Was Seneca a psychological monist or partitionist?

Stoic and Platonic

Theory of Soul and Emotion

Stefan Röttig

Abstract: With regard to many ancient philosophers, the question of how emotions
emerge can only be answered if one takes a closer look at their theories of soul. In this es-
say, using the example of the Stoics, I would like to demonstrate this. The problem is that
the Stoics, in the course of the approximately 500 years of their existence, apparently did
not always have the same theory of soul. As a result, they seem to have given different
explanations for the emergence of emotions. I will therefore not speak of ‘the Stoics’ with-
out qualification, but adhere to the common subdivision of the school into an early, a mid-
dle and a late period. Accordingly, I will first focus on the thoughts of the early Stoics on
this topic, and afterwards on those of the middle Stoic Posidonius. Finally, I will take into
account what Seneca thinks about the structure of soul and the emergence of emotions. The
question of Seneca’s orthodoxy on this point has long been a matter of scholarly interest.
The relevance of these matters to the study of Plato’s thought will become apparent by the
end of the discussion.

1. The psychological monism of the early Stoics

The early Stoics have the reputation of being psychological monists. This label is
somewhat misleading because it suggests that the soul has only one part. But the sources
about the doctrines of the early Stoics1 reveal something different. Occasionally, it is said
that they believed in eight parts of the soul (ἐξ ὀκτὼ µερῶν/octo in partes) 2 – the
Hegemonikon (ἡγεµονικόν3/principale), which is the governing part4 and has its seat in the
heart5, the five senses (τὰ αἰσθητικά/τὰ αἰσθητήρια/sensus), i.e., the senses of sight, smell,

1
All we have are secondary sources.
2
Cf. Aët. plac. IV 4, 4 (= SVF II 827) and DL VII 110; later also Diogenes Laërtius speaks of eight parts of
the soul (cf. DL VII 157). According to Chalc. comm. 220 (= LS 53 G 4) and Tert. anim. 14, 2 (= Posid. F
147), it was Chrysippus who divided the soul into parts.
3
In one passage Diogenes Laërtius calls the leading part διανοητικόν and not ἡγεµονικόν (cf. DL VII 110);
in another he calls it λογιστικόν (cf. DL VII 157).
4
τὸ ἡγεµονικόν is the abbreviation for τὸ ἡγεµονικὸν µέρος (cf. Stob. anthol. II 65, 2). Stobaeus reports
furthermore that the ἡγεµονικὸν µέρος was also called διάνοια (cf. Stob. anthol., II 65, 3). Viewed in this
light it is not surprising that Diogenes Laërtius calls the leading part διανοητικόν (footn. 3).
5
Cf. Aët. plac. IV 5, 6 (= DG 391, 12ff.): Οἱ Στωικοὶ πάντες ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ καρδίᾳ ἢ τῷ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν
πνεύµατι. My own translation: “All Stoics [assumed that the Hegemonikon] is in the whole heart or in the
pneuma around the heart.“ Cf. also DL VII 159: ἡγεµονικὸν δ’ εἶναι τὸ κυριώτατον τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐν ᾧ αἱ
φαντασίαι καὶ αἱ ὁρµαὶ γίνονται καὶ ὅθεν ὁ λόγος ἀναπέµπεται: ὅπερ εἶναι ἐν καρδίᾳ. Translated by Robert
D. Hicks: “By ruling part of the soul is meant that which is most truly soul proper, in which arise presenta-
tions and impulses and from which issues rational speech. And it has its seat in the heart.“ Galen criticizes

1
hearing, taste and touch; the generative faculty (σπερµατικόν/σπέρµα/γεννητικόν/serendi
procreandique potentia) and the faculty of speech (φωνητικόν/φωνή/vocalis substantia).6
The senses and the faculties of generation and speech are described as streams of pneuma
(πνεύµατα/spiritus), which flow from the Hegemonikon (which likewise consists of pneu-
ma) like water out of a fountain and spread in all directions.7 Other doxographers also
speak of different parts of the soul, but they do not mention a definite number. This is most
evident in a passage of Galen’s book De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis where he suppos-
edly quotes Chrysippus:

Ἡ ψυχὴ πνεῦµά ἐστι σύµφυτον ἡµῖν συνεχὲς παντὶ τῷ σώµατι διῆκον, ἔστ’ ἂν ἡ τῆς
ζωῆς εὐτονία παρῇ ἐν τῷ σώµατι. ταύτης οὖν τῶν µερῶν ἑκάστῳ διατεταγµένων µορίῳ, τὸ
διῆκον αὐτῆς εἰς τὴν τραχεῖαν ἀρτηρίαν φωνήν <φαµεν> εἶναι, τὸ δὲ εἰς ὀφθαλµοὺς ὄψιν,
τὸ δὲ εἰς ὦτα ἀκοήν, τὸ δὲ εἰς ῥῖνας ὄσφρησιν, τὸ δ’ εἰς γλῶτταν γεῦσιν, τὸ δ’ εἰς ὅλην τὴν
σάρκα ἁφήν, καὶ τὸ εἰς ὄρχεις ἕτερόν τιν’ ἔχον τοιοῦτον λόγον σπερµατικόν, εἰς ὃ δὲ
συµβαίνει πάντα ταῦτα, ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ εἶναι, µέρος ὂν αὐτῆς τὸ ἡγεµονικόν.8

“The soul is pneuma connate with us, extending as a continuum through the whole
body as long as the free-flowing breath of life is present in the body. Now of the parts of
the soul that have been assigned to the several parts (of the body), that of them which ex-
tends to the trachea is the voice; that to the eyes, sight; that to the ears, hearing; that to the
nostrils, smell; that to the tongue, taste; that to the entire flesh, touch; and that which ex-
tends to the testicles, possessing another such logos, is seminal. That part where all these
meet is in the heart, being the governing part of the soul.”9

On closer inspection, it becomes clear that Galen mentions the same eight parts of
the soul as the other doxographers: the Hegemonikon, the five senses and the faculties of
generation and speech. Galen’s remarks are interesting in another respect. The early Stoics
obviously distinguished the faculties of the soul with regard to the different parts of the
body.10 Just as there are eyes, ears, nostrils, tongues and flesh, so there are faculties of
sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. As can be gathered from other sources, there is one
organ, according to the early Stoics, which has more than one faculty. Among adult human
beings, the Hegemonikon with its seat in the heart is usually, as the doxographer Aetius

this view (cf. Gal. PHP V 1, 1ff.) and follows Plato’s figure of Timaeus according to which only the spirited
part of the soul is in the heart (cf. Gal. PHP V 1, 3 and Plat. Tim. 70a–d).
6
Cf. Aët. plac. IV 4, 4 (= SVF II 827) as well as 21, 1-4 (= LS 53 H 5ff.). Cf. additionally Chalc. comm. 220
(= LS 53 G 3ff.) and DL VII 110.
7
Cf. Chalc. comm. 220 (= LS 53 G 5f.). A few lines later Chalcidius compares the Hegemonikon with a tree-
trunk and the other parts of the soul with its branches. Elsewhere he compares it with a spider and the other
parts of the soul with spinning threads: The spider holds them tight in its feet and notices immediately when-
ever something flies into the web (cf. Chalc. ebd. [= SVF II 879]). Aetius compares the Hegemonikon and the
other parts of the soul with an octopus and its tentacles (cf. Aët. plac. IV 21, 1-4 [= LS 53 H 4f.]). From a
present-day perspective all these comparisons are highly reminiscent of the brain and its nervous system (cf.
Long 2002, p. 572).
8
Gal. PHP III 1, 9f. (= SVF II 885). If we can trust Galen, the quotation is from Chrysippus’ lost treatise On
Soul (Περὶ ψυχῆς).
9
Translated by Phillip de Lacy.
10
The term δύναµις is actually not used by Galen in the quotation. Cf. on that point Iamblichus’ account of
the old Stoic theory of soul (Stob. anthol. I 368, 12–20 [= LS 53 K]). Admittedly, neither he does use the
term, but it seems to be contained in his question πῶς οὖν διακρίνονται. The heading under which it is placed
reads as follows: Ἐν ταὐτῷ· περὶ δυνάµεων ψυχῆς („In the same [treatise of Iamblichus, namely On Soul]:
On the faculties of the soul“ [own translation]). I think that is why Long and Sedley suggest: „Supply αἱ
δυνάµεις τῆς ψυχῆς“ (cf. their commentary on LS 53 K).

