Ladera v. HodgesG.R. No. 8027-R, September 23, 1952, Vol. 48, No.

12,
Official Gazette 5374 Reyes, J.B.L., J.
FACTS: Paz G. Ladera entered into a contract with C.N. Hodges. Hodges promised to sell a lot with an
area of 278 square meters to Ladera, subject to certain terms and conditions. The agreement called for a
down payment of P 800.00 and monthly installments of P 5.00 each with interest of 1% per month, until P
2,085 is paid in full. In case of failure of the purchaser to make any monthly payment within 60 days after
it fell due, the contract may be considered as rescinded or annulled.

Ladera built a house on the lot. Later on, she defaulted in the payment of the agreed monthly installment.
Hodges filed an action for the ejectment of Ladera.

The court issued an alias writ of execution and pursuant thereto, the city sheriff levied upon all rights,
interests, and participation over the house of Ladera. At the auction sale, Ladera’s house was sold to
Avelino A. Magno. Manuel P. Villa, later on, purchased the house from Magno.

Ladera filed an action against Hodges and the judgment sale purchasers. Judgment was rendered in
favor of Ladera, setting aside the sale for non-compliance with Rule 39, Rules of Court regarding judicial
sales of real property. On appeal, Hodges contends that the house, being built on a lot owned by another,
should be regarded as movable or personal property.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ladera’s house is an immovable property.

HELD: YES. The old Civil Code numerates among the things declared by it as immovable property the
following: lands, buildings, roads and constructions of all kind adhered to the soil. The law does not make
any distinction whether or not the owner of the lot is the one who built. Also, since the principles of
accession regard buildings and constructions as mere accessories to the land on which it is built, it is
logical that said accessories should partake the nature of the principal thing.

Mindanao Bus Company v. The City Assessor and Treasurer G.R. No. L-17870, September 29,
1962, 6 SCRA 197 Labrador, J.

FACTS: Petitioner Mindanao Bus Company is a public utility solely engaged in transporting passengers
and cargoes by motor trucks, over its authorized lines in the Island of Mindanao, collecting rates approved
by the Public Service Commission. Respondent sought to assess the following real properties of the
petitioner; (a) Hobart Electric Welder Machine, (b) Storm Boring Machine; (c) Lathe machine with motor;
(d) Black and Decker Grinder; (e) PEMCO Hydraulic Press; (f) Battery charger (Tungar charge machine)
and (g) D-Engine Waukesha-M-Fuel. It was alleged that these machineries are sitting on cement or
wooden platforms, and that petitioner is the owner of the land where it maintains and operates a garage
for its TPU motor trucks, a repair shop, blacksmith and carpentry shops, and with these machineries,
which are placed therein. Respondent City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro City assessed at P4, 400
petitioner's above-mentioned equipment. Petitioner appealed the assessment to the respondent Board of
Tax Appeals on the ground that the same are not realty. Respondents contend that said equipments,
though movable, are immobilized by destination, in accordance with paragraph 5 of Article 415 of the New
Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether the equipments in question are immovable or movable properties.

HELD: The equipments in question are movable. So that movable equipments to be immobilized in
contemplation of the law, it must first be "essential and principal elements" of an industry or works without
which such industry or works would be "unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it
was established." Thus, the Court distinguished those movable which become immobilized by destination
because they are essential and principal elements in the industry from those which may not be so
considered immobilized because they are merely incidental, not essential and principal.

The tools and equipments in question in this instant case are, by their nature, not essential and principle
municipal elements of petitioner's business of transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks. They
are merely incidentals—acquired as movables and used only for expediency to facilitate and/or improve
its service. Even without such tools and equipments, its business may be carried on, as petitioner has
carried on, without such equipments, before the war. The transportation business could be carried on
without the repair or service shop if its rolling equipment is repaired or serviced in another shop belonging
to another.
Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation v. Wearever Textile Mills, Inc. G.R. No. L-58469, May 16,
1983, 122 SCRA 29De Castro, J.

FACTS: To obtain financial accommodations from the Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation, the
Wearever Textile discounted and assigned several receivables with them under a “receivable purchase
agreement.” To secure the collection of receivables assigned, Wearever Textile executed a chattel
mortgage over certain raw materials inventory, as well as machinery described as an aero dryer
stentering range. Upon default of Wearever Textile, the Makati Leasing petitioned for extrajudicial
foreclosure of the properties mortgaged to it. When the sheriff failed to enter Wearever Textile’s premises
to seize the machinery, Makati Leasing applied for a replevin. Wearever Textile contended that it cannot
be a subject of replevin or a chattel mortgage because it is a real property as it is attached to the ground
by means of bolts and that the only way to remove it is to destroy the concrete floor.

ISSUE: Whether or not the machinery is real or personal property.

HELD: The machinery is a personal property. The Supreme Court explained that if a house of strong
materials may be considered as personal property for purposes of executing a chattel mortgage, there is
absolutely no reason why a machinery, which is movable in its nature and becomes immobilized only by
destination or purpose, may not be likewise treated as such.

Santos Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. G.R. No. L-11139, April 23, 1958, 103 Phil.
401 Concepcion, J.

FACTS: On June 4, 1949, Santos Evangelista instituted a civil case for a sum of money. On the same
date, he obtained a writ of attachment, which was levied upon a house, built by Rivera on a land situated
in Manila and leased to him. In due course, judgment was rendered in favor of Evangelista, who bought
the house at public auction held in compliance with the writ of execution issued in said case. When
Evangelista sought to take possession of the house, Rivera refused to surrender it, upon the ground that
he had leased the property from the Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. and that the latter is now the true
owner of said property. It appears that on May 10, 1952, a definite deed of sale of the same house had
been issued to Alto Surety, as the highest bidder at an auction sale held. Hence, Evangelista instituted an
action against Alto Surety and Ricardo Rivera, for the purpose of establishing his title over said house,
and securing possession thereof, apart from recovering damages. After due trial, the CFI Manila rendered
judgment for Evangelista, sentencing Rivera and Alto Surety to deliver the house in question to
Evangelista and to pay him, jointly and severally, P40.00 a month from October, 1952, until said delivery,
plus costs.

ISSUE: Whether or not a house constructed by the lessee of the land on which it is built, should be dealt
with, for purposes of attachment, as immovable property or as personal property.

HELD: The house is not personal property, much less a debt, credit or other personal property not
capable of manual delivery, but immovable property. As explicitly held, in Ladera vs. Hodges (48 OG
5374), "a true building (not merely superimposed on the soil) is immovable or real property, whether it is
erected by the owner of the land or by a usufructuary or lessee. The opinion that the house of Rivera
should have been attached in accordance with subsection (c) of said section 7, as "personal property
capable of manual delivery, by taking and safely keeping in his custody", for it declared that "Evangelista
could not have validly purchased Ricardo Rivera's house from the sheriff as the latter was not in
possession thereof at the time he sold it at a public auction” is untenable.

Tsai v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 120098, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 324 Quisumbing, J.

FACTS: On November 26, 1975, respondent Ever Textile Mills, Inc. (EVERTEX) obtained a three million
peso (P3,000,000.00) loan from petitioner Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom). As security for
the loan, EVERTEX executed in favor of PBCom, a deed of Real and Chattel Mortgage over the lot where
its factory stands, and the chattels located therein. On April 23, 1979, PBCom granted a second loan to
EVERTEX. The loan was secured by a chattel mortgage over personal properties enumerated in a list
attached thereto. After April 23, 1979, the date of the execution of the second mortgage mentioned above,
EVERTEX purchased various machines and equipments.

Upon EVERTEX's failure to meet its obligation to PBCom, the latter commenced extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings against EVERTEX. On December 15, 1982, the first public auction was held where petitioner
PBCom emerged as the highest bidder and a Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor on the same date.
On March 7, 1984, PBCom consolidated its ownership over the lot and all the properties in it. In
November 1986, it leased the entire factory premises to petitioner Ruby L. Tsai. On May 3, 1988, PBCom
sold the factory, lock, stock, and barrel to Tsai, including the contested machineries.

On March 16, 1989, EVERTEX filed a complaint for annulment of sale, reconveyance, and damages with
the Regional Trial Court against PBCom. EVERTEX claimed that no rights having been transmitted to
PBCom over the assets of insolvent EVERTEX, therefore Tsai acquired no rights over such assets sold to
her, and should reconvey the assets.

ISSUE: Whether or not the inclusion of the questioned properties in the foreclosed properties is proper.

HELD: Yes. While it is true that the questioned properties appear to be immobile, a perusal of the contract
of Real and Chattel Mortgage executed by the parties gives a contrary indication. In the case at bar, the
true intention of PBCOM and the owner, EVERTEX, is to treat machinery and equipment as chattels.
Assuming that the properties in question are immovable by nature, nothing detracts the parties from
treating it as chattels to secure an obligation under the principle of estoppel. It has been held that an
immovable may be considered a personal property if there is a stipulation as when it is used as security in
the payment of an obligation where a chattel mortgage is executed over it, as in the case at bar.

Serg’s Products, Inc. v. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. G.R. No. 137705, August 22, 2000, 338 SCRA
499 Panganiban, J.

FACTS: Respondent PCI Leasing and Finance Inc. filed with the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for sum
of money, with an application for a writ of replevin. A writ of replevin was issued, directing the sheriff to
seize and deliver the machineries and equipment to PCI Leasing after five days and upon payment of the
necessary expenses. The sheriff proceeded to petitioner's factory and seized one machinery. Petitioner
filed a motion for special protective order invoking the power of the court to control the conduct of its
officers and amend and control its processes, praying for a directive for the sheriff to defer enforcement of
the writ of replevin. The motion was opposed by PCI on the ground that the properties were personal and
therefore still subject to seizure and writ of replevin. In their reply, petitioners asserted that the properties
were immovable as defined in Article 415 of the Civil Code, the parties' agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding. Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals via an original action for certiorari. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the subject machines were personal property as provided by the agreement of the
parties.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject machines were personal, not real, property, which may be a proper
subject of a writ of replevin.

HELD: The contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as personal. After
agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise. Under the principle
of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any material fact found
therein. In the present case, the lease agreement clearly provides that the machines in question are to be
considered as personal properties. Clearly then, petitioners were estopped from denying the
characterization of the subject machines as personal property. Under the circumstances, they are proper
subject of the writ of seizure. Accordingly, the petition was denied and the assailed decision of the Court
of Appeals was affirmed.

Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFPG.R. No. 64261, December 26, 1984, 133 SCRA 800 Escolin, J.

FACTS: On December 7, 1982, two search warrants where issued and the premises at 19, Road 3,
Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business
addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers were searched. Office and printing
machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication
and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written
literature alleged to be in the possession and control of Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We
Forum" newspaper, were seized.

ISSUE: Whether or not real properties were seized under the disputed warrants.

HELD: No. Under Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code, "machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements
intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or
on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works" are considered
immovable property. In Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, it was said that machinery which is movable by
nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so
when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such
person acted as the agent of the owner. In the present case, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of
the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. The machineries, while in fact bolted to
the ground, remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
Lopez v. Orosa, Jr., and Plaza Theatre, Inc.G.R. No. L-10817-18, February 28, 1958, 103 Phil. 98
Felix, J.

FACTS: Lopez was engaged in business under the name Lopez-Castelo Sawmill. Orosa approached
Lopez and invited the latter to make an investment in the theatre business he was forming, the Plaza
Theatre. Lopez expressed his unwillingness to invest. Nonetheless, Lopez agreed to supply the lumber
for the construction of the theatre. Lopez further agreed that that the payment therefore would be on
demand and not cash on delivery basis. Lopex delivered the lumber which was used for the construction
of the Plaza Theatre. However, of the total cost of materials amounting to P62, 255.85, Lopez was paid
only P 20, 848.50, thus leaving a balance of P 41, 771.35.

Due to Lopez’ demands, Orosa issued a deed of assignment over his shares of stock of the Plaza
Theatre, Inc. As there was still an unpaid balance, Lopez filed a case against Orosa and Plaza Theatre.
He asked that Orosa and Plaza theatre be held liable solidarily for the unpaid balance, and in case
defendants failed to pay, the land and building should be sold in public auction with the proceeds to be
applied to the balance, or that the shares of stock be sold in public auction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lien for the value of the materials used in the construction of the building
attaches to said structure alone and does not extend to the land on which the building is adhered to.

HELD: No. While it is true that generally, real estate connotes the land and the building constructed
thereon, it is obvious that the inclusion of the building, separate and distinct from the land, in the
enumeration of what may constitute real properties could only mean one thing—that a building is by itself
an immovable property. In view of the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, a building is an
immovable property irrespective of whether or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to
belong to the same owner. The lien so created attaches merely to the immovable property for the
construction or repair of which the obligation was incurred. Therefore, the lien in favor of appellant for the
unpaid value of the lumber used in the construction of the building attaches only to said structure and to
no other property of the obligors.

Yap v. TañadaG.R. No. L-32917, July 18, 1988, 163 SCRA 464 Narvasa, J.

FACTS: Goulds Pumps International (Phil.), Inc. filed a complaint against Yap and his wifeseeking
recovery of P1,459.30 representing the balance of the price and installation cost of a water pump in the
latter's premises. Goulds presented evidence ex parte and judgment by default was rendered by Judge
Tañada requiring Yap to pay to Goulds the unpaid balance of the pump purchased by him and interest of
12% per annum.

Thereafter, the water pump in question was levied by the sheriff and by notice dated November 4, 1969,
scheduled the execution sale thereof. But in view of the pendency of Yap's motion for reconsideration,
suspension of the sale was directed. It appears however that a copy of the order suspending the sale was
not transmitted to the sheriff Hence, the Deputy Provincial Sheriff went ahead with the scheduled auction
sale and sold the property levied on to Goulds as the highest bidder.

Yap argues that "the sale was made without the notice required by Sec. 18, Rule 39, of the New Rules of
Court," i.e., notice by publication in case of execution sale of real property, the pump and its accessories
being immovable because attached to the ground with character of permanency (Art. 415, Civil Code).

ISSUE: Whether or not the water pump in question is an immovable property.

HELD: No. Yap's argument is untenable. The Civil Code considers as immovable property, among others,
anything "attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated
therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object." The pump does not fit this
description. It could be, and was in fact separated from Yap's premises without being broken or suffering
deterioration. Obviously, the separation or removal of the pump involved nothing more complicated than
the loosening of bolts or dismantling of other fasteners.

Machinery and Engineering Supplies, Inc. v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-7057, October 29, 1954,
96 Phil. 70Concepcion, J.

FACTS: Petitioner Machinery and Engineering Supplies filed a complaint for replevin for the recovery of
the machinery and equipment sold and delivered to Ipo Limestone Co. An order was issued to seize and
take immediate possession of the properties specified in the order. Upon carrying out the court’s order,
Roco, the company’s President, along with a crew of technical men and labourers, proceeded to the
factory. The manager of Ipo Limestone Co. and Torres protested against the seizure of the properties on
the ground that they are not personal properties. However, since the sheriff contended that his duty is
purely ministerial, they all went to the factory and dismantled the equipment despite the fact that the
equipment could not be dismantled without causing damage or injuries to the wooden frames attached to
them. Consequently, they had to cut some of the supports of the equipment which rendered its use
impracticable.

ISSUE: Whether or not the machinery and equipment in question could be the subject of replevin.

HELD: No. Replevin is applicable only to personal property. The machinery and equipment in question
appeared to be attached to the land, particularly to the concrete foundation of said premises, in a fixed
manner, in such a way that the former could not be separated from the latter without breaking the material
or deterioration of the object. Hence, in order to remove the said outfit, it became necessary not only to
unbolt the same, but also to cut some of its wooden supports. Moreover, said machinery and equipment
were intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry carried on said immovable. For these
reasons, they were already immovable pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 5 of Article 415 of the Civil Code.

FELS Energy, Inc. v. The Province of Batangas G.R. No. 168557, February 16, 2007Callejo, Sr., J.

FACTS: On January 18, 1993, NPC entered into a lease contract with Polar Energy, Inc. over diesel
engine power barges moored at Balayan Bay in Calaca, Batangas. The contract staes that NPC shall be
responsible for the payment of all taxes other levies imposed government to which POLAR may be or
become subject to in respect of the Power Barges. Subsequently, Polar Energy, Inc. assigned its rights
under the agreement to FELS Energy Inc.

On August 7, 1995, FELS received an assessment of real property taxes on the power barges from
Provincial Assessor of Batangas City. The assessed tax amounted to P56,184,088.40 per annum. FELS
referred the matter to NPC, reminding it of its obligation under the agreement to pay all real estate taxes.
NPC sought reconsideration of the Provincial Assessor’s decision to assess real property taxes on the
power barges, alleging that barges are non-taxable items. In its answer, the Provincial Assessor averred
that the barges were real property for purposes of taxation under Section 199(c) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7160.

ISSUE: Whether power barges, which are floating and movable, are personal properties and therefore,
not subject to real property tax.

HELD: NO. The power barges are real property and are thus subject to real property tax. Tax
assessments by tax examiners are presumed correct and made in good faith, with the taxpayer having
the burden of proving otherwise. Besides, factual findings of administrative bodies, which have acquired
expertise in their field, are generally binding and conclusive upon the Court.

Laurel v. GarciaG.R. No. 92013, July 25, 1990, 187 SCRA 797 Gutierrez, J.

FACTS: In view of the Reparations Agreement between the Philippines and Japan, four properties
located in Japan were given to the Philippines. One of these properties is the Roppongi property. The said
property was formerly the location of the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy until it was transferred to
Nampeidai on July 22, 1976. The Roppongi property has remained abandoned from the time of the
transfer due to lack of funds to develop the said property. Consequently, Administrative orders were
issued by the President authorizing the study of the condition of the properties of the Philippines in Japan.
Subsequently, Executive Order 296 was issued by President Aquino allowing non-Filipinos to buy or lease
some of the properties of the Philippines located in Japan, including Roppongi.

Petitioners now contend that the Roppongi property cannot be alienated as it is classified as public
dominion and not of private ownership because it is a property intended for public service under
paragraph 2, article 420 of the Civil Code. On the other hand, respondents aver that it has already
become part of the patrimonial property of the State which can be alienated because it has not been used
for public service for over 13 years. They further contend that EO 296 converted the subject property to
patrimonial property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Roppongi property still forms part of the public dominion hence cannot be
disposed nor alienated.

HELD: Yes. The respondents failed to convincingly show that the property has already become
patrimonial. The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service
does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Under Art. 422 of the Civil Code, there must be a
definite and a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being public.
Abandonment must be a certain and a positive act based on correct legal premises. The mere transfer of
the embassy to Nampeidai is not a relinquishment of the property’s original purpose.

The Administrative orders authorizing the study of the conditions of government properties in Japan were
merely directives for investigation but did not in any way signify a clear intention to dispose of the
properties. Likewise, EO 296 did not declare that the properties lost their public character; it merely made
them available to foreigners in case of sale, lease or other disposition. Thus, since there is no law
authorizing its conveyance, the Roppongi property still remains part of the inalienable properties of the
State.

Rabuco v. VillegasG.R. No. L-24916, February 28, 1974, 55 SCRA 658

FACTS: The issue in this case involves the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3120 whereby the
Congress converted the lots in question together with another lot in San Andres, Malate that are reserved
as communal property into disposable or alienable lands of the State. Such lands are to be placed under
the administration and disposal of the Land Tenure Administration for subdivision into small lots not
exceeding 120 square meters per lot for sale on instalment basis to the tenants or bona fide occupants
thereof and expressly prohibited ejectment and demolition of petitioners' homes under Section 2 of the
Act. Respondent contends that the Act is invalid and unconstitutional for it constitutes deprivation of
property without due process of law and without just compensation.

ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act No. 3120 is constitutional.

HELD: Yes. The lots in question are manifestly owned by the city in its public and governmental capacity
and are therefore public property over which Congress had absolute control as distinguished from
patrimonial property owned by it in its private or proprietary capacity of which it could not be deprived
without due process and without just compensation. It is established doctrine that the act of classifying
State property calls for the exercise of wide discretionary legislative power, which will not be interfered
with by the courts. The Acts in question were intended to implement the social justice policy of the
Constitution and the government program of land for the landless and that they were not intended to
expropriate the property involved but merely to confirm its character as communal land of the State and to
make it available for disposition by the National Government. The subdivision of the land and conveyance
of the resulting subdivision lots to the occupants by Congressional authorization does not operate as an
exercise of the power of eminent domain without just compensation in violation of Section 1, subsection
(2), Article III of the Constitution, but simply as a manifestation of its right and power to deal with state
property.

Macasiano v. DioknoG.R. No. 97764, August 10, 1992, 212 SCRA 464 Medialdea, J.

FACTS: The Municipality of Paranque passed an ordinance that authorized the closure of J. Gabriel, G.G.
Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets located at Baclaran, Paranaque Metro Manila
and the establishment of a flea market thereon. Thereafter, the municipal council of Paranaque issued a
resolution authorizing Paranaque Mayor Walfrido N. Ferrer to enter into a contract with any service
cooperative for the establishment, operation, maintenance and management of flea markets and/or
vending areas. By virtue of this, respondent municipality and respondent Palanyag, a service cooperative,
entered into an agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain and manage the flea market in the
aforementioned streets with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal government of
Paranaque. Consequently, market stalls were put up by Palanyag on the said streets.

Petitioner Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command, then ordered the
destruction and confiscation of the stalls along the abovementioned streets. Hence, respondents filed with
the trial court a joint petition for prohibition and mandamus with damages and prayer for preliminary
injunction, to which the petitioner filed his opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
The trial court upheld the validity of the ordinance in question.

ISSUE: Whether or not an ordinance or resolution which authorizes the lease and use of public streets or
thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is valid.

HELD: No. The aforementioned streets are local roads used for public service and are therefore
considered public properties of respondent municipality. Article 424 of the Civil Code provides that
properties of public dominion devoted for public use and made available to the public in general are
outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or leased by the local government unit to private
persons. Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed public and
are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, LGUs have no authority whatsoever to control or
regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress.
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 100709, November 14, 1997, 281 SCRA
639 Panganiban, J.

FACTS: Morato filed for a patent on a parcel of land located in Calauag, Quezon, which was approved,
provided that the land shall not be encumbered or alienated within a period of five years from the date of
the issuance of the patent. Later on, the land was established to be a portion of Calauag Bay, which was
five to six feet deep during high tides and three feet deep on low tides. The water level rose because of
the ebb and flow of tides from the bay and the storms that frequently passed through the area.
Furthermore, it was observed by the Director of Lands from his investigation, that the land of Morato was
leased to Advincula for P100 per month and it was also mortgaged to Co for P10,000. The Director of
Lands filed a suit with the contention that Morato violated the 5-year prohibitory period and thus the patent
should be cancelled and the land should revert back to the State.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of the prohibition of the patent, and thus, the subject land
should revert back to the ownership of the State.

HELD: Yes. The lease was an encumbrance included in the prohibitions of the patent because it impairs
the use of the land by Morato herself. As for the mortgage, it is a legal limit on the title and if there will be
foreclosure because Morato was not able to pay her debts, the property will be auctioned. It is also a
limitation on Morato's right to enjoy and possess the land for herself. Encumbrance, as defined, is an
impairment on the use or transfer of property, or a claim or lien on the property where there is a burden on
the title. Thus, Morato clearly violated the terms of the patent on these points. Moreover, the property
became a foreshore land because it turned into a portion of land which was covered most of the time with
water, whether it was low or high tide. Foreshore is defined as land between high and low waters which is
dry depending on the reflux or ebb of the tides. In accordance with this land reclassification, the land can
no longer be subject to a pending patent application and must be returned to the State.

Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga G.R. No. L-24440, March 28, 1968, 22
SCRA 1334 Bengzon, J.P., J.

FACTS: On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was approved dividing the province of Zamboanga into two
(2): Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. Republic Act 3039 was approved providing that “all
buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located within the
City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of charge, in favor of the said City of Zamboanga.”

Plaintiff-appellee Zamboanga del Norte filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del
Norte against defendants-appellants Zamboanga City, the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue. It was prayed that Republic Act 3039 be declared unconstitutional for depriving plaintiff
province of property without due process and just compensation. Included in the properties were the
capital site and capitol building, certain school sites, hospital and leprosarium sites, and high school
playground.

ISSUE: Whether or not the properties mentioned are properties for public use or patrimonial.

HELD: The subject properties are properties for public use. The validity of the law ultimately depends on
the nature of the lots and buildings in question. The principle itself is simple: If the property is owned by
the municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in its public and governmental capacity, the property is
public and Congress has absolute control over it. But if the property is owned in its private or proprietary
capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The municipality cannot be deprived
of it without due process and payment of just compensation.

Applying the norm obtaining under the principles constituting the law of Municipal Corporations, all those
of the 50 properties in question which are devoted to public service are deemed public; the rest remain
patrimonial. Under this norm, to be considered public, it is enough that the property be held and, devoted
for governmental purposes like local administration, public education, public health, etc.

Regarding the several buildings existing on the lots above-mentioned, the records do not disclose
whether they were constructed at the expense of the former Province of Zamboanga. Considering
however the fact that said buildings must have been erected even before 1936 when Commonwealth Act
39 was enacted and the further fact that provinces then had no power to authorize construction of
buildings such as those in the case at bar at their own expense, it can be assumed that said buildings
were erected by the National Government, using national funds. Hence, Congress could very well dispose
of said buildings in the same manner that it did with the lots in question.
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002 Carpio, J.

FACTS: In 1973, the Government through the Commissioner of Public Highways and the Construction
and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) signed a contract to reclaim certain foreshore
and offshore areas of Manila Bay. PD 1084 was issued, creating Public Estates Authority (PEA), and PD
1085, transferring the reclaimed lands under the MCCRRP to PEA.

In 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation to develop
the Freedom Islands, and the JVA was approved by President Ramos. However, PEA and AMARI entered
into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding. A Legal Task Force was created to look into the
issue. The said task force upheld the legality of the JVA.

In 1998, Frank I. Chavez, as a taxpayer, filed a petition to compel PEA to disclose all facts on its
negotiations with AMARI, invoking the constitutional right of the people to information on matters of public
concern. He assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of the
constitutional prohibiting in the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations.

Despite the ongoing court petitions, PEA and AMARI signed an Amended Joint Venture Agreement
(Amended JVA) in 1999, and such was approved by President Estrada. The Amended JVA seeks to
convey to AMARI the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands.

ISSUE: Whether AMARI has the capacity to acquire the lands held by PEA.

