100 Largest Losses

MARSH REPORT March 2018
The 100 Largest Losses

1978-2017
Large Property Damage Losses in the Hydrocarbon Industry
25th edition
CONTENTS
3 Foreword
4 Harnessing the Power of Data to Prevent Losses
5 Improving Process Safety Performance by Learning from Losses
6 Downstream Losses – 2016 - 2017
9 Newly Qualifying Losses Since March 2016
14 Refineries
23 Petrochemicals
28 Gas Processing
30 Terminals and Distribution
32 Upstream
37 About Marsh
2 Marsh
FOREWORD
Welcome to the 25th edition of Marsh’s 100 Largest Losses
report. We hope that the information summarized in this
publication proves to be a valuable resource for energy
industry professionals.
Given the challenges that face the energy industry
today, ranging from adjusting to a prolonged period of
low oil prices, to the evolution that new and disruptive
technology will bring, considering the potential for
serious incidents or major losses has never been more
crucial. And in many cases, there are important lessons to
be learned from the past.
To help bring this information to the industry, Marsh
has been collecting and recording data on major
property damage losses in the energy industry since the
publication of the first edition of this report, and now has
a database with more than 10,000 incidents from across
the global industry.
This data can support organizations in their hazard
identification activities, highlighting the particular
exposures relevant to the technologies they are
developing and managing these based on historical loss
records. This information should be complimented by
that collected and recorded on losses and near misses
within organizations to further support improvements in
risk management practice.
Many risk improvement recommendations are based
on the experience of energy industry insurers, including
the experience from the major property damage losses
summarized in this publication.
Ian Henderson
Global Energy & Power Engineering Leader
100 Largest Losses 3

HARNESSING THE POWER OF DATA TO

PREVENT LOSSES
As we enter the era of big data required and their effectiveness in INSURANCE MARKET
and analytics, loss data, such reducing the likelihood of the loss.
as that contained within this This also informs energy industry WORKS TO IDENTIFY
report, is an invaluable resource insurance engineers in their CRITICAL RISK TOPICS
that enables correlations to be assessment of the adequacy of risk
identified between causes of losses, controls on sites when undertaking a Members of the London insurance
risk management practices, and risk engineering survey. market organization the Lloyd’s
possible outcomes. This will, Market Association (LMA) have
in the future, allow for more A risk engineering survey of the sites undertaken work to identify the key
detailed targeting of risk reduction covered by a policy is a key part of scenarios and failures associated
and mitigation investment. the placement of energy industry with the major energy industry
insurance. These surveys, conducted losses that have resulted in large
Despite the significant efforts in by professional engineers, review the insurance claims. This work has
safety design and management hardware, software, and emergency been used to help identify the
systems, catastrophic incidents response capabilities in relation to critical topics to be focused on
are still happening. Could it be the insurances in place to transfer during risk engineering surveys.
that the industry is not learning the risk exposure. The surveys A paper summarizing the work
lessons from the past? It is also collect data to enable the was presented at the international
evident that losses with common calculation of a maximum property process safety conference Hazards
causes continue to occur across damage loss value (normally called 27 in Birmingham, UK in 2017.1
various parts of the industry. the property damage estimated
maximum loss). Depending on This analysis used a slightly different
In many of the cases examined the insurance products in place, set of data than that presented in
in this report, minor incidents maximum loss values will also be this document, with a shorter time
have escalated in an uncontrolled estimated for other exposures (for frame (20 years), only considering
manner to result in major events. example, business interruption and onshore losses, not including natural
The consequences of those events machinery breakdown). catastrophe events, and including
were not significantly mitigated and business interruption in the loss
resulted in major physical damage Risk engineering surveys also values applied.
and other significant impacts. routinely result in the survey
team making recommendations The analysis of the losses
As such, we hope that this to the site managers to improve highlights some dominant themes.
publication can act as a spur to risk management practices. Approximately 43% of the losses
organizations to collect and share Recommendations should be linked were identified as being the result
information on industry losses by to the relevant insurances being of mechanical integrity failure, and
demonstrating the value of being purchased for the exposed site this percentage was higher for the
able to learn from the experience of and should - when implemented losses on oil refineries. Of these
others to prevent the reoccurrence - result in a significant reduction mechanical integrity failures, 70%
of accidents and incidents. in the likelihood of a major loss were identified as being as a result
occurring, or reduction in the of corrosion of process piping,
USING RISK foreseeable consequences of a loss. primarily due to internal corrosion.
They are typically linked to the site Where external corrosion was a
ENGINEERING SURVEYS cause, it was as a result of corrosion
hardware, management systems, or
TO EVALUATE RISKS emergency response arrangements. under insulation. A significant
They should also be practical and proportion of these mechanical
Examining past events can help
proportionate, considering the integrity failures are identified as
the industry think about the
risk profile of the site and the scale being a result of an inadequate or
barriers that would have prevented
and mitigated these losses. This of the potential risk benefits.
1 Jarvis, R. and Goddard, A. “An Analysis
understanding can then be used of Common Causes of Major Losses in
to identify potential major hazard the Onshore Oil, Gas and Petrochemical
exposures, as well as the measures Industries”, I.Chem.E, Symposium Series No.
162, Hazards 27. Paper 34.
4 Marsh
incomplete inspection program, Engineers should continue to MILFORD HAVEN

