Ballatan Vs CA

9/14/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 304
34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ballatan vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 125683. March 2, 1999.
EDEN BALLATAN and SPS. BETTY MARTINEZ and CHONG

CHY LING, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GONZALO
GO, WINSTON GO, LI CHING YAO, ARANETA INSTITUTE OF
AGRICULTURE and JOSE N. QUEDDING, respondents.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Docket Fees; The rule in this

jurisdiction is that when an action is filed in court, the complaint must be
accompanied by the payment of the requisite docket and filing fees.—The
third-party complaint in the instant case arose from the complaint of
petitioners against respondents Go. The complaint filed was for accion
publiciana, i.e., the recovery of possession of real property which is a real
action. The rule in this jurisdiction is that when an action is filed in court,
the complaint must be accompanied by the payment of the requisite docket
and filing fees. In real actions, the docket and filing fees are based on the
value of the property and the amount of damages claimed, if any. If the
complaint is filed but the fees are not paid at the time of filing, the court
acquires jurisdiction upon full payment of the fees within a reasonable time
as the court may grant, barring prescription.
Same; Same; Same; Where the fees prescribed for the real action have
been paid but the fees of certain related damages are not, the court,
although having jurisdiction over the real action, may not have acquired
jurisdiction over the accompanying claim for damages.—Where the fees
prescribed for the real action have been paid but the fees of certain related
damages are not, the court, although having jurisdiction over the real action,
may not have acquired jurisdiction over the accompanying claim for
damages. Accordingly, the court may expunge those claims for damages, or
allow, on motion, a reasonable time for amendment of the complaint so as to
allege the precise amount of damages and accept payment of the requisite
legal fees.
Same; Same; Same; If there are unspecified claims, the determination

of which may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading, the
additional filing fee thereon shall constitute a lien
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016d2da32806cb1900f9003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/17
___________________
* SECOND DIVISION.
35
VOL. 304, MARCH 2, 1999 35
on the judgment award.—If there are unspecified claims, the determination

of which may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading, the
additional filing fee thereon shall constitute a lien on the judgment award.
The same rule also applies to third-party claims and other similar pleadings.
Ownership; Possession; Builders in Good Faith; Where a person had

no knowledge that he encroached on his neighbor’s lot, he is deemed a
builder in good faith until the time the latter informed him of his
encroachment on the latter’s property.—We hold that the Court of Appeals
correctly dismissed the third-party complaint against AIA. The claim that
the discrepancy in the lot areas was due to AIA’s fault was not proved. The
appellate court, however, found that it was the erroneous survey by
Engineer Quedding that triggered these discrepancies. And it was this
survey that respondent Winston Go relied upon in constructing his house on
his father’s land. He built his house in the belief that it was entirely within
the parameters of his father’s land. In short, respondents Go had no
knowledge that they encroached on petitioners’ lot. They are deemed
builders in good faith until the time petitioner Ballatan informed them of
their encroachment on her property.
Same; Same; Same; Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who
alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the burden of proof.—
Respondent Li Ching Yao built his house on his lot before any of the other
parties did. He constructed his house in 1982, respondents Go in 1983, and
petitioners in 1985. There is no evidence, much less, any allegation that
respondent Li Ching Yao was aware that when he built his house he knew
that a portion thereof encroached on respondents Go’s adjoining land. Good
faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of
a possessor rests the burden of proof.
Same; Same; Same; The right to choose between appropriating the

