Need To Evolve Sentencing Policy in Death Penalty Cases
Need To Evolve Sentencing Policy in Death Penalty Cases
Need To Evolve Sentencing Policy in Death Penalty Cases
BHOPAL
CRIMINAL LAW – IV
PROJECT ON
REVISION POWERS OF THE COURT AND INTERLOCUTORY
ORDERS UNDER THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973
TENTH TRIMESTER
HYPOTHESIS.......................................................................................................................... III
LIFE IMPRISONMENT BEING THE RULE. .......................... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.
BIRTH OF THE DOCTRINE OF “RAREST OF RARE” CASE ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.
SCOPE OF THE TEST OF 'RAREST OF RARE' ..................... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.
ii. Motive for Commission of murder ........................ Error! Bookmark not defined.
iii. Period from 2011 onward ..................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION.............................................................................................. 12
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
The Indian Penal Code provides for imprisonment for life or death penalty as alternative
punishment under various offences. However, the Code of Criminal Procedure does not
provide any guidelines as when should the Courts impose death penalty or award life
imprisonment or lesser than that for any offence. This entails that the judicature exercise its
discretionary power and reasoning to decide the punishment but by following the guidelines of
the doctrine of Rarest of Rare case.
In spite the doctrine of Rarest of Rare case, the imposition and non-imposition of death penalty
is largely dependent upon the predilection of the bench hearing the appeal or petition. Thus,
there is no uniform understanding of the requirement of the rarest of rare doctrine in death
penalty cases and judges have varied notions on it.
HYPOTHESIS
The doctrine of Rarest of Rare case is not a sufficient test to determine whether death penalty
should be awarded or not.
MODE OF RESEARCH
Discuss the various provisions pertaining to death penalty under the Code of Criminal
Procedure.
Discuss the historic role background of death penalty as part of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.
Discuss the scope of the doctrine of Rarest of Rare case.
Discuss the application of the test of Rarest of Rare case.
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
Determine whether the Doctrine of Rarest of Rare case is sufficient test in order to
eliminate the possibility of discretion and arbitrariness in determining award death
penalty.
Determine whether a judicial sentencing policy would be a better alternative to the
Doctrine of Rarest of Rare case.
In the erstwhile Code of Criminal Procedure,1 the revisional jurisdiction of the courts was
envisaged under Section 435. It read as follows:
“The High Court Division or any Sessions Judge, the District Magistrate or any Sub-Divisional
Magistrate empowered by the State Government may call for and examine the record of any
proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within the local limits of its or his
jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or
propriety of any finding, sentence or order recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any
proceedings of such inferior Court and may, when calling for such record, direct that the
execution of any sentence be suspended and, if the accused is in confinement, that he be
released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record.”
In the present Code for Criminal Procedure (“Cr PC”),2the revisional jurisdiction of the courts
in envisaged in Section 397(1). It reads as follows:
“The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding
before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of
satisfying itself or himself; to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or
order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court,
and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be
suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on bail or on his own bond
pending the examination of the record.”
Compared to the erstwhile Code of Criminal Procedure, wherein revisional jurisdiction was
exercised by the District Magistrate or any Sub-Divisional Magistrate empowered by the State
Government, the new provision vests the right to revise the order of an inferior court only to
the High Court’s and Session Court’s.
1
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.
2
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Another interesting development is that the substantive law regarding the “Inherent power of
High Court Divisions” has remained the same.4 It says that nothing in the other parts of the
Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent power of the High Court Division to make
such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse
of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. This raises the question
as to whether an individual aggrieved by the bar on revisional jurisdiction of the Court under
Section 398(2) of the Cr PC can circumvent the provision by seeking relief under Section 482
of the Cr PC.
The authors will firstly give a general overview on the revisional jurisdiction of the criminal
courts in India. Thereon, the authors will secondly discuss the nature of interlocutory orders
and the methods used by the courts in determining whether a particular order is interlocutory
in nature. Finally, the authors will contemplate whether an individual aggrieved by the bar on
revisional jurisdiction can approach the High Court under Section 482, effectively seeking what
is barred.
3
Amar Nath And Others vs State Of Haryana & Others, 1978 SCR (1) 222.