or failure to manage construction analyze the experience of accidents
materials and quality assurance. and near-miss events to identify The major accident on the oil
any common issues or causes. This refinery in Milford Haven in the
Other topics identified as important demonstrates barriers that must UK in 1994 was compounded by
contributors to losses include: be in place and working effectively the overwhelming number of
to prevent and mitigate major alarms received in the control
•• Inadequate hazard identification. room by the panel operators,
accidents.
which significantly hindered their
•• Inadequate risk assessment of
This review of the lessons from ability to correctly diagnose what
safety critical tasks (for example,
losses, and assurance of the was occurring. This resulted in a
assessment of plant start-up to
adequacy of the measures in catastrophic failure of the flare
develop the procedure).
place, is an important component system, the release of a cloud of
•• Reliance on remotely operated of any integrated process safety flammable vapor, and subsequent
valves for safe isolations. management system. It confirms vapor cloud explosion which caused
that the measures are focused on the major damage to the refinery.
•• Failure to identify safety critical correct areas to control the risk of
devices. accidents. On sites where the control
rooms have not been subject to
effective alarm rationalization,
risk engineering surveys often
IMPROVING PROCESS SAFETY recommend an alarm study to
eliminate unnecessary alarms
PERFORMANCE BY LEARNING and ensure that, in the event of a
serious incident, panel operators
FROM LOSSES will not be subject to a flood of
alarms blinding them to the cause of
the upset and preventing effective
The following examples of major loss events provide and appropriate response.
valuable lessons for energy risk mitigation in the future.
DEEPWATER HORIZON
PIPER ALPHA The Piper Alpha disaster was a
demonstration of the importance Following the Deepwater Horizon/
This year sees the 30th anniversary of clear communication between Macondo loss in the Gulf of
of the Piper Alpha disaster in the UK operating shifts, recording and Mexico in 2010, which resulted
North Sea that resulted in the death understanding the status of in 11 fatalities, the US Chemical
of 167 offshore workers. As a result of equipment under maintenance, and Safety and Hazard Investigation
the loss, and the subsequent public the major loss mitigation benefits of Board (CSB) carried out a thorough
inquiry led by the Honourable Lord remotely operated valves to isolate investigation and published a
Cullen, there were major changes the flow of large inventories of comprehensive report. The report
to the regulation of safety in the hazardous flammable materials. included several recommendations,
UK Continental Shelf oil industry with the overall goal of reducing the
and significant improvements in Shift handover, permit to work, and risks of major accidents in offshore
the culture of loss prevention and remotely operated isolation valves drilling to a level as low as reasonably
process safety. are all topics that are routinely practicable (ALARP). For example,
reviewed during an insurance risk the recommendations relating
The recommendations from the survey of an energy industry asset to the management of blow-out
Cullen Report, published after the to determine their adequacy and preventers in order to ensure that
public inquiry, include requirements effectiveness in preventing and there is a high reliability that they
to improve the safety management mitigating accidents. These topics will operate on demand are typical
systems, as well as more specific may also result in risk improvement of the type of recommendation
recommendations relating to recommendations, if the standards that would be made following
engineering hardware measures. observed are less than that a risk engineering survey.
These critical findings continue considered necessary to adequately
to inform the scrutiny of major control the risks.
accident hazard plans carried out by
insurance industry engineers.

