426 Supreme Court Reports Annotated: Tiu vs. Arriesgado

2/24/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 437
426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Tiu vs. Arriesgado
*
G.R. No. 138060. September 1, 2004.
WILLIAM TIU, doing business under the name and style of

“D’ Rough Riders,” and VIRGILIO TE LASPIÑAS,
petitioners, vs. PEDRO A. ARRIESGADO, BENJAMIN
CONDOR, SERGIO PEDRANO and PHILIPPINE
PHOENIX SURETY AND INSURANCE, INC.,
respondents.
Civil Law; Contracts; Contracts of Carriage; Common

Carriers; Extraordinary Diligence; A man must use common sense,
and exercise due reflection in all his acts—it is his duty to be
cautious, careful and prudent, if not from instinct, then through
fear of recurring punishment.—A man must use common sense,
and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be
cautious, careful and prudent, if not from instinct, then through
fear of recurring punishment. He is responsible for such results as
anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would have
performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise, his own
person, rights and property, and those of his fellow beings, would
ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Negligence; Upon the
happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once
arises, and it becomes
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
427
VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 1, 2004 427
Tiu vs. Arriesgado
the duty of a common carrier to prove that he observed

extraordinary diligence in the care of his pasengers.—Under the
said contract of carriage, the petitioners assumed the express
obligation to transport the respondent and his wife to their
destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with due
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2/24/2019 regard for all circumstances.SUPREMEAny
COURTinjury suffered
REPORTS byVOLUME
ANNOTATED the 437
passengers in the course thereof is immediately attributable to
the negligence of the carrier. Upon the happening of the accident,
the presumption of negligence at once arises, and it becomes the
duty of a common carrier to prove that he observed extraordinary
diligence in the care of his passengers. It must be stressed that in
requiring the highest possible degree of diligence from common
carriers and in creating a presumption of negligence against
them, the law compels them to curb the recklessness of their
drivers.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The carrier must
show the utmost diligence of very cautious persons as far as
human care and foresight can provide, or that the accident was
caused by fortuitous event.— While evidence may be submitted to
overcome such presumption of negligence, it must be shown that
the carrier observed the required extraordinary diligence, which
means that the carrier must show the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons as far as human care and foresight can provide,
or that the accident was caused by fortuitous event.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Principle of Last
Clear Chance; Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the principle
of last clear chance is inapplicable in the instant case, as it only
applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of colliding
vehicles.—Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the principle of
last clear chance is inapplicable in the instant case, as it only
applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of two colliding
vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands
responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual
obligations, for it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent
driver and its owner on the ground that the other driver was
likewise guilty of negligence. The common law notion of last clear
chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who has
also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear
chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is
difficult to see what role, if any, the common law of last clear
chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common
law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to
recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in
Article 2179 of the Civil Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Presumed
Negligence; It is such a firmly established principle, as to have
virtually formed part of the law itself, that the negligence of the
employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of
the employer.—It is such a firmly established principle, as to have
virtually formed part of the law itself, that the negli-
428
Tiu vs. Arriesgado

gence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence
on the part of the employer. This is the presumed negligence in
the selection and supervision of employee. The theory of presumed
negligence, in contrast with the American doctrine of respondeat
superior, where the negligence of the employee is conclusively
presumed to be the negligence of the employer, is clearly
deducible from the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code which provides that the responsibility therein mentioned
shall cease if the employers prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages. . . .
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Indemnity;
Compulsory Vehicle Liability Insurance; The nature of
Compulsory Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance is such that it is
primarily intended to provide compensation for the death or bodily
injuries suffered by innocent third parties or pasengers as a result
of the negligent operation and use of motor vehicles.—The nature
of Compulsory Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance is such that it is
primarily intended to provide compensation for the death or
bodily injuries suffered by innocent third parties or passengers as
a result of the negligent operation and use of motor vehicles. The
victims and/or their dependents are assured of immediate
financial assistance, regardless of the financial capacity of motor
vehicle owners.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Extent;
Although the victim may proceed directly against the insurer for
indemnity, the third party liability is only up to the extent of the
insurance policy and those required by law.—Although the victim
may proceed directly against the insurer for indemnity, the third
party liability is only up to the extent of the insurance policy and
those required by law. While it is true that where the insurance
contract provides for indemnity against liability to third persons,
and such persons can directly sue the insurer, the direct liability
of the insurer under indemnity contracts against third party
liability does not mean that the insurer can be held liable in
solidum with the insured and/or the other parties found at fault.
For the liability of the insurer is based on contract; that of the
insured carrier or vehicle owner is based on tort. . . .
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Exemplary Damages;
Article 2231 of the Civil Code explicitly authorizes the imposition
of exemplary damages in quasi-delicts “if the defendant acted with
gross negligence.”— While the immediate beneficiaries of the
standard of extraordinary diligence are, of course, the passengers
and owners of cargo carried by a common carrier, they are not the
only persons that the law seeks to benefit. For if common carriers
carefully observed the statutory standard of extraordinary
diligence in respect of their own passengers, they cannot help but
simultaneously benefit pedestrians and the passengers of other
vehicles who are equally entitled to the safe and convenient use of
our roads
429
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Tiu vs. Arriesgado
and highways. The law seeks to stop and prevent the slaughter
and maiming of people (whether passengers or not) on our
highways and buses, the very size and power of which seem to
inflame the minds of their drivers. Article 2231 of the Civil Code
explicitly authorizes the imposition of exemplary damages in
cases of quasi-delicts “if the defendant acted with gross
negligence.” . . .
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Solidary Liability; In
case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the driver of
the bus on which he was riding and of the driver of another
vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the two vehicles are
jointly and severally liable for damages.— The same rule of
liability was applied in situations where the negligence of the
driver of the bus on which plaintiff was riding concurred with the
negligence of a third party who was the driver of another vehicle,
thus causing an accident. In Anuran v. Buño, Batangas Laguna
Tayabas Bus Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, and Metro
Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the bus company,
its driver, the operator of the other vehicle and the driver of the
vehicle were jointly and severally held liable to the injured
passenger or the latter’s heirs. The basis of this allocation of
liability was explained in Viluan v. Court of Appeals, thus: “Nor
should it make difference that the liability of petitioner [bus
owner] springs from contract while that of respondents [owner
and driver of other vehicle] arises from quasi-delict. As early as
1913, we already ruled in Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, 56 Phil. 177,
that in case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the
driver of the bus on which he was riding and of the driver of
another vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the two
vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages. Some
members of the Court, though, are of the view that under the
circumstances they are liable on quasi-delict.”
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Rufino L. Remoreras, Jr. and Sixto Rey M. Orig for
petitioners.
Rogelio R. Corro for private respondent Pedro A.
Arriesgado.
Glenn N. Jumao-as for respondent B. Condor.
Ma. Cristina G. Laderas for respondent PPSII.
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Tiu vs. Arriesgado
2/24/2019
CALLEJO, SR., J.: SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 437
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court from the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 2
No. 54354 affirming with
modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, 7th
Judicial Region, Cebu City, Branch 20, in Civil Case No.
CEB-5963 for breach of contract of carriage, damages and
attorney’s fees, and the Resolution dated February 26, 1999
denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
The following facts are undisputed:
At about 10:00 p.m. of March 15, 1987, the cargo truck
marked “Condor Hollow Blocks and General Merchandise”
bearing plate number GBP-675 was loaded with firewood
in Bogo, Cebu and left for Cebu City. Upon reaching Sitio
Aggies, Poblacion, Compostela, Cebu, just as the truck
passed over a bridge, one of its rear tires exploded. The
driver, Sergio Pedrano, then parked along the right side of
the national highway and removed the damaged tire to
have 3it vulcanized at a nearby shop, about 700 meters
away. Pedrano left his helper, Jose Mitante, Jr. to keep
watch over the stalled vehicle, and instructed
4
the latter to
place a spare tire six fathoms away behind the stalled
truck to serve as a warning for oncoming vehicles. The
truck’s tail lights were also left on. It was about 12:00 a.m.,
March 16, 1987.
At about 4:45 a.m., D’ Rough Riders passenger bus with
plate number PBP-724 driven by Virgilio Te Laspiñas was
cruising along the national highway of Sitio Aggies,
Poblacion, Compostela, Cebu. The passenger bus was also
bound for Cebu City, and had come from Maya,
Daanbantayan, Cebu. Among its passengers were the
Spouses Pedro A. Arriesgado and Felisa Pepito Arriesgado,
who were seated at the right side of the bus, about three (3)
or four (4) places from the front seat.
As the bus was approaching the bridge, Laspiñas saw5
the stalled truck, which was then about 25 meters away.
He applied the
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis, with Associate

