COMPILATION OF CASES IN ADMINISTRATIVE AND ELECTION LAW

G.R. No. L-46440 January 18, 1939

Planas vs. Gil

Facts:

1. The case stemmed from a statement made by petitioner which was published in a
newspaper (La Guardia) wherein he criticized certain government officials acts as well as
the election of Assemblyman in 1938. Petitioner was a member of the municipal board of
Manila.
2. An investigation directed by the authority of the President was conducted by the
respondent Commissioner of Civil Service. Hence this petition for prohibition where
petitioner contends that respondent lacks the jurisdiction to investigate him and that it
violates Art. 7, Sec.11 (1) of the Constitution, as it seeks to remove or suspend him.

ISSUE:
W/N the President has the legal authority to order the investigation

RULING:
YES. Provided the investigation should be in accordance with law. The constitution grants
to the President the powers of control and supervision. The power to exercise general
supervision over all local governments and to take care that the laws be faithfully executed
authorizes him to order an investigation of the act or conduct of the petitioner herein.

Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an active power. It is certainly not without

limitation, but it at least implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to
render the power real and effective. If supervision is to be conscientious and rational, and
not automatic and brutal, it must be founded upon a knowledge of actual facts and
conditions disclosed after careful study and investigation.

The President in the exercise of the executive power under the Constitution may act
through the heads of the executive departments. The heads of the executive departments
are his authorized assistants and agents in the performance of his executive duties, and
their official acts, promulgated in the regular course of business, are presumptively his
acts.

The power of removal which the President may exercise directly and the practical
necessities of efficient government brought about by administrative centralization easily
make the President the head of the administration.
G.R. No. L-26979 April 1, 1927
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiffs,
vs.
MILTON E. SPINGER, DALAMACIO COSTAS, and ANSELMO HILARIO, defendants.

FACTS:
On November 9, 1926, the Government-General promulgated Executive Order
No. 37. Reference was made therein to opinions of the Judge Advocate General of the
United States Army and of the Acting Attorney-General of the United States wherein it
was held that the provisions of the statutes passed by the Philippine Legislature creating
a voting committee or board of control, and enumerating the duties and powers thereof
with respect to certain corporations in which the Philippine Government is the owner of
stock, are nullities. Announcement was made that on account of the invalidity of the
portions of the Acts creating the voting committee or board of control, the Governor-
General would, thereafter, exercise exclusivelythe duties and powers theretofore
assumed by the voting committee or board of control. Notice of the contents of this
executive order was given to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives.
On December 6, 1926, at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the special meeting of the
stockholders of the National Coal Company was held in accordance with the call. The
Governor-General, through his representative, asserted the sole power to vote the stock
of the Government. The president of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives attended the meeting and filed with the secretary of the company a
certified copy of the minutes of the meeting of the committee held at the office of the
company a half hour before.
However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate President
as well as the House Speaker, notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the objection of the
Governor-General, still elected Milton Springer and four others as Board of Directors of
NCC. Thereafter, a quo warranto proceeding in behalf of the government was filed against
Springer et al questioning the validity of their election into the Board of NCC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Senate President as well as the House Speaker can elect
the directors of the National Coal Company.

HELD:
 NO. The court deduce that the power of appointment in the Philippines
appertains, with minor exceptions, to the executive department; that membership in the
voting committee in question is an office or executive function; that the National Coal
Company and similar corporations are instrumentalities of the Government; that the duty
to look after government agencies and government property belongs to the executive
department; that the placing of members of the Philippine Legislature on the voting
committee constitutes an invasion by the Legislative Department of the provileges of the
Executive Department. Under a system of government of delegated powers, under which
delagation legislative power vests in the Philippine Legislature and executive power vests
in the Governor-General, and under which Governor-General and a specified power of
appointment resides in the Philippine Legislature, the latter cannot directly or indirectly
perform functions of an executive nature through the designation of its presiding officers
as majority membersof a body which has executive functions.
Occena vs. Comelec
G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981

Facts:
The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three
BatasangPambansa Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments goes further than
merely assailing their alleged constitutional infirmity. The rather unorthodox aspect of
these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law. The
three Resolutions were: 1) Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land
for residential purposes 2) Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime
Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly; and 3) Resolution No. 3 on the
amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections. The three resolutions were
approved by the InterimBatasangPambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on
February 5 and 27, 1981 which the date of plebiscite has been set on April 7, 1981. It is
thus within the 90-day period provided by the Constitution.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Interim Batasang Pambansa has the power to propose
amendments.

Held:

Yes, the Interim Batasang Pambansa has the power and privilege to propose
amendments. On January 17, 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect.
With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal
postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also
be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts
were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. The existence of this power
is indubitable as the applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit.

The Interim BatasangPambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose

amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible
proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body
applies as well when it has been convened as the agency through which amendments
could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional convention is
concerned. It is not a requirement either when, as in this case, the Interim Batasang
Pambansa exercises its constituent power to propose amendments.
 Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential
purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the
Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of
147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the
Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention. The three resolutions
were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on
February 5 and 27, 1981, thus making them valid.
G.R. No. 138200 February 27, 2002

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND

COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC), Petitioner, vs.
ROBERTO MABALOT, Respondent

FACTS:

The Secretary of DOTC Jesus Garcia Jr., issued Memorandum No. 96-735
addressed to Land Transportation Franchising Regulatory Board (LTFRB) directing to
effect the transfer of regional functions of the office to the DOTC-Cordillera Administrative
Region (CAR) Regional Office. Respondent Mabalot filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order against the
petitioner and LTFRB Chairman Lantin before the RTC of Quezon City. The lower court,
upon filing of a bond issued a writ of preliminary injunction.
Thereafter, the then Secretary of DOTC Amado Lagdameo, Jr., issued the assailed
Department Order No. 97-1025. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved to
reopen the hearing in the lower court for the purpose of enabling petitioner to present
D.O. No. 97-1025 and the motion was granted. Mabalot filed a petition assailing the
validity of D.O. No. 97-1025. The lower court admitted petitioner’s documentary exhibits
over the respondent’s objection and likewise admitted the supplemental petition filed by
the latter. The court rendered declaring M.O No. 96-735 and 97-1025 of the DOTC
Secretary null and void without any legal effect as being violative of the provision of the
Constitution against encroachment on the powers of the legislative department and, also
of the provision enjoining appointive officials from holding any other office or employment
in the Government. The preliminary injunction was made permanent. Hence this present
petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or NOT the subject administrative issuances by the DOTC Secretary are
valid.

HELD:

YES. Accordingly, in the absence of any patent or latent constitutional or statutory

infirmity attending the issuance of the challenged orders, this Court upholds
Memorandum Order No. 96-735 and Department Order No. 97-1025 as legal and valid
administrative issuances by the DOTC Secretary. Contrary to the opinion of the lower
court, the President – through his duly constituted political agent and alter ego, the DOTC
Secretary in the present case – may legally and validly decree the reorganization of the
Department, particularly the establishment of DOTC-CAR as the LTFRB Regional Office
at the Cordillera Administrative Region, with the concomitant transfer and performance of
public functions and responsibilities appurtenant to a regional office of the LTFRB.
It is apropos to reiterate the elementary rule in administrative law and the law on public
officers that a public office may be created through any of the following modes, to wit,
either:
1.) by the Constitution (Fundamental Law)
2.) by law (Statute duly enacted by Congress)
3.) by authority of law

Verily, Congress can delegate the power to create positions. This has been settled
by decisions of the Court upholding the validity of reorganization statutes authorizing the
President to create, abolish or merge offices in the executive department. Thus, at various
times, Congress has vested power in the President to reorganize executive agencies and
redistribute functions, and particular transfers under such statutes have been held to be
within the authority of the President. The creation and establishment of LTFRB-CAR
Regional Office was made pursuant to the third mode – by authority of law, which could
be decreed for instance, through an Executive Order (E.O) issued by the President or an
order of an administrative agency such as the Civil Service Commission pursuant to
Section 17, Book V of E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as The Administrative Code of
1987. In the instant case, the DOTC Secretary issued the assailed Memorandum and
Department Orders pursuant to A.O No. 36 of the President.
Simply stated, it is as if the President himself carried out the creation and
establishment of LTFRB-CAR Regional Office, when in fact, the DOTC Secretary, as alter
ego of the President, directly and merely sought to implement the Chief Executives’
Administrative Order.
It must be emphasized that the reorganization in the instant case was decreed in
the interest of the service and for purposes of economy and more effective coordination
of the DOTC functions in the Cordillera Administrative Region. The Court ruled that in this
jurisdiction, reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith. As a
general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy
or to make bureaucracy more efficient. Reorganization pursued in the case at bar bears
the earmark of good faith. As petitioner points out, tapping the DOTC-CAR pending the
eventual creation of LTFRB Regional Office is economical in terms of manpower and
resource requirements, ergo, reducing expenses from the limited resources of the
government.
The court adjudged in favor of the petitioner and the decision rendered by the lower
court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
EUGENIO vs. CSC et al
G.R. No. 115863
March 31, 1995
FACTS:
Eugenio, Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute, applied
for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank. She was given a CES
eligibility and was recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the Career
Executive Service Board.
Then respondent Civil Service Commission passed a Resolution which
abolished the CESB, relying on the provisions of Section 17, Title I, Subtitle A. Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987 allegedly conferring on the Commission the power and
authority to effect changes in its organization as the need arises. Said resolution states:
“Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service Board, shall now be known as
the Office for Career Executive Service of the Civil Service Commission. Accordingly, the
existing personnel, budget, properties and equipment of the Career Executive Service
Board shall now form part of the Office for Career Executive Service.”
Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive
Service Board which recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner
filed the petition at bench to annul, among others, said resolution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Civil Service Commission has given the authority to abolish the office of
the CESB?

HELD:
The petition is granted and Resolution of the respondent Commission is hereby
annulled and set aside
 No. The controlling fact is that the CESB was created in PD No. 1 on September
1, 1974. It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only
be abolished by the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the
creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function
In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the
abolition of the CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975
to 1993, the legislature has set aside funds for the operation of CESB.
Respondent Commission invoked Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book
V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its power to abolish the CESB.
But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must
be read together with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates the offices under
the respondent Commission.
The conclusion is that respondent Commission’s power to reorganize is limited
to offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16.

