Before The Hon'Ble Supreme Court of Indiana: Team Code: Tb-2

TEAM CODE: TB-2
BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

[WRIT, ORIGINAL AND CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION]
IN THE MATTERS OF:-
TOMAR RASHID (...Petitioner) vs. UNION OF INDIANA(...Respondent)

WRIT PETITION No. _______ of 2016.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of Indiana)
WITH
RAMAIYA KUMAR (...Appellant) vs. UNION OF INDIANA(...Respondent)

CRIMINAL APPEAL No. _______ of 2016.
WITH
KAMAL KAPOOR(...Petitioner) vs. UNION OF INDIANA (...Respondent)

WRIT PETITION No. _______ of 2016.
MEMORIAL FOR THE PETITIONER(S) AND APPELLANT

IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY, DEHRADUN 4th NATIONAL MOOT COURT
COMPETITION, 2016.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS...........................................................................................................2
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS....................................................................................................3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
 BOOKS AND GUIDELINES REFERRED...................................................................4

 STATUTES INVOLVED..............................................................................................4
 LEGAL DATABASES..................................................................................................5
 TABLE OF CASES........................................................................................................5
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION..........................................................................................7
STATEMENT OF FACTS.........................................................................................................8
STATEMENT OF ISSUES......................................................................................................10
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS.............................................................................................11
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
I. WHETHER THE PRESENT WRIT PETITIONS FILED BEFORE THE HON‟BLE
SUPREME COURT IS MAINTAINABLE.......................................................................12
II. WHETHER THE RIGHT TO PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY OF TOMAR RASHID WAS
INFRINGED BY THE STATE..........................................................................................15
III. WHETHER RAMAIYA KUMAR IS GUILTY FOR
SEDITION..........................................................................................................................18
IV. WHETHER THE PROVISION OF SEDITION IS CONSTITUTIONALLY
VALID................................................................................................................................21
V. WHETHER SECTION 14A OF THE PRESS COUNCIL ACT, 1978 IS
CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID.......................................................................................23
PRAYER..................................................................................................................................30
BIBLIOGRAPHY....................................................................................................................31
MEMORIAL FOR THE PETITIONER(S) & APPELLANT

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COMPETITION, 2016.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ABBREVIATION DEFINITION
¶ Para
& And
AIR All India Reporter
Art. Article
Co-Op Co-Operative
Dy. Deputy
Hon‟ble Honorable
i.e. That is
Ltd. Limited
Ors. Others
p. Page
pp. Pages
Pvt. Private
r/w Read with
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
Sec. Section
u/a Under Article
vs. Versus

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COMPETITION, 2016.
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
 BOOKS AND GUIDELINES REFERRED:

S. No. DESCRIPTION
Basu, D.D., “Commentary on the Constitution of India”, (Vol. 9) Lexis Nexis

1.
Butterworths Wadhwa Nagpur, 8th Edition 2011.
Basu, D.D., “Law of the Press”, Lexis Nexis Butterworths Wadhwa Nagpur, 5th
2.
Edition 2015.
De, D. J., “Interpretation and Enforcement of Fundamental Rights”, Eastern Law
3.
House, Calcutta, 2010.
Jain, M.P., “Indian Constitutional Law”, (6th Ed, LexisNexis Butterworth Wadhwa,
4.
2010).
Ratanlal & Dhirajlal (Rev. by Justice K.T. Thomas and M.A. Rashid), “The Indian
5.
Penal Code”, 34th Edition, Lexis Nexis 2014.
6. Sathe, S.P., “The Right to Know”, (1991, Tripathi).
Singh, M.P., “V.N. Shukla‟s Constitution of India”, Eastern Book Company

7.
Lucknow, 12th Edition 2013.
Vibhute, K.I. (Ed.), “PSA Pillai’s Criminal Law {Incorporating The Criminal Law
8.
(Amendment) Act, 2013}”, 12th Edition, Lexis Nexis 2014.
 STATUTE INVOLVED:
S. No. STATUTE/LEGISLATION
1. The Constitution of India, 1950.
2. Indian Penal Code, 1860
3. Press Council Act, 1978
4. The Press Council (Procedure for Inquiry) Regulations, 1979

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COMPETITION, 2016.
 LEGAL DATABASES:
S. No. LEGAL DATABASES
1. Westlaw
2. Manupatra
3. SCC Online
 TABLE OF CASES:
S. No. NAME OF THE CASE CITIED CITATION OF THE CASE PAGE No.
1. Arup Bhuyan vs. State of Assam (2011) 3 SCC 377. 22
Babulal Parate vs. State of

2. AIR 1961 SC 884. 16
Maharashtra
3. Balwant Singh vs. State of Punjab AIR 1987 SC 1080. 23
4. Bandhua Mukti Morcha vs. Union of AIR 1984 SC 802. 17

India
5. Binod Rao vs. Minocher Rustom (1976) 78 Bombay L.R. 125. 25

Masani
6. Brij Bhushan vs. State of Delhi AIR 1950 SC 129. 19; 25
7. Charan Lal Sahu vs. Union of India (1990) 1 SCC 614 (667). 28
Chintaman Rao vs. State of Madhya

8. AIR 1951 SC 118. 26
Pradesh
Dwaraka Prasad Lakshmi Narain vs.
9. AIR 1954 SC 224. 26
State of U.P.
10. Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. vs. A.I.R. 1958 SC 578. 25

Union of India
11. Himat Lal vs. Commissioner of Police, AIR 1973 SC 87. 16

Gujarat

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COMPETITION, 2016.
12. Indra Das vs. State of Assam (2011) 3 SCC 380. 22
13. Khatri vs. State of Bihar AIR 1981 SC 928. 18
14. Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597. 13; 17; 25
15. P.D. Samdasani vs. Central Bank of 24

AIR 1952 SC 59.
India
16. S. Rangarajan vs. Jagjivan Ram (1989) 2 SCC 574. 17; 26
17. Romesh Thapper vs. State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 124. 19; 25
18. Secretary Ministry of Broadcasting vs. 24

AIR 1995 SC 1236.
Cricket Association of Bengal & Ors.
19. Shreya Singhal vs. Union of India (2013) 12 SCC 73. 15; 20; 23
20. State of M.P. vs. Baldeo Prasad AIR 1961 (SC) 293 (296). 29
21. Virendra vs. State of Punjab A.I.R. 1957 SC 896. 26
 IMPORTANT DEFINITIONS:
(1) „Petitioner(s)/Appellant‟ for the purposes of this memorandum, in the first issue shall
stand for „Tomar Rashid, Mr. Kamal Kumar and Ramaiya Kumar‟; in the second issue
shall stand for „Tomar Rashid‟, in the third issue shall stand for „Ramaiya Kumar‟; in the
fourth issue shall stand for „Mr. Kamal Kumar‟.
(2) „Respondent(s)‟ for the purposes of this memorandum stands for „The Union of Indiana‟.