Justices Artemon D. Luna and Rodrigo V. Cosico concurring.
2 Penned by Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos.
3 TSN, 3 September 1990, p. 7 (Pedrano).
4TSN, 4 September 1990, p. 14 (Mitante, Jr.).
5 TSN, 20 November 1989, p. 6.
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Tiu vs. Arriesgado
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brakes and tried to swerve to the left to avoid hitting the
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 437
truck. But it was too late; the bus rammed into the truck’s
left rear. The impact damaged the right side of the bus and
left several passengers injured. Pedro Arriesgado lost6
consciousness and suffered a fracture in his right colles.
His wife, Felisa, was brought to the Danao City Hospital.
She was later transferred to the Southern 7
Island Medical
Center where she died shortly thereafter.
Respondent Pedro A. Arriesgado then filed a complaint
for breach of contract of carriage, damages and attorney’s
fees before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch
20, against the petitioners, D’ Rough Riders bus operator
William Tiu and his driver, Virgilio Te Laspiñas on May
27, 1987. The respondent alleged that the passenger bus in
question was cruising at a fast and high speed along the
national road, and that petitioner Laspiñas 8 did not take
precautionary measures to avoid the accident. Thus:
6. That the accident resulted to the death of the

plaintiff’s wife, Felisa Pepito Arriesgado, as
evidenced by a Certificate of Death, a xerox copy of
which is hereto attached as integral part hereof and
marked as ANNEX – “A”, and physical injuries to
several of its passengers, including plaintiff himself
who suffered a “COLLES FRACTURE RIGHT,” per
Medical Certificate, a xerox copy of which is hereto
attached as integral part hereof and marked as
ANNEX – “B” hereof.
7. That due to the reckless and imprudent driving by
defendant Virgilio Te Laspiñas of the said Rough
Riders passenger bus, plaintiff and his wife, Felisa
Pepito Arriesgado, failed to safely reach their
destination which was Cebu City, the proximate
cause of which was defendant-driver’s failure to
observe utmost diligence required of a very cautious
person under all circumstances.
8. That defendant William Tiu, being the owner and
operator of the said Rough Riders passenger bus
which figured in the said accident, wherein plaintiff
and his wife were riding at the time of the accident,
is therefore directly liable for the breach of contract
of carriage for his failure to transport plaintiff and
his wife safely to their place of destination which
was Cebu City, and which failure in his obligation
to transport safely his passengers was due to and in
consequence of his failure to exercise the diligence
of a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of his employees, 9 particularly
defendant-driver Virgilio Te Laspiñas.
_______________
6Exhibit “G”, Records, p. 8.

2/24/2019 7TSN, 23 January 1989, pp. SUPREME COURT
7-13; Exhibit REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 437
“B”.
8Records, p. 2
9 Id., at pp. 2-3.
432

Tiu vs. Arriesgado
The respondent prayed that judgment be rendered in his

favor and that the petitioners be condemned to pay the
following damages:
1). To pay to plaintiff, jointly and severally, the amount of

P30,000.00 for the death and untimely demise of plaintiff’s
wife, Felisa Pepito Arriesgado;
P38,441.50, representing actual expenses incurred by the
plaintiff in connection with the death/burial of plaintiff’s
wife;
P1,113.80, representing medical/hospitalization expenses
incurred by plaintiff for the injuries sustained by him;
P50,000.00 for moral damages;
P50,000.00 by way of exemplary damages;
P20,000.00 for attorney’s fees;
P5,000.00 for litigation expenses.
PLAINTIFF FURTHER PRAYS FOR SUCH