From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit
administratively attached to respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the
Reorganization Committee “the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to view the
problem of building up executive manpower in the government with a broad and positive
outlook.”
The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its
attachment to respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall
within the control of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the
purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related government agency to another is to
attain “policy and program coordination.” This is clearly etched out in Section 38(3),
Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit:

Attachment. This refers to the lateral relationship between the department or its
equivalent and attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program
coordination. The coordination may be accomplished by having the department
represented in the governing board of the attached agency or corporation, either as
chairman or as a member, with or without voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter;
having the attached corporation or agency comply with a system of periodic reporting
which shall reflect the progress of programs and projects; and having the department or
its equivalent provide general policies through its representative in the board, which shall
serve as the framework for the internal policies of the attached corporation or agency.
LARRAINE VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 90482 August 5, 1991

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, acting through the SUGAR REGULATORY

ADMINISTRATION, and REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, 15th Division, THE HONORABLE
CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her official capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Branch 26, Manila, JORGE C.
VICTORINO and JAIME K. DEL ROSARIO, in their official capacities as RTC Deputy
Sheriffs of Manila, ROGER Z. REYES, ERNESTO L. TREYES, JR., and EUTIQUIO M.
FUDOLIN, respondents.

FACTS:

On May 16,1986, Republic Planters Bank (RPB), Zosimo Maravilla, Rosendo de

la Rama, Bibiano Sabino, Roberto Mascufiana and Ernesto Kramer "for themselves and
in representation of other sugar producers" filed a Complaint with the RTC for Sum of
Money and/or Delivery of Personal Property with Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction against the Philippine Sugar Commission (PHILSUCOM) and the National
Sugar Trading Corporation (NASUTRA).

The petitioner prayed to the court to order PHILSUCOM and NASUTRA to render
a faithful account of different bank accounts being held; to render a faithful inventory of
all the sugar stocks for the crop year 84- 85; to remit dollar accounts held; to deliver sugar
stocks of crop year 84-85; pay interests and penalties for accounts covered by unpaid
sugar quedans, damages, attorney’s fees and cost of the suit,

Before PHILSUCOM and NASUTRA could answer, a compromise agreement was

submitted and was approved by the lower court. Three orders were issued. First order –
dismissed separate petitions for relief from judgment filed by different sugar associations
(National Federation of Sugar Cane Planters, Sugar Central Inc, Independent Sugar
Planters). Second order – granted a second motion to resolve a pending motion for
issuance of a writ of execution and allowed the issuance of an alias writ of execution.
Third order – required officers of the RPB to appear before the court to explain why they
should not be cited in contempt for defying the alias writ of execution.

The Court of Appeals denied the petition for the nullification of the orders because
o RPB accepted the appointment as Trustee whose obligation is to pay, received benefits
by way of trustee’s fees and cannot question the right of private respondents to attorney’s
fees. SRA may not lawfully bring action on behalf of the Republic because EO 18 says
that PHILSUCOM remains a judicial entity for 3 years for the purpose of prosecuting and
defending suits against it. Petition should have been filed through the OSG and not
through the OGCC; SRA cannot lawfully represent the Government because it may only
perform powers and functions as may be authorized by the laws which created them.
 The Supreme Court required respondents to comment and issued TRO directing
respondent Judge to desist and refrain from further proceeding in the civil case. Hence,
this petition.

ISSUE:

Did the CA erred in holding that neither OGCC nor SRA can represent the Government
in an action before it?

RULING:

No. The Supreme Court says that Court of Appeals correctly ruled that SRA may
not lawfully bring an action on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines and that the OGCC
does not have the authority to represent the petitioner in this case. Further, EO abolished
PHILSUCOM and created SRA but PHILSUCOM was allowed to continue as a juridical
entity for 3 years for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits by or against it under
the supervision of the SRA. Under Section 3 of EO 18 does not specifically include the
power to represent the Republic nor the power to sue and be sued. Also Section 4, EO
18 – specific functions do not include the power to represent the Republic. Charter does
not grant the SRA the power to represent republic in suits filed by or against it.

The Supreme Court further said that SRA is an administrative agency o

Administrative agency – only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law and those
that are necessarily implied in the exercise; government body charged with administering
and implementing particular legislation. The power to represent the Republic – withheld
from SRA so it cannot institute the instant petition. Supreme Court also said that the
OGCC cannot represent SRA or Republic. The OGCC is the principal law office of all
OGCCs including subsidiaries; the president may not allow it to act as lawyer for a
specified OGCC or subsidiary. Since SRA is neither a OGCC or a subsidiary, OGCC does
not have the authority to represent it.

The Supreme Court find the explanation to be satisfactory. No malice attended the
commission of the challenged act. Supreme Court says “we accord to respondent judge
good faith in her claimed desire to preserve and protect public funds. Moreover,
petitioners failed to show that the act in question caused any injury or damage to their
rights or interest.”

The Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.

G.R NO. 116418 March 7, 1995
SALVADOR C. FERNANDEZ and ANICIA DE LIMA, petitioners, vs.
HON. PATRICIA STO. TOMAS, Chairman, and HON. RAMON B. ERENETA,
Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioners Salvador Fernandez is the Director of the Office Personnel Inspection
and Audit (OPIA) and Anicia de Lima is serving as the Director of the Office of the
Personnel Relations (OPR) both at the Central Office of the Civil Service Commission
(CSC). During their tenure, the herein public respondents Hon. Sto. Tomas and Hon.
Ereneta, Chairman and Commissioner, respectively, signed Resolution No. 94-3710
where the authority to effect changes were provided in Section 17 Book V of Executive
Order 292. The Commission finds it imperative to effect changes in the organization to
streamline its operations and improve delivery of service. In its Resolution, the
Commission also finds it necessary to immediately effect changes in the organization of
Central Offices in view of the need to implement new programs in lieu of those functions
which were transferred to the Regional Office. The Offices of the petitioners were merged
together with the Office of Career Systems and Standards (OCSS) to form the Research
and Development Office (RDO). Despite the petitioners’ objections, Chairman Sto. Tomas
expressed the determination of the Commission to implement Resolution No. 94-3710
unless restrained by higher authority.
Petitioners received Office Orders from the Commission assigning them to
Regional Offices in Legazpi City Region V and San Fernando in Pampanga Region III
with positions as Director IV. Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and prayed that public respondents be restrained from
enforcing the said Office Orders which was granted in a Resolution dated 27 September
1994. The Commission filed its own comment and moved to lift the TRO. The Office of
the Solicitor General also filed a separate comment defending the validity of Resolution
No. 94-3710 and urging dismissal of the petition. The petitioners argued that said
Resolution effected the “abolition” of public offices, something which may be done only
by the same legislative authority which had created those public offices in the first place.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or NOT the CSC had legal authority to issue Resolution No. 94-3710
where it merges the Office of Career System and Standards, Office of Personnel
Inspection and Audit and Office of Personnel Relations to form the Research and
Development Office of CSC
2. Whether or NOT the reassignment of petitioners to Regional Offices constitute a
violation of their constitutional right to security of tenure?
HELD:
1. Examination on the statutory provisions specifically The Revised Administrative
Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292) sets out, in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, the
internal structure and organization of the Commission Section 16. Offices in the
Commission reveals that the OCSS, OPIA and OPR and as well as each of the
other Offices listed in Section 16, consist of aggregations of Divisions, each of
which Divisions is in turn a grouping of Sections. In short, theses offices constitute
administrative subdivisions of the CSC. Legislative Authority have validly
delegated to CSC by Section 17 and Section 1 (Declaration of Policy) of 1987
Revised Administrative Code.

2. No. Section 26 (7) Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the 1987 Revised Administrative
Code recognizes reassignment as a management prerogative vested un the
Commission and, for that matter, in any department or agency of government
embraced in the civil service:
“(7) Reassignment. An employee may be re-assigned from one
organizational unit to another in the same agency, Provided, that such re-
assignment shall not involve a reduction in rank status and salary.”
The reassignment of petitioners Fernandez and de Lima from their previous
positions had been effected with express statutory authority and did not constitute
removals without lawful cause. The reassignment did not involve any violation of
the constitutional right of petitioners to security of tenure considering that they
retained their positions of Director IV and would continue to enjoy the sane rank,
status, and salary at their new assigned stations which they had enjoyed at the
Head Office of the Commission in Metro Manila.
The Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Writ
of Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order is dismissed. The TRO issued
by the court dated 27 September 1994 is lifted.
Lianga Bay Logging Co. vs. Enage
GR. No. L-30637, July 16, 1987

FACTS:

The parties herein are both forest concessionaries whose licensed areas are adjacent to
each other. Since the concessions of petitioner and respondent are adjacent to each
other, they have a common boundary-the Agusan-Surigao Provincial boundary-whereby
the eastern boundary of respondent Ago's concession is petitioner Lianga's western
boundary. Because of reports of encroachment by both parties on each other's
concession areas, the Director of Forestry ordered a survey to establish on the ground
the common boundary of their respective concession areas. The decision fixed the
common boundary of the licensed areas of the Ago Timber Corporation and Lianga Bay
Logging Co., Inc. as that indicated in red pencil of the sketch attached to the decision. In
an appeal interposed by respondent Ago, docketed in the Department of Agriculture and
Natural Resources as DANR Case No. 2268, the then Acting Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources Jose Y. Feliciano, in a decision dated August 9, 1965 set aside the
appealed decision of the Director of Forestry and ruled that "(T)he common boundary line
of the licensed areas of the Ago Timber Corporation and the Lianga Bay Logging Co.,
Inc., should be that indicated by the green line on the same sketch which had been made
an integral part of the appealed decision." Petitioner elevated the case to the Office of the
President, where in a decision dated June 16,1966, signed by then Assistant Executive
Secretary Jose J. Leido, Jr., the ruling of the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources was affirmed. On motion for reconsideration, the Office of the President issued
another decision dated August 9, 1968 signed by then Assistant Executive Secretary
Gilberto Duavit reversing and overturning the decision of the then Acting Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and affirming in toto and reinstating the decision,
dated March 20, 1961, of the Director of Forestry. Thereafter, Ago brought the action in
the CFI.
ISSUE:
WON the CFI has authority to hear and decide the case.

HELD:
No. The Court grants the petition for certiorari and prohibition and holds that
respondent judge, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion, has no competence
nor authority to review anew the decision in administrative proceedings of respondents
public officials (director of forestry, secretary of agriculture and natural resources and
assistant executive secretaries of the Office of the President) in determining the correct
boundary line of the licensed timber areas of the contending parties. The Court reaffirms
the established principle that findings of fact by an administrative board or agency or
official, following a hearing, are binding upon the courts and will not be disturbed except
where the board, agency and/or official(s) have gone beyond their statutory authority,
exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to their
duty or with grave abuse of discretion.
G.R. No. 84811 August 29, 1989

SOLID HOMES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
TERESITA PAYAWAL and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Facts:

The complaint was filed on August 31, 1982, by Teresita Payawal against Solid
Homes, Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-36119. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant contracted to sell to her a
subdivision lot in Marikina on June 9, 1975, for the agreed price of P 28,080.00, and that
by September 10, 1981, she had already paid the defendant the total amount of P
38,949.87 in monthly installments and interests. Solid Homes subsequently executed a
deed of sale over the land but failed to deliver the corresponding certificate of title despite
her repeated demands because, as it appeared later, the defendant had mortgaged the
property in bad faith to a financing company. The plaintiff asked for delivery of the title to
the lot or, alternatively, the return of all the amounts paid by her plus interest. She also
claimed moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and the costs of the suit.