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
**************
**************
THE HON‟BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA HAS JURISDICTION TO TRY,

ENTERTAIN AND DISPOSE THE PRESENT CASE BY VIRTUE OF ARTICLE 321 (1) &
(2) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA, 1960.
***************
***************
ALSO UNDER ARTICLE 132(1)2 SUPREME COURT IS EMPOWERED TO HEAR AN

APPEAL IN THE CASES ADJUDGED BY THE HIGH COURT.
***************
***************
FURTHER „RULE 5 AND RULE 6 OF ORDER XLVII‟3 OF THE SUPREME COURT

RULES, 1966 ALLOWS THE SUPREME COURT TO HEAR ALL THE PETITIONS
TOGETHER.
***************
***************
1
Art. 32 - Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this part:
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights
conferred by this Part is guaranteed.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of
habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for
the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part.
2
Art. 132 - Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court in appeals from High Courts in certain cases:
(1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order of a High Court in the
territory of India, whether in a civil, criminal or other proceeding, if the High Court certifies under Article
134A that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution.
3
ORDER XLVII - Power to Dispense and Inherent Powers:
(5) Where there are two or more appeals arising out of the same matter, the Court may at any time either on its
own motion or on the application of any party, order that the appeals be consolidated 3[***]. Unless
otherwise ordered by this Court the liability of the parties to pay separate Court-fees shall not be affected
by any order for consolidation.
(6) Nothing in these rules shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the Court to make
such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Indiana is a federal country with the written Constitution. The pragmatic approach of the
drafters of the Constitution, led to the incorporation of certain significance value loaded
phrase in the preamble such as “sovereign, democratic & republic” which was later
supplemented by “secular & socialist” and the most striking feature of the Constitution is the
fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens so that they would live a dignified life and
wanted less intervention of the government in public sphere.
2. New Delporto, being the capital city of state of Indiana has been given special status
owing to which it has its own Government however Union has control over the maintenance
of public order through the Home Ministry.
3. Great Northern University (GNU) is a reputed university in Delporto offering quality
education but at the same time it has a “very active culture of student politics”. Great
Northern University Student Union (GNUSU) is the branch of All India Student Union
(AISU)and has been consistently wining the student council elections since last 10 years due
to which its president has a substantial influence among the member of union.
4. The Indiana Peoples Party (IPP), a newly elected right wing party embarked on an
economic reform mission which looked at the labialization of the economy to bring more
foreign investments. But this idea didn‟t go well and country wide protests were held by
GNUSU.
5. On, 8th June, 2016 a countrywide strike was called by the parent body of GNUSU where
the protestors were allegedly blocking the national highway and lathi charged by the Police.
As the news of lathi charge spreads the violent protests were held all across the country
including Delporto. In Delporto, GNUSU led by its President Ramaiya Kumar started the
movement.
6. On 16th June, 2016 a rally was organized and in a mean-time some posters which contains
the signature of Ramaiya Kumar were put up across the GNU campus, claiming a rally to be
in the solidarity of the hanging of Chengiz Khan, who belongs to the Makshir & was the main
accused in the terrorist attack at Indiana Parliament in 2006. Makshir was northern-most state
which has always been in an issue of dispute with the Paristan.
7. Since the start of rally protestors were high in energy and enthusiasm as they were
shouting slogans against the governments „dictatorship‟. Though protestors pledged to fight
against the government but the rally ended peacefully.

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COMPETITION, 2016.
8. As soon as the rally ended some videos become viral on social media where it was seen
that Ramaiya Kumar in his speech claimed the Mashkir deserved to be independent and they
will seek independence at any cost and soon the government arrested Ramaiya Kumar and
charged with offence of Sedition. The session court sentenced him for one year
imprisonment. He filed an appeal in the High Court of Delporto where he also challenged the
constitutionality of the provision related to Sedition & argued that it is a colonial provision
and has no relevance in an independent nation like Indiana.
9. The Delporto High Court upheld the order of the session court but issued a certificate
under Art. 134A stating that the case involved substantial questions of law which is to be
decided by the Supreme Court.
10. The news of Ramaiya Kumar‟s arrestwas been provided an extensive coverage to the
issue and some of the channels repeatedly telecasted his speech which pours in some
sympathy from certain sections of political and intellectual class of the nation.
11. As the monsoon session began, the government amended the Press Councils Act, 1978.
Section 14A was incorporated into the act which read as: “Where, on receipt of a complaint
made to it or otherwise, the Council has reason to believe that a newspaper or news agency
has offended against the sovereignty or integrity of the nation or national interest or that an
editor or working journalist has by their conduct either by written or orally tried to
manipulate public opinion against the sovereignty & integrity of the nation or against the
elected government, the Council may, after giving the newspaper, or news agency, the editor
or journalist concerned an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry in such manner as
may be provided by regulations made under this Act and, if it is satisfied that it is necessary
so to do, it may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, warn, admonish, censure the
newspaper, the news agency, the editor or the journalist, disapprove the conduct of the editor
or the journalist as the case maybe or may impose a fine not exceeding Rs 10,00,000”
12. Since the passing of the amendment number of newspapers and news channels were
censured & also fined. One of them, Mr. Kamal Kapoor, who is the head of “Indiana 24*7”,
an English news channel, filed a petition in the Supreme Court of Indiana and challenged the
constitutionality of Section 14A of the Press Councils Act, 1978.
13. The Supreme Court of Indiana in the interest of justice clubbed the 3 matters given their
inter connection and listed them for final hearing.

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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE I:
WHETHER THE PRESENT WRIT PETITIONS FILED BEFORE THE

HON’BLE SUPREME COURT ARE MAINTAINABLE?
ISSUE II:
WHETHER THE RIGHT TO PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY OF TOMAR

RASHID WAS INFRINGED BY THE STATE?
ISSUE III:
WHETHER RAMAIYA KUMAR IS GUILTY OF SEDITION?
ISSUE IV:
WHETHER THE PROVISION OF SEDITION IS
CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID?
ISSUE V:
WHETHER SECTION 14A OF THE PRESS COUNCIL ACT, 1978 IS


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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I. WHETHER THE PRESENT WRIT PETITIONS FILED BEFORE

THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT ARE MAINTAINABLE?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon‟ble Court that in the present writ petition fundamental
rights of the petitioner(s) are infringed by the Union Government. Hence, the petition is
maintainable under Art. 32 of the Constitution of Indiana.
II. WHETHER THE RIGHT TO PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY OF TOMAR

RASHID WAS INFRINGED BY THE STATE?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon‟ble Court that the right of peaceful assembly & right to
personal liberty of the petitioner infringed by the arbitrary State action of lathi-charge.
III. WHETHER RAMAIYA KUMAR IS GUILTY OF SEDITION?

It is humbly submitted before this Hon‟ble Court that Ramaiya Kumar is not guilty of
sedition as he has just exercised his freedom of speech and expression and none of his
conducts were done to bring into hatred or contempt or excite disaffection towards the
Government established by law, or even attempt to do so.
IV. WHETHER THE PROVISION OF SEDITION IS

The counsel humbly submits before this Hon‟ble Court that the provision of Sedition is
unconstitutional as this provision is violative Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution and also it
cannot be saved by the „reasonable restriction‟ clause under Art. 19(2) of the Constitution.

