (36 Jur. Fil., 1040), en que el primero, en un
recurso de habeas corpus, reclamaba contra su esposa la custodia
de su hijo menor de 10 a�os, este Tribunal, en apelacion, declaro
que el juzgado a quo no abuso de la discrecion conferida a el por el
articulo 771 del Codigo de procedimiento civil al denegar la
solicitud. Esta interpretacion del articulo en cuanto al debido
ejercicio de la discrecion de un Juzgado de primera instancia ha sido
reafirmada en el asunto de Pelayo contra Lavin (40 Jur. Fil.,
529).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

En la solicitud presentada, no hay siquiera alegacion de que el

juzgado a quohaya abusado de su discrecion. Este Tribunal no debe
revocar su actuacion. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

En la vista de la causa en el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Ilocos

Sur, el recurrido declaro que habia traido su hija a Filipinas porque
queria evitar que ella tuviera conocimiento de la conducta impropia
y de la infidelidad cometida por la madre, impidiendo que la viese
convivir con el hombre que habia ofendido a su padre. El recurrido
dijo que queria que su hija se criase en un ambiente de elevada
moral, y que no se sancionara indirectamente la infidelidad de la
esposa. Bajo la Ley de Divorcio No. 2710, el conyuge culpable no
tiene derecho a la custodia de los hijos menores. La legislacion
vigente, las buenas costumbres y los interesesdel orden publico
aconsejan que la ni�a debe estar fuera del cuidado de una madre
que ha violado el juramento de fidelidad a su marido. Creemos que
este Tribunal no debe hacer cumplir un decreto dictado por un
tribunal extranjero, que contraviene nuestras leyes y los sanos
principios de moralidad que informan nuestra estructura social
sobre relaciones familiares. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

En el asunto de Manuela Barretto Gonzales contra Augusto

Gonzales (58 Jur. Fil., 72), se pidio por la demandante que el
divorcio obtenido por el demandado en Reno, Nevada, en 28 de
noviembre de 1927, fuera confirmado y ratificado por el Juzgado de
primera instancia de Manila. Este juzgado dicto sentencia a tenor de
la peticion. Teniendo en cuenta el articulo 9 del Codigo civil que
dispone que "Las leyes relativas a los derechos y deberes de familia,
o al estado, condicion y capacidad legal de las personas, obligan a
los espanoles (filipinos) aunque residan en pais extranjero" y el
articulo 11 del mismo codigo que dice en parte qye ". . . las leyes
prohibitivas concernientes a las personas, sus actos o sus bienes, y
las que tienen por objeto el orden publico y las buenas costumbres,
no quedaran sin efecto por leyes o sentencias dictadas, ni por
disposiciones o convenciones acordades en pais extranjero," este
Tribunal, en apelacion, declaro: "Los litigantes, mediante convenio
mutuo, no pueden obligar a los tribunales a que aprueben sus
propios actos, ni que permitan que las relaciones personales de los
ciudadanos de estas Islas queden afectadas por decretos de paises
extranjeros en una forma que nuestro Gobierno cree que es
contraria al orden publico y a la recta moral," y revoco la decision
del juzgado inferior.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Las sentencias de tribunales extranjeros no pueden properse en

vigor en Filipinas si son contrarias a la leyes, costumbres y orden
publico. Si dichas decisiones, por la simple teoria de reciprocidad,
cortesia judicial y urbanidad internacional son base suficiente para
que nuestros tribunales decidan a tenor de las mismas, entonces
nuestros juzgados estarian en la pobre tesitura de tener que dictar
sentencias contrarias a nuestras leyes, costumbres y orden publico.
Esto es absurdo. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

