Zulueta vs.

Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 107383. February 20, 1996
Justice Mendoza

Doctrine:

- The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction
declaring “the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable” is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity)
who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to
the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a “lawful order [from a] court or when public safety
or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.” Any violation of this provision renders the
evidence obtained inadmissible “for any purpose in any proceeding.”

- The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers
and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A
person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

- The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged.
Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as
to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion
for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of
fidelity that each owes to the other.

Facts:

 This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers
taken by her from private respondents clinic without the latters knowledge and consent.
 Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982,
petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her
mother, a driver and private respondents secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in
her husbands clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr.
Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport,
and photographs.
 The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and
for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
 Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages
against petitioner.
  The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which, after trial, rendered
judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner
of the properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiffs Complaint.
 The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and
her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from using or submitting/admitting as evidence
the documents and papers in question.
 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
 Hence this petition.
 In appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial courts decision,
petitioners only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr.,1 this Court ruled that the
documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-i to J-7 of respondents comment in that case) were
admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioners attorney, Alfonso Felix, Jr., did not
constitute malpractice or gross misconduct.

Issue:

- Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court instead of dismissing
private respondents’ complaint. (NO)
- Whether the evidence is admissible (NO)

Ruling: Negative.
Petitioners contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment. Among other things,
private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged that in using the documents in
evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct because of the injunctive order of the
trial court. In dismissing the complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr., this Court took note of the following defense
of Atty. Felix, Jr. which it found to be impressed with merit:

On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he maintains that:

When respondent refiled Cecilias case for legal separation before the Pasig Regional Trial Court, there was
admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from using the documents Annex
A-I to J-7. On September 6, 1983, however having appealed the said order to this Court on a petition for
certiorari, this Court issued a restraining order on aforesaid date which order temporarily set aside the order
of the trial court. Hence, during the enforceability of this Courts order, respondents request for petitioner
to admit the genuineness and authenticity of the subject annexes cannot be looked upon as malpractice.
Notably, petitioner Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and authenticity of the questioned annexes. At that
point in time, would it have been malpractice for respondent to use petitioners admission as evidence
against him in the legal separation case pending in the Regional Trial Court of Makati? Respondent submits
it is- not malpractice.

Significantly, petitioners admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin himself under oath.
Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in evidence against him.
Petitioner became bound by his admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of her husbands admission and
use the same in her action for legal separation cannot be treated as malpractice.

Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a declaration
that his use of the documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martins admission as to their
genuiness and authenticity did not constitute a violation of the injunctive order of the trial court. By no
means does the decision in that case establish the admissibility of the documents and papers in
question.

It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because, at the time he used the documents and
papers, enforcement of the order of the trial court was temporarily restrained by this Court. The TRO issued
by this Court was eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial courts
order was dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the further use of the documents and papers
became effective again.

The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction
declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable3 is no less applicable simply
because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the party against
whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law.4 Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.5

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged.
Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse
while the marriage subsists.6 Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to
share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to
the other.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.

Ong Chia vs. Republic

- Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 of the Rules of Court which provides that—These rules shall not
apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings,
and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient. Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule
132, §34) now being invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a
petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or
suppletorily in such cases is when it is “practicable and convenient.” That is not the case here, since
reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to
be the more practical and convenient course of action considering that decisions in naturalization
proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata. Consequently, a final favorable judgment
does not preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on
the basis of the same documents.

- The Court notes that these documents—namely, the petition in SCN Case No. 031767, petitioner’s
marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and petitioner’s income tax
returns—are all public documents. As such, they have been executed under oath. They are thus
reliable. Since petitioner failed to make a satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that may
cast doubt on the authenticity of these documents, it is our conclusion that the appellate court did
not err in relying upon them.