BIG SPRING risk engineers carrying out surveys found that there was
no common practice for the inspection and maintenance
The refinery loss at Big Spring in the US in February of the pressure containment envelope for pumps of
2008 is believed to have been as a result of the failure of this design, and, in some cases, it was found that the
a propylene pump leading to the release of a vapor cloud pump barrels had never been inspected since they were
of light hydrocarbon that found a source of ignition, installed.
resulting in a vapor cloud explosion.
Following the experience from the Big Spring incident, it
The design of the pump – a long-shaft vertical-buried is now common practice to examine the inspection and
can pump – is common in refinery operations for the maintenance regimes for vertical can pumps to ensure
transfer of low flash-point liquids. Insurance industry the management of their long-term integrity.
FIGURE 1 DISTRIBUTION OF THE 100 LARGEST LOSSES BY YEAR

Source: Marsh Research
2000
Total value of upstream losses (million US$) – 2017 values
1500
1000
500
0
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
DOWNSTREAM LOSSES – 2016 - 2017
There has been a significant spike in the number of high-value downstream losses over the past two years. The insurance
industry is also responding to a large number of losses which, although not large enough to make the 100 Largest Losses
list, have had a high impact on the global energy industry.
NOTABLE LOSSES IN THE DOWNSTREAM ENERGY SECTOR
LOSS ESTIMATE (PROPERTY DAMAGE PLUS

YEAR LOCATION LOSS DESCRIPTION
BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) US$ MILLION
2016 GERMANY PETROCHEMICALS 500
2017 IVORY COAST REFINERY 210
2016 US GAS PLANT 100
2016 THAILAND PETROCHEMICALS 95
2016 BAHRAIN REFINERY 90
2017 JAPAN REFINERY 85
2016 RUSSIA REFINERY 80
2017 US PETROCHEMICALS 67
2017 NORWAY CHEMICALS 46
There are no obvious common themes driving these; the recent downstream losses have occurred across refining,
petrochemicals, chemicals, and oil sands operations.
6 Marsh
THE IMPACT OF THE PRICE OF OIL

In the 24th edition of 100 Largest losses shows some correlation, around US$40/bbl, the lowest
Losses, we commented on the with some major losses occurring point since 2005. As we prepare
historical correlation between low in the years following significant this edition, the Brent crude oil
oil prices and loss trends in the reductions in the oil price. At the price stands at just below US$70/
hydrocarbon industry. The graph of time of publication of the 24th bbl. There has been a fairly steady
crude oil price and upstream energy edition, the price of oil stood rise over that two-year period.
FIGURE 2 CRUDE OIL PRICE VERSUS UPSTREAM LOSSES BY YEAR – 1974-2015

Total value of upstream losses (US$ million ) – 2015 values

120
2000
Year-end price of Brent crude (US$/barrel)
100
1500
80 Low oil price
60
1000
Low oil price Low oil price

40
500
20
0
0
1989
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
The downstream sector is more the substantial cost saving programs day in 2017 (increase in the daily
insulated from variations in crude taken by many organizations since production capacity of US refineries
prices than the upstream businesses. 2015 (which saw major reductions over the year). However, it was also
Downstream margins are positively in investments and in the working reported that US refinery utilization
affected as the drop represents a population), it’s not unreasonable increased and at the end of 2017
potential reduction in feedstock to ask if these are factors that have was at 96.7%, its highest level since
costs. Indeed, during this period of contributed to the spike in losses. 2005. It could be argued therefore
commercial opportunity, Marsh has that US refineries are being pushed
noted an increase in the number of It was reported that US refinery to operate at greater capacity and
downstream sites that have extended throughput growth rates slowed that increase in demand is not being
shutdowns and turnaround from 1.8 million barrels per day addressed through investment in
maintenance intervals. Coupled with in 2015 to 0.6 million barrels per new refinery projects.
SPOTLIGHT
The Effect of Low Oil Prices on Upstream Assets

In the upstream sector, lower oil prices have led to the divestment by some of the oil majors of mature assets that are no longer giving a
high rate of return on investment, as they develop projects in newer oil and gas producing regions. In many cases, this has led to older
assets being taken over by smaller organizations, sometimes with limited previous corporate experience in the oil and gas sector. It is
important that these new entrants maintain the competency to understand the risks associated with the assets that they
have acquired.

