Felobello V. Palatino 72 PHIL. 441 G.R. No. L-48100 Facts

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Without the necessity of inquiring into

FELOBELLO V. PALATINO the historical background of the


72 PHIL. 441 benign prerogative of mercy, we adopt
G.R. No. L-48100 the broad view expressed in Cristobal
vs. Labrador, G. R. No. 47941,
FACTS: promulgated December 7, 1940, that
subject to the limitations imposed by
Petitioner Pelobello instituted quo the Constitution, the pardoning power
warranto proceedings in the CFI cannot be restricted or controlled by
against respondent Palatino, the legislative action; that an absolute
mayor-elect of Torrijos, Marinduque. pardon not only blots out the crime
He alleged that the respondent, having committed but removes all disabilities
been criminally convicted bi final resulting from the conviction, and that
judgment in 1912 and sentenced to when granted after the term of
imprisonment, was disqualified from imprisonment has expired, absolute
voting and being voted upon for the pardon removes all that is left of the
contested municipal office, such consequences of conviction.
disqualification not having been
removed by plenary pardon granted While there may be force in the
by the President on Dec. 25, 1940. argument which finds support in well
From the records, it is admitted that considered cases that the effect of
the respondent committed the offense absolute pardon should not be
more than 25 years ago; that he had extended to cases of this kind, we are
already been merited conditional of the opinion that the better view in
pardon from the Gov. General in 1915; the light of the constitutional grant in
that thereafter he had exercised the this jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily
right of suffrage, was elected councilor restrict or impair the power of the
for the period of 1918-1921; was Chief Executive who, after inquiry into
elected municipal president of the environmental facts, should be at
Torrijos three times in succession liberty to atone the rigidity of the law
(1922-1931) and finally elected mayor to the extent of relieving completely
in the 1940 local elections. the party or parties concerned from
the accessory and resultant
ISSUE: disabilities of criminal conviction. In
the case at bar, it is admitted that the
Whether or not the absolute pardon respondent mayor-elect committed
had the effect of removing the the offense more than 25 years ago;
disqualification incident to criminal that he had already merited
conviction under Sec. 94 of Election conditional pardon from the
Code, the pardon having been granted Governor-General in 1915; that
after the election but before the date thereafter he had exercised the right
fixed by law for assuming office. of suffrage, was elected councilor of
Torrijos, Marinduque, for the period
RULING: 1918 to 1921; was elected municipal
president of that municipality three
times in succession (1922-1931); and
finally elected mayor of the and academic, the whereabouts of
municipality in the election for local petitioners having already become
officials in December, 1940. known to petitioner Josefina Garcia-
Padilla.
Under these circumstances, it is
evident that the purpose in granting Petitioner: “arrest of petitioners was
him absolute pardon was to enable patently unlawful and illegal since it
him to assume the position in was effected without any warrant of
deference to the popular will; and the arrest; that the PC/INP raiding team
pardon was thus extended on the date which made the arrest were only
mentioned hereinabove and before armed with a search warrant”.
the date fixed in section 4 of the
Election Code for assuming office. We Nowhere in said warrant was
see no reason for defeating this authority given to make arrests, much
wholesome purpose by a restrictive less detention; that the search warrant
judicial interpretation of the which authorized respondents to seize
constitutional grant to the Chief "subversive documents, firearms of
Executive. We, therefore, give efficacy assorted calibers, medicine and other
to executive action and disregard subversive paraphernalia" in the
what at bottom is a technical o house and clinic of Dra. Aurora Parong
was a roving and general warrant and
GARCIA-PADILLA V ENRILE is, therefore, illegal per se because it
does not state specifically the things
FACTS: that are to be seized