Solid Homes moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no
jurisdiction, this being vested in the National Housing Authority under PD No. 957.
Issue:
Whether or not the National Housing Authority was jurisdiction to hear the said
case?
Ruling:
The applicable law is PD No. 957, as amended by PD No. 1344, entitled
"Empowering the National Housing Authority to Issue Writs of Execution in the
Enforcement of Its Decisions Under Presidential Decree No. 957." Section 1 of the latter
decree provides as follows:

SECTION 1. In the exercise of its function to regulate the real estate trade and
business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the
National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of
the following nature:

A. Unsound real estate business practices;

B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractuala statutory obligations filed by
buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman.
Blue Bar Coconut Philippines v. Tantuico
G.R. No. L-47051
July 29, 1988

Facts:

Sometime in 1976, the respondent Acting Chairman of the Commission on Audit

initiated a special audit of coconut end-user companies, which include herein petitioners,

with respect to their Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund levy collections and the

subsidies they had received.

As a result of the initial findings of the Performance Audit Office with respect only

to the petitioners, respondent Acting COA Chairman directed the Chairman, the

Administrator, and the Military Supervisor of PCA and the Manager of the Coconut

Consumers Stabilization Fund, in various letters to them (Annexes G-2 H, I, J, L and N of

petition) to collect the short levies and overpaid subsidies, and to apply subsidy claims to

the settlement of short levies should the petitioners fail to remit the amount due.

Issues:

Whether or not the respondent COA Chairman may disregard the PCA rules and

decisions has become moot.

Ruling:

In the case at bar, the petitioners have failed to show that acts were done with

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Case dismissed.

Petitioners contend that they are outside the ambit of respondents' "audit" power
which is confined to government-owned or controlled corporations.

Section 2 (1) of Article IX-D of the Constitution provides that "The Commission on

Audit shall have the power, authority and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts

pertaining to the revenues and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and

property, owned or held in trust by or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its

subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled

corporation with original charters, and on a post-audit basis. ... (d) such non-governmental

entities receiving subsidy or equity directly or indirectly from or through the Government

which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition

of subsidy or equity." The Constitution formally embodies the long established rule that

private entities who handle government funds or subsidies in trust may be examined or

audited in their handling of said funds by government auditors. In view of the above

considerations, we apply the principle of primary jurisdiction:

In cases involving specialized disputes, the trend has been to refer the

same to an administrative agency of special competence. As early as 1954, the

Court in Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Co., Inc. (94 Phil.

932,941), held that under the sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary

jurisdiction ... the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a

question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal prior to the

decision of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question

demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special

knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine

technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to

comply with the Purposes of the regulatory statute administered." Recently, this

Court specaking thru Mr. Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee said that "In this era of

clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or

commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and

determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual matters,

subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well-

nigh indispensable." The court reminds us that the legal presumption is that official

duty has been duly performed.

G.R. No. 102976 October 25, 1995

IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER CORPORATION,
respondents.

FACTS:

The National Steel Corporation embarked on an expansion program embracing

the construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan City which was considered a priority
and major industrial project of the Government. Pursuant to such expansion, the
President of the Philippines issued Proclamation No. 2239 withdrawing from sale or
settlement a large tract of public land and reserving that land for the use of NSC.
However, certain portions of said land were occupied by Maria Cristina Fertilizer
Corporation. A Letter of Instruction was therefore issued directing the NSC to negotiate
with the owners of MCFC and if they fail to reach an agreement within 60 days from the
date of the LOI, the Iron and Steel Authority was to exercise its power of eminent domain
and to initiate expropriation proceedings. The ISA was created by P.D. No. 272 in order,
generally, to develop and promote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines.

Negotiations between NSC and MCFC did fail. Petitioner ISA accordingly
commenced eminent domain proceedings against private respondent MCFC in the
RTC. A writ of possession was issued by the Trial Court in favour of ISA placing NSC
in possession and control of the land in controversy.

While the trial was on-going, the statutory existence of ISA expired. MCFC then
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the juridical person of ISA had already
ceased. The RTC granted MCFC’s motion to dismiss based on the provision of the
Rules of Court that only natural or juridical entities authorized by law may be parties in
a civil case. ISA moved for reconsideration and urged that the Republic of the
Philippines be allowed to be substituted on its behalf. The RTC denied such motion for
reconsideration.
On appeal to the CA, the same was dismissed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted for ISA
in view of the expiration of ISA’s term.

Ruling:
 Yes. When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the powers,
duties and functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to,
and are re-assumed by, the Republic of the Philippines, in the absence of special
provisions of law specifying some other disposition thereof to some other identified
successor agency or instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines. Since, in the
instant case, ISA is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic, its
powers, duties, functions, assets and liabilities are properly regarded as folded back
into the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and hence assumed once again
by the Republic.

While the power of eminent domain is, in principle, vested primarily in the
legislative department of the government, no new legislative act is necessary should
the Republic decide, upon being substituted for ISA, to continue to prosecute the
expropriation proceedings. For the legislative authority enacted a continuing or standing
delegation of authority to the President of the Philippines to exercise, or cause the
exercise of, the power of eminent domain on behalf of the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines particularly in Section 64 of the 1917 Revised Administrative Code,
which was in effect at the time of the commencement of the present expropriation
proceedings. It provided that:

Sec. 64. Particular powers and duties of the President of the Philippines. —
In addition to his general supervisory authority, the President of the Philippines shall
have such other specific powers and duties as are expressly conferred or imposed on
him by law, and also, in particular, the powers and duties set forth in this Chapter.

Among such special powers and duties shall be:

xxx xxx xxx

(h) To determine when it is necessary or advantageous to exercise the

right of eminent domain in behalf of the Government of the Philippines; and to
direct the Secretary of Justice, where such act is deemed advisable, to cause the
condemnation proceedings to be begun in the court having proper jurisdiction.

The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 currently in force has substantially

reproduced the foregoing provision in the following terms:

Sec. 12. Power of eminent domain. — The President shall determine when it
is necessary or advantageous to exercise the power of eminent domain in behalf of the
National Government, and direct the Solicitor General, whenever he deems the action
advisable, to institute expopriation proceedings in the proper court.
US VS DORR
G. R. No. 155320 February 5, 2004

RENATO F. HERRERA, petitioner

vs.
PLA RIDEL ELMER J. BOHOL, respondent

FACTS:

Renato F. Herrera, former Director III at DAR Central Office, approved the request
for shift of item number of Plaridel Elmer J. Bohol, a Senior Agrarian Reform officer at the
Bureau of Agrarian Reform Information and Education (BARIE) of the DAR. The shift or
item number from 577-1 of Fund 108 to 562-3 of Fund 101 resulted to Bohol obtaining his
salary under Fund 101. When Bohol was informed that he could not draw his salary under
such item anymore because his item was recalled and was given to another person, he
charged Herrera before the Office of the Ombudsman, with Grave Misconduct and/or
Inefficiency and Incompetence. The Ombudsman found Renato Herrera guilty of simple
misconduct and was suspended for one month without pay, the same being final and
executory in accordance with Sections 7 and 10 of Administrative Order No. 07, in relation
to Section 25 (sic) of Republic Act No. 6770. Herrera appealed to the CA but the same
was denied. A petition for review was raised to the SC due to the following grounds: 1)
he stressed that one month suspension, as stated in the Ombudsman Act of 1998, is
appealable considering that it is not among those enumerated as final and unappealable;
2) he contends that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the finding of the Ombudsman
that respondent was not informed beforehand of the recall of his item, and that petitioner
did not take any corrective measure to address respondent’s complaint; 3) petitioner
contends that the Court of Appeals erred in finding him guilty of misconduct despite lack
of proof that he acted deliberately and with evil intent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the provision in R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the
Ombudsman Act of 1998, providing suspension of not more than one month’s salary is
final and unappealable.

RULING:

Sec. 27 of RA No. 6770 states that: “any order, directive or decision imposing the
penalty of public censure, reprimand, suspension of not more than one month’s salary
shall be final and unappealable…” Salary suspension is an effect of work suspension
following the “no work, no pay” principle. It will be the employee concerned who will be
suspended and such suspension without pay,being final, and unappealable, is clearly
expressed the law. RA No. 6770, therefore, is a legal and clear basis of denying the
petitioner’s appeal. The phrase "suspension of not more than one month’s salary includes
that imposed upon petitioner, i.e., suspension for one month without pay. There is no
penalty as suspension of salary in our administrative law, rules and regulations. Salaries
are simply not suspended. Rather it is the official or employee concerned who is
suspended with a corresponding withholding of salaries following the principle of "no
work, no pay."

G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940

MAXIMO CALALANG v. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.

FACTS:
The National Traffic Commission, with A.D. Williams as the chairman, in its
resolution, resolved to recommend to Vicente Fragante, the Director of Public Works and
Sergio Bayan, the Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-
drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the designated roads at certain times in
a resolution on July 17, 1940.
On July 18, 1940, the chairman of the NTC recommended the adoption of the
measure proposed in the resolution to the Director of Public Works in pursuance of
Commonwealth Act No. 548, which authorized the Director of Public Works to promulgate
rules and regulations for the use and control of traffic on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director of Public Works recommended to the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, the approval of the recommendation made by the
Chairman of NTC, with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to
animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad
crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street.
Sergio Bayan, the acting Secretady of Public Works and Communications approved
the said recommendation; and the Mayor and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have
enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted; and as a
result, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the
places specified in the resolution.
The petitioner, contended that Commonwealth Act No. 548 was unconstitutional as
it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power; and that the rules and regulations
promulgated by the respondents under the provisions of C.A. No. 548 constitutes an
unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to personal
liberty and freedom of locomotion. Finally, he contended that the rules and regulations
complained of, infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social
justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people.

ISSUE:
Whether or not C.A. No. 548 is unconstitutional
RULING:
No. There is no undue delegation of legislative power. Commonwealth Act No. 548
does not grant legislative power to the Director of Public Works and Communications.
The rules and regulations complained of is not to determine what public policy demands
but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly, that is
"to promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on roads and streets designated as
national roads by the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the
Philippines" and to close tthem temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the
condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such necessary or advisable in the
public convenience and interest".
The promulgation of these rules and regulations mentioned in Sec. 1 of the C.A. No.
548 is an administrative function wich cannot be directly discharged by the National
Assembly. The Court further ruled that the delegated power is merely the ascertainment
of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated.
Since it aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads,
in the interest and convenience of the public, the said law is deemed to have clear
considerations on public welfare and convenience. Thus, the Act is constitutional as it
observes social justice on the principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
VIGAN ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY INC vs. THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
GR No. L-19850

FACTS:
Petitioner, Vigan Light Electric Company Inc., was granted a franchise to construct,
maintain and operate a power plant for the purpose of generating and distributing light,
heat and power, for sale within the limits of several municipalities in the province of Ilocos
Sur. Subsequently, the petitioner was able to secure from the respondent, a certificate of
public convenience to render electric light, heat or power services to said municipalities
subject to the rates to be charged to the consumers.
After five years from the acquisition of the petitioner thereof, respondent issued a
letter ordering the reduction of rates of the petitioner as the latter is making a net profit in
excess to the allowable return of 12% on its invested capital and that it is in public interest
and in consonance with Section 3, RA No. 3043 that reduction of rates to the extent of its
excessive revenue be put into effect immediately. Petitioner instituted an action for
certiorari to annul said order, it being unconstitutional because it was issued without
notice and hearing, thus the issuance is without due process of law. In its defense, the
respondent alleged that the disputed order was issued under its delegated legislative
authority, the exercise of which does not require previous notice and hearing.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Congress validly delegated legislative powers to the
respondent (Public Service Commission).

