Norse Management Co.

vs National Seamen Board

Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case
cited. Xie xie!

NORSE MANAGEMENT CO. (PTE) and PACIFIC SEAMEN SERVICES, INC., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD, HON. CRESCENCIO M. SIDDAYAO, OSCAR M. TORRES, REBENE C.
CARRERA and RESTITUTA C. ABORDO, respondents.

Facts:

Napoleon B. Abordo, the deceased husband of private respondent Restituta C. Abordo, was
the Second Engineer of M.T. "Cherry Earl" when he died from an apoplectic stroke in the
course of his employment with petitioner NORSE MANAGEMENT COMPANY (PTE). The M.T.
"Cherry Earl" is a vessel of Singaporean Registry. In her complaint for compensation benefits
filed before the National Seamen Board, private respondent alleged that the amount of
compensation due her from petitioners should be based on the law where the vessel is
registered. Petitioners contend that the law of Singapore should not be applied in this case
because the National Seamen Board cannot take judicial notice of the Workmen's Insurance
Law of Singapore instead must be based on Board’s Memeorandum Circular No. 25. Ministry
of Labor and Employment ordered the petitioner to pay jointly and severally the private
respondent. Petitioner appealed to the Ministry of Labor but same decision. Hence, this
petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the law of Singapore ought to be applied in this case.

Held:

The SC denied the petition. It has always been the policy of this Board, as enunciated in a long
line of cases, that in cases of valid claims for benefits on account of injury or death while in
the course of employment, the law of the country in which the vessel is registered shall be
considered. In Section 5(B) of the Employment Agreement between petitioner and
respondent’s husband states that In the event of illness or injury to Employee arising out of
and in the course of his employment and not due to his own willful misconduct, EMPLOYER will
provide employee with free medical attention. If such illness or injury incapacitates the
EMPLOYEE to the extent the EMPLOYEE's services must be terminated as determined by a
qualified physician designated by the EMPLOYER and provided such illness or injury was not
due in part or whole to his willful act, neglect or misconduct compensation shall be paid to
employee in accordance with and subject to the limitations of the Workmen's Compensation
Act of the Republic of the Philippines or the Workmen's Insurance Law of registry of the vessel
whichever is greater. Finally, Article IV of the Labor Code provides that "all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this code, including its implementing
rules and resolved in favor of labor.

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS,

297 SCRA 4691998FACTS:Herein private respondent Milagros P. Morada is a flight attendant
for petitioner SAUDIA airlines, where the former was tried to be raped by Thamer and Allah
AlGazzawi, both Sauidi nationals and fellow crew member, after a night of dancing in their
hotel while in Jakarta, Indonesia. She was rescued. After twoweeks of detention the accused
were both deported to Saudi and they werereinstated by Saudia. She was pressured by police
officers to make a statementand to drop the case against the accused; in return she will then
be allowed toreturn to Manila and retrieved her passport. For the second time, she was
askedby her superiors to again appear before the Saudi court. Without her knowledge, she
was already tried by Saudi court together with the accused andwas sentenced to five months
imprisonment and to 286 lashes in connection withJakarta rape incident. The court found her
guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to adisco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of
Islamic laws; and (3)socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic
tradition.ISSUE/S:WHETHER OR NOT the QC Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction tohear and try
the civil case based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code or theKingdom of Saudi Arabia court
though there is the existence of foreign element.RULING:The forms in which a foreign element
may appear are many, such as the fact thatone party is a resident Philippine national, and
that the other is a resident foreigncorporation. The forms in which this foreign element may
appear are many. Theforeign element may simply consist in the fact that one of the parties to
a contractis an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract between nationals of
oneState involves properties situated in another State. In other cases, the foreignelement
may assume a complex form. In the instant case, the foreign elementconsisted in the fact that
private respondent Morada is a resident Philippinenational, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a
resident foreign corporation. Also, byvirtue of the employment of Morada with the petitioner
SAUDIA as a flightstewardess, events did transpire during her many occasions of travel
acrossnational borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia,and vice
versa, that caused a “conflicts” situation to arise.The forms in which a foreign element may
appear are many, such as the fact thatone party is a resident Philippine national, and that the
other is a resident foreigncorporation. The forms in which this foreign element may appear are
many. Theforeign element may simply consist in the fact that one of the parties to a contractis
an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract between nationals of one State involves
properties situated in another State. In other cases, the foreignelement may assume a
complex form. In the instant case, the foreign elementconsisted in the fact that private
respondent Morada is a resident Philippinenational, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident
foreign corporation. Also, byvirtue of the employment of Morada with the petitioner SAUDIA as
a flightstewardess, events did transpire during her many occasions of travel acrossnational
borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia,and vice versa, that
caused a “conflicts” situation to arise.Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish
the existence of a foreignelement, the problem could present a “conflicts” case. Where the
factualantecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign element, we agreewith
petitioner that the problem herein could present a “conflicts” case. A factualsituation that cuts
across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two or more states is said to
contain a “foreign element.” The presence of aforeign element is inevitable since social and
economic affairs of individuals andassociations are rarely confined to the geographic limits of
their birth or conception.