improvement or selling the land on which the improvement of the builder,
planter or sower stands, is given to the owner of the land.—The owner of
the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith
shall have the right to appropriate as his own the building, planting or
sowing, after payment to the builder, planter or sower of the necessary and
useful expenses, and in the proper case, expenses for pure luxury or mere
pleasure. The owner of the land may also oblige the builder, planter or
sower to purchase
36
and pay the price of the land. If the owner chooses to sell his land, the
builder, planter or sower must purchase the land, otherwise the owner may
remove the improvements thereon. The builder, planter or sower, however,
is not obliged to purchase the land if its value is considerably more than the
building, planting or sowing. In such case, the builder, planter or sower must
pay rent to the owner of the land. If the parties cannot come to terms over
the conditions of the lease, the court must fix the terms thereof. The right to
choose between appropriating the improvement or selling the land on which
the improvement of the builder, planter or sower stands, is given to the
owner of the land.
Same; Same; Same; In the event that the owner elects to sell to the
builder, planter or sower the land on which the improvement stands, the
price must be fixed at the prevailing market value at the time of payment.—
In the event that petitioners elect to sell to respondents Go the subject
portion of their lot, the price must be fixed at the prevailing market value at
the time of payment. The Court of Appeals erred in fixing the price at the
time of taking, which is the time the improvements were built on the land.
The time of taking is determinative of just compensation in expropriation
proceedings. The instant case is not for expropriation. It is not a taking by
the state of private property for a public purpose upon payment of just
compensation. This is a case of an owner who has been paying real estate
taxes on his land but has been deprived of the use of a portion of this land
for years. It is but fair and just to fix compensation at the time of payment.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Jose A. Dizon for petitioners.
Jose C. Guico, Jr. Law Office for private respondents Li
Ching Yao.
Rogelio E. Subong for Gonzalo Go and Winston S. Go.
Rogelio R. Nacorda for private respondent Quedding.
Macario O. Directo for Araneta Institute of Agriculture.
37
VOL. 304, MARCH 2, 1999 37

PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court

of Appeals dated March 25, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No. 32472
entitled “Eden Ballatan, et al., plaintiffs-appellees v. Gonzalo Go
and Winston Go, appellants and third-party 1
plaintiffs-appellants v. Li
Ching Yao, et al., third-party defendants.”
The instant case arose from a dispute over forty-two (42) square
meters of residential land belonging to petitioners. The parties herein
are owners of adjacent lots located at Block No. 3, Poinsettia Street,
Araneta University Village, Malabon, Metro Manila. Lot No. 24,
414 square meters in area, is registered in the name of petitioners2
Eden Ballatan and spouses Betty Martinez and Chong Chy Ling.
Lots Nos. 25 and 26, with an area of 415 and 313 square meters
respectively,
3
are registered in the name of respondent Gonzalo Go,
Sr. On Lot No. 25, respondent Winston Go, son of Gonzalo Go, Sr.,
constructed his house. Adjacent to Lot No. 26 is Lot No. 27, 417
square meters
4
in area, and is registered in the name of respondent Li
Ching Yao.
In 1985, petitioner Ballatan constructed her house on Lot No. 24.
During the construction, she noticed that the concrete fence and side
pathway of the adjoining house of respondent Winston Go5
encroached on the entire length of the eastern side of her property.
Her building contractor informed her that the area of her lot was
actually less than that described in the title. Forthwith, Ballatan
informed respondent Go of this discrepancy and his encroachment
on her property. Respondent Go, however, claimed that his house,
including its
_____________________
1 Penned by Justice Celia Lipana-Reyes and concurred in by Justices Alfredo L.

Benipayo and Corona Ibay-Somera.
2 Exhibit “A,” Folder of Plaintiffs’ Exhibits.
3 Exhibits “1” and “2,” Folder of Defendants Go’s Exhibits.
4 Exhibit “1,” Folder of Defendant Li Ching Yao’s Exhibits; Exhibit “4-a,” Folder
of Exhibits of Araneta Institute of Agriculture.
5 Exhibit “D,” Folder of Plaintiffs’ Exhibits.
38