HELD:
No, the Congress has not delegated and cannot delegate legislative powers to the
Public Service Commission. According to the principle of separation of powers, legislative
powers may not be delegated except to local governments and only as to the matters of
purely local in concern. However, the Congress may delegate to administrative agencies
the power to supply the details in the execution of a policy laid down by law which is
complete in itself (determinable without requiring other legislation). Otherwise, there
would be no reasonable means to ascertain whether or not said body has acted within
the scope of its authority and in consequence, the power of legislation would eventually
be exercised by a branch of Government other than those authorize by the Constitution,
in violation of not only the allocation of powers therein made, but also of the principle of
separation of powers.
Moreover, although the rule making power and even the power to fix rates may
partake of a legislative character, such is not the nature of the order complained of.
Indeed, the same applies exclusively to the petitioner herein. In a finding of facts made
by the respondent based upon the report submitted by the General Auditing Office, it was
stated that the petitioner is making a profit more than 12% of its invested capital but it was
denied by the latter. With these, the petitioner should be entitled to cross examine the
maker of the reports, introduce evidence to disprove or complement the contents thereof
and to refute the conclusions drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other words, in
making said finding of facts, the respondent performed a function partaking of a quasi-
judicial character, the valid exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing.
Failure to issue previous demand and hearing by the respondent before the issuance of
such order renders it null and void for being violative of due process clause.
Wherefore, the writ prayed for is granted.
LOUIS BIRAOGO V. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION
G.R No. 192935
December 7, 2010

FACTS:
E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was
signed by President Aquino. The said PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the
Office of the President tasked to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed
by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and submit
their findings and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
However, PTC is not a quasi-judicial body, it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle
or render awards in disputes between parties. Its job is to investigate, collect and asses
evidences gathered and make recommendations. It has subpoena powers but it has no
power to cite people in contempt or even arrest. It cannot determine for such facts if
probable cause exist as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Barely
a month after the issuance of EO No. 1, two cases were filed before the SC assailing
the validity and constitutionality of the said EO.
The first case is a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis
Biraogo in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No.
1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of
the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a
public office and to appropriate funds therefor. Biraogo argues that EO No. 1 is
unconstitutional because there is no provision in the Constitution or any specific law
that authorizes the President to create a truth commission.
The second case is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by
petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, et. al. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of
the House of Representatives. Petitioners-Legislators argue that the said Order is
unconstitutional because the creation of a public office lies within the province of
Congress and not with the executive branch of government.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the President has the power to create an ad hoc body such as the
Philippine Truth Commission.

2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman
and the DOJ.

3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING:

1. Yes.The creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are
faithfully executed. Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that
our laws are faithfully executed. As stated above, the powers of the President are
not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized
powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is
the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to
ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. With AO 298
as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not
affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same
composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in
conducting the inquiry.

On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of

Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a public office, suffice it to say
that there will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing
funds already appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the
Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. Further, there is no need
to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission
because, in the words of the Solicitor General, “whatever funds the Congress has
provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the
commission. Moreover, since the amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall
be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations, there is no impropriety in the
funding.

2. No. Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function
of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. Contrary to
petitioners’ apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ
or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the
commission will complement those of the two offices. As pointed out by the
 Solicitor General, the recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of the
overall task of the commission to conduct a fact-findinginvestigation.

The actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on

the merits of the charges against them, is certainly not a function given to the
commission. The phrase, “when in the course of its investigation,” under Section
2(g), highlights this fact and gives credence to a contrary interpretation from that
of the petitioners. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the
appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the
Ombudsman.

3. Yes. Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative
power of the President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality
of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal
protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of

reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the
same class. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be

struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the
envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth “concerning the
reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration” only. The
intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.

G.R. No. L-27811 November 17, 1967

LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC vs. JOSE PAÑO

FACTS

In 1932, Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant of a 1,103-hectare

pasture land when he subsequently ceded his rights and interests to a portion of the
above public land to plaintiff which was then officially released from the forest zone as
pasture land and declared agricultural land.

On January 26, 1955, Jose Paño and nineteen other claimants applied for the
purchase of ninety hectares of the released area. Plaintiff corporation in turn filed its own
sales application covering the entire land which was met by Paño’s protest that they are
actual occupants of the part thereof covered by their own sales application.

The Director of Land and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources ruled
in favor of plaintiff corporation, and such case was elevated to the President of the
Philippines wherein Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, reversed the decision, thus the
foregoing appeal.

ISSUE

WON the Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, reverse a

decision of the Director of Lands that had been affirmed by the Executive Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources?

RULING

The President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin as well as his
control of all executive departments. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm,
modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. Evidently, the decision
of the Lands Director as approved by the Secretary was considered superseded by that
of the President's appeal.

Secondly, it is incorrect for the appellant to contend that decision of the Executive
Secretary herein is an undue delegation of power. The rule which has thus gained
recognition is that "under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for
and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm,
modify, or even reverse any order" that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue.

Also, the Executive Secretary acts "[b]y authority of the President," his decision is
that of the President's and only the President may rightfully say that the Executive
Secretary is not authorized to do so. Therefore, unless the action taken is "disapproved
or reprobated by the Chief Executive," that remains the act of the Chief Executive, and
cannot be successfully assailed.

Sierra Madre Trust vs. Honorable Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
G.R. Nos. L-32370 & L-327267 April 20, 1983

FACTS:
On July 26, 1992, the petitioner filed with the Bureau of Mines an Adverse Claim
against LLA No. V-7872 of the Jusan Trust Mining Company over six lode mineral claims
all situated in Sitio Maghanay, Barrio Abaca Municipality of Dupax, Nueva Vizcaya. The
adverse claim alleged that the six lode mineral claims encroached and overlapped the
eleven lode mineral claims of the petitioner, all situated in Sitio Taduan Barrio of Abaca,
Nueva Vizcaya.
On July 26, 1966, the same petitioner filed with the Bureau of Mines an Adverse
Claim against LLA No. V-9028 of the J & S Partnership over six lode mineral claims, all
situated in Sitio Gatid, Barrio of Abaca Municipality of Dupax, Province of Nueva Vizcaya.
It alleged that the six lode mineral claims encroached and overlapped thirteen lode
mineral claims of the petitioner.
These two adverse claims were jointly heard in the Bureau of Mines, and jointly
considered in the appeal in the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
The Director of Mines found that "By sheer force of evidence, this Office is
constrained to believe that there exists no conflict or overlapping between the protestant's
and respondent's mining claims." This finding was affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources.

ISSUE:
May there be a valid location of mining claims after the lapse of 30 days from the
date of discovery, in contravention to the mandatory provision of Section 33 of the New
Mining Law?

RULING:
The Court sees no reason why they have to answer the questions in this petition
considering that there is no justiciable issue between the parties. The officers of the
Executive Department tasked with administering the Mining Laws have found that there
is neither encroachment nor overlapping in respect of the claims involved. It is useful to
remind that the interpretation by officers of laws which are entrusted to their administration
is entitled to great respect.
The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, et.al, respondents.
FACTS:
In August 1970, Jose Hernando acquired prospective and beneficial ownership
over Lot. No. 15, Block IV of the Ponderosa Heights Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal from
the petitioner Antipolo Realty Corporation under a Contract to Sell. In August 1974,
Hernando transferred his rights over the said lot to private respondent Yuson, embodied
in a Deed of Assignment and Substitution of Obligor, executed with the consent of
Antipolo Realty, in which Mr. Yuson assumed the performance of the vendee’s
obligations. However, for failure of Antipolo Realty to develop the subdivision project in
accordance with its undertaking under Clause 17 of the Contract (subdivision
beautification), Yuson paid only the arrearages pertaining to the period up to August 1972
and stopped all monthly installment payments falling due thereafter. In October 1976, the
president of Antipolo Realty sent a notice to Yuson advising that the required
improvements in the subdivision had already been completed, and requesting resumption
of payment of the monthly installments. In a second letter dated November 1976, Antipolo
Realty reiterated its request. A formal demand was made for full and immediate payment.
Yuson refused to pay the September 1972 - October 1976 monthly installments but
agreed to pay the post October 1976 installments. Antipolo Realty responded by
rescinding the Contract to Sell, and claiming the forfeiture of all installment payments
previously made by Mr. Yuson. Aggrieved by the rescission of the Contract to Sell, Yuson
brought his dispute before NHA. Antipolo Realty filed a motion to dismiss, which NHA
denied. After hearing, the NHA rendered a decision ordering the reinstatement of the
Contract to Sell. Antipolo Realty filed a Motion for Reconsideration asserting that the
jurisdiction to hear and decide Yuson’s complaint was lodged in the regular courts, not
with the NHA, since that complaint involved the interpretation and application of the
Contract to Sell. However, the MR was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the NHA acted beyond its competence when it heard the complaint and
ordered the reinstatement of the contract.

RULING:
No. Under the law creating NHA, it is empowered to regulate the real estate trade
and business involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed
by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman. The NHA did not commit any abuse, let alone a grave abuse of
discretion or act in excess of its jurisdiction when it ordered the reinstatement of the
Contract to Sell between the parties. Such reinstatement is no more than a logical
consequence of the NHA’s correct ruling, just noted, that the petitioner was not entitled
to rescind the Contract to Sell. There is in any case, no question that under Presidential
Decree No. 957, the NHA was legally empowered to determine and protect the rights of
contracting parties under the law administered by it and under the respective agreements,
as well as to ensure that their obligations thereunder are faithfully performed. The Court
held that under the "sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the
courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal where the question demands the exercise of
sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact,
and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute
administered.