NATURAL CATASTROPHES LEAD TO SIGNIFICANT LOSSES IN NORTH AMERICA

Following several benign years Individual losses from 2017 an indication of the risk control
for natural catastrophes in North hurricanes failed to make the 100 measures that were considered as
America, 2017 entered history as Largest Losses, however, it should being below the best practices in
a significant loss year, with the be noted that this does not include industry. The dominant topics of the
energy industry being affected by business interruption impacts, recommendations are “systems of
hurricanes, severe weather, storms, which was the most significant work” (for example, permit to work,
flooding, and wildfires. Insured component of many of the losses. shift handover communication,
losses from natural catastrophes last Such events also bring into focus the and management of change) and
year are estimated to have reached risks that the energy industry faces “inspection” (for example, staffing
a record amount of US$135 billion from flooding; after all, as the 100 levels, competency, philosophy, and
globally.2 Such events have caused Largest Losses highlights, some of data analysis).
physical damage and business the largest losses have occurred as a
interruption for the energy industry. result of flooding. Focus on “systems of work” as
cited in loss reports reflects their
The 2017 Atlantic hurricane season Elsewhere in North America, the critical importance to the safe
heated up after a benign few worst year on record for wildfires operation of energy facilities.
years, with several major storms in British Columbia, Canada4 led Furthermore, the study by the
affecting the US East Coast and to firms having to temporarily Lloyd’s Market Association cited
Caribbean, resulting in business shut down natural gas wells, earlier in this document concluded
interruption and property damage pipelines, and other facilities as a that “mechanical integrity
in the oil and gas sector. Hurricane precaution where wildfires came failure” was responsible for 57%
Harvey, which made landfall in dangerously close to operations. For of man-made losses. Given these
the Texas Gulf Coast as a Category energy companies, property losses concerns, and combined with
4 storm on the Saffir-Simpson remained low, but the closures led to high operating rates, reduced
scale, caused significant flooding costly business interruption. staffing levels, and other cost
to local refineries in the area. saving programs, operators must
TRENDS IN RISK maintain high levels of monitoring
Much of the US refining capacity, and vigilance to ensure that asset
as well as a significant amount of RANKING
integrity is being maintained
petrochemical and LNG production, Analysis of risk improvement and accidents are eliminated.
is concentrated along the Gulf Coast, recommendations made during
meaning losses and supply chain the course of engineering surveys
disruption is a particular worry in over the past two years provides
this region. As a result of the storm,
approximately 22% of US refinery
FIGURE 3 10 Most Commonly Cited Topics, Full Dataset (By %)
capabilities were shut down due Source: Marsh
to flooding,3 leading to business
interruption and property damage 18
losses for the downstream sector. 16
For the upstream sector, crude oil 14
production in the region slowed due

Frequency of Citation (%)
12
to Harvey, but the impact was not as 10
severe as in the downstream sector. 8
6
2 Munich Re. “Natural catastrophe review:
4
Series of hurricanes makes 2017 year of
highest insured losses ever”, available 2
at https://www.munichre.com/en/ 0
media-relations/publications/press- S.
Systems
S.
Inspection
H. S. ER.
Fireproofing Ergonomics Maintenance
ER. Fire
Detection
ER.
Fire Water
ER.
Emergency
H.
Engineering
ER.
Fixed Fire
of Work & Operability /Testing & Alarm System Plans Standards Protection
releases/2018/2018-01-04-press-release/
index.html, accessed 13 February 2018.
3 Platts. “Oil factbox: USGC refinery outages,
port closures continue to increase Aug 30”, 4 Government of British Columbia. “Wildfire
available at https://www.platts.com/latest- Statistics”, available at https://www2.gov.
news/oil/newyork/oil-factbox-usgc-refinery- bc.ca/gov/content/safety/wildfire-status/
outages-port-closures-26796285, accessed wildfire-statistics, accessed 13 February
13 February 2018. 2018.
8 Marsh
NEWLY FIGURE 4 LARGEST LOSSES 2016-2017

QUALIFYING DATE PLANT TYPE EVENT TYPE LOCATION COUNTRY
PROPERTY
LOSS (US$M)
LOSSES SINCE 02/11/2016

EXPLORATION AND
PRODUCTION (E&P) OFFSHORE
MECHANICAL
DAMAGE
JUBILEE FIELD GHANA 450
MARCH 2016 12/01/2016 REFINERY FIRE

SANNAZZARO DE’
BURGONDI
ITALY 250
RUWAIS, ABU UNITED ARAB

01/11/2017 REFINERY FIRE 1,000+
Figure 4 shows the largest DHABI EMIRATES
property damage losses 01/30/2017 CHEMICAL FIRE PORI FINLAND 267
to have occurred in the 03/14/2017 REFINERY FIRE

