EN BANC

G.R. No. 148912 September 10, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
TIMOTEO ESCARLOS, alias "Tomy," appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
By interposing self-defense, herein appellant admits authorship of the killing. Thus, shifted to
him is the burden of proof showing that the killing was justified. Despite his failure to prove self-
defense, he may be convicted only of homicide, not murder, because of the inability of the
prosecution to establish any qualifying circumstance. Here, treachery is negated by the victim's
awareness of the impending attack.
The Case
For automatic review before the Court is the May 29, 2001 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Urdaneta, Pangasinan (Branch 46) in Criminal Case No. U-10792, finding appellant
guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing him to death. The dispositive portion
of the Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered CONVICTING beyond reasonable
doubt accused Timoteo Escarlos of the crime of Murder and the Court sentences him to
suffer the penalty of DEATH; he is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of Antonio
Balisacan the sum of P28,650.00 as actual damages, the sum of P50,000.00 as moral
damages and the further sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
"The Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to prepare the mittimus.
"The Jail Warden, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) Urdaneta District
Jail, Urdaneta City, is hereby ordered to deliver the living body of Timoteo Escarlos to
the National Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City, immediately upon receipt of this Decision."2
The Information3 dated August 29, 2000, charged appellant as follows:
"That on or about July 1, 2000, in the evening, at Barangay Dumanpot, Asingan,
Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a sharp pointed bladed weapon, with deliberate intent to kill,
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, hold and stab from behind Brgy. Kgd. Antonio Balisacan,
inflicting upon him the following injuries:
External Findings:
(1) Stab wound located below right clavicle measuring 3 inches length and 8
inches depth.
(2) Stab wound located at left armpit measuring 4 [inches] length and 6 inches
depth.
(3) Stab wound located at mid lumbar area measuring 3 inches length and 4
inches depth
(4) Stab wound located between right first and second finger measuring 3 inches
length.
Internal Findings:
(1) Cutting of the upper and lower lobe of the right lung.
(2) Cutting of the lower lobe of the left lung.
which injuries directly caused the death of said Brgy. Kgd. Antonio Balisacan, to the
damage and prejudice of his heirs.
"Contrary to Art. 248, Revised Penal Code in relation to Republic Act No. 7659."4
During his arraignment on November 8, 2000, appellant, with the assistance of his
counsel,5 pleaded not guilty to the charge.[6] After trial in due course, he was found guilty by the
lower court.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) narrates the factual version of the prosecution as
follows:
"Around 9 o'clock in the evening of July 1, 2000, Antonio Balisacan went to the
residence of Jaime Ulep in Domampot, Asingan, Pangasinan to attend a benefit dance
which was near the place. In the benefit dance was his son Crisanto Balisacan, who
attended the dance with his friends. Crisanto stood beside the emcee, Ceasario
Escarlos, appellant's brother. While Ceasario was calling the victim, Antonio Balisacan,
to come to the the stage as he was a kagawad, Crisanto heard the people at his back
shout 'Ay!'. Five (5) to six (6) meters at his back, with the place [illuminated] by a 50 to
100 watts bulb, he saw appellant stab his father, Antonio, several times. Crisanto was

Page 1 of 8
 momentarily shocked that he was not able to react. When appellant fled, Crisanto came
to his senses and ran to Antonio. Antonio was still alive so he brought him to Urdaneta
Sacred Heart Hospital where he expired a few minutes after arrival.
"Jesus Dismaya was also beside Ceasario when Antonio Balisacan's name was called.
When he heard people shout, he turned around and saw from a distance of four (4)
meters appellant stabbing Antonio four (4) times with a ten (10) inch-long knife. He then
called Antonio's brother, [Marcelo] Balisacan.
"Within the vicinity was Antonio's brother, Marcelo Balisacan. He was in the Asingan-
Urdaneta road, which was about fifteen (15) meters outside Ulep's yard when he heard
people shout and run from the benefit dance. Wanting to know what was happening, he
went to the benefit dance and saw that Antonio was stabbed. He went near Antonio,
hugged him, and asked who stabbed him. He replied, 'Tomy Escarlos.'