The counsel humbly submits before the Hon‟ble Court that the newly incorporated, Sec. 14A
of the Press Council Act, 1978 which puts a censure upon the press and electronic media
which violates of the freedom of speech and expression of press and also people‟s right to be
informed and also the provision of the Section is ambiguous.

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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
I. WHETHER THE PRESENT WRIT PETITIONS FILED BEFORE

THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT IS MAINTAINABLE?
1. The present writ petitions are filed by the Tomar Rashid and Mr. Kamal Kumar under
Art. 324 of the Constitution of Indiana.
2. In case of Tomar Rashid vs. Union of India: In the present case petitioner and other
protestors who have participated in the countrywide strike called by the AISU (All Indiana
Students Union) were lathi charged without any warning and in course of lathi charge,
petitioner and other protestors were seriously injured and had to be admitted to the hospital. 5
Here, this action of State was unreasonable and unjustified being violative of the life and
personal liberty of the protestors enshrined under Art. 21 of the Constitution of Indiana. The
act of Police also violated the Right of Assembly of the petitioner under Art. 19(1)(b) and
Freedom of Speech and Expression under Art. 19(1)(a) as the silent strike of the protestors
was dispersed which violates the petitioners right to expression. These rights are conferred by
the Part III of the Constitution of Indiana and the remedies for the enforcement of these rights
are conferred in Art. 32 of the Constitution. Therefore petitioner is approaching the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution of Indiana for the appropriate remedy.
3. In case of Mr. Kamal Kapoor vs. Union of India: Mr. Kamal Kapoor, who is the head of
“Indiana 24*7”, an English news channel, challenged the constitutional validity of the newly
incorporated Sec. 14A of the Press Council Act, 1978 which gives an unfettered power to the
„Council‟ to act arbitrarily. Also „Council‟ in the pursuance of power conferred to it by the
Act, censured number of newspapers and channels and also imposed fine upon some
4
Art. 32 of the Constitution of Indiana read as:
Art. 32 - Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part:
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights
conferred by this Part is guaranteed.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the
nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be
appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part.
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause ( 1 ) and ( 2 ), Parliament
may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of
the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause ( 2 ).
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this
Constitution.
5
Moot Proposition, p. 2 ¶ 7.

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COMPETITION, 2016.
newspapers and channels6, without complying with the regulations made under the Act which
provides the mandate of opportunity of hearing. And hence violated the fundamental right
guaranteed under Art. 147 and Art. 198 of the Constitution.
4. From reading of Art. 32, it is manifested that clause 1(i) of Art. 32 guarantees the right to
move to the Supreme Court for an appropriate writ for the purpose of enforcing the
Fundamental Rights included in Part-III of the Constitution. The sole object of Article 32 is
the enforcement of Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the Constitution. It follows that no
question other than relating to the Fundamental Right will be determined in a proceeding
under Article 32 of the Constitution.
5. In the case of Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury vs. Union of India, Hon‟ble Supreme Court
observed that: “The Writ Jurisdiction of Supreme Court can be invoked under Art. 32 of the
Constitution for the violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under Part-III of the
Constitution. The sole objective of Art. 32 is the enforcement of the fundamental rights
guaranteed by the Constitution of Indiana. The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
can be invoked in any case of violation of the fundamental right guaranteed by Part III of the
Constitution of India.”
6. Remedies under the writ jurisdiction can be exercised against the State defined in Art.129
of the Constitution. Here, both of the present matters are filed against the Union of India
which is included under the definition of Art. 12. The fundamental rights are given to
individuals for protection against the actions of State. In Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India10
the Supreme Court observed: “Fundamental Rights…weave a „pattern of guarantee‟ on the
6
7
Art. 14 - Equality before law: The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal
protection of the laws within the territory of India.
8
Art. 19 - Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc:
(1) All citizens shall have the right -
(a). to freedom of speech and expression;
(b). to assemble peaceably and without arms;
(c). to form associations or unions;
(d). to move freely throughout the territory of India;
(e). to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; and
(f). ***omitted
(g). to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.
9
Art. 12 - Definition: In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires, “the State‟‟ includes the Government
and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other
authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India.
10
Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597.

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COMPETITION, 2016.
basic structure of human rights, and impose negative obligations on the State not to encroach
on individual liberty in its various dimensions.”
7. In the present case petitioners has option to approach to the High Court under Art. 226
but he has not applied for that particular remedy because the matter involves the issue of
gross concerned as it involves the violation of rights conferred under Art. 14, 19 and 21 of the
Constitution and number of persons are been injured. Therefore, chances are there that in
future some more petitions may be filed before the court and hence, there might be
multiplicity of litigations before the High Court.
8. In Romesh Thappar case, the Supreme Court ruled that a writ petition can come straight
to the Supreme Court without going to the High Court first. Art. 32 provide a guaranteed
remedy for the enforcement of the Fundamental Rights and constitute the Supreme Court as
the “guarantor and protector of Fundamental Rights.” This proposition has been reiterated
by the Supreme Court in a number of cases.
9. Hence, the writ petition filed by the petitioners, Tomar Rashid and Mr. Kamal Kumar
under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India are maintainable.
10. In case of Ramaiya Kumar vs. Union of India: Ramaiya Kumar is filling appeal against
the order of High Court, which upheld the original order of session court, in which Ramaiya
Kumar was held guilty and sentenced for one year of imprisonment. Since in this case High
Court has issued a certificate under Art. 134A stating the case involved substantial question
of law which should be decided by the Supreme Court.11
11. Finally, the Supreme Court suo-moto in the interest of justice clubbed all the three
matters12, as the issues are interconnected to each other and is listed for the final hearing.
In case of Aneesh D. Lamannde vs. State of Goa, SC held that, “The writ petition before the
High Court would not be maintainable if Supreme Court seized of the matter.”
Hence in the light of aforementioned arguments and judicial pronouncements, the present
writ petitions and appeal filed before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court maintainable.
11
12
Exercising its Inherent Jurisdiction under „Rule 5 and 6 of Order XLVII‟of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966
which allows the Supreme Court to hear all the petitions together r/w Art.136 r/w Art. 142.