HELD: No. Under the 1987 Constitution, private corporations such as AMARI cannot acquire alienable
land of the public domain. Reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, which are covered by
certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these
lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations.
PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987
Constitution and existing laws. Thus, the Amended Joint Venture Agreement between AMARI and PEA
was null and void.
Chavez v. National Housing Authority G.R. No. 164527,
August 15, 2007 Velasco, Jr., J.
FACTS: President Corazon Aquino issued Memorandum Order
No. 161 approving and directing the implementation of the
Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste
Management Plan. Respondent National Housing Authority was
ordered to “conduct feasibility studies and develop low–cost
housing projects at the dumpsite and absorb scavengers in NHA
resettlement/low–cost housing projects”, particularly in the
Smokey Mountain. It produced the “Smokey Mountain
Development Plan and Reclamation of the Area Across R-10” or
the Smoke Mountain Development and Reclamation Project. The
Project aimed to covert Smokey mountain dumpsite into a
habitable housing project, inclusive of the reclamation of the area.
President Aquino approved the said Project through MO 415.
After President Aquino’s term, President Fidel Ramos, through
Proclamation No. 39, authorized the NHA to enter into a Joint
Venture Agreement with R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) for the
implementation of the project. Afterwards, President Ramos
issued Proclamation No. 465 increasing the proposed area for
reclamation across R-10 from 40 hectares to 79 hectares. The
petitioner Francisco Chavez contended that the respondent NHA
or respondent RBI has no authority to reclaim foreshore and
submerged land.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent NHA has the authority to
reclaim foreshore and submerged land.
HELD: Yes. The National Housing Authority (NHA) is a
government agency not tasked to dispose of public lands under
its charter – it is an “end-user agency” authorized by law to
administer and dispose of reclaimed lands. The moment titles
over reclaimed lands based on the special patents are transferred
to the National Housing Authority (NHA) by the Register of Deeds,
they are automatically converted to patrimonial properties of the
State which can be sold to Filipino citizens and private
corporations, 60% of which are owned by Filipinos. The combined
and collective effect of Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 with
Special Patents Nos. 3592 and 3598 is tantamount to and can be
considered to be an official declaration that the reclaimed lots are
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Even if it is
conceded that there was no explicit declaration that the lands are
no longer needed for public use or public service, there was
however an implicit executive declaration that the reclaimed areas
are not necessary anymore for public use or public service when
President Aquino through MO 415 conveyed the same to the
National Housing Authority (NHA) partly for housing project and
related commercial/industrial development intended for
disposition to and enjoyment of certain beneficiaries and not the
public in general and partly as enabling component to finance the
project.
Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006Carpio, J.
FACTS: MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax
Delinquency from the City of Parañaque for the taxable years
1992 to 2001. MIAA’s real estate tax delinquency was estimated
at P624 million. Thus, the City of Parañaque, through its City
Treasurer, issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the
Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of Parañaque
threatened to sell at public auction the Airport Lands and
Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax delinquency.
City of Parañaque contends that Section 193 of the Local
Government Code expressly withdrew the tax exemption
privileges of “government-owned and-controlled corporations”
upon the effectivity of the Local Government Code. However,
MIAA avers that airport lands and buildings are owned by the
State, and thus, exempt from tax.
ISSUE: Whether or not airport lands and buildings of MIAA are
exempt from real estate tax.
HELD: Yes. MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with
corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental functions.
MIAA is like any other government instrumentality, the only
difference is that MIAA is vested with corporate powers. Unless
the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-
stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality
exercising not only governmental but also corporate powers.
Thus, MIAA exercises the governmental powers of eminent
domain, police authority and the levying of fees and charges. The
airport lands and buildings of MIAA are property of public
dominion and therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the
Philippines. Hence, the subject properties are not subject to tax.
16
Javier v. Veridiano IIG.R. No. L-48050, October 10, 1994, 237
SCRA 565 Bellosillo, J.
FACTS: Javier filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application for lot
1641. She later instituted a complaint for forcible entry against
Babol, alleging that she was forcibly dispossessed of a portion of
said land. The case for forcibly entry was however dismissed as it
was found by the court that the occupied portion was outside Lot
1641. The same was dismissed on appeal. Javier was eventually
granted a Miscellaneous Sales Patent and issued an OCT for lot
1641. Babol, however had sold the property he was occupying,
including a portion of 200 square meters to Rosete. Javier
demanded the surrender of the same area from Rosete who
repeatedly refused to comply. After 4 years, Javier instituted a
complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession with
damages against Babol and Rosete. Rosete moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of res judicata. The CFI sustained the
argument of Rosete and granted his motion to dismiss. Javier
contends that res judicata cannot apply in the instant case since
there is no identity of parties and causes of action between her
complaint for forcible entry, which had long become final and
executory, and her subsequent petition for quieting of title. Javier
maintains that there is no identity of causes of action since the
first case was for forcible entry, which is merely concerned with
the possession of the property, whereas the subsequent case was
for quieting of title, which looks into the ownership of the disputed
land.
ISSUE: Whether or not there are really different causes of action
between the forcible entry case and the later quieting of title case.
HELD: Yes. For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent
action the following requisites must concur: (1) There must be a
final judgment or order; (2) The court rendering the judgment
must have jurisdiction over the subject matter; (3) The former
judgment is a judgment on the merits; and, (4) There is between
the first and second actions identity of (4a) parties, (4b) of subject
matter and (4c) of causes of action. Javier's argument that there
is no identity of parties between the two actions is without merit.
We have repeatedly ruled that for res judicata to apply, what is
required is not absolute but only substantial identity of parties.
But, there is merit in Javier's argument that there is no identity of
causes of action.
"The only issue in an action for forcible entry is the physical or
material possession of real property, that is, possession de facto
and not possession de jure. The philosophy underlying this
remedy is that irrespective of the actual condition of the title to the
property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be
turned out by strong hand, violence or terror." A judgment
rendered in a case for recovery of possession is conclusive only
on the question of possession and not on the ownership. It does
not in any way bind the title or affects the ownership of the land or
building.
On the other hand, Civil Case No. 2203-0 is in reality an action to
recover a parcel of land or an accion reivindicatoria under Art. 434
of the Civil Code, and should be
17
distinguished from Civil Case No. 926, which is an accion
interdictal. Accion interdictal, which is the summary action for
forcible entry (detentacion) where the defendant's possession of
the property is illegal ab initio, or the summary action for unlawful
detainer (desahuico) where the defendant's possession was
originally lawful but ceased to be so by the expiration of his right
to possess, both of which must be brought within one year from
the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and
from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer, in the
proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court; accion
publiciana which is a plenary action for recovery of the right to
possess and which should be brought in the proper regional trial
court when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year;
and, accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion which
seeks the recovery of ownership and includes the jus utendi and
the jus fruendi brought in the proper regional trial court.
Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is thus an action
whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and
seeks recovery of its full possession. It is different from accion
interdictal or accion publiciana where plaintiff merely alleges proof
of a better right to possess without claim of title.
In Civil Case No. 926 Javier merely claimed a better right or prior
possession over the disputed area without asserting title thereto.
It should be distinguished from Civil Case No. 2203-0 where she
expressly alleged ownership.
Bustos v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 120784-85, January 24,
2001, 350 SCRA 155 Pardo, J.
FACTS: Paulino Fajardo died intestate on April 2, 1957. He had
four (4) children, namely: Manuela, Trinidad, Beatriz and Marcial,
all surnamed Fajardo. On September 30, 1964, the heirs
executed an extra-judicial partition of the estate of Paulino
Fajardo. On the same date, Manuela sold her share to Moses G.
Mendoza, husband of Beatriz by deed of absolute sale. At the
time of the sale, there was no cadastral survey in Masantol,
Pampanga. Later, the cadastre was conducted and the property
involved in the partition case was specified as Lots 280, 283, 284,
1000-A and 1000-B. The share of Manuela, which was sold to
Moses, includes Lot 284 of the Masantol Cadastre and Lot 284
was subdivided into Lots 284-A and 284-B. Trinidad was in
physical possession of the land. She refused to surrender the
land to her brother-in-law Moses G. Mendoza, despite several
demands.
On September 3, 1971, Moses filed with the Court of First
Instance, Pampanga a complaint for partition claiming the one
fourth (1/4) share of Manuela which was sold to him. During the
pendency of the case for partition, Trinidad Fajardo died. On
December 15, 1984, the heirs executed an extra-judicial partition
of the estate of Trinidad Fajardo. On February 16, 1987, Lucio
Fajardo Ignacio, son of Trinidad sold Lot 284-B to spouses
Venancio Viray and Cecilia Nunga-Viray.
18
On February 8, 1989, the Regional Trial Court, Pampanga,
Macabebe, Branch 55 rendered a decision in favor of Moses G.
Mendoza.In the meantime, on November 6, 1989, spouses
Venancio Viray and Cecilia Nunga-Viray, buyers of Lucio Ignacio's
share of the property, filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Macabebe-Masantol, Pampanga an action for unlawful detainer
against spouses Bustos, the buyers of Moses G. Mendoza, who
were in actual possession as lessees of the husband of Trinidad,
Francisco Ignacio, of the subject land. The municipal circuit trial
court decided the case in favor of spouses Viray. Subsequently,
the trial court issued writs of execution and demolition, but stayed
when spouses Bustos filed with the regional Trial Court,
Pampanga, Macabebe, Branch 55, a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and injunction. On December 18, 1992, the regional
trial court rendered a decision dismissing the case. On September
9, 1994, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration; however, on
June 21, 1995, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners could be ejected from what is
now their own land.
HELD: In this case, the issue of possession is intertwined with the
issue of ownership. In the unlawful detainer case, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court as to possession
on the ground that the decision has become final and executory.
This means that the petitioners may be evicted. In the accion
reinvindicatoria, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ownership of
petitioners over the subject land. Hence, the court declared
petitioners as the lawful owners of the land. In the present case,
the stay of execution is warranted by the fact that petitioners are
now legal owners of the land in question and are occupants
thereof. To execute the judgment by ejecting petitioners from the
land that they owned would certainly result in grave injustice.
Besides, the issue of possession was rendered moot when the
court adjudicated ownership to the spouses Bustos by virtue of a
valid deed of sale. Placing petitioners in possession of the land in
question is the necessary and logical consequence of the
decision declaring them as the rightful owners is possession. It
follows that as owners of the subject property, petitioners are
entitled to possession of the same. "An owner who cannot
exercise the seven (7) "juses" or attributes of ownership-the right
to possess, to use and enjoy, to abuse or consume, to
accessories, to dispose or alienate, to recover or vindicate and to
the fruits is a crippled owner.
Heirs of Roman Soriano v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 128177,
August 15, 2001, 363 SCRA 87 Ynares – Santiago, J.
FACTS: The land in dispute in this case is originally owned by
Adriano Soriano who died sometime in 1947. Adriano Soriano has
7 heirs whom leased the subject parcel of land to David de Vera
and Consuelo Villasista for a term of 15 years starting July 1,
1967. The lease contract states that Roman Soriano will serve as
the caretaker of the said property during the period of lease.
During the effectivity of the lease contract, the
19
heirs of Adriano Soriano entered into extrajudicial settlement of
his estate. As a result of the settlement, the property was divided
into two property, Lot No. 60052 which was assigned to Lourdes
and Candido, heirs of Adriano and the heirs of Dionisia another
heir of Adriano. The other property, Lot No. 8459 was assigned to
Francisco, Librada, Elcociado and Roman all heirs of Adriano.
The owners of Lot No. 60052 sold the lot to spouses Braulio and
Aquiliana Abalos, and the owners of Lot No. 8459, except Roman
also sold their shares to spouses Briones.
On March 14, 1968, the de Vera spouses ousted Roman as
caretaker and appointed Isidro Versoza and Vidal Versoza as his
substitute. Roman filed a case for reinstatement and reliquidation
against the de Vera spouses in CAR Case No. 1724-P- 68. On
September 30, 1969, the Agrarian Court rendered a decision
authorizing the ejectment of Roman. On appeal, the decision was
reversed by the Court of Appeals. The deicion became final and
executor. However, before it was executed, the parties entered
into a post-decisional agreement wherein the de Vera spouses
allowed Roman Soriano to sub-lease the property until the
termination of the original lease on June 30, 1982. This
agreement was approved by the CAR court in an order dated
December 22, 1972.
On August 16, 1976, the Abalos spouses applied for the
registration of the disputed parcel of land. Roman Soriano and the
Director of Lands acted as oppositors. On June 27, 1983, the
Land Registration Court granted the application for registration.
On April 13, 1983, after the expiration of the original lease and
sub-lease in favor of Roman Soriano, the Abalos spouses filed a
case for unlawful detainer against Roman Soriano, later, this case
was dismissed on motion of the Abalos spouses. On July 14,
1983, Elcociado, Librada, Roman, Francisco, Lourdes, Candido
and the heirs of Dionisia filed a complaint to annul the deeds of
sale they executed in favor of the Abalos spouses or should the
deeds be not annulled, to allow Roman, Elcociado and Librada to
redeem their shares in the disputed land and to uphold Roman
Soriano’s possession of the fishpond portion of the property as a
tenant-caretaker.
After the dismissal of the case for unlawful detainer, the Abalos
spouses filed on August 22, 1984, a motion for execution of the
post-decisional order embodying the agreement of Roman
Soriano and the de Vera spouses allowing the former to sublease
the property. On October 25, 1984, Roman filed a motion to
suspend hearing on the rental demanded by the Abalos spouses
until after the other issues raised in his opposition to the motion
for execution are resolved. The motion to suspend hearing on the
issue of the rentals was denied and the trial court authorized the
substitution of the de Vera spouses by the Abalos spouses.
Roman Soriano's motion for reconsideration was denied on
March 16, 1985. Roman filed petition for certiorari and prohibition
in the Court of Appeals but the latter denied the petition, pending
the denial of this petition, Roman Soriano died. Not satisfied with
the decision of the Court of Appeals, the heirs of Roman Soriano
brought this case in the Supreme Court.
20
ISSUE: Whether or not a winning party (ABALOS) in a land
registration case can effectively eject the possessor (SORIANO)
thereof, whose security of tenure rights is still pending
determination before the DARAB.
HELD: No. The Court held that a judgment in a land registration
case cannot effectively used to oust the possessor of the land,
whose security of tenure rights are still pending determination
before the DARAB. There is no dispute that Abalos spouses' title
over the land under litigation has been confirmed with finality.
However, the declaration pertains only to ownership and does not
automatically include possession, especially soin the instant case
where there is a third party occupying the said parcel of land,
allegedly in the concept of an agricultural tenant. Agricultural
lessees are entitled to security of tenure and they have the right to
work on their respective landholdings once the leasehold
relationship is established. Security of tenure is a legal
concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life itself ad
deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of
their only means of livelihood. The exercise of the right of
ownership, then, yields to the exercise of the rights of an
agricultural tenant. The Supreme Court decided to refrain from
ruling whether petitioners may be dispossessed of the subject
property while petitioner's status as tenant has not yet been
declared by the DARAB.
Garcia v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 133140, August 10, 1999,
312 SCRA 180 Puno, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Atty. Pedro Garcia, with the consent of his wife
Remedios Garcia, sold a parcel of land situated at Bel Air II
Village, Makati to his daughter Maria Luisa Magpayo and her
husband Luisito Magpayo. The Magpayos mortgaged the land to
the Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) to secure a
loan. The Magpayos failed to pay their loan upon its maturity,
hence, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and at the
public auction sale in which PBCom bought the land. The
redemption period of the foreclosed mortgage expired without the
Magpayos redeeming the same, hence, title over the land was
consolidated in favor of PBCom.
PBCom subsequently filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession over the land with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati. The RTC granted the petition. Upon service of the writ of
possession, Maria Luisa Magpayo’s brother, Jose Ma. T. Garcia,
who was in possession of the land, refused to honor it. Jose
Garcia thereupon filed against PBCom, the Magpayos, and the
RTC Sheriff the instant suit for recovery of realty and damages
wherein he contended, inter alia, that at the time of the alleged
sale to the Magpayo spouses, he was in possession of the
property; that, when his mother Remedios Tablan Garcia died,
sometime in October, 1980, he became, by operation of law, a co-
owner of the property; and that, Atty. Pedro V. Garcia, at the time
of the execution of the instrument in favor of the Magpayo
spouses was not in possession of the subject property.
21
ISSUE: Whether or not Jose Magpayo was a co-owner of the
parcel of the land in dispute.
HELD: No. Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts.
Ownership exists when a thing pertaining to one person is
completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law
and consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain
rights to the owner, one of which is the right to dispose of the
thing by way of sale. Atty. Pedro Garcia and his wife Remedios
exercised their right to dispose of what they owned when they
sold the subject property to the Magpayo spouses. On the other
hand, possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the
enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and
physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession may be
had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner
and possession of a holder. “A possessor in the concept of an
owner may be the owner himself or one who claims to be so.” On
the other hand, “one who possesses as a mere holder
acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be
ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong.” The records
show that petitioner Jose Garcia occupied the property not in the
concept of an owner for his stay was merely tolerated by his
parents. An owner’s act of allowing another to occupy his house,
rent-free does not create a permanent and indefeasible right of
possession in the latter’s favor. Consequently, it is of no moment
that petitioner was in possession of the property at the time of the
sale to the Magpayo spouses. It was not a hindrance to a valid
transfer of ownership. All said, the Magpayo spouses were
already the owners when they mortgaged the property to PBCom.
Rodil Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 129609,
November 29, 2001, 371 SCRA 79 Bellosillo, J.
FACTS: Rodil Enterprises Inc. (RODIL) is the lessee of the Ides
O'Racca Building (O'RACCA) since 1959 which is a property
owned by the Republic of the Philippines. In 1980, Rodil entered
into a sublease contract with respondents Carmen Bondoc,
Teresita Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear and Chua Huay Soon,
members of the Ides O’Racca Building Tenants Association, Inc.
On 12 September 1982 BP 233 was enacted. It authorized the
sale of "former alien properties" classified as commercial and
industrial, and the O'RACCA building was classified as
commercial property. RODIL and Ides O’Racca Building Tenants
Association, Inc., offered to purchase the subject property.
Pending action on the offer of RODIL to purchase the property,
Director Factora of the Building Services and Real Property
Management Office granted RODIL's request for another renewal
of the lease contract on 23 September 1987 for another five (5)
years from 1 September 1987. The renewal contract was
forwarded to then Secretary Jose de Jesus of Department of
General Services and Real Estate Property Management
(DGSREPM) for approval. Upon recommendation of DGSREPM
Rufino Banas, De Jesus disapproved the renewal contract in
favour of Rodil and
22
recalled all papers signed by him regarding the subject. Secretary
De Jesus likewise directed RODIL to pay its realty tax
delinquency and ordered the issuance of a temporary occupancy
permit to the ASSOCIATION.
On 6 October 1987 RODIL filed an action for specific
performance, damages and injunction with prayer for temporary
restraining order before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against
the REPUBLIC, De Jesus, Banas, Factora and the
ASSOCIATION. De Jesus, Banas and Factora were later
substituted by Secretary Fulgencio Factoran of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in the action for
specific performance. On 31 May 1988 Factora issued Order No.
1 designating the Land Management Bureau represented by
Director Abelardo Palad, Jr. as custodian of all "former alien
properties" owned by the REPUBLIC. Pending the action for
specific performance, RODIL signed a renewal contract with
Director Palad which was approved by Secretary Factora. The
renewal contract would extend the lease for ten (10) years from 1
September 1987. A supplement to the renewal contract was
subsequently entered into on 25 May 1992 where rentals on the
previous lease contract were increased. As a result, the action
was dismissed in favour of Rodil. Rodil then filed an action for
unlawful detainer against Divisoria Footwear, Bondoc, Bondoc-
Esto and Chua Huay Soon. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals
declared the contracts null and void and dismissed the actions for
unlawful detainer.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rodil has the right to occupy the building
by virtue of its lease contract with the Republic.
HELD: Yes. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a
thing, without other limitations than those established by law.
Every owner has the freedom of disposition over his property. It is
an attribute of ownership, and this rule has no exception. The
REPUBLIC being the owner of the disputed property enjoys the
prerogative to enter into a lease contract with RODIL in the
exercise of its jus disponendi. Hence, as lessor, the REPUBLIC
has the right to eject usurpers of the leased property where the
factual elements required for relief in an action for unlawful
detainer are present.
Private respondents claim that the agreements of 23 September
1987, 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992 did not give rise to valid
contracts.This is true only of the Contract of Lease entered into on
23 September 1987 which the REPUBLIC did not approve.
RODIL neither alleged nor proved that such approval was made
known to it. The so- called approval of the lease contract was
merely stated in an internal memorandum of Secretary De Jesus
addressed to Director Factora. This is evident from the fact that
Secretary De Jesus, in his letter, asked Factora to duly execute a
lease contract and forward it to his office for approval. The
consequences of this fact are clear. The Civil Code provides that
no contract shall arise unless acceptance of the contract is
communicated to the offeror. Until that moment, there is no real
meeting of the minds, no concurrence of offer and acceptance,
hence, no contract.
However, the same is not true of the contracts of 18 May 1992
and 25 May 1992. As argued by RODIL, these contracts are not
proscribed by law; neither is there a law
23
prohibiting the execution of a contract with provisions that are
retroactive. Where there is nothing in a contract that is contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public policy or public order, the
validity of the contract must be sustained.
The Court of Appeals invalidated the contracts because they were
supposedly executed in violation of a temporary restraining order
issued by the Regional Trial Court. The appellate court however
failed to note that the order restrains the REPUBLIC from
awarding the lease contract only as regards respondent
ASSOCIATION but not petitioner RODIL. While a temporary
restraining order was indeed issued against RODIL, it was issued
only on 25 May 1992 or after the assailed contracts were entered
into. As correctly stated by petitioner, one cannot enjoin an act
already fait accompli. Private respondents argue that the "renewal
contract" cannot "renew" a void contract. However, they could cite
no legal basis for this assertion. It would seem that respondents
consider the renewal contract to be a novation of the earlier lease
contract of 23 September 1987. However, novation is never
presumed. Also, the title of a contract does not determine its
nature. On the contrary, it is the specific provisions of the contract
which dictate its nature. Furthermore, where a contract is
susceptible of two (2) interpretations, one that would make it valid
and another that would make it invalid, the latter interpretation is
to be adopted. The assailed agreement of 18 May 1992,
"Renewal of Contract of Lease," merely states that the term of the
contract would be for ten (10) years starting 1 September 1987.
This is hardly conclusive of the existence of an intention by the
parties to novate the contract of 23 September 1987. Nor can it
be argued that there is an implied novation for the requisite
incompatibility between the original contract and the subsequent
one is not present. Based on this factual milieu, the presumption
of validity of contract cannot be said to have been overturned.
Respondent ASSOCIATION claims that the Decision of the Office
of the President declaring null and void the lease contracts of 18
May 1992 and 25 May 1992 should be counted in its favor. We do
not agree. The contention does not hold water. It is well- settled
that a court's judgment in a case shall not adversely affect
persons who were not parties thereto.
Isaguirre v. De LaraG.R. No. 138053, May 31, 2000, 332 SCRA
803 Gonzaga – Reyes, J.
FACTS: Alejandro de Lara was the original applicant-claimant for
a Miscellaneous Sales Application over a parcel of land with an
area of 2,342 square meters. Upon his death, Alejandro de Lara
was succeeded by his wife-respondent Felicitas de Lara as
claimant. On this lot stands a two-story residential-commercial
apartment declared for taxation purposes in the name of
respondent’s sons, Apolonio and Rodolfo de Lara. When Felicitas
encountered financial difficulties, she approached petitioner
Cornelio M. Isaguirre. On February 10, 1960, a document
denominated as “Deed of Sale and Special Cession of Rights and
Interests” was executed by Felicitas and Isaguirre,
24
whereby the former sold a 250 square meter portion of the subject
lot, together with the two-story commercial and residential
structure standing thereon. Sometime in May 1969, Apolonio and
Rodolfo de Lara filed a complaint against petitioner for recovery of
ownership and possession of the two-story building. However,
petitioner filed a sales application over the subject property and
was issued an OCT. Due to overlapping of title, petitioner filed an
action for quieting of title. Judgment was rendered in favor of the
respondents. When respondent filed a motion for execution,
petitioner opposed, and alleged that he had a right of retention
over the property until payment of the value of the improvements
he had introduced on the property.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can be considered a builder in
good faith with respect to the improvements he made on the
property.
HELD: No. The petitioner is a possessor in bad faith. Based on
the factual findings from this case, it is evident that petitioner
knew from the very beginning that there was really no sale and
that he held respondent’s property as mere security for the
payment of the loan obligation. Therefore, petitioner may claim
reimbursement only for necessary expenses; however, he is not
entitled to reimbursement for any useful expenses which he may
have incurred.
25
German Management & Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 76216 and 76217, September 14, 1989, 177 SCRA
495 Fernan, J.
FACTS: Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene
Jose, residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are the
owners of a parcel of land situated in Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro,
Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of 232,942 sq. M. The land was
originally registered on 5 August 1948 in the Office of the Register
of Deeds Rizal as OCT 19, pursuant to a Homestead Patent
granted by the President of the Philippines on 27 July 1948. On
26 February 1982, the spouses Jose executed a special power of
attorney authorizing German Management Services to develop
their property into a residential subdivision. Consequently, the
German Management obtained Development Permit 00424 from
the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission for said
development. Finding that part of the property was occupied by
Gernale and Villeza and 20 other persons, German Management
advised the occupants to vacate the premises but the latter
refused. Nevertheless, German Management proceeded with the
development of the subject property which included the portions
occupied and cultivated by Gernale, et.al. Gernale, et.al. filed an
action for forcible entry against German Management before the
MTC Antipolo, Rizal, alleging that they are mountainside farmers
of Sitio Inarawan who have occupied and tilled their farmholdings
some 12 to 15 years prior to the promulgation of PD 27, and that
they were deprived of their property without due process of law
when German Management forcibly removed and destroyed the
barbed wire fence enclosing their farmholdings without notice and
bulldozing the rice, corn, fruit bearing trees and other crops that
they planted by means of force, violence and intimidation The
MTC dismissed Gernale et.al.'s complaint for forcible entry. On
appeal, the RTC sustained the dismissal by the MTC. Gernale
then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Said
court gave due course to their petition and reversed the decisions
of the MTC and the RTC. The Appellate Court held that since
Gernale, et.al. were in actual possession of the property at the
time they were forcibly ejected by German Management, they
have a right to commence an action for forcible entry regardless
of the legality or illegality of possession. German Management
moved to reconsider but the same was denied by the Appellate
Court. Hence, here is the present recourse.
ISSUE: Whether the doctrine of self-help may be availed of when
respondents refused to vacate the premises.
HELD: No. The justification that the drastic action of bulldozing
and destroying the crops of the prior possessor on the basis of
the doctrine of self help (enunciated in Article 429 NCC) is
unavailing because the such doctrine can only be exercised at the
time of actual or threatened dispossession, which is absent in the
present case. When possession has already been lost, the owner
must resort to judicial process for the recovery of property. This is
clear from Article 536 New Civil Code which provides that "in no
case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as
long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He, who
believes that he has an action or right to
26
deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of
the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the
thing."
Caisip v. People of the PhilippinesG.R. No. L-28716,
November 18, 1970, 36 SCRA 17 Concepcion, C. J.
FACTS: Spouses Marcelino Guevarra and Gloria Cabalag
cultivated a parcel of land known as Lot 105-A of Hacienda Palico
situated in Nasugbu, Batangas, the same land used to be
tenanted by Cabalag’s father when he was still alive. Hacienda
Palico is owned by Roxas y Cia, administered by Antonio
Chuidian, and supervised by the overseer, Felix Caisip. Prior to
the incident involved, Guevarra sought recognition as a lawful
tenant of Royas y Cia from the Court of Agrarian Relations but his
action was dismissed. Thereafter, Roxas y Cia filed an action
against Guevarra for forcible entry with prayer that Guevarra be
ejected from the premises of Lot 105-A. The Justice of the Peace
of Court of Nasugbu decided in favor of Roxas y Cia and on June
6, 1959, a trouble between Cabalag and Caisip occurred
regarding the cutting of sugarcane.
A day later, Cabalag entered again the premises of Lot 105-A and
refused to be driven out by Caisip. Due to Cabalag’s tenacious
attitude, Caisip sought the help of the Chief of Police of Nasugbu.
The Deputy Sheriff, however, informed Caisip that his request to
eject Cabalag cannot be acted upon without a proper court order.
Nevertheless, the Chief of Police assigned Sergeant Ignacio
Rojales and Corporal Frederico Villadelrey to Haciendo Palico.
On June 17, 1959, Cabalag was seen weeding a portion of Lot
105-A which was a ricefield. Caisip approached her and bade her
to leave, but she refused to do so. So, Caisip went to Sgt. Rojales
and Cpl. Villadelrey and brought them to Cabalag. Rojales told
Cabalag to stop weeding but she insisted on her right to stay in
the said lot. While in squatting position, Cabalag was grabbed by
Rojales who twisted her right arm and wrested the trowel she was
holding. Villadelrey held her left hand and together Rojales
forcibly dragged her towards a banana plantation while Caisip
stood nearby, with a drawn gun. Cabalag shouted, “Ina ko po! Ina
ko po!” and was heard by some neighbors. Zoilo Rivera, head of
the tenant organization to which Cabalag was affiliated, went with
them on their way to the municipal building. Upon arrival, Cabalag
was turned over by Rojales and Villadelrey to the policemen on
duty, who interrogated her. But upon representations made by
Rivera, she was released and allowed to go home. Cabagan then
filed a complaint charging Caisip, Rojales and Villadelrey of the
crime of “grave coercion.”
The Court of First Instance of Batangas found them guilty as
charged. On appeal, The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the force employed by Caisip and others,
in the exercise of his right granted by Article 429, is reasonably
necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful
physical invasion or usurpation of his property.
27
HELD: No. Caisip was not even entitled to the right granted by
Article 429. This is totally inapplicable to the case, for, having
been given 20 days from June 6th within which to vacate the lot,
Cabalag did not, on June 17th and within said period, invades or
usurps the said lot. She had merely remained in possession
thereof, even though the hacienda owner may have become its
co-possessor by reason of the prior order of the Justice of Peace
Court of Nasugbu. Caisip and others did not repel or prevent an
actual or threatened physical invasion or usurpation. They
expelled Cabalag from a property which she and her husband
were in possession, despite the fact that the Sheriff had explicitly
authorized Guevarra and Cabalag to stay in said property up to
June 26th, and had expressed the view that he could not oust
them without a judicial order. It is clear, therefore, that Caisip,
Rojales and Villadelrey, by means of violence, and without legal
authority, had prevented the complainant from doing something
not prohibited by law (weeding and being in Lot 105-A), and
compelled her to do something against her will (stopping the
weeding and leaving said lot), whether it be right or wrong,
thereby taking the law into their hands, in violation of Article 286
of the Revised Penal Code.
People of the Philippines v. PletchaG.R. No. 19029-CR, June
27, 1977, 22 CA Rep. 807 Sison, J.
FACTS: Tito Pletcha, Jr., farmer, invoking ‘self-help’ in defense of
the land he inherited from his father 19 years ago against the
workers of Radeco Corporation, who without court order, were
constructing a fence in a hacienda allegedly leased by the
corporation from a certain Lopinco.
Claiming actual possession and ownership and believing that the
land sought to be fenced was an integral part of the land he
inherited, Pletcha asked the group to desist from fenicing pending
a resurvey he proposed, but he was totally ignored, thus he
fought off and prevented the workers. As a result of such
resistance he was prosecuted and convicted of grave coercion by
the Municipal Trial Court. Pletcha appealed the decision of the
MTC with the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether the appellant’s action is a legitimate exercise of
a private citizen’s ‘self- help.
HELD: Yes. In the instant case,the usurper’s possession has not
yet become complete and the complainants were in the act of
building a fence. Such an act constitutes force in contemplation of
the law. This act of trespass justified the appellant to drive them
away, even by means of bolo because they refused to listen to his
appeal which is reasonable. The appellant need not rush to the
court to seek redress before reasonably resisting the invasion of
his property. The situation required immediate action and Art. 429
gave him the self executory mechanics of self-defense and self-
reliance. The provision in Art 429 of the New Civil Code confirms
the right of the appellant, an owner
28
and lawful possessor, to use reasonable force to repel an invasion
or usurpation, actual, threatened or physical of his property. The
principle of self-defense and the protective measures related
thereto, covers not only his life, but also his liberty and property.
“The principle of self-help authorizes the lawful possessor to use
force, not only to prevent a threatened unlawful invasion or
usurpation thereof; it is a sort of self-defense. It is lawful to repel
force by force. He who merely uses force to defend his
possession does not possess by force. The use of such
necessary force to protect propriety or possessory rights
constitutes a justifying circumstance under the Penal Code.”
29
Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate CourtG.R. No. 74761,
November 6, 1990, 191 SCRA 195 Fernan, C.J.
FACTS: Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are
the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang,
Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent,
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious
corporation. Within the land of respondent corporation,
waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were
constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners'
land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops
and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of
petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons,
and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.
Petitioners instituted a criminal action against the officers and
directors of respondent corporation, for destruction by means of
inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
Subsequently, petitioners filed a civil action against respondent
corporation for damages. The trial court dismissed the civil case
for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted
ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. The appellate court
affirmed the order of the trial court. The motion for reconsideration
was also denied.
ISSUE: Whether a corporation, which has built through its agents,
waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its land,
thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can
be held civilly liable for damages.
HELD: Yes. Petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that
petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage
due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent
corporation. It must be stressed that the use of one's property is
not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that
"the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner
as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT
ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have
mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his
own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the
rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of
an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be
so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that
they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can
withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the
structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a
third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or
damage suffered.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person
for damage caused by his act or omission constituting fault or
negligence. However, responsibility for fault or negligence under
the said article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. The
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant. The decision is reversed and set
aside.
30
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-
43938, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 228 Cruz, J.
FACTS: An application for registration of a parcel of land was filed
on February 11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and
on behalf of his three children. The land, situated in Tuding,
Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots. According to
the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-
9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto,
respectively, in 1964. In support of the application, both Balbalio
and Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject land by
virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5
from her father shortly after the Liberation. Alberto said he
received Lots 6-9 in 1961 from his mother, Bella Alberto. She was
corroborated by Felix Marcos, who recalled the earlier possession
of the land by Alberto's father. Benguet opposed on the ground
that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it
on September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James
Kelly, who located the claim in September 1909 and recorded it
on October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet had
been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in
concept of owner. Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of
Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral claims
located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and
recorded on January 2, 1931, in the office of the mining recorder
of Baguio. These claims were purchased from these locators on
November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been in open,
continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots. The Bureau
of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing
that the land sought to be registered was covered by the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated
February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not
subject to alienation under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.
The trial court denied the application, holding that the applicants
had failed to prove their claim of possession and ownership of the
land sought to be registered. The applicants appealed to the
respondent court, which reversed the trial court and affirmed the
surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same
time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by
virtue of their mining claims. Both Benguet and Atok appealed to
the Supreme Court, invoking their superior right of ownership. The
Republic filed its own petition for review and reiterated its
argument that neither the private respondents nor the two mining
companies had any valid claim to the land because it was not
alienable and registerable.
ISSUE: Whether or not Benguet and Atok have a better right over
the property in question.
HELD: Yes. It is true that the subject property was considered
forest land and included in the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve,
but this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and
Atok at that time. The perfection of the mining claim converted the
property to mineral land and under the laws then in force removed
it from the public domain. By such act, the locators acquired
exclusive rights over the land, against even
31
the government, without need of any further act such as the
purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. As the
land had become the private property of the locators, they had the
right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok.It is
true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such private property
was subject to the "vicissitudes of ownership," or even to
forfeiture by non-user or abandonment or, as the private
respondents aver, by acquisitive prescription. The Court of
Appeals justified this by saying there is "no conflict of interest"
between the owners of the surface rights and the owners of the
sub-surface rights. Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is
classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface,
subject to separate claims of title. However, the rights over the
land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half
agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be
categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or
completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed,
the land which was originally classified as forest land ceased to
be so and became mineral — and completely mineral — once the
mining claims were perfected. As long as mining operations were
being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be
so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was
enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were
unlawfully occupying the surface.
This is an application of the Regalian doctrine. If a person is the
owner of agricultural land in which minerals are discovered, his
ownership of such land does not give him the right to extract or
utilize the said minerals without the permission of the State to
which such minerals belong.
Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in
question by virtue of their respective mining claims which they
validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the
alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural
lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption.
The land was not and could not have been transferred to the
private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could
its use be shared simultaneously by them and the mining
companies for agricultural and mineral purposes. The decision is
set aside and that of the trial court is reinstated.
32
Custodio v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 116100, February 9,
1996, 253 SCRA 483 Regalado, J.
FACTS: Pacifico Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a two-door
apartment. Said property may be described to be surrounded by
other immovables owned by petitioner Spouses Custodio,
Spouses Santos and Rosalina Morato. From the main street P.
Burgos, there are two possible passageways to Mabasa’s
property. One of the tenants of the apartment vacated because an
adobe fence was constructed thereby making the first
passageway narrower in width. Ma. Cristina Santos testified that
she constructed said fence for security reasons. Morato also
constructed her fence and even extended it in such a way that the
entire passageway was enclosed. It was then that the remaining
tenants of the apartment left. Thereafter, Mabasa filed a case for
the grant of an easement of right of way against petitioners. The