Nine (9) of the fourteen (14) detainees No criminal charges have as of yet
herein were arrested when three (3) been filed against any of the detainees;
teams of the PC/INP of conducted a there is no judgment, decree, decision
raid at the residence of Dra. Aurora or order from a court of law which
Parong who were having a conference. would validate the continued
4 other detainees were arrested the detention of the petitioner; that while
next day it is true that a purported telegram
stating the issuance of a Presidential
The (14) detainees were all detained Commitment Order (PCO) was shown
at the PC/INP Command to the detainees on or about July 11
Headquarters, Bayombong, Nueva and 12, 1982, but counsel and the
Viscaya until their transfer to an detainees have not yet been given a
undisclosed place. copy of such PCO, nor notified of its
contents, raising a doubt whether such
Petition for the writ of habeas corpus commitment order has in fact been
and mandamus filed by Josefina issued.
Garcia-Padilla, mother of detained
petitioner Sabino G. Padilla, Jr. Respondents are denying the
detainees their constitutional right to
The mandamus aspect of the instant counsel, averring that the detainees
petition has, however, become moot were allowed regular visits by counsel
and relatives during their period of of printing paraphernalia, which were
detention then seized.
There is no doubt that circumstances
ISSUES: attendant in the arrest of the herein
detainees fall under a situation where
1.Whether or not petitioners' arrest is lawful even without a judicial
detention is legal warrant as specifically provided for
under Section 6(a), Rules 113 of the
2.Whether or not the issuance of a Rules of Court and allowed under
Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) existing jurisprudence on the matter.
has provided the legal basis of the As provided therein, a peace officer or
detention of herein detainees a private person may, without a
following their arrest for Proclamation warrant, arrest a person when the
No. 2045 covered offenses person to be arrested has committed
or actually committing, or is about to
RULING: commit an offense in his presence.

(1) Yes. Prior thereto to the arrest, the The arrest of persons involved in the
detainees were identified as members rebellion whether as its fighting
of the Communist Party of the armed elements, or for committing
Philippines (CCP) engaging in non-violent acts but in furtherance of
subversive activities and using the the rebellion, is more an act of
house of detainee Dra. Aurora Parong capturing them in the course of an
in Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya, as their armed conflict, to quell the rebyellion,
headquarters. than for the purpose of immediately
prosecuting them in court for a
Caught in flagrante delicto, the nine statutory offense. The arrest,
(9) detainees mentioned scampered therefore, need not follow the usual
towards different directions leaving procedure in the prosecution of
on top of their conference table offenses which requires the
numerous subversive documents, determination by a judge of the
periodicals, pamphlets, books, existence of probable cause before the
correspondence, stationaries, and issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest
other papers, including a plan on how and the granting of bail if the offense
they would infiltrate the youth and is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a
student sector (code-named YORK). judicial warrant is no legal
impediment to arresting or capturing
Also found were one (1) .38 cal. persons committing overt acts of
revolver with eight (8) live bullets, violence against goarrest and
nineteen (19) rounds of ammunition detention of persons ordered by the
for M16 armalite, eighteen thousand President through the issuance of
six hundred fifty pesos (P18,650.00) Presidential Commitment Order (PCO)
cash believed to be CPP/NPA funds, is merely preventivevernment forces,
assorted medicine packed and ready or any other milder acts but equally in
for distribution, and sizeable quantity pursuance of the rebellious
movement.
the suspension of the writ was a
(2) No answer. Political Question political question to be resolved solely
by the president. It was also noted
Reverting to the ruling of Montenegro that the suspension of the privilege of
vs. Castañeda that the President's the writ of habeas corpus must,
decision to suspend the privilege of indeed, carry with the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus is "final and the right to bail, if the government’s
conclusive upon the courts, and all campaign to the rebellion is to be
other persons." enhanced and rendered effective. If
the right to bail may be demanded
Under LOI 1211, a Presidential during the continuance of the
Commitment Order, the issuance of rebellion, and those arrested, captured
which is the exclusive prerogative of and detained in the course thereof will
the President under the Constitution, be released, they would, without the
may not be declared void by the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in
courts, under the doctrine of "political the field thereby jeopardizing the
question," as has been applied in the success of government efforts to end
Baker and Castañeda cases, on any the invasion, rebellion or insurrection.
ground, let alone its supposed
violation of the provision of LOI 1211,
thus diluting, if not abandoning, the
doctrine of the Lansang case. The
supreme mandate received by the
President from the people and his
oath to do justice to every man should
be sufficient guarantee, without need
of judicial overseeing, against
commission by him of an act of
arbitrariness in the discharge
particularly of those duties imposed
upon him for the protection of public
safety which in itself includes the
protection of life, liberty and property.
This Court is not possessed with the
attribute of infallibility that when it
reviews the acts of the President in
the exercise of his exclusive power, for
possible fault of arbitrariness, it would
not itself go so far as to commit the
self-same fault.

The questioned power of the


president to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus was once
again held as discretionary in the
president. The SC again reiterated that

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