CITY OF BAGUIO ET. AL VS FRANCISCO NINO

G.R. No. 162070 October 19, 2005

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by SECRETARY JOSE MARI

B. PONCE (OIC), Petitioner
vs.
DELIA T. SUTTON, ELLA T. SUTTON-SOLIMAN and HARRY T. SUTTON,
Respondents.

Facts:
 This is a petition for review filed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of
the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated September 19, 2003 and
February 4, 2004, respectively, which declared DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9,
series of 1993, null and void for being violative of the Constitution. The case at bar
involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents which has been devoted
exclusively to cow and calf breeding.
On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the
government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholdings to
petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law. On June 10, 1988, a new
agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, took effect. It included in its coverage farms used for raising
livestock, poultry and swine.
On December 21, 1992, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Aroroy,
Masbate, inspected respondents’ land and found that it was devoted solely to cattle-
raising and breeding. He recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be exempted from
the coverage of the CARL. Subsequently, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which
provided that only portions of private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock,
poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL.
In determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O. fixed the following retention
limits, viz: 1:1 animal-land ratio (i.e., 1 hectare of land per 1 head of animal shall be
retained by the landowner), and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure for
every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded from the operations of the CARL. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. It declared DAR A.O. No.
9, s. 1993, void for being contrary to the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to
exclude livestock farms from the land reform program of the government. Hence this
petition.

Issue:

Whether or not DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993 which prescribes a maximum
retention limit for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising is unconstitutional

Held:

The A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution.

The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of
agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However,
the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude,
inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry- raising. Petitioner
DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the
Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing
the assailed A.O. While Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 provides that the CARL shall cover
all public and private agricultural lands, the term "agricultural land" does not include lands
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial. It is doctrinal that rules
of administrative bodies must be in harmony with the provisions of the Constitution. They
cannot amend or extend the Constitution.
 To be valid, they must conform to and be consistent with the Constitution. In case
of conflict between an administrative order and the provisions of the Constitution, the
latter prevails.22 The assailed A.O. of petitioner DAR was properly stricken down as
unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage of agrarian reform beyond the scope intended
by the 1987 Constitution.

GMA NETWORK INC. V. MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION

BOARD
G.R. NO. 148579 FEBRUARY 5, 2007

FACTS:
Petitioner operates and manages the UHF Televisions Station, EMC Channel 27.
On January 7, 2000, respondent issued an order of suspension against petitioner for
airing “Muro Ami: The Making” without first securing a permit from it, as provided in
Section 7 of PD 1986. The penalty was based on Memorandum Circular 98-17 dated
December 15, 1998, which provided for the penalties for exhibiting a program without a
valid permit from the MTRCB.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the suspension order and informed
MTRCB of its compliance of the suspension by going since midnight of January 11, 2000,
and filed a letter-protest which were both denied as it was merely “noted.” Petitioner filed
a petition for certiorari with the CA which was dismissed, but with the January 7, 2000
suspension affirmed in toto. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the MTRCB has the power or authority to review “Muro Ami: The
Making,” prior to its broadcast by television?
2. Whether or not Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 was enforceable and binding on
petitioner?

RULING:
1. YES, MTRCB has the power and authority to review “Muro Ami: The Making,” prior
to its broadcast by television by virtue of Section 3 of PD 1986 which empowers it
to screen, review and examine all motion pictures, television programs including
publicity materials. Although petitioner claims that “Muro Ami: The Making” was a
public affairs program, the Court has already ruled that such is within the MTRCB’s
power of review as it does not fall under of the exemptions provided for in Section
7 of PD 1986 which are: 1.) Television programs imprinted or exhibited by the
Philippine Government and/or departments and agencies, and 2.) newsreels.

2. NO, Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 is not binding on the petitioner because it
has not been registered with the Office of the National Administrative Register of
the UP Law Center. Section 3 of the Administrative Code of 1987 expressly
requires each agency to file with the ONAR three certified copies of every rule
adopted by it, and since Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 has not been registered
with the ONAR as of January 27, 2000, the same is ineffective and may not be
enforced. Hence, petitioner was not bound by said circular and should not have
been meted the sanction provided thereunder.
GR No. L-15138 July 31, 1961
BILL MILLER v. ATANACIO MARDO, et. ATANACIO A. MARDO

FACTS:

The case at bar is a consolidation of several appeals treated together as one for
assailing the validity of the Reorganization Plan #20-A.
 In GR No. L-15138, Manuel Gonzales filed with the Regional Office No. 3 of the
Department of Labor in Manila, with the respondent Mardo as the Hearing Officer, an
action against Bill Miller due to the alleged arbitrary dismissal of the latter to the former.
Gonzales worked as a driver of Miller and according to him, he was not paid of separation
pay due him. In return, Miller prayed for the dismissal of the action before the CFI of
Baguio alleging the lack of jurisdiction of the Hearing Officer. The Court then issued a writ
of preliminary injunction. Gonzales then filed motions to dismiss the petition on the
grounds of lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, and non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies pursuant to RAs 997 and 1241, as implemented by EO 218, and Reorganization
Plan # 20-A which hold that regional offices of the Department of Labor have exclusive
jurisdiction over all cases involving money claims arising from violations of labor
standards and working conditions. It was denied by the court. Thereafter, the latter upheld
that the aforementioned laws and executive order are valid because it does not violate
the Judiciary Act. The question of the venue was also dismissed for being moot and
academic.

In GR No. L-16781, Cresencio Estano filed an action with the Regional Office of
Department of Labor against his employers, Chin Hua Trading Co. and/or Lao Kang Suy
and Ke Bon Chiong, the latter being the manager and assistant manager thereof. He
alleged that he was not paid overtime and vacation leave pay when he worked as a driver
of the Chin Hua Trading. Chin Hua Trading then filed an answer. However, as the
proceedings went by, Chin Hua Trading filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary
injunction before the CFI of Manila averring the hearing officers do not have jurisdiction
over the case and assailed the constitutionality of the Reorganization Plan #20-A as well
as EO #218, in relation to RA 997, as amended by RA 1241. The court ruled in favor of
Ching Hua Trading granting the writ of prohibition making permanent the previous
preliminary injunction. However, it declared that Reorganization Plan #20-A
unconstitutional.

In GR No. 15377, appellant Numeriana Rayas appeared before the CFI filing a
complaint against Sen Bee Trading Company, Macario Tan, and Sergio Tan, for being
underpaid while working as a seamstress of the appellees. She further contended that
she was also never compensated for doing overtime as well as entitled to vacation and
sick leave pay. Appellees were firmed that the case should be dismissed because the
court has no jurisdiction. Moreover, another case filed by the same plaintiff is pending
before the regional office of the Department of Labor involving the same reliefs sought
against the same appellees. The court dismissed the case.

In GR No. L-6660, Vicente Romero filed with the Regional Office No. 2 of the
Department of Labor against Sia Seng to recover the alleged unpaid wages, overtime,
and separation pay. Sia failed to appear despite due notice. The court favored Romero.
The case was referred to the Regional Labor Administrator Angel Hernando who refused
to issue writ of execution and ordered rehearing. This prompted Romero to file with the
CFI of Isabela a petition for mandamus for the immediate issuance of the writ of execution
by Hernando which was favored.

In GR No. L-17056, Mariano Pabillare, a chief mechanic, filed a case against Fred
Wilson and Co. with the Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor for his sudden
dismissal without cause and without sufficient notice as well as separation pay. He also
averred that he is entitled for overtime pay. Petitioner Fred Wilson and Co. moved for the
dismissal of the action contending the regional office has no jurisdiction to adjudicate
which was subsequently denied by the respondent Hearing Officer Meliton Parducho.
Petitioner sought relief by filing a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction with the CFI of Manila to restrain respondent hearing officer from proceeding
the case and declared the Reorganization Plan #20 unconstitutional. The court granted
the writ of preliminary injunction but ruled that Reorganization Plan #20-A is valid.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Reorganization Plan #20-A is valid and constitutional.

RULING:

It is invalid and unconstitutional.

Paragraph 25 of Article VI of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, which is hereunder quoted:

25 Each regional office shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
cases falling under the Workmen's Compensation law, and cases affecting
all money claims arising from violations of labor standards on working
conditions including but not restrictive to: unpaid wages, underpayment,
overtime, separation pay and maternity leave of employees and laborers;
and unpaid wages, overtime, separation pay, vacation pay and payment for
medical services of domestic help.

Under this provision, the regional offices have been given original and exclusive
jurisdiction over:

(a) all cases falling under the Workmen's Compensation law;

 (b) all cases affecting money claims arising from violations of labor
standards on working conditions, unpaid wages, underpayment, overtime,
separation pay and maternity leave of employees and laborers; and
(c) all cases for unpaid wages, overtime, separation pay, vacation pay and
payment for medical services of domestic help.

Before the effectivity of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, however, the Department
of Labor, except the Workmen's Compensation Commission with respect to claims for
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation law, had no compulsory power to
settle cases under (b) and (c) above, the only authority it had being to mediate merely or
arbitrate when the parties so agree in writing, In case of refusal by a party to submit to
such settlement, the remedy is to file a complaint in the proper court. The jurisdiction to
take cognizance of cases affecting money claims such as those sought to be enforced in
these proceedings, is a new conferment of power to the Department of Labor not
theretofore exercised by it.

But these "functions" which could thus be created, obviously refer merely to
administrative, not judicial functions. For the Government Survey and Reorganization
Commission was created to carry out the reorganization of the Executive Branch of the
National Government. And the Constitution expressly provides that "the Judicial power
shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established
by law.(Sec. 1, Art. VII of the Constitution). It may be conceded that the legislature may
confer on administrative boards or bodies quasi-judicial powers involving the exercise of
judgment and discretion, as incident to the performance of administrative functions. But
in so doing, the legislature must state its intention in express terms that would leave no
doubt, as even such quasi-judicial prerogatives must be limited, if they are to be valid,
only to those incidental to or in connection with the performance of jurisdiction over a
matter exclusively vested in the courts.

But it is urged, in one of the cases, that the defect in the conferment of judicial or
quasi-judicial functions to the Regional offices, emanating from the lack of authority of the
Reorganization Commission has been cured by the non-disapproval of Reorganization
Plan No. 20-A by Congress under the provisions of Section 6(a) of Republic Act No. 997,
as amended. It is, in effect, argued that Reorganization Plan No. 20-A is not merely the
creation of the Reorganization Commission, exercising its delegated powers, but is in fact
an act of Congress itself, a regular statute directly and duly passed by Congress in the
exercise of its legislative powers in the mode provided in the enabling act.

The pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 997, as amended, invoked in favor of
this argument reads as follows:

SEC. 6 (a) The provisions of the reorganization plan or plans submitted by

the President during the Second Session of the Third Congress shall be
deemed approved after the adjournment of the said session, and those of
the plan or plans or modifications of any plan or plans to be submitted after
 the adjournment of the Second Session, shall be deemed approved after
the expiration of the seventy session days of the Congress following the
date on which the plan is transmitted to it, unless between the date of
transmittal and the expiration of such period, either House by simple
resolution disapproves the reorganization plan or any, modification thereof.
The said plan of reorganization or any modification thereof may, likewise,
be approved by Congress in a concurrent Resolution within such period.