- It is settled that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the
government and against the applicant.— The above discussion would have been enough to dispose
of this case, but to settle all the issues raised, we shall briefly discuss the effect of petitioner’s failure
to include the address “J.M. Basa St., Iloilo” in his petition, in accordance with §7, CA. No. 473. This
address appears on petitioner’s Immigrant Certificate of Residence, a document which forms part
of the records as Annex A of his 1989 petition for naturalization. Petitioner admits that he failed to
mention said address in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of Residence
containing it had been fully published, with the petition and the other annexes, such publication
constitutes substantial compliance with §7. This is allegedly because the publication effectively
 satisfied the objective sought to be achieved by such requirement, i.e., to give investigating
agencies of the government the opportunity to check on the background of the applicant and
prevent suppression of information regarding any possible misbehavior on his part in any
community where he may have lived at one time or another. It is settled, however, that
naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and
against the applicant. As noted by the State, CA. No. 473, §7 clearly provides that the applicant for
naturalization shall set forth in the petition his present and former places of residence. This
provision and the rule of strict application of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioner’s
argument of “substantial compliance” with the requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law.
On this ground alone, the instant petition ought to be denied.

Facts:
 This is a petition for review of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal, South Cotabato2 admitting petitioner Ong Chia to
Philippine citizenship.
 Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China.
 In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived at the port of Manila on board the vessel “Angking.”
Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines where he found employment and eventually started his
own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had four children.
 On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen
under CA. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended.
 Petitioner testified as to his Qualifications (Section 2) and presented three witnesses to corroborate
his testimony. The Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran (State) was impressed with the testimony of
the petitioner and did not present evidence to refute the petitioner’s testimony.
 The trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship.
 The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed contending that
petitioner: (1) failed to state all the names by which he is or had been known; (2) failed to state all
his former places of residence in violation of CA. No. 473, §7; (3) failed to conduct himself in a
proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of §2; (4) has
no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient or
misdeclared, also in contravention of §2; and (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate
documentary evidence.
 The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and denied petitioner’s application for naturalization.
Issue:
- Whether the appellate court erred in considering the documents which had merely been annexed
by the State to its appellant’s brief. (NO)

Ruling:

Petitioner’s Contention: Not having been presented and formally offered as evidence, they are mere
“scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value,”12 so it was argued, because under Rule
132, §34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The petitioner’s contention has no merit.

Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 of the Rules of Court which provides that—These rules shall not apply to
land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases
not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient. Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) now being
invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for
naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases
is when it is “practicable and convenient.” That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents
presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient
course of action considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res
judicata. Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving for a
revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same documents.

The Court is also not persuaded in the petitioner’s claim that as a result of the failure of the State to present
and formally offer its documentary evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against
their authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural due process. The reason
for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the
opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of
the right to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

Tating vs. Marcella

Doctrine:

The admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence; It is settled that
affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but
by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statements, which may thus be either
omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them.—There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject
sworn statement. However, the admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence.
The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence while the weight of evidence
pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item
of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the
guidelines provided by the rules of evidence. It is settled that affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence
since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in writing
the affiant’s statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them.

As in all civil cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the material allegations of his complaint
and he must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the
defendant.—Private respondents should have presented other evidence to sufficiently prove their
allegation that Daniela, in fact, had no intention of disposing of her property when she executed the subject
deed of sale in favor of petitioner. As in all civil cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the material
allegations of his complaint and he must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of
the evidence of the defendant. Aside from Daniela’s sworn statement, private respondents failed to present
any other documentary evidence to prove their claim. Even the testimonies of their witnesses failed to
establish that Daniela had a different intention when she entered into a contract of sale with petitioner.