4
Section 561A, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989; Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
The object of the revision is to confer upon superior criminal courts a kind of paternal or
supervisory jurisdiction in order to correct miscarriage of justice arising from misconception
of law, irregularity of procedure, neglect of proper precautions of apparent harshness of
treatment which has resulted on the one hand in some injury to the due maintenance of law and
order, or on the other hand in some undeserved hardship to individuals. The purpose of revision
is to enable the revision court to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any
finding, sentence or order recorded or passed and as to the regularity of any proceedings of the
inferior criminal court.
In the Cr PC provisions for revision in criminal cases are provided from Section 397- 405 and
in Section 482. The Sections 399, 400 and 401 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 deal with
the powers of revision of Sessions Judge, Additional Sessions Judge and High Court. In the
exercise of revision, the High Court is superior to Sessions Judge and the Sessions Judge is
superior to Assistant Sessions Judge, Chief Judicial Magistrate, and all other magistrates
including District Magistrate.
The provision for revision is discretionary in nature. Therefore, no party to a case has an
inherent right to be heard before a court exercising revision. The court can dispose of the
revision petition of its own without even hearing the parities.
Under Section 397(1) of the Cr PC, the High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and
examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or
his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality
or propriety of any finding, Sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of
any Proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling for such record, direct that the
execution of any Sentence order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that he be
released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record.
There is a consensus of opinion that unless the High Court acts suo moto, it can be moved to
exercise its power of revision only when an aggrieved party makes an application under section
397(1) to call for the records, such aggrieved party may be the accused himself or the
complainant or some other person. When a case has been instituted on police report, a private
party cannot, therefore, make such application and move the High Court to call for the records
and to exercise its power under section 401, in revision unless there are exceptional
circumstances.
The revisional jurisdiction when involved by a private complainant against an order of acquittal
ought not to be exercised lightly and that it could be exercised only in exceptional case where
the interest of public justice require interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or
the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice.5
5
Kaptan Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (1997) 4 SCC 211.
Section 397(2) mentions that the powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be
exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other
proceeding. The statutory bar on the power of revision in relation to interlocutory orders is
intended with the object of eliminating inordinate delay in the disposal of criminal cases and
to ensure expeditious trials.
The term interlocutory order has not been defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Ordinarily, the expression interlocutory order is taken to mean as a converse of the term final
order. A judgment or order, which determines the principal matter in question, is generally
termed as final'. Normally, an order which does not deal with the final rights of the parties, is
made before the judgment, gives no final decision on the matters in dispute, but is merely on a
matter of procedure, is termed as interlocutory. Though not conclusive of the main dispute an
interlocutory order may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals.6
But the true test of determining whether or not, an order is interlocutory in nature is whether
the order in question finally disposes of the rights of the parties or leaves the case still alive
and undecided.
Explaining the meaning of the expression ‘interlocutory order’, the Supreme Court in Amar
Nath v. State of Haryana,7 observed though the term has not been defined in Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 but ordinarily and generally it has been understood as converse of the term
‘final order’. In general, a judgment or order which determines the principal matter in question
is termed “final”. An order which does not deal with the final rights of the parties but either is
made before judgment and gives no final decision on the matters in dispute, but is merely on a
matter of procedure or is made after judgment, and merely directs how the declarations or rights
already given in the final judgment are to be worked out, is termed “interlocutory”. But an
interlocutory order even though not conclusive of the main dispute, may be conclusive as to
the subordinate matter with which it deals.
6
Puneet Sabharwal vs Central Bureau Of Investigation on 6th January, 2010, Delhi High Court.
7
AIR (1977) 4 SCC 137
Interlocutory in Nature
• Granting or refusal to grant bail – In the case of Usmaanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon &
Ors v. State of Gujarat,8 the Supreme Court held that granting or refusal to grant bail is an
interlocutory order.
• Order summoning accused – In the case of V.C. Shukla v. State through C.B.I., 9 the
Supreme Court held that an order summoning an accused is not an interlocutory order.
• Order framing Charge – In the case of Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Pvt. Ltd. &
Anr. v. CBI,11 the Supreme Court held that order framing charge is not purely an interlocutory
order and nor a final order.
In Girish Kumar Suneja Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation,12 the court There are three
categories of orders that a court can pass - final, intermediate and interlocutory. There is no
doubt that in respect of a final order, a court can exercise its revision jurisdiction - that is in
respect of a final order of acquittal or conviction. There is equally no doubt that in respect of
an interlocutory order, the court cannot exercise its revision jurisdiction. As far as an
intermediate order is concerned, the court can exercise its revision jurisdiction since it is not
an interlocutory order.