It is an established fact that the Reorganization Commission submitted

Reorganization Plan No. 20-A to the President who, in turn, transmitted the same to
Congress on February 14, 1956. Congress adjourned its sessions without passing a
resolution disapproving or adopting the said reorganization plan. It is now contended that,
independent of the matter of delegation of legislative authority (discussed earlier in this
opinion), said plan, nevertheless became a law by non-action on the part of Congress,
pursuant to the above-quoted provision.

Such a procedure of enactment of law by legislative in action is not countenanced

in this jurisdiction. By specific provision of the Constitution -

No bill shall be passed or become a law unless it shall have been printed
and copies thereof in its final form furnished the Members at least three
calendar clays prior to its passage by the National Assembly (Congress),
except when the President shall have certified to the necessity of its
immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no amendment thereof
shall be allowed, and the question upon its final passage shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered on the Journal.
(Sec. 21-[a], Art. VI).

Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be

presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it, but if
not, he shall return it with his objections to the House where it originated,
which shall enter the objections at large on its Journal and proceed to
reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of
such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the
objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered,
and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members voting for and against shall
be entered on its journal. If any bill shall not be returned by the President as
herein provided within twenty days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have
been presented to him, the same shall become a law in like manner as if he
has signed it, unless the Congress by adjournment prevent its return, in
which case it shall become a law unless vetoed by the President within thirty
days after adjournment. (Sec. 20[1]. Art. VI of the Constitution).

A comparison between the procedure of enactment provided in section 6 (a) of the

Reorganization Act and that prescribed by the Constitution will show that the former is in
distinct contrast to the latter. Under the first, consent or approval is to be manifested by
silence or adjournment or by "concurrent resolution." In either case, the contemplated
procedure violates the constitutional provisions requiring positive and separate action by
each House of Congress. It is contrary to the "settled and well-understood parliamentary
law (which requires that the) two houses are to hold separate sessions for their
deliberations, and the determination of the one upon a proposed law is to be submitted
to the separate determination of the other," (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., p.
187).

Furthermore, Section 6 (a) of the Act would dispense with the "passage" of any
measure, as that word is commonly used and understood, and with the requirement
presentation to the President. In a sense, the section, if given the effect suggested in
counsel's argument, would be a reversal of the democratic processes required by the
Constitution, for under it, the President would propose the legislative action by action
taken by Congress. Such a procedure would constitute a very dangerous precedent
opening the way, if Congress is so disposed, because of weakness or indifference, to
eventual abdication of its legislative prerogatives to the Executive who, under our
Constitution, is already one of the strongest among constitutional heads of state. To
sanction such a procedure will be to strike at the very root of the tri-departmental scheme
four democracy.

On the basis of the foregoing considerations, we hold ad declare that

Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, insofar as confers judicial power to the Regional Offices
over cases other than these falling under the Workmen's Compensation on Law, is invalid
and of no effect.

WHEREFORE:

(a) The decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio involved in case G.R. No.
L-15138 is hereby affirmed, without costs;

(b) The decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila questioned in case G.R.
No. L-16781 is hereby affirmed, without costs;

(c) The order of dismissal issued by the Court of First Instance of Cebu appealed
from in case G.R. No. L-15377 is set aside and the case remanded to the court of
origin for further proceedings;

(d) In case G.R. No. L-16660, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela,
directing the Regional Labor Administrator to issue a writ of execution of the order
of the Regional Office No. 2, is hereby reversed, without costs; and

(e) In case G.R. No. L-17056, the decision rendered after hearing by the Court of
First Instance of Manila, dismissing the complaint for annulment of the proceedings
before the Regional Office No. 3, is hereby reversed and the preliminary injunction
at first issued by the trial court is revived and made permanents without costs.
RCPI v BOARD OF COMMUNICATIONS
G.R. No. L-43653 and G.R. No. L-45378
November 29, 1977

Facts:

The complainants respondents of these two consolidated petitions have identical

factual events: they are both recipient of failed telegram transmissions of death
notifications of close family members, death of wife for complainant respondent Diego
Morales and death of father of complainant respondent Pacificio Inocencio. Because of
RCPI’s failure to transmit the telegrams, Mr. Diego Morales has to be informed personally
so as to catch up with his wife’s burial, while for Mr. Pacificio Inocencio, he only learned
of his father’s death a month after when he went to visit his hometown thereby missing
the internment.

Complaints were filed with the Board of Communications. After hearing, the
respondent Board in both cases held that the service rendered by petitioner was
inadequate and unsatisfactory and imposed upon the petitioner in each case a
disciplinary fine of P200 pursuant to Section 21 of Commonwealth Act 146, as amended,
by Presidential Decree No. 1 and Letter of Implementation No. 1.

The main thrust of the argument of petitioner is that respondent Board has no
jurisdiction to entertain and take cognizance of complaints for injury caused by breach of
contractual obligation arising from negligence covered by Article 1170 of the Civil Code 1
and injury caused by quasi delict or tort liability under Article 2176 of the Civil Code 2
which according to it should be ventilated in the proper courts of justice and not in the
Board of Communications.

Issue:

Whether or not the Board of Communications has jurisdiction over claims for
damages allegedly suffered by private respondents for failure to receive telegrams sent
thru the petitioner Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc.

Held:

The Board of Communications has no jurisdiction.

The Board of Communications as a successor in interest of the Public Service

Commission, the Court has ruled that the latter "being a creature of the legislature and
not a court, can exercise only such jurisdiction and powers as are expressly or by
necessary implication, conferred upon it by statute."
One of these powers as provided under Section 129 of the Public Service Act governing
the organization of the Specialized Regulatory Board, is to issue certificate of public
convenience. But this power to issue certificate of public convenience does not carry with
it the power of supervision and control over matters not related to the issuance of
certificate of public convenience or in the performance therewith in a manner suitable to
promote public interest.

In the two cases, the petitioner is not being charged nor investigated for violation
of the terms and conditions of its certificate of public convenience or of any order, decision
or regulations of the respondent Board of Communications. The complaint of respondents
in the two cases was that they were allegedly inconvenienced or injured by the failure of
the petitioner to transmit to them telegrams informing them of the deaths of close relatives
which according to them constitute breach of contractual obligation through negligence
under the Civil Code. The charges, however, do not necessarily involve petitioner’s failure
to comply with its certificate of public convenience or any order, decision or regulation of
the respondent Board of Communications. The charge does not relate to the
management of the facilities and system of transmission of messages by petitioner in
accordance with its certificate of public convenience. If in the two complainants Diego
Morales and Pacifico Innocencio allegedly suffered injury due to petitioner’s breach of
contractual obligation arising from negligence, the proper forum for them to ventilate their
grievances for possible recovery of damages against petitioner should be in the courts
and not in the respondent Board of Communications.

[G.R. NO. 147525 : February 26, 2007]

BONIFACIO ESPINOZA, Petitioner, v. PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR OF THE

PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION OFFICE OF PAMPANGA and
MARIA QUIBULOY, Respondents.

FACTS:
 A complaint for ejectment was filed against petitioner by private respondent Maria
V. Quibuloy, as co-owner and administratrix of three parcels of land. She alleged that
petitioner had reneged on his obligations as tenant to pay the rent and till the subject
landholding.

Petitioner moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. He contended that
presentation of a certification from the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council (BARC) was a
jurisdictional requirement. (Section 1, Rule III of the 1989 Rules of Procedure of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (1989 DARAB Rules)). Quiboloy
denied allegations of non-payment of rents and non-tillage of the land for lack of
knowledge and information to form a belief as to the veracity thereof.

Without issuing a ruling on petitioner's motion to dismiss, the provincial adjudicator

set the case for hearing but neither Espinoza nor his counsel attended the hearing. Thus,
Quiboloy was allowed to present her evidence ex parte. Thereafter, the dispute was
submitted for decision. The provincial adjudicator was sufficiently convinced that
Quiboloy’s allegations were true and correct. Accordingly, he decided the case against
Espinoza.

ISSUE:

Whether or not DARAB is bound by technical rules followed in courts of law.

RULING:

No. Administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions are not bound by

technical rules followed in courts of law. The adjudicator is given enough latitude, subject
to the essential requirements of administrative due process, to be able to expeditiously
ascertain the facts of the agrarian dispute.

While there may have been a technical lapse on the part of the adjudicator in
disposing of the motion to dismiss, the assailed acts of the adjudicator did not amount to
a grave abuse of discretion justifying a writ of certiorari. Considering the technical
flexibility afforded to agrarian adjudicators, the order may easily be construed as a denial
of the motion to dismiss. What would have been the prudent recourse under the rules
was to submit an answer immediately, participate in the hearing and appeal an adverse
decision. Sadly, petitioner failed to do any of these. It is now too late for him to dispute
the adjudicator's decision.
[G.R. NO. 154243 : December 22, 2007]

DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL ROBERTO LASTIMOSO, ACTING CHIEF

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), DIRECTORATE FOR PERSONNEL AND
RECORDS MANAGEMENT (DPRM), INSPECTOR GENERAL, P/CHIEF SUPT.
RAMSEY OCAMPO and P/SUPT. ELMER REJANO,Petitioners, v. P/SENIOR
INSPECTOR JOSE J. ASAYO, Respondent.

FACTS:
 In 1997, Delia Buño, a private citizen filed with the Office of the Inspector General
of the Philippine National Police (PNP) an administrative complaint for harassment/abuse
of authority against herein respondent. The PNP Legal Service conducted the summary
hearing and in January 22, 1999, herein petitioner PNP Chief Lastimoso rendered
decision on the dismissal from police service of the respondent.

Respondent commenced an action for certiorari and prohibition at the RTC. In

August 27, 1999, the RTC annulled the January 22, 2019 decision of herein petitioner for
having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

In August 17, 2001, the CA nullified the RTC decision and ruled that the PNP Chief
had jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the civilian against the respondent and that
respondent’s failure to exhaust the administrative remedy of filing an appeal with the
National Appellate Board was fatal to his cause.

In August 8, 2002, CA reversed its decision and ruled that since the offense
charged against respondent was punishable by dismissal, the People’s Law Enforcement
Board has jurisdiction. It further ruled that the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies does not apply to the case since the issue involved is purely legal in nature and
the RTC’s decision was affirmed.

In March 6, 2007, The Supreme Court has set aside the August 8, 2002 CA
decision and reinstated the August 17, 2001 CA decision.