En Ingenohl contra Olsen & Co. (47 Jur. Fil., 199), se discutio el
alcanse de la cortesia internacional. El articulo 311 del Codigo de
Procedimiento Civil que es hoy el articulo 48, Regla 39, fue la base
de la accion presentada por Ingenohl. Pidio en su demanda que el
Juzgado de primera instancia de Manila dictase sentencia de
acuerdo con la dictada por el Tribunal Supremo de Hongkong.
Despues de la vista correspondiente, el juzgado dicto sentencia a
favor del demandante con intereses legales y costas. En apelacion,
se alego que el juzgado inferior erro al no declarar que la decision y
sentencia del Tribunal Supremo de Hongkong se dicto y registro
como resultado de un error manifiesto de hecho y de derecho. Este
Tribunal declaro que "Es principio bien sentado que, a falta de un
tratado o ley, y en virtud de la cortesia y del derecho internacional,
una sentencia dictada por un tribunal de jurisdiccion competente de
un pais extranjero, en el que las partes han comparecido y discutido
un asunto en el fondo, sera reconocido y puesta en vigor en
cualquier otro pais extranjero." Pero teniendo en cuenta el articulo
311 del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil que dispone que "la sentencia
puede ser rechazada mediante prueba de falta de competencia, o de
haber sido dictada sin la previa notificacion a la parte, o que hubo
connivencia, fraude o error manifiesto de derecho o de hecho,"
concluyo: "En virtud de esa Ley cuando una persona trata de hacer
cumplir una sentencia extranjera, el demandado tiene derecho a
ejercitar cualquier defensa de esas, y si se llegara a demostrar que
existe propiamente alguna de ellas, destruira los efectos de la
sentencia." Revoco la decision del juzgado inferior y declaro y fallo
que "la sentencia dictada por el Tribunal de Hongkong, contra la
demandada, constituyo un error manifesto de hecho y de derecho,
y, por tal razon, no debe exigirse su cumplimiento en las Islas
Filipinas."
chanrobles virtual law library

Si se concede la solicitud, la menor estaria bajo el cuidadode su

madre que fued declarada judicialmente culpable de infidelidad
conyugal; viviria bajo un techo juntamente con el hombre que
deshonro a su madre y ofendio a su padre; jugaria y creceria con el
fruto del amor adulterino de su madre; llegaria a la pubertad con la
idea de que una mujer que fue infiel a su marido tiene derecho a
custodiar a su hija. En semejante medio ambiente no puede criarse
a una ni�a de una manera adecuada: si llegara a saber durante su
adolescencia que su padre ha sido traicionado por su madre con el
hombre con quien vive, esa ni�a viviria bajo una impresion de
inferioridad moral de incalculables consecuencias, y por ello nunca
seria feliz; y si, bajo la influencia de su madre, llegara a creer que la
infidelidad de una esposa es solo un incidente tan pasajero como
cambiar de tocado, la ni�a iria por el camino de la perdicion. Y la
educacion moral que puede darle su padrasto dificilmente puede ser
mejor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Si se deniega la solicitud, la ni�a viviria con su padre con el

beneficio de un cuidado paternal exclusivo, y no con la dividida
atencion de una madre que tiene que atender a su esposo, a sus
dos hijas y a una tercera ni�a, la protegida. Para el bienestar de la
menor Querubina, que es lo que mas importa en el caso presente,
su custodia por el padre debe considerarse preferente. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

En los mismos Estados Unidos, el punto cardinal que tienen en

cuenta los juzgados, no es la reclamacion de las partes o la fuerza
del decreto interlocutorio, sino el bienestar del menor.

A consideration of all the facts and circumstances leads to the

conclusion that comity does not require the courts of this state,
regardless of the well-being of the child, to lend their aid to the
enforcement of the Iowa decree by returning Winifred to the
custody of her grandmother. A child is not a chattel to which title
and the right of possession may be secured by the decree of any
court. If the decree had been rendered by a domestic court of
competent jurisdiction, it would not have conclusively established
the right to the custody of the child. In a contest between rival
claimants, this court would have been free, notwithstanding the
decree, to award the custody solely with an eye to the child's
welfare. (State ex rel.Aldridge vs. Aldridge, 204 N.W. 324.) chanrobles virtual law library

On habeas corpus by the mother to obtain possession from the

father of two children aged four and six years, whose custody she
alleged had been awarded her in divorce proceedings in another
state, it appeared that the mother was without property, and had no
means of support save her personal earnings of $15 per month, was
in poor health, and lived with her mother, in immoral surroundings,
and that the father was an industrious and sober man, earnings
$100 per month. Held, that the welfare of the children was the only
thing to be considered, and a judgment awarding their custody to
the mother should be reversed. (Kentzler vs. Kentzler, 28 Pac.,
370.)

La recurrente, como ultimo recurso, invoca la comity of nations. La

reciprocidad, la cortesia entre naciones no es absoluta. Rige cuando
hay tratado y hay igualdad de legislacion. Se adopta la doctrina de
reciprocidad cuando el tribunal extranjero tiene jurisdiccion para
conocer de la causa, las partes han comparecido y discutido el
asunto en el fondo. Algunas veces se concede como privilegio pero
no como estricto derecho. La cortesia pedida no ha sido reconocida
por este Tribunal cuando declaro que los derechos y deberes de
familia, estado, condicion y capacidad legal de las personas se rigen
por las leyes de Filipinas y no por las de America
(Gonzales contraGonzales, supra) y no dio validez a la decision del
Tribunal Supremo de Hongkong porque era erronea en sus
conclusiones de hecho y de derecho (Ingenohl contra Olsen y
Co., supra).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