"Meanwhile around 9:30 of the same evening of July 1, 2000. SPO1 Patricio Badua was
on duty. He received a phone call about a stabbing incident in a benefit dance in
Domampot, Asingan, Pangasinan. When he went to the scene of the crime, the victim,
Antonio Balisacan was already in the hospital and appellant had already fled. He later
learn[ed] that Antonio died.
"Dr. Noemi Taganas conducted an autopsy on Antonio's body and found:
External Findings:
(1) Stab wound located below the right clavicle measuring 3 inches length (in)
and 8 inches (in) depth.
(2) Stab wound located at left armpit measuring 4 inches length and 6 inches
depth.
(3) Stab wound located at mid lumbar area measuring 3 inches length and 4
inches depth
(4) Stab wound located between right first and second finger measuring 3 inches
length.
Internal Findings:
(1) Cutting of the upper and lower lobe of the right lung.
(2) Cutting of the lower lobe of the left lung.
"She later issued a death certificate. She stated in court that out of the four (4) stab
wounds, Antonio's second stab wound was fatal because the lungs were penetrated.
"Dr. Ronald Bandonil, an NBI medico-legal officer confirmed Taganas' autopsy report.
He also conducted an autopsy on the exhumed body of Antonio. In his autopsy he found
that Antonio's first and second wounds were fatal as these caused his death due to
hypovalmic shock or massive blood loss."7 (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant, on the other hand, relates his version of the facts in this manner:
"On the night of July 1, 2000, accused TIMOTEO ESCARLOS together with Rexie
Yabes, Fredo Ramos, Erwin Ramos, Rowena Alamigo and others were at the yard of
Jaime Ulep, in Purok Inanama, Domanpot Asingan, Pangasinan watching a benefit
dance sponsored by Mr. & Mrs. Organization. He was invited to buy lechon during the
benefit dance.
"While thereat, Kgd. Antonio Balisacan who was then drunk, passed in front of accused
and told him, 'You are here again to create trouble.' Accused was offended so he
answered back saying 'Why do you say that to me when I am not doing any trouble
here.' Antonio Balisacan told him, 'OKINNAM KETDI' (vulva of your Mother) and without
warning boxed him. Timoteo was hit on the forehead, which left a scar on his forehead
about an inch above the right eyebrow. He intended to box back but he noticed that the
victim was pulling out a kitchen knife, so for fear of his life, he grabbed the weapon from
Antonio Balisacan and used the knife in stabbing the latter who was hit at the side below
the left armpit. He stabbed him twice and when the victim was about to fall down, he was
able to hit him for the third time.
"The weapon that Timoteo was able to get from Antonio was a kitchen knife about 10 to
12 inches. Antonio drew the knife from his left side. Timoteo was able to get hold of the
handle of the knife when he grappled for the same from the victim, by taking hold of the
knife with his right hand and stabbed Antonio who was intending to stab him. Antonio
was one (1) inch taller than accused.
"Timoteo's testimony was corroborated by an eyewitness, CESARIO ESCARLOS, the
brother of Timoteo and president of the Mr. & Mrs. Association which sponsored the
benefit dance on July 1, 2000.

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 "On the night of July 1, 2000, Cesario Escarlos was at the yard of Jaime Ulep. At about
9:00 o'clock in the evening of the said date, he saw his brother Timoteo Escarlos
together with Dexie Yabis standing in a corner watching the dance. Several minutes later
Kgd. Antonio Balisacan arrived and later on, while Cesario was on his way to urinate. He
heard Antonio uttered to Timoteo 'ADDA CAYO MANEN NGA AGARAMED TI
NILOLOCON.' While relieving himself, he heard both Timoteo and Antonio arguing and
before he could get near and pacify them, he saw them wrestling with each other. Many
people were around but nobody pacified them. Next minute he saw Antonio bloodied
and lying on the ground. There were at least 100 people then and might have seen the
incident. He noticed that Jesus Dismaya was there but the latter did not do anything.