RTC granted the easement of right of way sought by private
respondent. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC
and furthermore, ordering petitioners to pay private respondent a
sum of money for damages.
ISSUE: Whether the award of damages to private respondent is
proper.
HELD: No, the act of petitioners in constructing a fence within
their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners. Article 430 of
the Civil Code provides that “every owner may enclose or fence
his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead
hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes
constituted thereon. The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot
constitute a legal wrong for which an action will lie, although the
act may result in damage to another. The courts can give no
redress for hardship to an individual resulting from action
reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful end by lawful means.
33
Abejaron v. NabasaG.R. No. 84831, June 20, 2001, 359 SCRA
47 Puno, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Abejaron avers that he is the actual and lawful
possessor and claimant of a 118-square meter portion of a 175-
square meter residential lot in Silway, General Santos City.
Petitioner Abejaron and his family occupied the 118-square meter
land. At that time, the land had not yet been surveyed. They
fenced the area and built thereon a family home with nipa roofing
and a small store. Petitioner later improved their abode to become
a two-storey house. This house, which stands to this day,
occupies a portion of Lot 1, Block 5 and a portion of the adjoining
Lot 2 of the same Psu. Lot 2 belongs to petitioners' daughter,
Conchita. The small store was eventually destroyed and in its
stead, petitioner Abejaron another store. He later planted five
coconut trees on the property. Knowing that the disputed land was
public in character, petitioner declared only his house, and not the
disputed land, for taxation purposes. The last two declarations
state that petitioners' house stands on Lots 1 and 2, Block 5.
Petitioner stated that respondent Nabasa resided on the
remaining 57-square meter portion of Lot 1. Nabasa built his
house about 4 meters away from petitioner Abejaron's house.
Employees of the Bureau of Lands surveyed the area. Abejaron
did not apply for title of the land on the belief that he could not
secure title over it as it was government property. Without his
knowledge and consent, Nabasa applied for and caused the titling
in his name the entire Lot 1, including petitioner Abejaron's 118-
square meter portion. Nabasa was issued an Original Certificate
of Title pursuant to a Free Patent covering Lot 1. As the title
included petitioner Abejaron’s portion of the lot, he filed a protest
with the Bureau of Lands against Nabasa's title and application.
The protest was dismissed for failure of the petitioner to attend
the hearings. Petitioner Abejaron then filed an action for
reconveyance with damages against respondent Nabasa before
the RTC. The RTC The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of
petitioner in its reconveyance case declaring the possession and
occupancy of Abejaron over 118 square meters of lot in good faith
and thereby declaring the inclusion of said portion in the OCT
issued in the name of Nabasa erroneous. On appeal, the CA
reversed the decision of the RTC stating that the only basis for
reconveyance is actual fraud which in this case was failed to be
substantiated by Abejaron. Without proof of irregularity neither in
the issuance of title nor in the proceedings incident thereto nor a
claim that fraud intervened in the issuance of the title, the title
would become indefeasible. The petitioner hence resorts to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has acquired title over the
disputed land.
HELD: An action for reconveyance of a property is the sole
remedy of a landowner whose property has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another's name after one year from the
date of the decree so long as the property has not passed to an
innocent purchaser for value. The action does not seek to reopen
the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of
registration but only purports to show that the person who
secured the registration of the property in controversy is not the
real owner thereof. Fraud is a ground for reconveyance. For an
action for reconveyance based on
34
fraud to prosper, it is essential for the party seeking reconveyance
to prove by clear and convincing evidence his title to the property
and the fact of fraud.
Reconveyance is a remedy granted only to the owner of the
property alleged to be erroneously titled in another's name. In the
case at bench, petitioner does not claim to be the owner of the
disputed portion. Admittedly, what he has is only a "preferential
right" to acquire ownership thereof by virtue of his actual
possession since January 1947. Title to alienable public lands can
be established through open, continuous, and exclusive
possession for at least 30 years. Not being the owner, petitioner
cannot maintain the present suit. Persons who have not obtained
title to public lands could not question the titles legally issued by
the State.
35
Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. v. Talisay – Silay Milling Co. G.R.
No. 35223, September 17, 1931, 56 Phil. 117 Romualdez, J.
FACTS: On December 22, 1923, the Talisay-Silay Milling Co.,
Inc., was indebted to the Philippine National Bank. To secure the
payment of its debt, it succeeded in inducing its planters, among
whom, was Mariano Lacson Ledesma, to mortgage their land to
the creditor bank. And in order to compensate those planters for
the risk they were running with their property under the mortgage,
the aforesaid central, by a resolution passed on that same date,
i.e., December 22, 1923, undertook to credit the owners of the
plantation thus mortgaged every year with a sum equal to two per
centum of the debt secured according to yearly balance, the
payment of the bonus being made at once, or in part from time to
time, as soon as the central became free of its obligations to the
aforesaid bank, and of those contracted by virtue of the contract
of supervision, and had funds which might be so used, or as soon
as it obtained from said bank authority to make such payment.
Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. filed a complaint against the Talisay-
Silay Milling Co., Inc., for the delivery of the amount P13,850 or
promissory notes or other instruments or credit for that sum
payable on June 30, 1930, as bonus in favor of Mariano Lacson
Ledesma.
The Philippine National Bank filed a third party claim alleging a
preferential right to receive any amount which Mariano Lacson
Ledesma might be entitled to from the Talisay-Silay Milling Co. as
bonus, because that would be civil fruits of the land mortgaged to
said bank by said debtor for the benefit of the central referred to,
and by virtue of a deed of assignment, and praying that said
central be ordered to delivered directly to the intervening bank
said sum on account of the latter's credit against the aforesaid
Mariano Lacson Ledesma.
ISSUE: Whether or not the bonus in question is civil fruits
HELD: No. The said bonus bears no immediate, but only a
remote accidental relation to the land mentioned, having been
granted as compensation for the risk of having subjected one's
land to a lien in favor of the bank, for the benefit of the entity
granting said bonus. If this bonus be income or civil fruits of
anything, it is income arising from said risk, or, if one chooses,
from Mariano Lacson Ledesma's generosity in facing the danger
for the protection of the central, but certainly it is not civil fruits or
income from the mortgaged property. Hence, the amount of the
bonus, according to the resolution of the central granting it, is not
based upon the value, importance or any other circumstance of
the mortgaged property, but upon the total value of the debt
thereby secured, according to the annual balance, which is
something quite distinct from and independent of the property
referred to.
Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. v. Mayfair Theater, Inc.
36
G.R. No. 136221, May 12, 2000, 370 SCRA 56 Pardo, J.
FACTS: Carmelo and Bauermann, Inc. use to own a parcel of
land, together with two 2-storey buildings constructed thereon.
Carmelo entered into a Contract of Lease with Mayfair Theater
Inc. for a period of 20 years. The lease covered a portion a
portion of the second floor and mezzanine of a 2-storey building
which respondent used as a movie house known as Maxim
Theater. Two years later, Mayfair entered into a second Contract
of Lease with of Carmelo for the lease of another portion of the
latter’s property – namely, part of the second floor of the 2-storey
building and two store spaces on the ground floor and the
mezzanine, on which Mayfair put up another movie house known
as Miramar Theater. The contract was likewise for a period of 20
years. Both leases contained a provision granting Mayfair a right
of first refusal to purchase the subject properties. However, the
subject properties were sold by Carmelo to Equatorial Realty
Development, Inc. without offering it first to Mayfair. Mayfair filed a
Complaint before the RTC of Manila for the annulment of the
Deed of Absolute Sale between Carmelo and Equatorial. The
RTC rendered its decision in favour of Carmelo and Equatorial.
The Court of Appeals completely reversed and set aside the
judgment of the lower court. The Supreme Court denied the
petition for review and rescinded the contract of sale between
Carmelo and Equatorial and ordered Carmelo to allow Mayfair to
buy the lots. However, Carmelo could no longer be located. Thus,
following the order of execution of the trial court, Mayfair
deposited with the clerk of court a quo its payment to Carmelo.
The lower court issued a Deed of Reconveyance in favour of
Carmelo and a Deed of Sale in favor of Mayfair. Later, Equatorial
filed with the trial court an action for the collection of the sum of
money against Mayfair, claiming payment of rentals or reasonable
compensation for the defendant’s use of subject premises after its
lease contract had expired.
ISSUE: Whether or not Equatorial should be entitled to back
rentals.
HELD: No. Rescission creates the obligation to return the things
which were the object of the contract, together with their fruits,
and the price with its interest. It is clear the Equatorial never took
actual control and possession of the property sold, in view of
Mayfair’s timely objection to the sale and continued actual
possession of the property. Furthermore, the fact that Mayfair paid
rentals to Equatorial during the litigation should not be interpreted
to mean actual delivery or ispo facto recognition of Equatorial’s
title. They were made merely to avoid imminent eviction and
should not be construed as recognition of Equatorial as new
owner.
37
Ignacio v. HilarioG.R. No. L-175, August 30, 1946, 76 Phil. 605
Moran, C. J.
FACTS: This case concerns the ownership of a parcel of land,
partly rice-land and partly residential. The lower court rendered
judgment holding plaintiffs as the legal owners of the whole
property but conceding to defendants the ownership of the
houses and granaries built by them on the residential portion with
the rights of a possessor in good faith, in accordance with article
361 of the Civil Code.
Subsequently, the plaintiffs prayed for an order of execution
alleging that since they chose neither to pay defendants for the
buildings nor to sell to them the residential lot, said defendants
should be ordered to remove the structure at their own expense
and to restore plaintiffs in the possession of said lot. Defendants
objected to this motion which, after hearing, was granted by
Judge Natividad. Hence, this petition by defendants praying for
(a) a restraint and annulment of the order of execution issued by
Judge Natividad; (b) an order to compel plaintiffs to pay them the
sum of P2,000 for the buildings, or sell to them the residential lot
for P45; or (c), a rehearing of the case for a determination of the
rights of the parties upon failure of extra-judicial settlement.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent Court erred in its judgment.
HELD: Yes. The Civil Code provides:
ART. 361. The owner of land on which anything has been built,
sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate
as his own the work, sowing or planting, after the payment of the
indemnity stated in articles 453 and 454, or to oblige the one who
built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who
sowed, the proper rent.
ART. 453. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every
possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the
thing until such expenses are made good to him.
Useful expenses shall be refunded to the possessor in good faith
with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated him
in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the
expenses or paying the increase in value which the thing may
have acquired in consequence thereof.
The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned
by another, is entitled to retain the possession of the land until he
is paid the value of his building, under article 453. The owner of
the land, upon the other hand, has the option, under article 361,
either to pay for the building or to sell his land to the owner of the
building. But he cannot, as respondents here did, refuse both to
pay for the building and to sell the land and compel the owner of
the building to remove it from the land where it is erected. He is
entitled to another motion only when, after having chosen to sell
his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.
38
The Court holds, therefore, that the order of Judge Natividad
compelling defendants- petitioners to remove their buildings from
the land belonging to plaintiffs-respondents only because the
latter chose neither to pay for such buildings not to sell the land, is
null and void, for it amends substantially the judgment sought to
be executed and is, furthermore, offensive to articles 361 and 453
of the Civil Code.
Ignao v. Intermediate Appellate CourtG.R. No. 72876, January
18, 1991, 193 SCRA 17 Fernan, C. J.
FACTS: Petitioner Florencio Ignao and his uncles Juan Ignao and
Isidro Ignao were co- owners of a 534sqm land located in Cavite.
Pursuant to an action for partition filed by petitioner, the CFI of
Cavite directed the partition of the said land. A total of 133.5 sqm
was allotted to the petitioner’s uncles while the remaining 266.5
was allotted to the petitioner. However, when Juan and Isidro built
their houses they encroached upon a portion of land belonging to
Florencio. A geodetic engineer surveyed the land and it was found
out that Juan and Isidro occupied a total of 101sqm of Florencio’s
lot.
The trial court which based its decision on Article 448 of the Civil
Code, ruled that Florencio should have the choice to either
appropriate to himself that part of the house standing on his lot or
to require Juan and Isidro to pay the price of the land. But since
the first option seems to be impractical, it ordered to sell to Juan
and Isidro those portions occupied by them because it is the
“workable solution”. Upon appeal petitioner contends that Article
448 cannot be applied because they are co-owners of he subject
property. However, the appellate court affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 448 of the Civil Code is applicable
in the case at bar.
HELD: Yes. It is true that Article 448 cannot be applied where a
co-owner builds upon a land owned in common. However, in the
case at bar, the co-ownership has already been terminated by
virtue of the partition, thus, Article 448 now applies since the
builder is not anymore considered as an owner of the land where
the house was built.
As to the workable solution applied by the lower court, the same
cannot be upheld because Article 448 clearly states that the right
of choice belongs to the land owner and not upon the builder and
the courts. Thus, whether it might seem impractical, the
landowner may choose to appropriate the improvements.
Filipinas Colleges, Inc. v. Garcia Timbang, et. al., G.R. No. L-
12812, September 29, 1989, 164 SCRA 287 Barrera, J.
39
FACTS: After appropriate proceedings, the Court of Appeals held,
among other things, that Filipinas Colleges, Inc. are declared to
have acquired the rights of the spouses Timbang in the
questioned lots, they are ordered to pay the spouses Timbang in
the amount of P15,807.90 plus such other amount which said
spouses might have paid or had to pay. On the other hand, Maria
Gervacio Blas was also declared to be a builder in good faith of
the school building constructed in the lot in question and was
entitled to be paid the amount of P19,000.00 for the same. Also,
in case that Filipinas Colleges, Inc. failed to deposit the value of
the land, which after liquidation was fixed at P32,859.34, within
the 90-day period set by the Court, Filipinas Colleges would lose
all its rights to the land and the spouses Timbang would then
become the owners thereof. If that is the case, the Timbangs are
ordered to make known to the court their option under Article 448
of the Civil Code whether they would appropriate the building in
question, in which even they would have to pay Filipinas
Colleges, Inc. the sum of P19,000.00, or would compel the latter
to acquire the land and pay the price thereof. Filipinas Colleges,
Inc. failed to pay the sum of P32,859.34 so the spouses Timbang
made known to the court their decision that they had chosen not
to appropriate the building but to compel Filipinas Colleges, Inc.,
for the payment of the sum of P32,859,34 which was granted by
the Court. As a consequence of which, a writ of execution was
issued. Meanwhile, Blas filed a motion for execution of her
judgment representing the unpaid portion of the price of the house
sold to Filipinas which was granted. Levy was made on the house
in virtue of the writs of execution. Then, the Sheriff of Manila sold
the building in public auction in favor of the spouses Timbang, as
the highest bidders. Several motion were the subsequently filed
before the lower court wherein the court held that: a) the Sheriff's
certificate of sale covering a school building sold at public auction
was null and void unless within 15 days from notice of said order
spouses Timbang shall pay to Blas the sum of P5,750.00 that the
spouses Timbang had bid for the building at the Sheriff's sale; b)
that Filipinas is owner of 245.00/32,859.34 undivided interest in
Lot No. 2-a on which the building sold in the auction sale is
situated; and c) that the undivided interest of the Filipinas in the
lot should be sold to satisfy the unpaid portion of the judgment in
favor of Blas and against Filipinas in the amount of P8,200.00
minus the sum of P5,750.00. The spouses Timbang contends that
because the builder in good faith has failed to pay the price of the
land after the owners thereof exercised their option under Article
448 of the Civil Code, the builder lost his right of retention
provided in Article 546 and that by operation of Article 445, the
spouses Timbang as owners of the land automatically became the
owners ipso facto of the school building.
ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses Timbang automatically
become the owners of the building upon failure of Filipinas to pay
the value of the land.
HELD: No. Based on Article 448 and 546 of the New Civil Code,
the owner of the land has the right to choose between
appropriating the building by reimbursing the builder of the value
thereof or compelling the builder in good faith to pay for his land.
Even this second right cannot be exercised if the value of the land
is considerably more than that of the building. In addition to the
right of the builder to be paid the value of his improvement, Article
546 gives him the corollary right of retention of the property until
he is indemnified by the owner of the land. There is nothing in the
language of these
40
two articles, 448 and 546, which would justify the conclusion of
appellants that, upon the failure of the builder to pay the value of
the land, when such is demanded by the land-owner, the latter
becomes automatically the owner of the improvement under
Article 445. The case of Bataclan vs Bernardo cannot be applied
in this case in the sense that although it is true it was declared
therein that in the event of the failure of the builder to pay the land
after the owner thereof has chosen this alternative, the builder's
right of retention provided in Article 546 is lost, nevertheless there
was nothing said that as a consequence thereof, the builder loses
entirely all rights over his own building. Also, in the present case,
the Court of Appeals has already adjudged that appellee Blas is
entitled to the payment of the unpaid balance of the purchase
price of the school building. Blas is actually a lien on the school
building are concerned. The order of the lower court directing the
Timbang spouses, as successful bidders, to pay in cash the
amount of their bid in the sum of P5,750.00 is therefore correct.
Manotok Realty v. TecsonG.R. No. L-47475 August 19, 1988,
164 SCRA 287 Gutierrez Jr., J.
FACTS: Petitioner Manotok Realty filed a complaint against Nilo
Madlangawa for recovery of possession with damages with the
Court of First Instance of Manila. Said court rendered judgment
declaring Madlangawa as a builder-possessor in good faith;
ordering the company to recognize the right of Madlangawa to
remain in Lot 345, Block 1, of the Clara Tambunting Subdivision
until after he shall have been reimbursed by the company the sum
of P7,500.00, without pronouncement as to costs.
Not satisfied with the trial court’s decision, petitioner appealed to
the Court of Appeals and upon affirming the trial court’s decision,
it elevated the case to the Supreme Court. On July 13, 1977, the
Supreme Court issued a resolution denying Manotok’s petition for
lack of merit. Petitioner then filed with the trial court (Judge Jose
H. Tecson), a motion for the approval of the company’s exercise
of option and for satisfaction of judgment. However, Judge Tecson
denied the motion for approval. Hence, this petition is filed.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Judge Tecson can deny
petitioner’s (landowner) motion to avail of its option.
HELD: No. There is, therefore, no basis for the respondent judge
to deny the petitioner’s motion to avail of its option to appropriate
the improvements made on its property. Neither can the judge
deny the issuance of a writ of execution because the private
respondent was adjudged a builder in good faith or on the ground
of “peculiar circumstances which supervened after the institution
of this case, like, for instance, the introduction of certain major
repairs of and other substantial improvements...” because the
option given by law belongs to the owner of the land. Under
Article 448 of the Civil Code, the right to appropriate the works or
improvements or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the
proper price of the land belongs to the owner of the land. The only
41
right given to the builder in good faith is the right of
reimbursement of necessary expenses for the preservation of the
land; the builder cannot compel the landowner to sell such land to
the former.
Bernardo v. BataclanG.R. No. L-44606, November 28, 1938, 66
Phil. 598 Laurel, J.
FACTS: Bernardo bought a parcel of land from Samonte which
was located in Cavite. In order that he may take possession and
occupy the said land, he filed a case in the CFI for such purpose
and the court rendered a favorable decision for Bernardo.
However, when he was supposedly set in occupying the said
land, he found Bataclan. He was within the premises because he
was authorized by the previous owners to clear the land and
make the necessary improvements he deems fit, further claiming
that such authorization was granted to him ever since 1922. Since
Bataclan was not a party in the first case, Bernardo filed against
him a separate case. Bernardo was declared owner but the
defendant was held to be a possessor in good faith for whom the
work done and improvements made by him should be
reimbursed. An appeal to the decision of the court was filed by
both Bernardo and Bataclan. The decision was modified by
lowering the price of the land from P300 to P200 per hectare.
Bernardo was given 30 days to exercise his option, whether to
sell the land to Bataclan or to buy the improvements from him.
Bernardo chose the option which would require Bataclan to pay
him the value of the land at the rate of P200 per hectare.
However, Bataclan informed the court that he will not be able to
pay for the price of the land. The court then gave Bataclan 30
days to pay the price of the property and after the lapse of the
period, the land shall be sold in a public auction. After 30 days,
the land was sold to Teodoro at a public auction, after failure of
Bataclan to pay within the period the purchase price.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bataclan has the right of retention over
the parcel of land in question.
HELD: No. Bataclan no longer has lost the right of retention. The
option of the owner was already exercised where he decided that
he will just allow the defendant to purchase the land such that
Bataclan was to comply with the option if he wants to retain the
land. From the moment that he told the courts of his inability to
pay for the price of the land, he already lost his right to retain the
land.
Heirs of Ramon Durano, Sr. v. UyG.R. No. 136456 October 24,
2000, 344 SCRA 238 Gonzaga – Reyes, J.
FACTS: Respondents stated that sometime in August 1970 and
months thereafter they 42
received mimeographed notices dated August 2, 1970 and signed
by the late Ramon Durano, Sr., informing them that the lands
which they are tilling and residing in, formerly owned by the Cebu
Portland Cement Company (hereafter, “Cepoc”), had been
purchased by Durano & Co., Inc. The notices also declared that
the lands were needed by Durano & Co. for planting to sugar and
for roads or residences, and directed respondents to immediately
turn over the said lands to the representatives of the company.
Simultaneously, tall bamboo poles with pennants at the tops
thereof were planted in some areas of the lands and metal sheets
bearing the initials “RMD” were nailed to posts.
As early as the first week of August 1970, and even before many
of the respondents received notices to vacate, men who identified
themselves as employees of Durano & Co. proceeded to bulldoze
the lands occupied by various respondents, destroying in their
wake the plantings and improvements made by the respondents
therein. On September 15, 1970, Durano & Co. sold the disputed
property to petitioner Ramon Durano III, who procured the
registration of these lands in his name under TCT No. T- 103 and
TCT No. T-104.
Respondents contended that the display of force and the known
power and prestige of petitioners and their family restrained them
from directly resisting this wanton depredation upon their property.
Respondents urged the Department of Justice to conduct the
preliminary investigation. The RTC found that the case
preponderated in favor of respondents, who all possessed their
respective portions of the property covered by TCT Nos. T-103
and T-104 thinking that they were the absolute owners thereof. A
number of these respondents alleged that they inherited these
properties from their parents, who in turn inherited them from their
own parents. Some others came into the properties by purchase
from the former occupants thereof. They and their predecessors
were responsible for the plantings and improvements on the
property. They were the ones who sought for the properties to be
tax-declared in their respective names, and they continually paid
the taxes thereto. Respondents maintained that they were
unaware of anyone claiming adverse possession or ownership of
these lands until the bulldozing operations in 1970.
Dissatisfied, petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the Court of
Appeals, which, in turn, affirmed the said decision and ordered
the return of the property to all the respondents-claimants.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its decision
ordering the petitioners to return the properties to the
respondents.
HELD: No. The evidence shows that respondents successfully
complied with all the requirements for acquisitive prescription to
set in. The properties were conveyed to respondents by purchase
or inheritance, and in each case the respondents were in actual,
continuous, open and adverse possession of the properties. They
exercised rights of ownership over the lands, including the regular
payment of taxes and introduction of plantings and improvements.
They were unaware of anyone claiming to
43
be the owner of these lands other than themselves until the
notices of demolition in 1970 --- and at the time each of them had
already completed the ten-year prescriptive period either by their
own possession or by obtaining from the possession of their
predecessors-in-interest.
Furthermore, a purchaser of a parcel of land cannot close his
eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard,
such as when the property subject of the purchase is in the
possession of persons other than the seller. A buyer who could
not have failed to know or discover that the land sold to him was
in the adverse possession of another is a buyer in bad faith. In the
case, respondents were in open possession and occupancy of the
properties when Durano & Co. supposedly purchased the same
from Cepoc. Petitioners made no attempt to investigate the nature
of respondents’ possession before they ordered demolition in
August 1970.
In the same manner, the purchase of the property by petitioner
Ramon Durano III from Durano & Co. could not be said to have
been in good faith. It is not disputed that Durano III acquired the
property with full knowledge of respondents’ occupancy thereon.
There even appears to be undue haste in the conveyance of the
property to Durano III, as the bulldozing operations by Durano &
Co. were still underway when the deed of sale to Durano III was
executed on September 15, 1970. There is not even an indication
that Durano & Co. attempted to transfer registration of the
property in its name before it conveyed the same to Durano III.
Since petitioners knew fully well the defect in their titles, they were
correctly held by the Court of Appeals to be builders in bad faith.
The Civil Code provides:
Art. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of
another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right of
indemnity.
Art. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built,
planted or sown in bad faith may demand the demolition of the
work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to
replace things in their former condition at the expense of the
person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the builder
or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper
rent.
Art. 451. In the cases of the two preceding articles, the landowner
is entitled to damages from the builder, planter or sower.
Based on these provisions, the owner of the land has three
alternative rights: (1) to appropriate what has been built without
any obligation to pay indemnity therefor, or (2) to demand that the
builder remove what he had built, or (3) to compel the builder to
pay the value of the land. In any case, the landowner is entitled to
damages under Article 451.
44
The Court sustains the return of the properties to respondents
and the payment of indemnity as being in accord with the reliefs
under the Civil Code.
Ballatan v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 125683, March 2, 1999,
304 SCRA 34 Puno, J.
FACTS: Ballatan, Martinez and Ling are the owners of adjacent
lots in Malabon, Metro Manila. Lot No. 24, 414 square meters in
area, is registered in the name of petitioners Eden Ballatan and
spouses Betty Martinez and Chong Chy Ling. Lots Nos. 25 and
26 are registered in the name of respondent Gonzalo Go, Sr. On
Lot No. 25, respondent Winston Go, son of Gonzalo Go, Sr.,
constructed his house. Adjacent to Lot No. 26 is Lot No. 27,
registered in the name of respondent Li Ching Yao. In 1985,
petitioner Ballatan constructed her house on Lot No. 24. During
the construction, she noticed that the concrete fence and side
pathway of the adjoining house of respondent Winston Go
encroached on the entire length of the eastern side of her
property. Her building contractor informed her that the area of her
lot was actually less than that described in the title. Forthwith,
Ballatan informed respondent Go of this discrepancy and his
encroachment on her property. Go, however, claimed that his
house, including its fence and pathway, were built within the
parameters of his father's lot; and that this lot was surveyed by
Engineer Jose Quedding, the authorized surveyor of the Araneta
Institute of Agriculture (AIA), the owner-developer of the
subdivision project. So Ballatan called the attention of the IAI and
after another survey of the land, Engineer Quedding found that
the lot area of petitioner Ballatan was less by few meters and that
of respondent Li Ching Yao, which was three lots away, increased
by two meters. Engineer Quedding declared that he made a
verification survey of Lots Nos. 25 and 26 of respondents Go in
1983 and allegedly found the boundaries to have been in their
proper position. He, however, could not explain the reduction in
Ballatan's area since he was not present at the time respondents
Go constructed their boundary walls.
On 10 June 1985, petitioner Ballatan made a written demand on
respondents Go to remove and dismantle their improvements on
Lot No. 24 but Go refused. So Ballatan instituted against Go a
civil case for recovery of possession the RTC of Malabon decided
in favor of Ballatan, ordering the Go's to vacate the subject
portion of Lot No. 24, demolish their improvements and pay
petitioner Ballatan actual damages, attorney's fees and the costs
of the suit. Go appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ballatan have a right of remotion.
HELD: All the parties have acted in good faith so Article 448 must
apply. Petitioners are ordered to exercise within thirty (30) days
from finality of the decision their option to either buy the portion of
respondents Go's improvement on their Lot No. 24, or sell to said
respondents the portion of their land on which the improvement
stands. If petitioners elect to sell the land or buy the improvement,
the purchase price must be at
45
the prevailing market price at the time of payment. If buying the
improvement will render respondents Go's house useless, then
petitioners should sell the encroached portion of their land to
respondents Go. If petitioners choose to sell the land but
respondents Go are unwilling or unable to buy, then the latter
must vacate the subject portion and pay reasonable rent from the
time petitioners made their choice up to the time they actually
vacate the premises. But if the value of the land is considerably
more than the value of the improvement, then respondents Go
may elect to lease the land, in which case the parties shall agree
upon the terms, the lease. Should they fail to agree on said terms,
the court of origin is directed to fix the terms of the lease.
46
Spouses Del Ocampo v. AbesiaG.R. No. L-49219, April 15,
1998, 160 SCRA 379 Gancayco, J.
FACTS: Plaintiffs – spouses Concepcion Fernandez and
Estanislao Del Campo and defendant Bernarda Fernandez
Abesia are co-owners of parcel of land with an area of 45 square
meters and divided in the proportion of 2/3 and 1/3 share each,
respectively. A commissioner, who is appointed by the court,
conducted a survey and recommended that the property be
divided into two lots: Lot 1161 – A with an area of 30 square
meters for the plaintiffs and Lot 1161 – B with an area of 15
square meters for the defendants. However, it was shown in the
sketch plan that the house of the defendant occupied the portion
with an area of 5 square meters of Lot 1161 – A of plaintiffs. The
parties asked the court to finally settle and adjudicate who among
the parties should take possession of the 5 square meters of land.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not Article 448 of the Civil Code, the rights of a
builder in good faith, should be applied to the plaintiff-spouses Del
Campo.2.) Whether or not the house of the defendant Abesia
should be removed and demolished at their expense.
HELD: 1.) Yes. Article 448 of the Civil Code cannot apply where a
co-owner builds, plants or sows on the land owned in common for
then, he did not build, plant or sow upon land that exclusively
belongs to another but of which he is a co-owner. The co- owner
is not a third person under the circumstances, and the situation is
governed by the rules of co-ownership. However, when, as in this
case, the co-ownership is terminated by the partition and it
appears that the house of defendants overlaps or occupies a
portion of 5 square meters of the land pertaining to plaintiffs which
the defendants obviously built in good faith, then the provisions of
Article 448 of the new Civil Code should apply. Manresa and
Navarro Amandi agree that the said provision of the Civil Code
may apply even when there was co-ownership if good faith has
been established.
2.) It depends. Applying Article 448 of the Civil Code, the plaintiffs
have the right to appropriate said portion of the house of
defendants upon payment of indemnity to defendants as provided
for in Article 546 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, the plaintiffs may
oblige the defendants to pay the price of the land occupied by
their house. However, if the price asked for is considerably much
more than the value of the portion of the house of defendants built
thereon, then the latter cannot be obliged to buy the land. The
defendant shall then pay the reasonable rent to the plaintiffs upon
such terms and conditions that they may agree. In case of
disagreement, the trial court shall fix the terms thereof. Of course,
defendants may demolish or remove the said portion of their
house, at their own expense, if they so decide.
47
Pacific Farms Inc. v. EsguerraG.R. No. L-21783, November 29,
1969, 30 SCRA 684 Castro, J.
FACTS: On October 1, 1956 to March 2, 1957 the Company sold
and delivered lumber and construction materials to the Insular
Farms Inc. which the latter used in the construction of the si
buildings at its compound in Bolinao, Pangasinan, of the total
procurement price of P15,000.00, the sum of P4,710.18 has not
been paid. Consequently, the Company instituted a civil case to
recover the unpaid balance and the court sustained their claim.
The defendant sheriff levied th six buildings. The Pacific Farms,
Inc. filed a suit against the Company and the sheriff asserting
ownership over the levied buildings which it had acquired from the
Insular Farms by virtue of absolute sale executed on March 21,
1958. Pacific prays that the judicial sale of the six buildings be
declared null and void. The trial court rendered judgment
annulling the levy and the certificate of sale. However, it denied
the plaintiff's claim for actual and exemplary damages on the
ground that it was not "prepared to find there was gross
negligence or bad faith on the part of any defendants".
ISSUE: Whether or not the application by analogy of the rules of
accession would suffice for a just adjudication.
HELD: Article 447 of the Civil Code contemplates a principal and
an accessory; the land being considered the principal, and the
plantings, constructions or works, the accessory. The owner of the
land who in good faith - whether personally or through another -
makes constructions or works thereon, using materials belonging
to somebody else, becomes the owner of the said materials with
the obligation however of paying for their value. On the other
hand, the owner of the materials is entitled to remove them,
provided no substantial injury is caused to the landowner.
Otherwise, he has the right to reimbursement for the value of his
materials,
Applying article 447 by analogy, the Court consider the buildings
as the principal and the lumber and construction materials that
went into their construction as the accessory. Thus the appellee, if
it does own the six buildings, must bear the obligation to pay for
the values of the said materials; the appellant — which apparently
has no desire to remove the materials, and, even if it were minded
to do so, cannot remove them without necessarily damaging the
buildings — has the corresponding right to recover the value of
the unpaid lumber and construction materials.
Pecson v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 115814, May 26, 1995,
244 SCRA 407 Davide, Jr. J.
FACTS: Pedro Pecson owned a commercial lot situated in
Kamias street, Quezon City, on which he built a a four-door, two-
storey apartment building. But because of failure to
48
pay realty taxes amounting to P12,000.00, the commercial lot
owned was sold at a public auction. It was purchased by
Nepomuceno, which later sold the same to the Nuguid spouses
for P103,000 on October 12, 1983. Pecson then challenged the
sale, alleging that the apartment building, contrary to the claim of
the Nuguid spouses, was not included in the sale. The lower court
judged in favor of Pecson, declaring that the apartment building
was indeed not included in the subject sale. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the same. The Spouses Nuguid then filed a motion for
delivery of possession of the lot and the apartment building. The
lower court ruled in favor of the private respondents, but subject
to the reimbursement to Pecson of the cost of constructing the
apartment building minus the rents due to the spouses (calculated
at P21,000 from June 23, 1993 to September 23, 1993). With the
said decision at hand, the spouses then made a move to eject
Pecson and as well as the tenants residing therein. However, the
spouses have yet to pay Pecson for the construction costs.
ISSUE: Whether the Nuguid Spouses can eject Pecson even if
reimbursement hasn’t been given for the construction costs.
HELD: No. The Court ruled that since the spouses still haven’t
reimbursed Pecson for the cost of construction of the building, the
latter has the right to retain the property, and along with it, the
fruits of which during such possession.
The court ruled that though Article 448 do not apply in the case at
bar. By its clear language, Article 448 refers to a land whose
ownership is claimed by two or more parties, one of whom has
built some works, or sown or planted something. The building,
sowing or planting may have been made in good faith or in bad
faith. As in this case, since the owner himself was the one who
constructed the improvement, good faith and bad faith becomes
irrelevant. However, by analogy, the indemnity may be applied,
considering that the primary intent of Article 448 is to avoid a state
of forced co- ownership and that the parties agree that Articles
448 and 546 of the Civil Code are applicable and indemnity for
the improvements may be paid, although they differ as to the
basis of the indemnity. Since the spouses have opted to
appropriate the apartment building, Pecson is thus entitled to the
possession and enjoyment of the apartment building, until he is
paid the proper indemnity, as well as of the portion of the lot
where the building has been constructed. This is so because the
right to retain the improvements while the corresponding
indemnity is not paid implies the tenancy or possession in fact of
the land on which it is built, planted or sown. The petitioner not
having been so paid, he was entitled to retain ownership of the
building and, necessarily, the income therefrom.
49
Technogas Philippines Manufacturing Corporation v. Court of
Appeals G.R. No. 108894, February, 10, 1997, 268 SCRA 5
Panganiban, J.
FACTS: Technogas purchased a parcel of land from Pariz
Industries, Inc. In the same year, Eduardo Uy purchased the land
adjacent to it. The following year, Uy bought another lot adjoining
the lot of Technogas. Portions of the buildings and wall bought by
Technogas together with the land from Pariz Industries are
occupying a portion of Uy’s adjoining land. The knowledge of
some encroachment was only made known to both parties after
their parties of their respective parcels of land.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not petitioner Technogas Philippines is a possessor
in bad faith.2.) Whether or not petitioner Technogas Philippines
has stepped into the shoes of the seller.
HELD: 1.) No. Unless one is versed in the science of surveying,
no one can determine the precise extent or location of his
property by merely examining his paper title. There is no question
in that when Technogas purchased the land from Pariz Industries,
the buildings and other structures were already in existence.
Furthermore, it is not clear as to who actually built these
structures but it can be assumed that the predecessor-in- interest
of Technogas, Pariz Industries, did so. An article 527 of the New
Civil Code presumes good faith. Since no proof exists to show
that the builder built the encroaching structures in bad faith, the
structures should be presumed to have been built in good faith.
Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is
building on is his, and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his
title. Furthermore, possession acquired in good faith does not lose
this character except in case and from the moment facts exist
which show that the possessor is not aware that he possesses
the thing improperly or wrongfully. The good faith ceases from the
moment the defects in the title are made known to the possessor,
by extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the property of
the true owner.
2.) Yes. Has been shown, contrary as to the good faith of
Technogas has not been overthrown. Similarly, upon delivery of
the property to Pariz Industries, as seller, to Technogas, as buyer,
the latter acquired ownership of the property. Consequently,
Technogas is deemed to have stepped into the shoes of the seller
with regard to all the rights of ownership of the property over the
immovable sold, including the right to compel Uy to exercise
either of the two options under Article 448 of the New Civil Code.
Thus, the landowner’s exercise of his option can only take place
after the builder shall have to know the intrusion – in short, when
both parties shall have become aware of it. Only then will the
occasion for exercising the option arise, for it is only then that
both parties will have been aware that a problem exists with
regard to their property rights.
50
Pleasantville Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 79688, February 1, 1996,Panganiban, J.
FACTS: On March 26, 1974, Wilson Kee on installment Lot 8
from C.T. Torres Enterprises Inc. the exclusive real estate agent of
petitioner. Under the Contract to Sell on installment. Kee can
exercise possession over the parcel of land even before the
completion of installment payments. On January 20, 1975, Kee
paid CTTEI relocation fee of Php 50.00 and another on January
27, 1975 for the preparation of lot plan. These amounts were paid
by Kee before he took possession of Lot 8. After the preparation
of the lot plan and a copy was presented to Kee, Zenaida
Octaviano, employee of CTTEI accompanied Donnabelle Kee the
wife of Wilson Kee to inspect Lot 8. Unfortuantely, Octaviano
pointed Lot 9. Thereafter, Kee constructed his residence on the
said Lot 9 together a store, repair shop and other improvements.
Edith Robillo purchased from Pleasantville Development
Corporation Lot 9. Sometime in 1975, she sold the said parcel of
land, Lot 9, to Eldred Jardinico which at that time is vacant. Upon
paying completely to Robillo, Jardinico secured from the Register
of Deeds of Bacolod City on December 19, 1978 Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 106367 in his name. It was only that time
that he discovered that Wilson Kee take possession of that lot and
that the same have introduced improvements to the same lot.
Jardinico confronted Kee and tried to reach for an amicable
settlement, but failed.
On January 30, 1981, Jardinico, through his lawyer, demanded
that Kee vacate Lot 9 and remove all the improvements
introduced by the latter. Kee refused which made Jardinico filed
with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Bacolod City a
complaint for ejectment with damages against Kee. Kee, in turn
filed a third-party complaint against Pleasantville Development
Corporation and CTTEI.
The MTCC held that the erroneous delivery was attributable to
CTTEI and the Kee has no rights to Lot 9 because of the
rescission made by CTTEI of their contract due to Kee’s failure to
pay the installment. MTCC also held that Kee must pay
reasonable rental for the use of Lot 9 and furthermore he cannot
claim reimbursement for the improvements introduced by him. On
appeal, the Regional Trial Court held that Pleasantville and CTTEI
were not negligent and that Kee was in bad faith.
Kee appealed directly to the Supreme Court which referred the
matter to the Court of Appeals. The Appellate Court overturned
the ruling of the RTC and held the Kee was a builder in good faith
and the erroneous delivery was attributable to the negligence of
CTTEI. Hence the instant petition filed by Pleasantville.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not, Wilson Kee is a builder in good faith.2.)
Whether or not petitioner is liable for the acts of its agent CTTEI.
HELD: 1.) Petitioner fails to persuade the Court to abandon the
findings and 51
conclusions of the Court of Appeals that Kee was a builder in
good faith. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the
land he is building on is his and his ignorance of any defect or
flaw in his title. And as good faith is presumed, petitioner has the
burden of proving bad faith on the part of Kee. At the time he built
improvements on Lot 8, Kee believed that said lot was what he
bought from petitioner. He was not aware that the lot delivered to
him was not Lot 8. Thus, Kee is in good faith. Petitioner failed to
prove otherwise.
To demonstrate Kee's bad faith, petitioner points to Kee's violation
of paragraphs 22 and 26 of the Contract of Sale on Installment. It
has no merit. Such violations have no bearing whatsoever on
whether Kee was a builder in good faith, that is, on his state of
mind at the time he built the improvements on Lot 9. These
alleged violations may give rise to petitioner's cause of action
against Kee under the said contract (contractual breach), but may
not be the basis to negate the presumption that Kee was a builder
in good faith.
2.) Yes. The rule is that the principal is responsible for the acts of
the agent done within the scope of his authority, and should bear
the damage caused to third persons. On the other hand, the
agent who exceeds his authority is personally liable for the
damage. But CTTEI was acting within its authority as the sole real
estate representative of petitioner when it made the delivery to
Kee, only that in so acting, it was negligent. It is this negligence