Hence, the present motion for consideration of the respondent against this court’s
decision. He asserts that the evidence presented in the summary hearing does not prove
his guilt of the charges against him. Respondent insists that he was not accorded due
process during the summary hearing since the summary hearing officer did not conduct
any hearing at all but only relied on the affidavits and pleadings submitted to him, without
propounding further questions to complainant's witnesses, or calling in other witnesses.
ISSUES:

I. Whether or not the respondent the respondent was accorded due process
considering no hearing was conducted in the summary proceeding
 II. Whether or not respondent failed to exhaust all administrative remedies prior
to the filing of the case in court

III. Whether or not the PNP Chief had jurisdiction to act on a private citizen’s
complaint against respondent

IV. Whether or not the evidence in the summary proceeding has proved the guilt
of the respondent on the charges filed against him

RULING:

1. NO. Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type

proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. A formal or trial-type hearing is not
at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements of due process are
satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their side of the controversy at hand. It is not legally objectionable for being
violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based
solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the
parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their direct testimony.

2. NO. One exception on the principle of exhaustion of remedies is when the issue
involved is a purely legal question. Since the issue presented by the respondent
before the RTC was whether or not the PNP Chief had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the complaint filed by a civilian against him is a purely legal question,
the principle of exhaustion of remedies does not apply in this case. He rightfully
invoked the jurisdiction of the courts without first going through all the
administrative remedies.

In addition, it is also understandable why respondent immediately resorted to the

remedy of certiorari instead of pursuing his motion for reconsideration of the PNP
Chief's decision as an appeal before the National Appellate Board (NAB). It was
quite easy to get confused as to which body had jurisdiction over his case. It was
only in Quiambao v. Court of Appeals, promulgated in 2005 or after respondent
had already filed the Petition for Certiorari with the trial court, when the Court
resolved the issue of which body has jurisdiction over cases that fall under both
Sections 41 and 42 of R.A. No. 6975.

3. YES. The People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) and the PNP Chief and
regional directors have concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases filed
against members of the PNP which may warrant dismissal from service and fall
 under Sections 41 and 42 of RA NO. 6975- Department of Interior and Local
Government Code of 1990. However, once a complaint is filed with the PNP Chief
or regional directors, said authorities shall acquire exclusive original jurisdiction
over the case.

4. To resolve the fourth issue, respondent would have the Court re-calibrate the
weight of evidence presented before the summary hearing officer, arguing that said
evidence is insufficient to prove respondent's guilt of the charges against him. . He
may file an appeal before the NAB, pursuant to Section 45, R.A. No. 6925.

It must be emphasized that the action commenced by respondent in the RTC was
one for certiorari. Yet, when the issue involved affects the legal soundness of the
decision, it is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari. The general
rule is that the filing of a Petition for Certiorari does not toll the running of the period
to appeal. However, Section 1, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the Rules
shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. It is a settled
jurisprudence that in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied.

WHEREFORE, Respondent 's Motion for Reconsideration is partly GRANTED.

The Decision of the Court dated March 6, 2007 is MODIFIED such that respondent
is hereby allowed to file his appeal with the National Appellate Board within ten
(10) days from finality of herein Resolution.SO ORDERED.
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion
322 SCRA 160
(Due process in administrative adjudication)

FACTS:
In 1977, PD 1069 or the Philippine Extradition Law was issued by Pres. Marcos.
In 1994, RP-US Extradition Treaty was signed in Manila between Philippines and USA,
and said treaty was concurred by the Senate. In 1999, an extradition request of private
respondent was sent by the Secretary of State of the US to the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs of the Philippines. Based on the document, Mark Jimenez was being charged with
Conspiracy to commit offense, attempted tax evasion, fraud by wire, radio or TV, false
statement and Election offense. On the same day, DFA Secretary transmitted the
extradition request to the DOJ Secretary for its “technical evaluation and assessment.”

Pending evaluation, private respondent Jimenez wrote a letter to the DOJ

requesting to be furnished with the Extradition documents from the US. The DOJ denied
the letter request on the ground of confidentiality of documents and for being premature.
Note that evaluation by the department of the document is NOT a preliminary
investigation nor akin to investigation of criminal cases. The purpose is merely to
determine whether the procedures and requirement under the law and treaty have been
complied with by the requesting State.

Aggrieved, private respondent filed before the RTC petitions for Mandamus,
Certiorari and Prohibition with application for TRO and writ of preliminary injunction.

Judge Lantion of RTC Manila issued a TRO in favor of respondent. DOJ Secretary
filed before the SC for immediate remedy. SC ordered RTC judge to cease and desist
from enforcing the assailed order. Issue on the merits of the case was heard on oral
arguments.
ISSUE:
Whether or not procedural process rights of notice and hearing are indispensable
during the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings.

RULING: [2 DECISIONS]
A.
On January 2000, SC through Justice Melo ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE. [NOTE THOUGH
THAT there was a failure on the DFA to strictly observe the Extradition Law. Under Sec.
5 (1) of said Law, the DOJ Sec. has the ministerial duty of filing the extradition papers. In
this case, it was the DOJ Secretary who made the extradition evaluation when it should
be done by the DFA Sec.] The evaluation process, just like extradition proceedings, is
sui generis. It is not criminal investigation, but it is also not merely an exercise of
ministerial functions. During the evaluation stage, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs shall:
(1) Make technical assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the extradition
papers (2) Outrightly deny the request if on its face the documents are incomplete and/or
crime indicated is not extraditable and (3) Make a determination W/N the request is
politically motivated Hence, this process is investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast
to a proceeding conducted in the exercise of an administrative body’s quasi-judicial
power.

The basic rights of notice and hearing pervade not only in criminal and civil proceedings,
but in administrative proceedings as well. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate
the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their
interests and upon notice; they may claim the right to appear therein and present their
side and to refute the position of opposing party.

REASON FOR RULING IN THE AFFIRMATIVE:

1. The evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an
investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are criminal. Although the
law is silent on whether or not notice and hearing shall be granted to the extraditee,
 the extradition request pending evaluation creates an impending threat to a
prospective extraditee’s liberty which is imminent in nature. Because of this
possible consequence of arrest, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of
a criminal investigation.

2. This case does not fall in any of the instances when right to notice & hearing
may be dispensed with. The peculiarity and deviant characteristic of evaluation
proceeding is that on one hand, there is yet no extradite, but ironically on the other,
it results in an administrative determination which, if adverse to the person
involved, may cause immediate incarceration.

The “accused” faces the threat of arrest, not only after the extradition petition is
filed in court, but even during the evaluation stage itself by virtue of the provisional
arrest allowed under the treaty and the implementing law. There is therefore
blatant and manifest prejudice to the accused during the evaluation stage.
Therefore, it cannot be dispensed with.

3. In case of conflict between international law and municipal law, efforts should
first be exerted to harmonize them. In case of irreconcilable difference,
jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld. In the case at bar,
although said rights are granted to extradite after the filing of the extradition petition
in court by the DOJ Secretary, the law is silent as to W/N these rights are granted
during the evaluation. When the law is silent, we must apply rules of fair play. A
libertarian approach is thus called for.

B.
In Oct. 2000, SC through Justice Puno REVERSED decision issued in January 2000.
We now hold that private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during
the evaluation stage of the extradition process, for SIX (6) REASONS:
First. P.D. No. 1069[3] which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides
the time when an extraditee shall be furnished a copy of the petition for extradition
as well as its supporting papers, i.e., after the filing of the petition for extradition in
the extradition court. (Art. 6 of the Law)

Second. All treaties, including the RP-US Extradition Treaty, should be interpreted
in light of their intent. Nothing less than the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory provides that "a treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to
the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose.

Third. An equally compelling factor to consider is the understanding of the

parties themselves to the RP-US Extradition Treaty as well as the general
interpretation of the issue in question by other countries with similar treaties with
the Philippines. The rule is recognized that while courts have the power to interpret
treaties, the meaning given them by the departments of government particularly
charged with their negotiation and enforcement is accorded great weight.[7] The
reason for the rule is laid down in Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines, et
al.,[8] where we stressed that a treaty is a joint executive-legislative act which
enjoys the presumption that "it was first carefully studied and determined to be
constitutional before it was adopted and given the force of law in the country."

Fourth, An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal

proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the
determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused.[13] His guilt or innocence
will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a
rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence
of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee especially by one whose
extradition papers are still undergoing evaluation.
Fifth. Private respondent would also impress upon the Court the urgency of his
right to notice and hearing considering the alleged threat to his liberty "which may
be more priceless than life."[24] The supposed threat to private respondent’s
liberty is perceived to come from several provisions of the RP-US Extradition
Treaty and P.D. No. 1069 which allow provisional arrest and temporary detention.

Sixth. To be sure, private respondent’s plea for due process deserves serious
consideration involving as it does his primordial right to liberty. His plea to due
process, however, collides with important state interests which cannot also be
ignored for they serve the interest of the greater majority. In tilting the balance in
favor of the interests of the State, the Court stresses that it is not ruling that the
private respondent has no right to due process at all throughout the length and
breadth of the extrajudicial proceedings. Procedural due process requires a
determination of what process is due, when it is due, and the degree of what is
due. Stated otherwise, a prior determination should be made as to whether
procedural protections are at all due and when they are due, which in turn depends
on the extent to which an individual will be "condemned to suffer grievous loss.
EMELITA A. DORAN, petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE JUDGE JIMMY HENRY F. LUCZON, JR., Regional Trial Court, Branch
1, Tuguegarao City,Cagayan, and JUDGE SALVADOR B. CAMPOS, Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Amulung-Iguig, Cagayan, respondents.

FACTS:

A petition for certiorari with a prayer for a writ of prohibitory injunction was filed by
Emelita Doran assailing the resolutions issued by Executive Judge Luczon Jr. regarding
the case which the former filed against Judge Campos.

The petitioner filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a complaint charging
respondent Judge Campos with grave misconduct. Upon recommendation by then Court
Administrator Benipayo, the Supreme Court referred the administrative matter to
Executive Judge Luczon, Jr. for investigation, report, and recommendation. The
respondent allowed Judge Campos to file a demurrer to evidence to which the petitioner
believed it to be improper, hence the petition for certiorari.

However, upon the recommendation of Court Adminitrator Velasco Jr., the

Supreme Court issued a resolution dismissing the petitioner’s complaint against the
respondent judge for insufficiency of evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner was correct in assailing the resolutions of respondent
through the special civil action of certiorari?

RULING:

A special civil action of certiorari may be invoked when it is directed against any
tribunal, board or officer "exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions," which "acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”

It is important therefore to determine what are considered judicial and quasi-judicial

acts. It is the nature of the act to be performed, rather than of the office, board or body
which performs it, that determines whether or not it is exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial
function. Judicial or quasi-judicial function involves the determination of what the law is,
and what the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect to the matter in
controversy and, on the basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their
respective rights. In other words, the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial function must be clothed with power and authority to pass judgment or render a
decision on the controversy construing and applying the laws to that end. Where an
administrative body or officer does not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, certiorari
does not lie.