Cesario, after the incident only stayed there for 3 minutes because he was looking for
his three year-old daughter. In the meantime, nobody touched the body of the victim."8
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court believed that the prosecution's evidence was sufficient to convict appellant of
murder qualified by treachery. It rejected his plea of self-defense, because there had been no
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
"x x x. The established facts revealed that the victim was one of the persons who filed a
case of malicious mischief against [appellant]. Said case was filed five (5) months before
the instant case happened. To the mind of the Court, the accused only found a way of
avenging what he felt towards the victim. He took advantage of that x x x particular time
and place to let out his feelings in the presence of his barangay mates. Such hidden
grudge by the accused against the victim, established the motive of the former.
xxx xxx xxx
"The second element of self-defense is also lacking. The nature, location and the
number of wounds inflicted on the victim belie and negate the accused['s] claim of self-
defense. The post mortem findings of the autopsy report showed that the victim
sustained four stab wounds.
"If there is any truth to the accused'[s] claim of self-defense, he would not have stabbed
him several times. [Worse,] the location of the wounds suggested that the accused was
at the back of the victim when the wounds were inflicted. It is therefore evident from the
conduct of the accused that he was determined to kill the victim and did not just act to
defend himself. In view of the foregoing, it is no longer necessary to discuss the third
element."9
Hence, this automatic review.10
The Issues
Appellant assigns the following alleged errors for our consideration:
"1. The honorable trial court erred in appreciating treachery as a qualifying circumstance
despite failure of the prosecution to prove its attendance.
"2. The honorable trial court erred in not finding that the testimony of the supposed
eyewitnesses for the prosecution as to the attendance of treachery is flawed and
unworthy of belief.
"3. The honorable trial court erred in not giving exculpatory weight to the theory of self-
defense interpose[d] by the accused-appellant.
"4. The honorable trial court committed a grave and serious error in not finding that the
victim [was] the first to assault accused.
"5. The honorable trial court erred in considering motive to establish the guilt of the
accused.
"6. The honorable court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of murder instead of
acquitting him or at most convicting him of homicide."11
These issues boil down to four: (1) sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence, (2) viability of self-
defense, (3) appreciation of treachery as a qualifying circumstance, and (4) propriety of the
penalty and the damages imposed by the trial court.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Sufficiency of the Prosecution's Evidence
Although appellant did not directly raise the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence as an
issue, this Court nonetheless deliberated on it motu proprio, because an automatic appeal in a
criminal action opens the whole case for review. Indeed, the strength of the prosecution's
evidence must be passed upon, especially in cases in which the death penalty has been
imposed by the trial court.12 We have carefully examined the evidence for the prosecution and

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found that the fact of killing and the identity of the killer were duly established beyond
reasonable doubt.
Prosecution Witness Crisanto Balisacan, son of the victim, testified on the stabbing incident,
which had occurred during a benefit dance on that fateful night of July 1, 2000. The witness'
testimony is as follows:
"COURT:
You go to the main point.
ATTY. VELASCO:
While there, did you observe or did you see if there was any unusual incident that
took place?
A: Yes, your Honor.
Q: What was that unusual incident you have seen and observed?
A: Stabbing incident, your Honor.
COURT:
Who was stabbed?
ATTY. VELASCO:
Who was the victim of that stabbing?
A: My father.
Q: Who stabbed him?
A: Mr. Timoteo 'Tomy' Escarlos, the accused in this case, your Honor.
Q: Will you please focus your eyes within this Honorable Court and tell us whether
the person you said who stabbed your father by the name of Timoteo Escarlos is in the
premises of this Honorable Court?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Will you please stand up and point to him?
A: The first one, your Honor (Witness is pointing unto a person seated on the bench
inside the courtroom, who, when his name was asked, he answered Timoteo Escarlos).
Q: How long have you been acquainted with the accused Timoteo Escarlos?
A: About ten years, your Honor.
Q: He is also from Domampot?
A: Yes, your Honor.
Q: Considering that it is already about 9:20-9:30 o'clock in the evening when this
stabbing incident took place, how can you be sure that it was Timoteo Escarlos who
stabbed your father?
A: There was x x x light, your Honor.
Q: What kind of light are you trying to say?
A: 50–100 watts bulb.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. VELASCO:
Did you see the spot where your father was actually stabbed?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How far is this place where your father was stabbed in relation to the entrance of
the dance arena.
A: About 5 to 6 meters at my back, your Honor.
Q: And at that distance, what happened next while you were watching?
A: I heard shouting.
Q: These shouting that you heard, where did they come from?