that is the basis of petitioner's liability, as principal of CTTEI, per
Articles 1909 and 1910 of the Civil Code. For such negligence,
the petitioner should be held liable for damages. The rights of Kee
and Jardinico vis-a-vis each other, as builder in good faith and
owner in good faith, respectively, are regulated by law (i.e., Arts.
448, 546 and 548 of the Civil Code). It was error for the Court of
Appeals to make a "slight modification" in the application of such
law [by holding petitioner and CTTEI solidarily liable], on the
ground of "equity".
Germiniano v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 120303, July 24,
1996, 259 SCRA 344 Davide, Jr., J.
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari which has its
origins in Civil Case No. 9214 of Branch 3 of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC) in Dagupan City for unlawful detainer and
damages. During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to
confine the issues to: (1) whether there was an implied renewal of
the lease which expired in November 1985; (2) whether the
lessees were builders in good faith and entitled to reimbursement
of the value of the house and improvements; and (3) the value of
the house.
On the first issue, the court held that since the petitioners' mother
was no longer the owner of the lot in question at the time the
lease contract was executed in 1978, in view of its acquisition by
Maria Lee as early as 1972, there was no lease to speak of, much
52
less, a renewal thereof. And even if the lease legally existed, its
implied renewal was not for the period stipulated in the original
contract, but only on a month-to-month basis pursuant to Article
1687 of the Civil Code. The refusal of the petitioners' mother to
accept the rentals starting January 1986 was then a clear
indication of her desire to terminate the monthly lease. As regard
the petitioners' alleged failed promise to sell to the private
respondents the lot occupied by the house, the court held that
such should be litigated in a proper case before the proper forum,
not an ejectment case where the only issue was physical
possession of the property.
The court resolved the second issue in the negative, holding that
Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, which allow possessors in
good faith to recover the value of improvements and retain the
premises until reimbursed, did not apply to lessees like the private
respondents, because the latter knew that their occupation of the
premises would continue only during the life of the lease. Besides,
the rights of the private respondents were specifically governed
by Article 1678, which allow reimbursement of up to one-half of
the value of the useful improvements, or removal of the
improvements should the lessor refuse to reimburse.
On the third issue, the court deemed as conclusive the private
respondents' allegation that the value of the house and
improvements was P180,000.00, there being no controverting
evidence presented.
On appeal by the private respondents, the RTC of Dagupan City
reversed the trial court's decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 448 or Article 1678 of the Civil
Code should apply in the instant case.
HELD: In this case, both parties admit that the land in question
was originally owned by the petitioners' mother. The land was
allegedly acquired later by one Maria Lee by virtue of an
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage. Lee, however, never sought
a writ of possession in order that she gain possession of the
property in question. The petitioners' mother therefore remained
in possession of the lot. It has been said that while the right to let
property is an incident of title and possession, a person may be
lessor and occupy the position of a landlord to the tenant although
he is not the owner of the premises let. There is no need to apply
by analogy the provisions of Article 448 on indemnity as was done
in Pecson vs. Court of Appeals, because the situation sought to
be avoided and which would justify the application of that
provision, is not present in this case. Suffice it to say, "a state of
forced co-ownership" would not be created between the
petitioners and the private respondents. For, as correctly pointed
out by the petitioners, the right of the private respondents as
lessees is governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code which allows
reimbursement to the extent of one-half of the value of the useful
improvements.
It must be stressed, however, that the right to indemnity under
Article 1678 of the Civil Code arises only if the lessor opts to
appropriate the improvements. Since the
53
petitioners refused to exercise that option the private respondents
cannot compel them to reimburse the one-half value of the house
and improvements. Neither can they retain the premises until
reimbursement is made. The private respondents' sole right then
is to remove the improvements without causing any more
impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.
54
Agustin v. Intermediate Appellate CourtG.R. No. 66075-76,
July 5, 1990, 187 SCRA 218 Grino – Aquino, J.
FACTS: The Cagayan River separates the towns of Solana on
the west and Tuguegarao on the east in the province of Cagayan.
In 1919 the lands of the east of the river were covered by the
Tuguegarao Cadastre. In 1925, OCT 5472 was issued for land
east of the Cagayan River owned by Eulogio Agustin. As the
years went by, the Cagayan River moved gradually eastward,
depositing silt on the west bank. The shifting of the river and
siltation continued until 1968. In 1950, all lands west of the river
were included in the Solana Cadastre. Among these occupying
lands covered by Solana Cadastre were Pablo Binayug and Maria
Melad. Through the years, the Cagayan River eroded lands of the
Tuguegarao Cadastre on its eastern bank among which was
Agustin’s Lot 8457, depositing the alluvium as accretion on the
land possessed by Binayug on the western bank. However, 1968,
after a big flood, the Cagayan River changed its course, returned
to its 1919 bed and in the process, cut across the lands of Maria
Melad, Timoteo Melad, and the spouses Pablo Binayug and
Geronima Ubina whose lands were transferred on the eastern, or
Tuguegarao, side of the river. To cultivate those lots they had to
cross the river. In April 1969, while the Melads, Binayug, Urbina
and their tenants were planting corn on their lots located on the
easter side of Cagayan River, Agustin, the heirs of Baldomero
Langcay, Juan Langcay, and Arturo Balisi, accompanied by the
mayor and some policemen of Tuguegarao, claimed the same
lands as their own and drove away the Melads, Binayug and
Urbina from the premises.
ISSUE: Whether or not ownership of accretion is lost upon
sudden and abrupt change of the river.
HELD: No. The ownership of the accretion to the lands was not
lost upon sudden and abrupt change of the course of the river
(Cagayan River in 1968 or 1969 when it reverted to its old 1919
bed), and separated or transferred said accretions to the other
side (eastern bank) of the river. Articles 459 and 463 of the New
Civil Code apply to this situation. Article 459 provides that
“whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent segregates from
an estate on its bank a known portion of land and transfer it to
another estate, the owner of the land to which the segregated
portion belonged retains the ownership of it, provided that he
removes the same within two years.” Article 463 provides that,”
whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches,
leaving a piece of land or part thereof isolated, the owner of the
land retains his ownership. He also retains it if a portion of land is
separated from the estate by the current.”
Cureg v. Intermediate Appellate CourtG.R. No. 73465,
September 7, 1989, 177 SCRA 313 Medialdea, J.
55
FACTS: On November 5, 1982, private respondents Domingo
Apostol et al. filed a complaint for quieting of title against
petitioners Leonida Cureg et al. The complaint alleged that private
respondents, except Apostol, are the legal and/or the forced heirs
of the late Domingo Gerardo, and his predecessors-in-interest
have been in actual, open, peaceful and continuous possession,
under a bona fide claim of ownership of a parcel of land (referred
to as their “motherland”). Subsequently, the heirs verbally sold the
“motherland” to Apostol. The “motherland” showed signs of
accretion caused by the movement of the Cagayan River. When
private respondents were about to cultivate their “motherland”
together with its accretion, they were prevented by the petitioners.
Petitioners alleged that the “motherland” claimed by the private
respondents is non- existent, that the “subject land” is an
accretion to their registered land, and that petitioners have been
in possession and cultivation of the “accretion” for many years
now.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have the better right of
accretion.
HELD: Yes. The petitioners are entitled to the accretion. The
“subject land” is an alluvial deposit left by the northward
movement of the Cagayan River and pursuant to Article 457 of
the New Civil Code: “To the owners of land adjoining the banks of
river belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the
effects of the current of the waters.” However, the increase in the
area of the petitioner’s land, being an accretion left by the change
of course or the northward movement of the Cagayan River does
not automatically become registered land just because the lot
which receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. As
such, it must also be placed under the operation of the Torrens
system.
Viajar v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 77294, December 12, 1988,
168 SCRA 405 Medialdea, J.
FACTS: The spouses Ricardo and Leonor Ladrido were the
owners of Lot 7511. Spouses Rosendo and Ana Te were also the
registered owners of a parcel of land described in their title as Lot
7340 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan. On 6 September 1973,
Rosendo Te, with the conformity of his wife, sold this lot to
Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar for P5,000. A Torrens title
was later issued in the latter’s names. Later, Angelica Viajar had
Lot 7340 relocated and found out that the property was in the
possession of Ricardo Y. Ladrido. Consequently, she demanded
its return but Ladrido refused. The piece of real property which
used to be Lot 7340 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan was
located in barangay Guibuanogan, Pototan, Iloilo; that at the time
of the cadastral survey in 1926, Lot 7511 and Lot 7340 were
separated by the Suague River; that Lot 7340 has been in the
possession of Ladrido; that the area of 14,036 sq.ms., which was
formerly the river bed of the Suague River per cadastral survey of
1926, has also been in the possession of Ladrido; and that the
Viajars have never been in actual
56
physical possession of Lot 7340. On 15 February 1974, Angelica
and Celso Viajar instituted a civil action for recovery of
possession and damages against Ricardo Y. Ladrido. The trial
court rendered its decision in favor of Ladrido, dismissing the
complaint of Angelica and Celso Viajar with costs against them,
declaring the Ladridos are entitled to the possession thereof. Not
satisfied with the decision, the Viajars appealed to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the court.
The Viajars filed a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the respondents are entitled to the land on the
ground of accretion.
HELD: Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides that “to the
owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters." The presumption is that the change in the course of the
river was gradual and caused by accretion and erosion. In the
present case, the lower court correctly found that the evidence
introduced by the Viajars to show that the change in the course of
the Suague River was sudden or that it occurred through avulsion
is not clear and convincing. The Ladridos have sufficiently
established that for many years after 1926 a gradual accretion on
the eastern side of Lot 7511 took place by action of the current of
the Suague River so that in 1979 an alluvial deposit of 29,912
sq.ms. more or less, had been added to Lot 7511. The
established facts indicate that the eastern boundary of Lot 7511
was the Suague River based on the cadastral plan. For a period
of more than 40 years (before 1940 to 1980) the Suague River
overflowed its banks yearly and the property of the defendant
gradually received deposits of soil from the effects of the current
of the river. The consequent increase in the area of Lot 7511 due
to alluvion or accretion was possessed by the defendants whose
tenants plowed and planted the same with corn and tobacco. The
quondam river bed had been filled by accretion through the years.
The land is already plain and there is no indication on the ground
of any abandoned river bed. Under the law, accretion which the
banks or rivers may gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters becomes the property of the owners of the
lands adjoining the banks. Therefore, the accretion to Lot 7511
which consists of Lots A and B belong to the Ladridos.
Vda. De Nazareno v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 98045, June
26, 1996, 257 SCRA 589 Romeo, J.
FACTS: The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land formed
as a result of sawdust dumped into the dried-up Balacanas Creek
and along the banks of the Cagayan river. Private respondents
Salasalan and Rabaya leased the subject lots on which their
houses stood from Antonio Nazareno, petitioners’ predessor-in-
interest. Private respondents allegedly stopped paying rentals. As
a result, Nazareno and petitioners filed a case for ejectment with
the MTC of Cagayan de Oro City. The MTC rendered a decision
against private respondents which was affirmed by the RTC. After
several petitions for annulmentof judgment by private respondents
which were all dismissed, the
57
decision of the lower court was finally enforced with the private
respondents being ejected from portions of the subject lots they
occupied. Before Nazareno died, he caused the approval by the
Bureau of lands of the survey plan with a view to perfecting his
title over the accretion area being claimed by him. The said
petition was protested by private respondents. After conducting a
survey of the subject land, land investigator Avelino labis
recommended that the survey plan be cancelled and that private
respondents be directed to file appropriate public land application
covering their respective portions. Nazareno filed a motion for
reconsideration with the Undersecretary of the Department of
Natural Resources and OIC of the Bureau of lands Ignacio who
denied the Motion. Respondent Director of lands Abelardo Palad
ordered Nazareno to vacate the portions adjudicated to private
respondents and remove whatever improvements they have
introduced; he also ordered that private respondents be placed in
possession thereof. A petitioner filed a case for annulment of the
previous decisions with the RTC but was dismissed. The CA
affirmed the RTC decision contending that the approved of the
survey plan belongs exclusively to the Director of lands and the
same shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners can claim ownership of the
subject land by virtue of Art 457 of the Civil Code.
HELD: No, accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Art
457 of the NCC requires the concurrence of the requisites
mentioned in the Article. These are called rules on alluvion, which
if present in a case, give to the owners of lands adjoining the
banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually received from
the effects of the current of waters. The word “current” indicates
the participation of the body of water in the flow of waters due to
high and low tide. Petitioners, however, admit that the accretion
was formed by the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling
materials on portions of the Balacanas creek and the Cagayan
River. The Bureau of lands classified the subject land as an
accretion area which was formed by deposits of sawdust.
Petitioner’s submission not having met the first and second
requirements of the rules of alluvion, they cannot claim the rights
of a riparian owner. The subject being public land is under the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of lands, respondent Palad is authorized
to exercise executive control over any form of concession,
disposition and management of the lands of public dominion.
Heirs of Navarro v. Intermediate Appellate Court G.R. No.
68166, February 12, 1997, 268 SCRA 589 Hermosisima, J:
FACTS: On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual, filed an
application for foreshore lease covering a tract of foreshore land
in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, having an area of approximately
seventeen (17) hectares. Subsequently, petitioners' predecessor-
in- interest, Emiliano Navarro, filed a fishpond application with the
Bureau of Fisheries
58
covering twenty five (25) hectares of foreshore land also in
Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Initially, such application was denied
by the Director of Fisheries on the ground that the property
formed part of the public domain.
Sometime in the early part of 1960, Sinforoso Pascual flied an
application to register and confirm his title to a parcel of land,
situated in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, described in Plan Psu-
175181 and said to have an area of 146,611 square meters.
Pascual claimed that this land is an accretion to his property,
situated in Barrio Puerto Rivas, Balanga, Bataan, and covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 6830. It is bounded on the eastern
side by the Talisay River, on the western side by the Bulacan
River, and on the northern side by the Manila Bay. The Talisay
River as well as the Bulacan River flow downstream and meet at
the Manila Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on Pascual's
property resulting in an accretion thereon. Sinforoso Pascual
claimed the accretion as the riparian owner.
On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands, represented by the
Assistant Solicitor General, filed an opposition thereto stating that
neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in- interest possessed
sufficient title to the subject property, the same being a portion of
the public domain and, therefore, it belongs to the Republic of the
Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not the land sought to be registered is
accretion or foreshore land, or, whether or not said land was
formed by the action of the two rivers of Talisay and Bulacan or by
the action of the Manila Bay.
HELD: Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said
Article 457, requires the concurrence of the following requisites:
(1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of
the river; and (3) that the land where the accretion takes place is
adjacent to the bank of the river. If the accretion were to be
attributed to the action of either or both of the Talisay and Bulacan
Rivers, the alluvium should have been deposited on either or both
of the eastern and western boundaries of petitioners' own tract of
land, not on the northern portion thereof which is adjacent to the
Manila Bay. Clearly lacking, thus, is the third requisite of
accretion, which is, that the alluvium is deposited on the portion of
claimant's land which is adjacent to the river bank.
The disputed land, thus, is an accretion not on a river bank but on
a sea bank, or on what used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay
which adjoined petitioners' own tract of land on the northern side.
Applicant Pascual has not presented proofs to convince the Court
that the land he has applied for registration is the result of the
settling down on his registered land of soil, earth or other deposits
so as to be rightfully be considered as an accretion [caused by
the action of the two rivers]. Article 457 finds no applicability
where the accretion must have been caused by action of the bay.
The conclusion formed by the trial court on the basis of the
aforegoing observation is that the disputed land is part of the
foreshore of Manila Bay and therefore, part of the public domain.
Thus, the disputed property is an accretion on a sea bank, Manila
Bay
59
being an inlet or an arm of the sea; as such, the disputed property
is, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, part of
the public domain.
60
Del Banco v. Intermediate Appellate CourtG.R. No. 72694,
December 1, 1987, 156 SCRA 55 Paras, J.
FACTS: In a document executed in the Municipality of San
Rafael, Bulacan, on February 11, 1859, three brothers, Benedicto
Pansacola, Jose Pansacola and Manuel Pansacola (known as Fr.
Manuel Pena) entered into an agreement which provided, among
others: (1) That they will purchase from the Spanish Government
the lands comprising the Island of Cagbalite which is located
within the boundaries of the Municipality of Mauban, Province of
Tayabas (now Quezon) and has an approximate area of 1,600
hectares; (2) That the lands shall be considered after the
purchase as their common property; (3) That the co-ownership
includes Domingo Arce and Baldomera Angulo, minors at that
time represented by their father, Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel
Pena) who will contribute for them in the proposed purchase of
the Cagbalite Island; (4) That whatever benefits may be derived
from the Island shall be shared equally by the co-owners in the
following proportion: Benedicto Pansacola-1/4 share; Jose
Pansacola-1/4 share; and, Domingo Arce and Baldomera Angulo-
2/4 shares which shall be placed under the care of their father,
Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena). On August 14, 1866, co-
owners entered into the actual possession and enjoyment of the
Island purchased by them from the Spanish Government. On April
11, 1868 they agreed to modify the terms and conditions of the
agreement entered into by them on February 11, 1859.
About one hundred years later, on November 18, 1968, private
respondents brought a special action for partition in the Court of
First Instance of Quezon, under the provisions of Rule 69 of the
Rules of Court, including as parties the heirs and successors-in-
interest of the co-owners of the Cagbalite Island in the second
contract of co-ownership dated April 11, 1968. In their answer
some of the defendants, petitioners herein, interposed such
defenses as prescription, res judicata, exclusive ownership,
estoppel and laches.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision dated
November 6, 1981 dismissing the complaint. The motion for
reconsideration filed by the plaintiffs, private respondents herein,
was denied by the trial court in an order dated February 25, 1982.
On appeal, respondent Court reversed and set aside the decision
of the lower court .It also denied the motion for reconsideration
and the supplement to motion for reconsideration filed by private
respondents, in its resolution dated October 15, 1983.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not Cagbalite Island is still undivided property
owned in common by the heirs and successors-in-interest of the
brothers, Benedicto, Jose and Manuel Pansacola.2.) Whether or
not a prescription may run in favor of a co-owner against his co-
owners or co-heirs.
61
HELD: 1.) On the first issue, there is nothing in all four
agreements that suggests that actual or physical partition of the
Island had really been made by either the original owners or their
heirs or successors-in-interest. The agreement entered into in
1859 simply provides for the sharing of whatever benefits can be
derived from the island. The agreement, in fact, states that the
Island to be purchased shall be considered as their common
property. In the second agreement entered in 1868 the co-owners
agreed not only on the sharing proportion of the benefits derived
from the Island but also on the distribution of the Island each of
the brothers was allocated a 1/4 portion of the Island with the
children of the deceased brother, Eustaquio Pansacola allocated
a 1/4 portion and the children of Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel
Pena) also allocated a 1/4 portion of the Island. With the
distribution agreed upon each of the co-owner is a co-owner of
the whole, and in this sense, over the whole he exercises the right
of dominion, but he is at the same time the sole owner of a
portion, in the instant case, a 1/4 portion (for each group of co-
owners) of the Island which is truly abstract, because until
physical division is effected such portion is merely an Ideal share,
not concretely determined (3 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 3rd Ed.,
page 486, cited in Lopez vs. Cuaycong, 74 Phil. 601; De la Cruz
vs. Cruz, 32 SCRA 307 [1970]; Felices vs. Colegado, 35 SCRA
173 [1970],; Dultra vs. CFl 70 SCRA 465 [1976]; Gatchalian vs.
Arlegui, 75 SCRA 234 [1977].)
In the agreement of January 20, 1907, the heirs that were
represented agreed on how the Island was to be partitioned. The
agreement of April 18, 1908 which supplements that of January
20, 1907 reveals that as of the signing of the 1908 agreement no
actual partition of the Island had as yet been done. The second
and fourth paragraphs of the agreement speaks of a survey yet to
be conducted by a certain Amadeo and a plan and description yet
to be made. Virgilio Pansacola, a son of the surveyor named
Amadeo who is referred to in the contract dated April 18, 1908 as
the surveyor to whom the task of surveying Cagbalite Island
pursuant to said agreement was entrusted, however, testified that
said contracts were never implemented because nobody defrayed
the expenses for surveying the same.
It is not enough that the co-owners agree to subdivide the
property. They must have a subdivision plan drawn in accordance
with which they take actual and exclusive possession of their
respective portions in the plan and titles issued to each of them
accordingly (Caro vs. Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 10 [1982]).
The mechanics of actual partition should follow the procedure laid
down in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. Maganon vs. Montejo, 146
SCRA 282 [1986]).
Neither can such actual possession and enjoyment of some
portions of the Island by some of the petitioners herein be
considered a repudiation of the co-ownership. It is undisputed that
the Cagbalite Island was purchased by the original co-owners as
a common property and it has not been proven that the Island had
been partitioned among them or among their heirs. While there is
co-ownership, a co-owner's possession of his share is co-
possession which is linked to the possession of the other co-
owners (Gatchalian vs. Arlegui, 75 SCRA 234 [1977]).
62
2.) On the second issue, no prescription shall run in favor of a co-
owner against his co- owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly
or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership (Valdez vs. Olonga, 51
SCRA 71 [1973], Tero vs. Tero, 131 SCRA 100 [1984]). Co-
owners cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-
owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership clearly
communicated to the other co-owners. An action for partition does
not prescribe. Article 403 of the Old Civil Code, now Article 497,
provides that the assignees of the co-owners may take part in the
partition of the common property, and Article 400 of the Old Code,
now Article 494 provides that each co-owner may demand at any
time the partition of the common property, a provision which
implies that the action to demand partition is imprescriptible or
cannot be barred by laches (Budlong vs. Pondoc, 79 SCRA 24
[1977]). An action for partition does not lie except when the co-
ownership is properly repudiated by the co- owner.
63
Pardell v. BartolomeG.R. No. L-4656, November 18, 1912, 23
Phil. 450 Torres, J.
FACTS: Plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz and defendant Matilde Ortiz are the
duly recognized natural daughters of the spouses Miguel and
Calixta who died in Vigan, Ilocos Sur. Prior to the death of their
mother, she executed a will whereby Matilde and Vicenta became
the heirs of all her property. Subsequently, defendants, without
judicial authorization or extrajudicial agreement took over the
administration and enjoyment of the properties as well as
collection of the rents, fruits and products thereof. Moreover,
Matilde and her husband occupied the upper storey of the house
and the room of the lower floor as an office. With this, Vicenta
demanded that she be given rental payments by Matilde in
occupying the house since she is a co-owner of the property not
occupying the same and as such is entitled to its enjoyment
and/or fruits.
ISSUE: Whether or not Vicenta can collect rentals from Matilde
who occupies and enjoy the property alone as a co-owner.
HELD: No. The law grants each co-owner the right to use the
property for the purpose intended provided that the interest of the
co-ownership must not be injured or prejudiced and the other co-
owners must not be prevented from using it according to their
rights.
Matilde occupied the property owned in common in accordance
with the purpose for which it is intended. Records show no proof
that she neither occasioned any detriment to the interest of the
community property nor prevented her sister from utilizing the
said property in accordance to her right as a co-owner thereof.
Matilde was excercising her right as a co-owner without being
prejudicial to Vicenta who could have also occupied her property
had she wanted to.
Each co-owner of a property has the right pro-indiviso over the
whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other
limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-
owners, for the reason that until a division is made, the respective
part of each holder of a right as a co-owner cannot be determined
and every co-owner exercises joint ownership over the pro-
indiviso property in addition to his use and enjoyment of the
same.
64
Caro v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. L-46001, March 25, 1982,
113 SCRA 10 Guerrero, J.
FACTS: Alfredo Benito, Mario Benito and Benjamin Benito were
the original co-owners of two parcels of land somewhere in
Sorsogon. Sometime in 1957, Mario died. His wife, Basilia
Lahorra and his father, Saturnino Benito, were subsequently
appointed as joint administrators of Mario’s estate by the CFI of
Sorsogon.
On August 26, 1959, Benjamin executed a deed of absolute sale
of his one-third undivided portion over said parcels of land in favor
of herein petitioner, Luz Caro for the sum of 10,000.
Subsequently, with the consent of Saturnino Benito and Alfredo
Benito as shown in their affidavits, a subdivision title was issued
to petitioner Luz Caro over the lot.
Sometime in May 1966, when private respondent Basilia Lahorra
learned from a pleading sent to her that petitioner Luz Caro
acquired from Benjamin Benito the aforesaid one-third of the
undivided share of the subject lands. She sent to petitioner thru
counsel, a written offer to redeem the said one-third share.
However, this offer was ignored by the petitioner. Hence, private
respondent Basilia Lahorra filed a case for legal redemption and
sought to prove that as joint administrator of the estate of Mario
Benito, she had not been notified of the sale as required by
articles 1620 and 1623 of the Civil Code.
During the hearing of the case, petitioner presented the following
secondary evidence to prove the service of notice of the intended
sale to possible redemptioners: (1) affidavit of Benjamin Benito
attesting to the fact that the possible redemptioners were formally
notified in writing of his intention to sell his undivided share; (2)
deposition of Saturnino’s widow that she received and showed the
notice to husband but the latter was not interested to buy the
property.
The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner. However, the
decision was reversed by the CA. Hence, the case was brought to
the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not co-ownership on the lots in question still
exist thereby allowing private respondent Basilia Lahorra to
exercise the right of legal redemption.
HELD: The court held that as early as 1960, co-ownership of the
parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. T-609 and T-610 was
terminated when Alfredo Benito, Luz Caro and the intestate estate
of Mario Benito, represented by administrators Saturnino Benito,
as trustee and representative of the heirs of Mario Benito, agreed
to subdivide the property. It added that an “agreement of partition,
though oral, is valid and consequently binding upon the parties.”
65
A partition for subdivision was then filed for the purpose. This was
accompanied by the affidavits of Alfredo Benito and Saturnino
Benito to the effect that they agree to the segregation of the land
owned in common by the three amigos. A subdivision plan was
made and by common agreement Lot 1-C, with an area of 163
hectares, was ceded to petitioner, to wit, TCT no. T-4978.
In addition, notwithstanding the ruling in the Caram case wherein
the sale of the property took place after the partition agreement,
the court therein saw no difference with respect to a conveyance
which took place before the partition agreement.
Regarding the contention of private respondent that she was not
notified of the sale, the court ruled that since the right of legal
redemption does not exist nor apply in this case because
admittedly a subdivision title has already been issued in the name
of the petitioner on Lot 1-C sold to her, it becomes moot and
academic. It becomes unnecessary to decide whether private
respondent complied with the requirements for the exercise of
legal redemption under Article 1623 of the New Civil Code.
Bailon – Casilao v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 78178, April 15,
1988, 160 SCRA 738 Cortes, J.
FACTS: The Roman Catholic Archbishop [sic] of Manila was the
owner of a parcel of land (Lot No. 1272, Balanga Cadastre)
situated in the Barrio of Puerto Rivas, Municipality of Balanga,
Bataan, having an area of 3,368 sq. m., more or less covered by
OCT No. 14379 of de Registry of Deeds for the province of
Bataan. With respect to its rights over its properties in Bataan
(inclusive of Lot No. 1272), the said church was succeeded by the
Roman Catholic Bishop of San Fernando, Pampanga which was,
likewise, succeeded by Catholic Bishop of Balanga — registered
as a corporation on 15 December 1975.Prior thereto, or on 23
August 1936, by virtue of the authority given him by the Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila to donate a portion of Lot No. 1272,
the then parish priest and administrator of all the properties of the
said church in the Municipality of Balanga Bataan, Rev. Fr.
Mariano Sarili, executed an Escritura De Donacion donating an
area of 12.40 meters by 21.40 meters or 265.36 sq. m (the
subject property) of Lot No. 1272 to Ana de los Reyes and her
heirs, as a reward for her long and satisfactory service to the
church. Her acceptance of the donation, as well as her
possession of the subject property, is indicated in the deed of
donation, which deed, for unknown reasons, was refused
registration by the Register of Deeds. Six (6) years later, or in
1939, Ana de los Reyes died without issue. Nevertheless, before
her death, she had given the subject property to her nephew who
had been living with her, the herein defendant-appellant [private
respondent]. The latter immediately took possession of the
property in the concept of owner, built his house thereon and,
through the years, declared the land for taxation purposes as well
as paid the taxes due thereon. His possession of the subject
property was never disturbed by anybody until plaintiff-
66
appellee [petitioner] filed the instant complaint against him on 5
November 1985, or more than 49 years after the deed of donation
was executed.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is barred to recover the property
by the doctrine of laches.
HELD: Yes. Laches means the failure or neglect for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier;
it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned or declined to assert it. It has also been
defined as such neglect or omission to assert a right taken in
conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances
causing prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in
equity. The following are the essential elements of laches: (1)
Conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he
claims, giving rise to the situation complained of; (2) Delay in
asserting complainant's right after he had knowledge of the
defendant's conduct and after he has an opportunity to sue; (3)
Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the
complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit;
and (4) Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is
accorded to the complainant. 32 Under the present circumstances,
all of the aforegoing elements are attendant in this case.
Finally, we agree with the respondent Court of Appeals that, while
petitioner is admittedly still the registered owner of the donated
property, and jurisprudence is settled as to the imprescriptibility
and indefeasibility of a Torrens Title, there is equally an
abundance of cases in the annals of our jurisprudence where we
categorically ruled that a registered landowner may lose his right
to recover the possession of his registered property by reason of
laches.
Roque v. Intermediate Appellate CourtG.R. No. L-75886,
August 30, 1988, 165 SCRA 118 Feliciano, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Concepcion Roque, on 6 December 1977, filed
a Complaint for "Partition with Specific Performance" (docketed
as Civil Case No. 5236-M) with Branch 2 of the then Court of First
Instance of Malolos against respondents Emesto Roque and the
heirs of Victor Roque. In her complaint, petitioner (plaintiff below)
claimed legal ownership of an undivided three-fourths (3/4)
portion of Lot No. 1549, by virtue of the 27 November 1961
"Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan" executed in her favor by Emesto
Roque and Victor Roque.
In support of this claim, petitioner also presented an undated and
unnotarized "Kasulatang Pagkilala sa Bilihan Patuluyan ng
Bahagui at Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman at Paghahati-hati
at Abuyan ng Bahagui" said to have been signed by the
respondents in acknowledgment of the existence and validity of
the Bilihan in favor of
67
petitioner. Finally, petitioner alleged that, as a co-owner of Lot No.
1549, she had a right to seek partition of the property, that she
could not be compelled to remain in the co- ownership of the
same. Respondents Ernesto Roque and the legal heirs of Victor
Roque, however, refused to acknowledge petitioner's claim of
ownership of any portion of Lot No. 1549 and rejected the plan to
divide the land.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can be compelled to remain in
the co-ownership.
HELD: No. Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that "no co-
owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership" and that
"each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing
owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned." The facts
on record clearly show that petitioner Concepcion Roque had
been in actual, open and continuous possession of a three-fourths
(3/4) portion of Lot No. 1549 ever since execution of the "Bilihan
Lubos at Patuluyan" in November of 1961. The Court notes that it
was only in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim filed with
the trial court in December of 1977 — more than sixteen (16)
years later — that respondents first questioned the genuineness
and authenticity of the "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan." Not once
during those sixteen (16) years did respondents contest
petitioner's occupation of a three-fourths (3/4) portion of Lot No.
1549.
Furthermore, if indeed it is true that respondents, as they claim,
are the absolute owners of the whole of Lot No. 1549, it is most
unusual that respondents would have allowed or tolerated such
prolonged occupation by petitioner of a major portion (3/4) of the
land while they, upon the other hand, contented themselves with
occupation of only a fourth thereof. This latter circumstance,
coupled with the passage of a very substantial length of time
during which petitioner all the while remained undisturbed and
uninterrupted in her occupation and possession, places
respondents here in laches: respondents may no longer dispute
the existence of the co-ownership between petitioner and
themselves nor the validity of petitioner's claim of a threefourths
(3/4) interest in Lot No. 1549, as they are deemed, by their
unreasonably long inaction, to have acquiesced in the co-
ownership.
Delima v. Court of AppealsG. R. No. L-46296, September 24,
1991, 201 SCRA 641 Medialdea J.
FACTS: Lino Delima acquired a lot from the friar lands. Later, he
died, leaving as his only heirs three brothers and sisters namely:
Eulalio Delima, Juanita Delima, Galileo Delima and Vicente
Delima. Galileo was the caretaker of the property. He was able to
execute an affidavit adjusting to himself the parcel of land and
was able to secure the issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title in
his name. This prompted the heirs of his siblings to file a action
for reconveyance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property is subject to prescription.
68
HELD: Yes. From the moment one of the co-owners claims that
he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the properties and
denies the others any share therein, the question involved is no
longer one of partition but of ownership. In such case, the
imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be
invoked or applied when one of the co-owners has adversely
possessed the property as exclusive owner for a period sufficient
to vest ownership by prescription. It is settled that possession by
the co-owner or co-heir is that of a trutee. In order that such
possession is considered adverse to the cestui que trust
amounting to a repudiation of the co-ownership, the following
elements must concur: 1) that the trustee has performed
unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of cestui que trust; 2)
that such positive acts of repudiation had been made known to
the cestui que trust; and 3) that the evidence thereon should be
clear and conclusive.
When the co-owner of the property executed a deed of partition
and on the strength thereof, obtained a cancellation of the title in
the name of their predecessor and the issuance of a new title in
his name as the owner, the statute of limitations started to run for
the purposes of the action instituted by the latter seeking a
declaration of the existence of the co-ownership and their rights
thereafter. The issuance of a new title constituted a clear act of
repudiation of the trust and co-ownership.
Aguilar v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 76351, October 29, 1993,
227 SCRA 472 Bellosillo, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Virgilio and respondent Senen are brothers,
and were among the seven (7) children of the late Maximiano
Aguilar. In 1969, the two brothers purchased a house and lot in
Parañaque where their father could spend and enjoy his
remaining years in a peaceful neighborhood. Initially, the brothers
agreed that Virgilio's share in the co-ownership was two-thirds
while that of Senen was one-third. By virtue of a written
memorandum, Virgilio and Senen agreed that henceforth their
interests in the house and lot should be equal, with Senen
assuming the remaining mortgage obligation of the original
owners with the SSS in exchange for his possession and
enjoyment of the house together with their father. Since Virgilio
was then disqualified from obtaining a loan from SSS, the
brothers agreed that the deed of sale would be executed and the
title registered in the meantime in the name of Senen. It was
further agreed that Senen would take care of their father and his
needs since Virgilio and his family were staying in Cebu.
After Maximiano Aguilar died in 1974, petitioner demanded from
private respondent that the latter vacate the house and that the
property be sold and proceeds thereof divided among them.
Because of the refusal of respondent to give in to petitioner's
demands, the latter filed an action to compel the sale of the house
and lot so that the they could divide the proceeds between them.
In his complaint, petitioner prayed that the proceeds of the sale,
be divided on the basis of two-thirds (2/3) in his favor and one-
third (1/3) to
69
respondent. Petitioner also prayed for monthly rentals for the use
of the house by respondent after their father died. In his answer
with counterclaim, respondent alleged that he had no objection to
the sale as long as the best selling price could be obtained; that if
the sale would be effected, the proceeds thereof should be
divided equally; and, that being a co-owner, he was entitled to the
use and enjoyment of the property. Rendering judgment by
default against defendant, for failure to appear at pre- trial, the
trial court found him and plaintiff to be co-owners of the house
and lot, in equal shares on the basis of their written agreement.
However, it ruled that plaintiff has been deprived of his
participation in the property by defendant's continued enjoyment
of the house and lot, free of rent, despite demands for rentals and
continued maneuvers of defendants, to delay partition. The trial
court also upheld the right of plaintiff as co-owner to demand
partition. Since plaintiff could not agree to the amount offered by
defendant for the former's share, the trial court held that this
property should be sold to a third person and the proceeds
divided equally between the parties. The CA set aside the order of
the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner may demand partition of the
property.
HELD: Yes. We uphold the trial court in ruling in favor of
petitioner, except as to the effectivity of the payment of monthly
rentals by respondent as co-owner which we here declare to
commence only after the trial court ordered respondent to vacate
in accordance with its order. Article 494 of the Civil Code provides
that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership,
and that each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the
thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned.
Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code states that whenever
the thing is essentially, indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree
that it be, allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it
shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly distributed. This is
resorted to (1) when the right to partition the property is invoked
by any of the co-owners but because of the nature of the property
it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the
interests of the co-owners, and (b) the co-owners are not in
agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or assigned
the entire property upon proper reimbursement of the co-owners.
However, being a co-owner respondent has the right to use the
house and lot without paying any compensation to petitioner, as
he may use the property owned in common long as it is in
accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in a
manner not injurious to the interest of the other co-owners. 9
Each co-owner of property held pro indiviso exercises his rights
over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no
other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-
owners, the reason being that until a division is made, the
respective share of each cannot be determined and every co-
owner exercises, together with his co-participants joint ownership
over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and
enjoyment of the same.
Since petitioner has decided to enforce his right in court to end
the co-ownership of the house and lot and respondent has not
refuted the allegation that he has been preventing the sale of the
property by his continued occupancy of the premises, justice and
equity demand that respondent and his family vacate the property
so that the sale
70
can be effected immediately. In fairness to petitioner, respondent
should pay a rental of P1,200.00 per month, with legal interest;
from the time the trial court ordered him to vacate, for the use and
enjoyment of the other half of the property appertaining to
petitioner. When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the
property and the trial court granted the petition and ordered the
ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership was deemed
terminated and the right to enjoy the possession jointly also
ceased. Thereafter, the continued stay of respondent and his
family in the house prejudiced the interest of petitioner as the
property should have been sold and the proceeds divided equally
between them. To this extent and from then on, respondent
should be held liable for monthly rentals until he and his family
vacate.
Tomas Claudio Memorial College v. Court of Appeals G.R. No.
124262, October 12, 1999, 316 SCRA 502 Quisimbing, J.
FACTS: Juan De Castro died intestate in 1993 leaving a parcel of
land located in Morong, Rizal to his heirs. Mariano De Castro one
of the heirs sold the said lot to petitioner Tomas Claudio Memorial
College by representing that he is the sole owner of the property.
The other heirs filed an action for partition before the Regional
Trial Court of Rizal alleging that the sale made by Mariano
affected only his undivided share of the lot but not the shares of
the other co-owners. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the
partition for the reason that it has already been barred by
prescription.
The Regional Trial Court of Rizal dismissed the petitioner’s
motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the sale affected only the undivided share of
Mariano 2.) Whether or not the action to file for partition has
already prescribed.
HELD: 1.) Yes. The Court has consistently ruled that even if a co-
owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his
own share but not those of the other co- owners who did not
consent to the sale. The sale of the whole property by a co-owner
does not make the sale null and void but it only transfers the
rights to the undivided share of the co-owner who made the sale.
The proper action in a case like this is not nullification nor
recovery but a division or partition of the entire property.
2.) No. As to the issue on prescription, the Civil Code provides
that no prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co-heirs as
long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
Robles v. Court of Appeals
71
GR. No. 123509, March 14, 2000, 328 SCRA 97 Panganiban, J.
FACTS: Leon Robles originally owned the land which was
inherited by his son Silvino Robles. The latter then took
possession of the land and declared it in his name for taxation