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II. WHETHER THE RIGHT TO PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY OF TOMAR

RASHID WAS INFRINGED BY THE STATE.
A. THE ACTION OF STATE IS VIOLATIVE OF FUNDAMENTAL

RIGHTS OF TOMAR RASHID.
1. When it comes to democracy, liberty of thought and expression is a cardinal value that is
of paramount significance under our constitutional scheme.13 The right to assemble
peacefully, together with freedom of expression and freedom of association, rests at the core
of any functioning democratic system. The protection of the freedom to peacefully assemble
is crucial to creating a tolerant and pluralistic society in which groups with different beliefs,
practices or policies can exist peacefully together.
2. The Human Rights Council has affirmed that „everyone must be able to express their
grievances or aspirations in a peaceful manner, including through public protests without
fear of reprisals or of being intimidated, harassed, injured, sexually assaulted, beaten,
arbitrarily arrested and detained, tortured, killed or subjected to enforced disappearance‟.14
15
3. Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states
that: “The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions may be placed on
the exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public
order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others.”
4. In the present case, the protestors were lathi charged by the police, which results into the
serious injuries to some of the protestors. They were alleged of blocking national highway in
Utkal, during the countrywide strike called by the AISU. It is to be noted that protestors were
claiming that they were just sitting peacefully on the road but State is claiming that they have
blocked the national highway.16
13
Shreya Singhal vs. Union of India, (2013) 12 SCC 73.
14
Human Rights Council, Resolution 22/10, „The promotion and protection of human rights in the context of
peaceful protests‟, 21 March 2013, Preamble, §13.
15
Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 1966.
16

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5. These two are quite different acts, „Sitting peacefully‟ on the road/national highway to
display the non-conformity with the policy of the government must be allowed but on the
other hand „Blocking of Highway‟ which is to be considered as the peaceful protest until it
becomes clear that protestors were carrying some arms with them or some mischief were
going to be take place. If we consider, the Highway was actually blocked, still there was no
apprehension to the police from the protestors so that they could resort to the use of force by
lathi charge. They must have given adequate warning and even after the warning use of force
cannot be considered as to the necessary step.
6. The use of force must be regulated by domestic law, which should set out the
circumstances that justify its use (including the need to provide adequate prior warnings) and
the level of force acceptable to deal with various threats. Governments should develop a
range of responses that enable a differentiated and proportional use of force. These responses
should include the development of non-lethal incapacitating weapons for use in appropriate
situations where other more peaceful interventions have failed. In particular, the state has a
positive duty to take reasonable and appropriate measures to enable peaceful assemblies to
take place without participants fearing physical violence.
7. Here, it is clearly apparent on the face that the Union Government has misused the State
authorities (Police) to suppress the protest of ideologically different group and particularly
those who does not confirms to their right wing ideology. Although particular forms of
assembly may raise specific regulatory issues, still all types of peaceful assembly, both static
and moving assemblies, as well as those that take place on publicly or privately owned
premises or in enclosed structures, deserve protection.
8. The Supreme Court of India, observing that the right of assembly is well-recognized in
free democracies, ruled that the area of restriction on this freedom must be very narrow.17
9. The Supreme Court of India in Babulal Parate vs. State of Maharashtra18 also upheld the
citizen‟s right to take out procession or to hold demonstration or public meetings as part of
the freedom to assemble peacefully and without arms and the right to move freely anywhere
in the territory of India. In this case the Court held that Section 144 of Criminal Procedure
Code was Constitutional and that the Magistrate had power to prevent such activities which
would obstruct the public interest and peace.
17
Himat Lal vs. Commissioner of Police, Gujarat, AIR 1973 SC 87.
18
Babulal Parate vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1961 SC 884.

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10. The Apex Court in S.Rangarajan vs. Jagjivan Ram19stated that:“The Fundamental Rights
cannot be taken away at the instance of the persons, who are having opposite point of view.
When persons having opposite point of view try to interfere with the Fundamental Right of
the Citizens guaranteed under Article 19, the State shall give protection to the Citizens in
order to exercise their Fundamental Rights and the State shall not deprive the Fundamental
Rights citing the law and order problems that could be created by the persons and
organisations having opposite point of view.”
11. The action of State (Police Authorities) not only violated the right of assembly of persons
but it in turn also violated the life and personal liberty of the protestors enshrined under Art.
21 of the Constitution of Indiana.
12. Art. 21 of the Constitution of Indiana, a very familiar fundamental right, applicable to all
persons under Part III of the Constitution of Indiana. Art. 21 read as:
“Protection of Life and Personal Liberty - No person shall be deprived of his life or personal
liberty except according to procedure established by law.”
13. This means that no person can be denied to life or personal liberty and restraint can be put
only with procedure prescribed by law. However, Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of
Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India20, held that „procedure established by law‟ within the
meaning of Art. 21 must be „just and fair and reasonable‟ and „not arbitrary, fanciful or
oppressive‟ otherwise, it would be no procedure at all. It must be in accordance of the golden
triangle, i.e. Art. 14, Art. 19 and Art. 21.
14. In the present case protestors were treated so badly in lathi charge that some of them
were seriously injured and had to be admitted to the hospital, which was not justified in any
circumstances and could be held as excessive use of force which is violative of basic rule of
law.21
15. The Court endorsed the statement of law laid down in Bandhua Mukti Morcha vs. Union
of India22that the power of Supreme Court under Art. 32 to deviate from the traditional jargon
and to formulate new horizons in granting effective relief for violation of fundamental rights
particularly the right to personal liberty
19
S. Rangarajan vs. Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 SCC 574.
20
21
22
Bandhua Mukti Morcha vs. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 802.

≈ PAGE NO. 17 ≈
COMPETITION, 2016.
16. In popularly known Bhagalpur Blinding Case23, it was alleged in a petition that police
blinded certain under trial prisoners and state was liable to pay compensation to them. This
inhuman act was treated as violation of the fundamental right to life guaranteed under Art. 21
of the constitution, conceding the state liability, the Court directed the State of Bihar to
provide them the best treatment at State cost.
Thus, in the light of for the aforementioned reasons, justifications and case laws, it is humbly
submitted before the Hon‟ble Court that the action of State was arbitrary, unjust and
unreasonable which has violated the fundamental rights specifically Art. 19(1)(a) and Art. 21
of the petitioner and he must be awarded with the adequate compensation for the injuries
sustained by him.
III. WHETHER THE PROVISION OF SEDITION IS

CONSTITUTIONAL.
The counsel humbly submits before this Hon‟ble Court that provision of Sedition i.e., Sec.
124A of the Indiana Penal Code24 is unconstitutional.
A. A RELIC OF OUR COLONIAL PAST:
1. The provision, as it reads today after some amendments, defines sedition as any action
whether by words, signs or visible representation which “brings or attempts to bring into
hatred or contempt, or excites or attempts to excite disaffection towards the Government
established by law in India”. The section also contains a clarification to the effect that the
word “disaffection” includes disloyalty and all feelings of enmity.This definition of sedition,
as is only plainly evident, is exceedingly broadly worded. Its vagueness certainly did wonders
for the colonialists.
2. During the course of the British rule, there was a general consensus that Sec. 124A was
intended to indict any speech that as much as questioned the moral superiority of
23
Khatri vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1981 SC 928.
24
Laws of Indiana are pari materia to the Laws of India.