2
reports, that “[…] which produces impressions, assents, perceptions and impulses” (τὸ
ποιοῦν τὰς φαντασίας καὶ συγκαταθέσεις καὶ αἰσθήσεις καὶ ὁρµας).11 These faculties differ
from each other as sweetness and fragrance in an apple12, which seems to mean that the
difference between them is merely a functional one.13 The substrate where they are located
is the same.14
Due to the Hegemonikon, it is possible that the received stimuli of the sense organs,
which are in their own right merely physiological in nature, become sensations and im-
pressions. The early Stoics illustrated this idea, as Plotinus reports, using the example of
pain. If someone says her finger hurts, then the pain unquestionably pertains to her finger.
But the sensation of the pain (ἡ αἴσθησις τοῦ ἀλγεῖν) is taking place in the Hegemonikon.15
The Hegemonikon, moreover, enables human beings at a certain age to express the phe-
nomenal content of their impressions linguistically. Similarly, it enables them to assent to
propositions (ἀξιώµατα) corresponding to those impressions. Suppose an adult human
agent has an impelling impression (φαντασία ὁρµητική)16 of sunny weather and assents to
the corresponding proposition “I should go for a walk”. What happens is that her
Hegemonikon will send a stream of pneuma to the legs, causing them thereby to move; this
was allegedly the view of Cleanthes.17 Chrysippus, on the other hand, believed that in this
case the pneuma of the Hegemonikon causes the movement of the legs directly with the
assent.18 Therefore, asked what a walk is, he is quoted as saying: “The Hegemonikon itself
is the walk.”19
After these considerations, it should be clear that the psychological monism of the
early Stoics is not a theory according to which there is nothing but one part of the soul. Yet
the expression is legitimate insofar as the Hegemonikon is the integrative locus of all cog-
nitive functions.20 It is the power that rules over all the other parts or faculties of the soul.21
But it is not necessarily to be understood as an all-determining mechanism. Indeed, the
Hegemonikon actualizes some of its faculties immediately, as the sense impressions (pro-
vided the agent is awake). Others, however, it actualizes – at least in the case of adult hu-
man agents – indirectly, like impulses, which are caused by assents. The early Stoics hold
that impulses of adult human agents never occur by themselves; they always depend on

11
Cf. Aët. plac. IV 21, 1-4 (= LS 53 H 1f.).
12
Cf. Iamblichus in Stob. anthol. I 368, 17ff. (= LS 53 K 5ff.).
13
This comparison is on several grounds awkward. First of all, one would rather say that there is a qualitative
difference between sweetness and fragrance, not a functional one. Further, sweetness and fragrance are strict-
ly speaking not in an apple. They are impressions which are caused by a sensation of something that is in an
apple.
14
Cf. also Plut. de virt. mor. 441 C (= LS 61 B): καὶ νοµίζουσιν οὐκ εἶναι τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἄλογον διαφορᾷ
τινι καὶ φύσει τοῦ λογικοῦ διακεκριµένον, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὸ τῆς ψυχῆς µέρος, ὃ δὴ καλοῦσι διάνοιαν καὶ
ἡγεµονικόν […]. Translated by William C. Helmbold: “They also think that the passionate and irrational part
of the soul is not distinguished from the rational by any difference or by ist nature, but is the same part,
which, indeed, they term intelligence and the governing part […].”
15
Cf. Plot. enn. IV 7, 7 (= SVF II 858).
16
Cf. Stob. anthol. II 86, 17f. (= LS 53 Q 1f.) and Frede 2011, p. 36: “Such impressions are called ‘impul-
sive’ (hormêtikai), since they impel the animal to act.”
17
Cf. Sen. epist. 113, 23.
18
Cf. Inwood 1985, p. 50: “Chrysippus thought that the relation of mind to body was more intimate, and that
the pneuma of the mind could act directly on the limbs and that this should properly be called ‘action’.”
19
Cf. Sen. epist. 113, 20: [...] Chrysippus [ait] ipsum principale.
20
Müller 2009, p. 157.
21
Margaret Graver calls the Hegemonikon “single command center” (cf. Graver 2014, p. 261, footn. 14).

3
assents. That is why Chrysippus and Antipater of Tarsus said in their dispute with the Aca-
demics that they are talking nonsense if they claim impulses can follow at once on impres-
sions without people having first yielded (εἴκειν) or given their assent (συγκατατίθεσθαι).22
When it comes to emotions, this view forms the theoretical foundation: According to the
early Stoics, emotions are impulses, or to put it more precisely, they are excessive impuls-
es. So it follows that they depend on assents, too – no emotion emerges merely by itself.
This is the so-called cognitive approach in the philosophy of emotions in its original ver-
sion.23