Facts:
  The present case arose from a controversy involving a parcel of land denominated as Lot 56 of
Subdivision plan Psd31182, located at Abelarde St., Cadiz City, Negros Occidental.
 The subject lot, containing an area of 200 square meters, was owned by Daniela Solano Vda. De
Tating (Daniela) as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4393 issued by the
Registry of Deeds of the City of Cadiz.
 Daniela sold the subject property to her granddaughter, herein petitioner Nena Lazalita Tating
(Nena). The contract of sale was embodied in a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale executed
by Daniela in favor of Nena.4 Subsequently, title over the subject property was transferred in the
name of Nena.5 She declared the property in her name for tax purposes and paid the real estate
taxes due thereon for the years 1972, 1973, 1975 to 1986 and 1988.6 However, the land remained
in possession of Daniela.
 Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that she had actually no intention of selling the
property; the true agreement between her and Nena was simply to transfer title over the
subject property in favor of the latter to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the
subject property for the purpose of helping her defray her business expenses.
 Daniela later discovered that Nena did not secure any loan nor mortgage the property and she
wants the title in the name of Nena cancelled and the subject property reconveyed to her.7
 Daniela died on July 29, 19888 leaving her children as her heirs, namely: Ricardo, Felicidad, Julio,
Carlos and Cirilo who predeceased Daniela and was represented by herein petitioner.
 Carlos informed Nena that when Daniela died they discovered the sworn statement she executed
on December 28, 1977 and they are demanding from Nena the return of their rightful shares
over the subject property as heirs of Daniela. However, Nena did not reply and efforts to settle
the case amicably proved futile.
 Carlos and Felicidad, represented by her son Salvador, filed a complaint with the RTC of Cadiz
City, Negros Occidental against Nena praying for the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by Daniela in her favor, cancellation of the TCT issued in the name of Nena, and
issuance of a new title and tax declaration in favor of the heirs of Daniela. An amended complaint
was then subsequently filed excluding Ricardo as a party plaintiff as he died intestate leaving
Carlos, Felicidad, Julio, and Nena as his sole heirs.
 In her Answer, Nena denied that any fraud or misrepresentation attended the execution of the
subject Deed of Absolute Sale. She also denied having received the letter of her uncle, Carlos.
 The RTC decided in favor of the plaintiffs and declared the sale NULL and VOID.
 The CA affirmed the RTC judgment.

Petitioner’s Contention:
1.) The Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 14, 1969 is simulated because Daniela’s actual intention
was not to dispose of her property but simply to help petitioner by providing her with a collateral.
2.) Asserts that the sole evidence which persuaded both the RTC and the CA in holding that the
subject deed was simulated was the Sworn Statement of Daniela dated December 28, 1977.
However, petitioner argues that said Sworn Statement should have been rejected outright by the
lower courts considering that Daniela has long been dead when the document was offered in
evidence, thereby denying petitioner the right to cross examine her.
3.) While the subject deed was executed on October 14, 1969, the Sworn Statement was purportedly
executed only on December 28, 1977 and was discovered only after the death of Daniela in 1994.
4.) Petitioner argues that if the deed of sale is indeed simulated, Daniela would have taken action
against the petitioner during her lifetime. However, the fact remains that up to the time of her
death or almost 20 years after the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed, she never uttered a word
of complaint against petitioner.
 5.) Asserts that the RTC and the CA erred in departing from the doctrine held time and again by the
Supreme Court that clear, strong and convincing evidence beyond mere preponderance is
required to show the falsity or nullity of a notarial document.
6.) Argued that the RTC and the CA erred in its pronouncement that the transaction between Daniela
and petitioner created a trust relationship between them because of the settled rule that where
the terms of a contract are clear, it should be given full effect.
Private Respondent’s Answer:
- Contended that petitioner failed to show that the CA or the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in arriving at their assailed judgments;
- That Daniela’s Sworn Statement is sufficient evidence to prove that the contract of sale by and
between her and petitioner was merely simulated; and that, in effect, the agreement between
petitioner and Daniela created a trust relationship between them.

Issue:
Ruling:

The Court rules for the petitioner.

The CA and the trial court ruled that the contract of sale between petitioner and Daniela is simulated. A
contract is simulated if the parties do not intend to be bound at all (absolutely simulated) or if the parties
conceal their true agreement (relatively simulated).19 The primary consideration in determining the true
nature of a contract is the intention of the parties.20 Such intention is determined from the express terms
of their agreement as well as from their contemporaneous and subsequent acts.21

In the present case, the main evidence presented by private respondents in proving their allegation that
the subject deed of sale did not reflect the true intention of the parties thereto is the sworn statement of
Daniela dated December 28, 1977. The trial court admitted the said sworn statement as part of private
respondents’ evidence and gave credence to it. The CA also accorded great probative weight to this
document.

There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn statement. However, the admissibility of evidence
should not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and
competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to
convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight
depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence. It is settled that
affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by
another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statements, which may thus be either omitted
or misunderstood by the one writing them.

The adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross examine the affiant. Thus, affidavits are generally
rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.
The Court finds that both the trial court and the CA committed error in giving the sworn statement
probative weight. Since Daniela is no longer available to take the witness stand as she is already dead, the
RTC and the CA should not have given probative value on Daniela’s sworn statement for purposes of
proving that the contract of sale between her and petitioner was simulated and that, as a consequence, a
trust relationship was created between them. Private respondents should have presented other evidence to
sufficiently prove their allegation that Daniela, in fact, had no intention of disposing of her property when
she executed the subject deed of sale in favor of petitioner. Private respondents failed to present any other
documentary evidence to prove their claim. Even the testimonies of their witnesses failed to establish that
Daniela had a different intention when she entered into a contract of sale with petitioner.

The legal presumption is in favor of the validity of contracts and the party who impugns its regularity has
the burden of proving its simulation. The private respondents failed to discharge the burden.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

People vs. Yatar

Doctrine:

- The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved against
appellant. This Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the
credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. Well
entrenched is the rule that the findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses are entitled to
great weight on appeal unless cogent reasons are presented necessitating a reexamination if not
the disturbance of the same; the reason being that the former is in a better and unique position of
hearing firsthand the witnesses and observing their deportment, conduct and attitude. Absent any
showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances
of weight which would affect the result of the case, the trial judge’s assessment of credibility
deserves the appellate court’s highest respect. Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses
for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their testimonies are entitled to full faith
and credit.
- The weight of the prosecution’s evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-settled rule which
provides that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient
circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt
that the accused committed the crime.
- Evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence
or nonexistence. — In Daubert v. Merrell Dow, it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on
scientifically valid principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under
Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial, including
the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA
evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by
the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles
of human genetics and molecular biology.
- The right against self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of
the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is
not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.
- Generally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly established evidence and never on
mere conjectures or suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence denotes “something more than
a minimum of probative value,” suggesting that such evidentiary relevance must contain a “plus
value.” This may be necessary to preclude the trial court from being satisfied by matters of slight
value, capable of being exaggerated by prejudice and hasty conclusions. Evidence without “plus
 value” may be logically relevant but not legally sufficient to convict. It is incumbent upon the trial
court to balance the probative value of such evidence against the likely harm that would result from
its admission. The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when there is relevant evidence
from which the court can properly find or infer that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires moral certainty of guilt in order to sustain a conviction.
Moral certainty is that degree of certainty that convinces and directs the understanding and satisfies
the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. It is certainty
beyond reasonable doubt. This requires that the circumstances, taken together, should be of a
conclusive nature and tendency; leading, on the whole, to a satisfactory conclusion that the accused,
and no one else, committed the offense charged. In view of the totality of evidence appreciated
thus far, we rule that the present case passes the test of moral certainty.

Facts:
- Appellant was charged with Rape with Homicide.
- On June 30, 1998 at Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga the accused, in order to have carnal knowledge of a
certain Kathylyn D. Uba , did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, and with use of a
bladed weapon stab the latter inflicting upon her fatal injuries resulting in the death of the victim,
and on the occasion or by reason thereof, accused, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and by
means of force and violence had carnal knowledge of said Kathlyn D. Uba against her will.
- Appellant denied the allegations against him and during arraignment, pleaded “not guilty”.
- Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

Issue:

1.) Whether the Trial Court gravely erred in giving much weight to the evidence presented by the
prosecution.
2.) Whether the Trial Court erred in not acquitting the accused-appellant of the crime charged due to
reasonable doubt.

Ruling:

Appellant’s contentions are unmeritorious. The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses should be resolved against appellant.

This Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses
unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been
overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. Well entrenched is the rule that the
findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight on appeal unless cogent
reasons are presented necessitating a reexamination if not the disturbance of the same; the reason being
that the former is in a better and unique position of hearing firsthand the witnesses and observing their
deportment, conduct and attitude. Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, the trial judge’s
assessment of credibility deserves the appellate court’s highest respect. Where there is nothing to show
that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their testimonies are entitled to
full faith and credit.
The weight of the prosecution’s evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-settled rule which provides
that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient circumstantial
evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime.

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow, it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could
be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over
which testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques.
DNA typing is one such novel procedure. Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly
to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to the case
at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was
appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid
principles of human genetics and molecular biology.