fence and pathway, were built within the parameters of his father’s
lot; and that this lot was surveyed by Engineer Jose Quedding, the
authorized surveyor of the Araneta Institute of Agriculture (AIA),
the owner-developer of the subdivision project.
Petitioner Ballatan called the attention of the AIA to the
discrepancy of the land area in her title and the actual land area
received from them. The AIA authorized another survey of the land
by Engineer Jose N. Quedding.
In a report dated February 28, 1985, Engineer Quedding found
that the lot area of petitioner Ballatan was less by a few meters and
that of respondent Li Ching Yao, which was three lots away,
increased by two (2) meters. Engineer Quedding declared that he
made a verification survey of Lots Nos. 25 and 26 of respondents
Go in 1983 and allegedly found the boundaries to have been in their
proper position. He, however, could not explain the reduction in
Ballatan’s area since he was not 6present at the time respondents Go
constructed their boundary walls.
On June 2, 1985, Engineer Quedding made a third relocation
survey upon request of the parties. He found that Lot No. 24 lost
approximately 25 square meters on its eastern boundary, that Lot
No. 25, although found to have encroached on Lot No. 24, did not
lose nor gain any area; that Lot No. 26 lost some three (3) square
meters which,
7
however, were gained by Lot No. 27 on its western
boundary. In short, Lots Nos. 25, 26 and 27 moved westward to the
eastern boundary of Lot No. 24.
On the basis of this survey, on June 10, 1985, petitioner Ballatan
made a written demand on respondents Go to remove and dismantle
their improvements on Lot No. 24. Respondents Go refused. The
parties, including Li Ching Yao, however, met several times to reach
an agreement on the matter.
_____________________
6 Exhibit “1,” Folder of Exhibits—Quedding.

7 Exhibit “5,” Folder of Defendants Go’s Exhibits; Decision of the Court of
Appeals, p. 3, Rollo, p. 25.
39
VOL. 304, MARCH 2, 1999 39

Failing to agree amicably, petitioner Ballatan brought the issue

before the barangay. Respondents Go did not appear. Thus, on April
1, 1986, petitioner Ballatan instituted against respondents Go Civil
Case No. 772-MN for recovery of possession before the Regional
Trial Court, Malabon, Branch 169. The Go’s filed their “Answer
with Third-Party Complaint” impleading as third-party defendants

respondents Li Ching Yao, the AIA and Engineer Quedding.
On August 23, 1990, the trial court decided in favor of
petitioners. It ordered the Go’s to vacate the subject portion of Lot
No. 24, demolish their improvements and pay petitioner Ballatan
actual damages, attorney’s fees and the costs of the suit. It dismissed
the third-party complaint against: (1) AIA after finding that the lots
sold to the parties were in accordance with the technical description
and verification plan covered by their respective titles; (2) Jose N.
Quedding, there being no privity of relation between him and
respondents Go and his erroneous survey having been made at the
instance of AIA, not the parties; and (3) Li Ching Yao for failure to8
prove that he committed any wrong in the subject encroachment.
The court made the following disposition:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and

against the defendants, ordering the latter:
1. To demolish and remove all improvements existing and

encroaching on plaintiff’s lot;
2. To clear, vacate and deliver possession of the encroached area to
the plaintiffs;
3. To pay plaintiffs jointly and severally the following:
a) P7,800.00 for the expenses paid to the surveyors;

b) P5,000.00 for plaintiffs’ transportation;
4. To pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, attorney’s fees equivalent to

25% of the current market value of the subject matter in litigation
at the time of execution; and
_____________________
8 Decision of the trial court, p. 11, Court of Appeals Rollo, p. 86.
40

5. To pay the costs of suit.
The third-party complaint filed by third-party plaintiff Gonzalo Go and

Winston Go against third-party defendants Araneta Institute of Agriculture,
Jose N. Quedding and Li Ching Yao is hereby DISMISSED, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.”
Respondents Go appealed. On March 25, 1996, the Court of Appeals

modified the decision of the trial court. It affirmed the dismissal of
the third-party complaint against the AIA but reinstated the
complaint against Li Ching Yao and Jose Quedding. Instead of
ordering respondents Go to demolish their improvements on the
subject land, the appellate court ordered them to pay petitioner
Ballatan, and respondent Li Ching Yao to pay respondents Go, a
reasonable amount for that portion of the lot which they encroached,
the value to be fixed at the time of taking. It also ordered Jose
Quedding to pay respondents Go attorney’s fees of P5,000.00 for his
erroneous survey. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby

AFFIRMED insofar as the dismissal of the third-party complaint against
Araneta Institute of Agriculture is concerned but modified in all other
aspects as follows:
1) Defendants-appellants are hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs-

appellees the reasonable value of the forty-two (42) square meters
of their lot at the time of its taking;
2) Third-party defendant Li Ching Yao is hereby ordered to pay
defendants-appellants the reasonable value of the thirty-seven (37)
square meters of the latter’s lot at the time of its taking; and
3) Third-party defendant Jose N. Quedding is hereby ordered to pay to
defendants-appellants the amount of P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
LET THE RECORD of the case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court
of Malabon for further proceedings and reception of evidence for the
determination of the 9reasonable value of Lots Nos. 24 and 26.
SO ORDERED.”
__________________
9 Rollo, p. 44.
41
VOL. 304, MARCH 2, 1999 41

Hence, this petition. Petitioners allege that:

“RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON QUESTIONS OF
LAW AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN:
1. IT APPLIED EQUITY OR EQUITABLE SOLUTIONS TO THE

INSTANT CASE IN UTTER DISREGARD AND IN VIOLATION
OR GROSS IGNORANCE OF EXISTING LAWS AND
JURISPRUDENCE VESTING BASIC PROPERTY RIGHTS TO

HEREIN PETITIONERS. RESPONDENT COURT HAS NO
POWER TO APPLY/USE EQUITY IN THE PRESENCE OF
EXISTING LAWS TO THE CONTRARY.
2. UNDER THE GUISE OF APPLYING EQUITY BUT IN EFFECT
A VERY APPARENT PARTIALITY AND FAVOR TO
RESPONDENTS GO, IT ORDERED PAYMENT OF THE
ENCROACHED AREA AT THE VALUE AT THE TIME OF ITS
TAKING AND NOT THE VALUE AT THE TIME OF PAYMENT,
THEREBY ENRICHING THE GO’S BUT DEPRIVING
PETITIONERS OF THE FRUITS OR INCREASE IN VALUE OF
THEIR PROPERTY TO WHICH THEY ARE ENTITLED
UNDER THE LAW AS THE REGISTERED OWNERS WITH
TORRENS TITLE IN THEIR NAMES.
3. WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS THE THIRD-PARTY
COMPLAINT DUE TO NON-PAYMENT OF ANY FILING OR
DOCKET FEE.
4. WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONERS THE RECOVERY OF THE
NECESSARY10EXPENSES IN PROTECTING THEIR RIGHTS IN
THIS CASE.”
Petitioners question the admission by respondent Court of Appeals

of the third-party complaint by respondents Go against the AIA,
Jose Quedding and Li Ching Yao. Petitioners claim that the third-
party complaint should not have been considered by the Court of
Appeals for lack of jurisdiction due to third-party plaintiffs’ failure
to pay the docket and filing fees before the trial court.
___________________
10 Petition, p. 4, Rollo, p. 6.
42

The third-party complaint in the instant case arose from the

complaint of petitioners against respondents Go. The complaint filed
was for accion publiciana, i.e., the recovery of possession of real
property which is a real action. The rule in this jurisdiction is that
when an action is filed in court, the complaint must be accompanied
11
by the payment of the requisite docket and filing fees. In real
actions, the docket and filing fees are based on the value 12
of the
property and the amount of damages claimed, if any. If the
complaint is filed but the fees are not paid at the time of filing, the
court acquires jurisdiction upon full payment of the fees within a
13
13
reasonable time as the court may grant, barring prescription. Where
the fees prescribed for the real action have been paid but the fees of
certain related damages are not, the court, although having
jurisdiction over the real action, may not have14
acquired jurisdiction
over the accompanying claim for damages. Accordingly, the court
may expunge those claims for damages, or allow, on motion, a
reasonable time for amendment of the complaint so as to allege the
precise
15
amount of damages and accept payment of the requisite legal
fees. If there are unspecified claims, the determination of which
may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading, the
additional filing fee thereon shall constitute a
________________________
11 Tacay v. RTC of Tagum, Davao del Norte, 180 SCRA 433, 444 [1989]; Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, 170 SCRA 274, 285 [1989]; see also
Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 562, 568-569
[1987].
12 Tacay v. RTC of Tagum, Davao del Norte, supra, at 440, 444—a real action may
be commenced or prosecuted without an accompanying claim for damages.
13 Id.
14 Original Dev’t. and Construction Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 753,
760 [1991].
15 Tacay, supra, at 444; Original Dev’t. and Construction Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, supra, at 760.
43
VOL. 304, MARCH 2, 1999 43

