59 Cruz vs. CA PDF

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 192 13/09/2017, 8+02 AM
VOL. 192, DECEMBER 10, 1990 209

Cruz vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 79962. December 10, 1990.
LUCIO R. CRUZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS

AND CONRADO Q. SALONGA, respondents.
Evidence; Parol Evidence; Sec. 7, Rule 130 is predicated on the

existence of a document embodying the terms of an agreement. Exh.
D does not contain such an agreement, hence the rule will not apply,
and parol evidence may be introduced to explain the real agreement
between the parties.·The reason for the rule is the presumption
that when the parties have reduced their agreement to writing they
have made such writing the only repository and memorial of the
truth, and whatever is not found in the writing must be understood
to have been waived or
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
210
210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
abandoned. The rule, however, is not applicable in the case at bar.

Section 7, Rule 130 is predicated on the existence of a document
embodying the terms of an agreement, but Exhibit D does not
contain such an agreement. It is only a receipt attesting to the fact
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that on May 4,1982, the petitioner received from the private

respondent the amount of P35,000. It is not and could have not been
intended by the parties to be the sole memorial of their agreement.
As a matter of fact, Exhibit D does not even mention the
transaction that gave rise to its issuance. At most, Exhibit D can
only be considered a casual memorandum of a transaction between
the parties and an acknowledgment of the receipt of money
executed by the petitioner for the private respondent's satisfaction.
A writing of this nature, as Wigmore observed, is not covered by the
parol evidence rule. A receipt·i.e. a written acknowledgment,
handed by one party to the other, of the manual custody of money or
other personalty·will in general fall without the line of the rule;
i.e. it is not intended to be an exclusive memorial, and the facts may
be shown irrespective of the terms of the receipt. This is because
usually a receipt is merely a written admission of a transaction
independently existing, and, like other admissions, is not
conclusive.
Same; Same; Same; A deed is not conclusive evidence of
everything it may contain.·While Exhibit I is dated May 14, 1982,
it does not make any categorical declaration that the amount of
P28,000.00 stated therein was received by the petitioner on that
same date. That date may not therefore be considered conclusive as
to when the amount of P28,000.00 was actually received. A deed is
not conclusive evidence of everything it may contain. For instance,
it is not the only evidence of the date of its execution, nor its
omission of a consideration conclusive evidence that none passed,
nor is its acknowledgment of a particular consideration an objection
to other proof of other and consistent considerations; and, by
analogy, the acknowledgment in a deed is not conclusive of the fact.
Same; Same; Same; Failure to object to the introduction of
evidence varying the terms of a written agreement, is deemed a
waiver of the benefit of the parol evidence rule.·For failure of the
private respondent to object to the evidence introduced by the
petitioner, he is deemed to have waived the benefit of the parol
evidence rule. Thus, in Abrenica v. Gonda, this Court held: x x x it
has been repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence that a protest or
objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at
the proper time, and that if not so made it will be understood to
have been waived. The proper time to make a protest or objection is
when, from the question ad-
211
VOL. 192, DECEMBER 10, 1990 211
dressed to the witness, or from the answer thereto, or from the

presentation of proof, the inadmissibility of evidence is, or may be
inferred.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Courts cannot disregard evidence

which would ordinarily be incompetent under the rules but has been
rendered admissible by the failure of a party to object thereto.·It is
also settled that the court cannot disregard evidence which would
ordinarily be incompetent under the rules but has been rendered
admissible by the failure of a party to object thereto. Thus: x x x
The acceptance of an incompetent witness to testify in a civil suit,
as well as the allowance of improper questions that may be put to
him while on the stand is a matter resting in the discretion of the
litigant. He may assert his right by timely objection or he may
waive it, expressly or by silence. In any case the option rests with
him. Once admitted, the testimony is in the case for what it is worth
and the judge has no power to disregard it for the sole reason that it
could have been excluded, if it had been objected to, nor to strike it
out on its own motion. (Emphasis supplied.)
Civil Procedure; Pleadings, Amendment of; Where the failure to
order an amendment does not appear to have caused a surprise or
prejudice to the objecting party, it may be allowed as a harmless
error.·In Co Tiamco v. Diaz, the Supreme Court held: x x x When
evidence is offered on a matter not alleged in the pleadings, the
court may admit it even against the objection of the adverse party,
when the latter fails to satisfy the court that the admission of the
evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his defense upon the
merits, and the court may grant him continuance to enable him to
meet the situation created by the evidence. x x x While it is true
that the private respondent did not even file a motion to amend his
complaint in order that it could conform to the evidence presented,
this did not prevent the court from rendering a valid judgment on
the issues proved. As we held in the Co Tiamco case: x x x where the
failure to order an amendment does not appear to have caused a
surprise or prejudice to the objecting party, it may be allowed as a
harmless error. Well-known is the rule that departures from
procedure may be forgiven when they do not appear to have
impaired the substantial rights of the parties.
PETITION to review the decision of the Court of

Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Edmundo A. Cruz for petitioner.
Rodel L. Ambas for private respondent.
212

CRUZ, J.:
The private respondent Conrado Salonga filed a complaint **

for collection and damages against petitioner Lucio Cruz
in the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City alleging that in
the course of their business transactions of buying and
selling fish, the petitioner borrowed from him an amount of
P35,000.00, evidenced by a receipt dated May 4, 1982,
marked as Exhibit D, reading as follows:
5/4/82
Received the amount of Thirty Five Thousand Cash from Rodrigo
Quiambao and Conrado Salonga on the day of May 4,1982
Sgd. Lucio Cruz
The plaintiff claimed that of this amount, only P20,000.00

had been paid, leaving a balance of P15,000.00; that in
August 1982, he and the defendant agreed that the latter
would grant him an exclusive right to purchase the harvest
of certain fishponds leased by Cruz in exchange for certain
loan accommodations; that pursuant thereto, Salonga
delivered to Cruz various loans totaling P1 5,250.00,
evidenced by four receipts and an additional P4,000.00, the
receipt of which had been lost; and that Cruz failed to
comply with his part of the agreement by refusing to
deliver the alleged harvest of the fishpond and the amount
of his indebtedness.
Cruz denied having contracted any loan from Salonga.
By way of special defense, he alleged that he was a lessee
of several hectares of a fishpond owned by Nemesio Yabut

and that sometime in May 1982, he entered into an
agreement with Salonga whereby the latter would
purchase (pakyaw) fish in certain areas of the fishpond
from May 1982 to August 15, 1982. They also agreed that
immediately thereafter, Salonga would sublease
(bubuwisan) the same fishpond for a period of one year.
Cruz admitted having received on May 4,1982, the amount
of P35,000.00 and on several occasions from August 15,
1982, to
_______________
** The ponente is not related to the petitioner or his counsel.
213
VOL. 192, DECEMBER 10, 1990 213

Cruz us. Court of Appeals
September 30, 1982, an aggregate amount of P15,250.00.

He contended however, that these amounts were received
by him not as loans but as consideration for their "pakyaw"
agreement and payment for the sublease of the fishpond.
He added that it was the private respondent who owed him
money since Salonga still had unpaid rentals for the 10-
month period that he actually occupied the fishpond. Cruz
also claimed that Salonga owed him an additional
P4,000.00 arising from another purchase of fish from other
areas of his leased fishpond.
In a pre-trial conference held on August 24,1984,
petitioner and private respondent entered into the
following partial stipulation of facts.
COURT:
Plaintiff and defendant, through their respective counsel, during

the pre-trial conference, agreed on the following stipulation of facts:
1) That plaintiff Conrado Salonga entered into a contract of

what is commonly called as "pakyawan" with defendant
Lucio Cruz on the fishes contained in a fishpond which
defendant Lucio Cruz was taking care of as lessee from the
owner Mr. Nemesio Yabut, with a verbal contract for the