Generally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly established evidence and never on mere
conjectures or suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence denotes “something more than a minimum of
probative value,” suggesting that such evidentiary relevance must contain a “plus value.” This may be
necessary to preclude the trial court from being satisfied by matters of slight value, capable of being
exaggerated by prejudice and hasty conclusions. Evidence without “plus value” may be logically relevant
but not legally sufficient to convict. It is incumbent upon the trial court to balance the probative value of
such evidence against the likely harm that would result from its admission. The judgment in a criminal case
can be upheld only when there is relevant evidence from which the court can properly find or infer that the
accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires moral certainty of guilt
in order to sustain a conviction. Moral certainty is that degree of certainty that convinces and directs the
understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon
it. It is certainty beyond reasonable doubt. This requires that the circumstances, taken together, should be
of a conclusive nature and tendency; leading, on the whole, to a satisfactory conclusion that the accused,
and no one else, committed the offense charged. In view of the totality of evidence appreciated thus
far, we rule that the present case passes the test of moral certainty.

People vs. Salafranca

Doctrine:

Evidence; Hearsay Evidence Rule; Dying Declarations; Res Gestae; The statement of the victim an hour
before his death and right after the hacking incident bore all the earmarks either of a dying
declaration or part of the res gestae either of which was an exception to the hearsay rule.—It appears
from the foregoing testimony that Bolanon had gone to the residence of Estaño, his uncle, to seek help
right after being stabbed by Salafranca; that Estaño had hurriedly dressed up to bring his nephew to the
Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that on the way to the hospital, Estaño had asked Bolanon who had
stabbed him, and the latter had told Estaño that his assailant had been Salafranca; that at the time of the
utterance Bolanon had seemed to be having a hard time breathing, causing Estaño to advise him not to
talk anymore; and that about ten minutes after his admission at the emergency ward of the hospital,
Bolanon had expired and had been pronounced dead. Such circumstances qualified the utterance of
Bolanon as both a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae, considering that the Court has recognized
that the statement of the victim an hour before his death and right after the hacking incident bore all the
earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of the res gestae either of which was an exception to the
hearsay rule.

A dying declaration is generally inadmissible for being hearsay; Exceptions.—A dying declaration,
although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted
when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) that the declaration must concern the cause and
surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the declaration is made, the
declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death; (c) that the declarant is competent as a witness;
and (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the
declarant is a victim. All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his ante-mortem statement
to Estaño, identifying Salafranca as the person who had stabbed him. At the time of his statement, Bolanon
was conscious of his impending death, having sustained a stab wound in the chest and, according to Estaño,
was then experiencing great difficulty in breathing. Bolanon succumbed in the hospital emergency room a
few minutes from admission, which occurred under three hours after the stabbing. There is ample authority
for the view that the declarant’s belief in the imminence of his death can be shown by the declarant’s own
statements or from circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of his wounds, statements made in his
presence, or by the opinion of his physician. Bolanon would have been competent to testify on the subject
of the declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration was offered in this criminal prosecution for
murder in which Bolanon was the victim.

Res Gestae; Requisites for declaration or an utterance as part of the res gestae to be admissible in
evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule.—A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res
gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites
concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made
before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending circumstances. The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as
part of the res gestae concur herein. Surely, when he gave the identity of the assailant to Estaño, Bolanon
was referring to a startling occurrence, i.e., his stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon was then on board the
taxicab that would bring him to the hospital, and thus had no time to contrive his identification of Salafranca
as the assailant. His utterance about Salafranca having stabbed him was made in spontaneity and only in
reaction to the startling occurrence. The statement was relevant because it identified Salafranca as the
perpetrator.

The term res gestae has been defined as “those circumstances which are the undersigned incidents of
a particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act.”—The term res gestae
has been defined as “those circumstances which are the undersigned incidents of a particular litigated act
and which are admissible when illustrative of such act.” In a general way, res gestae refers to the
circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and
are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and
fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the
commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous
reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the
declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of
the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or
connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction
itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.
An ante-mortem declaration of a victim of murder, homicide, or parricide that meets the conditions of
admissibility under the Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence is admissible either as a dying declaration
or as a part of the res gestae, or both.