16
lien on the judgment award. The same17 rule also applies to third-
party claims and other similar pleadings.
In the case at bar, the third-party complaint filed by respondents
Go was incorporated in their answer to the complaint. The third-
party complaint sought the same remedy as the principal complaint
but added a prayer for attorney’s fees and costs without specifying
their amounts, thus:
“ON THE THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT
1. That summons be issued against Third-Party Defendants Araneta

Institute of Agriculture, Jose N. Quedding and Li Ching Yao;
2. That after hearing, they be sentenced to indemnify the Third-Party
Plaintiffs for whatever is adjudged against the latter in favor of the
Plaintiffs;
3. That Third-Party Defendants be ordered to pay attorney’s fees as
may be proved during trial;
4. That Third-Party Defendants be ordered to 18

pay the costs. Other just
and equitable reliefs are also prayed for.”
The Answer with Third-Party Complaint was admitted by the trial

court without the requisite19 payment of filing fees, particularly on the
Go’s prayer for damages. The trial court did not award the Go’s any
damages. It dismissed the third-party complaint. The Court of
Appeals, however, granted the third-party complaint in part by
ordering third-party defendant Jose N. Quedding to pay the Go’s the
sum of P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
Contrary to petitioners’ claim, the Court of Appeals did not err in
awarding damages despite the Go’s failure to specify
_________________
16 Original Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, su-pra, at 761.

17 Tacay, supra, at 441-442; Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, 170 SCRA
274, 285 [1989].
18 Answer with Third Party Complaint, p. 7, Records, p. 37.
19 Order dated May 30, 1986, Records, p. 49.
44

the amount prayed for and pay the corresponding additional filing
fees thereon. The claim for attorney’s fees refers to damages arising
after the filing of the complaint against the Go’s. The additional
filing fee on this20
claim is deemed to constitute a lien on the
judgment award.
The Court of Appeals found that the subject portion is actually
forty-two (42) square meters in area, not forty-five (45), as initially
found by the trial court; that this forty-two (42) square meter portion
is on the entire eastern side of Lot No. 24 belonging to petitioners;
that on this said portion is found the concrete fence and pathway that
extends from respondent Winston Go’s house on adjacent Lot No.
25; that inclusive of the subject portion, respondents Go did not gain
nor lose any portion of Lots Nos. 25 and 26; that instead, Lot No.
27, on which respondent Li Ching Yao built his house, encroached
on the land of respondents Go, gaining 21
in the process thirty-seven
(37) square meters of the latter’s land.
We hold that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the third-
party complaint against AIA. The claim that the discrepancy in the
lot areas was due to AIA’s fault was not proved. The appellate court,
however, found that it was the erroneous survey by Engineer
Quedding that triggered these discrepancies. And it was this survey
that respondent Winston Go relied upon in constructing his house on
his father’s land. He built his house in the belief that it was entirely
within the parameters of his father’s land. In short, respondents Go
had no knowledge that they encroached
22
on petition-ers’ lot. They are
deemed builders in good faith until the
____________________________
20 In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, supra, at 279, it was held that
the Manchester rule and its clarifications are procedural rules and may be applied
retroactively to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. The
instant case was pending at the time Manchester was promulgated in 1987.
21 Decision of the Court of Appeals, pp. 15-16, Rollo, pp. 37-38.
22 Article 526, Civil Code provides:
45
VOL. 304, MARCH 2, 1999 45

time petitioner
23
Ballatan informed them of their encroachment on her
property.
Respondent Li Ching24
Yao built his house on his lot before any of
the other parties did. He constructed 25his house in 1982, respondents
Go in 1983, and petitioners in 1985. There is no evidence, much
less, any allegation that respondent Li Ching Yao was aware that
when he built his house he knew that a portion thereof encroached
on respondents Go’s adjoining land. Good faith is always presumed,
and upon him who alleges
26
bad faith on the part of a possessor rests
the burden of proof.
All the parties are presumed to have acted in good faith. Their
rights must, therefore, be determined in accordance with the
appropriate provisions of the Civil Code on property. Article 448 of
the Civil Code provides:
“Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or
planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the
works, sowing or planting,
27
after payment of the indemnity provided for in
Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one
___________________
“Art. 526. He is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that there exists in his
title or mode of acquisition any flaw that invalidates it.”
23 Article 528, Civil Code provides:
“Art. 528. Possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in the case and from the
moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or
wrongfully.”
24 Decision of the Court of Appeals, p. 16, Rollo, p. 38.
25 Id., at pp. 16-17, Rollo, pp. 38-39.
26 Article 527, Civil Code.
27 Articles 546 and 548 provide:
“Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith
may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor. Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the
possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the
possession having the option of re-
46

