OLEGO V.

REBUENO

FACTS:

Pedro D. Servano, a lawyer from Naga City, filed a complaint against Cenona Olego in the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur, he asked for a declaration as to the legality of his title to a residential lot. He
alleged that he acquired the lot by purchase. His possession was disturbed by Cenona Olego, who claimed
to be the owner of the lot. "thereby casting a cloud of doubt" on his title and rendering it necessary that
his title and possession" "be declared legal". Cenona Olego pleaded the defense that she was the
"absolute owner and lawful possessor" covered by Tax Declaration No. 255 in the name of Santiago Olego,
her late father.

The case was set for hearing for the seventh time on January 8, 1964 and the parties submitted an
amicable agreement:

- That the defendant admits the allegation of the plaintiff's complaint as to his claim of ownership
of the land described therein in said complaint and that judgment be rendered declaring the
plaintiff the owner thereof;

- That the plaintiff waived his claim-for attorney's fees and all other damages against the
defendant.

The lower court approved the compromise in its decision and copies of which were furnished to both
parties. The record shows that there was no further proceeding in the case more than ten years after the
alleged compromise settlement was concluded. On February 19, 1947 Servano filed in the lower court a
"petition for contempt" against Cenona Olego and her children, Segundo Rivero and Rosita Rivero,
wherein he alleged that he (Servano) was the prevailing party.

Servano’s argument: that Cenona Olego and her children prevented Servano from having "the peaceful
use and enjoyment" of said land; that they branded the decision as "fake" and "not worthy of respect",
and that they occupied a portion of the land and disturbed Servano's "property rights." He prayed that
Cenona Olego and her children be punished for contempt of court and ordered to pay damages to him.

Olego’s argument: Cenona Olego through a new counsel, Atty. Abel G. Flores, filed a motion to dismiss
the contempt charge. The motion was based on the grounds (a) that the amicable settlement was
obtained through fraud and misrepresentation, (b) that the execution of the judgment was barred by the
statute of limitations, and (c) that the court had lost jurisdiction over the case.

Atty. Flores further alleged in his motion to dismiss that Servano did nothing to implement the decision
within the ten-year period for enforcing it; Atty. Flores contended that the lower court had no more
jurisdiction over the case in view of the expiration of the ten-year period for enforcing its judgment.

Judge Rebueno: reasoned out that inasmuch as Cenona Olego had not disputed the validity of the
decision on the ground of fraud or mistake during the period of more than ten years "her right of action
to impugn its validity" had already prescribed; Cenona Olego filed the instant special civil action of
certiorari against Atty. Servano and Judge Rebueno, praying that the orders setting the contempt charge
for hearing be set aside and that the case should be dismissed because the lower court had no more
jurisdiction over it.

ISSUES:

(a) whether Cenona Olego could be held in contempt of court for not vacating the land involved in the
compromise ; and

(b) whether the lower court's decision should be set aside on the ground of fraud or could be enforced
after the expiration of more than ten years from the date of its finality.

RULING:

We hold that Cenona Olego's failure to vacate the lot could not be the basis of a contempt proceeding
against her. In the compromise agreement and in the decision approving it, she was not ordered to vacate
the lot.

The rule is that an order or judgment which declares the rights of the parties without any express
command or prohibition is not one which may be the basis of a contempt proceeding (Hammock vs.
Hammock, 209 Ga. 751 S.E. 2d 15). A violation of the rights of ownership does not constitute contempt of
court, even though they have been ascertained and declared by judgment, hence, Cenona Olego could
not be held guilty of contempt of court.

Does Cenona Olego's acknowledgment of Servano's ownership include the obligation to deliver the
possession of the land to him?

GR: the adjudication of ownership does not include the possession of the property (Talens v. Garcia)

XPN: the adjudication of ownership would include the delivery of possession if the defeated party has not
shown any right to possess the land independently of his claim of ownership which was rejected (Perez
and Alcantara vs. Evite and Manigbas)

Atty. Servano did not enforce his right to possess the land within the ten-year period. To enforce the
judgment in his favor by means of a contempt proceeding after the expiration of the ten-year period
would be a circumvention of the statute of limitations. What the law prohibits directly should not be
allowed to be done indirectly.