≈ PAGE NO. 18 ≈
COMPETITION, 2016.
government, that harboured any sentiments of ill feeling towards the state. Policies of
government, the judiciary largely agreed, could be questioned, so long as one didn‟t excite
hatred, contempt or disaffection. As the lawyer and jurist A.G. Noorani once wrote, what this
really meant was that the government had to be “loved, not hated”.
B. LIMITS FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION:
1. The Constitution of Indiana bestows several fundamental rights to its citizens; the most
powerful one is the right to free speech and expression.25 Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution
of India which guarantees the right to free speech and expression absolutely allows for
criticism of the government. However, this right has been curbed by the sedition laws of the
country.
2. In 1942, for the first time, the courts in India raised pressing questions against the use of
sedition as a weapon to chill all innocent forms of dissidence. Sir Maurice Gwyer, the chief
justice of the Federal Court, ruled that “public disorder, or the reasonable anticipation or
likelihood of public disorder, is the gist of the offence”. In so doing, he drew a necessity for a
link between words uttered and actual threat of violence for maintaining a prosecution of
sedition.
3. After the Constitution was adopted, it appeared Sec. 124A would soon be denounced as
an abhorrent relic of our colonial past.
4. Moreover, the reasoning adopted in the two earliest free speech cases decided by the
Supreme Court Brij Bhushan vs. State of Delhi26 and Romesh Thapar vs. Union of India27
also pointed to the incompatibility of laws of sedition with the Constitution. In both these
cases, efforts to ban publications on the purported threats that they posed to public safety
were ruled unconstitutional, since the exception in Article 19(2), as it read then, was
restricted to dangers to the security of the state. When the first amendment to the Constitution
was introduced, to include public order as a specific limitation to free speech, the offence of
sedition was still fundamentally unconstitutional.
5. The Constitution bench of the Supreme Court explained the amplitude of sedition for the
25
Article 19 of the Constitution of India, 1950.
26
Brij Bhushan vs. State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 129.
27
Romesh Thapar vs. Union of India, AIR 1950 SC 124.

≈ PAGE NO. 19 ≈
COMPETITION, 2016.
first time in 1962 in the case of Kedar Nath vs. State of Bihar28. Quite interestingly the court
adopted the view of the Federal Court of India that the gist of the offence of sedition is
“incitement to violence” or the “tendency or the intention to create public disorder”. So, as
per the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, a person can be charged with sedition only
if there is incitement to violence in his speech or writing or an intention to create disorder.
6. The Supreme Court upheld Sec. 124A, in Kedar Nath Singh vs. State of Bihar. But the
court ignored all the apparent contradictions in allowing sedition to remain on the IPC. While
grounding the legality of the provision on supposed public order considerations, the court
also failed to establish any rational test on how to determine when speech in disaffection of
the government could be construed as causing a disruption of public order.
7. It said that in 1979, India ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), which sets forth internationally recognized standards for the protection of freedom
of expression. However, misuse of sedition law under Sec. 124A and the arbitrary slapping of
charges continue to restrict speech in ways that are inconsistent with the ICCPR.
C. A WEAPON TO CRUSH OPPOSITION:
1. In the decades since Kedar Nath Singh, Indian free speech jurisprudence has gone
through substantial change. The court has proceeded towards expounding something
resembling a practical theory that distinguishes advocacy and incitement. In 1995, the court
acquitted some men who had raised a number of seemingly incendiary slogans in the wake of
Indira Gandhi‟s assassination, on the grounds that there existed no link between the slogans
and actual threats to public order. In Shreya Singhal vs. Union of India29, in declaring
unconstitutional the notorious Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, the court
ruled that “speech howsoever offensive, annoying or inconvenient cannot be prosecuted
unless its utterance has, at the least, a proximate connection with any incitement to disrupt
public order.”
2. The flagrant instances of misuse of the sedition law and the tendency to invoke it against
those involved in strident forms of political dissent and scathing criticism of governments.
One way to limit its mischief is to narrow the definition; but a more rational and
28
Kedar Nath Singh vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955.
29

≈ PAGE NO. 20 ≈
COMPETITION, 2016.
constitutional option would be to scrap the provision altogether.

3. However, in spite of the Supreme Court narrowing the scope of sedition, and in spite of
the more recently evolved tests to determine when mere speech or expression can be
prosecuted, governments have routinely invoked Sec. 124A with a view to restricting even
benign forms of dissent. To argue against sedition does not tantamount to arguing in favour
of absolute free speech. That words which directly provoke violence or which directly
threaten the maintenance of public order deserve censure is unquestionable, especially given
India‟s constitutional structure. But that‟s not what the offence of sedition seeks to achieve.
At its core, it is a devastating provision that is meant to assist in crushing all opposition to the
ruling dispensation. Its use continues to have the effect of chilling right to freedom of speech
and expression in India. Sec. 124A of the IPC negates the right to dissent, which is an
essential condition of any reasonable government. Viewed thus, Sec. 124A is opposed to the
idea of a legitimate liberal democratic state and is constitutionally invalid.
Therefore, in the light of for the aforementioned reasons, the provision of Sedition is not
within the mandates of permissible Constitutional schemes and hence is not constitutionally
valid.
IV. WHETHER RAMAIYA KUMAR IS GUILTY OF SEDITION.
1. The counsel humbly submits before this Hon‟ble Court that Ramaiya Kumar is not guilty
of sedition.
2. Government arrested Ramaiya Kumar late at night and slapped him with the charges of
sedition.30 The move presents with vivid clarity the government‟s pointed efforts at quelling
any and every form of dissent. It also, through the invocation of Sec. 124A of the Indiana
Penal Code, 1860, provides a stark reminder of the sheer depravity of some of our antiquated,
colonial-era laws.
30

≈ PAGE NO. 21 ≈
COMPETITION, 2016.
3. According to charges, rally was organized in Delporto by GNUSU to show solidarity to

the injured students of Utkal. Meanwhile some posters were put up across the campus of
GNU which claimed that the rally was also in solidarity of the hanging of Chengiz Khan,
who was hanged 3 years ago.
4. Thus far, the evidence presented fails to point to Mr. Kumar having actually uttered
anything remotely bordering on the controversial because it was seen that the Ramaiya
Kumar in his speech claimed that „Mashkir‟ deserved to be independent and that they will
seek independence at any cost. But even assuming he went as far as to question the integrity
of the Indiana state, his arrest ought to be viewed as a serious affront to liberal democratic
values.31
32
5. In the case of Sec. 124A of the Indiana Penal Code, which defines Sedition in wide,
expansive terms, and punishes the act with imprisonment for life, the danger doesn‟t lie
merely in its abuse, or even in its potential for causing anti-democratic mischief. Unlike other
provisions that might assume a pitiless character based on the nature of their usage, Sec.
124A is intrinsically draconian. The problems in the clause are obviously apparent in its
wordings, and the purpose that it unequivocally seeks to achieve: a suppression of all kinds of
opposition.
6. In this case it cannot be established that the speech is disaffection of the government
which could be construed as causing a disruption of public order because it was submitted
that those actions, which do not involve violence or the tendency to create public disorder,
such as the organisation of rally, solidarity of the hanging of Chengiz Khan, demanding
independence of Mashkir and criticism of the government do not constitute sedition.
7. In Indra Das vs. State of Assam33 and Arup Bhuyan vs. State of Assam34, the Supreme
Court unambiguously stated that only speech that amounts to “incitement to imminent
lawless action” can be criminalized.
8. In Shreya Singhal vs. Union of India35, the Supreme Court drew a clear distinction
between “advocacy” and “incitement”, stating that only the latter could be punished. Also,
31
32
Section 124A of the IPC states, “Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible
representation, or otherwise, brings or attempts to bring into hatred or contempt, or excites or attempts to excite
disaffection towards the government established by law in India shall be punished with imprisonment for life to
which fine may be added or with imprisonment which may extend to three years.”
33
Indra Das vs. State of Assam, (2011) 3 SCC 380.
34
Arup Bhuyan vs. State of Assam, (2011) 3 SCC 377.