sum of P28,000.00 sometime in May 1982.
2) That because of the necessity, defendant Lucio Cruz at that
time needed money, he requested plaintiff Conrado Salonga
to advance the money of not only P28,000.00 but P35,000.00
in order that Lucio Cruz could meet his obligation with the
owner of the fishpond in question, Mr. Nemesio Yabut;
3) That the amount of P35,000.00 as requested by defendant
Lucio Cruz was in fact delivered by plaintiff Conrado
Salonga duly received by the defendant Lucio Cruz, as
evidenced by a receipt dated May 4,1982, duly signed by
defendant Lucio Cruz.
4) That pursuant to said contract of "pakyaw," plaintiff
Conrado Salonga was able to harvest the fishes contained in
the fishpond administered by Lucio Cruz in August 1982.
5) Immediately thereafter the aforesaid harvest thereon, they
entered again on a verbal agreement whereby plaintiff
Conrado Salonga and defendant Lucio Cruz had agreed
that defendant Lucio Cruz will sublease and had in fact
subleased the fishpond of Nemesio Yabut to the herein
plaintiff for the amount of P28,000.00 for a period of one
year beginning August 15, 1982.
6) That sometime on June 15, 1983, Mayor Nemesio Yabut,
who is the owner of the fishpond, took back the subject
matter of this case
214

from the defendant Lucio Cruz.

7) That defendant Lucio Cruz in compliance with their verbal
sublease agreement had received from the plaintiff Conrado
Salonga the following sums of money:
a) P8,000.00 on August 15, 1982 as evidenced by Annex "B" of

the Complaint. (Exh. E);
b) The sum of P500.00 on September 4, 1982, as evidenced by
Annex "C" of the complaint (Exh. F);
c) The sum of P3,000.00 on September 19, 1982 as evidenced

by Annex "D" of the complaint (Exh. G); and
d) The sum of P3,750.00 on September 30, 1982 as Annex "E"
of the complaint (Exh. H).
At the trial, the private respondent claimed that aside from

the amounts of P35,000.00 (Exh. D), P8,000.00 (Exh. E),
P500.00 (Exh. F), P3,000.00 (Exh. G) and P3,750.00 (Exh.
H) mentioned in the partial stipulation of facts, he also
delivered to the petitioner P28,000.00, which constituted
the consideration for their "pakyaw" agreement. This was
evidenced by a receipt dated May 14,1982 marked as
Exhibit I and reading as follows:
May 14, 1982

Tinatanggap ko ang halagang dalawampu't walong libong piso
(P28,000.00) bilang halaga sa pakyaw nila sa akin sa sangla sa
kahong bilang #8 maliit at sa kaputol na sapa sa gawing may
bomba. Ito ay tatagal hanggang Agosto 1982.
SGD. LUCIO CRUZ
Salonga also claimed that he had paid Cruz the amount of

P4,000 but the receipt of which had been lost and denied
being indebted to the petitioner for P4,000 for the lease of
other portions of the fishpond.
For his part, the petitioner testified that he entered into
a "pakyaw" and sublease agreement with the private
respondent for a consideration of P28,000 for each
transaction. Out of the P35,000 he received from the
private respondent on May 4, 1982, P28,000 covered full
payment of their "pakyaw" agreement while the remaining
P7,000 constituted the advance payment for their sublease
agreement. The petitioner denied hav-
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VOL. 192, DECEMBER 10, 1990 215

ing received another amount of P28,000 from Salonga on

May 14,1982. He contended that the instrument dated May
14,1982 (Exh. I) was executed to evidence their "pakyaw"
agreement and to fix its duration. He was corroborated by

Sonny Viray, who testified that it was he who prepared the
May 4, 1982, receipt of P35,000.00, P28,000 of which was
payment for the "pakyaw" and the excess of P7,000.00 as
advance for the sublease.
The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner and
ordered the private respondent to pay the former the sum
of P3,054.00 plus P1,000.00 as litigation expenses and
attorney's fees, and the costs. Judge Eriberto U. Rosario,
Jr. found that the transactions between the petitioner and
the private respondent were indeed "pakyaw" and sublease
agreements, each, having a consideration of P28,000.00, for
a total of P56,000.00. Pursuant to these agreements,
Salonga paid Cruz P35,000.00 on May 4, 1982 (Exh. D);
P8,000.00 on August 15, 1982 (Exh. E); P500.00 on
September 4,1982 (Exh. F); P3,000 on September 19,1982;
P3,750 on September 30, 1982 (Exh. H) and P4,000.00 on
an unspecified date. The trial court noted an earlier
admission of the private respondent that on an unspecified
date he received the sum of P6,000.00 from the petitioner.
This amount was credited to the petitioner and deducted
from the total amount paid by the private respondent. As
the one-year contract of sublease was pre-terminated two
months short of the stipulated period, the rentals were
correspondingly reduced.
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed.
The respondent court instead ordered the petitioner to pay
the private respondent the sum of P24,916.00 plus
P1,500.00 as litigation expenses and attorney's fees, on the
following justification:
Exhibit "I" is very clear in its non-reference to the transaction