Seagull Shipmanagement and Transport, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
and Tuazon
333 SCRA 236, GR No. 123619, June 8, 2000

FACTS:

On March 17, 1991, petitioner deployed respondent Benjamin T. Tuazon, (now deceased and
represented by his daughter in the instant case) to work as radio officer on board its vessel,
MV Pixy Maru for a period of 12 months. Prior to his deployment and as a condition to final
hiring, Benjamin was required to submit to a medical examination with the petitioner's
accredited clinic, the LDM Clinic and Laboratory. The medical examination consisted among
others, of the standard X-ray exposure, and urine tests. In 1986, complainant underwent a
heart surgery for an insertion of a pacemaker, so petitioner’s accredited clinic required
Benjamin to secure from his cardiologist a certification to the effect that he could do normal
physical activities. Consequently, he was declared fit to work. While on board the vessel,
however, Benjamin suffered bouts of coughing and shortness of breathing. He was
immediately sent and confined to a hospital in Japan from December 12 to 27, 1991. Due to
the medical findings that an open heart surgery was needed, he was repatriated back in the
Philippines on December 28, 1991. Upon arrival, Seagull referred him to its accredited
physician and an open-heart surgery was performed, with Benjamin shouldering all the costs
and expenses. He later filed a complaint asking for sickness and disability benefits with the
POEA.

The POEA rendered a decision in favor of respondent Benjamin Tuazon and ordered herein
petitioners to pay US$2,200 representing 120 days sickness benefits, and the amount of
US$15,000.00 representing the permanent disability benefits provided for under Appendix "A"
of the POEA Standard Contract. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the POEA’s judgment, finding
that it was sufficiently established that herein petitioners’ physician already knew, as early as
June 1989, of the existence of complainant's pacemaker, the main reason why they asked him
to submit a medical certificate to the effect that he could do normal physical activities.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is entitled to sickness benefits and permanent disability benefits

COURT RULING:

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the ground there is no merit in petitioners'
suggestion that private respondent did not make a full disclosure of his medical history
because the records reveal that private respondent was deployed by petitioners twice
already, the first one being in 1989 and the second one being in 1991.

Under the employment contract, compensability of the illness or death of seamen need not
depend on whether the illness was work connected or not. It is sufficient that the illness
occurred during the term of the employment contract.

It is not necessary, in order to recover compensation, that the employees must have been in
perfect health at the time he contracted the disease. If the disease is the proximate cause of
the employee's death for which compensation is sought, the previous physical condition of the
employee is unimportant, and recovery may be had for said death, independently of any pre-
existing disease.

Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and Inductivo
318 SCRA 623, GR No. 130772, November 19, 1999

FACTS:

Petitioner employed private respondent’s husband, Faustino Inductivo, as utilityman for MT

Rowan, for a period of ten months. Faustino underwent pre-employment medical examination
and his employer's doctors found him physically fit for work, so he boarded the vessel on May
13, 1993, Barely two months before the expiration of his employment contract, or on January
1994, he was discharged from the vessel, under a "mutual consent, on completion of 8
months and 5 days." On January 19, 1994, Faustino was hospitalized after complaining of
occasional coughing and chest pains. After a series of transfers from one hospital to another,
Faustino was brought to the Makati Medical Center where the doctor found that his disease
was already in its advanced stage. Faustino succumbed to his illness on April 23, 1994 and the
autopsy report showed as cause of death disseminated intravascular coagulations,
septecalmia, pulmonary congestion and multiple intestinal obstruction secondary to multiple
adhesions.

Before Faustino death, or sometime in February 1994, respondent Elizabeth Inductivo went to
petitioners to claim the balance of her husband’s leave wages. Petitioners said, however, that
her husband was not entitled to sickness benefits because he was not sick at the time he was
"offsigned" from the vessel; he was "offsigned" from the vessel on "mutual consent" and not
on medical grounds; and since he failed to advise or notify petitioners in writing within
seventy-two hours of his alleged sickness, his right to claim sickness benefits was deemed
forfeited. Respondent Elizabeth filed a compliant against petitioners for the payment of
sickness and insurance benefits, which was amended to include death benefits after Faustino
died. The Labor Arbiter ordered petitioners to pay the complainant, for herself and in her
capacity as guardian of her two minor children. On appeal, the NLRC sustained the Labor
Arbiter, and the motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent is entitled to death benefits

COURT RULING:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, giving credence to the finding of the NLRC that the
illness was contracted during the Faustino's employment on board MT Rowan.

The POEA standard employment contract is designed primarily for the protection and benefit
of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going vessels. Its
provisions must, therefore, be construed and applied fairly, reasonably and liberally in favor or
for the benefit of the seamen and their dependents.

Medical opinions of an employer’s doctor which are palpably self-serving and biased in favor
of the employer cannot prevail over the entries in the Death Certificate and Autopsy Report.

It is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or
acceleration of the illness to entitle the claimant to the benefits provided therefore. It is
enough that the employment had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of
the disease and in bringing about his death.