EUSTACIO ATWEL, Et Al. vs. Concepcion Progressive Association
EUSTACIO ATWEL, Et Al. vs. Concepcion Progressive Association
EUSTACIO ATWEL, Et Al. vs. Concepcion Progressive Association
Upon the enactment of RA 8799 in 2000, the jurisdiction of the SEC over
CONCEPCION PROGRESSIVE ASSOCIATION intra-corporate controversies and other cases enumerated in Section 5 of PD
J. Corona | April 14, 2008 902-A was transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction. Under this
authority, Branch 8 of the Tacloban City RTC, acting as a special commercial
In 1948, Emiliano Melgazo founded CPA in Hilongos, Leyte. In 1968, court, deemed the mandatory injunction case filed by CPAI an intra-corporate
Melgazo bought a parcel of land in behalf of CPA. The property was later dispute falling under subparagraph (2) of the aforecited provision as it
converted into a wet market. It also housed a cockpit and other amusements. involved the officers and members thereof.
The income it generated was paid to CPA. Emiliano’s son, Manuel,
succeeded him as CPA president. Atwel and Pilpil were elected CPA VP and To determine whether a case involves an intra-corporate controversy to be
treasurer respectively. heard and decided by the RTC, two elements must concur: (1) The status or
relationship of the parties and (2) The nature of the question that is subject of
In 1997, some of CPA’s officers and members formed their own group and their controversy.
registered themselves as officers and members of the respondent CPA, Inc.
Atwel et al were not listed as officers or members of CPAI. Later, CPAI In the case at bar, these elements are not present. The records reveal that
objected to Atwel et al’s collection of rentals from the market vendors. petitioners were never officers nor members of CPAI. CPAI itself admitted
this in its pleadings. In fact, petitioners were the only remaining members of
In 2000, CPAI filed a case in SEC for injunction. With the passage of RA CPA which, obviously, was not the CPAI that was registered in the SEC.
8799 (Securities Regulation Code), the case was transferred to Branch 24 of
Southern Leyte RTC and later to Branch 8 of Tacloban RTC. Both were Moreover, the issue in this case does not concern the regulation of CPAI (or
special commercial courts. even CPA). The determination as to who is the true owner of the disputed
property entitled to the income generated therefrom is civil in nature and
On June 9, 2004, the RTC ruled that the deed of sale covering the property should be threshed out in a regular court. Cases of this nature are cognizable
was in the name of CPA, not Emiliano. In the dispositive, however, the RTC by the RTC under BP 129. Therefore, the conflict among the parties here
considered CPA to be one and the same as CPAI. was outside the jurisdiction of the special commercial court.
Atwel et al appealed to the CA. On Mar. 17, 2005, although the CA found But did the doctrine of estoppel bar petitioners from questioning the
that the special commercial court should have not tried the case since there jurisdiction of the special commercial court? No. In Lozon v. NLRC, this Court
was no intra-corporate dispute among CPAI members or officers, it came up with a clear rule on when jurisdiction by estoppel applies and when
nonetheless held that Atwel et al were already barred from questioning the it does not: The operation of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction
court’s jurisdiction based on the doctrine of estoppel citing Tijam. seemingly depends on whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or
not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the
ISSUE / RATIO theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from
assailing such jurisdiction, for the same must exist as a matter of law, and
WON estoppel can apply in this case – NO may not be conferred by the consent of the parties or by estoppel.
A court’s jurisdiction is conferred exclusively by the Constitution or by law, We likewise held in Metromedia that Tijam provided an exceptional
not by the parties’ agreement or by estoppel. circumstance. To void the trial court's decision in Tijam for lack of jurisdiction
was not only unfair but patently revolting considering that the question on
Originally, Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) 902-A conferred on the SEC jurisdiction was raised only after 15 years of tedious litigation.
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the following:
The rule remains that estoppel does not confer jurisdiction on a tribunal that
(2) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate, partnership, or association has none over the cause of action or subject matter of the case.[24]
relations, between and among stockholders, members, or associates; or Unfortunately for CPAI, no exceptional circumstance appears in this case to
association of which they are stockholders, members, or associates, warrant divergence from the rule. Jurisdiction by estoppel is not available
respectively; here.