2. Back to Plato: The Posidonian Approach to Emotions

The ancient physician Galen reports that the middle Stoic Posidonios did not agree
with the early Stoics in matters of soul and emotions, but returned to Plato’s three parts of
the soul. What I want to do in this section is to flesh out the crucial features of this theory,
for which the fourth book of the Republic is the main source. By doing this, we have, I
think, a good starting point to understand the Posidonian approach to emotions. This ap-
proach is particularly interesting with regard to Seneca because some scholars have
claimed that he was influenced by it.24
In the Republic Socrates draws an analogy between the polis and the soul. He as-
sumes that each of them has three classes of natures in it (τριττὰ γένη φύσεων25 or εἰδή26,
sometimes he uses also the term “parts” [µέρη]27): To the deliberative (βουλευτικόν), aux-
iliary (ἐπικουρητικόν) and money-making (χρηµατιστικόν) parts in the polis28, there corre-
spond the rational (λογιστικόν), spirited (θυµοειδές) and appetitive (ἐπιθυµητικόν) parts in
the soul.29 The polis and the soul are alike in another respect: Both of them can be wise,
courageous, moderate and just. The polis is wise if it is well-advised (εὔβουλος), i.e., if its
rulers (ἄρχοντες) have the non-subject-specific practical knowledge of good counsel
(εὐβουλία) and make use of it.30 The soul is wise, on the other hand, if reason rules in it
(ἄρχειν) and applies its knowledge of that which is expedient (ἐπιστήµη τοῦ
ξυµφέροντος)31 – for instance, by declaring in certain situations that something must not be
done (αἱροῦντος λόγου µὴ δεῖν)32. Furthermore, the polis can be called courageous if its
auxiliary part, namely the military forces, preserve under any conditions – in pains and
pleasures, desires and fears – the legislator’s opinion about which things are terrible
(δεινόν).33 The soul is for a very similar reason courageous. It is courageous if its spirited

22
Cf. Plut. de Stoic. rep. 47, 1057 A (= LS 53 S).
23
Occasionally, it is also called “affective volitionalism” (cf. Graver 2007, p. 63).
24
Cf. Holler 1934, Pohlenz 51978, p. 308 and Fillion-Lahille 1984, p. 163–169.
25
Cf. Plat. rep. IV 435b.
26
Cf. Plat. rep. IV 435b–c, e and 439e.
27
Cf. Plat. rep. IV 431e–432a, 442b–c and 444b.
28
Cf. Plat. rep. IV 440e–441a. Beforehand Socrates speaks of the φυλακικόν, ἐπικουρητικόν and the
χρηµατιστικὸν γένος (cf. Plat. rep. IV 434c).
29
Cf. Plat. rep. IV 439d and 440e–441a.
30
Cf. Plat. rep. IV 428b–d.
31
Cf. Plat. rep. IV 442c.
32
Cf. Plat. rep. IV 440b.
33
Cf. Plat. rep. IV 429b–429d.

4
part “[…] preserves in the midst of pain and pleasures the rule handed down by the reason
as to what is or is not to be feared.”34 Socrates defines the other two cardinal virtues in an
exactly parallel manner. A moderate polis is characterized in that there is a concord
(ὁµόνοια or ξυµφωνία) between its naturally superior and inferior part.35 The concord ex-
ists if the few reasonable people rule over the many unreasonable, who are guided by their
desires, pleasures and unpleasures.36 Likewise, the soul has a naturally superior and inferi-
or part.37 The former is reason, which also represents the smaller part of the soul38; the
latter is appetite and is regarded, on the contrary, as the most abundant part.39 One can
deem the soul moderate if reason rules over the appetitive part, and both are in agreement
(ὁµοδοξεῖν) about the reason’s rulership.40 Finally, the polis is just if every part of it does
its own business (τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν)41—more precisely, if all the members of its social
classes do what is to be considered their own proper function, e.g., if the businessman
makes money and the soldier defends the values of the polis. A businessman who tries to
enter into the class of the soldiers or a soldier who wants to be a counselor is a great danger
for the polis because such persons are not acting in accordance with their proper functions.
As a result, they give rise to a “meddlesomeness” (πολυπραγµοσύνη) in the polis, which
renders it unjust and throws it into turmoil.42 By analogy, the same things can be said about
the soul. The soul is just if all of its parts do their own business43, i.e., if reason rules, the
spirited part puts into action what reason has determined and appetite desires without inter-
fering with the other two parts of the soul.44 The appetitive part will become a disruptive
factor if it grows big and strong due to bad education.45 If it grows so big and strong that it
takes over rulership, then the soul falls into an unjust state, which Socrates also describes
as a division into factions (στάσις).46
Socrates refers to several cases of psychic conflicts which illustrate the tripartite the-
ory of soul. He presents one of them in the fourth book of the Republic when he considers
the question of whether spirit (θυµός) is different in nature from or identical with reason
and appetite.47 Instead of giving a direct answer, he tells a story which he says he heard
from someone.48 Leontius the son of Aglaion hiked one day from the Piraeus up to the city,
following the outer site of the north wall. On his way he passed a place of public execution
and noticed dead bodies lying there. Suddenly, he was captured by a desire to look at them.
At the same time he felt repugnance and aversion, which impelled him to turn away. But
the desire to look at them was still there. He struggled with himself for a while until he was
finally overwhelmed by his desire (κρατούµενος δ’ οὖν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυµίας) and rushed to

34
Cf. Plat. rep. IV 442b–c. Translated by Paul Shorey.
35
Cf. Plat. rep. IV 432a–b.
36
Cf. Plat. rep. IV 431b–c.
37
Cf. Plat. rep. IV 431a.
38
Cf. Plat. rep. IV 442c.
39
Cf. Plat. rep. IV 442a.
40
Cf. Plat. rep. IV 442c–d.
41
Cf. Plat. rep. IV 433b.
42
Cf. Plat. rep. IV 434a–b.
43
Cf. Plat. rep. IV 441d–e.
44
Cf. Plat. rep. IV 441e–442b.
45
This follows in my opinion ex negativo from Plat. rep. IV 441e–442b.
46
Cf. Plat. rep. IV 440e and 444b.
47
Cf. Plat. rep. IV 439e.
48
Cf. Plat. rep. IV 439e–440a.