purposes. Upon his death, the same was inherited by his widow
Maria dela Cruz and his children. The plaintiffs entrusted the
payment of the land taxes to their co- heir and half-brother, Hilario
Tobles. For unknown reasons, the tax declaration of the parcel of
land in the name of Silvino Robles was cancelled and transferred
to one Exequiel Ballena, father of Andres Robles who is the wife
of the defendant Hilario Robles. He secured a loan from the
Cardona Rural Bank, Inc. which was foreclosed for failure to pay
the mortgage debt wherein the defendant bank emerged as the
highest bidder during the auction sale. Defendant Rural Bank sold
the same to the Spouses Santos. A n action for quieting of title
was filed by respondent Santos. The plaintiffs alleged that they
had been in possession of the land since 1942 and it was only in
1987 that they knew about the foreclosure of the mortgage. The
Court of Appeals ruled that because of the plaintiff’s inaction for
more than 20 years, prescription had already set in.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action has prescribed in favour of
Hilario Robles.
HELD: Yes. Hilario effected no clear and evident repudiation of
the co-ownership. It is a fundamental principle that a co-owner
cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners,
absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the
title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites
must concur: (1) the co- owner has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2)
such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the
other co-owner; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and
convincing. In the present case, Hilario did not have possession
of the subject property; neither did he exclude the petitioners from
the use and the enjoyment thereof, as they had indisputably
shared in its fruits. Likewise, his act of entering into a mortgage
contract with the bank cannot be construed to be a repudiation of
the co-ownership. As absolute owner of his undivided interest in
the land, he had the right to alienate his share, as he in fact did.
Neither should his payment of land taxes in his name, as agreed
upon by the co-owners, be construed as a repudiation of the co-
ownership. The assertion that the declaration of ownership was
tantamount to repudiation was belied by the continued occupation
and possession of the disputed property by the petitioners as
owners.
Galvez vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 157954, March 24, 2006
Chico – Nazario, J.
FACTS: Timotea F. Galvez died intestate and left a parcel of land
in La Union. She left behind her children Ulpiano and petitioner
Paz Galvez. Ulpiano who died before Timotea was survived by his
son, private respondent, Porfirio Galvez. With regards to
72
the property of Timotea, it is supposed to pass to Paz and Porfirio.
However, Porifirio was surprised to discover that Paz executed an
affidavit of adjudication stating that she is the true and lawful
owner of the said property. Moreover, without the knowledge and
consent of Porfirio, Paz sold the property to petitioner Carlos Tam
for P10,000.00. Tam thereafter filed an application for registration
for said parcel of land. Subsequently, Tam sold the property to
Tycoon Properties, Inc. Having knowledge of such sale, Porfirio
filed a complaint for Legal Redemption with Damages and
Cancellation of documents against petitioner which was affirmed
by the lower court and the Court of Appeals.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the claim of Porfirio Galvez which is based on
an implied trust has already prescribed because the action was
filed 24 years after Paz Galvez repudiated the said trust?2.)
Whether or not the claim of Porfirio Galvez which is based on an
implied trust is already banned by laches because he failed to
assert his alleged right for almost 24 years?
3.) Whether or not Carlos Tam and Tycoon Properties are buyers
in good faith and for value and has the right to rely on the face of
the title?
HELD: 1.) No. Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that "a
prescription shall not run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against
his co-owners or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership." It is a fundamental principle that a
co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-
owners, absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership.
Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co- ownership,
must have been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership).
The act of repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1)
a co-owner repudiates the co- ownership; (2) such an act of
repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the
evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in
possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of the property for the period required by law. In this
case, we find that Paz Galvez effected no clear and evident
repudiation of the co-ownership. The execution of the affidavit of
self- adjudication does not constitute such sufficient act of
repudiation as contemplated under the law as to effectively
exclude Porfirio Galvez from the property. This Court has
repeatedly expressed its disapproval over the obvious bad faith of
a co-heir feigning sole ownership of the property to the exclusion
of the other heirs essentially stating that one who acts in bad faith
should not be permitted to profit from it to the detriment of others.
2.) No. On the matter of laches, it is hornbook doctrine that laches
is a creation of equity and its application is controlled by equitable
considerations. Laches cannot be used to defeat justice or
perpetrate fraud and injustice. Neither should its application be
used to prevent the rightful owners of a property from recovering
what has been fraudulently registered in the name of another. The
equitable remedy of laches is, therefore, unavailing in this case.
73
3.) No. As to petitioners Carlos Tam and Tycoon Properties, Inc.’s
claim that they are buyers in good faith, same fails to persuade. A
purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the
property without notice that some other person has a right to or
interest in such property and pays its fair price before he has
notice of the adverse claims and interest of another person in the
same property. So it is that the "honesty of intention" which
constitutes good faith implies a freedom from knowledge of
circumstances which ought to put a person on inquiry. "Tam did
not exert efforts to determine the previous ownership of the
property in question" and relied only on the tax declarations in the
name of Paz Galvez. It must be noted that Carlos Tam received a
copy of the summons and the complaint on 22 September 1994.
This notwithstanding, he sold the property to Tycoon Properties,
Inc. on 27 September 1994. Significantly, Carlos Tam is also an
owner of Tycoon Properties, Inc. to the extent of 45%. A notice of
lis pendens dated 8 July 1997 filed with the Registry of Deeds of
the Province of La Union was inscribed on TCT No. T- 40390.
Despite the inscription, Tycoon Properties, Inc. mortgaged the
land to Far East Bank and Trust Company for the sum of
P11,172,600. All these attendant circumstances negate
petitioners’ claim of good faith.
Adille vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No. L-45546, January 29, 1988
Sarmiento, J.
FACTS: Felisa Alzul, who owned a parcel of lot in Albay was
married twice. The first was with Bernabe Adille whom she had an
only child, herein petitioner Rustico Adille. The second was with
Procopio Asejo whom she had three children, herein the private
respondents. It was alleged that Felisa sold the property in pacto
de retro to certain 3rd persons, for a period of repurchase being 3
years. However, she died without being able to redeem the lot.
After her death but during the period of redemption, petitioner
Rustico repurchased, by himself alone the said lot. Afterwards, he
executed a deed of extra- judicial partition by himself. Efforts to
compromise were made but failed. Thus, his half- brothers and
sisters, private respondents filed a present case of partition with
accounting on the position that he was only a trustee on an
implied trust when he redeemed the lot. Moreover, it turned out
that one of the private respondents, Emeteria Asejo was
occupying a portion. The lower court was in favor of the petitioner;
however, it was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not a co-owner can acquire an exclusive
ownership over the property held in common.2.) Whether or not
prescription has set in.
HELD: 1.) No. The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-
owner with aspect to his share alone. While the records show that
the petitioner redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering
the expenses therefore, that did not make him the owner of all of
it. In other words, it did not put to end the existing state of co-
ownership. Necessary
74
expenses may be incurred by one co-owner, subject to his right to
collect reimbursement from the remaining co-owners. There is no
doubt that redemption of property entails a necessary expense.
Under Article 488 of the Civil Code, it provides that each co-owner
shall have a right to compel the other co-owners to contribute to
the expenses of preservation of the thing or right owned in
common and to the taxes. Any one of the latter may exempt
himself from this obligation by renouncing so much of his
undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share of the
expenses and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is
prejudicial to the co-ownership. The result is that the property
remains to be in a condition of co-ownership. While a vendee a
retro, under Article 1613 of the Code, “may not be compelled to
consent to a partial redemption,” the redemption by one co-heir or
co-owner of the property in its totality does not vest him
ownership over it. Failure on the part of all the co-owners to
redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to retain the property and
consolidate title thereto in his name. But the provision does not
give to the redeeming co-owner the right to the entire property. It
does not provide for a mode of terminating a co-ownership.
Neither does the fact that the petitioner had succeeded in
securing title over the parcel in his name terminate the existing
co-ownership. While his half-brothers and sisters are, as we said,
liable to him for reimbursement as and for their shares in
redemption expenses, he cannot claim exclusive right to the
property owned in common. Registration of property is not a
means of acquiring ownership. It operates as a mere notice of
existing title, that is, if there is one.
2.) We hold in the negative. Prescription, as a mode of
terminating a relation of co- ownership, must have been preceded
by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in
turn is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the
co- ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made
known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear
and conclusive, and (4) he has been in possession through open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property
for the period required by law. The instant case shows that the
petitioner had not complied with these requisites. We are not
convinced that he had repudiated the co-ownership; on the
contrary, he had deliberately kept the private respondents in the
dark by feigning sole heirship over the estate under dispute. He
cannot therefore be said to have "made known" his efforts to deny
the co-ownership. Moreover, one of the private respondents,
Emeteria Asejo, is occupying a portion of the land up to the
present; yet, the petitioner has not taken pains to eject her
therefrom. As a matter of fact, he sought to recover possession of
that portion Emeteria is occupying only as a counterclaim, and
only after the private respondents had first sought judicial relief.
Adlawan vs. AdlawanG.R. No. 161916, January 20, 2006
Ynares – Santiago, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Arnelito Adlawan, the acknowledged
illegitimate child of Dominador Adlawan filed an ejejctment suit
against the siblings of his father, respondents Narcisa
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and Emeterio Adlawan. Being the sole heir of Dominador, he
executed an affidavit adjudicating the house and lot owned by his
father. However, he alleged that out of respect and generosity to
respondents, he granted their plea to occupy the subject property
provided they would vacate the same should his need for the
property arise. Later, when he verbally requested respondents to
vacate the house and lot, they refused and filed instead an action
for quieting of title. He then also filed a complaint for ejectment. In
answer, the respondents, 70 and 59 years of age respectively
denied that they begged petitioner to allow them to say on the
property since they have been staying there since birth. They
claimed that the said lot was originally registered in the name of
their deceased parents, Ramon and Oligia Adlawan. Spouses
Ramon and Oligia needed money to finance the renovation of
their house. Since they were not qualified to obtain a loan, they
transferred ownership of the lot to Dominador who was the only
one in the family who had a college education. Dominador and his
wife, Graciana did not disturb respondents’ possession of the
property until they died. They also argued that even if petitioner is
indeed Dominador’s acknowledged illegitimate son, his right to
succeed is doubtful because Dominador was survived by his wife,
Graciana.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can validly maintain the
instant case of ejectment.
HELD: No. Petitioner averred that he is an acknowledged
illegitimate son and the sole heir of Dominador. However, the RTC
lost sight of the fact that the theory of succession invoked by
petitioner would end up proving that he is not the sole owner of
the subject lot. This so because Dominador was survived not only
by petitioner but also by his legal wife, Graciana, who died 10
years after the death of Dominador. By intestate succession,
Graciana and petitioner became co-owners of the subject lot and
house. Petitioner then contended that even granting that he is a
co-owner, he can file the instant case pursuant to Article 487 of
the Civil Code. This article covers all kinds of actions for the
recovery of possession. It includes forcible entry and unlawful
detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion
publiciana) and recovery of ownership (accion de reinvindicacion).
A co-owner may bring such action without the necessity of joining
all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is
presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-owners. It should be
stressed, however, that where the suit is for the benefit of the
petitioner alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to
the possession of the litigated property, the action should be
dismissed.
According to the renowned civilest, Professor Arturo M. Tolentino,
he explained that “a co-owner may bring such an action, without
the necessity of joining all the other co- owners as co-plaintiffs,
because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. If
the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he
claims possession for himself and not for the co-ownership, the
action will not prosper. In this case, it is not disputed that
petitioner brought the suit for unlawful detainer in his name alone
and for his own benefit to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana
as he even executed an affidavit of self-adjudication over the
disputed property. It is clear therefore that petitioner cannot validly
maintain the instant action considering that he does not recognize
the co-ownership that necessarily flows from his theory of
succession to the property of his father, Dominador.
76
Sumipat v. BangaG.R. No. 155810, August 13, 2004 Tinga, J.
FACTS: The spouses Placida Tabo-tabo and Lauro Sumipat
acquired three parcels of land. The couple was childless. Lauro
Sumipat, however, sired five illegitimate children. They are the
petitioners herein. Lauro executed a document denominated
“Deed of Absolute Transfer and/or Quit-Claim over Real
Properties” in favor of the petitioners. On the document, it
appears that the signature of his wife, Placida which indicates that
she gave her marital consent. Moreover, it was alleged that Lauro
executed it when he was already very sick and bedridden that
upon petitioner Lydia’s request, their neighbor Benjamin Rivera
lifted the body of Lauro whereupon Lydia guided his hand in
affixing his signature on the document. Lydia left but later returned
on the same day and requested Lauro’s unlettered wife, Placida
to sign on the said document. After Lauro’s death, his wife,
Placida and petitioners jointly administered the properties, 50% of
the produce went to his wife. As wife’s share in the produce of the
properties dwindled, she filed a complaint for declaration of
partition disclaiming any partition in the execution of the subject
document.
ISSUE: Whether or not a co-ownership was formed from the said
deed.
HELD: No. A perusal of the deed reveals that it is actually a
gratuitous disposition of property — a donation — although Lauro
Sumipat imposed upon the petitioners the condition that he and
his wife, Placida, shall be entitled to one-half (1/2) of all the fruits
or produce of the parcels of land for their subsistence and
support. Where the deed of donation fails to show the
acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance, made
in a separate instrument, is either not given to the donor or else
not noted in the deed of donation and in the separate acceptance,
the donation is null and void. In this case, the donees’ acceptance
of the donation is not manifested either in the deed itself or in a
separate document. Hence, the deed as an instrument of
donation is patently void. The Court declared that the deeds of
sale questioned therein are not merely voidable but null and void
ab initio as the supposed seller declared under oath that she
signed the deeds without knowing what they were. The significant
circumstance meant, the Court added, that her consent was not
merely marred by vices of consent so as to make the contracts
voidable, but that she had not given her consent at all.
77
Rizal Cement Co., Inc. v. VillarealG.R. No. L-30272, February
28, 1985, 135 SCRA 15 Cuevas, J.
FACTS: Respondents are applicants for the registration of two
agricultural lands located in Rizal. They presented testimonial and
documentary evidence appearing that the property applied for,
designated as Lot Nos. 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-147662, have a total
area of 26,015 sq. m.; that these lots originally belong to one
Maria Certeza; that upon her death, the property was involved in
a litigation between her grandchildren and Gonzalo Certeza, and
that the lots were given by the latter to Justice de Joya as the
latter’s attorney’s fees; that the lots were then sold by de Joya to
Filomeno Sta. Ana, who in turn sold the same to spouses
Victoriano Cervo and Ignacia Guillermo in 1939; that sometime in
November 1955, the said spouses sold the lots to herein
applicants as shown by a duly notarized deed of sale. The
spouses Cervo declared the property for taxation purposes in the
name of the wife, Ignacia Guillermo, and paid for the realty taxes
thereon; that prior to the sale, the spouses Cervo had the two lots
surveyed first in 1950 and then in 1955. On the other hand,
oppositor (Rizal Cement Company) claims to be the owner of the
subject lots, having bought the same from Maria Certeza, and to
have been in continuous and adverse possession of the property
since 1911. To substantiate this claim, petitioner submitted
documentary evidence, one of which is a tax declaration of the
said lots. The Court of First Instance denied the application for
registration of respondents and ordered the issuance of a decree
of registration in the name of Rizal Cement Co., after finality of
said decision. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set
aside the decision of the CFI. The CA denied petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration. Hence, this petition was filed.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents had been in actual
possession of the land in question.
HELD: Yes. The CA gave credence to the testimony of the
witnesses for respondents. As a general rule, it is provided in the
Civil Code that possession is acquired by the material occupation
of a thing or the exercise of a right or by the fact that it is subject
to the action of our will, or by the proper acts or legal formalities
established for acquiring such right. Petitioner’s evidence,
consisting of tax receipts, tax declaration and survey plan are not
conclusive and indisputable basis of one’s ownership of the
property in question. Assessment alone is of little value as proof
of title. Mere tax declaration does not vest ownership of the
property upon defendant.
Wong v. CarpioG.R. No. 50264, October 21, 1991, 203 SCRA
118 Bidin, J.
FACTS: William Giger sold a parcel of land through a pacto de
recto sale to Manuel Mercado. Mercado only began to harvest the
coconut fruits but he never placed anyone
78
over the land to watch it. Neither did he reside in the land nor was
there any hut constructed thereon to show possession.
Thereafter, Ignacio Wong inspected the land to see if whether
there was anyone claiming the land. After finding there was none,
he bought the land from Giger. He placed workers on the land,
constructed a farmhouse, and fenced the boundaries. He couldn't
register the sale due to some technicalities.
ISSUE: Whether or not the possession of the disputed land
belongs to Ignacio Wong.
HELD: It should be stressed that "possession is acquired by the
material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the
fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts
and legal formalities for acquiring such right." And that the
execution of a sale thru a public instrument shall be equivalent to
the delivery of the thing, unless there is stipulation to the contrary.
If, however, notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the
purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the
thing and make use of it herself, because such tenancy and
enjoyment are opposed by another, then delivery has not been
effected. Applying the above pronouncements on the instant case,
it is clear that possession passed from vendor William Giger to
private respondent Manuel Mercado by virtue of the first sale a
retro, and accordingly, the later sale a retro in favor of petitioner
failed to pass the possession of the property because there is an
impediment — the possession exercised by private respondent.
Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in
two different personalities except in the cases of co-possession.
Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the
present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two
possessions, the one longer in possession, if the dates of
possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and if
these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial
deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership
through proper proceedings.
Somodio v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 82680, August 15, 1994,
235 SCRA 307 Quiason, J.
FACTS: Wilfredo Mabugat and Nicanor Somodio bought a
residential lot situated at Rajah Muda, Bula, General Santos.
Petitioner and Mabugat partitioned the property into two portions,
with petitioner taking the western part. Immediately after the
partition, petitioner took possession of his portion and planted
thereon ipil-ipil trees, coconut trees and other fruit-bearing trees.
In 1976, petitioner began construction of a structure with a
dimension of 22-by-18 feet on his lot. His employment, however,
took him to Kidapawan, North Cotabato, and he left the unfinished
structure to the case of his uncle. He would visit the property
every three months or on weekened when he had time. Sometime
in October 1977, petitioner allowed respondent Felomino Ayco, to
transfer his hut to petitioner's lot. About six years later, petitioner
demanded that Ayco vacate the premises but such demand
proved futile. Hence, on August 23, 1983, petitioner filed an action
for unlawful detainer with damages against respondent Ayco.
Meanwhile, on
79
June 26, 1983, respondent Ebenecer Purisima entered the land
and constructed a house thereon. Four days later, petitioner filed
against respondent Purisima a complaint for forcible entry before
the same court docketed as Civil Case No. 2013-I. Said case was
later consolidated with Civil Case No. 2032-II.
ISSUE: Whether or not Somodio has actual possession of the
property.
HELD: Yes. Article 531 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
provides that possession is acquired by the material occupation of
a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to
the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities
established for acquiring such right. Petitioner took possession of
the property sometime in 1974 when he planted the property to
coconut trees, ipil- ipil trees and fruit trees. In 1976, he started the
construction of a building on the property. It is immaterial that the
building was unfinished and that he left for Kidapawan for
employment reasons and visited the property only intermittently.
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has
to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be
said that he is in possession (Ramos v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil.
175 [1918]). It is sufficient that petitioner was able to subject the
property to the action of his will.
Maglucot – Aw v. MaglucotG.R. No. 132518, March 28, 2000,
329 SCRA 78 Kapunan, J.
FACTS: Sometime in 1946 there was a prior oral agreement to
tentatively partition Lot No. 1639. By virtue of this agreement, the
original co-owners occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639. It
was only in 1952 when the petition to subdivide Lot No. 1639 was
filed because two of the co-owners, namely Hermogenes Olis and
heirs of Pascual Olis, refused to have said lot subdivided and
have separate certificates of title. Significantly, after the 1952
proceedings, the parties in this case by themselves and/or
through their predecessors-in-interest occupied specific portions
of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the sketch plan. Sometime in
1963, Guillermo Maglucot rented a portion of the subject lot.
Subsequently, Leopoldo and Severo, both surnamed Maglucot,
rented portions of subject lot in 1964 and 1969, respectively, and
each paying rentals therefor. Said respondents built houses on
their corresponding leased lots. They paid the rental amount of
P100.00 per annum to Mrs. Ruperta Salma, who represented the
heirs of Roberto Maglucot, petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest. In
December 1992, however, said respondents stopped paying
rentals claiming ownership over the subject lot alleging they had a
right over the land because such was not partitioned and they
were co-owners. Manglucot-Aw thus filed a complaint for recovery
of possession and damages against Manglucot.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manglucot-Aw may recover possession by
virtue of a valid partition.
80
HELD: Yes. An order for partition is final and not interlocutory
and, hence, appealable because it decides the rights of the
parties upon the issue submitted. In this case, both the order of
partition and the unconfirmed sketch plan are, thus, interlocutory.
Nevertheless, where parties do not object to the interlocutory
decree, but show by their conduct that they have assented
thereto, they cannot thereafter question the decree, especially,
where, by reason of their conduct, considerable expense has
been incurred in the execution of the commission. Respondents in
this case have occupied their respective lots in accordance with
the sketch/subdivision plan. They cannot after acquiescing to the
order for more than forty (40) years be allowed to question the
binding effect thereof. Under the present rule, the proceedings of
the commissioners without being confirmed by the court are not
binding upon the parties. However, this rule does not apply in
case where the parties themselves actualized the supposedly
unconfirmed sketch/subdivision plan. The purpose of court
approval is to give effect to the sketch/subdivision plan. In this
case, the parties themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest implemented the sketch plan made pursuant to a court
order for partition by actually occupying specific portions of Lot
No. 1639 in 1952 and continue to do so until the present until this
case was filed, clearly, the purpose of the court approval has
been met. This statement is not to be taken to mean that
confirmation of the commissioners may be dispensed with but
only that the parties herein are estopped from raising this
question by their own acts of ratification of the supposedly non-
binding sketch/subdivision plan.
Cequeña v. BolanteG.R. No. 137944, April 6, 2000, 330 SCRA
216 Panganiban, J.
FACTS: The petitioners Fernanda Mendoza Cequeña and
Eduarda Apiado sought for the ownership and possession of the
land occupied by the respondent Honorata Bolante. Prior to 1954,
the land in Binangonan, Rizal was declared for taxation purposes
in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza, the father of respondent.
Sinforoso died in 1930. On the basis of an affidavit, the tax
declaration in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza of the contested lot
was cancelled and subsequently declared in the name of
Margarito Mendoza, the father of the petitioners. Margarito and
Sinforoso are brothers. During the cadastral survey, respondent
Honorata is the present occupant of the land together with Miguel
Mendoza, another brother of the petitioners. The trial court
rendered the petitioners as the lawful owner and possessors of
the land. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision
because the genuineness and the due execution of the affidavit. It
was said to be insufficient to overcome the denial of respondent
and her mother. Moreover, the probative value of petitioners’ tax
receipts and declarations paled in comparison with respondent’s
proof of ownership of the disputed parcel. The actual, physical,
exclusive and continuous possession by respondent since 1985
gave her a better title under Article 538 of the Civil Code. The
petitioners contended otherwise that she came into possession
through force and violence, contrary to Article 536 of the Civil
Code.
81
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the respondent has the actual, physical,
exclusive and continuous possession of the land.2.) Whether or
not tax declarations and receipts are conclusive evidence of
ownership or possession.
HELD: 1.) Yes. Possession by the petitioner before 1985 was not
exclusive, as the respondent also acquired it before 1985. The
records show that the petitioners’ father and brother, as well as
the respondent and her mother were simultaneously in adverse
possession of the land. Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code, the
respondent is the preferred possessor because, benefitting from
her father’s tax declaration of the subject lot since 1926, she has
been in possession thereof for a longer period. On the other hand,
petitioners’ father acquired joint possession only in 1952.
2.) No. Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence
of ownership. At most, they constitute mere prima facie proof of
ownership or possession of the property for which taxes have
been paid. In the absence of actual public and adverse
possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not
prove ownership. The petitioners’ claim of ownership of the whole
parcel has no legal basis.
82
Aragon v. Insular GovernmentG.R. No. L-6019, March 25,
1911, 19 Phil. 223 Carson, J.
FACTS: The Government of the Philippine Islands, through its
proper representatives, objected to the application for registration
pursuant to the Land Registration Act of a small lot of parcel of
land being instituted by herein petitioner, Juan Aragon on the
ground that said land forms part of the public domain applying the
provisions of subsection 1 of Article 339 of the old Civil Code, now
Article 420, paragraph 1 of the New Civil Code which provides
that the following things are property of public dominion: (1)
Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks,
shores, roadstead, and others of similar character. It appears,
however, that possessory title over the land in question was duly
registered in favor of petitioner, and that the applicant and their
predecessors in interest have been in possession of the parcel of
land in question, under an undisputed claim of ownership. That
there are strong reasons to believe that the land in question was
originally well above the ebb and flow of the tide and only in later
years have the waters risen to such a height along the shores of
the Bay of Manila at this point as to cover the land in question
completely at high tide, though, it cannot be ascertained definitely
whether it is due to changes in the current and flow of the waters
in the bay, or to the gradual sinking of the land along the coast.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled ownership over the
land in question.
HELD: The Court affirmed the decree entered by the lower court
in favor of petitioner applying the provisions of Article 446 of the
old Civil Code, Article 539 of the New Civil Code which provides
that every possessor has a right to be protected in his
possession; and should he be disturbed therein, he shall be
protected in or restored to said possession by the means
established by the laws and the Rules of Court. Corollary, a
possessor may lose his possession under the circumstances
provided under Article 555 of the New Civil Code, to wit: (1) By
the abandonment of the thing; (2) By an assignment made to
another either by onerous or gratuitous title; (3) By the destruction
or total loss of the thing, or because it goes out of commerce; and
(4) By the possession of another, subject to the provisions of
Article 537, if the new possession has lasted longer than one
year. But the real right of possession is not lost till after the lapse
of ten years. The Court held that since the foregoing
enumerations with respect to the loss of possession was not
conclusively established by the representatives of the
government, and the fact that the owners of the land in question
have never intended to abandon the same, then it is just and
proper to register said land in their name.
Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the Mountain Province v. Court of
Appeals G.R. No. 80294, March 23, 1990, 183 SCRA 639
Gancayco, J.
83
FACTS: CA-G.R. No. 38830-R was a land registration case
where petitioner and private respondents were asking for
confirmation of their alleged imperfect titles to the lots in question
under Section 49 (b) of the Public Land Act. In the said decision,
the appellate court found that the petitioner was not entitled to
confirmation of its imperfect title to Lots 2 and 3. In separate
motions for reconsideration filed by private respondents Heirs of
Octaviano and Heirs of Juan Valdez relating to the same decision,
they also asked that said two lots be registered in their names. On
August 12, 1977, the Court of Appeals denied both motions.
Effectively, therefore, in the said decision the appellate court ruled
that neither the petitioner nor the private respondents are entitled
to the confirmation of imperfect title over said two lots. Pursuant to
the said decision in CA-G.R. No. 38830-R, the two lots in question
remained part of the public lands. This is the only logical
conclusion when the appellate court found that neither the
petitioner nor private respondents are entitled to confirmation of
imperfect title over said lots. The present actions that were
instituted in the Regional Trial Court by private respondents are
actions for recovery of possession (accion publiciana) and not for
recovery of ownership (accion reivindicatoria).
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the possession of
the subject lots.
HELD: Yes. Under Article 555 (4) of the Civil Code, it is provided
that a possessor may lose his possession “by the possession of
another, subject to the provisions of Article 537, if the new
possession has lasted longer than one year. But the real right of
possession is not lost till after the lapse of ten years.” In the case
at bar, it is clear that the petitioner was in possession of the said
property as borrower in commodatum from private respondents
since 1906. However, in 1951 petitioner repudiated the trust when
it declared the property for tax purposes under its name. Thus,
when petitioner filed its application for registration of the said
property in 1962, it had been in adverse possession of the same
for at least 11 years. Hence, the action for recover of possession
of said property filed by private respondents against petitioner
must fail. The Court, therefore, finds that the trial court and the
Court of Appeals erred in declaring the private respondents to be
entitled to the possession thereof. Much less can they pretend to
be owners thereof. Said lots are part of the public domain.
84
Ladera v. HodgesG.R. No. 8027-R, September 23, 1952, Vol.
48, No. 12, Official Gazette 5374 Reyes, J.B.L., J.
FACTS: Paz G. Ladera entered into a contract with C.N. Hodges.
Hodges promised to sell a lot with an area of 278 square meters
to Ladera, subject to certain terms and conditions. The agreement
called for a down payment of P 800.00 and monthly installments
of P 5.00 each with interest of 1% per month, until P 2,085 is paid
in full. In case of failure of the purchaser to make any monthly
payment within 60 days after it fell due, the contract may be
considered as rescinded or annulled.
Ladera built a house on the lot. Later on, she defaulted in the
payment of the agreed monthly installment. Hodges filed an
action for the ejectment of Ladera.
The court issued an alias writ of execution and pursuant thereto,
the city sheriff levied upon all rights, interests, and participation
over the house of Ladera. At the auction sale, Ladera’s house
was sold to Avelino A. Magno. Manuel P. Villa, later on, purchased
the house from Magno.
Ladera filed an action against Hodges and the judgment sale
purchasers. Judgment was rendered in favor of Ladera, setting
aside the sale for non-compliance with Rule 39, Rules of Court
regarding judicial sales of real property. On appeal, Hodges
contends that the house, being built on a lot owned by another,
should be regarded as movable or personal property.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ladera’s house is an immovable property.
HELD: YES. The old Civil Code numerates among the things
declared by it as immovable property the following: lands,
buildings, roads and constructions of all kind adhered to the soil.
The law does not make any distinction whether or not the owner
of the lot is the one who built. Also, since the principles of
accession regard buildings and constructions as mere
accessories to the land on which it is built, it is logical that said
accessories should partake the nature of the principal thing.
Mindanao Bus Company v. The City Assessor and Treasurer
G.R. No. L-17870, September 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 197 Labrador,
J.
FACTS: Petitioner Mindanao Bus Company is a public utility
solely engaged in transporting passengers and cargoes by motor
trucks, over its authorized lines in the Island of Mindanao,
collecting rates approved by the Public Service Commission.
Respondent sought to assess the following real properties of the
petitioner; (a) Hobart Electric Welder Machine, (b) Storm Boring
Machine; (c) Lathe machine with motor; (d) Black and Decker
Grinder; (e) PEMCO Hydraulic Press; (f) Battery charger (Tungar
1
De Garcia v. Hon. Court of AppealsG.R. No. L-20264, January
30, 1971, 37 SCRA 129 Fernando, J.
FACTS: On October 11, 1953, Angelina Guevarra, while talking to
Consuelo de Garcia, recognized her ring in the finger of the latter
which she lost sometime in February 1952. Guevarra asked
where de Garcia bought the ring to which de Garcia answered
that she bought it from her comadre. Guevarra explained to de
Garcia that that ring was the very same ring stolen from her. De
Garcia handed the ring to Guevarra and the ring fitted her finger.
Two or three days later, at the request of Guevarra, she, her
husband Lt. Col. Juan Guevara, Lt. Cementina of Pasay PD, de
Garcia and her attorney proceeded to the store of Mr. Rebullida to
whom they showed the ring in question. Mr. Rebullida examined
the ring with the aid of high power lens and after consulting the
stock card thereon, concluded that it was the very ring that
plaintiff bought from him in 1947. The ring was returned to
defendant who despite a written request therefor failed to deliver
the ring to plaintiff. In trial, de Garcia said that she bought the ring
from Mrs. Miranda who got it from Mrs. Angelita Hinahon who in
turn got it from, Aling Petring who was boarding in her house.
ISSUE: Whether or not de Garcia’s possession of the ring in good
faith confers her title to the said ring.
HELD: No. The controlling provision is Article 559 of the Civil
Code which provides that possession of movable property
acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one
who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof
may recover it from the person in possession of the same. If the
possessor of a movable lost of which the owner has been
unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale,
the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price
paid therefor. Respondent Angelina D. Guevara, having been
unlawfully deprived of the diamond ring in question, was entitled
to recover it from petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia who was found
in possession of the same. The only exception the law allows is
when there is acquisition in good faith of the possessor at a public
sale, in which case the owner cannot obtain its return without
reimbursing the price. The common law principle that where one
of two innocent persons must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by the
another, the law imposes the loss upon the party who, by his
misplaced confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed,
cannot be applied in a case which is covered by an express
provision of the new Civil Code, specifically Article 559. Between
a common law principle and statutory provision, the latter must
prevail in this jurisdiction. It is thus immediately apparent that
there is no merit to the contention raised in the first assigned error
that her possession in good faith, equivalent to title, sufficed to
defeat respondent Guevara's claim. As the above cases
demonstrate, even on that assumption the owner can recover the
same once she can show illegal deprivation. Respondent Court of
Appeals was so convinced from the evidence submitted that the
owner of the ring in litigation is such respondent.
86
Dizon v. SuntayG.R. No. L-30817, September 29, 1972, 47
SCRA 160 Fernando, J.
FACTS: Lourdes Suntay is the owner of a 3 carat diamond ring.
She entered into a transaction with Clarita Sison, wherein said
ring was delivered to the latter for sale on commission. Upon
receiving the ring, the receipt was delivered to Suntay. After a
lapse of a considerable amount of time, the ring was not yet
returned and so Suntay demanded for its return from Sison but
the latter could not comply as she had already pledged it with
Dizon’s pawnshop for P 2,600.00. After insistent demands, Sison
delivered the pawnshop ticket to Suntay. Suntay through her
counsel, wrote to Dizon asking for the delivery of the ring pledged
but, the latter refused. She filed an action for recovery with P 500
as attorney’s fees and costs. She asked for the remedy of
replevin upon filing the requisite bond pending final determination
of the action. The CFI of Manila issued the writ and Suntay was
able to regain possession during the pendency of the action. The
lower court rendered a decision in favor of Suntay. On appeal,
Dizon sought the reversal of the lower court’s decision and
invoking estoppel. CA affirmed the lower court’s decision. SC
affirmed CA decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the owner of the ring may recover its
possession from the pawnshop owner.
HELD: Yes. Owner of a diamond ring may recover the possession
of the same from a pawnshop where another person had pledged
it without authority to do so. Art. 559 of the civil code applies and
the defense that the pawnshop acquired possession of the
without notice of any defect in the title of the pledgor is unavailing.
Neither the promptings of equity nor the mandates of moral right
and natural justice come to his rescue. Dizon is engaged in a
business where presumably ordinary prudence would manifest
itself to ascertain whether or not an individual who is offering a
jewelry by way of a pledge is entitled to do so. If no such care be
taken he should be the last to complain if thereafter the right of
the true owner of such jewelry should be recognized.
Ledesma v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 86051, September 1,
1992, 213 SCRA 195 Davide, J.
FACTS: Two motor vehicles—Honda Gemini and Holden
Premiere Model—were purchased from Citiwide Motors by a
person who identified himself as Jojo Consunji. He bought the
vehicles purportedly for his father. Upon delivery to him of the
vehicles, he paid a manager’s check drawn against PCIB. The
check though was dishonored by the bank on the ground that the
check’s value has been materially altered. This was
87
reported to the police authorities and it was found out that the
person misrepresenting himself was actually Suarez who had a
long line of criminal cases against him for his modus operandi.
The Holden car was recovered after being abandoned
somewhere in Quezon City. The Honda on the other hand, was
discovered to be sold to Ledesma. Ledesma averred he
purchased the vehicle in good faith from one Neyra, as evidenced
by his certificate of registration. Citiwide Motors was able to
recover.
ISSUE: Whether or not CITIWIDE MOTORS has been unlawfully
deprived.
HELD: No. There was a perfected unconditional contract of sale
between Citiwide Motors and Suarez. The subsequent dishonor of
the check merely amounted to failure of consideration which
doesn't render a contract of sale void, but merely allows the
prejudiced party to sue for specific performance or rescission of
the sale. This being the case, Citiwide motors wasn't unlawfully
deprived of the property. It is thus not entitled to the return of the
vehicle from Ledesma who bought the property in good faith and
for consideration.
88
Azarcon and Abobo v. EusebioG.R. No. L-11977, April 29,
1959, 105 SCRA 569 Labrador, J.
FACTS: Victor Eusebio had a dispute over a parcel of land with
Leonardo Azarcon, Manuel Azarcon and Esteban Abobo. Eusebio
filed a lease application for a parcel of land, a portion thereof was
occupied by Azarcon et al. under a homestead application. Before
the dispute could be settled, Eusebio filed a complaint in the CFI
of Nueva Ecija, alleging that he had acquired a big parcel of land
by lease from the Bureau of Lands, and that while he was in
possession thereof, Azarcon et al. occupied a portion. The trial
court ruled in favor of Eusebio, and a writ of execution ordering
Azarcon et al. to restore possession of the land to Eusebio was
issued on October 3, 1955. However, in spite of the receipt of the
notice of writ of execution, Azarcon et al. nevertheless entered the
land to gather palay which was then pending harvest.
ISSUE: Whether or not Azarcon and Abobo are entitled to the
pending fruits of the land.
HELD: Yes. While the court order of October 3, 1955 ordered
them to move out of the premises, it did not prohibit them from
gathering the crop then existing thereon. Under the law, a person,
who is in possession and who is being ordered to leave a parcel
of land while products thereon are in pending harvests, has the
right to a part of the net harvest, as expressly provided by Article
545 of the Civil Code. Hence, as the order of execution did not
expressly prohibit Azarcon et al. from gathering the pending fruits,
which fruits were the result of their possession and cultivation of
the land, it cannot be said that they committed an act which is
clear violation of the court’s order.
Cordero v. CabralG.R. No. L-36789, July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA
532 Abad Santos, J.
FACTS: Mr. Gregorio Z. Ocampo of Meycauayan, Bulacan,
husband of the plaintiff Felipa Cordero and father of the other
plaintiffs surnamed Ocampo, died on May 17, 1958. The said
deceased left several properties, which were inherited by the
plaintiffs including the land in question which parcel of land was
originally registered in accordance with the Land Registration Act
on December 14, 1933, and was registered and/or transferred in
the name of Mr. Gregorio Z. Ocampo on July 31, 1934. After the
death of the said Mr. Gregorio Z. Ocampo, the plaintiffs herein
took possession of the said parcel of land which is a riceland, but
they found out that the southern portion of the same with an area
4,303 square meters, more or less, upon verification, was
possessed by the defendants herein, Victoria P. Cabral, Alejandro
Berboso and Dalmacio Montaos. Victoria P. Cabral claimed to be
the owner of said portion while her co-defendants co-possessed
the same as her tenants. The plaintiffs demanded of the
defendants to surrender to the former possession of the portion of
land and/or vacate it but they refused and failed to do so, and the
defendant Victoria P. Cabral continued
89
claiming to be the owner of the same while her co-defendants
continued recognizing her as the owner thereof instead of the
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs alleged that because of the defendants'
occupancy of the aforementioned plaintiffs' portion of land with the
area of 4,303 square meters, more or less, to the exclusion of the
latter, the said plaintiffs failed to realize a yearly harvest of at least
ten (10) cavanes of palay at the rate of P10.00 per cavan, from
the harvest-time of 1958 up to the present.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants must reimburse the fruits
receive.
HELD: Yes. The disputed land is included in T.C.T. No. 14513
issued to Gregorio Z. Ocampo, the predecessor of the plaintiffs.
The original registration which includes the disputed land was not
vitiated by error or fraud. The defendants, by their own admission,
are in possession of the disputed land. There is no evidence that
they were possessors in bad faith. However, their good faith
ceased when they were served with summons to answer the
complaint. As possessors in bad faith from the service of the
summons they "shall reimburse the fruits received and those