Considering that the judgment against Cenona Olego is no longer enforceable. The compromise, on which
the said judgment was based, was vitiated by fraud and mistake, the said judgment cannot possibly affect
her possession of the disputed land. Nor can it destroy the legal presumption in her favor that as possessor
of the land in the concept of owner she has a just title thereto (Art 541, Civil Code).

Hence, lower court’s order citing Cenona Olego for contempt of court, is set aside. The lower court's
judgment of January 8, 1964 can no longer be enforced against Cenona Olego because it had already
prescribed.
MIAA V. CA

Principles Of Law: A Government Instrumentality May Also Perform Commercial Functions, In That Sense,
It Is Exempt From Tax; Provided That Such Instrumentality: (A) Has A Personality Not Separate And Distinct
From Government And (B) It Must Neither Be A Non-Stock, Nor A Stock Instrumentality; Miaa Is Not A
Government-Owned Or Controlled Corporation But An Instrumentality Of The National Government And
Thus Exempt From Local Taxation. The Real Properties Of Miaa Are Owned By The Republic Of The
Philippines And Thus Exempt From Real Estate Tax. The Airport Lands And Buildings Of Miaa Are Property
Of Public Dominion And Therefore Owned By The State Or The Republic Of The Philippines. The Airport
Lands And Buildings Are Devoted To Public Use Because They Are Used By The Public For International And
Domestic Travel And Transportation. The Fact That The Miaa Collects Terminal Fees And Other Charges
From The Public Does Not Remove The Character Of The Airport Lands And Buildings As Properties For
Public Use. The Operation By The Government Of A Tollway Does Not Change The Character Of The Road
As One For Public Use.

FACTS:

Petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA) and had received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Parañaque for the
taxable years 1992 to 2001. The City of Parañaque, through its City Treasurer, issued notices of levy and
warrants of levy on the Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of Parañaque threatened to
sell at public auction the Airport Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax
delinquency because Section 193 of the LGC expressly withdrew the tax exemption privileges of MIAA.

The OGCC (Office of the Government Corporate Counsel) opined that the Local Government Code of 1991
withdrew the exemption from real estate tax granted to MIAA under Section 21 of the MIAA Charter.
Thus, MIAA negotiated with respondent City of Parañaque to pay the real estate tax imposed by the City.
MIAA then paid some of the real estate tax already due.

MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Parañaque.

The Mayor of the City of Parañaque threatened to sell at public auction the Airport Lands and Buildings
should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax delinquency. MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals an original
petition for prohibition and injunction. The petition sought to restrain the City of Parañaque from
imposing real estate tax on, levying against, and auctioning for public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings.

Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because MIAA filed it beyond the 60-day reglementary period.
Court of Appeals also denied motion for reconsideration hence, the present petition for review.

MIAA insists that it is exempted from real estate tax under Section 234 of the Local Government Code
because the Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the government. To justify the exemption, MIAA
invokes the principle that the government cannot tax itself.

Respondents invoke Section 193 of the Local Government Code, which expressly withdrew the tax
exemption privileges of "government-owned and-controlled corporations" upon the effectivity of the
Local Government Code.
Issue: May MIAA Be Charged Realty Tax? Are Its Properties Parts Of Public Dominion?

Ruling:

The Court held that MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of
the National Government and thus exempt from local taxation. MIAA is a government instrumentality
vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA is like any other
government instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is vested with corporate powers.

Airport Lands and Buildings are also of Public Dominion. No one can dispute that properties of public
dominion mentioned in Article 420 of the Civil Code, like “roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State,” are owned by the State. The term “ports” includes seaports and airports. The
MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a “port” constructed by the State.

Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings are properties of public
dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. The Airport Lands and Buildings
are devoted to public use because they are used by the public for international and domestic travel and
transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and other charges from the public does not
remove the character of the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for public use.

The Court has also ruled that property of public dominion, being outside the commerce of man, cannot
be the subject of an auction sale. Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to
levy, encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or
auction sale of any property of public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy.

Essential public services will stop if properties of public dominion are subject to encumbrances,
foreclosures and auction sale. This will happen if the City of Parañaque can foreclose and compel the
auction sale of the 600-hectare runway of the MIAA for non-payment of real estate tax.

Further, Sec 234 of the LGC provides that real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any
of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or
otherwise, to a taxable person following are exempted from payment of the real property tax.