10
OTHER RELIEFS
AND REMEDIES IN LAW AND EQUITY.
The petitioners,
11
for their part, filed a Third-Party
Complaint on August 21, 1987 against the following:
respondent Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Inc.
(PPSII), petitioner Tiu’s insurer; respondent Benjamin
Condor, the registered owner of the cargo truck; and
respondent Sergio Pedrano, the driver of the truck. They
alleged that petitioner Laspiñas was negotiating the uphill
climb along the national highway of Sitio Aggies,
Poblacion, Compostela, in a moderate and normal speed. It
was further alleged that the truck was parked in a slanted
manner, its rear portion almost in the middle of the
highway, and that no early warning device was displayed.
Petitioner Laspiñas promptly applied the brakes and
swerved to the left to avoid hitting the truck head-on, but
despite his efforts to avoid damage to property and physical
_______________
2/24/2019 10 Id., at p. 5. SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 437
11 Id., at pp. 35-39.
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Tiu vs. Arriesgado
injuries on the passengers, the right side portion of the bus

hit the cargo truck’s left rear. The petitioners further
alleged, thus:
5. That the cargo truck mentioned in the aforequoted

paragraph is owned and registered in the name of
the third-party defendant Benjamin Condor and
was left unattended by its driver Sergio Pedrano,
one of the third-party defendants, at the time of the
incident;
6. That third-party defendant Sergio Pedrano, as
driver of the cargo truck with marked (sic) “Condor
Hollow Blocks & General Merchandise,” with Plate
No. GBP-675 which was recklessly and
imprudently parked along the national highway of
Compostela, Cebu during the vehicular accident in
question, and third-party defendant Benjamin
Condor, as the registered owner of the cargo truck
who failed to exercise due diligence in the selection
and supervision of third-party defendant Sergio
Pedrano, are jointly and severally liable to the
third-party plaintiffs for whatever liability that
may be adjudged against said third-party plaintiffs
or are directly liable of (sic) the alleged death of
plaintiff’s wife;
7. That in addition to all that are stated above and in
the answer which are intended to show reckless
imprudence on the part of the third-party
defendants, the third-party plaintiffs hereby
declare that during the vehicular accident in
question, third-party defendant was clearly
violating Section 34, par. (g) of the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code . . .
...
10. That the aforesaid passenger bus, owned and
operated by third-party plaintiff William Tiu, is
covered by a common carrier liability insurance
with Certificate of Cover No. 054940 issued by
Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Inc.,
Cebu City Branch, in favor of third-party plaintiff
William Tiu which covers the period from July 22,
1986 to July 22, 1987 and that the said insurance
coverage was valid, binding and subsisting during
2/24/2019
the time of the aforementioned incident (Annex “A”
as part hereof);
11. That after the aforesaid alleged incident, third-
party plaintiff notified third-party defendant
Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Inc., of
the alleged incident hereto mentioned, but to no
avail;
12. That granting, et arguendo et arguendi, if herein
third-party plaintiffs will be adversely adjudged,
they stand to pay damages sought by the plaintiff
and therefore could also look up to the Philippine
Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Inc., for
contribution, indemnification and/or
reimbursement of any liability or obligation that
they might [be] adjudged per insurance coverage
duly entered into by and between third-party
plaintiff
434

Tiu vs. Arriesgado
William Tiu and third-party defendant

12
Philippine Phoenix
Surety and Insurance, Inc.; . . .
The respondent PPSII, for its part, admitted that it had
an existing contract with petitioner Tiu, but averred that it
had already attended to and settled13 the claims of those who
were injured during the incident. It could not accede to
the claim of respondent Arriesgado, as such claim was way
beyond the scheduled 14
indemnity as contained in the
contract of insurance.
After the parties presented their respective evidence, the
trial court ruled in favor of respondent Arriesgado. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby

rendered in favor of plaintiff as against defendant William Tiu
ordering the latter to pay the plaintiff the following amounts:
1 —The sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as

moral damages;
2 —The sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as
exemplary damages;
3 —The sum of THIRTY-EIGHT THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED FORTY-ONE PESOS (P38,441.00) as actual
damages;
4 —The sum of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00)
as attorney’s fees;
5 —The sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as
costs of suit;
15
15
2/24/2019 “SO ORDERED.” SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 437
According to the trial court, there was no dispute that

petitioner William Tiu was engaged in business as a
common carrier, in view of his admission that D’ Rough
Rider passenger bus which figured in the accident was
owned by him; that he had been engaged in the
transportation business for 25 years with a sole
proprietorship; and that he owned 34 buses. The trial court
ruled that if petitioner Laspiñas had not been driving at a
fast pace, he could have easily swerved to the left to avoid
hitting the truck, thus, averting the
_______________
12 Id., at pp. 37-39.

13Annexes “1” to “6”, Records, pp. 57-62.
14Records, p. 55.
15 Id., at p. 311.
435
VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 1, 2004 435

Tiu vs. Arriesgado
unfortunate incident. It then concluded that petitioner

Laspiñas was negligent.
The trial court also ruled that the absence of an early
warning device near the place where the truck was parked
was not sufficient to impute negligence on the part of
respondent Pedrano, since the tail lights of the truck were 16
fully on, and the vicinity was well lighted by street lamps.
It also found that the testimony of petitioner Tiu, that he
based the selection of his driver Laspiñas on efficiency and
in-service training, and that the latter had been so far an
efficient and good driver for the past six years of his
employment, was insufficient to prove that he observed the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of his employees.
After the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the
said decision was denied, the petitioners elevated the case
to the Court of Appeals on the following issues:
I WHETHER THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT

SERGIO PEDRANO WAS RECKLESS AND
IMPRUDENT WHEN HE PARKED THE CARGO
TRUCK IN AN OBLIQUE MANNER;
II WHETHER THE THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS
ARE JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE
DIRECTLY TO PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE OR TO
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS FOR WHATEVER
LIABILITY THAT MAY BE ADJUDGED TO THE
SAID DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS;
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III WHETHER DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
VIRGILIO TE LASPIÑAS WAS GUILTY OF

GROSS NEGLIGENCE;
IV WHETHER DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
WILLIAM TIU HAD EXERCISED THE DUE
DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER OF A FAMILY
IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF
HIS DRIVERS;
V GRANTING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT
THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WILLIAM TIU
IS LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
WHETHER THERE IS LEGAL AND FACTUAL
BASIS IN AWARDING EXCESSIVE MORAL
DAMAGES, EX[E]MPLARY DAMAGES,
ATTORNEY’S FEES AND LITIGATION
EXPENSES TO PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE;
_______________
16 Id., at p. 308.
436

Tiu vs. Arriesgado
VI WHETHER THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT

PHILIPPINE PHOENIX SURETY AND
INSURANCE, INC. IS LIABLE
17
TO DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT WILLIAM TIU.
The appellate court rendered judgment affirming the trial

court’s decision with the modification that the awards for
moral and exemplary damages were reduced to P25,000.
The dispositive portion reads:
“WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated November 6, 1995 is

hereby MODIFIED such that the awards for moral and exemplary
damages are each reduced to P25,000.00 or a total of P50,000.00
for both. The judgment
18
is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
“SO ORDERED.”
According to the appellate court, the action of respondent

Arriesgado was based not on quasi-delict but on breach of
contract of carriage. As a common carrier, it was incumbent
upon petitioner Tiu to prove that extraordinary diligence
was observed in ensuring the safety of passengers during
transportation. Since the latter failed to do so, he should be
held liable for respondent Arriesgado’s claim. The CA also
ruled that no evidence was presented against the
respondent PPSII, and as such, it could not be held liable
for respondent Arriesgado’s claim, nor for contribution,
2/24/2019
indemnification and/or SUPREME
reimbursement in case the
COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 437
petitioners were adjudged liable.