In this case, Judge Luczon was designated by this Court merely to investigate and,
thereafter, submit a report and the appropriate recommendation relative to the said
complaint. Simply stated, his function is merely investigative and recommendatory in
nature. He has no power to pronounce judgment on the controversy as such function
belongs only to this Court pursuant to its power of supervision and control over court
personnel and officers. His designation as investigator, therefore, does not involve the
exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial power. Hence, his act/s may not be challenged in a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
VIDOL VS COMELEC
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. V. TORRES
G.R. No. 101279 August 6, 1992

FACTS:
On June 1, 1991, as a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by
Filipino housemaids employed in Hong Kong, DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued
Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by
private employment agencies of "Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong". The
DOLE itself, through the POEA took over the business of deploying such Hong Kong-
bound workers.
A petition for prohibition with temporary restraining order was filed by the Philippine
Association of Service Exporters (PASEI, for short), to prohibit and enjoin the Secretary
of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the Administrator of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or POEA) from enforcing and
implementing DOLE Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991 and POEA Memorandum
Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991. PASEI filed a petition for prohibition to annul
the aforementioned DOLE and POEA circulars and to prohibit their implementation.
Moreover, PASEI alleges that the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of
the National Administrative Register were not complied with.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of
their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars;

2. Whether or not the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution,
are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and

3. Whether or not the questioned circulars are invalid for failure to comply with the
publication requirement.

RULING:
1. No. The respondents acted well within in their authority and did not commit grave abuse
of discretion. This is because Article 36 (Labor Code) clearly grants the Labor Secretary
to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities, to wit:
Art. 36. Regulatory Power. — The Secretary of Labor shall have the power
to restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all
agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation of Recruitment and
Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue orders and
promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement
the provisions of this title.
2. No. The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies
is not unconstitutional, unreasonable and oppressive. Said administrative issuances
merely restricted the scope or area of PASEI’s business operations by excluding
therefrom recruitment and deployment of domestic helpers for Hong Kong till after the
establishment of the “mechanisms” that will enhance the protection of Filipino domestic
helpers going to Hong Kong. In fine, other than the recruitment and deployment of Filipino
domestic helpers for Hong Kong, PASEI may still deploy other class of Filipino workers
either for Hong Kong and other countries and all other classes of Filipino workers for other
countries. Said administrative issuances, are intended to curtail, if not to end, rampant
violations of the rule against excessive collections of placement and documentation fees,
travel fees and other charges committed by private employment agencies recruiting and
deploying domestic helpers to Hong Kong. They are reasonable, valid and justified under
the general welfare clause of the Constitution, since the recruitment and deployment
business, as it is conducted today, is affected with public interest.
3. Yes. The questioned circulars are defective and unenforceable for lack of power
publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in
Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter
2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.

The ruling in Tañada vs. Tuvera 146 SCRA 446 states that:

. . . Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their

purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation. (p. 447.)

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,

regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-
called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning
the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties. (p. 448.)

… Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is

to inform the public of the content of the laws.

For lack of proper publication, the administrative circulars in question may

not be enforced and implemented.
MATEO VS CA
CARINO vs. CAPULONG
222 SCRA 593
This is a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge and the writ of preliminary
injunction issued pursuant to the said order, and to enjoin the respondent Judge from
implementing the order of 15 November 1990 and from further conducting proceedings
in Special Civil Case No. 90-2917 until further orders from this Court.

FACTS:

Regional Director Venancio R. Nava, Region IX-DECS, received AMA's letter of

intent to operate as an educational institution in Davao City. Responding to the said letter,
Nava reminded AMA "of the provisions of the Rules and Regulations of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 232, specifically Article E, Section 7, Rule III that the filing of the application shall be
at least one (1) year before the opening of classes" and the "provisions of the Private
School Law reiterated in the Educational Act of 1992 which prohibits the operation of
unauthorized schools or courses." Nevertheless, AMA proceeded to announce its
opening through news and print media, and thereupon, started to enroll students in
elementary, secondary and tertiary levels. Taking remedial action, the DECS Regional
Director directed AMA to stop enrollment and to desist from operating without prior
authorization. DECS inspection team confirmed that AMA, however, not only continued
the enrollment but even started to hold regular classes. AMA's Officer-in-Charge
requested that the closure be held in abeyance for fifteen (15) days, but was denied by
Director Nava.

AMA filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 18, a petition for
prohibition, certiorari and mandamus against the Hon. Isidro Carino, DEC's Secretary
and Atty. Nava, Regional Director, DECS, Region IX to annul and set aside the closure
order and to enjoin the respondents from closing or padlocking AMACC, Davao
City. Thereafter, AMA filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari assailing the
order of the court a quo, but, again, the Court of Appeals peremptorily dismissed the
petition and also denied its motion for reconsideration. Under the cloak of an organization
of parents of students styling themselves as AMACC-PARENTS Organization, AMA filed
another petition for prohibition and/or mandamus with preliminary injunction with the RTC
of Davao City, but the court dismissed the petition.

AMA, however, filed with the RTC of Makati, Branch 134, presided over by
respondent Judge, another petition for mandamus, with damages, preliminary injunction
and/or restraining order against Hon. Isidro Carino, to compel the respondents to approve
petitioners' application for permit to operate retroactive to the commencement of school
year 1990-1991, and to enjoin the closure and/or padlocking of AMA-Davao school.
 Petitioners, through the Office of the Solicitor General, moved to dismiss AMA's
petition on the ground that (1) AMA is not entitled to the writ of mandamus as petitioners'
authority to grant or deny the permit to operate is discretionary and not ministerial; (2)
AMA failed to comply with the provisions of the Education Act; (3) AMA is blatantly
engaging in forum shopping; (4) AMA failed to exhaust available administrative remedies
before resorting to court; and (5) lack of territorial jurisdiction over petitioner Regional
Director and AMA-Davao. However the respondent judge issued a writ of preliminary
injunction in favor of AMA

ISSUE:

Whether or not the authority to grant permit by DECS to applicant educational

institution is a ministerial duty or discretionary duty.

RULING:

The action filed by the private respondents is a petition for mandamus to compel
the petitioners to approve their application to operate AMACC-Davao City as an
educational institution. As a rule, mandamus will lie only to compel an officer to perform
a ministerial duty but not a discretionary function. A ministerial duty is one which is clear
and specific as to leave no room for the exercise of discretion in its performance. If the
law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when
the duty shall be performed, such duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same
requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment. On the other hand, a
discretionary duty is that which by nature requires the exercise of judgment.

In the present case, the issuance of the permit in question is not a ministerial duty
of the petitioners. It is a discretionary duty or function on the part of the petitioners
because it had to be exercised in accordance with — and not in violation of — the law
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. Thus, as aptly observed by the Solicitor
General in his Motion to dismiss the petition —

Establishment or recognition of private schools through government grant

of permits is governed by law, specifically Batas Pambansa Blg. 232. The
authority to grant permit is vested upon the judgment of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports, which prescribes the rules and regulations
governing the recognition on private schools (Section 27, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 232).

Whether to grant or not a permit is not a ministerial duty of the Department

of Education, Culture and Sports. Rather it is a discretionary duty to be
exercised in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed.
 In the case at bar, petitioner has been operating a school without a permit
in blatant violation of law. Public respondent has no ministerial duty to issue
to petitioner a permit to operate a school in Davao City before petitioner has
even filed an application or before his application has been first processed
in accordance with the rules and regulations on the matter. Certainly, public
respondent is not enjoined by any law to grant such permit or to allow such
operation without a permit, without first processing an application. To do so
is violation of the Educational Act.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the order dated 15 November 1990 and
the writ of preliminary injunction dated 16 November 1990 are hereby ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. The petition for mandamus before the respondent court is DISMISSED.

The Temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued by this Court is hereby made
PERMANENT.
TATAD VS DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
G.R. No. 124360 and 127867. November 5, 1997

FACTS:
The petitioner, Tatad, questioned the constitutionality of RA No. 8180 “An Act
Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes.” The deregulation
process has two phases: (a) the transition phase and the (b) full deregulation phase
through EO No. 372.
The petitioner claims that Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation
of legislative power to the President and the Sec. of Energy because it does not provide
a determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining
when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry, and the law does
not provide any specific standard to determine when the prices of crude oil in the world
market are considered to be declining nor when the exchange rate of the peso to the US
dollar is considered stable.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Sec 15 of R.A. 8180 is unconstitutional for violation regarding the
prohibition on undue delegation of power.

RULING:
The court ruled that RA No. 8180 is declared unconstitutional and ED. No. 372
void.The rational of the Court annulling RA No. 8180 is not because it disagrees with
deregulation as an economic policy but because as cobbled by Congress in its present
form, the law violates the Constitution.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid
delegation of legislative power, viz: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves
the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is
to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent
the delegation from running not. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of
legislative authority to the delegates who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the
legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in our constitutional
landscape. As sagely observed, delegation of legislative power has become an
inevitability in light of the increasing complexity of the task of government. To cede to the
Executive the power to make law is to invite tyranny, indeed, to transgress the principle
of separation of powers. The exercise of delegated power is given a strict scrutiny by
courts for the delegate is a mere agent whose action cannot infringe the terms of agency.
PELAEZ VS AUDITOR GENERAL
Eastern Shipping Lines vs. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
G.R. No. 76633 October 18. 1988
FACTS:
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in
an accident in Tokyo, Japan, on March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under EO
No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the
vessel, contends that Saco was not an overseas worker but a domestic employee; that
the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System. The
POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and ruled in favor of the complainant.
The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses
was made by the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2. The petitioner
contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation;
and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative
discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the POEA has jurisdiction over the case.
2. Whether or not Memorandum Circular No. 2 is in violation of the principle of the
non-delegation of legislative power.

RULING:
1. Yes. The POEA was created under Executive Order No. 797, promulgated on
May 1, 1982. Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the POEA is vested with
"original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving
employee-employer relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving
Filipino contract workers, including seamen." These cases, according to the 1985 Rules
and Regulations on Overseas Employment issued by the POEA, include "claims for
death, disability and other benefits" arising out of such employment.”
Under the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment, overseas is
defined as "employment of a worker outside the Philippines, including employment on
board vessels plying international waters, covered by valid contract.” A contract worker is
described as "any person working or who has worked overseas under a valid employment
contract and shall include seamen." These definitions clearly apply to Vitaliano Saco for
it is not disputed that he died while under a contract of employment with the petitioner
and alongside the petitioner's vessel, the M/V Eastern Polaris, while berthed in a foreign
country.
2. No. Legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be
delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be
enforced, not what the law shall be. There are two accepted tests to determine whether
or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power: the completeness test and the
sufficient standard test. The law must be complete in all its terms and conditions and there
must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate's authority.
The delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the
exception. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar
problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to
administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of
the statute which is called the "power of subordinate legislation." With this power,
administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling
in" the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to
provide. These regulations have the force and effect of law.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model
contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of cases without
challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA in requiring the model contract is not
unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said
authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of
overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices."
Petition is dismissed.