A: From my back.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
What is that shouting about?
ATTY. VELASCO:
You heard shoutin[g], according to you, what did you hear, if you know?
A: About the incident.
COURT:
Tell [us] exactly what you heard[.]
A: I heard shouting, 'Ay!'
Q: How many people shouted, 'Ay'?
A: Many, your Honor, because that was a benefit dance.
ATTY. VELASCO:
When you heard shoutin[g], what did you do, if any?
A: I turned my head to my back.

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 Q: When you focused your attention and sight at your back, what happened next?
A: I saw stabbing. I saw my father stabbed by Timoteo Escarlos, your
Honor."13 (Italics supplied)
Undoubtedly, the factual premises with regard to the killing and its commission by appellant are
clear and undisputed. He did not at all deny the allegations against him and openly admitted
that he had killed the victim. However, he interposes self-defense to seek his exoneration from
criminal liability.
Second Issue:
Plea of Self-Defense
In pleading self-defense, appellant asserts that it was the victim who initially approached and
assaulted him. Allegedly, the former had no choice but to defend himself under the
circumstances. In his testimony before the trial court, he described the confrontation that had
led to the fatal killing as follows:
"Q: And while you were there at the yard of Jaime Ulep on that night of July 1, 2000
do you remember having seen the person of one Kgd. Antonio Balisacan?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And did he see you also?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And did you happen to see him?
A: When he passed in front of me he uttered in a loud voice – 'you are here again to
create trouble' (ADDA KA MANEN DITOY NGA AGARAMID TI NILILOKO).
Q: To whom did Antonio Balisacan utter these words?
A: I, sir.
Q: And you said it was uttered in a loud manner, how far were you when he uttered
these words?
A: More or less 3 to 4 meters, sir.
Q: What did you say?
A: I was offended, sir.
Q: And do you know the physical appearance of Antonio Balisacan when he
mentioned those words to you?
A: As if he was drunk, sir.
Q: What made you say that as if he was drunk?
A: I smell his breath, sir.
Q: How did you react later when Antonio Balisacan uttered those words to you?
A: I said: 'Why do you say that to me when I am not doing any trouble here.'
Q: By the way, when Antonio Balisacan said those words to you, were you doing
anything that time?
A: None, sir.
Q: What happened later on when you answered Brgy. Kgd. Antonio Balisacan?
A: He said: 'OKINNAM KETDI' (vulva of your mother) and then he boxed me, sir.
Q: Were you hit?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What part of your body was hit?
A: This one on my forehead, sir. (Witness is pointing on his forehead).
Q: Were you injured?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What injury did you suffer?
A: My forehead was injured (Witness is pointing a [to] a scar on his forehead about
an inch at the right above the right eyecrow).
Q: And what did you do after you were boxed by Antonio Balisacan?
A: When I intend to box him I noticed that he withdrew a balisong and I tried to grab
and used the balisong in stabbing, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
How many times did you stab him?
A: Two times but when he was about to fall down I was able to hit him once for the
third time, sir.
Q: You said that he drew a knife, where did he draw the knife?
A: At his left side, sir.
Q: What kind of weapon did he draw?
A: I sized it to be a kitchen knife, sir.
Q: Could you tell the Honorable Court the length of that knife to include the handle?

Page 5 of 8
 A: 10 to 12 inches, sir.
Q: And how did you grapple for the possession of that knife?
A: I was able to hold the handle of the kitchen knife, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What prompted you to stab him considering that you already got hold [of] the
knife from him?
A: Yes, sir, because he intend[ed] to stab me, so, when I had possession of the
knife I stabbed him, sir."14 (Italics supplied)
We stress that when the accused invokes self-defense, the burden of proof is shifted from the
prosecution to the defense. Thus, the latter assumes the responsibility of establishing this plea
by clear and convincing evidence.15 Upon its shoulders rests the duty of proving, to the
satisfaction of the trial court, the justifying circumstance of self-defense.16
The implications of pleading self-defense insofar as the burden of proof is concerned was
explained by the Court in Macalino v. People,17 from which we quote:
"In pleading self-defense, petitioner in effect admitted that he stabbed the victim. It was
then incumbent upon him to prove that justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the
court, relying on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution. The reason is that even if the prosecution evidence were weak, such could
not be disbelieved after petitioner admitted the fact of stabbing the victim."18
The accused who avers that the killing arose from an impulse of self-defense has the onus
probandi of proving the elements thereof.19 The essential requisites of self-defense are the
following: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person resorting to self-defense.20 Verily, to invoke self-defense successfully,
there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the
accused, who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by employing
reasonable means to resist the attack.21
Unlawful Aggression on the Part of the Victim
In the present case, appellant claims that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim when the latter unceremoniously boxed him on the forehead in the heat of their argument.