The petitioners now come to this Court and ascribe the
following errors committed by the appellate court:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED

IN NOT DECLARING RESPONDENTS
BENJAMIN CONDOR AND SERGIO PEDRANO
GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE AND HENCE,
LIABLE TO RESPONDENT PEDRO A.
ARRIESGADO OR TO PETITIONERS FOR
WHATEVER LIABILITY THAT MAY BE
ADJUDGED AGAINST THEM.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN FINDING PETITIONERS GUILTY OF
NEGLIGENCE AND HENCE, LIABLE TO
RESPONDENT PEDRO A. ARRIESGADO.
_______________
17 CA Rollo, pp. 29-30.

18 Rollo, p. 29.
437
VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 1, 2004 437

Tiu vs. Arriesgado
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED

IN FINDING PETITIONER WILLIAM TIU
LIABLE FOR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES,
ATTORNEY’S FEES AND LITIGATION
EXPENSES.
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN NOT FINDING RESPONDENT PHILIPPINE
PHOENIX SURETY AND INSURANCE, INC.
LIABLE TO RESPONDENT PEDRO A.
ARRIESGADO
19
OR TO PETITIONER WILLIAM
TIU.
According to the petitioners, the appellate court erred in

failing to appreciate the absence of an early warning device
and/or built-in reflectors at the front and back of the cargo
truck, in clear violation of Section 34, par. (g) of the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code. They aver that such
violation is only a proof of respondent Pedrano’s negligence,
as provided under Article 2185 of the New Civil Code. They
also question the appellate court’s failure to take into
account that the truck was parked in an oblique manner,
its rear portion almost at the center of the road. As such,
the proximate cause of the incident was the gross
recklessness and imprudence of respondent Pedrano,
creating the presumption of negligence on the part of
2/24/2019
respondent Condor in supervising his employees, which
presumption was not rebutted. The petitioners then

contend that respondents Condor and Pedrano should be
held jointly and severally liable to respondent Arriesgado
for the payment of the latter’s claim.
The petitioners, likewise, aver that expert evidence
should have been presented to prove that petitioner
Laspiñas was driving at a very fast speed, and that the CA
could not reach such conclusion by merely considering the
damages on the cargo truck. It was also pointed out that
petitioner Tiu presented evidence that he had exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of his drivers.
The petitioners further allege that there is no legal and
factual basis to require petitioner Tiu to pay exemplary
damages as no evidence was presented to show that the
latter acted in a fraudulent, reckless and oppressive
manner, or that he had an active participation in the
negligent act of petitioner Laspiñas.
Finally, the petitioners contend that respondent PPSII
admitted in its answer that while it had attended to and
settled the claims of
_______________
19 Id., at pp. 12-13.
438

Tiu vs. Arriesgado
the other injured passengers, respondent Arriesgado’s

claim remained unsettled as it was beyond the scheduled
indemnity under the insurance contract. The petitioners
argue that said respondent PPSII should have settled the
said claim in accordance with the scheduled indemnity
instead of just denying the same.
On the other hand, respondent Arriesgado argues that
two of the issues raised by the petitioners involved
questions of fact, not reviewable by the Supreme Court: the
finding of negligence on the part of the petitioners and
their liability to him; and the award of exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses in his favor.
Invoking the principle of equity and justice, respondent
Arriesgado pointed out that if there was an error to be
reviewed in the CA decision, it should be geared towards
the restoration of the moral and exemplary damages to
P50,000 each, or a total of P100,000 which was reduced by
the Court of Appeals to P25,000 each, or a total of only
P50,000.
Respondent Arriesgado also alleged that respondents
Condor and Pedrano, and respondent Phoenix Surety, are
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parties with whom he had no contract of carriage, and had
no cause of action against. It was pointed out that only the

petitioners needed to be sued, as driver and operator of the
ill-fated bus, on account of their failure to bring the
Arriesgado Spouses to their place of destination as agreed
upon in the contract of carriage, using the utmost diligence
of very cautious persons with due regard for all
circumstances.
Respondents Condor and Pedrano point out that, as
correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the proximate
cause of the unfortunate incident was the fast speed at
which petitioner Laspiñas was driving the bus owned by
petitioner Tiu. According to the respondents, the allegation
that the truck was not equipped with an early warning
device could not in any way have prevented the incident
from happening. It was also pointed out that respondent
Condor had always exercised the due diligence required in
the selection and supervision of his employees, and that he
was not a party to the contract of carriage between the
petitioners and respondent Arriesgado.
Respondent PPSII, for its part, alleges that contrary to
the allegation of petitioner Tiu, it settled all the claims of
those injured in accordance with the insurance contract. It
further avers that it did not deny respondent Arriesgado’s
claim, and emphasizes that its
439
VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 1, 2004 439

Tiu vs. Arriesgado
liability should be within the scheduled limits of indemnity

under the said contract. The respondent concludes that
while it is true that insurance contracts are contracts of
indemnity, the measure of the insurer’s liability is
determined by the insured’s compliance with the terms
thereof.
The Court’s Ruling
At the outset, 20
it must be stressed that this Court is not a
trier of facts. Factual findings of the Court of Appeals are
final and may not be reviewed on appeal by this Court,
except when the 21lower court and the CA arrived at diverse
factual findings. The petitioners in this case assail the
finding of both the trial and the appellate courts that
petitioner Laspiñas was driving at a very fast speed before
the bus owned by petitioner Tiu collided with respondent
Condor’s stalled truck. This is clearly one of fact, not
reviewable
22
by the Court in a petition for review under Rule
45.
On this ground alone, the petition is destined to fail.
2/24/2019
However, consideringSUPREME
that novel questions of law are
likewise involved, the Court resolves to examine and rule

on the merits of the case.
Petitioner Laspiñas
Was negligent in driving
The Ill-fated bus
In his testimony before the trial court, petitioner Laspiñas
claimed that he was traversing the two-lane road at
Compostela, Cebu at a speed of only forty (40) to23fifty (50)
kilometers per hour before the incident occurred. He also
admitted that he saw the truck which was parked 24in an
“oblique position” at about 25 meters before impact, and
tried to avoid hitting it by swerving to the left. However,
even in the absence 25 of expert evidence, the damage
sustained by the truck itself supports the finding of both
the trial
_______________
20 Flores v. Uy, 368 SCRA 347 (2001).