which the legitimate possessor could have received.
90
Mendoza and Enriquez v. De GuzmanG.R. No. L-28721,
October 5, 1928, 52 Phil. 164 Malcolm, J.
FACTS: In the cadastral proceedings of the municipality of
Sariaya, Tayabas, a piece of land identified as lot No. 687 was
adjudicated in favor of Martin Mendoza and Natalio Enriquez in
equal parts pro indiviso subject to the right of retention on the part
of Manuel de Guzman until he shall have been indemnified for the
improvements existing on the land. Mendoza has possessed it
since 1916. By virtue of this judgment, De Guzman presented a
motion requesting the issuance of a writ of possession for lot No.
687 in his favor which was granted on June 25, 1924. Since then
De Guzman has had dominion over the land. Being unable to
come to an agreement as to the amount which should be allowed
for the improvements made on the land, Martin Mendoza and
Natalio Enriquez began an action requesting the court to (a) fix
the value of the necessary and useful expenses incurred by
Manuel de Guzman in introducing the improvements; (b) require
the defendant to render an accounting of the fruits received by
him and order that the value of the fruits be applied to the
payment of the necessary and useful expenses; and (c) decree
the restitution of the possession to the plaintiffs. Max. B. Solis,
one of the persons who were ejected from the land, asked leave
to intervene, alleging, among other things, that De Guzman had
transferred all his rights in the improvements and in the lot to him
with the exception of two hundred coconut trees. This petition was
granted. At the trial which followed and at the instance of the
parties, two commissioners were appinted with instructions to
inspect the land and to count the number of coconut trees planted
thereon, determining the number of fruit-bearing trees and those
that are not fruit-bearing as well as the condition of the same.
After trial, Judge of First Instance Gloria rendered judgment
declaring (a) that the defendant Manuel de Guzman and the
intervenor Bernardo Solis have the right to collect from the
plaintiffs Martin Mendoza and Natalio Enriquez the sum of P2,046
as compensation for the necessary and useful expenditures in the
proportion of 20 per cent for Manuel de Guzman and 80 per cent
for Bernardo Solis; and (b) that Manuel de Guzman and Bernardo
Solis are obliged to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of P666.93 per
annum from June 25, 1924, one-fifth of this amount to be paid by
Manuel de Guzman and the other four-fifths by Bernardo Solis. As
on the date when this judgment was rendered, that is on
September 23, 1927, the amount that the plaintiffs were required
to pay to the defendant and intervenor exceeded the amount that
the latter were to pay the former, the defendant and intervenor
were ordered to deliver the land and its improvement as soon as
the plaintiffs have paid the difference, without special
pronouncement as to costs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court correctly declared the
amount to be paid as "indemnizacion" in the form of necessary
and useful expenditures incurred by the defendant.
HELD: Yes. Article 361 of the Civil Code in the original Spanish
text uses the word "indemnizacion." However one may speculate
as to the true meaning of the term "indemnizacion" whether
correctly translated as "compensation" or "indemnity," the
91
amount of the "indemnizacion" is the amount of the expenditures
mentioned in articles 453 and 454 of the Civil Code, which in the
present case is the amount of the necessary and useful
expenditures incurred by the defendant. Necessary expenses
have been variously described by the Spanish commentators as
those made for the preservation of the thing; as those without
which the thing would deteriorate or be lost; as those that
augment the income of the things upon which they are expanded.
Among the necessary expenditures are those incurred for
cultivation, production, upkeep, etc. Here the plaintiffs have
chosen to take the improvements introduced on the land and are
disposed to pay the amount of the necessary and useful
expenses incurred by the defendant. Inasmuch as the retentionist,
who is not exactly a posessor in good faith with in the meaning of
the law, seeks to be reimbursed for the necessary and useful
expenditures, it is only just that he should account to the owners
of the estate for any rents, fruits, or crops he has gathered from it.
Robles and Martin v. Lizarraga HermanosG.R. No. L-16736,
December 22, 1921, 42 Phil. 584 Romualdez, J.
FACTS: Anastasia de la Rama died on the 17th of October, 1916,
leaving six children, to wit, Magdalena, Jose, Evarista, Zacarias,
Felix, and Purificacion, surnamed Robles, and some properties,
among which is house No. 4 on Iznart Street in the city of Iloilo.
The children and heirs of Anastasia de la Rama entered into
partnership with Lizarraga Hermanos in liquidation and settlement
of their accounts, by virtue of which the competent court awarded
to said partnership the properties left by the deceased, including
the aforesaid house No. 4 on Iznart Street. Evarista Robles, one
of the heirs, since before the death of her mother Anastasia de la
Rama, has been with her husband occupying the aforesaid house
No. 4 on Iznart Street, at the beginning, by permission of her
mother, later on by the consent of her coheirs, and lastly by
agreement with the partnership, Lizarraga Hermanos, to whom it
had been awarded, having made some improvements on the
house, the value of which is fixed at four thousand five hundred
pesos (P4,500), and paying to said partnership forty pesos (P40)
monthly as rent of the upper story. On March 18, 1918, Lizarraga
Hermanos notified Evarista Robles (Exhibit J) that beginning April
next the rent of the upper story of the house would be raised to
sixty pesos (P60) a month, and that, if she did not agree to the
new rate of rent, she might vacate the house. Evarista Robles
refused to pay such a new rate of rent and to vacate the house,
and Lizarraga Hermanos brought suit against her for ejectment.
Evarista Robles sued Lizarraga Hermanos afterwards to recover
the value of the improvements.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not Evarista Robles is the owner of the aforesaid
improvements and has the right to demand payment of their
value.2.) Whether or not she has any right to retain the building
until the said value is paid to her.
92
HELD: 1.) Yes. Robles is the owner of the improvements. The
expenditures incurred in these improvements were not necessary
inasmuch as without them the house would have continued to
stand just as before, but were useful, inasmuch as with them the
house better serves the purpose for which it was intended, being
used as a residence, and the improvements consisting of the
addition of a dining room, kitchen, closet, and bathroom in the
lower and upper stories of the house, and a stable, suitable as a
coach house and dwelling, it is beyond doubt that such
improvements are useful to the building. Since the improvements
are useful and Robles’ possession is in good faith, applying Article
453, it is beyond question that Evarista Robles is the owner of
such improvements, and entitled to reimbursement therefor.
2.) Yes. It is a fact that the value of the improvements in question
has not as yet been paid by Lizarraga Hermanos. Wherefore, if
Evarista Robles and her husband are entitled to retain the
building until the value of such improvements is paid them,
Lizarraga Hermanos have not yet any right to oust them from the
building, nor, therefore, to be indemnified for any damages
caused by the refusal of the plaintiffs found on their legitimate
rights. Hence, due to the non-reimbursement of the aforesaid
useful expenditures, the possessor in good faith has the right of
retention until she has been fully reimbursed with the same.
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Court of
Appeals G.R. No. L-54526, August 25, 1986, 143 SCRA 623
Martinez, J.
FACTS: Sometime in 1965, petitioner MWSS (then known as
NAWASA) leased around one hundred twenty eight (128)
hectares of its land (hereafter, subject property) to respondent
CHGCCI (formerly the International Sports Development
Corporation) for twenty five (25) years and renewable for another
fifteen (15) years or until the year 2005, with the stipulation
allowing the latter to exercise a right of first refusal should the
subject property be made open for sale. The terms and conditions
of respondent CHGCCI's purchase thereof shall nonetheless be
subject to presidential approval. Pursuant to Letter of instruction
(LOI) No. 440 issued on July 29,1976 by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos directing petitioner MWSS to negotiate the
cancellation of the MWSS-CHGCCI lease agreement for the
disposition of the subject property, Oscar Ilustre, then General
Manager of petitioner MWSS, sometime in November of 1980
informed respondent CHGCCI, through its president herein
respondent Pablo Roman, Jr., of its preferential right to buy the
subject property which was up for sale. Valuation thereof was to
be made by an appraisal company of petitioner MWSS' choice,
the Asian Appraisal Co., Inc. which, on January 30, 1981, pegged
a fair market value of P40.00 per square meter or a total of
P53,800,000.00 for the subject property. Upon being informed
that petitioner MWSS and respondent CHGCCI had already
agreed in principle on the purchase of the subject property,
President Marcos expressed his approval of the sale as shown in
his marginal note on the letter sent by respondents
93
Jose Roxas and Pablo Roman, Jr. dated December 20, 1982.The
Board of Trustees of petitioner MWSS thereafter passed
Resolution 36-83, approving the sale of the subject property in
favor of respondent SILHOUETTE, as assignee of respondent
CHGCCI. The MWSS-SILHOUETTE sales agreement eventually
pushed through. Per the Agreement dated May 11, 1983 covering
said purchase, the total price for the subject property is
P50,925,200, P25 Million of which was to be paid upon President
Marcos' approval of the contract and the balance to be paid within
one (1) year from the transfer of the title to respondent
SILHOUETTE as vendee with interest at 12% per annum. The
balance was also secured by an irrevocable letter of credit. A
Supplemental Agreement was forged between petitioner MWSS
and respondent SILHOUETTE on August 11, 1983 to accurately
identify the subject property. Subsequently, respondent
SILHOUETTE, under a deed of sale dated July 26, 1984, sold to
respondent AYALA about sixty-seven (67) hectares of the subject
property at P110.00 per square meter. Of the total price of around
P74 Million, P25 Million was to be paid by respondent AYALA
directly to petitioner MWSS for respondent SILHOUETTE's
account and P2 Million directly to respondent SILHOUETTE.
P11,600,000 was to be paid upon the issuance of title in favor of
respondent AYALA, and the remaining balance to be payable
within one (1) year with 12% per annum interest. Respondent
AYALA developed the land it purchased into a prime residential
area now known as the Ayala Heights Subdivision. Almost a
decade later, petitioner MWSS on March 26, 1993 filed an action
against all herein named respondents before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City seeking for the declaration of nullity of the
MWSS-SILHOUETTE sales agreement and all subsequent
conveyances involving the subject property, and for the recovery
thereof with damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not MWSS failed to provide appropriate
security measures over its own records; Circumstances led NBI to
believe that the fraudulent encashment as an “inside job”.
HELD: Yes. The records likewise show that MWSS failed to
provide appropriate security measures over its own records
thereby laying confidential records open to unauthorized persons.
MWSS's own Fact Finding Committee, in its report submitted to
their General Manager underscored this laxity of records control.
It observed that the "office of Mr. Ongtengco (Cashier VI of the
Treasury Department at the NAWASA) is quite open to any
person known to him or his staff members and that the check
writer is merely on top of his table. Relying on the foregoing
statement of Mr. Ongtengco, the NBI concluded in its Report
dated 2 November 1970 that the fraudulent encashment of the 23
checks in question was an "inside job". Thus the NBI believe that
the fraudulent act was an inside job or one pulled with inside
connivance at NAWASA. The serial numbers of the checks in
question conform with the numbers in current use of NAWASA,
aside from the fact that these fraudulent checks were found to be
of the same kind and design as that of NAWASA's own checks.
While knowledge as to such facts may be obtained through the
possession of a NAWASA check of current issue, an outsider
without information from the inside can not possibly pinpoint
which of NAWASA's various accounts has sufficient balance to
cover all these fraudulent checks. None of these checks, it should
be noted, was dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
94
Bachrach v. Seifert and ElianoffG.R. No. L-2659, October 12,
1950, 87 Phil. 483 Ozaeta, J.
FACTS: The deceased E. M. Bachrach, who left no forced heir
except his widow Mary McDonald Bachrach, in his last will and
testament made various legacies in cash and willed the remainder
of his estate. The estate of E. M. Bachrach, as owner of 108,000
shares of stock of the Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co., Inc., received
from the latter 54,000 shares representing 50 per cent stock
dividend on the said 108,000 shares. On June 10, 1948, Mary
McDonald Bachrach, as usufructuary or life tenant of the estate,
petitioned the lower court to authorize the Peoples Bank and Trust
Company, as administrator of the estate of E. M. Bachrach, to
transfer to her the said 54,000 shares of stock dividend by
indorsing and delivering to her the corresponding certificate of
stock, claiming that said dividend, although paid out in the form of
stock, is fruit or income and therefore belonged to her as
usufructuary or life tenant. Sophie Seifert and Elisa Elianoff, legal
heirs of the deceased, opposed said petition on the ground that
the stock dividend in question was not income but formed part of
the capital and therefore belonged not to the usufructuary but to
the remainderman. While appellants admit that a cash dividend is
an income, they contend that a stock dividend is not, but merely
represents an addition to the invested capital.
ISSUE: Whether or not a dividend is an income and whether it
should go to the usufructuary.
HELD: Yes. The usufructuary shall be entitled to receive all the
natural, industrial, and civil fruits of the property in usufruct. The
108,000 shares of stock are part of the property in usufruct. The
54,000 shares of stock dividend are civil fruits of the original
investment. They represent profits, and the delivery of the
certificate of stock covering said dividend is equivalent to the
payment of said profits. Said shares may be sold independently of
the original shares, just as the offspring of a domestic animal may
be sold independently of its mother. If the dividend be in fact a
profit, although declared in stock, it should be held to be income.
A dividend, whether in the form of cash or stock, is income and,
consequently, should go to the usufructuary, taking into
consideration that a stock dividend as well as a cash dividend can
be declared only out of profits of the corporation, for if it were
declared out of the capital it would be a serious violation of the
law.
Under the Massachusetts rule, a stock dividend is considered part
of the capital and belongs to the remainderman; while under the
Pennsylvania rule, all earnings of a corporation, when declared as
dividends in whatever form, made during the lifetime of the
usufructuary, belong to the latter. The Pennsylvania rule is more
in accord with our statutory laws than the Massachusetts rule.
Hemedes v. Court of Appeals,
95
G.R. No. 107132, October 8, 1999, 316 SCRA 347 Gonzaga –
Reyes, J.
FACTS: Jose Hemedes, father of Maxima Hemedes and Enrique
D. Hemedes. Jose Hemedes executed a document entitled
"Donation Inter Vivos with Resolutory Conditions" whereby he
conveyed ownership over the subject land, together with all its
improvements, in favor of his third wife, Justa Kausapin, subject
to the following resolutory conditions that upon her death or
marriage, the donee shall revert the said property to anyone of
Jose Hemedes children. On September 27, 1960 a "Deed of
Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property by Reversion" was
made conveying to Maxima Hemedes. She had it titled and
mortgage it to R & B Insurance with an annotation of “Usufruct” in
favor of her stepmother, Justa Kausapin. Unable to pay the
mortgage, R & B Insurance extra-judicially foreclosed the
property. However, Justa Kausapin executed another agreement
or Kasunduan on May 27, 1971 to his stepson, Enrique D.
Hemedes. He obtained tax declarations and pay realty taxes from
thereon. The Ministry of Agrarian Reform Office conducted a
cadastral survey and indicated Enrique Hemedes as the owner.
Enrique Hemedes sold the property to Dominium Realty Const.
Corp. (Dominium), a sister company of Asia Brewery. Asia
Brewery started to introduce some improvements already when R
& B insurance informed them that they are the owners of the
property where these improvements are being built.
ISSUE: Whether or not the kasunduan executed by Justa
Kausapin in favor of Enrique D. Hemedes was valid.
HELD: No. The court dismissed the petition and affirmed the
decision of the CA. It held that Maxima failed to comply with the
requirements of Art. 1332 of the civil code and also failed to
repudiate Justa Kausapin’s allegation that she did not execute
such a deed and she never allowed to use the land as security for
the loan. It was found that the deed of conveyance to Maxima
was spurious and it follows that the original title she had for the
property was also null and void so as the mortgage to R & B
Insurance. On the other hand, Kausapin executed an affidavit to
affirm the authenticity of the the kasundudan in favor of his
stepson, Enrique Hemedes whom she is dependent from for her
financial support.
96
Fabie v. Gutierrez DavidG.R. No. L-123, December 12, 1945,
75 Phil. 536 Ozaeta, J.
FACTS: The petitioner Josefa Fabie is the usufructuary of the
income of certain houses located at 372-376 Santo Cristo,
Binondo, and 950-956 Ongpin, Santa Cruz, Manila, under the
ninth clause of the will of the deceased Rosario Fabie y Grey. The
owner of Santo Cristo property abovementioned is the respondent
Juan Grey, while those of the Ongpin property are other person
not concern herein. Previous to September 1944 litigation arose
between Josefa Fabie as plaintiff and Juan Grey as defendant
and the owner of the Ongpin property as intervenors, involving the
administration of the houses mentioned.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action instituted by the petitioner
Josefa Fabie is a purely possessory action and as such within the
jurisdiction of said court, or an action founded on property right
and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal court.
HELD: Yes. It is admitted by the parties that the petitioner Josefa
Fabie is the usufructuary of the income of the property in question
and that the respondent Juan Grey is the owner thereof. It is
likewise admitted that by virtue of a final judgment entered in Civil
Case No. 1659 of the Court of First Instance of Manila between
the usufructuary and the owner, the former has the right to collect
all the rents of said property for herself with the obligation on her
part to pay all the real estate taxes, special assessments, and
insurance premiums, and make all necessary repairs thereon,
and in case default on her part the owner shall have the right to
do all those things, in which event he shall be entitled to collect all
subsequent rents of the property concerned until the amount paid
by him and the expenses of collection are fully satisfied, after
which the usufructuary shall again collect the rents. There is
therefore no dispute as to the title to or the respective interests of
the parties in the property in question. The naked title to the
property is to admittedly in the respondent Juan Grey, but the
right to all the rents thereof, with the obligation to pay the taxes
and insurance premiums and make the necessary repairs, is, also
admittedly, vested in the usufructuary, the petitioner Josefa Fabie,
during her lifetime.
Construing said judgment in the light of the ninth clause of the will
of the deceased Rosario Fabie y Grey, which was quoted in the
decision and by which Josefa Fabie was made by the
usufructuary during her lifetime of the income of the property in
question, we find that the said usufructuary has the right to
administer the property in question. All the acts of administration
— to collect the rents for herself, and to conserve the property by
making all necessary repairs and paying all the taxes, special
assessments, and insurance premiums thereon — were by said
judgment vested in the usufructuary
97
Vda. De Aranas v. AranasG.R. No. L-56249, May 29, 1987, 150
SCRA 415 Paras, J.
FACTS: Fr. Teodoro Aranas, a priest of the Roman Catholic
Church, died on January 19, 1953. He had executed on June 6,
1946 his Last Will and Testament which was admitted to probate
on August 31, 1956. In said Last Will and Testament, Fr. Teodoro
Aranas stipulated the special administration of the remainder of
his estate (after returning to his brothers Aniceto and Carmelo or
their heirs all properties acquired by him including 10 parcels of
land inherited by him from his parents) by Vicente Aranas, a
faithful and serviceable nephew and designating him also as
recipient of 1/2 of the produce of said properties after deducting
the expenses for the administration and the other 1/2 of the
produce to be given to the Catholic Church for the eternal repose
of the testator's soul. Said pertinent provision reads as follows: “It
is my will that the lands I had bought from other persons should
be converged and placed under a special administrator. The
special administrator of these lands, for his office, should receive
one half of all the produce from which shall be deducted the
expenses for the administration, and the other half of the produce
should be received by the Roman Catholic Church and should be
spent for my soul, Vicente B. Aranas (Tingting), because he is a
faithful and serviceable nephew, should be the first special
administrator of said properties, without bond, until his death or
until he should not want to hold the said office anymore. Anyone
of the sons of my brother Carmelo Aranas can hold the said office
of special administrator, and none other than they. Their father,
my brother Carmelo Aranas shall be the one to decide who
among them shall hold the said office, but upon the death of my
said brother Carmelo Aranas, his said sons will have power to
select the one among them ourselves. The special administration
is perpetual.”
ISSUE: Whether or not perpetual inalienability and administration
of the estate of the late Fr. Teodoro Aranas is null and void for
being violative of Article 870 of the NCC.
HELD: No. Vicente Aranas as a usufructuary has the right to
enjoy the property of his uncle with all the benefits which result
from the normal enjoyment (or exploitation) of another's property,
with the obligation to return, at the designated time, either the
same thing, or in special cases its equivalent. This right of Vicente
to enjoy the fruits of the properties is temporary and therefore not
perpetual as there is a limitation namely his death or his refusal.
Likewise his designation as administrator of these properties is
limited by his refusal and/or death and therefore it does not run
counter to Art. 870 of the Civil Code relied upon by the petitioners.
Be it noted that Vicente Aranas is not prohibited to dispose of the
fruits and other benefits arising from the usufruct. Neither are the
naked owners (the other heirs) of the properties, the usufruct of
which has been given to Vicente Aranas prohibited from disposing
of said naked ownership without prejudice of course to Vicente's
continuing usufruct. To void the designation of Vicente Aranas as
usufructuary and/or administrator is to defeat the desire and the
dying wish of the testator to reward him for his faithful and
unselfish services rendered during the time when said testator
was seriously ill or bed-ridden.
98
Locsin v. ValenzuelaG.R. No. L-51333, May 18, 1989, 173
SCRA 454 Feliciano, J.
FACTS: Petitioners were co-owners of a large tract of agricultural
land known as “Hacienda Villa Regalado”. A portion of this land
known as Lot No. 2-C-A-3 was subject to lifetime usufructuary
rights of respondent Helen Schon. The bulk of this lot was
cultivated by the lessees who customarily delivered the rentals to
respondent. In 1972, PD 27 was enacted, decreasing the
“Emancipation of Tenants”. The tract of land owned in common by
the petitioners, including the portion thereof subject to petitioner’s
usufructuary rights, fell within the scope of the “Operation Land
Transfer”. Petitioners sought the opinion of the Department of
Agrarian Reform(DAR) as to who should be entitled to receive the
rental payments which continued to be made by the tenants to
respondent. The DAR District Officer rendered the opinion that
the rental payments were properly considered as amortization
payments for the land and as such should pertain to the
landowners and not the usufructuary.
ISSUE: Whether or not the usufructuary was extinguished by PD
27 and who, between the naked owner and the usufructuary,
should be entitled to the amounts paid by the tenants beginning
October 21, 1972.
HELD: Yes. The usufruct which had therefore existed as a jus in
re aliena in favour of Helen Schon was effectively extinguished by
PD 27. To hold, as private respondent apparently urges would
obviously defeat the purpose of the land reform statute. PD 27
was enacted to emancipate the tenants from “bondage of the soil”
by giving to the tenant-farmers ownership of the land which they
were cultivating. Ownership over the lands subjected to the
Operation Land Transfer moved from the registered owner to the
tenants. The Court holds that Lot No. 2-C-A-3 having been
declared part of the land reform area and subjected to the
Operation Land Transfer, the payments made on October 21,
1972 by the tenant-farmers constituted amortization payments on
the cost of the land that they were required to pay under PD 27.
These payments, therefore, legally pertain to the petitioners as
part of the compensation for the dominion over the land of which
they were deprived of by operation of PD 27.
99
Valisno v. AdrianoG.R. No. L-37409, May 23, 1988, 161 SCRA
398 Grino – Aquino, J.
FACTS: Plaintiff – appellant Nicolas Valisno alleges that he is the
owner of a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija which he bought from his
sister, Honorata Adriano Francisco. Said land is planted with
watermelon, peanuts, corn, tobacco and other vegetables and
adjoins the land of Felipe Adriano, on the bank of the Pampanga
River. At the time of the sale of the land to Valisno, the land was
irrigated by water from the Pampanga River through a canal
about 70 meters long, traversing Adriano’s land. Later, Adriano
levelled a portion of the irrigation canal so that Valisno was
deprived of the irrigation water and prevented from cultivating his
57 – hectare land. Thus, Valisno filed a complaint for deprivation
of waters rights in the Bureau of Public Works and
Communications (Bureau – PWC). Bureau – PWC ruled in favour
of Valisno. Instead of restoring the irrigation canal, Adriano asked
for a reinvestigation of the case which was granted. In the
meantime, Valisno rebuilt the irrigation canal at his own expense
due to his urgent need to irrigate his watermelon fields. Valisno
then filed a complaint for damages. However, the Secretary of
Bureau – PWC reversed its decision and dismissed Valisno’s
complaint. It held that Eladio Adriano’s water rights which had
been granted in1923 ceased to be enjoyed by him in 1936 or
1937, when his irrigation canal collapsed. His non-use of the
water rights since then for a period of more than five years
extinguished the grant by operation of law. Hence, the water
rights did not form part of his hereditary estate which his heirs
partitioned among themselves. Likewise, Valisno, as vendee of
the land which Honorata received from her father’s estate did not
acquire any water rights with the land purchased. The trial court
held that Valisno had no right to pass through the defendant's
land to draw water from the Pampanga River. It pointed out that
under Section 4 of the Irrigation Law, controversies between
persons claiming a right to water from a stream are within the
jurisdiction of the Secretary of Bureau-PWC and his decision on
the matter is final, unless an appeal is taken to the proper court
within thirty days. The court may not pass upon the validity of the
decision of the Public Works Secretary collaterally. Furthermore,
there was nothing in Valisno’s evidence to show that the
resolution was not valid. It dismissed the complaint and
counterclaim. Valisno’s motion for reconsideration was denied,
and he appealed to the Court of the Appeals who certified the
case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether the provisions of the Irrigation Act (Act No. 2152)
or those of the Civil Code should apply to this case.
HELD: The provisions of the Civil Code shall apply. The existence
of the irrigation canal on Adriano’s land for the passage of water
from the Pampanga River to Honorata's land prior to and at the
time of the sale of Honorata's land to Valisno was equivalent to a
title for the vendee of the land to continue using it as provided in
Article 624 of the Civil Code: The existence of an apparent sign of
easement between two estates, established or maintained by the
owner of both shall be considered, should either of them be
alienated, as a title in order that he easement may continue
actively and passively,
100
unless at the time, theownership of the two estates is divided, the
contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of
them, or the sign aforesaid should be removed before the
execution of the deed. This provision shall also apply in case of
the division of a thing owned in common on by two or more
persons (Civil Code).
This provision was lifted from Article 122 of the Spanish Law of
Waters which provided:
Whenever a tract of irrigated land which previously received its
waters from a single point is divided through inheritance, sale or
by virtue of some other title, between two or more owners, the
owners of the higher estates are under obligation to give free
passage to the water as an easement of conduit for the irrigation
of the lower estates, and without right to any compensation
therefore unless otherwise stipulated in the deed of conveyance.
The deed of sale in favor of Valisno included the "conveyance and
transfer of the water rights and improvements" appurtenant to
Honorata Adriano's property. By the terms of the Deed of Absolute
Sale, the vendor Honorata Adriano Francisco sold, ceded,
conveyed and transferred to Dr. Nicolas Valisno all "rights, title,
interest and participations over the parcel of land above-
described, together with one Berkely Model 6 YRF Centrifugal
Pump G" suction, 6" discharge 500-1500 GPM, with Serial No.
5415812 and one (1) set of suction pipe and discharge of pipe
with elbow, nipples, flanges and footvalves," and the water rights
and such other improvements appertaining to the property subject
of this sale. According to Valisno, the water right was the primary
consideration for his purchase of Honorata's property, for without
it the property would be unproductive.
Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation
purposes, which are appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the
conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned in the
conveyance. The purchaser's easement of necessity in a water
ditch running across the grantor's land cannot be defeated even if
the water is supplied by a third person. The fact that an easement
by grant may also have qualified as an easement of necessity
does detract from its permanency as property right, which
survives the determination of the necessity. As an easement of
waters in favor of Valisno has been established, he is entitled to
enjoy it free from obstruction, disturbance or wrongful interference
(19 CJ 984), such as Adriano’s act of levelling the irrigation canal
to deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga River.
Ronquillo, et. al. v. Roco, et. al.G.R. No. L-10619, February 28,
1958, 103 Phil. 84 Montemayor, J.
FACTS: Plaintiff Leogario Ronquillo have been in the continuous
and uninterrupted use of a road which traversed the land of the
defendants, Rocos, in going to Igualdad Street and the market
place of Naga City for more than 20 years and that the Rocos
have long recognized and respected the private legal easement of
a right of way of said plaintiffs.
101
On May 12, 1953, the defendants along with a number of men
maliciously obstructed plaintiff’s right of way by constructing a
chapel in the middle of the said road and then later, by means of
force, intimidation, and threats, illegally and violently planted
wooden posts, fenced with barbed wire and closed hermitically
the road passage way thereby preventing the plaintiff from using
it.
The plaintiff claims that he has already acquired the easement of
right of way over the land thru prescription by his continuous and
uninterrupted use of the narrow strip of land as passage way.
However, plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed by the CFI.
ISSUE: Whether or not an easement of right of way can be
acquired by prescription.
HELD: No. The Court held than an easement of right of way may
not be acquired thru prescription because though it may be
apparent, it is nevertheless discontinuous or intermittent, and
therefore, under Article 622 of the New Civil Code, can be
acquired only by a virtue of a title. Furthermore, a right of way
cannot be acquired by prescription because prescription requires
that the possession be continuous and uninterrupted.
Tañedo v. BernadG.R. No. L-66520 August 30, 1988, 165
SCRA 86 Padilla, J.
FACTS: Private respondent Antonio Cardenas owned Lot 7501-A
and Lot 7501-B. On the said two lots, a septic tank was
constructed for the common use of the occupants of both lots.
Cardenas sold Lot 7501-A to herein petitioner Tañedo and the
other Lot 7501- B was also mortgaged to Tañedo as a security for
the payment of loan with an agreement that Cardenas would only
sell Lot 7501-B to him. However, said Lot 7501-B was sold to
herein respondent Spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim. Upon
learning of the said sale, Tañedo offered to redeem the property
from Sim but the latter refused. Instead, Sim blocked the sewage
pipe connecting the building of Eduardo Tañedo built on Lot 7501-
A, to the septic tank in Lot 7501-B. He also asked Tañedo to
remove that portion of his building enroaching on Lot 7501-B.
Tañedo was then constrained to file an action for legal redemption
and damages invoking Article 1622 of the Civil Code. On the other
hand, respondent Spouses claimed they are the absolute owners
of Lot 7501-B and that Eduardo Tañedo has no right to redeem
the land under Art. 1622 of the Civil Code as the land sought to be
redeemed is much bigger than the land owned by Tañedo.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s right to continue to use the
septic tank, erected on Lot 7501-B, ceased upon the subdivision
of the land and its subsequent sale to different owners who do not
have the same interest.
102
HELD: No. Applying Article 631 and 624 of the Civil Code, no
statement abolishing or extinguishing the easement of drainage
was mentioned in the deed of sale of Lot 7501- A to Eduardo
Tañedo. Nor did Antonio Cardenas stop the use of the drain pipe
and septic tank by the occupants of Lot 7501-A before he sold
said lot to Eduardo Tafiedo. Hence, the use of the septic tank is
continued by operation of law. Accordingly, the spouses Romeo
and Pacita Sim the new owners of the servient estate (Lot 7501-
B), cannot impair, in any manner whatsoever, the use of the
servitude.
Costabella Corporation v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 80511
January 25, 1991, 193 SCRA 333 Sarmiento, J.
FACTS: Petitioner owns the real estate properties situated at Sitio
Buyong, Maribago, Lapu-Lapu City, on which it had constructed a
resort and hotel. The private respondents, on the other hand, are
the owners of adjoining properties. Before the petitioner began
the construction of its beach hotel, the private respondents, in
going to and from their respective properties and the provincial
road, passed through a passageway which traversed the
petitioner's property. In 1981, the petitioner closed the
aforementioned passageway when it began the construction of its
hotel, but nonetheless opened another route across its property
through which the private respondents, as in the past, were
allowed to pass. Later, or sometime in August, 1982, when it
undertook the construction of the second phase of its beach hotel,
the petitioner fenced its property thus closing even the alternative
passageway and preventing the private respondents from
traversing any part of it. Therefore, an action for injunction with
damages was filed against the petitioner by the private
respondents before the then Court of First Instance of Cebu.
The CFI rendered a decision on March 15, 1984 finding that the
private respondents had acquired a vested right over the
passageway in controversy based on its long existence and its
continued use and enjoyment by the private respondents and also
by the community at large. On appeal, Appellate Court held as
without basis the trial court's finding that the private respondents
had acquired a vested right over the passageway in question by
virtue of prescription. The appellate court pointed out that an
easement of right of way is a discontinuous one which, under
Article 622 of the New Civil Code, may only be acquired by virtue
of a title and not by prescription. That notwithstanding, the
appellate court went on to rule that ". . . in the interest of justice
and in the exercise by this Court of its equity jurisdiction, there is
no reason for Us in not treating the easement here sought by
appellees Katipunan Lumber Co., Inc. and Perfecta Guangco as
one that is not dependent upon the claims of the parties but a
compulsory one that is legally demandable by the owner of the
dominant estate from the owner of the servient estate."
ISSUE: Whether or not the easement may be granted to private
respondent over the land of Costabella.
103
HELD: No. It is already well-established that an easement of right
of way, as is involved here, is discontinuous and as such can not
be acquired by prescription. Insofar therefore as the appellate
court adhered to the foregoing precepts, it stood correct.
Unfortunately, after making the correct pronouncement, the
respondent Appellate Court did not order the reversal of the trial
court's decision and the dismissal of the complaint after holding
that no easement had been validly constituted over the
petitioner's property. Instead, the Appellate Court went on to
commit a reversible error by considering the passageway in issue
as a compulsory easement which the private respondents, as
owners of the "dominant" estate, may demand from the petitioner
the latter being the owner of the "servient" estate.
Based on Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, the owner of the
dominant estate may validly claim a compulsory right of way only
after he has established the existence of four requisites, to wit: (1)
the (dominant) estate is surrounded by other immovables and is
without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) after payment of
the proper indemnity; (3) the isolation was not due to the
proprietor's own acts; and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point
least prejudicial to the servient estate. In the case at bar, there is
absent any showing that the private respondents had established
the existence of the four requisites mandated by law.
Encarnacion v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 77628, March 11,
1991, 195 SCRA 74 Fernan, C.J.
FACTS: Petitioner owns the dominant estate bounded on north by
the servient estate owned by respondents and an estate owned
by Magsino, all of which are located in Talisay, Batangas. The
servient estate is bound on the north by the national highway. To
provide access to the highway, a one meter road path was paved
through in which half of its width was taken from the estate of
Magsino and the other half from the estate of the respondent.
Petitioner started a nursery plant type of business in which
pushcarts were used to haul the plants from his estate to and
from his nursery and the highway, using the one meter road path.
As his business grew, he bought a jeepney to enable him to
transport more plants and soil catering to the now bigger demand.
The problem however was that the jeepney cannot pass through
the road path since its width would not be accommodated by a
one meter width. Petitioner made a request upon the respondent
to sell to him 1 1⁄2 meters of their property so that the pathway
may be widened to enable his jeepney to pass through. The
respondents refused. Petitioner went to court praying that he
would be granted the additional land to the right of way already
constituted but the trial court rendered a decision adverse to the
petitioner because there was no such necessity as it was shown
that there was the presence of dried river bed only 80 meters
away from the property of the petitioner which he may use as an
alternative route. The CA affirmed said decision of the trial court.
104
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to be granted his
prayer to buy the additional land to increase the existing one
meter road path.
HELD: Yes. Even with the presence of the dried river bed, upon
thorough investigation, it was found to be an inadequate right of
way because a concrete bridge traverses it thereby the jeep
would have to jump over said bridge which has a height of 5
meters in order to reach the highway. It was also found that during
the rainy season, the same was impassable as it became flooded.
This right of way could not provide adequate access to the
highway thereby when an estate has no access to a public road, it
may demand for a right of way. Furthermore, under Article 651 of
the Civil Code, it is the needs of the dominant property which
ultimately determine the width of the right of way. In this case,
since the business of the petitioner grew larger and pushcarts
became tedious to transport his nursery plants, it became
necessary for him to do so with a jeepney. And in order to
efficiently make such transportation of his plants, the right of way
had to be widened to accommodate the width of the jeepney of
the petitioner. The petitioner thus shall be granted the additional
land to the existing right of way.
Case v. Heirs of TuasonG.R. No. L-5044, December 1, 1909,
14 Phil. 521 Torres, J.
FACTS: The counsel for the heirs of Pablo Tuason and Leocadia
Santibañez alleged that the parties whom he represents are
owners in common of the property adjoining that of the petitioner
Edwin Case on the southwest. The latter, extended his southwest
boundary line to a portion of the lot of the said heirs of Tuason
and Santibañez. They alleged that the true dividing line between
the property of the petitioner and that of the said heirs is a
belonging to the respondents, and that about two years ago,
when Case made alterations in the buildings erected on his land,
he improperly caused a portion of them to rest on the wall owned
by the respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the wall is the property of the heirs of the
late Tuason and Santibañez.
HELD: The wall in controversy belongs to the heirs of the late
Tuason and Santibañez for the reason, among others, that in the
public document by which one of their original ancestors acquired
on the 19th of April, 1796, the property now possessed by them, it
appears that property was then already inclosed by a stone wall.
The wall supports only the property of the respondents and not
that of the petitioner, can not be a party wall, one-half of which
along its entire length would belong to the adjoining building
owned by Mr. Case. There is not sufficient proof to sustain such
claim, and besides, the building erected thereon disproves the
pretension of the petitioner.
105
Under article 572 of the Civil Code the easement of party walls is
presumed, unless there is a title or exterior sign, or proof to the
contrary, among others, in dividing walls adjoining buildings up to
the common point of elevation.
The legal presumption as to party walls is limited to the three
cases dealt with in the said article of the code, and is that of juris
tantum unless the contrary appear from the title of ownership of
the adjoining properties, that is to say, that the entire wall in
controversy belongs to one of the property owners, or where there
is no exterior sign to destroy such presumption and support a
presumption against the party wall.
It can not be presumed that the aforesaid portion was a party wall,
and that it was not exclusively owned by the respondents,
inasmuch as the latter have proven by means of a good title that
has not been impugned by the petitioner, that when one of their
ancestors and principals acquired the property the lot was already
inclosed by the wall on which the building was erected; it must
therefore be understood that in the purchase of the property the
wall by which the land was inclosed was necessarily included.
Choco v. SantamariaG.R. No. 6076, December 29, 1911, 21
Phil. 132 Mapa, J.
FACTS: The defendant in the building of his house, has made
several openings and windows in the walls of the house on both
sides overlooking then property of the plaintiff; that at the time the
defendant was building his house, and the windows and the
openings were being made, the plaintiffs protested, and later on
and in the year 1905 made written protest and demand on the
defendant, and the defendant received the written protest and
referred it to his counsel, who, from the evidence, appears to
have suggested an amicable and adjustment of the matter, but
the adjustment was not made, and this action was brought. The
Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, Severina
and Flora Choco, and against the defendant, Isidro Santamaria,
forever prohibiting the opening of the window stated, which must
be closed, and forever prohibiting the opening of the windows and
openings marked, which must be closed or made to conform to
the requirements of law with regard to dimensions and an iron
grate embedded in the wall, with the costs of the action.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred by not ordering in his
judgment the final and perpetual closing of the large window
opened in the balcony of the back part of the appellee's house
and that, though the appellant's lot can be seen through the
window, it is not contiguous to the latter's property.
HELD: To judge from the photographic views, it opens on the
boundary line between the said lot and that the appellee and is
situated perpendicularly above a part of the wall that belongs to
the appellants. This opinion is corroborated by the testimony of
the defendant's witness who took the said photographs, in so far
as he said that "a part of
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the window in question is in front of the plaintiffs' property, since
between it and the plaintiffs' property there does not intervene the
distance required by law — that of two meters in the first case,
and 60 centimeters in the second, therefore, its opening is a
manifest violation of the provisions of article 582 of the Civil Code
which reads as follows: “Windows with direct views, or balconies
or any similar openings projecting over the estate of the neighbor,
cannot be made if there is not a distance of, at least, 2 meters
between the wall in which they are built and said estate. Neither
can side nor oblique views be opened over said property, unless
there is a distance of 60 centimeters.” Because of the lack of the
distance required by law, the window in question must be closed,
and consequently the judgment appealed from should be modified
in this sense, as regards this window.
Solid Manila Corporation v. Bio Hong Trading Co., Inc. G.R.
No. 90596, April 8, 1991, 195 SCRA 748 Sarmiento, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Solid Manila Corporation is the owner of the
land in Ermita, Manila. The same lies in the vicinity of another
parcel, registered in the name of the private respondent Bio Hong
Trading Co., Inc. The private respondent’s title came from a prior
owner, and in their deed of sale, the parties thereto reserved as
easement of way. As a consequence, there is an annotation which
was entered wherein a construction of private alley has been
undertaken. However, the petitioner averred that they and their
neighbors have been using the private alley and maintained and
contributed to its upkeep until sometime in 1983. Due to this, the
private respondent constructed steel gates that precluded
unhampered used. The petitioner commenced suit for injunction
against the private respondent to have the gates removed and to
allow full access to the easement. The court a quo issued ex
parte an order directing the private respondent to open the gates.
However, the Court of Appeals ordered the restoration of the
annotation. They ruled that an easement is a mere limitation on
ownership and that it does not impair the private respondent’s
title, and that since the private respondent had acquired title to the
property, “merger” brought about an extinguishment of the
easement. The petitioner then averred that the very deed of sale
executed between the private respondent and the previous owner
of the property “excluded” the alley in question, and that in any
event, the intent of the parties was to retain the “alley” as an
easement, notwithstanding the sale.
ISSUE: Whether or not an easement had been extinguished by
merger.
HELD: No. The Court held that no genuine merger took place as
a consequence of the sale in favor of the private respondent
corporation. According to the Civil Code, a merger exists when
ownership of the dominant and servient estates is consolidated in
the same person. Merger then, as can be seen, requires full
ownership of both estates. One thing ought to be noted here,
however. The servitude in question is a personal servitude, that is
to say, one constituted not in favor of a particular tenement but
rather,
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for the benefit of the general public as stated in Article 614 of the
Civil Code. In personal servitude, there is therefore no “owner of a
dominant tenement” to speak of, and the easement pertains to
persons without a dominant estate, in this case, the public at