Appellant adds that he had initially thought of hitting back when he noticed that the victim was
pulling out a kitchen knife. Hence, to save his life, the former grabbed the weapon and used it to
stab the latter. Appellant insists that under the circumstances, he was legally justified in using
the knife to ward off the unlawful aggression. For him to wait for the knife to be raised and to fall
on him before acting to defend himself would be asking too much, he argues.
The contentions of appellant are untenable. While the victim may be said to have initiated the
confrontation, we do not subscribe to the view that the former was subjected to an unlawful
aggression within the legal meaning of the phrase.
The alleged assault did not come as a surprise, as it was preceded by a heated exchange of
words between the two parties who had a history of animosity. Moreover, the alleged drawing of
a knife by the victim could not have placed the life of appellant in imminent danger. The former
might have done it only to threaten or intimidate the latter.
Unlawful aggression presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger -- not merely
threatening and intimidating action.22 Uncertain, premature and speculative was the assertion of
appellant that the victim was about to stab him, when the latter had merely drawn out his knife.
There is aggression, only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to one's life.
The peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not just speculative.23
Even assuming arguendo that there was an altercation before the stabbing incident and that
some danger did in fact exist, the imminence of that danger had already ceased the moment
appellant disarmed the victim by wresting the knife from the latter. After the former had
successfully seized it, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to speak of that would have
necessitated the need to kill the latter. Hence, appellant became the unlawful aggressor when
he stabbed the victim.24
When an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one who resorts to self-
defense has no right to kill or even to wound the former aggressor.25 To be sure, when the
present victim no longer persisted in his purpose or action to the extent that the object of his
attack was no longer in peril, there was no more unlawful aggression that would warrant legal
self-defense on the part of appellant.26 Undoubtedly, the latter went beyond the call of self-
preservation when he proceeded to inflict excessive, atrocious and fatal injuries on the latter,
even when the allegedly unlawful aggression had already ceased.
Reasonable Necessity of the Means Employed to Prevent or Repel the Attack

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Appellant argues that in the heat of the encounter, he was not in a position to calculate or
determine the effects of his blows, and that it was nevertheless necessary for him to inflict them
in order to save his own life.
As correctly held by the trial court, the nature, the number and the location of the wounds
inflicted upon the victim were important indicia disproving self-defense.27 The claim of appellant
that only two of the four stab wounds were fatal is of no moment, inasmuch as the means he
employed was glaringly disproportionate to the perceived unlawful aggression. He admitted in
his testimony that he had stabbed the victim for the third time, even when the latter was about to
fall.
The means employed by a person invoking self-defense must be reasonably commensurate to
the nature and the extent of the attack sought to be averted, as held by the Court in People v.
Obordo:28
"Even assuming arguendo that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim,
accused-appellant likewise failed to prove that the means he employed to repel Homer's
punch was reasonable. The means employed by the person invoking self-defense
contemplates a rational equivalence between the means of attack and the defense.