behind Exhibit "D." What only gives the semblance that Exhibit "I"
is an explanation of the transaction behind Exhibit "D" are the oral
testimonies given by the defendant and his two witnesses. On the
other hand, Exhibit "I" is very clear in its language. Thus, its tenor
must not be clouded by any parol evidence introduced by the
defendant. And with the tenor of Exhibit "I" remaining
unembellished, the conclusion that Exhibit "D" is a mere tentative
receipt becomes untenable.
216

The trial court erred when it relied on the self-serving testimonies

of the defendant and his witness as against the receipts both
parties presented and adopted as their own exhibits. As said before,
Exhibit "I" is very clear in its tenor. And if it is really the intention
of Exhibit "I" to explain the contents of Exhibit "D", such
manifestation or intention is not found in the four corners of the
former document.
The respondent court also found that the amounts of

P35,000.00, P8,000.00, P500.00, P3,000.00, P3,750.00 and
P4,000.00 were not payments for the "pakyaw" and
sublease agreement but for loans extended by Salonga to
Cruz. It also accepted Salonga's claim that the amount of
P28,000.00 was delivered to the petitioner on May 14,1982,
as payment on the "pakyaw" agreement apart from the
P35,000.00 (Exh. D) that was paid on May 4,1982.
However, it agreed that the amount of P6,000.00 received
by the private respondent from the petitioner should be
credited in favor of the latter.
The petitioner is now before this Court, raising the
following issues:
1. The public respondent Court of Appeals gravely

erred in (1) disregarding parol evidence to Exhibits
"D" and "I" despite the fact that these documents
fall under the exceptions provided for in Sec. 7,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and thereby in (2)
making a sweeping conclusion that the transaction
effected between the private respondent and
petitioner is one of contract of loan and not a
contract of lease.
2. Assuming for the sake of argument that exhibits
"D" and "I" evidence separate transactions, the
latter document should be disregarded, the same
not having been pleaded as a cause of action.
3. Whether or not the Stipulation of Facts entered
into by the parties herein relative to their executed
transactions during the hearing of their case a quo,
are binding upon them and as well as, upon the
public respondent?
Our ruling follows:

Rule 1130, Sec. 7, of the Revised Rules of Court
provides:
________________
1 Now Sec. 9, Rule 130, Revised Rules on Evidence, Effective July

1,1989.
217
VOL. 192, DECEMBER 10, 1990 217

Sec. 7. Evidence of Written Agreements.·When the terms of an

agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as
containing all such terms, and therefore, there can be, between the
parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of
the agreement other than the contents of the writing, except in the
following cases:
a) When a mistake or imperfection of the writing or its failure

to express the true intent and agreement of the parties, or
the validity of the agreement is put in issue by the
pleadings;
b) When there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing. The
term "agreement" includes wills.
The reason for the rule is the presumption that when the
parties have reduced their agreement to writing they have
made such writing the only repository and memorial of the
truth, and whatever is not found in the writing
2
must be
understood to have been waived or abandoned.
The rule, however, is not applicable in the case at bar,
Section 7, Rule 130 is predicated on the existence of a
document em-
_______________
3. PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
Sec. 9. Evidence of written agreements.·When the terms of an agreement have

been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed
upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no
evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the
terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written

agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors
in interest after the execution of the written agreement.
The term "agreement" includes wills. (7a).
2 Van Sychkel v. Dalrymple, 32 N.J. Eq., 233 cited in Vol. 5, F. Moran,