5
the corpses with his eyes wide open. Admitting his defeat, he yelled at his eyes: “Look for
yourself, wretches, and fill yourselves with an image of the beautiful!”49 In Socrates’ opin-
ion this story indicates that spirit50 sometimes fights (πολεµεῖν) against appetite as one
thing against something else (ὡς ἄλλο ὂν ἄλλῳ).51 The spirit is directed at implementing
the reason’s command not to look at the dead bodies (or as Socrates would put it: to pre-
serve its rule not to look at them). But due to bad education, Leontius is impelled by his
desire in the other direction – to look at them –, so much that it thwarts his spirit’s plans.
Subsequently, it becomes his motivating reason and puts into action what it merely im-
pelled him to do in the beginning. That Leontius is now under the control of another psy-
chic force as “something else” is shown by the fact that he yells at his eyes – as if they
were not his own, but those of his desire itself.
According to Galen, Posidonius, in his work “On Emotions” (Περὶ παθῶν), which
has not survived, used exactly the same terminology for the three parts of the soul as Pla-
to’s Socrates in the fourth book of the Republic52, but refused to speak of “parts” (µέρη) or
“natures” (εἴδη)53. Instead, he preferred the term “faculty” (δύναµις).54 So, if we can trust
Galen, Posidonios holds that there are three faculties of the soul: an appetitive
(ἐπιθυµητική), a spirited (θυµοειδής) and a rational one (λογιστική).55 Whether they also
have the same functions as Plato’s Socrates ascribes to them is something that Galen hard-
ly discusses. Only once, when he is talking about the development of reason among chil-
dren, does he note that they lack reason and therefore do not notice its commands
(προστάγµατα).56 Still, the problem with this remark is whether Galen is presenting his
own view or that of Posidonius.
Posidonius apparently integrated Plato’s tripartite theory of soul into his own philos-
ophy of emotion. Following Galen’s account, he believed neither that emotions are judg-
ments (a view that Chrysippus is said to have held) nor that they supervene on judgments
(a view that Zeno is said to hold), but claimed that they are caused by the spirited and ap-
petitive faculty of the soul (ὑπὸ τῆς θυµοειδοῦς τε καὶ ἐπιθυµητικῆς δυνάµεως ἡγεῖται
γίγνεσθαι τὰ πάθη).57 Otherwise it would not be comprehensible, as Galen expresses his
own and certainly also Posidonius’ view, how an emotion and thereby an excessive im-
pulse could emerge58, since reason alone is not capable of exceeding its own acts and
measures.59 To make his point even clearer, Posidonius probably took up Chrysippus’ ex-

49
Cf. Plat. rep. IV 440a. Translated by Chris Emlyn-Jones and William Preddy.
50
Socrates speaks in this context actually of ὀργή. I think, he considers it a synonym for θυµός, since this is
term he uses in his initial question of whether spirit is in nature different from or identical with reason and
appetite, and both the story of Leontius and the conclusions Socrates draws from it are clearly dedicated to
that question.
51
Cf. Plat. rep. IV 440a.
52
Cf. Gal. PHP VIII 1, 14 (= Posid. F 32).
53
Cf. Gal. PHP VI 2, 5 (= Posid. F 146).
54
Cf. Gal. PHP VI 2, 5 (= Posid. F 146).
55
Cf. Gal. PHP VIII 1, 14 (= Posid. F 32).
56
Cf. Gal. PHP V 5, 7 (= Posid. F 31 C and 169 B).
57
Cf. Gal. PHP IV 3, 3f. (= Posid. F 34 A) and Gal. PHP V 1, 5 (= Posid. F 153 and 157). For Chrysippus’
view on emotions cf. Gal. PHP IV 3, 2 and DL VII 111; for Zeno’ view on emotions cf. Gal. PHP IV 3, 2,
too.
58
Judging from what Galen says, Posidonius assumed that the excessive impulse arises from the emotion (cf.
Gal. PHP V 6, 14 [= Posid. F 150b] and Gal. PHP V 6, 23f. [= Posid. F 162 and 187 D]).
59
This is, I think, the explanation why Posidonius is supposed to have frequently asked what causes the ex-
cess (cf. Gal. PHP IV 3, 4f. [= Posid. F 34 B and 157] and Gal. PHP IV 3, 8).