who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed the
proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the
land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In
such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not
choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The
parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement,
the court shall fix the terms thereof.”
The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or
planted in good faith shall have the right to appropriate as his own
the building, planting or sowing, after payment to the builder,
planter or sower of the necessary and useful expenses, and in the
proper case, expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure. The owner
of the land may also oblige the builder, planter or sower to purchase
and pay the price of the land. If the owner chooses to sell his land,
the builder, planter or sower must purchase the land, otherwise the
owner may remove the improvements thereon. The builder, planter
or sower, however, is not obliged to purchase the land if its value is
considerably more than the building, planting or sowing. In such
case, the builder, planter or sower must pay rent to the owner of the
land. If the parties cannot come to terms over the conditions of the
lease, the court must fix the terms thereof. The right to choose
between appropriating the improvement or selling the land on which
the improvement of the 28
builder, planter or sower stands, is given to
the owner of the land.
___________________
funding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the
thing may have acquired by reason thereof.” “Art. 548 . Expenses for pure luxury or
mere pleasure shall not be refunded to the possessor in good faith; but he may remove
the ornaments with which he has embellished the principal thing if it suffers no injury
thereby, and if his successor in the possession does not prefer to refund the amount
expended.”
28 Grana & Torralba v. Court of Appeals, 109 Phil. 260, 263 [1960]; Acuna v.
Furukawa Plantation Co., 93 Phil. 957, 961 [1953]; Aringo v. Arena, 14 Phil. 263,
269 [1909].
47
VOL. 304, MARCH 2, 1999 47

Article 448 has been applied to improvements or portions of

improvements built
29
by mistaken belief on land belonging to the
adjoining owner. 30 The facts of the instant case are similar to those in
Cabral v. Ibanez, to wit:
“[P]laintiffs Geronima Zabala and her husband Justino Bernardo,

constructed their house in the belief that it was entirely within the area of
their own land without knowing at that time that part of their house was
occupying a 14-square meter portion of the adjoining lot belonging to the
defendants, and that the defendants Bernardo M. Cabral and Mamerta M.
Cabral were likewise unaware of the fact that a portion of plaintiff’s house
was extending and occupying a portion of their lot with an area of 14 square
meters. The parties came to know of the fact that part of the plaintiff’s house
was occupying part of defendant’s land when the construction of plaintiff’s
house was about to be finished, after a relocation of the monuments of the
two properties had been made by the U.S. Army through the Bureau of
Lands, according to their ‘Stipulation of Facts,’ dated August 17, 1951.
On the basis of these facts, we held that:
“The Court, therefore, concludes that the plaintiffs are builders in good faith
and the relative rights of the defendant Mamerta Cabral as owner of the land
and of the plaintiffs as owners of the building is governed by Article 361 of
the Civil Code (Co Tao v. Joaquin Chan Chico, 46 Off. Gaz. 5514). Article
361 of the old Civil Code has been reproduced with an additional 31
provision
in Article 448 of the new Civil Code, approved June 18, 1949.”
32
Similarly, in Grana and Torralba v. Court of Appeals, we held that:
_________________
29 Grana and Torralba v. Court of Appeals, 109 Phil. 260, 263 [1960]; Miranda v.
Fadullon, 97 Phil. 801 [1955]; Cabral v. Ibanez, 98 Phil. 140 [1955].
30 98 Phil. 140 [1955].
31 Id., at 142.
32 109 Phil. 260 [1960].
48