large. Merger, as we said, presupposes the existence of a prior
servient-dominant owner relationship, and the termination of that
relation leaves the easement of no use. Unless the owner
conveys the property in favor of the public, if that is possible, no
genuine merger can take place that would terminate a personal
easement.
Floro v. LlenadoG.R. No. 75723, June 2, 1995, 244 SCRA 713
Romeo, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Simeon Floro is the owner of Floro Park
Subdivision who has its own egress and ingress to and from the
Mac Arthur Highway by means of its Road Lot 4 and the PNR
level crossing. On the other hand, Respondent Orlando Llenado,
is the registered owner of Llenado Homes Subdivision, adjacent
to Floro Park Subdivision. Prior to its purchase by Llenado, the
land was known as the Emmanuel Homes Subdivision, a duly
licensed and registered housing subdivision in the name of
Soledad Ortega. Bounded on the South by the 5 to 6 meter-wide
Palanas Creek, which separates it from the Floro Park
Subdivision, and on the west by ricelands belonging to Marcial
Ipapo. the Llenado Homes does not have any existing road or
passage to the Mac Arthur Highway. However, a proposed access
road traversing the idle riceland of Marcial Ipapo has been
specifically provided in the subdivision plan of the Emmanuel
Homes Subdivision which was duly approved by the defunct
Human Settlement Regulatory Commission. Meanwhile, the
Llenados sought, and were granted permission by the Floros to
use Road Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park Subdivision as
passageway to and from MacArthur Highway. However no
contract of easement of right of way was ever perfected by both
parties. Later, Floro barricaded Road Lot 5 with a pile of rocks,
wooden posts and adobe stones, thereby preventing its use by
the Llenados. Llenado instituted a complaint before the RTC of
Malolos, Bulacan against Floro for easement of right of way. The
RTC granted the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction and ordered Floro to open the road and pay
damages. Thereafter, the trial court rendered another judgment
dismissing the case and lifting the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction previously issued and ordered the plaintiff to pay
defendant damages and costs. On appeal by Llenado on the CA,
the judgment of the RTC was reversed ordering Floro to open
roads 4 and 5 and remove all the objects that prevent passage on
road 5 and to pay the plaintiff damages with costs and payment of
indemnity for the easement of right of way.
ISSUE: Whether or not Llenado is entitled to a compulsory
easement of right of way.
HELD: No. For the Llenados to be entitled to a compulsory
servitude of right of way under the Civil Code, the preconditions
provided under Articles 649 and 650 thereof must be established.
These preconditions are: (1) that the dominant estate is
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surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a
public highway (Art. 649, par. 1); (2) after payment of proper
indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1); (3) that the isolation was not due to
acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate (Art. 649, last par.);
and, (4) that the right of way claimed is at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as consistent with
this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest (Art. 650).
The burden of proving the existence of the prerequisites to validly
claim a compulsory right of way lies on the owner of the dominant
estate. On the past subdivision plans by Emmanuel Homes which
is bought by Llenado, there is an indication of an access road
through IPAPO’s property although it was not properly paved, a
dirt road will suffice. Seeing this, Llenado has failed to comply
with the first requirement. If the servitude requested by Llenado is
allowed, other subdivision developers/owners would be
encouraged to hastily prepare a subdivision plan with fictitious
provisions for access roads merely for registration purposes.
Furthermore, if such practice were tolerated, the very purpose for
which Presidential Decree No. 957 was enacted, that is, to protect
subdivision buyers from unscrupulous subdivision
owners/developers who renege on their duties to develop their
subdivisions in accordance with the duly approved subdivision
plans, would be defeated.
In order to justify the imposition of the servitude of right of way,
there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial necessity for it.
Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required
by law as the basis for setting up a compulsory easement. Even
in the face of a necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing
the servitude, the same should not be imposed.
The complaint for easement of right of way filed by Llenado in the
lower court did not contain a prayer for the fixing of the amount
that he must pay Floro in the event that the easement of right of
way is constituted. Thus, the existence of the second requisite
has likewise not been established. Private respondent Llenado
admitted that the Ipapo riceland was no longer being cultivated.
Indications are that it has already been abandoned as a ricefield.
There was no reason for private respondent's failure to develop
the right of way except the inconvenience and expenses it would
cost him. Hence, the third requisite has not been met. Failing to
establish the existence of the prerequisites under Articles 649 and
650 of the Civil Code, private respondent Llenado's bid for a
compulsory easement of right of way over Road Lots 4 and 5 of
the Floro Park Subdivision must fail.
Quimen v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 112331 May 29, 1996, 257
SCRA 163 Bellosillo, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Anastacia Quimen together with her brothers
Sotero, Sulpicio, Antonio and sister Rufina inherited a piece of
property situated in Pandi, Bulacan. They
109
agreed to subdivide the property equally among themselves, as
they did, with the shares of Anastacia, Sotero, Sulpicio and Rufina
abutting the municipal road. Located directly behind the lots of
Anastacia and Sotero is the share of their brother Antonio
designated as Lot No. 1448-B-C which the latter divided into two
(2) equal parts, now Lots Nos. 1448-B-6-A and 1448-B-6-B. The
latter Lot is behind the property of Sotero, father of private
respondent Yolanda Oliveros. Yolanda purchased Lot No. 1448-B-
6-A from her uncle Antonio through her aunt Anastacia who was
then acting as his administratrix. According to Yolanda, when
petitioner offered her the property for sale she was hesitant to buy
as it had no access to a public road. But Anastacia prevailed upon
her to buy the lot with the assurance that she would give her a
right of way on her adjoining property. Thereafter, Yolanda
constructed a house on the lot she bought using as her
passageway to the public highway a portion of Anastacia's
property. But when Yolanda finally offered to pay for the use of the
pathway Anastacia refused to accept the payment. In fact she
was thereafter barred by Anastacia from passing through her
property. Later, Yolanda purchased the other lot of Antonio
Quimen, Lot No. 1448-B-6- B, located directly behind the property
of her parents who provided her a pathway between their house
from the lot of Yolanda behind the sari sari store of Sotero, and
Anastacia's perimeter fence. The store is made of strong
materials and occupies the entire frontage of the lot measuring
four (4) meters wide and nine meters (9) long. Although the
pathway leads to the municipal road it is not adequate for ingress
and egress. The municipal road cannot be reached with facility
because the store itself obstructs the path so that one has to pass
through the back entrance and the facade of the store to reach
the road. Finally, Yolanda filed an action with the proper court
praying for a right of way through Anastacia's property. The report
was that the proposed right of way was at the extreme right of
Anastacia's property facing the public highway, starting from the
back of Sotero's sari-sari store and extending inward by one (1)
meter to her property and turning left for about five (5) meters to
avoid the store. However, the trial court dismissed her complaint.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision declaring that she
was entitled to a right of way on petitioner’s property and that the
way proposed by Yoland would cause the least damage and
detriment to the servient estate.
ISSUE: Whether or not passing through the property of Yolanda's
parents is more accessible to the public road than to make a
detour to her property and cut down the avocado tree standing
thereon.
HELD: Yes. The conditions sine quo non for a valid grant of an
easement of right of way are: (a) the dominant estate is
surrounded by other immovables without an adequate outlet to a
public highway; (b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper
indemnity; (c) the isolation was not due to the acts of the
dominant estate; and, (d) the right of way being claimed is at a
point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail
over the criterion of shortest distance although this is a matter of
judicial appreciation. While shortest distance may ordinarily imply
least prejudice, it is not always so as when there are permanent
structures obstructing the shortest distance; while on the other
hand, the longest distance may be free of obstructions and the
easiest or most convenient to pass
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through. In other words, where the easement may be established
on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the
one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage
should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2)
circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which
will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be
the shortest.
As between a right of way that would demolish a store of strong
materials to provide egress to a public highway, and another right
of way which although longer will only require an avocado tree to
be cut down, the second alternative should be preferred.
De Jesus, et. al. v. Homart Corporation, et. al.G.R. No. 44191
– R, August 28, 1974, 19 CA Rep. 831
FACTS: Jesus and Luz Miranda de Jesus are owners of the
building located in Tondo, Manila. They brought an action for
damages against Homart Corporation and Howmill Manufacturing
Corporation, owners of the land adjoining the plaintiff on the same
street where a sixty storey concrete building was constructed.
Plaintiffs allege that the defendants failed to observe the
necessary care and precautions to protect the construction of the
plaintiffs by depriving it of sufficient lateral or subjacent support,
thereby causing it to sink in some parts; its walls, ceilings, and
floorings to crack in some places; and by the careless manner of
handling the cement used the roofing’s of the building of the
plaintiff were damaged with the accumulated debris piled thereon.
ISSUE: Whether or not proper precautions had been taken by the
defendants in constructing the building in question so as to
prevent causing damage to the building of the plaintiff.
HELD: No. Article 684 of the New Civil Code provides “No
property shall make such excavations upon his land as to deprive
any adjacent land or building sufficient lateral or subjacent
support”. A reading of Article 684 shows that the duty of an
adjacent owner not to deprive any adjacent land or building of
sufficient lateral or subjacent support is an absolute one. It does
not depend on the degree of care and precaution made by the
proprietor in making the excavation or building on his land.
Plaintiffs’ house which adjoins the seven storey concrete building
constructed by the defendants had sunk by about eight inches.
The sinking of the left side of the house of the plaintiffs was due to
the weakening of subjacent support and to the weight of the
seven storey concrete building constructed by the defendant, as
the excavation made necessarily disturbed the subjacent soil of
the plaintiff’s land. Defendants having failed to provide the
plaintiff’s land and house with sufficient lateral and subjacent
support are liable for damages.
La Vista Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
111
G.R. No. 95252, September 5, 1997, 278 SCRA 498 Bellosillo,
J.
FACTS: The Tuasons owned a vast tract of land in Quezon City
and Marikina, and when they sold to Philippine Building
Corporation a portion of their landholdings, it was expressly
provided in the Deed of Sale with Mortgage that the boundary line
between the property sold and the adjoining property of the
Tuasons shall be a road fifteen (15) meters wide, one-half of
which shall be taken from the property sold to the Philippine
Building Corporation and the other half from the portion adjoining
belonging to the Tuasons. Philippine Building Corporation then
sold and assigned with the consent of the Tuasons, the subject
parcel of land to ATENEO which assumed the mortgage and the
obligation in the seven and one-half roadway.
On their part, the Tuasons developed a part of the estate
adjoining the portion sold to Philippine Building Corporation into a
residential village known as LA VISTA Subdivision. Thus the
boundary between LA VISTA and the portion sold to ATENEO was
the 15-meter wide roadway known as the Mangyan Road. The
Tuasons developed its 7.5-meter share of the 15-meter wide
boundary, while ATENEO deferred improvement on its share and
erected instead an adobe wall on the entire length of the
boundary.
ATENEO subsequently sold to Solid Homes Inc. the land which
the latter developed into a subdivision now known as LOYOLA
Grand Villas. Solid Homes Inc. now claims to have an easement
of right-of-way along Mangyan Road through which they could
have access to Katipunan Avenue.
LA VISTA however instructed its security guards to prohibit agents
and assignees of Solid Homes, Inc., from traversing Mangyan
Road, and even constructed concrete posts that prevented the
residents of LOYOLA from passing through.
Solid Homes, Inc., filed a case before the Regional Trial Court
and prayed that LA VISTA been joined from preventing and
obstructing the use and passage of LOYOLA residents through
Mangyan Road. The lower court recognized the easement of
right-of- way along Mangyan Road in favor of Solid Homes, Inc.,
and ordered LA VISTA to pay damages. On appeal by LA VISTA,
the decision of the lower court was affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an easement of right-of-way over
Mangyan Road.
HELD: Yes. The predecessors-in-interest of both LA VISTA and
Solid Homes, Inc., i.e., the Tuasons and the Philippine Building
Corporation, respectively, clearly established a contractual
easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road. A voluntary
easement is quite evidently manifested in the stipulation in the
Deed of Sale with mortgage executed by them. When the
easement was established by their contract, the parties
unequivocally made provisions for its observance by all whom in
the future might succeed them in dominion. It is thus very
apparent that the parties and their respective
112
predecessors-in-interest intended to establish an easement of
right-of-way over Mangyan Road for their mutual benefit, both as
dominant and servient estates.
With this, the free ingress and egress along Mangyan Road
created by the voluntary agreement between Ateneo and Solid
Homes, Inc., is thus legally demandable (Articles 619 and 625,
New Civil Code) with the corresponding duty on the servient
estate not to obstruct the same.
LA VISTA contends that there are other routes to LOYOLA from
Mangyan Road, however, this should not be taken into
consideration since the opening of an adequate outlet to a
highway can extinguish only legal or compulsory easements, not
voluntary easements like in the case at bar. The fact that an
easement by grant may have also qualified as an easement of
necessity does not detract from its permanency as a property
right, which survives the termination of the necessity.
Alcantara v. Reta, Jr.G.R. No. 136996, December 14, 2001, 372
SCRA 364 Pardo, J.
FACTS: Alcantara and the other petitioners claim that they were
tenants or lessees of the land owned by Reta. The land has been
converted into a commercial center and Reta is threatening to
eject them. They claim that since they are legitimate tenants or
lessees of such land, they have the right of first refusal to
purchase the land in accordance with Section 3(g) of Presidential
Decree No. 1517, the Urban Land Reform Act. They also claimed
that the amicable settlement executed between Reta and Ricardo
Roble, one of the petitioners, was void ab initio for being violative
of PD No. 1517. On the other hand, Reta claimed that the land is
question is not within the scope of PD No. 1517 since it was not
proclaimed as an Urban Land Reform Zone (ULRZ). Alcantara,
among others, then filed complaint for the exercise of the right of
first refusal under PD No. 1517 in the Regional Trial Court.
However, such complaint was dismissed and such dismissal was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition was filed.
ISSUE: Whether the Alcantara and the other petitioners have the
right of first refusal.
HELD: No. The land involved has not been proclaimed an Urban
Land Reform Zone (ULRZ). In fact, petitioners filed a petition with
the National Housing Authority requesting that said land be
declared as an ULRZ. Clearly, the request to have the land
proclaimed as an ULRZ would not be necessary if the property
was an ULRZ. PD No. 1517 pertains to areas proclaimed as
ULRZ. Consequently, petitioners cannot claim any right under the
said law since the land involved is not an ULRZ.
To be able to qualify and avail of the rights and privileges granted
by the said decree, one must be: (1) a legitimate tenant of the
land for ten (10) years or more; (2) must have
113
built his home on the land by contract; and, (3) has resided
continuously for the last ten (10) years. Those who do not fall
within the said category cannot be considered "legitimate tenants"
and, therefore, not entitled to the right of first refusal to purchase
the property should the owner of the land decide to sell the same
at a reasonable price within a reasonable time.
Reta denies that he has lease agreements with Alcantara and
Roble. Alcantara, on the other hand, failed to present evidence of
a lease agreement other than his testimony in court. Reta allowed
Roble to use sixty-two (62) coconut trees for P186 from where he
gathered tuba. This arrangement would show that it is a usufruct
and not a lease. Roble was also allowed to construct his house on
the land because it would facilitate his gathering of tuba. This
would be in the nature of a personal easement under Article 614
of the Civil Code. Whether the amicable settlement is valid or not,
the conclusion would still be the same since the agreement was
one of usufruct and not of lease. Thus, Roble is not a legitimate
tenant as defined by PD No. 1517.
With regard to the other petitioners, Reta admitted that he had
verbal agreements with them. This notwithstanding, they are still
not the legitimate tenants who can exercise the right of first
refusal under PD No. 1517. From the moment Reta demanded
that the petitioners vacate the premises, the verbal lease
agreements, which were on a monthly basis since rentals were
paid monthly, ceased to exist as there was termination of the
lease.
In conclusion, none of the petitioners is qualified to exercise the
right of first refusal under PD No. 1517.
There was also no intention on the part of Reta to sell the
property. Hence, even if the petitioners had the right of first
refusal, the situation which would allow the exercise of that right,
that is, the sale or intended sale of the land has not happened.
PD No. 1517 applies where the owner of the property intends to
sell it to a third party.
Prosperity Credit Resources, Inc. v. Court of Appeals G.R.
No. 114170, January 15, 1999, 301 SCRA 52 Mendoza, J.
FACTS: Private respondent Metropolitan Fabrics, Inc. (MFI) and
petitioner Prosperity Credit Resources, Inc. (PCRI) executed a
Memorandum of Undertaking (MOU) wherein PCRI acceded to
MFI’s request to redeem three of the seven lots foreclosed and
won by the former in the ensuing public auction. The MOA was
conditioned upon the agreement that the petitioner shall be given
a right of way on the existing private road which forms part of the
area to be redeemed by private respondents. Later, PCRI filed an
injunctive suit against MFI alleging, inter alia, that the latter, in
violation of the terms of the MOU, refused to allow PCRI to make
excavations on one side of the access road for the installation of
water. The trial court granted the petition for the issuance of the
114
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. On appeal, the CA set
aside the assailed order of the trial court; hence, this petition for
review on certiorari. PCRI contends that it is entitled to the
issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction as may be
gleaned from the following provision in the MOU: The above cited
lot, being an existing private road, will remain open to ingress and
egress for whatever kind of passage in favor of PROSPERITY
FINANCIAL RESOURCES, INC. or its successors=in-interest.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
ordering private respondent to allow petitioner to undertake
excavations along the access road for the purpose of installing
water pipes.
Held: Yes. There is no question as to the meaning of the terms
“ingress” and “egress”. They give petitioner the right to use the
private road as means of entry into and exit from its property on
the northwestern side o f the compound. The question concerns
the meaning of the phrase “for whatever kind of passage”. The
trial court read this phrase to mean that petitioner had the right to
make excavations on the side of the access road in order to install
a network of pipes. The word “passage” does not, however;
“clearly and unmistakably” convey a meaning that includes a right
to install water pipes on the access road. The ordinary meaning of
the word, as defined in Webster’s Dictionary, is that act or action
of passing: movement or transference from one place or point to
another.” this legal meaning is not different. It means, according to
Black’s Law Dictionary, the act of passing; transit; transition.
Villanueva v. VelascoG.R. No. 130845, November 27, 2000,
346 SCRA 99 Quisumbing, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Bryan Villanueva is the registered owner of the
parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 127862
of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. He bought it from Pacific
Banking Corporation, the mortgagee of said property. When
petitioner bought the parcel of land there was a small house on its
southeastern portion. It occupied one meter of the two-meter wide
easement of right of way the Gabriel spouses granted to the
Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, in a
Contract of Easement of Right of Way. Unknown to petitioner,
even before he bought the land, the Gabriels had constructed the
aforementioned small house that encroached upon the two-meter
easement. Petitioner was also unaware that private respondents,
Julio Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla, had filed on May 8, 1991 for
easement. As successors-in-interest, Sebastian and Lorilla
wanted to enforce the contract of easement. On August 13, 1991,
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued, ordering
the Gabriels to provide the right of way and to demolish the small
house encroaching on the easement. On January 5, 1995, Judge
Tirso Velasco issued an Alias Writ of Demolition. Meanwhile,
petitioner filed a Third Party Claim with Prayer to Quash Alias Writ
of Demolition. He maintains that the writ of demolition could not
apply to his property since he was not a party to the civil case.
115
ISSUE: Whether or not the easement on the property binds
petitioner.
HELD: Yes. Unlike other types of encumbrance of real property, a
servitude like a right of way can exist even if they are not
expressly stated or annotated as an encumbrance in a Torrens
title because servitudes are inseparable from the estates to which
they actively or passively belong. Moreover, Villanueva was
bound by the contract of easement, not only as a voluntary
easement but as a legal easement. A legal easement is mandated
by law, and continues to exist unless its removal is provided for in
a title of conveyance or the sign of the easement is removed
before the execution of the conveyance conformably with Article
649 in accordance with Article 617 of the Civil Code.
National Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals G.R.
No. 114348, September 20, 2000, 340 SCRA 661 Pardo, J.
FACTS: A free patent over 3 hectares of land in Cagayan was
issued and registered in the name of private respondent Dick
Manglapus’ predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Manglapus. The land
was granted to the latter subject to the provisions of sections 113,
121, 122 and 124 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which provide
that except in favor of the Government or any of its branches,
units, or institutions, the land hereby acquired shall be inalienable
and shall not be subject to encumbrance for a period of 5 years
from the date of this patent and shall not be liable for the
satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of that
period. Subsequently, private respondent Manglapus acquired the
lot from Vicente Manglapus by absolute sale and was later
registered 11 years later from the issuance of patent. Meanwhile,
petitioner National Irrigation Administration entered into a contract
with Villamar Development Construction. Under the contract,
petitioner NIA was to construct canals in Cagayan. NIA then
entered a portion of petitioner’s land and made diggings and
fillings thereon. Private respondent then filed a complaint for
damages alleging that petitioner’s diggings and fillings destroyed
the agricultural use of his land and that no reasonable
compensation was paid for its taking.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner NIA should pay Manglapus
just compensation for the taking of a portion of his property for
use as easement of a right of way.
HELD: No. We find that NIA is under no obligation. We sustain
the appeal. We agree with NIA that the Transfer Certificate of Title
and the Original Certificate of Title covering the subject parcel of
land contained a reservation granting the government a right of
way over the land covered therein.
Under the Original Certificate of Title, there was a reservation and
condition that the land is subject to “to all conditions and public
easements and servitudes recognized and
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prescribed by law, especially thouse mentioned in Sections 109,
110, 111, 112, 113 and 114, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended.” This reservation, unlike the other provisos imposed on
the grant, was not limited by any time period and thus is a
subsisting condition. Section 112, Commonwealth Act No. 141,
provides that lands granted by patent, “shall further be subject to
a right of way not exceeding twenty meters in width for public
highways, railrods, irrigation, ditches, aqueducts, telegraphs and
telephone lines, and similar works as the Government or any
public or quasi-public service or enterprises, including mining or
forest concessionaires may reasonably require for carrying on
their business, with damages for the improvements only.
Article 619 of the Civil Code provides that “Easements are
established either by law or by the will of the owners. The former
are called legal and the latter voluntary easements.” In the
present case, we find and declare that a legal easement of a
right- of-way exists in favor of the government. The land was
originally public land, and awarded to respondent Manglapus by
free patent. The ruling would be otherwise if the land were
originally private property, in which case, just compensation must
be paid for the taking of a part thereof for public use as an
easement of a right of way.
Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals G.R. No.
125018, April 6, 2000, 330 SCRA 145 Bellosillo, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Remman Enterprises, Inc. and private
respondent Crispin Lat are adjoining landowners in Lipa City. The
land of Lat is agricultural and planted mostly with fruit trees while
Remman’s land is devoted to its piggery business. The latter’s
land is 1 1⁄2 meters higher in elevation than that of respondent
Lat. Meanwhile, respondent noticed that petitioner’s waste
disposal lagoon was already overflowing and inundating 1⁄4 of
Lat’s plantation. He made several representations with petitioner
but they fell on deaf ears. Consequently, the trees growing on the
flooded portion where it was inundated with water containing pig
manure, started to wither and die. Private respondent then filed a
complaint for damages alleging that the acidity of the soil in his
plantation increased because of the overflow of the water heavy
with pig manure from petitioner’s piggery farm. Petitioner denied
the allegations and claimed that the construction of additional
lagoons was already adopted to contain the waste water coming
from its piggery to prevent any damage to the adjoining estate.
Petitioner also argued that the damages, if any, were due to a
fortuitous event.
ISSUE: Whether or not the damages were due to a fortuitous
event.
HELD: No. We cannot agree with petitioner. We defer instead to
the findings opions expressed by the lower courts: Even
assuming that the heavy rains constituted an act of God; by
reason of their negligence, the fortuitous event became
humanized, rendering appellants liable for the ensuing damges. In
National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 649
(1993), the Supreme Court held: “Accordingly, petitioners
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cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or force majeure to
escape liability for the loss or damages sustained by private
respondents since they, the petitioners, were guilty of negligence.
This event then was not occasioned exclusively by an act of God
or force majeure; a human factor – negligence or imprudence –
had intervened. The effect tehn of the force majeure in question
may be deemed to have, even if only partly, resulted from the
participation of man. Thus, the whole occurrence was thereby
humanized, as it were, and removed from the rules applicable to
acts of God.”
As regards the alleged natural easement imposed upon the
property of appelle, resort to pertinent provisions of applicable law
is imperative. Under Article 637 of the Civil Code, it is provided
that “lower estates are obliged to receive the waters which
naturally and without the intervention of man descend from the
higher estates, as well as the stones or earth which they carry
with them. The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works
which will impede this easement; neither can the owner of the
higher estate make works which will increase the burden.”
A similar provion is found under Article 50 of the Water Code of
the Philippines (P.D. No. 1067), which provides that “lower estates
are obliged to receive the water which naturally and without the
intervention of man flow from the higher estates, as well as the
stone or eath which they carry with them. The owner of the lower
estate cannot construct works which will impede this natural flow,
unless he provides an alternative method of drainage; neither can
the owner of the higher estate make works which will increase this
natural flow.”
As worded, the two aforecited provisions impose a natural
easement upon the lower estate to receive the waters which
naturally and without the intervention of man descend from higher
estates. However, where the waters which flow from a higher
estate are those which are artificially collected in man-made
lagoons, any damage occasioned thereby entitles the owner of
the lower or servient estate to compensation.
Jesus is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. v.
Municipality (now City) of Pasig, Metro Manila
G.R. No. 152230, August 9, 2005, 466 SCRA 235 Callejo, Sr., J.
FACTS: Respondent Municipality of Pasig needed an access
road from E.R. Santos Street, a municipal road near the Pasig
Public Market to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig where 60 to
70 houses, mostly made of light materials, were located. The road
has to be at least three meters in width, as required by the Fire
Code, so that fire trucks could pass through in case of
conflagration. Likewise, the residents in the area needed the road
for water and electrical outlets. The municipality then decided to
acquire 51 square meters out of the 1,791 square meter property
of Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto
Ching Cuanco Kho, which is abutting E.R. Santos Street.
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Meanwhile, the Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an
Ordinance authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate
expropriation proceedings to acquire the said property and
appropriate the fund therefore. The ordinance stated that the
property owners were notified of the municipality’s intent to
purchase the property for public use as an access road but they
rejected the offer. The municipality then filed a complaint against
the Cuancos for the expropriation of the property under Section
19 of the Republic Act No. 7160 or otherwise known as the Local
Government Code. The Cuancos then contended that they had
sold the said property to petitioner Jesus is the Lord Christian
School Foundation, Inc. (JILCSFI) as evidenced by a deed of
sale. When apprised about the complaint, petitioner JILCSFI filed
a motion for leave to intervene as defendant-in- intervention which
was granted.
The petitioner JILCSFI asserted that the respondent must comply
with the requirements for the establishment of an easement of
right-of-way, more specifically, the road must be constructed at
the point lease prejudicial to the servient state, and that there
must be no adequate outlet to a public highway. The petitioner
also claimed that the portion of the lot sought to be expropriated is
located at the middle protion of the petitioner’s entire parcel of
land, thereby splitting the lot into two halves, and making it
impossible for the petitioner to put up its school building and
worship center.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner JILCSFI’s contentions are
tenable.
HELD: No. The subject property is expropriated for the purpose of
constructing a road. The respondent is not mandated to comply
with the essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way under
the New Civil Code. Case law has it that in the absence of
legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent domain
may determine the location and route of the land to be taken
unless such determination is capricious and wantonly injurious.
Expropriation is justified so long as it is for the public good and
there is genuine necessity of public character. Governmentmay
not capriciously choose what private property should be taken.
The respondent has demonstrated the necessity for constructing
a road from E.R. Santos Street to Sto. Tomas Bukid. The
witnesses, who were residents of Sto. Tomas Bukid, testified that
although there were other ways through which one can enter the
vicinity, no vehicle, however, especially fire trucks, could enter the
area except through the newly constructed Damayan Street. This
is more than sufficient to establish that there is a genuine
necessity for the construction of a road in the area. After all,
absolute necessity is not required, only reasonable and practical
necessity will suffice. Nonetheless, the respondent failed to show
the necessity for constructing the road particularly in the
petitioner’s property and not elsewhere. We note that the wheras
clause of the ordinance states that the 51-square meter lot is the
shortest and most suitable access road to connect Sto. Tomas
Bukid to E.R. Santos Street. The respondent’s complaint also
alleged that the said portion of the petitioner’s lot has been
surveyed as the best possible ingress and egress. However, the
respondent failed to adduce a preponderance of evidence.
119
Acap v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 118114, December 7, 1995,
251 SCRA 30 Padilla, J.
FACTS: The title to Lot 1130 of the Cadastral Survey of
Hinigaran, Negros Occidental was evidenced by OCT R-12179.
The lot has an area of 13,720 sq. m. The title was issued and is
registered in the name of spouses Santiago Vasquez and Lorenza
Oruma. After both spouses died, their only son Felixberto
inherited the lot. In 1975, Felixberto executed a duly notarized
document entitled “Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Absolute
Sale” in favor of Cosme Pido. Since 1960, Teodoro Acap had
been the tenant of a portion of the said land, covering an area of
9,500 sq. m. When ownership was transferred in 1975 by
Felixberto to Cosme Pido, Acap continued to be the registered
tenant thereof and religiously paid his leasehold rentals to Pido
and thereafter, upon Pido’s death, to his widow Laurenciana. The
controversy began when Pido died interstate and on 27
November 1981, his surviving heirs executed a notarized
document denominated as “Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of
Rights of Lot 1130 Hinigaran Cadastre,” wherein they declared to
have adjudicated upon themselves the parcel of land in equal
share, and that they waive, quitclaim all right, interests and
participation over the parcel of land in favor of Edy de los Reyes.
The document was signed by all of Pido’s heirs. Edy de los Reyes
did not sign said document. It will be noted that at the time of
Cosme Pido’s death, title to the property continued to be
registered in the name of the Vasquez spouses. Upon obtaining
the Declaration of Heirship with Waiver of Rights in his favor, de
los Reyes filed the same with the Registry of Deeds as part of a
notice of an adverse claim against the original certificate of title.
Thereafter, delos Reyes sought for Acap to personally inform him
that he had become the new owner of the land and that the lease
rentals thereon should be paid to him. Delos Reyes alleged that
he and Acap entered into an oral lease agreement wherein Acap
agreed to pay 10 cavans of palay per annum as lease rental. In
1982, Acap allegedly complied with said obligation. In 1983,
however, Acap refused to pay any further lease rentals on the
land, prompting delos Reyes to seek the assistance of the then
Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) in Hinigaran, Negros
Occidental. The MAR invited Acap, who sent his wife, to a
conference scheduled on 13 October 1983. The wife stated that
the she and her husband did not recognize delos Reyes’s claim of
ownership over the land. On 28 April 1988, after the lapse of four
(4) years, delos Reyes filed a complaint for recovery of
possession and damages against Acap, alleging that as his
leasehold tenant, Acap refused and failed to pay the agreed
annual rental of 10 cavans of palay despite repeated demands.
On 20 August 1991.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject declaration of heirship and
waiver of rights is a recognized mode of acquiring ownership by
private respondent over the lot in question.
HELD: An asserted right or claim to ownership or a real right over
a thing arising from a juridical act, however justified, is not per se
sufficient to give rise to ownership over the res. That right or title
must be completed by fulfilling certain conditions imposed by law.
Hence, ownership and real rights are acquired only pursuant to a
legal mode or
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process. While title is the juridical justification, mode is the actual
process of acquisition or transfer of ownership over a thing in
question.
Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, the modes of acquiring
ownership are generally classified into two (2) classes, namely,
the original mode (i.e., through occupation, acquisitive
prescription, law or intellectual creation) and the derivative mode
(i.e., through succession mortis causa or tradition as a result of
certain contracts, such as sale, barter, donation, assignment or
mutuum).
In the case at bench, the trial court was obviously confused as to
the nature and effect of the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of
Rights, equating the same with a contract (deed) of sale. They are
not the same. In a Contract of Sale, one of the contracting parties
obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a
determinate thing, and the other party to pay a price certain in
money or its equivalent. Upon the other hand, a declaration of
heirship and waiver of rights operates as a public instrument
when filed with the Registry of Deeds whereby the intestate heirs
adjudicate and divide the estate left by the decedent among
themselves as they see fit. It is in effect an extrajudicial settlement
between the heirs under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.
Hence, there is a marked difference between a sale of hereditary
rights and a waiver of hereditary rights. The first presumes the
existence of a contract or deed of sale between the parties. The
second is, technically speaking, a mode of extinction of ownership
where there is an abdication or intentional relinquishment of a
known right with knowledge of its existence and intention to
relinquish it, in favor of other persons who are co-heirs in the
succession. Private respondent, being then a stranger to the
succession of Cosme Pido, cannot conclusively claim ownership
over the subject lot on the sole basis of the waiver document
which neither recites the elements of either a sale, or a donation,
or any other derivative mode of acquiring ownership.
De Luna v. AbrigoG.R. No. L-57455, January 18, 1990, 181
SCRA 150 Medialdea, J.
FACTS: Prudencio de Luna donated a portion of a lot of the
Cadastral Survey of Lucena to the Luzonian University
Foundation. The donation was embodied in a Deed of Donation
Intervivos and made subject to certain terms and conditions and
provided for the automatic reversion to the donor of the donated
property in case of violation or non-compliance. The foundation
failed to comply with the conditions of the donation. De Luna
"revived" the said donation in favor of the foundation, in a
document entitled "Revival of Donation Intervivos" subject to
terms and conditions which among others, required it to construct
a chapel, a nursery and a kindergarten school in the donated
property within five (5) years from execution. The automatic
reversion to the donor of the donated area in case of violation of
the conditions was also provided. The foundation, through its
president, accepted the donation. A "Deed of Segregation" was
121
later executed by De Luna and the foundation whereby the area
donated was adjudicated to the foundation. The heirs of de Luna
later filed a complaint with the trial court alleging that the terms
and conditions of the donation were not complied with by the
foundation. Thus, it prayed for the cancellation of the donation
and the reversion of the donated land to the heirs. The foundation
invoked, among others, the defense of prescription of action. The
court dismissed the complaint. It ruled that under Article 764 of
the New Civil Code, actions to revoke a donation on the ground of
non-compliance with any of the conditions of the donation shall
prescribe in four years (4) counted from such non-compliance. In
the instant case, the four-year period for filing the complaint for
revocation commenced on April 9, 1976 and expired on April 9,
1980. Since the complaint was brought on September 23, 1980 or
more than five (5) months beyond the prescriptive period, it was
already barred by prescription.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint is one for judicial decree of
revocation of the donation in question as contemplated in Article
764 of the New Civil Code and which prescribes in four (4) years
and not an action to enforce a written contract which prescribes in
ten (10) years.
HELD: The donation subject of this case is one with an onerous
cause. It was made subject to the burden requiring the donee to
construct a chapel, a nursery and a kindergarten school in the
donated property within five years from execution of the deed of
donation. It is true that under Article 764, actions for the
revocation of a donation must be brought within for (4) years from
the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation. However,
the said article does not apply to onerous donations in view of the
specific provision of Article 733 providing that onerous donations
are governed by the rules on contracts. Therefore, the rules on
contracts and the general rules on prescription and not the rules
on donations are applicable in the case at bar.
Furthermore, while the judicial action for the rescission of a
contract is generally not necessary where the contract provides
that it may be automatically revoked and cancelled for violation of
any of its terms and conditions, however, where one of the parties
contests or denies the rescission, judicial intervention is
necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration
rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an
agreement providing for rescission even without judicial
intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the
rescission was proper. Judicial action will be necessary as without
it, the extrajudicial resolution will remain contestable and subject
to judicial invalidation, unless attack thereon should become
barred by acquiescence, estoppel or prescription.
In the instant case, trial court was therefore not correct in holding
that the complaint is barred by prescription under Article 764
because Article 764 does not apply to onerous donations. As
provided in the donation executed on April 9, 1971, compliance
with the terms and conditions of the contract of donation, shall be
made within five (5) years from its execution. The complaint which
was filed on September 23, 1980 was then well within the ten (10)
year prescriptive period to enforce a written contract pursuant to
Article 1144 par. 1, counted from April 9, 1976.
122
Reyes v. MosquedaG.R. No. L-45262, July 23, 1990 Gutierrez,
Jr., J.
FACTS: On May 15, 1969, Dr. Emilio Pascual executed a Deed of
Donation of real property located at 1109-1111 R. Papa St. Tondo,
Manila in favor of Ofelia Parungao, a minor, with her mother,
Rosario Duncil, accepting the gift and donation for and in her
behalf. However, Ursula Pascual alleged that Dr. Pascual during
his lifetime on November 2, 1966 executed a Donation mortis
causa in her favor covering the said property. Parungao, upon
reaching the age of majority was able to register the Deed of
Donation with the Register of Deeds in Manila and was issued a
TCT.
On September 23, 1976, Ursula executed a deed of absolute sale
over the Tondo property in favor of Benjamin, Oscar, Jose, and
Emmanuel Reyes. Benjamin filed a complaint for the declaration
of nullity of the TCT of Parungao and/or reconveyance of the
deed of title. The CFI of Manila declared the TCT in the name of
Parungao null and void and ordered the Register of Deeds to
cancel the title. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the
1966 donation to Ursula was inter vivos, which meant that the
property was already transferred to Ursula at that time.
ISSUE: Whether or not the donation to Ursula was Inter Vivos or
Mortis Causa.
HELD: It was a Donation Inter Vivos. The title given by the donor
in the deed of donation is not a determinative factor which makes
the donation inter vivos or mortis causa. It is the body of the
document of donation and the statements contained therein and
not the title that should be considered in ascertaining the intent of
the donor. In the case, the donor used the term donation Mortis
Causa but from the stipulations of the deed, it can be clearly
inferred that he was actually executing a donation Inter Vivos to
Ursula.
The transfer of ownership over the properties donated to Ursula
was immediate and independent of the death of Dr. Pascual since
it was a donation Inter Vivos. The provision as regards the
reservation of properties for the donor's subsistence in relation to
the other provisions of the deed of donation confirms the intention
of the donor to give the naked ownership of the properties to
Ursula immediately after the execution of the deed of donation.
Hence, he could not have donated the property again in 1969 in
favor of Parungao since the lot was already transferred to Ursula
at that time.
Liguez v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. L-11240, December 18,
1957, 102 Phil. 577 Reyes, J.B.L., J.
123
FACTS: The case began upon complaint filed by petitioner-
appellant against the widow and heirs of the late Salvador P.
Lopez to recover a parcel of land in barrio Davao. Plaintiff averred
to be its legal owner, pursuant to a deed of donation of said land,
executed in her favor by the late owner, Salvador P. Lopez, on 18
May 1943. The defense interposed was that the donation was null
and void for having an illicit causa or consideration, which was the
plaintiff's entering into marital relations with Salvador P. Lopez, a
married man; and that the property had been adjudicated to the
appellees as heirs of Lopez by the court of First Instance, since
1949.
It was ascertained by the Court of Appeals that the donated land
originally belonged to the conjugal partnership of Salvador P.
Lopez and his wife, Maria Ngo; that the latter had met and
berated Conchita for living maritally with her husband, sometime
during June of 1943; that the widow and children of Lopez were in
possession of the land and made improvements thereon; that the
land was assessed in the tax rolls first in the name of Lopez and
later in that of his widow.; and that the deed of donation was
never recorded.
Upon these facts, the Court of Appeals held that the deed of
donation was inoperative, and null and void (1) because the
husband, Lopez, had no right to donate conjugal property to the
plaintiff appellant; and (2) because the donation was tainted with
illegal cause or consideration, of which donor and donee were
participants.
ISSUE: Whether or not the donation is valid.
HELD: In the present case, it is scarcely disputable that Lopez
would not have conveyed the property in question had he known
that appellant would refuse to cohabit with him. The cohabitation
was an implied condition to the donation, and being unlawful,
necessarily tainted the donation itself.
The rule that parties to an illegal contract, if equally guilty, will not
be aided by the law but will both be left where it finds them, has
been interpreted by this Court as barring the party from pleading
the illegality of the bargain either as a cause of action or as a
defense. Memo auditor propriam turpitudinem allegans.
