12.4.1.2 Alt Lab - Isolate Compromised Host Using 5-Tuple
12.4.1.2 Alt Lab - Isolate Compromised Host Using 5-Tuple
12.4.1.2 Alt Lab - Isolate Compromised Host Using 5-Tuple
Objectives
In this lab, you will review logs during an exploitation of a documented vulnerability to determine the
compromised hosts and file.
Part 1: Prepare the Virtual Environment
Part 2: Review the Logs
Background / Scenario
The 5-tuple is used by IT administrators to identify requirements for creating an operational and secure
network environment. The components of the 5-tuple include a source IP address and port number,
destination IP address and port number, and the protocol in use.
In this lab, you will also review the logs to identify the compromised hosts and the content of the compromised
file.
Required Resources
Host computer with at least 3 GB of RAM and 10 GB of free disk space
Latest version of Oracle VirtualBox
Internet connection
One virtual machine: Alternate Security Onion VM
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Lab – Isolated Compromised Host Using 5-Tuple
Status: seconion-eth0
* netsniff-ng (full packet data) [ OK ]
* pcap_agent (sguil) [ OK ]
* snort_agent-1 (sguil) [ OK ]
* snort-1 (alert data) [ OK ]
* barnyard2-1 (spooler, unified2 format) [ OK ]
<output omitted>
c. Select the returned root message that is associated with Sensor seconion-eth1-1 for further analysis. In
the figure below, Alert ID 5.5846 and its correlated event are used.
d. Right-click the number under the CNT heading to select View Correlated Events.
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e. In the new tab, right-click the Alert ID for one of the GPL ATTACK_RESPONSE id check returned root
alerts and select Transcript. The Alert ID 5.5848 is used in this example.
f. Review the transcripts for all the alerts. The latest alert in the tab is likely to display the transactions
between the threat actor and the target during the attack.
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Lab – Isolated Compromised Host Using 5-Tuple
b. To view all packets assembled in a TCP conversation, right-click any packet and select Follow TCP
Stream.
What did you observe? What do the text colors red and blue indicate?
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Lab – Isolated Compromised Host Using 5-Tuple
c. Exit the TCP stream window. Close Wireshark when you are done reviewing the information provided by
Wireshark.
b. Change the date in the From field to the date before the date displayed in Sguil. Click Submit Query.
c. Click bro_notice.
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Lab – Isolated Compromised Host Using 5-Tuple
d. The result indicates that 209.165.201.17 was performing a port scan on 209.165.200.235. The attacker
probably found vulnerabilities on 209.165.200.235 to gain access.
e. If an attacker has compromised 209.165.200.235, you want to determine the exploit that was used and
what was accessed by the attacker.
b. Right-click the number under the CNT heading and select View Correlated Events to view all the related
events. Select the Alert ID that starts with 5. This alert gathered the information from sensor on seconion-
eth1-1 interface.
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Lab – Isolated Compromised Host Using 5-Tuple
c. In the new tab with all the correlated events, right-click the Alert ID and select Transcript to view each
alert in more detail. The latest alert is likely to display the TCP transmission between the attacker and
victim.
d. You can also right-click the Alert ID and select Wireshark to review and save the pcap file and TCP
stream.
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Lab – Isolated Compromised Host Using 5-Tuple
Which file was transferred via FTP to 209.165.200.235? Whose account was used to transfer the file?
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d. Click info to view the transactions in the last record. The reply_msg field indicates that this is the last
entry for the transfer of the confidential.txt file. Click Plugin > getPcap. Enter username analyst and
password cyberops when prompted. Click Submit if necessary.
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Lab – Isolated Compromised Host Using 5-Tuple
The pcap transcript is rendered using tcpflow, and this page also provides the link to access the pcap file.
e. To determine the content of the file that was compromised, open ELSA by double clicking the icon on the
Desktop to open a new tab and perform a new search.
f. Expand FTP and click FTP Data.
g. Change the date in the From field as necessary to include the time period of interest, and click Submit
Query.
h. Click one of the Info links and select getPcap from the dropdown menu to determine the content of the
stolen file.
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Lab – Isolated Compromised Host Using 5-Tuple
i. The result displays the content of the file named confidential.txt that was transferred to the FTP server.
Step 6: Clean up
Shut down the VM when finished.
Reflection
In this lab, you have reviewed the logs as a cybersecurity analyst. Now summarize your findings.
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