“Although without any legal and valid claim over the land in question,
petitioners, however, were found by the Court of Appeals to have
constructed a portion of their house thereon in good faith. Under Article 361
of the old Civil Code (Article 448 of the new), the owner of the land on
which anything has been built in good faith shall have the right to
appropriate as his own the building, after payment to the builder of
necessary or useful expenses, and in the proper case, expenses for pure
luxury or mere pleasure, or to oblige the builder to pay the price of the land.
Respondents, as owners of the land, have therefore the choice of either
appropriating the portion of petitioners’ house which is on their land upon
payment of the proper indemnity to petitioners, or selling to petitioners that
part of their land on which stands the improvement. It may here be pointed
out that it would be impractical for respondents to choose to exercise the
first alternative, i.e., buy that portion of the house standing on their land, for
in that event the whole building might be rendered useless. The more
workable solution, it would seem, is for respondents to sell to petitioners
that part of their land on which was constructed a portion of the latter’s
house. If petitioners are unwilling or unable to buy, then they must vacate
the land and must pay rentals until they do so. Of course, respondents
cannot oblige petitioners to buy the land if its value is considerably more
than that of the aforementioned portion of the house. If such be the case,
then petitioners must pay reasonable rent. The parties must come to an
agreement as to the conditions of33 the lease, and should they fail to do so,
then the court shall fix the same.”
In light of these rulings, petitioners, as owners of Lot No. 24, may

choose to purchase the improvement made by respondents Go on
their land, or sell to respondents Go the subject portion. If buying
the improvement is impractical as it may render the Go’s house
useless, then petitioners may sell to respondents Go that portion of
Lot No. 24 on which their improvement stands. If the Go’s are
unwilling or unable to buy the lot, then they must vacate the land
and, until they vacate, they must pay rent to petitioners. Petitioners,
however, cannot compel respondents Go to buy the land if its value
is considerably more than the portion of their house
____________________
33 Id., at 263-264.
49
VOL. 304, MARCH 2, 1999 49

constructed thereon. If the value of the land is much more than the
Go’s improvement, then respondents Go must pay reasonable rent. If
they do not agree on the terms of the lease, then they may go to
court to fix the same.
In the event that petitioners elect to sell to respondents Go the
subject portion of their lot, the price must be fixed at the prevailing
market value at the time of payment. The Court of Appeals erred in
fixing the price at the time of taking, which is the time the
improvements were built on the land. The time of taking is
determinative of just compensation in expropriation proceedings.
The instant case is not for expropriation. It is not a taking by the
state of private property for a public purpose upon payment of just
compensation. This is a case of an owner who has been paying real
estate taxes on his land but has been deprived of the use of a portion
of this land for years.
34
It is but fair and just to fix compensation at the
time of payment.
Article 448 and the same conditions abovestated also apply to
respondents Go as owners and possessors of their land and
respondent Li Ching Yao as builder of the improvement that
encroached on thirty-seven (37) square meters of respondents Go’s
land.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of respondent Court of
Appeals is modified as follows:
(1) Petitioners are ordered to exercise within thirty (30) days

from finality of this decision their option to either buy the
portion of respondents Go’s improvement on their Lot No.
24, or sell to said respondents the portion of their land on
which the improvement stands. If petitioners elect to sell
the land or buy the improvement, the purchase price must
be at
___________________
34 See Cabral v. Ibanez, supra, at 143, where this Court gave the owner of the land
thirty days to elect either to purchase the improvement or sell the land; and once
having elected, the case was reset for admission of evidence on the value of the
improvement, or the value of the land. This implies that the price of the land or
improvement was fixed definitely not at the time of taking; see also Aringo v. Arena,
supra, at 270.
50

the prevailing market price at the time of payment. If

buying the improvement will render respondents Go’s
house useless, then petitioners should sell the encroached