The appellant seeks recovery of the disputed land on the strength
of a donation regular on its face. To defeat its effect, the appellees
must plead and prove that the same is illegal. But such plea on
the part of the Lopez heirs is not receivable, since Lopez, himself,
if living, would be barred from setting up that plea; and his heirs,
as his privies and successors in interest, can have no better rights
than Lopez himself.
Appellees, as successors of the late donor, being thus precluded
from pleading the defense of immorality or illegal causa of the
donation, the total or partial ineffectiveness of the same must be
decided by different legal principles. In this regard, the Court of
Appeals correctly held that Lopez could not donate the entirety of
the property in litigation, to the prejudice of his wife Maria Ngo,
because said property was conjugal in
124
character and the right of the husband to donate community
property is strictly limited by law
Pershing Tan Queto v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. L-35648,
March 27, 1987, 148 SCRA 54 Paras, J.
FACTS: Herein private respondent Restituta Tacalinar Guangco
de Pombuena received the questioned lot from her mother
Basilides Tacalinar either as a purported donation or by way of
purchase with P50 as the alleged consideration thereof. The
donation or sale was consummated while Restituta was already
married to her husband Juan Pombuena. Juan then filed for
himself and his supposed co-owner Resitituta an application for a
Torrens Title over the land which was later on granted
pronouncing him (‘married to Resitiuta’) as the owner of the land.
A contract of lease over the lot was entered into between
petitioner, Pershing Tan Queto and Restituta with the consent of
her husband for a period of 10 years. The lease of contract having
expired, Restituta filed for unlawful detainer against Tan Queto.
The unlawful detainer case was won by the spouses in the
Municipal Court but on appeal in the CFI the entire case was
dismissed because of a barter agreement whereby Tan Queto
became the owner of the disputed lot and the spouses became
the owners of a parcel of land with the house thereon previously
owned before the barter by Tan Queto. After the barter
agreement, Tan Queto constructed on the disputed land a
concrete building without any objection from Restituta. Afterwards
Restituta sued both Juan and Tan Queto for reconveyance of the
title over the registered but disputed lot, for annulment of the
barter, and for recovery of the land with damages.
The respondent court’s decision which later on was affirmed by
the Supreme court led to the reformation of the Contract of Sale
of the disputed lot from Basilides to Restituta from a sale to a
conveyance of the share of Restituta in the future hereditary
estate of her parents. Hence, this petition for a motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conveyance of the share of Restituta
in the future hereditary estate of her parents was valid hence a
paraphernal property.
HELD: No. The court ruled that the land is conjugal, not
paraphernal. The oral donation of the lot cannot be a valid
donation intervivos because it was not executed in a public
instrument (Art. 749, Civil Code), nor as a valid donation mortis
causa for the formalities of a will were not complied with. The
allegation that the transfer was a conveyance to RESTITUTA of
her hereditary share in the estate of her mother (or parents)
cannot be sustained for the contractual transmission of future
inheritance is generally prohibited.
The fact is ownership was acquired by both JUAN and
RESTITUTA by tradition (delivery) as a consequence of the
contract of sale (See Art. 712, Civil Code) with
125
P50.00 (then a considerable amount) as the cause or
consideration of the transaction. The lot is therefore conjugal,
having been acquired by the spouses thru onerous title (the
money used being presumably conjugal there being no proof that
RESTITUTA had paraphernal funds of her own).
Pajarillo vs. Intermediate Appellate CourtG.R. No. 72908,
August 11, 1989, 176 SCRA 340 Cruz, J.
FACTS: Perfecta Balane de Cordero died intestate in 1945 and
leaving a tract of 28 hectares of land with buildings and
improvements in the Quezon Province. On May 20, 1946,
perfecta’s siblings Juana and Felipe executed a public instrument
entitled “ Extra- judicial settlement of the estate of the decease
Perfecta Balane de Cordero.” In it they disposed that in according
to Perfecta’s wishes and in consideration of love and affection,
the said property be donated to private respondent Salud Suterio
de Matias, Perfecta’s niece, who will assume the
encumbrance/obligation to the Philippine National Bank in the
amount of P 1,000. In the same document, the done accepted the
donation in a public instrument. The instrument was never
registered nor the title transferred to Salud’s name although she
immediately took possession of the land. Sometime in 1951,
Salud transferred the possession of the land to her mother Juana,
who was then staying with her brother Claudio and his family.
During the period they were occupying the land, Claudio paid
realty taxes thereon. On May 25, 1956, Juana executed a deed of
absolute sale conveying the land to Claudio. Two years later,
Claudio had the land registered in his name. Claudio died in 1961
and his mother in 1963. On June 30, 1965, the private
respondents Salud and Pedro Matias filed a complaint for the
reconveyance of the property on the ground that the deed of sale
in favour of Claudio was fictitious and the registration in his name
was null and void. Salud claimed that no compensation was paid
by Claudio and that the transaction was deliberately concealed
from her by her brother and the defendants.
ISSUE: Whether or not the extra-judicial settlement was a
donation.
HELD: Yes. Felipe and Juana had declared themselves the heirs
of Perfecta and the owners of the property in question. As such,
they were free to give the land to whomever they pleased and for
whatever reason they saw fit. Hence, if they choose to respect
Perfecta’s wishes and carry out her intentions by donating the
land to Salud, there was no legal impediment to their doing so.
There is no question that Felipe and Juana could have simply
disregarded their sister’s sentiments and decided not to donate
the property to Salud. The fact that they did no do this speaks well
of their integrity and their loyalty to their deceased sister. The
extra-judicial settlement also reflects their own affection for Salud
which constituted the valid consideration for their own act of
liberality.
126
Cruz v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. L-58671, November 22,
1985, 140 SCRA 245 Plana, J.
FACTS: In 1973, Eduvigis Cruz, a childless widow, donated a
235.5 sq. m. residential lot in San Isidro, Taytay, Rizal together
with the two-door apartment erected thereon to her grandnieces
(private respondents Teresita, Lydia and Cecilia, all surnamed De
Leon). The property was accordingly transferred to the names of
private respondents.
In 1974, Cruz judicially adopted Cresencia Ocreto, a minor, after
which she extrajudicailly tried to revoke the donation, but the
donee resisted, alleging that: (1) the property in question was co-
owned by Eduvigis Cruz and her brother, the late Maximo Cruz,
grandfather of the donees, hence the latter own 1/2 of the
property by inheritance; and (2) Eduvigis owns another property,
an agricultural land of more than two hectares situated in Barrio
Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, hence the donation did not impair the
presumptive legitime of the adoptive child.
Petitioner filed a complaint against the donees for revocation of
donation, invoking Article 760, par. 3 of the NCC. The trial court
rendered a decision revoking the donation. On appal, The Court
of Appeals reversed the trial court and dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed
the complaint to annul the subject donation.
HELD: Yes. In the case of the subsequent adoption of a minor by
one who had previously donated some or all of his properties to
another, the donor may sue for the annulment or reduction of the
donation within 4 years from the date of adoption, if the donation
impairs the legitime of the adopted, taking into account the whole
estate of the donor at the time of the donation of the child (Articles
760, 761 and 763 of the NCC). Of course, the burden of proof is
on the plaintiff-donor, who must allege and establish the
requirements prescribed by law, on the basis of which annulment
or reduction of the donation can be adjudged. Unfortunately, in
the case at bar, the complaint for annulment does not allege that
the subject donation impairs the legitime of the adopted child.
Indeed, it contains no indication at all of the total assets of the
donor.
Nor is there proof of impairment of legitime. On the contrary, there
is unrebutted evidence that the donor has another piece of land
worth P273,420 in 1977. The legal situation of petitioner-donor is
made worse by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that the
grandfather of the donees was the owner pro indiviso of one-half
of the donated land, the effect of which is to reduce the value of
the donation which can then more easily be taken from the portion
of the estate within the free disposal of petitioner.
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals
127
G.R. No. 77425, June 19, 1991, 198 SCRA 300 Regalado, J.
FACTS: On August 23, 1930, the spouses Eusebio de Castro and
Martina Rieta executed a deed of donation in favor of herein
petitioner Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila covering a parcel
of land located at Cavite. The deed of donation provides that the
donee shall not dispose or sell the property within a period of 100
years from the execution of the deed of donation, otherwise a
violation of such condition would render ipso facto null and void
the donation and the property would revert to the estate of the
donors.
However, on June 30, 1980 while within the prohibitive period to
dispose, petitioner executed a deed of absolute sale of the
property subject of the donation in favor of the petitioner-spouses
Florencio and Soledad Ignao in consideration of the sum of
P114,000.00. Hence, private respondents filed a complaint for the
nullification of the deed of donation. In their answer, the
petitioners filed a motion to dismiss based on the grounds that the
action has been barred by prescription because the complaint
was filed four years after the sale, and that the complaint states
no cause of action.
ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation in favor of the
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila may be revoked.
HELD: No. The complaint in the case at bar cannot be barred by
prescription because the applicable prescriptive period is not the
4-year period provided in Article 764 of the New Civil Code, rather
it is the 10-year period ordinary prescription shall apply because
the deed of donation provides for the automatic reversion of the
property to the original owner in case of violation of any condition.
The Court in the previous case of De Luna v. Abrigo has already
settled such prescriptive period.
However, although the action cannot be dismissed on the ground
of prescription, the same should be dismissed for lack of cause of
action.
The cause of action of the private respondents is based on the
fact that the petitioner sold the lot during the 50th year of the
prohibitive period of 100 years. Such prohibitive period imposed
by the respondents was unreasonable because applying in
analogy Articles 494 and 870 of the New Civil Code, the donor
cannot order a prohibitive period of disposition exceeding 20
years. As such, the said condition regarding the prohibitive period
being contrary to law shall be considered as null and void
pursuant to Art. 727 of the New Civil Code but the donation shall
remain valid and subsisting. Thus, respondents cannot anymore
revoke the donation, and the sale of the property by the petitioner
to the Ignao spouses shall be valid and with legal effects.
Eduarte v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 105944, February 9,
1996, 253 SCRA 391
128
Francisco, J.
FACTS: Pedro Calapine was the registered owner of a parcel of
land with an area of 12,199 square meters. He executed a deed
entitled “Donation InterVivos” ceding one- half portion thereof to
his niece Helen S. Doria. Eventually, the whole parcel of land was
ceded to Doria by Calapine. Doria then donated a portion of 157
square meters to the Calauan Christian Reformed Church. He
also sold, transferred and conveyed unto the spouses Eduarte the
parcel of land, saving the 700 square meters on which Doria’s
house was erected. However, Pedro Calapine filed a complaint
against Doria, the Calauan Christian Reformed Church, Inc. and
the spouses Eduarte claiming that his signature to the deed of
donation was a forgery. He prays for the revocation of the
donation made in favour of Doria, to declare null and void the
deeds of donation and sale that she had executed in favor of the
Calauan Christian Reformed Church, Inc. and the spouses
Eduarte.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are buyers in bad faith of
the donated property.
HELD: No. The rule is well-settled that mere possession cannot
defeat the title of a holder of a registered torrens title to real
property. When herein petitioners purchased the subject property
from Helen Doria, the same was already covered by TCT No. T-
23205 under the latter's name. And although Helen Doria's title
was fraudulently secured, such fact cannot prejudice the rights of
herein petitioners absent any showing that they had any
knowledge or participation in such irregularity. Thus, they cannot
be obliged to look beyond the certificate of title which appeared to
be valid on its fade and sans any annotation or notice of private
respondents' adverse claim. Contrary therefore to the conclusion
of respondent Court, petitioners are purchasers in good faith and
for value as they bought the disputed property without notice that
some other person has a right or interest in such property, and
paid a full price for the same at the time of the purchase or before
they had notice of the claim or interest of some other person in
the property. And having established beyond doubt that Helen
Doria fraudulently secured her title over the disputed property
which she subsequently sold to petitioners, Helen Doria should
instead be adjudged liable to private respondents, and not to
petitioners as declared by the trial court and respondent Court of
Appeals, for the resulting damages to the true owner and original
plaintiff, Pedro Calapine.
Petition granted.
Quilala v. AlcantaraG.R. No. 132681, December 3, 2001, 371
SCRA 311 Ynares – Santiago, J.
FACTS: On February 20, 1981, Catalina Quilala executed a
"Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" in favor of Violeta Quilala
over a parcel of land. The "Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos"
consists of two pages. The first page contains the deed of
donation itself, and is signed on the bottom portion by Catalina
Quilala as donor, Violeta
129
Quilala as donee, and two instrumental witnesses. The second
page contains the Acknowledgment, which states merely that
Catalina Quilala personally appeared before the notary public and
acknowledged that the donation was her free and voluntary act
and deed. There appear on the left-hand margin of the second
page the signatures of Catalina Quilala and one of the witnesses,
and on the right-hand margin the signatures of Violeta Quilala and
the other witness The deed of donation was registered with the
Register of Deeds and, in due course, TCT No. 17214 was
cancelled and TCT No. 143015 was issued in the name of Violeta
Quilala.
On November 7, 1983, Catalina Quilala died. Violeta Quilala
likewise died on May 22, 1984. Petitioner Ricky Quilala alleges
that he is the surviving son of Violeta Quilala. Meanwhile,
respondents Gliceria Alcantara, Leonora Alcantara, Ines Reyes
and Juan Reyes, claiming to be Catalina's only surviving relatives
within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity, executed a deed of
extrajudicial settlement of estate, dividing and adjudicating unto
themselves the above-described property.
On September 13, 1984, respondents instituted against petitioner
and Guillermo T. San Pedro, the Registrar of Deeds of Manila, an
action for the declaration of nullity of the donation inter vivos. The
trial court found that the deed of donation, although signed by
both Catalina and Violeta, was acknowledged before a notary
public only by the donor, Catalina. Consequently, there was no
acceptance by Violeta of the donation in a public instrument, thus
rendering the donation null and void. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals rendered a decision affirming with modification the
decision of the trial court by dismissing the complaint for lack of
cause of action without prejudice to the filing of probate
proceedings of Catalina's alleged last will and testament.
ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation is void for lack of
acceptance on the part of the donee Violeta Quilala.
HELD: No. As stated above, the second page of the deed of
donation, on which the Acknowledgment appears, was signed by
the donor and one witness on the left-hand margin, and by the
donee and the other witness on the right hand margin. Surely, the
requirement that the contracting parties and their witnesses
should sign on the left-hand margin of the instrument is not
absolute. The intendment of the law merely is to ensure that each
and every page of the instrument is authenticated by the parties.
The requirement is designed to avoid the falsification of the
contract after the same has already been duly executed by the
parties. Hence, a contracting party affixes his signature on each
page of the instrument to certify that he is agreeing to everything
that is written thereon at the time of signing.
Simply put, the specification of the location of the signature is
merely directory. The fact that one of the parties signs on the
wrong side of the page does not invalidate the document. The
purpose of authenticating the page is served, and the requirement
in the above-quoted provision is deemed substantially complied
with.
130
In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by the donee
before the notary public does not also render the donation null
and void. The instrument should be treated in its entirety. It cannot
be considered a private document in part and a public document
in another part. The fact that it was acknowledged before a notary
public converts the deed of donation in its entirety a public
instrument. The fact that the donee was not mentioned by the
notary public in the acknowledgment is of no moment. To be sure,
it is the conveyance that should be acknowledged as a free and
voluntary act. In any event, the donee signed on the second page,
which contains the Acknowledgment only. Her acceptance, which
is explicitly set forth on the first page of the notarized deed of
donation, was made in a public instrument.
Hemedes v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 107132, October 8,
1999, 316 SCRA 347 Gonzaga – Reyes, J.
FACTS: Jose Hemedes, father of Maxima Hemedes and Enrique
D. Hemedes. Jose Hemedes executed a document entitled
"Donation Inter Vivos With Resolutory Conditions" whereby he
conveyed ownership over the subject land, together with all its
improvements, in favor of his third wife, Justa Kausapin, subject
to the following resolutory conditions that upon her death or
marriage, the DONEE shall revert the said property to anyone of
Jose Hemedes children.
On September 27, 1960 a "Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered
Real Property by Reversion" conveying to Maxima Hemedes. She
had it titled and mortgage it to R & B Insurance with an annotation
of USUFRUCT favor of her stepmother,Justa Kausapin. Unable to
pay the mortgage, R & B Insurance extra-judicially foreclosed the
property. However, Justa Kausapin executed another agreement
or Kasunduan on May 27, 1971 to his stepson, Enrique D.
Hemedes. He obtained tax declarations and pay realty taxes from
thereon. The Ministry of Agrarian Reform Office conducted a
cadastral survey and indicated Enrique Hemedes as the owner.
Enrique Hemedes sold the property to Dominium Realty Const.
Corp.(Dominium), a sister company of Asia Brewery. Asia
Brewery started to introduce some improvements already when R
& B insurance informed them that they are the owners of the
property where these improvements are being built.
ISSUE: Whether or not the kasunduan executed by Justa
Kausapin in favor of Enrique D. Hemedes valid.
HELD: The court dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision
of the CA. It held that Maxima failed to comply with the
requirements of Art. 1332 of the civil code and also failed to
repudiate Justa Kausapin’s allegation that she did not execute
such a deed and she never allowed to use the land as security for
the loan. It was found that the deed of conveyance to Maxima
was spurious and it follows that the original title she had for the
131
property was also null and void so as the mortgage to R & B
Insurance. On the other hand, Kausapin executed an affidavit to
affirm the authenticity of the kasundudan in favor of his stepson,
Enrique Hemedes whom she is dependent from for her financial
support.
Siguan v. LimG.R. No. 134685, November 19, 1999, 318 SCRA
725 Davide, Jr., C.J.
FACTS: On 2 July 1991, a Deed of Donation conveying parcels of
land and purportedly executed by LIM on 10 August 1989 in favor
of her children, Linde, Ingrid and Neil was registered with the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Cebu City. On 23 June 1993,
petitioner filed an accion pauliana against LIM and her children to
rescind the questioned Deed of Donation and to declare as null
and void the new transfer certificates of title issued for the lots
covered by the questioned Deed. Petitioner claimed therein that
sometime in July 1991, LIM, through a Deed of Donation,
fraudulently transferred all her real property to her children in bad
faith and in fraud of creditors, including her; that LIM conspired
and confederated with her children in antedating the questioned
Deed of Donation, to petitioner's and other creditors' prejudice;
and that LIM, at the time of the fraudulent conveyance, left no
sufficient properties to pay her obligations. The RTC ruled in favor
of Siguan and rescinded the Contract, but was reversed by the
CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Donation executed by
respondent may be rescinded for being in fraud of her alleged
creditor.
HELD: We resolve these issues in the negative. Art. 1381 of the
Civil Code enumerates the contracts which are rescissible, and
among them are "those contracts undertaken in fraud of creditors
when the latter cannot in any other manner collect the claims due
them."
The action to rescind contracts in fraud of creditors is known as
accion pauliana. For this action to prosper, the following requisites
must be present: (1) the plaintiff asking for rescission has a credit
prior to the alienation, although demandable later; (2) the debtor
has made a subsequent contract conveying a patrimonial benefit
to a third person; (3) the creditor has no other legal remedy to
satisfy his claim; (4) the act being impugned is fraudulent; (5) the
third person who received the property conveyed, if it is by
onerous title, has been an accomplice in the fraud. The general
rule is that rescission requires the existence of creditors at the
time of the alleged fraudulent alienation, and this must be proved
as one of the bases of the judicial pronouncement setting aside
the contract. Without any prior existing debt, there can neither be
injury nor fraud. While it is necessary that the credit of the plaintiff
in the accion pauliana must exist prior to the fraudulent alienation,
the date of the judgment enforcing it is immaterial. Even if the
judgment be subsequent to the alienation, it is merely declaratory,
with retroactive effect to the date when the credit was constituted.
In the instant case, the alleged debt of LIM
132
in favor of petitioner was incurred in August 1990, while the deed
of donation was purportedly executed on 10 August 1989. Even
assuming arguendo that petitioner became a creditor of LIM prior
to the celebration of the contract of donation, still her action for
rescission would not fare well because the third requisite was not
met. Under Article 1381 of the Civil Code, contracts entered into
in fraud of creditors may be rescinded only when the creditors
cannot in any manner collect the claims due them. It is, therefore,
"essential that the party asking for rescission prove that he has
exhausted all other legal means to obtain satisfaction of his claim.
20
Petitioner neither alleged nor proved that she did so. On this
score, her action for the rescission of the questioned deed is not
maintainable even if the fraud charged actually did exist."
Noceda vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 119730, September 2,
1999, 313 SCRA 504 Gonzaga – Reyes, J.
FACTS: Celestino Arbizo died in 1956 leaving behind a parcel of
land having an area of 66,530 square meters. His heirs plaintiff
Aurora Directo, defendant Rodolfo Noceda, and Maria Arbizo
extrajudicially settled the partition of the land with Directo getting
11,426 square meters, Noceda got 13,294 square meters, and
Arbizo got 41,810 square meters. Plaintiff Directo donated 625
square meters of her share to defendant Noceda, who is her
nephew being the son of her deceased sister However another
extrajudicial settlement-partition was executed. Three fifths of the
said land went to Maria Arbizo while plaintiff Directo and
defendant Noceda got only one-fifth each.
Sometime in 1981, Noceda constructed his house on the land
donated to him by Directo. Directo fenced the portion allotted to
her in the extrajudicial settlement, excluding the donated portion,
and constructed thereon three huts. But in 1985, Noceda
removed the fence earlier constructed by Directo, occupied the
three huts (3) and fenced the entire land of plaintiff Directo without
her consent. Directo demanded from Noceda to vacate her land,
but the latter refused. Hence, Directo filed a complaint for the
recovery of possession and ownership and rescission/annulment
of donation, against defendant Noceda
ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of Noceda constitute ingratitude
to warrant revocation of the donation.
HELD: Yes. It was established that petitioner Noceda occupied
not only the portion donated to him by private respondent Aurora
Arbizo-Directo but he also fenced the whole area of Lot C which
belongs to private respondent Directo, thus petitioner's act of
occupying the portion pertaining to private respondent Directo
without the latter's knowledge and consent is an act of usurpation
which is an offense against the property of the donor and
considered as an act of ingratitude of a donee against the donor.
The law does not require conviction of the donee; it is enough that
the offense be proved in the action for revocation.
133
The action to revoke by reason of ingratitude prescribes within
one (1) year to be counted from the time (a) the donor had
knowledge of the fact; (b) provided that it was possible for him to
bring the action. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show proof of
the concurrence of these two conditions in order that the one (1)
year period for bringing the action be considered to have already
prescribed. No competent proof was adduced by petitioner to
prove his allegation.
Heirs of Cesario Velasquez v. Court of Appeals G.R. No.
126996, February 15, 2000, 325 SCRA 552 Gonzaga – Reyes,
J.
FACTS: Spouses Leoncia de Guzman and Cornelio Aquino died
intestate sometime in 1945 and 1947, respectively and were
childless, leaving 6 parcels of land situated in Pangasinan.
Leoncia De Guzman was survived by her sisters Anatalia de
Guzman and Tranquilina de Guzman.
Sometime in 1989, the Meneses(heirs of Anatalia de Guzman)
filed a complaint for annulment, partition and damages against the
heirs of Cesario Velasquez(son of Tranquilina de Guzman) for the
latters' refusal to partition the properties of the Spouses Aquino.
The complaint alleged that before Leoncia’s death, she told that
the documents of donation and partition which she and her
husband earlier executed were not signed by them as it was not
their intention to give away all the properties to Cesario Velasquez
because Anatalia de Guzman who is one of her sisters had
several children to support; and that Cesario Velasquez and his
mother allegedly promised to divide the properties equally and to
give the plaintiffs one-half thereof. Plaintiffs further claim that after
the death of Leoncia, defendants forcibly took possession of all
the properties and despite plaintiffs' repeated demands for
partition, defendants refused.
Plaintiffs prayed for the nullity of the documents covering the
properties in question since they do not bear the genuine
signatures of the Aquino spouses, to order the partition of the
properties between plaintiffs and defendants in equal shares and
to order the defendants to render an accounting of the produce of
the land from the time defendants forcibly took possession until
partition shall have been effected.
Defendants filed their answer with counterclaim alleging that
during the lifetime of spouses Aquino, they had already disposed
of their properties in favor of petitioners' predecessors-in-interest,
Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman, and petitioners
Anastacia and Jose Velasquez in the following manner:
(1) The third and sixth parcels were conveyed to defendants' late
parents Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman, by virtue of a
Escritura de Donation Propter Nuptias dated February 15, 1919;
134
(2) The second parcel was conveyed to defendants' late parents
Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman by virtue of a deed of
conveyance dated July 14, 1939;(3) The first parcel was likewise
conveyed to defendants Jose Velasquez and Anastacia
Velasquez by virtue of a deed of conveyance (Donation
Intervivos) dated April 10, 1939;
(4) As to the fourth and fifth parcels, the same were owned and
possessed by third parties.
The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, giving credibility to
Santiago Meneses’ testimony; declaring the Donation Intervivos,
the Deed of Sale, the Deed of Donation, the Deed of Sale to third
parties over the 4th and 5th parcels as null and void insofar as 1/2
of the 6 parcels are concerned legitimately belong to the plaintiffs;
and ordering the defendants to pay damages. Defendants
appealed the decision to respondent CA which affirmed the same.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners but the
same was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have acquired absolute
and exclusive ownership of the properties in question.
HELD: Yes. Private respondent Santiago Meneses failed to prove
the nullity of the Deeds of Conveyance executed by the Aquino
spouses in favor of petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest
Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman since he failed to
adduce any evidence to support his claim other than his bare
allegations of its nullity. On the other hand, petitioners were able
to show by documentary evidence that the Aquino spouses during
their lifetime disposed of the four parcels of land subject of the
complaint, to wit: (a) Escritura de donation propter nuptias, (b)
Deed of donation inter vivos, (c) Escritura de Compreventa with a
P500 consideration: (d) Deed of Conveyance with a consideration
of P600 and confirming in the same Deed the Escritura de
donation propter nuptias and Escritura de compraventa
abovementioned. It was reversible error for the court to overlook
the probative value of these notarized documents.
A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an
effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the
donee and the donation is perfected from the moment the donor
knows of the acceptance by the donee. Once a donation is
accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property
donated.
The donation of the first parcel made by the Aquino spouses to
petitioners Jose and Anastacia Velasquez who were then 19 and
10 years old respectively was accepted through their father
Cesario Velasquez, and the acceptance was incorporated in the
body of the same deed of donation and made part of it, and was
signed by the donor and the acceptor. Legally speaking there was
delivery and acceptance of the deed, and the donation existed
perfectly and irrevocably. The donation inter vivos may be
revoked only for the reasons provided in Articles 760, 764 and
765 of the Civil Code.
135
The donation propter nuptias in favor of Cesario Velasquez and
Camila de Guzman over the third and sixth parcels including a
portion of the second parcel became the properties of the
spouses Velasquez since 1919. The deed of donation propter
nuptias can be revoked by the non-performance of the marriage
and the other causes mentioned in Article 86 of the Family Code.
The alleged reason for the repudiation of the deed, i.e., that the
Aquino spouses did not intend to give away all their properties
since Anatalia had several children to support is not one of the
grounds for revocation of donation either inter vivos or propter
nuptias, although the donation might be inofficious.
The Escritura compraventa over another portion of the second
parcel and the Deed of conveyance dated July 14, 1939 in favor
of Cesario and Camila Velasquez over the remaining portion of
the second parcel is also valid. In fact in the deed of sale, the
Aquino spouses ratified and confirmed the rights and interests of
Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman including the previous
deeds of conveyance over the second parcel in the complaint and
such deed of sale became the basis for the issuance of TCT in
the names of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman. The
best proof of the ownership of the land is the certificate of title and
it requires more than a bare allegation to defeat the face value of
TCT which enjoys a legal presumption of regularity of issuance.
Notably, during the lifetime of Cesario Velasquez, he entered into
contracts of mortgage and lease over the property as annotated
at the back of the certificate of title which clearly established that
he exercised full ownership and control over the property.
Petitioners were able to establish that these four parcels of land
were validly conveyed to them by the Aquino spouses, hence,
they no longer formed part of the conjugal properties of the
spouses at the time of their deaths. As regards the fourth and fifth
parcels, petitioners alleged that these were also conveyed to third
persons and they do not claim any right thereto.
In view of the foregoing, the action of partition cannot be
maintained. The properties sought to be partitioned by private
respondents have already been delivered to petitioners and
therefore no longer part of the hereditary estate which could be
partitioned. No co-ownership exists between private respondents
and petitioners.
Gonzales v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 110335, June 18, 2001,
358 SCRA 598 Melo, J.
FACTS: Deceased spouses Ignacio and Marina Gonzales were
registered owners of two parcels of agricultural land. Petitioners
are the successors-in-interest or the children and grandchildren of
the deceased spouses. On the other hand, private respondents
are the farmers and tenants of said spouses who have been
cultivating the parcels of land even before World War II either
personally or through their predecessors-in- interest. Marina
Gonzales died intestate and appointed as administratix was
petitioner
136
Lilia Gonzales. Prior to the partition of said estate, Ignacio
Gonzales executed a Deed of Donation in favor of his
grandchildren but was not registered. When Presidential Decree
No. 27 took effect, the landholdings of the said spouses were
placed under Operation Land Transfer. Private respondents were
then issued the corresponding Certificates of Land Transfer. The
administratix of the spouses’ estate, Lilia Gonzales filed an
application for retention requesting that their property be excluded
from the Operation Land Transfer. Initially, it was denied but was
approved due to the deed of donation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property subject of the deed of
donation which was not registered when P.D. No. 27 took effect,
should be excluded from the Operation Land Transfer.
HELD: No. Article 749 of the Civil Code provides inter alia that “in
order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be
made in a public document, specifying therein the property
donated and the value of the charges which the done must
satisfy.” Corollarily, Article 709 of the same Code explicitly states
that “the titles of ownership, or other rights over immovable
property, which are not duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry
of Property shall not prejudice third persons.” From the foregoing
provisions, it may be inferred that as between the parties to a
donation of immovable property, all that is required is for said
donation to be contained in a public document. Registration is not
necessary for it to be contained in a public document. It is not
necessary for it to be considered valid and effective. However, in
order to bind third persons, the donation must be registered in the
Registry of Property. In the case at bar, the donation executed by
Ignacio Gonzales in favor of his grand children, although in writing
and duly notarized, has not been registered in accordance with
law. For this reason, it shall not be binding upon private
respondents who did not participate in said deed nor had no
actual knowledge thereof.
Imperial v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 112483, October 8, 1999,
316 SCRA 393 Gonzaga – Reyes, J.
FACTS: Leoncio Imperial was the owner of a parcel of land with
an area of 32,837 sq. m. and located in Albay. On July 7, 1951,
Leoncio sold the lot for Php 1.00 to his acknowledged natural son,
petitioner in this case. Petitioner and Victor Imperial, adopted son
of Leoncio, agreed that despite the designation of the contract as
Deed of Absolute Sale, the transaction is in fact a Donation. Two
years after, Leoncio filed a complaint for the Annulment of
Donation. It was however resolved through a compromise
agreement under the following terms and conditions: (1) Leoncio
recognized and agreed the legality and validity of the rights of
petitioner; and (2) petitioner agreed to sell a designated 1,000
sq.m. portion of the donated land.
137
Leoncio died leaving only two heirs: petitioner and Victor Imperial.
On March 8, 1962, Victor was substituted in the complaint for
annulment. He moved for the execution of judgment and it was
granted. After 15 years, Victor died and was survived only by his
natural father, Ricardo Villalon. Ricardo Villalon is a lessee of the
portion of the subject property. Villalon died leaving his heirs,
Cesar and Teresa Villalon, respondents in this case. In 1986,
respondents filed a complaint for the annulment of the donation.
Allegedly, it impairs the legitime of Victor Imperial.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the respondents have the right to question the
inofficious donation and seek its reduction.2.) Whether or not the
30-year prescriptive period is applicable in the reduction of the
inofficious donation.
HELD: 1.) Yes. At the time of the substitution, the judgment
approving the compromise agreement has already been
rendered. Victor merely participated in the execution of the
compromise judgment. He was not a party to the compromise
agreement. When Victor substituted Leoncio, he was not deemed
to have renounced his legitime. He was therefore not precluded or
estopped from subsequently seeking the reduction. Nor are
Victor’s heirs, upon his death, precluded from doing so. This is in
accordance with Articles 772 and 1053 of the new Civil Code, to
wit:
Article 772. Only those who at the time of the donor’s death have
a right to the legitime and their heirs and successors in interest
may ask for the reduction of the inofficious donation xxx.
and
Article 1053. If the heir should die without having accepted or
repudiated the inheritance, his rights shall be transmitted to his
heirs.
2.) No. Under Article 1144 of the New Civil Code, actions upon an
obligation created by law must be brought within ten years from
the right of action accrues. Thus, the 10-year prescriptive period
applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious donations required
under Article 771 of the New Civil Code to the extent that they
impair the legitime of compulsory heirs.
The cause of action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the death
of the donor- decedent. Clearly so, since only then that the net
estate may be ascertained and on which basis, the legitimes may
be determined. It took 24 years since the death of Leoncio to
initiate this case. Thus, the action has long prescribed. Not only
has prescription set in, they are also guilty of estoppel and laches.
Fifteen years after the death of Leoncio, Victor died. Ricardo
Villalon, Victor’s sole heir, died four years later. While Victor was
alive, he gave no indication of any interest to contest the donation
of his deceased father.
138
Republic of the Philippines v. SilimG.R. No. 140487, April 2,
2001, 356 SCRA 1 Kapunan, J.
FACTS: Respondent Spouses Silim and Mangubat donated a
5,600 square meter parcel of land in favor of the Bureau of Public
Schools of the Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur. In
the Deed of Donation, the respondents imposed the condition that
the said property should be “used exclusively and forever for
school purposes only.” This donation was accepted by the District
Supervisor of the Bureau, through an Affidavit of Acceptance
and/or Confirmation of Donation.
A school building was thereafter constructed on the donated land.
However, another school building that was also supposed to be
allocated for the donated parcel of land could not be released
since the government required that it be built upon a 1 hectare
parcel of land. By reason of this, the District Supervisor and the
vice-mayor’s wife entered into a Deed of Exchange whereby the
donated lot was exchanged with a bigger lot owned by the latter.
Consequently, the school buildings were constructed on this new
school site and the school building previously erected on the
donated land was dismantled and transferred to the new location.
One day, respondents were surprised when he saw the vice-
mayor constructing a house on the donated land.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not there was a valid donation despite non-
notation of the acceptance in the Deed of Donation, as required in
Article 749.2.) Whether or not the condition on the donation was
violated.
HELD: 1.) Yes. The purpose of the formal requirement for
acceptance of a donation is to ensure that such is duly
communicated to the donor. In the case at bar, a school building
was immediately constructed after the donation was executed.
Respondents had knowledge of the existence of the school
building put up on the donated lot. The actual knowledge by
respondents of the construction and existence of the school
building fulfilled the legal requirement that the acceptance of the
donation by the donee be communicated to the donor.
2.) No. There was no violation even after the donated lot was
exchanged for another one. The purpose of the donation remains
the same, which is for the establishment of a school. The
exclusivity of the purpose was not altered or affected. In fact, the
exchange of the lot for a much bigger one was in furtherance and
enhancement of the purpose of the donation. The acquisition of
the bigger lot paved the way for the release of funds for the
construction of Bagong Lipunan school building which could not
be accommodated by the limited area of the donated lot.
139
Gestopa v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 111904, October 5, 2000,
342 SCRA 105 Quisumbing, J.
FACTS: Spouses Danlag were the owners of six parcels of
unregistered lands. They executed three deeds of donation mortis
causa, two of which were in favor of Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil. All
deeds contained the reservation of the rights of the donors to
amend, cancel or revoke the donation during their lifetime, and to
sell, mortgage, or encumber the properties donated during the
donors' lifetime, if deemed necessary. The spouses then executed
another deed of donation inter vivos in favor of Mercedes which
contained the condition that the donors, Danlag spouses, shall
continue to enjoy the fruits of the land during their lifetime and that
the donee enjoy the fruits of the land during their lifetime and that
the donee cannot sell or dispose of the land during the lifetime of
the donors without their prior consent and approval.
Consequently, Mercedes caused the transfer of the parcels of
land's tax declaration to her name and paid the taxes on them.
Spouses Danlag sold two parcels of lots to Spouses Agripino and
Isabel Gestopa and executed a deed of revocation recovering the
six parcels of land subject to the deed of donation inter vivos.
Mercedes Pilapil filed with the Regional Trial Court against the
Spouses Danlag and Gestopa, for quieting of title over the parcels
of land and alleged that the land was donated to her by Diego
Danlag and that she accepted the donation openly and publicly
exercised rights of ownership over the donated properties, and
transferred the tax declarations to her name. She also alleged
that the donation inter vivos was coupled with conditions and,
according to Mercedes, since its perfection, she had complied
with all of them; that she had not been guilty of any act of
ingratitude; and that Diego Danlag had no legal basis to revoke
the donation and then in selling the two parcels of land to the
Gestopa spouses.
In their opposition, the spouses Gestopa and the Danlag averred
that the deed of donation was null and void because it was
obtained by Mercedes through machinations and undue influence.
Even assuming it was validly executed, the intention was for the
donation to take effect upon the death of the donor and that the
donation was void for it left the donor, Diego Danlag, without any
property at all.
ISSUE: Whether the donation is a donation inter vivos or a
donation mortis causa.
HELD: The Court Rules that it was a donation inter vivos. The
Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that the reservation
by the donor of lifetime usufruct indicated that he transferred to
Mercedes the ownership over the donated properties; that the
right to sell belonged to the donee, and the donor's right referred
to that of merely giving consent; that the donor changed his
intention by donating inter vivos properties already donated
mortis causa; that the transfer to Mercedes' name of the tax
declarations pertaining to the donated properties implied that the
donation was inter vivos; and that Mercedes did not purchase two
of the six parcels of land donated to her.
140
In ascertaining the intention of the donor, all of the deed's
provisions must be read together. The granting clause shows that
Diego donated the properties out of love and affection for the
donee. This is a mark of a donation inter vivos. Second, the
reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates that the donor intended to
transfer the naked ownership over the properties. Third, the donor
reserved sufficient properties for his maintenance in accordance
with his standing in society, indicating that the donor intended to
part with the six parcels of land. Lastly, the donee accepted the
donation.
An acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos.
Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos. Donations
mortis causa, being in the form of a will, are not required to be
accepted by the donees during the donors' lifetime. The right to
dispose of the properties belonged to the donee. The donor's right
to give consent was merely intended to protect his usufructuary
interests. The limitation on the right to sell during the donors'
lifetime implied that ownership had passed to the donees and
donation was already effective during the donors' lifetime. Hence,
the moment that it was accepted by Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil,
ownership of the properties was transferred.
Sumipat v. BangaG.R. No. 155810, August 13, 2004 Tinga, J.
FACTS: The spouses Placida Tabo-tabo and Lauro Sumipat
acquired three parcels of land. The couple was childless. Lauro
Sumipat, however, sired five illegitimate children. They are the
petitioners herein. Lauro executed a document denominated
“Deed of Absolute Transfer and/or Quit-Claim over Real
Properties” in favor of the petitioners. On the document, it
appears that the signature of his wife, Placida which indicates that
she gave her marital consent. Moreover, it was alleged that Lauro
executed it when he was already very sick and bedridden that
upon petitioner Lydia’s request, their neighbor Benjamin Rivera
lifted the body of Lauro whereupon Lydia guided his hand in
affixing his signature on the document. Lydia left but later returned
on the same day and requested Lauro’s unlettered wife, Placida
to sign on the said document. After Lauro’s death, his wife,
Placida and petitioners jointly administered the properties, 50% of
the produce went to his wife. As wife’s share in the produce of the
properties dwindled, she filed a complaint for declaration of
partition disclaiming any partition in the execution of the subject
document.
ISSUE: Whether or not the questioned deed by its terms or under
the surrounding circumstances has validly transferred title to the
disputed properties to the petitioners.
HELD: No. A perusal of the deed reveals that it is actually a
gratuitous disposition of property — a donation — although Lauro
Sumipat imposed upon the petitioners the condition that he and
his wife, Placida, shall be entitled to one-half (1/2) of all the fruits
or produce of the parcels of land for their subsistence and
support. Where the deed of donation fails to show the
acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance,
141
made in a separate instrument, is either not given to the donor or
else not noted in the deed of donation and in the separate
acceptance, the donation is null and void. In this case, the
donees’ acceptance of the donation is not manifested either in the
deed itself or in a separate document. Hence, the deed as an
instrument of donation is patently void. The Court declared that
the deeds of sale questioned therein are not merely voidable but
null and void ab initio as the supposed seller declared under oath
that she signed the deeds without knowing what they were. The
significant circumstance meant, the Court added, that her consent
was not merely marred by vices of consent so as to make the
contracts voidable, but that she had not given her consent at all.
142