≈ PAGE NO. 22 ≈
COMPETITION, 2016.
advocating revolution or advocating even violent overthrow of the State, does not amount to
sedition, unless there is incitement to violence, and more importantly, the incitement is to
„imminent‟ violence.36
9. In carrying out the arrest and slapping charges, the police and the governments have, not
respected this restriction. Successive governments have blatantly used Section 124A to stifle
the voice of dissent and to further their political goals.
10. Quoting statistics, they said, according to the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB)
Report of 2014, as many as 47 Sedition cases were reported across nine Indian States in 2014
alone. Many of these cases did not involve violence or incitement to violence, which is a pre-
requisite for a sedition charge. It was submitted that as per NCRB figures, a total of 58 people
were arrested in connection with these cases, but the government managed only one
conviction.
Therefore, in the light of for the aforementioned reasons, Ramaiya Kumar is guilty for the
offence of Sedition.

CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID.
A. SECTION 14A OF THE PRESS COUNCIL ACT, 1978 VIOLETS THE

PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 14&19(1) OF THE CONSTITUTION:
1. The Preamble of the Constitution of Indiana inter alia speaks of liberty of thought,
expression, belief, faith and worship. It also says that India is a sovereign democratic
republic. It cannot be over emphasized that when it comes to democracy, liberty of thought
and expression is a cardinal value that is of paramount significance under our constitutional
scheme.
35
36
Balwant Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1987 SC 1080.

≈ PAGE NO. 23 ≈
COMPETITION, 2016.
2. Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution of Indiana assures the Freedom of Speech and
expression as „All citizens shall have the right of freedom of speech and expression.‟37
3. Basically it is designed to provide protection against state action other than in the
legitimate exercise of its power to regulate private rights in the public interest.38 They are the
basic right relating to the mass media of every kind including electronic media.
4. The right is at par with Article 19 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights which says:
“Everyone has the right to freedom of information and expression: this right includes
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information
and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”39
5. In the context of these legal provisions it can be seen that the term „Speech and
Expression‟ has different dimensions. In the context of electronic media or broadcaster it may
the right of the broadcaster or the audience (or anybody at the receiving end) or a third party
who is neither a broadcaster nor a member of the audience. The Fundamental Right is
available to all these three groups and the restrictions are given under the clause (2) of Article
19 itself.
6. The Primary right in the case of electronic media is the right to broadcast itself. Whether
the state has the right to exclude all others from the broadcasting activities is a much-debated
question. Supreme Court of India in the case of Secretary Ministry of Broadcasting vs.
Cricket Association of Bengal & Ors.,40has unambiguously held that:“Broadcasting is a
means of communication and, therefore, a medium of speech and expression. Hence in a
democratic polity, neither any private individual, institution organisation nor any
Government or Government organization can claim exclusive right over it.”
7. Further in the same case Supreme Court observed: “The freedom of speech and
expression includes right to acquire information and disseminate it. Freedom of Speech and
Expression is necessary, for self-expression, which is an important means of free conscience
and self-fulfillment. It enables people to contribute to debates of social and moral issues.
8. Bhagwati, J. in the Express Newspapers case speaking for the Court said that, “The
freedom of speech and expression includes freedom of propagation of ideas which freedom is
ensured by the freedom of circulation and that the liberty of the pressis an essential part of
37
Article 19(1)(a) Constitution of Indiana.
38
Samdasani P.D. vs. Central Bank of India, AIR 1952 SC 59.
39
Article 19 Universal Declarations of Human Rights.
40
Secretary Ministry of Broadcasting vs. Cricket Association of Bengal & Ors.AIR 1995 SC 1236.

≈ PAGE NO. 24 ≈
COMPETITION, 2016.
the right to freedom of speech and expression and that the liberty of the press consists in
allowing no previous restraint upon publication.”41
9. It is indisputable that by the term the freedom of the media is meant the rights of all
citizens to speak, publish and express their views. The freedom of the press embodies the
right of the people to read. The freedom of the press is not antithetical to the right of the
people to speak and express. The Bombay High court held in a case that: “True democracy
can thrive only in a free clearing house of competing ideologies and philosophies, political,
economic and social. In this the press has an important role to play. The day this clearing
house closes down would toll the death knell of democracy.42 The constitution of India
provides regulatory provisions to protect both the side of the electronic media venture. The
broadcaster as well as the beneficiary of the media is brought within the umbrellas of
protection well as the regulation. Article 13 prescribes that any law in derogation to the
principles of fundamental rights are void ab initio.43
10. But the word „speech and expression‟ covers the rights relating to broadcasting. The
decision in Maneka Gandhi‟s case reinforces this view.44
11. In the words of Justice Patanjali Shastri, Art. 19(1)(a) is the foundation of all democratic
organisations.45 Without free political discussion public education is not possible. The free
media is essential for the proper functioning of the government. But the Judge gave a hint of
warning by saying „a freedom of such amplitude might involve risks of abuse.‟46
12. The Supreme Court is generally against the „pre-censorship‟ of the media. In Brij
Bhushan vs. State of Delhi47, the apex court held that pre-censorship is restriction of the
41
Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. vs. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 578.
42
Binod Rao vs. Minocher Rustom Masani, (1976) 78 Bombay L.R. 125.
43
The Constitution of India - Article 13 -Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the Fundamental
Rights.-(1) All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution,
in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be
void.
(2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law
made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void.
(3) In this article, unless the context otherwise requires, - (a) “law” includes any Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule,
regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law; (b) “laws in force”
includes laws passed or made by a Legislature or other competent authority in the territory of India before the
commencement of this Constitution and not previously repealed, notwithstanding that any such law or any part
thereof may not be then in operation either at all or in particular areas.
4) Nothing in this article shall apply to any amendment of this Constitution made under article 368.
44
45
Romesh Thapper vs. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124.
46
Romesh Thapper vs. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124.
47
Brij Bhushan vs. State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 129.