6
ample of a runner and used it against him. The runner who is unable to stop right away, but
needs a moment for this action, is not able to stop right away because of his reason. Rather,
the cause of the delay is the weight of his body.60 By analogy, the same applies in principle
to emotions. The cause of their exceeding the measures of reason is not reason, but an irra-
tional power of the soul.
Galen overlooks a crucial point, however, or even disregards it on purpose. Posido-
nius did not seem to have denied that judgments are involved in emotions.61 This is appar-
ent from a classification of affections (πάθη) he is believed to have established.62 Accord-
ing to this classification, some affections are (i) purely psychic (τὰ ψυχικά) – as desire
(ἐπιθυµίαι), fear (φόβοι) or anger (ὀργαί) –, while others are (ii) purely physical (τὰ
σωµατικά), for instance fevers and chills. There are also some affections, according to this
classification, that are (iii) physical, but have a psychic impact (περὶ ψυχὴν σωµατικά) –
e.g., lethargies and impressions –, and some that are (iv) psychic, but have physical impact
(περὶ σῶµα ψυχικά), which include tremors (τρόµοι) and pallors (ὠχριάσεις). The purely
psychic affections, among which Posidonius apparently counted emotions, involve, as it is
said, in his view judgments and suppositions (τὰ ἐν κρίσεσι καὶ ὑπολήψεσιν). If one con-
nects this idea with the one that the soul has rational and irrational faculties, then the fol-
lowing picture emerges: Posidonius holds that judgments are an integral component of
emotions. But he does not believe that emotions are the result of judgments alone. Ulti-
mately, they emerge because the soul has irrational faculties that give a boost to judg-
ments.63 Our assessment of Posidonius’ level of criticism against the early Stoics must
therefore be lowered. He rejected, I think, Chrysippus’ assumption that emotions are to be
identified with judgments and followed Zeno insofar as they supervene on them. Yet, from
his point of view, emotions not only supervene on judgments, but are also the result of
something irrational in the soul, which consisted for him of – judging from what Galen
says – spirited and appetitive faculties.
In summary, it can be stated that Posidonius retained the old Stoic cognitive ap-
proach to emotions. At the same time, he weakened its rigor by introducing irrational fac-
ulties of the soul. However, if we take his cognitivism seriously, these faculties cannot
cause emotions on their own accord. A case like that of Leontius is impossible – no one
can be overwhelmed by their emotions. In order that emotions emerge, judgments are
needed.

60
Cf. Gal. PHP IV 3, 5 (Posid. F 34 B and 157).
61
The emotions that are at stake here are those of adult human beings. As Galen’s account suggests, Posido-
nius also believed that some animals (for instance quail, cocks, patridges, the ichneumon, the asp and the
crocodile) and children have emotions, even though they are not (yet) endowed with reason (cf. Gal. PHP V
5, 1ff. [= Posid. F 169 A], Gal. PHP V 1, 10f. [= Posid. F 159] and Gal. PHP V 6, 37ff. [= Posid. F 33]).
Since they lack reason, he must have regarded their emotions as structurally different from that of adult hu-
man beings.
62
Cf. Plut. de libid. et aegr. 6 (the first of Tyrwhitt’s fragments).
63
Fillion Lahille first proposed such an interpretation (cf. Fillion-Lahille 1984, p. 121ff.). She characterizes
the Posidonian irrational faculties of the soul as the cause première and the judgment as the cause efficiente
of an emotion (cf. Fillion-Lahille, p. 154). John M. Cooper is following her. He believes that Posidonius’
central innovation of the old Stoic theory of emotions was to acknowledge the existence of a reason-
independent psychic force that gives a boost to judgments (cf. Cooper 1998, p. 84f.).