21 Yobido v. Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA 1 (1997).
22 Cresenciano Duremdes v. Agustin Duremdes, G.R. No. 138256,
November 12, 2003, 415 SCRA 684.
23TSN, 20 November 1989, p. 6
24 Ibid.
25 Exhibits “1” to “7”.
440

Tiu vs. Arriesgado
court and the appellate court, that the D’ Rough Rider bus
driven by petitioner Laspiñas was traveling at a fast pace.
Since he saw the stalled truck at a distance of 25 meters,
petitioner Laspiñas had more than enough time to swerve
to his left to avoid hitting it; that is, if the speed of the bus
was only 40 to 50 kilometers per hour as he claimed. As
found by the Court of Appeals, it is easier to believe that
petitioner Laspiñas was driving at a very fast speed, since
at 4:45 a.m., the hour of the accident, there were no
oncoming vehicles at the opposite direction. Petitioner
Laspiñas could have swerved to the left lane with proper 26
clearance, and, thus, could have avoided the truck.
Instinct, at the very least, would have prompted him to
apply the breaks to avert the impending disaster which he
must have foreseen when he caught sight of the stalled
truck. As we had occasion to reiterate:
A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all
his acts; it is his duty to be cautious, careful and prudent, if not
from instinct, then through fear of recurring punishment. He is
2/24/2019 responsible for such resultsSUPREME
as anyone might
COURT foresee
REPORTS and for
ANNOTATED acts 437
VOLUME
which no one would have performed except through culpable

abandon. Otherwise, his own person, rights and property, and
those of his fellow 27beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of
danger and injury.
We agree with the following findings of the trial court,

which were affirmed by the CA on appeal:
A close study and evaluation of the testimonies and the

documentary proofs submitted by the parties which have direct
bearing on the issue of negligence, this Court as shown by
preponderance of evidence that defendant Virgilio Te Laspiñas
failed to observe extraordinary diligence as a driver of the
common carrier in this case. It is quite hard to accept his version
of the incident that he did not see at a reasonable distance ahead
the cargo truck that was parked when the Rough Rider [Bus] just
came out of the bridge which is on an (sic) [more] elevated
position than the place where the cargo truck was parked. With
its headlights fully on, defendant driver of the Rough Rider was in
a vantage position to see the cargo truck ahead which was parked
and he could just easily have avoided hitting and bumping the
same by maneuvering to the left without hitting the said cargo
truck. Besides, it is (sic) shown that there was still much room or
space for the Rough Rider to pass at the left lane of the said na-
_______________
26 CA Rollo, p. 79.
27 Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918), cited in People v. De los Santos, 355
SCRA 415, 430 (2001).
441
VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 1, 2004 441

Tiu vs. Arriesgado
tional highway even if the cargo truck had occupied the entire
right lane thereof. It is not true that if the Rough Rider would
proceed to pass through the left lane it would fall into a canal
considering that there was much space for it to pass without
hitting and bumping the cargo truck at the left lane of said
national highway. The records, further, showed that there was no
incoming vehicle at the opposite lane of the national highway
which would have prevented the Rough Rider from not swerving
to its left in order to avoid hitting and bumping the parked cargo
truck. But the evidence showed that the Rough Rider instead of
swerving to the still spacious left lane of the national highway
plowed directly into the parked cargo truck hitting the latter at
its rear portion; and thus, the (sic) causing damages
28
not only to
herein plaintiff but to the cargo truck as well.
Indeed, petitioner Laspiñas’ negligence in driving the bus

is apparent in the records. By his own admission, he had
2/24/2019
just passed a bridge and was traversing the highway of
Compostela, Cebu at a speed of 40 to 50 kilometers per

hour before the collision occurred. The maximum speed 29
allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kilometers per hour.
And, as correctly pointed out by the trial court, petitioner
Laspiñas also violated Section 35 of the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code, Republic Act No. 4136, as
amended:
Sec. 35. Restriction as to speed.—(a) Any person driving a motor

vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a careful and
prudent speed, not greater nor less than is reasonable and proper,
having due regard for the traffic, the width of the highway, and or
any other condition then and there existing; and no person shall
drive any motor vehicle upon a highway at such speed as to
endanger the life, limb and property of any person, nor at a speed
greater than will permit him to bring
30
the vehicle to a stop within
the assured clear distance ahead.
Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a

vehicle is presumed negligent if at the31time of the mishap,
he was violating any traffic regulation.
_______________
28 Records, p. 307.
29 Section 53, Motor Vehicle Law, cited in McKee v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 211 SCRA 517, 541 (1992).
30 Emphasis supplied.
31 Mallari, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 324 SCRA 147 (2000).
442

Tiu vs. Arriesgado
Petitioner Tiu failed to

Overcome the presumption
Of negligence against him as
One engaged in the business
Of common carriage
The rules which common carriers should observe as to the
safety of their32 passengers
33
are set
34
forth in the Civil Code,
Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756. In this case, respondent
Arriesgado and his deceased wife contracted with
petitioner Tiu, as owner and operator of D’ Rough Riders
bus service, for transportation from Maya, Daanbantayan,
35
Cebu, to Cebu City for the price of P18.00. It is
undisputed that the respondent and his wife were not
safely transported to the destination agreed upon. In
actions for breach of contract, only the existence of such
contract, and the fact that the obligor, in this case the
2/24/2019
common carrier, failed toSUPREME
transport his passenger safely to
36
his destination are the matters that need to be proved.
This is because under the said contract of carriage, the
petitioners assumed the express obligation to transport the
respondent and his wife to their destination safely and to
observe extraordinary
37
diligence with due regard for all
circumstances. Any injury suffered by the passengers in
the course thereof is im-
_______________
32Article 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and
for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence
in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of passengers
transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further
expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the
extraordinary diligence for the safety of passengers is further set forth in
articles 1755 and 1756.
33 Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry passengers safely as
far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of
very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
34 Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently,
unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed
in articles 1733 and 1755.
35 TSN, 23 January 1989, p. 8 (Arriesgado).
36 Calalas v. Court of Appeals, 332 SCRA 356 (2000).
37 Light Rail Transit Authority v. Navidad, 397 SCRA 75 (2003).
443
VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 1, 2004 443