Comments on the Rules of Court 104 (1970 ed.)
218

bodying the terms of an agreement, but Exhibit D does not

contain such an agreement. It is only a receipt attesting to
the fact that on May 4, 1982, the petitioner received from
the private respondent the amount of P35,000. It is not
and could have not been intended by the parties to be the
sole memorial of their agreement. As a matter of fact,
Exhibit D does not even mention the transaction that gave
rise to its issuance. At most, Exhibit D can only be
considered a casual memorandum of a transaction between
the parties and an acknowledgement of the receipt of
money executed by the petitioner for the private
respondent's satisfaction. A writing of this nature, as
Wigmore observed is not covered by the parol evidence rule.
A receipt·i.e. a written acknowledgment, handed by one party to

the other, of the manual custody of money or other personalty·will
in general fall without the line of the rule; i.e. it is not intended to
be an exclusive memorial, and the facts may be shown irrespective
of the terms of the receipt. This is because usually a receipt is

merely a written admission of a transaction independently existing,
3
and, like other admissions, is not conclusive.
The "pakyaw" was mentioned only in Exhibit I, which also

declared the petitioner's receipt of the amount of
P28,000.00 as consideration for the agreement. The
petitioner and his witnesses testified to show when and
under what circumstances the amount of P28,000.00 was
received. Their testimonies do not in any way vary or
contradict the terms of Exhibit I. While Exhibit I is dated
May 14,1982, it does not make any categorical declaration
that the amount of P28,000.00 stated therein was received
by the petitioner on that same date. That date may not
therefore be considered conclusive as to when the amount
of P28,000.00 was actually received.
A deed is not conclusive evidence of everything it may contain. For

instance, it is not the only evidence of the date of its execution, nor
its omission of a consideration conclusive evidence that none
passed, nor is its acknowledgment of a particular consideration an
objection to other proof of other and consistent considerations; and,
by analogy,
________________
3 IX J. Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 2432 (1940).
219
VOL. 192, DECEMBER 10, 1990 219

4
the acknowledgement in a deed is not conclusive of the fact.
A distinction should be made between a statement of fact

expressed in the instrument and the terms of the
contractual act. The former 5
may be varied by parol
evidence but not the latter. Section 7 of Rule 130 clearly
refers to the terms of an agreement and provides that
"there can be, between the parties and their successors in
interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement other
than the contents of the writing."
The statement in Exhibit I of the petitioner's receipt of

the P28,000.00 is just a statement of fact. It is a mere
acknowledgment of the distinct act of payment made by
the private respondent. Its reference to the amount of
P28,000.00 as consideration of the "pakyaw" contract does
not make it part of the terms of their agreement. Parol
evidence may therefore be introduced to explain Exhibit I,
particularly with respect to the petitioner's receipt of the
amount of P28,000.00 and of the date when the said
amount was received.
Even if it were assumed that Exhibits D and I are
covered by the parol evidence rule, its application by the
Court of Appeals was improper. The record shows that no
objection was made by the private respondent when the
petitioner introduced evidence to explain the circumstances
behind the execution and issuance of the said instruments.
The rule is that objections to evidence must be made as6
soon as the grounds therefor become reasonably apparent.
In the case of testimonial evidence, the
_______________
4 Baum v. Lynn, 72 Miss. 932, 18 So. 428, cited in IX Wigmore Sec.

2433.
5 Ibid.
6 Section 36, Rule 132, Revised Rules of Court. Now Sec. 36, Rule 132,
as amended provides:
Sec. 36. Objection.·Objection to evidence offered orally must be made

immediately after the offer is made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a
witness shall be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably
apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after
notice of the offer unless a different period is allowed by the court.
220

objection must be made when the objectionable question is
asked or after the answer is given if the objectionable 7

features become apparent only by reason of such answer.
For failure of the private respondent to object to the
evidence introduced by the petitioner, he is deemed to have
waived the benefit8 of the parol evidence rule. Thus, in
Abrenica v. Gonda, this Court held:
x x x it has been repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence that a

protest or objection against the admission of any evidence must be
made at the proper time, and that if not so made it will be
understood to have been waived. The proper time to make a protest
or objection is when, from the question addressed to the witness, or
from the answer thereto, or from the presentation of proof, the
inadmissibility of evidence is, or may be inferred.
It is also settled that the court cannot disregard evidence

which would ordinarily be incompetent under the rules but
has been rendered admissible by the failure of a party to
object thereto. Thus:
x x x The acceptance of an incompetent witness to testify in a civil