≈ PAGE NO. 25 ≈
COMPETITION, 2016.
liberty guaranteed by the Article 19(1)(a). Justice Das held in a case that if the mass media is
prevented from publishing its own view or the views of its correspondents „it is certainly a
serious encroachment on the valuable and cherished right to freedom of speech‟.48 The
restriction upon the media content as well as the material used for it comes within the
„objectionable restriction‟ by virtue of the observation of Supreme Court.
13. Regulations over the broadcasting media either through a specific statute or through a
general statute are subject to the reasonable restrictions prescribed under Art. 19(2)49 as well
Art. 13 of the Constitution.
14. The Supreme Court has examined the different aspects of reasonable restrictions in
several cases. In Dwaraka Prasad Lakshmi Narain vs. State of U.P.50, the court has observed
that the reasonable restrictions are the limitation upon the freedom. The restrictions should
neither be arbitrary or excessive in nature. In Chintaman Rao vs. State of M.P. the court held
the character of reasonableness would seize to exist when restriction invades the freedom
guaranteed by the Article 19(1).51 If the restriction imposed in Art. 19(2) does not strike
balance with the Art. 19(1) it must be held to want reasonableness. All the reasonable
restrictions prescribed in the Art. 19(2) are „Social Controls‟.
52
15. In the case of Rangarajan vs. Jagjivan Ram the Supreme Court held that even in a
situation the publication of the content of the media may cause violence the government
cannot restrict the freedom of speech and expression. The court said that “it is the duty of the
state to protect freedom of expression since it is a liberty guaranteed against the state. The
state cannot plead its inability to handle the hostile audience problem. It is the obligatory
duty of it to prevent it and protect the freedom of expression”
B. THE PROVISION OF THE STATUTE CONTAINS UNCLEAR AND

AMBIGUOUS WORDS:
48
Virendra vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 896.
49
“Article 19 - Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc. - (2) Nothing in sub-clause (a)
of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as
such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the
interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States,
public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence.”
50
Dwaraka Prasad Lakshmi Narain vs. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 224.
51
Chintaman Rao vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1951 SC 118.
52
Rangarajan vs. Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 SCC 574.

≈ PAGE NO. 26 ≈
COMPETITION, 2016.
1. In the present case the amendment made to the Press Councils Act, 1978 through which
Sec. 14A was incorporated which provides for the regulations and penalty against the
newspapers, news agencies and the editors and journalists which in itself was contrary to the
objective seems to achieve by the legislature of the country.
2. Objective of the Press Councils Act, 1978 reads as under:
3. “An Act to establish a Press Council for the purpose of preserving the freedom of the
Press and of maintaining and improving the standards of newspapers and news agencies in
India.”
4. But the present amendment to the statute provides vast and unbridled powers to the
„Council‟53 to encroach upon the freedom of the Press behind the curtains of „Sovereignty and
Integrity of the Nation‟ and „National Interest‟. The kind of loose-ended words like
Otherwise, Offended, National Interest, Public Opinion, News Agency, etc. are especially
provided in the provision so as to enlarge the ambit of the section. These words in a way
provide an unclear and ambiguous meaning to the section.
5. It is quite unclear that what the term „National Interest‟ connotes. Though one may argue,
government of the day is the most appropriate authority to decide what may included in the
nations interest but what if the government itself is on the receiving end. Whether they be
allowed to interpret the word in a manner they thinks suits to best of their interest? Can‟t it be
the violation of Principles of Natural Justice that “No one should be Judge of his own case or
cause?” Also the word „Public Opinion‟ is ambiguous in itself; it is not clear as to what
would be considered as a „Public Opinion‟. Indiana is a sovereign, democratic & republic
country,54whether opinion of few people be only considers as to the public interest. In a
democracy whether the opinion of every person is not important.
6. Also the word „News Agency‟ in the Press Councils Act, 1978 has not been provided any
particular definition. However, the Press Council of Indiana by the virtue of the power
conferred in the clause (c) of Section 2655 of the Press Council Act, 1978 makes the Press
53
Sec. 2(b) - Press Council Act, 1978:"Council" means the Press Council of India established under Section 4.
54
55
Sec. 26 - Power to make regulations: (1) The Council may , by notification in the Official Gazette, make
regulations not inconsistent with this Act thereof and the rules made thereunder, for -
(a) regulating the meetings of the Council or any committee thereof and the procedure for conducting the
business thereat under Section 9;
(b) specifying the terms and conditions of service of the employees, appointed by the Council, under Sub-
Section (2) of Section 11;
(c) regulating the manner of holding any inquiry under this Act;

≈ PAGE NO. 27 ≈
COMPETITION, 2016.
Council (Procedure for Inquiry) Regulations, 1979. And under the clause 2(e) of that
Regulation, the word “Matters” has been defined as:
7. (e) "Matter" means an article, news item, news report, or any other matter which is
published by a newspaper or transmitted by a news agency by any means whatsoever and
includes a cartoon, picture, photograph strip or advertisement which is published in a
newspaper.
8. This particular definition suggests the legislative intent behind the operation of the Press
Councils Act was limited upto the Print Media only. But in present matter, „Council‟ while
enlarging its ambit included the Electronic Media also which becomes clear through their
subsequent action, where the number of newspapers and news channels were censured and
some of them were fined also.56
9. Also in the present case „Council‟ acted sue-moto under the expression „Otherwise‟, but
no opportunity of hearing are been provided the newspapers and news channels. This action
of Council in itself is in contravention to the provisions of the Sec. 14A which specifically
provides that “the Council may, after giving the newspaper, or news agency, the editor or
journalist concerned an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry in such manner as may
be provided by regulations made under this Act and, if it is satisfied that it is necessary so to
do, it may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, warn, admonish, censure the newspaper, the
news agency, the editor or the journalist, disapprove the conduct of the editor or the
journalist as the case maybe or may impose a fine not exceeding Rs 10,00,000”
10. In the case of Charan Lal Sahu vs. Union of India57, Mukherjee, C.J. made an unguarded
statement, viz., that “In judging the Constitutional validity of the Act, the subsequent events,
namely, how the Act has worked out, have to be looked into.”
(d) delegating to the Chairman or the Secretary of the Council, subject to such conditions as it may think fit to
impose, any of its powers under Sub-Section (3) of Section 18;
(e) any other matter for which provision may be made by regulations under this Act: Provided that the
regulations made under clause (b) shall be made only with the prior approval of the Central Government.
(2) The Central Government shall cause every regulation made under this Act to be laid, as soon as may be after
it is made, before each House of Parliament, while it is in session, for a total period of thirty days which may be
comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions, and if, before the expiry of the session
immediately following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree in making any
modification in the regulation or both Houses agree that the regulation should not be made, the regulation shall
thereafter have effect only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the case may be; so, however, that any
modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under that
regulation.
56
57
Charan Lal Sahu vs. Union of India, (1990) 1 SCC 614 (667).