Facts:

Rodrigo Salafranca y Bello was charged with and tried for murder for the fatal stabbing of Johnny Bolanon,
and was ultimately found guilty of the felony by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, in Manila on September
23, 2004. On appeal, his conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) through its decision
promulgated on November 24, 2005. Salafranca has come to the Court on a final appeal, continuing to
challenge the credibility of the witnesses who had incriminated him.

 On past midnight on July 31, 1993 Bolanon was stabbed near the Del Pan Sports Complex in
Binondo, Manila; that after stabbing Bolanon, his assailant ran away; that Bolanon was still able to
walk to the house of his uncle Rodolfo B. Estaño in order to seek help; that his uncle rushed him to
the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that on their way to the hospitalBolanon told Estaño that
it was Salafranca who had stabbed him; that Bolanon eventually succumbed at the hospital at 2:30
am despite receiving medical attention; and that the stabbing of Bolanon was personally witnessed
by Augusto Mendoza, then still a minor of 13 years, who was in the complex at the time.
 Salafranca fled after stabbing Bolanon. He evaded arrest for a long period, despite the warrant for
his arrest being issued. He was finally arrested on April 23, 2003, and detained at the Manila City
Jail.
 After trial, the RTC convicted Salafranca.
 On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings and conclusions of the RTC, citing the dying declaration
made to his uncle pointing to Salafranca as his assailant, and Salafranca’s
positive identification as the culprit by Mendoza.
 Salafranca reiterates his defenses, and insists that the State did not prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

Issue:

- Whether Salafranca is correct that the State was not able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. (NO)
Ruling:

The appeal lacks merit. Discrediting Mendoza and Estaño as witnesses against Salafranca would be
unwarranted. The RTC and the CA correctly concluded that Mendoza and Estaño were credible and reliable.

As a rule, a dying declaration is hearsay and is inadmissible as evidence. (People vs. Labagala, 626
SCRA 267 [2010]) Res gestae refers to statements made by the participants or the victims of, or the
spectators to, a crime immediately before, during, or after its commission—these statements are a
spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion, without any opportunity for
the declarant to fabricate a false statement. (People vs. Fallones, 645 SCRA 650 [2011])

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals.

SCC Chemicals Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

Rule that hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative value admits of an exception; It is
settled that it is the opportunity to cross-examine which negates the claim that the matters testified
to by a witness are hearsay.—As a rule, hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative value.
However, the rule does admit of an exception. Where a party failed to object to hearsay evidence, then the
same is admissible. The rationale for this exception is to be found in the right of a litigant to cross-examine.
It is settled that it is the opportunity to cross-examine which negates the claim that the matters testified to
by a witness are hearsay. However, the right to cross examine may be waived. The repeated failure of a party
to cross-examine the witness is an implied waiver of such right.

Under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial admission requires no proof.—As correctly
found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner’s admission as to the execution of the promissory note by it
through private respondent Arrieta and Bermundo at pre-trial sufficed to settle the question of the
genuineness of signatures. The admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the
parties, it must be treated as a judicial admission. Under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial
admission requires no proof.

Facts:

 On December 13, 1983, SCC Chemicals Corporation (SCC for brevity) through its chairman, private
respondent Danilo Arrieta and vice president, Pablo (Pablito) Bermundo, obtained a loan from
State Investment House, Inc., (hereinafter SIHI) in the amount of P129,824.48.
 The loan carried an annual interest rate of 30% plus penalty charges of 2% per month on the
remaining balance of the principal upon non-payment on the due date-January 12, 1984.
 To secure the payment of the loan, Danilo Arrieta and private respondent Leopoldo Halili executed
a Comprehensive Surety Agreement binding themselves jointly and severally to pay the
obligation on the maturity date. SCC failed to pay the loan when it matured. SIHI then sent
demand letters to SCC, Arrieta and Halili, but notwithstanding receipt thereof, no payment was
made.
 On August 2, 1984, SIHI filed Civil Case No. 84-25881 for a sum of money with a prayer for
preliminary attachment against SCC, Arrieta, and Halili with the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
 In its answer, SCC asserted SIHFs lack of cause of action. Petitioner contended that the promissory
note upon which SIHI anchored its cause of action was null, void, and of no binding effect for lack
or failure of consideration.
 The case was then set for pre-trial. The parties were allowed to meet out-of-court in an effort to
settle the dispute amicably. No settlement was reached.
 The case then proceeded to trial on the sole issue of whether or not the defendants were liable to
the plaintiff and to what extent was the liability.
 SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim.
 The lower court promulgated its decision in favor of SIHI.
 On appeal, SCC contended that SIHI had failed to show, by a preponderance of evidence, that the
latter had a case against it. SCC argued that the lone witness presented by SIHI to prove its claim
was insufficient as the competency of the witness was not established and there was no showing
that he had personal knowledge of the transaction. SCC further maintained that no proof was
shown of the genuineness of the signatures in the documentary exhibits presented as evidence and
 that these signatures were neither marked nor offered in evidence by SIHI. Finally, SCC pointed out
that the original copies of the documents were not presented in court.
 The appellate court affirmed in toto the judgment appealed from.
 SCC filed its motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in its resolution.

Issue:
- Whether or not the Court of Appeals made an error of law in holding that private respondent SIHI
had proved its cause of action by preponderant evidence. (NO)

Petitioner’s Contention:
1.) Petitioner contends that SIHI introduced documentary evidence through the testimony of a witness
whose competence was not established and whose personal knowledge of the truthfulness of the
facts testified to was not demonstrated. It argues that the same was in violation of Sections 363
and 48,4 Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and it was manifest error for the Court of Appeals to have
ruled otherwise.
2.) SCC points out that the sole witness of SIHI did not profess to have seen the document presented
in evidence executed or written by SCC. Thus, no proof of its genuineness was adduced. SIHI thus
ran afoul of Section 2,5 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which requires proof of due execution and
authenticity of private documents before the same can be received as evidence.
3.) Petitioner likewise submits that none of the signatures affixed in the documentary evidence
presented by SIHI were offered in evidence. It vehemently argues that such was in violation of the
requirement of Section 34,6 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It was thus an error of law on the part
of the appellate court to consider the same.
4.) Finally, petitioner posits that the non-production of the originals of the documents presented in
evidence allows the presumption of suppression of evidence provided for in Section 3(e),7 Rule 131
of the Rules of Court, to come into play.

Ruling:

Petitioner’s arguments lack merit. SCC failed to appear several times on scheduled hearing dates despite
due notice to it and counsel. On all those scheduled hearing dates, petitioner was supposed to cross-
examine the lone witness offered by SIHI to prove its case.

Petitioner’s reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is misplaced. As a rule, hearsay
evidence is excluded and carries no probative value.8 However, the rule does admit of an exception. Where
a party failed to object to hearsay evidence, then the same is admissible.9 The rationale for this exception
is to be found in the right of a litigant to cross-examine.

The right to cross-examine may be waived. The repeated failure of a party to cross-examine the witness
is an implied waiver of such right. Petitioner was afforded several opportunities by the trial court to cross-
examine the other party’s witness. Petitioner repeatedly failed to take advantage of these opportunities.

Nor was the assailed testimony hearsay. The Court of Appeals correctly found that the witness of SIHI
was a competent witness as he testified to facts, which he knew of his personal knowledge. Thus, the
requirements of Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court as to the admissibility of his testimony were
satisfied.
Respecting petitioner’s other submissions, the same are moot and academic. As correctly found by the
Court of Appeals, petitioner’s admission as to the execution of the promissory note by it through private
respondent Arrieta and Bermundo at pre-trial sufficed to settle the question of the genuineness of
signatures. The admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must be
treated as a judicial admission. Under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial admission
requires no proof.

Nor will petitioner’s reliance on the “best evidence rule” advance its cause. Respondent SIHI had no
need to present the original of the documents as there was already a judicial admission by petitioner at
pre-trial of the execution of the promissory note and receipt of the demand letter. It is now too late for
petitioner to be questioning their authenticity. Its admission of the existence of these documents was
sufficient to establish its obligation. Petitioner failed to submit any evidence to the contrary or proof of
payment or other forms of extinguishment of said obligation.