7
 3. Seneca’s concept of soul and theory of emotions

Where can we locate Seneca in this whole matter? There are only a few passages that
give some indication of how he conceives the structure of the soul. Strictly speaking, he
does not even speak of the soul; he speaks of the mind (the term he uses is animus, not
anima). Letter 92 of the Epistulae morales ad Lucilium provides most information on Sen-
eca’s concept of mind. At the outset, he stipulates that he and Lucilius agree about the
mind being divided into ministering parts (partes ministrae) and a primary part, which
Seneca calls principale64 (this is the Latin equivalent for the old Stoic term Hegemoni-
kon65). Among the ministering parts he counts those that enable us to move and sustain life
(per quas movemur alimurque).66 These are two faculties that are also mentioned in the
sources about the doctrines of the early Stoa.67 What enables us to move and to sustain life
is given to us, as Seneca adds, “for the sake of the Hegemonikon” (propter ipsum princi-
pale nobis datas).68 Unfortunately, he does not explain what he means by this. He might
have wanted to say – and this is just one possible interpretation – that due to the faculty of
locomotion, the Hegemonikon can become practically active, and due to the faculty of nur-
ture, it can be kept alive. The Hegemonikon itself has, as Seneca further expounds, some-
thing irrational (irrationale) and something rational (rationale) in it.69 This is an assump-
tion that is at variance with the old Stoic theory of soul. The early Stoics divided the
Hegemonikon not into an irrational and a rational part, but ascribed to it several faculties –
according to the doxographer Aetius: perception, impression, assent and impulse.70 Seneca
does not call any of these faculties into play; he merely describes the relationship between
the irrational and the rational. It is very similar to that between the faculties of locomotion
and nurture on the one hand and the Hegemonikon on the other: The irrational serves (ser-
vit) the rational; the rational, however, is to be regarded as autonomous – it refers all things
to itself (omnia ad se refert).71 On the macro-level, the same holds for the relationship be-
tween God and everything else: “For the divine reason also is set in supreme command
over all things, and is itself subject to none.”72 Seneca’s equation seems all the more legit-
imate against the background that our reason, as he believes, is derived from the divine
reason (ex illa est).73 But instead of proceeding with his psychological analysis, he changes

64
Cf. Sen. epist. 92, 1.
65
Cf. Chalc. comm. 220 (= LS 53 G 3ff.) who uses the same Latin term for Hegemonikon as Seneca. Note
also that Chalcidius is not talking about the animus, but about the anima.
66
Cf. Sen. epist. 92, 1.
67
Cf. Chalc. comm. 220 (= LS 53 G 5ff.): [...] partes animae [...] omnia[...] membra usque quaque vitali
spiritu complent reguntque et moderantur innumerabilibus diversisque virtutibus, nutriendo, adolendo, mov-
endo motibus localibus, instruendo sensibus, compellendo ad operandum [...]. Long and Sedley translate this
passage as follows: “The soul’s parts [...] continually fill all the limbs with vital breath, and rule and control
them with countless different powers – nutrition, growth, locomotion, sensation, impulse to action.”
68
Cf. Sen. epist. 92, 1.
69
Cf. Sen. epist. 92, 1: In hoc principali est aliquid irrationale, est et rationale [...]. Seneca refers here to the
Hegemonikon of adult human beings. He believes that also animals have a one, but their Hegemonikon lacks
reason (cf. Sen. se ira I 3, 7 [= dial. III 3, 7]).
70
Cf. p. 2f. Here, again, the Hegemonikon of adult human beings is being considered.
71
Cf. Sen. epist. 92, 1.
72
Sen. epist. 92, 1. Translated by Richard M. Gummere.
73
Cf. Sen. epist. 92, 1.

8
the subject. The topic in which he is now interested is the connection between the happy
life (vita beata) and the attainment of perfect reason (ratio perfecta). Only at one place in
letter 92 does he return to his concept of mind. Rather parenthetically he notes:

Irrationalis pars animi duas habet partes, alteram animosam, ambitiosam, impo-
tentem, positam in affectibus, alteram humilem, languidam, voluptatibus deditam [...].74

“The irrational part of the mind is twofold: the one part is spirited, ambitious, uncon-
trolled; its seat is the emotions; the other is lowly, sluggish, and devoted to pleasure.”75

What is striking in this remark is first that Seneca is talking about the irrational part
of the mind and not, as before, about the irrational part of the Hegemonikon. Presumably, it
did not make any difference to him to speak of the irrational part of the mind or of the irra-
tional part of the Hegemonikon. One might regard this variation as a totum pro parte. A
further striking point is that Seneca makes a distinction between emotions (affectus) and
pleasures (voluptates) which is rather unorthodox. Usually, he considers pleasure an emo-
tion in the strict Stoic sense.76 The most striking point of the passage is, however, that Sen-
eca divides the irrational part of the mind into two more parts. The terms he uses for them
have a certain similarity with the ones Plato’s Socrates uses in the fourth book of the Re-
public (the attributes animosa and ambitiosa have a similar meaning as θυµοειδές, though
it is hard to find an equivalent for ἐπιθυµητικόν).77 But how should we understand their
functioning? Does Seneca (a) think that the irrational parts of the mind can make someone
act without him wanting it, as in the case of Leontius whose appetitive part of the soul
thwarted his spirit’s plans? Or does Seneca (b) hold the Posidonian view that the irrational
parts of the mind are meant to give a boost to judgments so that these can be put into ac-
tion? His belief that the irrational serves the rational and the rational refers all things to
itself at least indicates how (a) must be answered: It seems as though Seneca reckons such
cases as that of Leontius impossible. This assumption can be borne out, if one takes into
account what he says about the emergence of anger at the beginning of the second book of
his work De ira.
In this passage, after having advised his brother Novatus that he is now going to face
a more theoretical investigation, Seneca poses to him and himself the question: “Does an-
ger begin with an act of judgment (iudicio) or with a mere impulse (impetu78), i.e., is it set
in motion voluntarily (sua sponte) or like many things that come about inside us without
our being aware (insciis nobis)?“79 It does not take long for Seneca to give an overtly or-