suit, as well as the allowance of improper questions that may be
put to him while on the stand is a matter resting in the discretion
of the litigant. He may assert his right by timely objection or he
may waive it, expressly or by silence. In any case the option rests
with him. Once admitted, the testimony is in the case for what it is
worth and the judge has no power to disregard it for the sole reason
that it could have been excluded, if it had been objected to, nor to
9
strike it out on its own motion. (Emphasis supplied.)
We find that it was error for the Court of Appeals to

disregard the parol evidence introduced by the petitioner
and to conclude that the amount of P35,000.00 received on
May 4,1982 by the petitioner was in the nature of a loan
accommodation. The In any case, the grounds for the
objections must be specified.
_______________
7 II F. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 435 (5th ed., 1988).

8 34 Phil. 739.
9 Marella v. Reyes, 12 Phil. 1.
221
VOL. 192, DECEMBER 10, 1990 221

Court of Appeals should have considered the partial

stipulation of facts and the testimonies of the witnesses
which sought to explain the circumstances surrounding the
execution of Exhibits D and I and their relation to one
another.
We are satisfied that the amount of P35,000.00 was
received by the petitioner as full payment of their
"pakyaw" agreement for P28,000.00 and the remaining
P7,000.00 as advance rentals for their sublease agreement.
The claim that the excess of P7,000.00 was advance
payment of the sublease agreement is bolstered by the
testimony of the private respondent himself when during
the cross examination he testified that:
ATTY. CRUZ:
Q And during the time you were leasing the fishpond, is it
not a fact that you pay lease rental to the defendant?
SALONGA:
A No sir, because I have already advanced him money.
Q What advance money are you referring to?
10
A Thirty-Five Thousand Pesos (P35,000.00), sir.
It was also error to treat the amounts received by the

petitioner from August 15, 1982, to September 30, 1982,
from the private respondent as loan accommodations when
the partial stipulation of facts clearly stated that these
were payments for the sublease agreement. The pertinent
portions read:
7) That defendant Lucio Cruz in compliance with

their verbal sublease agreement had received from
the plaintiff Conrado Salonga the following sums of
money: (Emphasis Supplied.)
(a) P8,000.00 on August 15, 1982, as evidenced by

Annex "B" of the complaint;
(b) the sum of P500.00 on September 4,1982, as
evidenced by Annex "C" of the complaint;

(c) the sum of P3,000.00 on September 19, 1982, as
evidenced by Annex "D" of the complaint;
(d) the sum of P3,750.00 on September
11
30, 1982, as
Annex "E" of the complaint;
_______________
10 TSN, September 28,1984, pp. 26-27.

11 TSN, August 24,1984, pp. 14-15.
222

These admissions bind not only the parties but also the
court, unless modified upon request before the trial to
prevent manifest injustice.
We find, however, that the Court of Appeals did not
act in excess of its jurisdiction when it appreciated Exhibit
I despite the fact that it was not pleaded as a cause of
action and was objected to by the petitioner. According to
Rule 10 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of

evidence.·When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in
all respects, as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to
conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon
motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to
amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If
evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not
within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the
pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when the
presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby
and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission
of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or
defense upon the merits. The court may grant a continuance to
enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.
12
In Co Tiamco v. Diaz, the Supreme Court held:
x x x When evidence is offered on a matter not alleged in the

pleadings, the court may admit it even against the objection of the
adverse party, when the latter fails to satisfy the court that the
admission of the evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his
defense upon the merits, and the court may grant him continuance
to enable him to meet the situation created by the evidence. x x x
While it is true that the private respondent did not even

file a motion to amend his complaint in order that it could
conform to the evidence presented, this did not prevent the
court from rendering a valid judgment on the issues
proved. As we held in the Co Tiamco case:
_______________
12 75 Phil. 672.
223
VOL. 192, DECEMBER 10, 1990 223

x x x where the failure to order an amendment does not appear to

have caused a surprise or prejudice to the objecting party, it may be
allowed as a harmless error. Well-known is the rule that departures
from procedure may be forgiven when they do not appear to have
impaired the substantial rights of the parties.
The following computation indicates the accountability of