≈ PAGE NO. 28 ≈
COMPETITION, 2016.
11. In the context of these submissions counsel would like to mention the case of State of
M.P. vs. Baldeo Prasad58, the question of the existence of Public Emergency was been arose,
which is being left to the sole determination of an administrative official is an absolute and
arbitrary power and the court was of the opinion that a statute must not only provide adequate
safeguards for the protection of innocent citizens but also require the administrative authority
to be satisfied as to the existence of the conditions precedent laid down in the statute before
making an order. If the statute failed to do so in respect of any condition precedent then the
law suffered from an infirmity and was liable to be struck down as invalid and hence, the
statute was declared as ultra vires to the Constitution.
12. Also, as such the Council constituted under the Press Councils Act, 1978 has no
jurisdiction and power to act on the Electronic Media as they are solely governed by The
Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act 1995, The PrasarBharathi (Broadcasting
Corporation of India) Act 1990 and Information Technology Act 2000 which are some of the
significant laws made by the Parliament in regards to the Electronic Media. The deep-rooted
opinion about the electronic media is that it is totally different from the print media. Hence
the rules and regulation relating to the print media cannot be adopted for the broadcasting.
In the light of aforementioned observations related to the facts of the case and various
judicial pronouncements, it is humbly submitted before this Hon‟ble Court that the Sec. 14A
of the Press Councils Act, 1978 is in its very nature consists of number of loose-ended words
which are quite unclear and ambiguous which in its operation provides unfettered power to
the authorities which has been misused in the present case and used to subrogate the Freedom
of Speech and Expression enshrined under Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of Indiana which
is opposed to the principles enshrined under the supreme law of land and therefore it is
unconstitutional.
58
State of M.P. vs. Baldeo Prasad, AIR, 1961 (SC) 293 (296).

≈ PAGE NO. 29 ≈
COMPETITION, 2016.
PRAYER
In light of the issues raised, arguments advanced, reasons given and authorities cited it is
most humbly and respectfully requested that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to adjudge
and declare on behalf of:
1. Tomar Rashid and Mr. Kamal Kumar; that the present writ petitions filed before the
Hon‟ble Court is maintainable.
2. Tomar Rashid; that his right to life & personal liberty and right to peaceful assembly were
infringed by the State and therefore adequate compensation must be awarded for the
same.
3. Ramaiya Kumar that he is not guilty for the Sedition and also provision related to
Sedition is unconstitutional.
4. Mr. Kamal Kumar that newly incorporated Sec. 14A of the Press Council Act, 1978 is
ultra-vires to the Constitution and hence unconstitutional.
AND/OR
Pass any other Order, Direction, or Relief that it may deem fit in the Best Interests of Justice,
Fairness, Equity and Good Conscience.
For this Act of Kindness, the Respondents as in duty bound, shall forever pray.
The Petitioner(s)/Appellant
Sd/-
...................................
(COUNSELS FOR THE PETITIONER(S) & APPELLANT)

≈ PAGE NO. 30 ≈
COMPETITION, 2016.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
STATUTE/LEGISLATION:
 The Constitution of India, 1950.
 Indian Penal Code, 1860.
 Press Council Act, 1978.
 The Press Council (Procedure for Inquiry) Regulations, 1979.
LIST OF BOOKS:
 Basu, D.D., “Commentary on the Constitution of India”, (Vol. 9) Lexis Nexis
Butterworths Wadhwa Nagpur, 8th Edition 2011.
 Basu, D.D., “Law of the Press”, Lexis Nexis Butterworths Wadhwa Nagpur, 5th
Edition 2015.
 De, D. J., “Interpretation and Enforcement of Fundamental Rights”, Eastern Law
House, Calcutta, 2010.
 Jain, M.P., “Indian Constitutional Law”, (6th Ed, LexisNexis Butterworth Wadhwa,
2010).
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≈ PAGE NO. 31 ≈

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TEAM CODE: TB-2

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

IN THE MATTERS OF:-

TOMAR RASHID (...Petitioner) vs. UNION OF INDIANA(...Respondent)

RAMAIYA KUMAR (...Appellant) vs. UNION OF INDIANA(...Respondent)

KAMAL KAPOOR(...Petitioner) vs. UNION OF INDIANA (...Respondent)

MEMORIAL FOR THE PETITIONER(S) AND APPELLANT

 BOOKS AND GUIDELINES REFERRED...................................................................4

MEMORIAL FOR THE PETITIONER(S) & APPELLANT

AIR All India Reporter

r/w Read with

SCC Supreme Court Cases

u/a Under Article

MEMORIAL FOR THE PETITIONER(S) & APPELLANT

 BOOKS AND GUIDELINES REFERRED:

Basu, D.D., “Commentary on the Constitution of India”, (Vol. 9) Lexis Nexis

6. Sathe, S.P., “The Right to Know”, (1991, Tripathi).

Singh, M.P., “V.N. Shukla‟s Constitution of India”, Eastern Book Company

1. The Constitution of India, 1950.

2. Indian Penal Code, 1860

3. Press Council Act, 1978

4. The Press Council (Procedure for Inquiry) Regulations, 1979

MEMORIAL FOR THE PETITIONER(S) & APPELLANT

1. Arup Bhuyan vs. State of Assam (2011) 3 SCC 377. 22

Babulal Parate vs. State of

3. Balwant Singh vs. State of Punjab AIR 1987 SC 1080. 23

4. Bandhua Mukti Morcha vs. Union of AIR 1984 SC 802. 17

5. Binod Rao vs. Minocher Rustom (1976) 78 Bombay L.R. 125. 25

6. Brij Bhushan vs. State of Delhi AIR 1950 SC 129. 19; 25

Chintaman Rao vs. State of Madhya

10. Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. vs. A.I.R. 1958 SC 578. 25

11. Himat Lal vs. Commissioner of Police, AIR 1973 SC 87. 16

MEMORIAL FOR THE PETITIONER(S) & APPELLANT

12. Indra Das vs. State of Assam (2011) 3 SCC 380. 22

13. Khatri vs. State of Bihar AIR 1981 SC 928. 18

15. P.D. Samdasani vs. Central Bank of 24

16. S. Rangarajan vs. Jagjivan Ram (1989) 2 SCC 574. 17; 26

18. Secretary Ministry of Broadcasting vs. 24

21. Virendra vs. State of Punjab A.I.R. 1957 SC 896. 26

MEMORIAL FOR THE PETITIONER(S) & APPELLANT

THE HON‟BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA HAS JURISDICTION TO TRY,

ALSO UNDER ARTICLE 132(1)2 SUPREME COURT IS EMPOWERED TO HEAR AN

FURTHER „RULE 5 AND RULE 6 OF ORDER XLVII‟3 OF THE SUPREME COURT

MEMORIAL FOR THE PETITIONER(S) & APPELLANT

MEMORIAL FOR THE PETITIONER(S) & APPELLANT

MEMORIAL FOR THE PETITIONER(S) & APPELLANT

WHETHER THE PRESENT WRIT PETITIONS FILED BEFORE THE

WHETHER THE RIGHT TO PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY OF TOMAR

WHETHER RAMAIYA KUMAR IS GUILTY OF SEDITION?

WHETHER SECTION 14A OF THE PRESS COUNCIL ACT, 1978 IS

MEMORIAL FOR THE PETITIONER(S) & APPELLANT

I. WHETHER THE PRESENT WRIT PETITIONS FILED BEFORE

II. WHETHER THE RIGHT TO PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY OF TOMAR

III. WHETHER RAMAIYA KUMAR IS GUILTY OF SEDITION?

IV. WHETHER THE PROVISION OF SEDITION IS

V. WHETHER SECTION 14A OF THE PRESS COUNCIL ACT, 1978 IS

MEMORIAL FOR THE PETITIONER(S) & APPELLANT

I. WHETHER THE PRESENT WRIT PETITIONS FILED BEFORE