MIT18 440S14 Lecture4 PDF
MIT18 440S14 Lecture4 PDF
440: Lecture 4
Axioms of probability and
inclusion-exclusion
Scott Sheffield
MIT
18.440 Lecture 4
1
Outline
Axioms of probability
Consequences of axioms
Inclusion exclusion
18.440 Lecture 4
2
Outline
Axioms of probability
Consequences of axioms
Inclusion exclusion
18.440 Lecture 4
3
Axioms of probability
18.440 Lecture 4
4
�
I Neurological: When I think “it will rain tomorrow” the
“truth-sensing” part of my brain exhibits 30 percent of its
maximum electrical activity.
�
I Frequentist: P(A) is the fraction of times A occurred during
the previous (large number of) times we ran the experiment.
�
I Market preference (“risk neutral probability”): P(A) is
price of contract paying dollar if A occurs divided by price of
contract paying dollar regardless.
�
I Personal belief: P(A) is amount such that I’d be indifferent
between contract paying 1 if A occurs and contract paying
P(A) no matter what.
18.440 Lecture 4
5
Axiom breakdown
�
I What if personal belief function doesn’t satisfy axioms?
I
� Consider an A-contract (pays 10 if candidate A wins election)
a B-contract (pays 10 dollars if candidate B wins) and an
A-or-B contract (pays 10 if either A or B wins).
I
� Friend: “I’d say A-contract is worth 1 dollar, B-contract is
worth 1 dollar, A-or-B contract is worth 7 dollars.”
I
� Amateur response: “Dude, that is, like, so messed up.
Haven’t you heard of the axioms of probability?”
I
� Professional response: “I fully understand and respect your
opinions. In fact, let’s do some business. You sell me an A
contract and a B contract for 1.50 each, and I sell you an
A-or-B contract for 6.50.”
I
� Friend: “Wow... you’ve beat by suggested price by 50 cents
on each deal. Yes, sure! You’re a great friend!”
I
� Axioms breakdowns are money-making opportunities.
18.440 Lecture 4 6
�
I Neurological: When I think “it will rain tomorrow” the
“truth-sensing” part of my brain exhibits 30 percent of its
maximum electrical activity. Should have P(A) ∈ [0, 1],
maybe P(S) = 1, not necessarily P(A ∪ B) = P(A) + P(B)
when A ∩ B = ∅.
�
I Frequentist: P(A) is the fraction of times A occurred during
the previous (large number of) times we ran the experiment.
Seems to satisfy axioms...
�
I Market preference (“risk neutral probability”): P(A) is
price of contract paying dollar if A occurs divided by price of
contract paying dollar regardless. Seems to satisfy axioms,
assuming no arbitrage, no bid-ask spread, complete market...
�
I Personal belief: P(A) is amount such that I’d be indifferent
between contract paying 1 if A occurs and contract paying
P(A) no matter what. Seems to satisfy axioms with some
notion of utility units, strong assumption of “rationality”...
18.440 Lecture 4
7
Outline
Axioms of probability
Consequences of axioms
Inclusion exclusion
18.440 Lecture 4
8
Outline
Axioms of probability
Consequences of axioms
Inclusion exclusion
18.440 Lecture 4
9
Intersection notation
�
I We will sometimes write AB to denote the event A ∩ B.
18.440 Lecture 4
10
Consequences of axioms
�
I Can we show from the axioms that P(Ac ) = 1 − P(A)?
�
I Can we show from the axioms that if A ⊂ B then
P(A) ≤ P(B)?
�
I Can we show from the axioms that
�
I Can we show from the axioms that P(AB) ≤ P(A)?
�
I Can we show from the axioms that if S contains finitely many
18.440 Lecture 4
11
Famous 1982 Tversky-Kahneman study (see wikipedia)
�
I People are told “Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and
very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was
deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social
justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.”
�
I They are asked: Which is more probable?
� Linda is a bank teller.
� Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.
�
I 85 percent chose the second option.
�
I Could be correct using neurological/emotional definition. Or a
“which story would you believe” interpretation (if witnesses
offering more details are considered more credible).
�
I But axioms of probability imply that second option cannot be
more likely than first.
18.440 Lecture 4
12
Outline
Axioms of probability
Consequences of axioms
Inclusion exclusion
18.440 Lecture 4
13
Outline
Axioms of probability
Consequences of axioms
Inclusion exclusion
18.440 Lecture 4
14
Inclusion-exclusion identity
�
I Imagine we have n events, E1 , E2 , . . . , En .
�
I How do we go about computing something like
P(E1 ∪ E2 ∪ . . . ∪ En )?
�
I It may be quite difficult, depending on the application.
�
I There are some situations in which computing
P(E1 ∪ E2 ∪ . . . ∪ En ) is a priori difficult, but it is relatively
easy to compute probabilities of intersections of any collection
of Ei . That is, we can easily compute quantities like
P(E1 E3 E7 ) or P(E2 E3 E6 E7 E8 ).
�
I In these situations, the inclusion-exclusion rule helps us
compute unions. It gives us a way to express
P(E1 ∪ E2 ∪ . . . ∪ En ) in terms of these intersection
probabilities.
18.440 Lecture 4
15
Inclusion-exclusion identity
�
I Can we show from the axioms that
�
I How about P(E ∪ F ∪ G ) =
�
I More generally,
n
P(∪ni=1 Ei ) = P(Ei ) − P(Ei1 Ei2 ) + . . .
i=1 i1 <i2
�
I Consider a region of the Venn diagram contained in exactly
m > 0 subsets. For example, if m = 3 and n = 8 we could
consider the region E1 E2 E3c E4c E5 E6c E7c E8c .
�
I This region is contained in three single intersections (E1 , E2 ,
and E5 ). It’s contained in 3 double-intersections (E1 E2 , E1 E5 ,
and E2 E5 ). It’s contained in only 1 triple-intersection
(E1 E2 E5 ).
It is counted
m1 −
m2 +
m3 + . . . ±
m
e l e l e l e l
m times in the
�
I
inclusion exclusion sum.
�
I How many is that?
�
I Answer: 1. (Follows from binomial expansion of (1 − 1)m .)
�
I Thus each region in E1 ∪ . . . ∪ En is counted exactly once in
�
I n people toss hats into a bin, randomly shuffle, return one hat
to each person. Find probability nobody gets own hat.
�
I Inclusion-exclusion. Let Ei be the event that ith person gets
own hat.
�
I What is P(Ei1 Ei2 . . . Eir )?
(n−r )!
�
I Answer: .
en!nl
I
� There are r terms like that in the inclusion exclusion sum.
What is nr (n−r )!
e l
n!
?
I
� Answer: r1
! .
1 1 1 1
I
� P(∪ni=1 Ei ) = 1 − 2! + 3! − 4! + . . . ± n!
1 1 1
1
I
� 1 − P(∪ni=1 Ei ) = 1 − 1 + 2! − 3! + 4! − . . . ± n! ≈ 1/e ≈ .36788
18.440 Lecture 4
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