Accused-appellant claimed that the victim punched him and was trying to get something
from his waist, so he (accused-appellant) stabbed the victim with his hunting knife. His
act of immediately stabbing Homer and inflicting a wound on a vital part of the victim's
body was unreasonable and unnecessary considering that, as alleged by accused-
appellant himself, the victim used his bare fist in throwing a punch at him."29
Indeed, the means employed by a person resorting to self-defense must be rationally necessary
to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression.30
Unlawful aggression is a conditio sine qua non for upholding the justifying circumstance of self-
defense.31 Unless the victim has committed unlawful aggression against the other, there can be
no self-defense, complete or incomplete, on the part of the latter. If there is nothing to prevent or
repel, the other two requisites of self-defense will have no basis.32
Third Issue:
Appreciation of Qualifying Circumstances
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor without the
slightest provocation on the part of the victim, thus depriving the latter of any real chance to put
up a defense, and thereby ensuring the commission of the attack without risk to the
aggressor.33 Treachery requires the concurrence of two conditions: (1) the employment of a
means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation;
and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution.34
There is no treachery when the assault is preceded by a heated exchange of words between
the accused and the victim; or when the victim is aware of the hostility of the assailant towards
the former.35
In the instant case, the verbal and physical squabble prior to the attack proves that there was no
treachery, and that the victim was aware of the imminent danger to his life.36 Moreover, the
prosecution failed to establish that appellant had deliberately adopted a treacherous mode of
attack for the purpose of depriving the victim of a chance to fight or retreat.37
Certainly, the victim knew that his scuffle with appellant could eventually turn into a violent
physical clash. The existence of a struggle before the fatal blows were inflicted on the victim
clearly shows that he was forewarned of the impending attack, and that he was afforded the
opportunity to put up a defense.38 Indeed, a killing done at the spur of the moment is not
treacherous. Moreover, any doubt as to the existence of treachery must be resolved in favor of
the accused.39
In People v. Cariño,40 we modified the trial court's decision and ruled that the crime committed
was only homicide, because the qualifying circumstance of treachery had not been clearly
established. Thus, the Court declared:
"However, we agree with the OSG's recommendation that appellant be held liable only
for homicide, not murder. In this case, the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not
conclusively established. For treachery to exist, the following requisites must be met: (1)
that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2)
that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack
employed by him. The facts show that Edmundo was placed on guard concerning a
possible assault by Pedro. First, there was a heated argument between them at the
place of the wake. Second, Edmundo was not unaware that he and Rolando were
followed outside by appellant, who did not adopt any means to conceal himself or hide
his intention of confronting Edmundo. Third, the abrasions and contusions on Edmundo's

Page 7 of 8
 face show that Edmundo was able to put up a fight before he was fatally stabbed. These
circumstances negate the existence of treachery in the commission of the offense." 41
As in People v. Cariño, the Office of the Solicitor General recommended in this case that
appellant be convicted of homicide only, inasmuch as the qualifying circumstance of treachery
had not been sufficiently established.42
The trial court correctly ruled that the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was not
present in the killing. Essentially, there is evident premeditation when the execution of a criminal
act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out a criminal intent
within a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.43 Obviously, the acts of appellant
in the present case can hardly be described as a product of reflective thought or deliberate
planning towards a decisive resolve to kill the victim. On the contrary, the confrontation that
escalated to a violent brawl was quite spontaneous, casual and incidental. Verily, the brutal
killing was not the result of a previous plot or sinister design to end the life of the victim.
The elements of evident premeditation are as follows: (a) the time when the accused decided to
commit the crime; (b) an overt act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to the
determination to commit the crime; and (c) the lapse of a period of time, between the
determination and the subsequent execution of the crime, sufficient to allow the accused an
opportunity to reflect upon the consequences of the act.44 As found by the trial court, the
prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to establish any of the foregoing requisites. To
be sure, when there is no showing how and when the plan to kill was decided or how much time
had elapsed before the crime was carried out, there is no evident premeditation.45
In a criminal prosecution -- especially in cases involving the extreme penalty of death -- nothing
but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which
the accused is charged must be established.46
Fourth Issue:
Proper Penalty and Award of Damages
Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal.
There being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the appropriate penalty should be
reclusion temporal in its medium period. Appellant is likewise entitled to the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.
The trial court awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000, but failed to award P50,000
as civil indemnity for the death of the victim. Moral damages cannot be granted in the absence
of proof therefor.47 Unlike in rape cases, this type of award is not automatically given in murder
or homicide. The prosecution was, however, able to prove actual damages in the sum of
P28,650. The award of exemplary damages should be omitted considering that no aggravating
circumstance was duly proven.48
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is MODIFIED. Appellant is held guilty of homicide and
sentenced to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prison mayor medium, as minimum; to fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months and (1) day of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. He shall
also pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P28,650 as actual
damages, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence.[49] The grant of moral and exemplary
damages is DELETED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

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