La reciprocidad entre los estados de la Union Americana no es

absoluta. No es regla inquebrantable. Los varios casos citados mas
arriba lo demuestran. He ahi otro caso:

On the question of comity, this court said in the habeas corpus case
of In re Stockman, 71 Mich. 180, 38 N.W. 876: chanrobles virtual law library

"Comity cannot be considered in a case like this, when the future

welfare of the child is the vital question in the case. The good of the
child is superior to all other considerations. It is the polar star to
guide to the conclusion in all cases of infants, whether the question
is raised upon a writ of habeas corpus or in a court of chancery."
(Ex parte Leu, 215 N.W., 384.)

Ya hemos visto que la orden interlocutoria cediendo la custodia de

la menor a la recurrente esta en pugna con las disposiciones
expresas de la legislacion vigente en Filipinas. En el primer decreto
y en el enmendatorio se encomendo la custodia de la menor al
padre y se prohibio, en la orden enmendada, a la madre llevar a la
menor a su casa porque estaba otra vez en relaciones ilegales con
otro hombre. Pero el ultimo decreto enmendatorio, contrario al
sentido de justicia, a la ley, y a las buenas costumbres, encomendo
la custodia de la menor a la que fue esposa infiel porque ya estaba
casada con quien cometio adulterio. Y bajo la doctrina de la comity
of nations, la recurrente contiende que debe cumplirse en Filipinas
ese decreto. Opinamos que por las varias razones arriba expuestas,
la pretension es insostenible. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Se confirma la sentencia apelada. La recurrente pagara las cost

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-1606 May 28, 1949

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF YEE BO MANN FOR

PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. YEE BO MANN, petitioner-appellee,
vs. THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor

Florencio Villamor for appellant.
H.S. Hermosisima for appellee.

REYES, J.:

This is petition for naturalization. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner Yee Bo Mann was born in Canton, China, in 1898, of

Chinese parents, who at an earlier date had become naturalized
citizens of the United States. In 1915 he immigrated to the
Philippines and located in the City of Cebu, where he has resided
continuosly since then. Studying in the public schools there and
completing the primary and secondary courses, including a four-
year commercial course, he became a licensed public accountant in
1925 and has since then engaged in the practice of that profession
in addition to being a general merchant and purchasing agent. In
1922 he married Helen Leu, an American citizen born in Hawaii, and
with her came to have two children, Nellie and Philip, born in 1924
and 1933, respectively. Nellie took her primary course partly in
Hongkong and partly in Cebu and was at the time of the trial a high
school.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner believes in the principles underlying the Philippine

Constitution and can speak and write English and the Cebu Visayan
dialect. He is not a polygamist and has never been convicted of any
crime involving moral turpitude. He has a sister who is married to a
Filipino, Atty. Manuel Veloso, and he has no more relatives in China.
Asked why he wanted to become a Filipino citizen, he answered: "I
have been here so long, I was educated here, I have so many
Filipino friends and I love them and they love me too." He says he
has already decided to spend the rest of his life in the
Philippines. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The Court of First Instance of Cebu granted the petition, and the
case is now here on appeal by the Government on the ground that
petitioner has failed to declare his intention to become a Filipino
citizen one year before the filing of his petition to prove at the trial
that the laws of China permit Filipinos to naturalize in that
country. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

As to the first ground, section 5 of the Revised Naturalization to

declare his intention to become a Filipino citizen one year before the
application. But section 6 of the same law exempts from that
requirement, among others, those who have resided continuously in
the Philippines for 30 years or more before the filing of their
application, provided "that the applicant has given primary and
secondary education to all his children in the public schools or in
private schools recognized by the Government and not limited to
any race or nationality." The Solicitor General construes this proviso
as requiring completion of both primary and secondary education by
all the children of the applicant. This court, however, has already
held in other cases, among them that of Rafael Roa Yrostorza vs.
Republic of the Philippines, 1 G.R. No. L-1394, that enrollment in the
proper school is sufficient compliance with the law. Petitioner's case
comes within this ruling, since his children are actually studying in
school albeit they have not yet finished secondary education. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
As to the other ground of appeal, it appears that petitioner has
presented in evidence a translation of the Chinese naturalization law
certified to be correct by the Chinese Consulate General in Manila.
The admissibility not conform to section 41, Rule 123 of the Rule of
Court. The objection is of no moment, since this Court has already
accepted it as a fact in previous naturalization cases that the laws
China permit Filipinos to naturalize in that country. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is affirmed,

without special pronouncement as to costs. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library