Tiu vs. Arriesgado
38
mediately attributable to the negligence of the carrier.
Upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of
negligence at once arises, and it becomes the duty of a
common carrier to prove that he observed39
extraordinary
diligence in the care of his passengers. It must be stressed
that in requiring the highest possible degree of diligence
from common carriers and in creating a presumption of
negligence against them, the40law compels them to curb the
recklessness of their drivers.
While evidence may be submitted to overcome such
presumption of negligence, it must be shown that the
carrier observed the required extraordinary diligence,
which means that the carrier must show the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons as far as human care and
foresight can provide,
41
or that the accident was caused by
fortuitous event. As correctly found by the trial court,
petitioner Tiu failed to conclusively rebut such
presumption. The negligence of petitioner Laspiñas as
2/24/2019
driver of the passengerSUPREME
bus COURT
is, thus, binding against
REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 437
petitioner Tiu, as the42 owner of the passenger bus engaged

as a common carrier.
The Doctrine of
Last Clear Chance
Is Inapplicable in the
Case at Bar
Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the principle of last
clear chance is inapplicable in the instant case, as it only
applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of two
colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger
demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its
contractual obligations, for it would be inequitable to
exempt the negligent driver and its owner on the ground 43
that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.
The common law notion of last clear chance permitted
courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who has also been
negligent provided that the
_______________
38 Estrada v. Consolacion, 71 SCRA 523 (1976).

39 Calalas v. Court of Appeals, supra.
40 Kapalaran Bus Line v. Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 (1989).
41 Estrada v. Consolacion, supra at p. 530.
42 Mallari, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, supra.
43 Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 189
SCRA 158 (1990), citing Anuran v. Buño, 17 SCRA 224 (1966).
444

Tiu vs. Arriesgado
defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty

and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what
role, if any, the common law of last clear chance doctrine
has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept
of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by
the plaintiff, has itself been44rejected, as it has been in
Article 2179 of the Civil Code.
Thus, petitioner Tiu cannot escape liability for the death
of respondent Arriesgado’s wife due to the negligence of
petitioner Laspiñas, his employee, on this score.
Respondents Pedrano and

Condor were likewise
Negligent
In Phoenix45
Construction, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, where therein respondent Dionisio sustained
injuries when his vehicle rammed against a dump truck
parked askew, the Court ruled that the improper parking
2/24/2019
of a dump truck without any warning lights or reflector
devices created an unreasonable risk for anyone driving

within the vicinity, and for having created such risk, the
truck driver must be held responsible. In ruling against the
petitioner therein, the Court elucidated, thus:
. . . In our view, Dionisio’s negligence, although later in point of

time than the truck driver’s negligence, and therefore closer to the
accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause.
What the petitioners describe as an “intervening cause” was no
more than a foreseeable consequence of the risk created by the
negligent manner in which the truck driver had parked the dump
truck. In other words, the petitioner truck driver owed a duty to
private respondent Dionisio and others similarly situated not to
impose upon them the very risk the truck driver had created.
Dionisio’s negligence was not that of an independent and
overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of causation
in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the
accident, nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability. . . .
...
_______________
44 Phoenix Construction, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 353

(1987).
45Supra.
445
VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 1, 2004 445

Tiu vs. Arriesgado
We hold that private respondent Dionisio’s negligence was

“only contributory,” that the “immediate and proximate cause” 46
of
the injury remained the truck driver’s “lack of due care.” . . .
In this case, both the trial and the appellate courts failed to
consider that respondent Pedrano was also negligent in
leaving the truck parked askew without any warning lights
or reflector devices to alert oncoming vehicles, and that
such failure created the presumption of negligence on the
part of his employer, respondent Condor, in supervising his
employees47properly and adequately. As we ruled in Poblete
v. Fabros:
It is such a firmly established principle, as to have virtually

formed part of the law itself, that the negligence of the employee
gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the
employer. This is the presumed negligence in the selection and
supervision of employee. The theory of presumed negligence, in
contrast with the American doctrine of respondeat superior, where
the negligence of the employee is conclusively presumed to be the
negligence of the employer, is clearly deducible from the last
paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides that
2/24/2019 the responsibility therein mentioned shallREPORTS
SUPREME COURT cease ifANNOTATED
the employers
VOLUME 437
prove that they observed all the48

diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damages. . . .
The petitioners were correct in invoking respondent

Pedrano’s failure to observe Article IV, Section 34(g) of the
Rep. Act No. 4136, which provides:
(g) Lights when parked or disabled.—Appropriate parking lights

or flares visible one hundred meters away shall be displayed at a
corner of the vehicle whenever such vehicle is parked on highways
or in places that are not well-lighted or is placed in such manner
as to endanger passing traffic.
The manner in which the truck was parked clearly

endangered oncoming traffic on both sides, considering that
the tire blowout which stalled the truck in the first place
occurred in the wee hours of the morning. The Court can
only now surmise that the unfortunate incident could have
been averted had respondent Condor, the owner of the
truck, equipped the said vehicle with lights, flares, or,
_______________
46 Id., at pp. 367-368.

47 93 SCRA 200 (1979).
48 Id., at p. 204.
446

Tiu vs. Arriesgado
49
at the very least, an early warning device. Hence, we
cannot subscribe to respondents Condor and Pedrano’s
claim that they should be absolved from liability because,
as found by the trial and appellate courts, the proximate
cause of the collision was the fast speed at which petitioner
Laspiñas drove the bus. To accept this proposition would be
to come too close to wiping out the fundamental principle of
law that a man must respond for the foreseeable
consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Indeed,
our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and
burdens of living in society and to allocate them among its
members. To accept this50 proposition would be to weaken
the very bonds of society.
_______________
49 Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 229 which was issued by then

President Ferdinand E. Marcos on December 2, 1974 in recognition of the
fact that as statistics then showed, “one of the major causes of fatal or
serious accidents in land transportation is the presence of disabled,
stalled, or parked motor vehicles or highways without any appropriate
2/24/2019 early warning device,” requiresSUPREME
vehicles COURT
to haveREPORTS ANNOTATED
such devices at all VOLUME
times. 437
It was later on amended by LOI No. 479, issued on November 15, 1976.
The pertinent provisions are as follows:
1. That all powers, users or drivers of motor vehicles shall have at all times in
their motor vehicles at least one (1) pair of early warning device consisting
of a triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates in red and yellow colors at
least 5 cm. at the base and 40 cms. at the sides.
2. Whenever any motor vehicle is stalled or disabled or is parked for thirty
(30) minutes or more on any street or highways, including expressways or
limited access roads, the owner, user or driver thereof shall cause the
warning device mentioned herein to be installed at least four meters away
to the front and rear of the motor vehicle stalled, disabled or parked.
3. The Land Transportation Commissioner shall require every motor vehicle
owner to procure from any source and present at registration of his vehicle,
one pair of reflectorized triangular early warning device, as described
herein, of any brand or make chosen by said motor vehicle owner. The
Land Transportation Commissioner shall also promulgate such rules and
regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement this order.
50 Phoenix Construction, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra at