the private respondent to the petitioner:
Exh. D, May 4,1982 · P35,000.00

Exh. E, Aug. 15, 1982 · 8,000.00
Exh. F, Sept. 4,1982 · 500.00
Exh. G, Sept. 19,1982 · 3,000.00
Exh. H, Sept. 30, 1982 · 3,750.00
Lost receipt · __4,000.00_
P54,250.00
Less: (amount received by the

private respondent from the
petitioner) __(6,000.00)_
Total amount paid by the
private respondent to
the petitioner 48,250.00
Amount to be paid by the private respondent to the

petitioner:
1. Pakyaw P28,000.00
2. Sublease·28,000 per annum
Less: 2 months: 4,666 __23,334.00__
Total amount to be paid by the
private respondent to
the petitioner P51,334.00
Total amount to be paid by the
private respondent P51,334.00
Total amount paid by the
private respondent __48,250.00__
Deficiency in the amount paid
by the private respondent P3,084.00
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the respondent Court of

Appeals is REVERSED and that of the Regional Trial
Court of
224

S & A Gaisano Incorporated vs. Hidalgo
Laguna AFFIRMED, with the modification that the private

respondent shall pay the petitioner the sum of P3,084.00
instead of P3,054.00, plus costs. It is so ordered.
Narvasa (Chairman), Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and

Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Decision reversed.
Note.·Parol evidence is admissible to show that the

sale is not absolute, but one of pacto de retro or that the
transaction was merely to secure a loan. (Serrano vs. Court
of Appeals, 139 SCRA 179.)
··o0o··
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 192 13/09/2017, 8+02 AM

VOL. 192, DECEMBER 10, 1990 209

LUCIO R. CRUZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Evidence; Parol Evidence; Sec. 7, Rule 130 is predicated on the

210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cruz vs. Court of Appeals

abandoned. The rule, however, is not applicable in the case at bar.

that on May 4,1982, the petitioner received from the private

VOL. 192, DECEMBER 10, 1990 211

Cruz vs. Court of Appeals

dressed to the witness, or from the answer thereto, or from the

Same; Same; Same; Same; Courts cannot disregard evidence

impaired the substantial rights of the parties.

PETITION to review the decision of the Court of

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The private respondent Conrado Salonga filed a complaint **

The plaintiff claimed that of this amount, only P20,000.00

of several hectares of a fishpond owned by Nemesio Yabut

** The ponente is not related to the petitioner or his counsel.

VOL. 192, DECEMBER 10, 1990 213

September 30, 1982, an aggregate amount of P15,250.00.

Plaintiff and defendant, through their respective counsel, during

1) That plaintiff Conrado Salonga entered into a contract of

owner Mr. Nemesio Yabut, with a verbal contract for the

214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

from the defendant Lucio Cruz.

a) P8,000.00 on August 15, 1982 as evidenced by Annex "B" of

c) The sum of P3,000.00 on September 19, 1982 as evidenced

At the trial, the private respondent claimed that aside from

May 14, 1982

Salonga also claimed that he had paid Cruz the amount of

VOL. 192, DECEMBER 10, 1990 215

ing received another amount of P28,000 from Salonga on

agreement and to fix its duration. He was corroborated by

Exhibit "I" is very clear in its non-reference to the transaction

216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The trial court erred when it relied on the self-serving testimonies

The respondent court also found that the amounts of

1. The public respondent Court of Appeals gravely

Our ruling follows:

1 Now Sec. 9, Rule 130, Revised Rules on Evidence, Effective July

VOL. 192, DECEMBER 10, 1990 217

Sec. 7. Evidence of Written Agreements.·When the terms of an

a) When a mistake or imperfection of the writing or its failure

3. PAROL EVIDENCE RULE

Sec. 9. Evidence of written agreements.·When the terms of an agreement have

(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written

The term "agreement" includes wills. (7a).

2 Van Sychkel v. Dalrymple, 32 N.J. Eq., 233 cited in Vol. 5, F. Moran,

218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

bodying the terms of an agreement, but Exhibit D does not

A receipt·i.e. a written acknowledgment, handed by one party to

of the terms of the receipt. This is because usually a receipt is

The "pakyaw" was mentioned only in Exhibit I, which also

A deed is not conclusive evidence of everything it may contain. For

3 IX J. Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 2432 (1940).

VOL. 192, DECEMBER 10, 1990 219

A distinction should be made between a statement of fact