8
AIR 1988 SC 922
9
MANU/SC/0545/1980
10
AIR 1981 SC 1169
11
AIR 2018 SC 2039
12
MANU/SC/0829/2017
On 12 December 2006 a bench of Justices S.B. Sinha and Dalveer Bhandari delivered a
judgment in the case of Aloke Nath Dutta and ors. v. State of West Bengal. 13 In an unusually
candid judgment the Court admitted its failure to evolve a sentencing policy in capital cases.
The Bench examined various judgments over the past two decades in which the Supreme Court
adjudicated upon whether a case was ‘rarest of rare’ or not and concluded, “What would
constitute a rarest of rare case must be determined in the fact situation obtaining in each case
[sic]. We have also noticed hereinbefore that different criteria have been adopted by different
benches of this Court, although the offences are similar in nature. Because the case involved
offences under the same provision, the same by itself may not be a ground to lay down any
uniform criteria for awarding death penalty or a lesser penalty as several factors therefore are
required to be taken into consideration.” The frustration of the Court was evident when it
stated, “No sentencing policy in clear cut terms has been evolved by the Supreme Court. What
should we do?” The Court commuted the sentence.
On the same day however, another bench of Justices Arijit Pasayat and S.H. Kapadia delivered
a judgment in Bablu @ Mubarik Hussain v. State of Rajasthan.14 In this case the Court upheld
the death sentence of the appellant who had murdered his wife and four children. The judgment
did not discuss a motive for the killing. After referring to the importance of reformation and
rehabilitation of offenders as among the foremost objectives of the administration of criminal
justice in the country, the judgment merely referred to the declaration of the murders by the
accused as evidence of his lack of remorse. No discussion about the specific situation of the
appellant or the possibility of reform in his case was undertaken.
The fact that both these judgments were delivered on the same day in the Supreme Court not
only highlights the whimsical nature of the benches but also further reiterates the point made
by the bench in Aloke Nath Dutta Case about the lack of sentencing policy, leaving the
decisions to the particular views of the judges of the day. Such concerns have been reiterated
on multiple occasions, where the Court has pointed that the rarest of rare dictum propounded
in Bachan Singh has been inconsistently applied. In this context, it is instructive to examine
13
MANU/SC/8774/2006).
14
(AIR 2007 SC 697).
A sentencing policy will provide guidance on factors the court should consider that may affect
the sentence given. Criminal offences are very broadly defined and can have different levels of
seriousness. They set out different levels of sentence based on the harm caused to the victim
and how blameworthy the offender is. Offences happen in many different ways with many
different results. It is therefore necessary to have a range of sentences that appropriately reflect
the seriousness of each individual offence. Thus, ensuring courts are consistent in their
approach to sentencing.
The Malimath Committee Report had suggested a Sentencing Guideline way back in 2003. The
highlight of the Report with respect to Sentencing Guidelines are as follows:
a) The Indian Penal Code prescribed offences and punishments for the same. For many
offences only, the maximum punishment is prescribed and for some offences the
minimum may be prescribed. Thus, the Judge has wide discretion in awarding the
sentence within the statutory limits.
b) There is now no guidance to the Judge in regard to selecting the most appropriate
sentence given the circumstances of the case. Some Judges are lenient and some Judges
are harsh.
c) In some countries guidance regarding sentencing option is given in the penal code and
sentencing guideline laws.
15
SwamyShraddhananda v. State of Karnataka,(2008) 13 SCC 767
16
Farooq Abdul Gafur v. State of Maharashtra,(2010) 14 SCC 641
17
Sangeet v. State of Haryana,(2013) 2 SCC 452
18
Shankar Kisanrao Khade v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 5 SCC 546
19
Sangeet v. State of Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 452
20
SwamyShraddhananda v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 76
The Draft National Policy on Criminal Justice reiterated the need for a sentencing guideline in
the year 2007. The Draft suggested a Board of three judges including the trial judge, for
determining punishments in select offences punishable with life imprisonment or death, to
ensure objectivity. The Sentencing Board will also help the objective application of the “rarest
of rare” doctrine in death sentence.
a) The need for criminal law to offer more alternatives in the matter of punishments
instead of limiting the option merely to fines and imprisonment.
b) In respect of the quantum of punishments, the need for constant review to ensure that it
meets the ends of justice and disparity is reduced in similar situations.
c) A policy to avoid short-term imprisonments and to prevent overcrowding of jails and
other custodial institutions, to be rigorously pursued at all levels.
d) The need for specific sentencing guidelines to be evolved in respect of each
punishment.
e) Also the need for an institutional machinery involving correctional experts for fixing
proper punishment.
f) Fixing mandatory minimum sentences may not be a worthwhile solution.