p. 370.
447
VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 1, 2004 447

Tiu vs. Arriesgado
The Liability of
Respondent PPSII
as Insurer
The trial court in this case did not rule on the liability of
respondent PPSII, while the appellate court ruled that, as
no evidence was presented against it, the insurance
company is not liable.
A perusal of the records will show that when the
petitioners filed the Third-Party Complaint against
respondent PPSII, they failed to attach a copy of the terms
of the insurance
51
contract itself. Only Certificate of Cover
No. 054940 issued in favor of “Mr. William Tiu, Lahug,
Cebu City” signed by Cosme H. Boniel was appended to the
third-party complaint. The date of issuance, July 22, 1986,
the period of insurance, from July 22, 1986 to July 22,
1987, as well as the following items, were also indicated
therein:
SCHEDULED VEHICLE
MODEL MAKE TYPE OF COLOR BLT FILE
BODY NO.
Isuzu Forward Bus blue mixed
PLATE SERIAL/CHASSIS MOTOR AUTHORIZED UNLADEN
2/24/2019
NO. NO. SER450- NO. CAPACITY 50 WEIGHT
PBP- 1584124 677836 6 Cyls. Kgs.

724
SECTION 1/11 *LIMITS OF LIABILITY PREMIUMS
PAID
A. THIRD PARTY
LIABILITY P50,000.00
52
B. PASSENGER Per Person Per Accident P540.00
LIABILITY
P12,000.00 P50,000
53
In its Answer to the Third-Party Complaint, the
respondent PPSII admitted the existence of the contract of
insurance, in view of its failure to specifically deny the
same as required
54
under then Section 8(a), Rule 8 of the
Rules of Court, which reads:
_______________
51 Records, p. 41.
52 Ibid.
53 Id., at pp. 54-62.
54 Now Section 8, Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, and the epitaph now reads, “How to contest such documents.”
448

Tiu vs. Arriesgado
Sec. 8. How to contest genuineness of such documents.—When an

action or defense is founded upon a written instrument copied in
or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the
preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the
instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party,
under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he
claims to be the facts; but the requirement of an oath does not
apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the
instrument or when compliance with an order for inspection of the
original instrument is refused.
In fact, respondent PPSII did not dispute the existence of

such contract, and admitted that it was liable thereon. It
claimed, however, that it had attended to and settled the
claims of those injured during the incident, and set up the
following as special affirmative defenses:
Third party defendant Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance,

Inc. hereby reiterates and incorporates by way of reference the
preceding paragraphs and further states THAT:
2/24/2019 8. It has attended to the claimsCOURT
SUPREME of Vincent
REPORTSCanales, Asuncion
ANNOTATED VOLUME 437
Batiancila and Neptali Palces who sustained injuries

during the incident in question. In fact, it settled
financially their claims per vouchers duly signed by them
and they duly executed Affidavit[s] of Desistance to that
effect, xerox copies of which are hereto attached as
Annexes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 respectively;
9. With respect to the claim of plaintiff, herein answering
third party defendant through its authorized insurance
adjuster attended to said claim. In fact, there were
negotiations to that effect. Only that it cannot accede to
the demand of said claimant considering that the claim
was way beyond the scheduled indemnity as per contract
entered into with third party plaintiff William Tiu and
third party defendant (Philippine Phoenix Surety and
Insurance, Inc.). Third party Plaintiff William Tiu knew
all along the limitation as earlier stated,
55
he being an old
hand in the transportation business; . . .
Considering the admissions made by respondent PPSII, the

existence of the insurance contract and the salient terms
thereof cannot be dispatched. It must be noted that after
filing its answer, respondent PPSII no longer objected to
the presentation of evidence by respondent Arriesgado and
the insured petitioner Tiu.
_______________
55 Records, p. 55; Answer, p. 2.
449
VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 1, 2004 449

Tiu vs. Arriesgado
56
Even in its Memorandum before the Court, respondent
PPSII admitted the existence of the contract, but averred
as follows:
Petitioner Tiu is insisting that PPSII is liable to him for

contribution, indemnification and/or reimbursement. This has no
basis under the contract. Under the contract, PPSII will pay all
sums necessary to discharge liability of the insured subject to the
limits of liability but not to exceed the limits of liability as so
stated in the contract. Also, it is stated in the contract that in the
event of accident involving indemnity to more than one person,
the limits of liability shall not exceed the aggregate
57
amount so
specified by law to all persons to be indemnified.
As can be gleaned from the Certificate of Cover, such

insurance contract was issued pursuant to the Compulsory
Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance Law. It was expressly
provided therein that the limit of the insurer’s liability for
2/24/2019
each person was P12,000, while the limit per accident was
pegged at P50,000. An insurer in an indemnity contract for

third party liability is directly liable to the injured party up
to the extent specified in the agreement 58but it cannot be
held solidarily liable beyond that amount. The respondent
PPSII could not then just deny petitioner Tiu’s claim; it
should have 59
paid P12,000 for the death of Felisa
Arriesgado, and respondent Arriesgado’s hospitalization
expenses of P1,113.80, which the trial court found to have
been duly supported by receipts. The total amount of the
claims, even when added to that of the other injured
passengers
60
which the respondent PPSII claimed to have
settled, would not exceed the P50,000 limit under the
insurance agreement.
Indeed, the nature of Compulsory Motor Vehicle
Liability Insurance is such that it is primarily intended to
provide compensation for the death or bodily injuries
suffered by innocent third parties or passengers as a result
of the negligent operation and use of motor vehicles. The
victims and/or their dependents are assured of im-
_______________
56Rollo, pp. 161-169.