74
Cf. Sen. epist. 92, 8.
75
I use, again, Richard M. Gummere’s translation, but I have slightly modified it.
76
Cf. Sen. epist. 59, 1–4.
77
To what extent Seneca’s terminology of the irrational parts corresponds to that of Plato’s Socrates is a
question that is differently answered among scholars. Brad Inwood sees a match, but he does not believe that
Seneca took over Plato’s psychological premisses (cf. Inwood 2005, p. 40). Elizabeth Asmis, on the contrary,
sees no match (cf. Asmis 2015, p. 229).
78
Seneca expresses himself here somewhat imprecisely because he regards anger as an impulse, too (cf. Sen.
dial. IV 3, 4 and 5 [= de ira II 3, 4 and 5]), but not as an impulse in this sense. Cf. also Graver 2014, p. 270,
footn. 41: “The impulse that is stirred involuntarily is an impetus in some lesser sense than the impetus that is
genuine anger for which we are responsible [...].”
79
Cf. Sen. dial. IV 1, 1 (= de ira II 1, 1): [...] quaerimus enim ira utrum iudicio an impetu incipiat, id est
utrum sua sponte moveatur an quemadmodum pleraque quae intra nos <non> insciis nobis oriuntur. I am
following here Robert A. Kaster’s and Martha C. Nussbaum’s translation, but reformulate the originally

9
thodox Stoic answer: If there is no assent (assentiri/adprobare/adsensus mentis) 80 or
judgment, there is no anger either (iudicio nascitur, iudicio tollitur)81. Our getting angry or
not getting angry depends causally on these mental operations, and since they are in our
power we are also able to control whether we get angry or not.82 Seneca thus puts forward
an opinion that is in stark contrast with the view according to which people can be over-
whelmed by their emotions. But would he likewise say, in the manner of Posidonius, that
anger (or another emotion) not only supervenes on assents or judgments but is also the
result of something irrational in the mind? Neither in the key passages of De ira nor in any
other of Seneca’s writings can we find an answer to this question. He does not trace back
the emergence of anger or another emotion to the activity of different parts of the mind. As
a consequence, there is no basis for assuming that he took over the Posidonian approach to
emotions.

4. Conclusion

Was Seneca a psychological monist or partitionist? On the one hand he followed the
early Stoics insofar as he made the emergence of anger conditional on judgments or as-
sents. But in contrast to them he divided the Hegemonikon into a rational and an irrational
part. In a sense he can therefore be regarded as both a psychological monist and partition-
ist. Yet, he did not establish a connection between his concept of mind and his theory of
how anger emerges. Had he done so, the similarity with the Posidonian approach to emo-
tions would have been conspicuous.

indirect question into a direct one. What is more, in contrast to Reynolds I take no account of Hermes’ con-
jectural supplement, which is, in my opinion, not necessary. Cf. Inwood 2005, p. 52 who gives an interpreta-
tion of the passage with the conjeture.
80
Cf. Sen. dial. IV 1, 4 (= de ira II 1, 4). The term adsensus mentis is to be found in Sen. dial. IV 3, 5 (= de
ira II 3, 5).
81
Cf. Sen. dial. IV 4, 2 (= de ira II 4, 2). I think that iudicium and adsensus amount for Seneca in the second
book of De ira to the same thing. A judgment is, in his view, an assent to a proposition that corresponds to an
impression.
82
It is hence someone’s own fault if he gets angry. Anger is, according to Seneca, a fault of the mind subject
to our will (voluntarium animi vitium) (cf. Sen. dial. IV 2, 2 [= de ira II 2, 2 ]). Cf. also Bäumer 1982, p. 95:
“Entwickelt sich der Affekt durch ein rationales Urteil, unterliegt er unserer eigenen Verantwortung [...]”,
and Müller 2018, p. 439: “Für die initiale Selbstversklavung durch seine nicht erzwungene Zustimmung zum
Affekt ist der Geist selbst verantwortlich.” Seneca therefore sticks to the affective volitionalism of the early
Stoa. Even so, the emphasis on the voluntariness of anger could be regarded as his merit, as Bäumer argues
(cf. Bäumer 1982, p. 95).

10
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11
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