portion of their land to respondents Go. If petitioners
choose to sell the land but respondents Go are unwilling or
unable to buy, then the latter must vacate the subject portion
and pay reasonable rent from the time petitioners made
their choice up to the time they actually vacate the
premises. But if the value of the land is considerably more
than the value of the improvement, then respondents Go
may elect to lease the land, in which case the parties shall
agree upon the terms of the lease. Should they fail to agree
on said terms, the court of origin is directed to fix the terms
of the lease.
From the moment petitioners shall have exercised their
option, respondents Go shall pay reasonable monthly rent
up to the time the parties agree on the terms of the lease or
until the court fixes such terms.
(2) Respondents Go are likewise directed to exercise their
rights as owners of Lots Nos. 25 and 26, vis-a-vis
respondent Li Ching Yao as builder of the improvement that
encroached on thirty seven (37) square meters of
respondents Go’s land in accordance with paragraph one
abovementioned.
(3) The Decision of the Court of Appeals ordering Engineer
Quedding, as third-party defendant, to pay attorney’s fees of
P5,000.00 to respondents Go is affirmed. The additional
filing fee on the damages constitutes a lien on this award.
(4) The Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the
third-party complaint against Araneta Institute of
Agriculture is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena,

JJ., concur.
Judgment modified.
51
VOL. 304, MARCH 2, 1999 51

Notes.—A builder in good faith is one who is unaware of any

flaw in his title to the land at the time he builds on it. (Bishop vs.
Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 636 [1992])
Art. 448 of the Civil Code does not apply to a case where the
owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter who then later
loses ownership of the land by sale or donation. (Pecson vs. Court of

Appeals, 244 SCRA 407 [1995])
If the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period; While the payment of docket
fees, like other procedural rules, may have been liberally construed
in certain cases if only to secure a just and speedy disposition of
every action and proceeding, it should not be ignored or belittled lest
it scathes and prejudices the other party’s substantive rights.
(Colarina vs. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 647 [1999])
——o0o——
52
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

Ballatan Vs CA

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Ballatan Vs CA

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Ballatan Vs CA

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

9/14/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 304

34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

EDEN BALLATAN and SPS. BETTY MARTINEZ and CHONG

Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Docket Fees; The rule in this

Same; Same; Same; If there are unspecified claims, the determination

VOL. 304, MARCH 2, 1999 35

Ballatan vs. Court of Appeals

on the judgment award.—If there are unspecified claims, the determination

Ownership; Possession; Builders in Good Faith; Where a person had

Same; Same; Same; The right to choose between appropriating the

36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ballatan vs. Court of Appeals

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

VOL. 304, MARCH 2, 1999 37

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court

1 Penned by Justice Celia Lipana-Reyes and concurred in by Justices Alfredo L.

38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

6 Exhibit “1,” Folder of Exhibits—Quedding.

VOL. 304, MARCH 2, 1999 39

Failing to agree amicably, petitioner Ballatan brought the issue

with Third-Party Complaint” impleading as third-party defendants

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and

1. To demolish and remove all improvements existing and

a) P7,800.00 for the expenses paid to the surveyors;

4. To pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, attorney’s fees equivalent to

8 Decision of the trial court, p. 11, Court of Appeals Rollo, p. 86.

40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

5. To pay the costs of suit.

The third-party complaint filed by third-party plaintiff Gonzalo Go and

Respondents Go appealed. On March 25, 1996, the Court of Appeals

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby

1) Defendants-appellants are hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs-

VOL. 304, MARCH 2, 1999 41

Hence, this petition. Petitioners allege that:

1. IT APPLIED EQUITY OR EQUITABLE SOLUTIONS TO THE

JURISPRUDENCE VESTING BASIC PROPERTY RIGHTS TO

Petitioners question the admission by respondent Court of Appeals

42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The third-party complaint in the instant case arose from the

VOL. 304, MARCH 2, 1999 43

“ON THE THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT

1. That summons be issued against Third-Party Defendants Araneta

4. That Third-Party Defendants be ordered to 18

The Answer with Third-Party Complaint was admitted by the trial

16 Original Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, su-pra, at 761.

44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 304, MARCH 2, 1999 45

46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 304, MARCH 2, 1999 47

Article 448 has been applied to improvements or portions of

“[P]laintiffs Geronima Zabala and her husband Justino Bernardo,

On the basis of these facts, we held that:

48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ballatan vs. Court of Appeals

In light of these rulings, petitioners, as owners of Lot No. 24, may

VOL. 304, MARCH 2, 1999 49

(1) Petitioners are ordered to exercise within thirty (30) days