57 Id., at p. 166.
58 Metro Manila Transit Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA
494 (1998).
59See Perla Campania de Seguros, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 185 SCRA
741 (1990).
60Annexes “1” to “6” (Answer to the Third-party Complaint), Records,
pp. 57-62.
450

Tiu vs. Arriesgado
mediate financial assistance, regardless

61
of the financial
capacity of motor vehicle owners. As the Court, speaking
through Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing,
explained in
62
Government Service Insurance System v. Court
of Appeals:
However, although the victim may proceed directly against the

insurer for indemnity, the third party liability is only up to the
extent of the insurance policy and those required by law. While it
is true that where the insurance contract provides for indemnity
against liability to third persons, and such persons can directly
sue the insurer, the direct liability of the insurer under indemnity
contracts against third party liability does not mean that the
insurer can be held liable in solidum with the insured and/or the
other parties found at fault. For the liability of the insurer is
2/24/2019 based on contract; that of the insured
SUPREME carrier
COURT or vehicle
REPORTS owner
ANNOTATED is 437
VOLUME
based on tort. . . .
Obviously, the insurer could be held liable only up to the extent
of what was provided for by the contract of insurance, in
accordance with the CMVLI law. At the time of the incident, the
schedule of indemnities for death and bodily injuries, professional
fees and other charges payable under a CMVLI coverage was
provided for under the Insurance Memorandum Circular (IMC)
No. 5-78 which was approved on November 10, 1978. As therein
provided, the maximum indemnity for death was twelve thousand
(P12,000.00) pesos per victim. The schedules for medical expenses
were63
also provided by said IMC, specifically in paragraphs (C) to
(G).
Damages to be
Awarded
The trial court correctly awarded moral damages in the
amount of P50,000 in favor of respondent Arriesgado. The
award of exemplary damages 64
by way of example or
correction of the public good, is likewise in order. As65 the
Court ratiocinated in Kapalaran Bus Line v. Coronado:
. . . While the immediate beneficiaries of the standard of

extraordinary diligence are, of course, the passengers and owners
of cargo carried by a common carrier, they are not the only
persons that the law seeks to
_______________
61 Shafer v. Judge, RTC of Olongapo City, Branch 75, 167 SCRA 386 (1988).
62 308 SCRA 559 (1999).
63 Id., at pp. 569-570.
64 Article 2229, Civil Code.
65 Supra.
451
VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 1, 2004 451

Tiu vs. Arriesgado
benefit. For if common carriers carefully observed the statutory

standard of extraordinary diligence in respect of their own
passengers, they cannot help but simultaneously benefit
pedestrians and the passengers of other vehicles who are equally
entitled to the safe and convenient use of our roads and highways.
The law seeks to stop and prevent the slaughter and maiming of
people (whether passengers or not) on our highways and buses,
the very size and power of which seem to inflame the minds of
their drivers. Article 2231 of the Civil Code explicitly authorizes
the imposition of exemplary damages in cases66of quasi-delicts “if
the defendant acted with gross negligence.” . . .
2/24/2019
The respondent Pedro SUPREME
A. Arriesgado, as the surviving
spouse and heir of Felisa Arriesgado, 67

is entitled to
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00.
The petitioners, as well as the respondents Benjamin
Condor and Sergio Pedrano are jointly and severally liable
for said amount, conformably with the following
pronouncement
68
of the Court in Fabre, Jr. vs. Court of
Appeals:
The same rule of liability was applied in situations where the

negligence of the driver of the bus on which plaintiff was riding
concurred with the negligence of a third party who was the driver
of another vehicle, thus causing an accident. In Anuran v. Buño,
Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, and Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
the bus company, its driver, the operator of the other vehicle and
the driver of the vehicle were jointly and severally held liable to
the injured passenger or the latter’s heirs. The basis of this
allocation of liability was explained in Viluan v. Court of Appeals,
thus:
“Nor should it make difference that the liability of petitioner [bus owner]
springs from contract while that of respondents [owner and driver of
other vehicle] arises from quasi-delict. As early as 1913, we already ruled
in Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, 56 Phil. 177, that in case of injury to a
passenger due to the negligence of the driver of the bus on which he was
riding and of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well as the
owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages.
Some members of the Court, though, are of the view that under the
69
circumstances they are liable on quasi-delict.”
_______________
66Id., at pp. 801-802.

67Metro Manila Transit Corporation, supra.
68 259 SCRA 426 (1996).
69Id., at p. 438.
452

Commissioner of Customs vs. Philippine Phosphate
Fertilizer Corporation
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is

PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS:
(1) Respondent Philippine Phoenix Surety and

Insurance, Inc. and petitioner William Tiu are
ORDERED to pay, jointly and severally, respondent
Pedro A. Arriesgado the total amount of P13,113.80;
(2) The petitioners and the respondents Benjamin
Condor and Sergio Pedrano are ORDERED to pay,
2/24/2019
jointly and severally, respondent Pedro A.
Arriesgado P50,000.00 as indemnity; P26,441.50 as

actual damages; P50,000.00 as moral damages;
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P20,000.00
as attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez (Actg. Chairman), Tinga and

Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Puno (Chairman), J., On Official Leave.
Petition partially granted, judgment affirmed with

modifica tions.
Note.—Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier’s

employees naturally could give ground for an action for
damages. (Morris vs. Court of Appeals, 352 SCRA 428
[2001])
——o0o——
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426 Supreme Court Reports Annotated: Tiu vs. Arriesgado

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2/24/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 437

426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

WILLIAM TIU, doing business under the name and style of

Civil Law; Contracts; Contracts of Carriage; Common

VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 1, 2004 427

Tiu vs. Arriesgado

the duty of a common carrier to prove that he observed

428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Tiu vs. Arriesgado

Tiu vs. Arriesgado

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of

1 Penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis, with Associate

VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 1, 2004 431

6. That the accident resulted to the death of the

6Exhibit “G”, Records, p. 8.

432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The respondent prayed that judgment be rendered in his

1). To pay to plaintiff, jointly and severally, the amount of

PLAINTIFF FURTHER PRAYS FOR SUCH

11 Id., at pp. 35-39.

VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 1, 2004 433

injuries on the passengers, the right side portion of the bus

5. That the cargo truck mentioned in the aforequoted

434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

William Tiu and third-party defendant

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby

1 —The sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as

According to the trial court, there was no dispute that

12 Id., at pp. 37-39.

VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 1, 2004 435

unfortunate incident. It then concluded that petitioner

I WHETHER THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT

VIRGILIO TE LASPIÑAS WAS GUILTY OF

436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VI WHETHER THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT

The appellate court rendered judgment affirming the trial

“WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated November 6, 1995 is

According to the appellate court, the action of respondent

petitioners were adjudged liable.

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED

17 CA Rollo, pp. 29-30.

VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 1, 2004 437

III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED

According to the petitioners, the appellate court erred in

presumption was not rebutted. The petitioners then

19 Id., at pp. 12-13.

438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

the other injured passengers, respondent Arriesgado’s

no cause of action against. It was pointed out that only the

VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 1, 2004 439

liability should be within the scheduled limits of indemnity

The Court’s Ruling

likewise involved, the Court resolves to examine and rule

20 Flores v. Uy, 368 SCRA 347 (2001).

440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

which no one would have performed except through culpable