21
I Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Committee on Reforms of Criminal Justice System Report
170 (Mar. 2003), http://www.mha.nic.in/hindi/sites/upload_files/mhahindi/files/pdf/criminal_justice_
system.pdf.
MANU/SC/0163/2012
In this case the court opined that while determining the questions relateable to sentencing
policy, the Court has to follow certain principles and those principles are the loadstar besides
the other consideration in awarding death sentence.
(1) The Court has to apply the test to determine, if it was the 'rarest of rare' case for imposition
of a death sentence.
(2) In the opinion of the Court, imposition of any other punishment, i.e., life imprisonment
would be completely inadequate and would not meet the ends of justice.
(4) The option to impose sentence of imprisonment for life cannot be cautiously exercised
having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and all relevant considerations.
(5) The method (planned or otherwise) and the manner (extent of brutality and inhumanity,
etc.) in which the crime was committed and the circumstances leading to commission of such
heinous crime.
In other words, these are the considerations which may collectively or otherwise weigh in the
mind of the Court, while exercising its jurisdiction. The Court then would draw a balance-sheet
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The Court has to strike a balance between the
two and see towards which side the scale/balance of justice tilts.
The principle of proportion between the crime and the punishment is the principle of 'just
deserts' that serves as the foundation of every criminal sentence that is justifiable. In other
words, the 'doctrine of proportionality' has a valuable application to the sentencing policy under
the Indian criminal jurisprudence. Thus, the court will not only have to examine what is just
but also as to what the accused deserves keeping in view the impact on the society at large.
However, this approach, in my opinion, is a mixing of various subjective elements and the
linking of two different tests i.e., the balance sheet method in order to determine whether a case
is of the Rarest of Rare case. Such mixing will only further lead to arbitrary and inconsistent
sentences.
The 20th Law Commission chaired by Justice Ajit Prakash Shah, recommended in its 262nd
report22 that “Principle of 'rarest of rare' cannot be operated free of arbitrariness. A sentencing
process without discretion may be more consistent, but will also be equally arbitrary for
ignoring relevant differences between cases. In such a system sentencing is likely to be severely
unfair and would definitely not remain a judicial function. The commission also noted that
there exists no principled method to remove such arbitrariness from capital sentencing. A rigid,
standardization or categorization of offences which does not consider the difference between
cases is arbitrary in that it treats different cases on the same footing.
However, a possible solution to this is the abolishment of death penalty itself. The commission
accordingly recommended a “swift” abolition of death penalty except in terror-related cases,
noting it does not serve the penological goal of deterrence any more than life imprisonment.
22
The Law Commission of India 262nd Report, www.lawcommissionofindia.nic.in
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
The National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) records data on the number of death sentences
awarded annually. On average, NCRB records that 129 persons are sentenced to death row
every year, or roughly one person every third day. Further, as per a recent report published by
the Centre on the Death Penalty, National Law University, Delhi, there have been have been 9
cases of in limine dismissals of Special Leave Petitions concerning the death penalty. Further,
the report also suggests that compared to the 70 death sentences imposed by the Sessions
Courts in India in 2015, 136 death sentences were given in 2016. The figure has almost doubled
in a year which sets out a dangerous trend.
In Shankar Kisanrao Khade v. State of Mahrashtra23 the Supreme Court, took note of these
figures and stated that this number was “rather high”24 and appeared to suggest that the death
penalty is being applied much more widely than was envisaged by Bachan Singh. In fact, as
subsequent pages suggest, the Supreme Court itself has come to doubt the possibility of a
principled and consistent implementation of the ‘rarest of rare’ doctrine.
Death Penalty in India is essentially a contested topic in the legal field. Death penalty in India
is constitutionally valid and has been upheld by the Supreme Court in a number of cases
subjected to the doctrine of ‘rarest of rare’ cases. However, the Courts have not been consistent
in its application of the doctrine leaving the fate of the accused in the hands of the bench. This
calls for strict sentencing guidelines regarding the imposition of the death penalty and also
follow those guidelines without subjectivity or abolish death penalty except as envisaged under
the 262nd Law Commission Report.
23
(2013) 5 SCCC 546, at 149
24
Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 498, at para 112