FORT MCMURRAY,
ALBERTA
CANADA 220
hydrocarbon industry FIGURE 5 THE 20 LARGEST LOSSES 1978 - 2017

since the publication of Source: Marsh Research
the 24th edition of the DATE PLANT TYPE EVENT TYPE LOCATION COUNTRY
PROPERTY
DAMAGE1
(US$ M)
100 Largest Losses. We PIPER ALPHA, UNITED
07/06/1988 E&P OFFSHORE EXPLOSION, FIRE 1,960
have also identified the NORTH SEA KINGDOM
RUWAIS, ABU UNITED ARAB

20 largest losses in the 01/11/2017 REFINERY FIRE
DHABI EMIRATES
1,000+
industry, according to 10/23/1989 CHEMICAL

EXPLOSION, VAPOR
CLOUD EXPLOSION (VCE)
PASADENA, TEXAS
UNITED
STATES
1,520
Marsh data (Figure 5). 06/08/2009 E&P OFFSHORE BUSINESS INTERRUPTION NORTH SEA NORWAY 910
The following pages 03/19/1989 E&P OFFSHORE EXPLOSION, FIRE

BAKER, GULF OF
MEXICO
UNITED
STATES
900
provide insight on 03/15/2001 E&P OFFSHORE EXPLOSION

RONCADOR FIELD,
CAMPOS BASIN
BRAZIL 850
the distribution of the 09/25/1998

GAS
EXPLOSION, VCE
SALE, LONGFORD,
AUSTRALIA 810
PROCESSING VICTORIA
100 largest losses by ENCHOVA,
04/24/1988 E&P OFFSHORE BLOWOUT BRAZIL 760
year (Figure 6) and by CAMPOS BASIN
geographical distribution 09/21/2001 FERTILIZER EXPLOSION TOULOUSE FRANCE 730
(Figure 7). Further 06/25/2000 REFINERY EXPLOSION, FIRE MINA AL-AHMADI KUWAIT 720
details of these losses are 05/04/1988 CHEMICAL EXPLOSION

HENDERSON,
NEVADA
UNITED
STATES
690
available in the relevant 01/19/2004

GAS
EXPLOSION, FIRE SKIKDA ALGERIA 690
PROCESSING
sections of the publication. 04/01/2015 E&P OFFSHORE FIRE
ABKATUN, BAY OF
MEXICO 690
CAMPECHE
NORCO, UNITED
05/05/1988 REFINERY EXPLOSION, VCE 670
LOUISIANA STATES
03/11/2011 REFINERY EXPLOSION, FIRE SENDAI JAPAN 650
UNITED
04/21/2010 E&P OFFSHORE EXPLOSION, FIRE GULF OF MEXICO 640
STATES
MUMBAI, HIGH
07/27/2005 E&P OFFSHORE EXPLOSION, FIRE INDIA 520
NORTH
UNITED
11/14/1987 CHEMICAL EXPLOSION, VCE PAMPA, TEXAS 520
STATES
GAS BINTULU,
12/25/1997 EXPLOSION MALAYSIA 510
PROCESSING SARAWAK
5 I nflated to December 2017 values. Values are UNITED

02/04/2011 E&P OFFSHORE BUSINESS INTERRUPTION NORTH SEA 500
ground-up, property damage only. KINGDOM

FIGURE 6 PROPERTY DAMAGE VALUE OF 100 LARGEST LOSSES BY SECTOR

Refineries
US$629.2m US$679.3m
Petrochemicals Norco, Louisiana, US Mina Al-Ahmad
Gas processing US$1436m US$692.4m

Pasadena, Texas, US Toulouse, Franc
Terminals and distribution
Upstream US$655.4m
Henderson, Nevada, US
US$488.4m US$468m US$482.8m

Pampa, Texas, US Treasure Saga, Bintulu,
North Sea, Sarawak,
US$721m Norway Malaysia
Enchova, Brazil
US$235.4m US$1857m US$850.9m US$769.3m

Bantry Bay,Ireland Piper Alpha, North Sea Baker, Gulf of Mexico Longford,
United Kingdom US Victoria,
Australia
Low oil price Low oil

price
1978 1980 1985 1990 1995
10 Marsh
m US$265.2m US$1,000+m
di, Kuwait Texas City, Ruwais,
Texas, Abu Dhabi,
US UAE
m
ce US$616.3m
Sendai, Japan
US$805.1m US$450m
Roncador Field, Jubilee Field
Campos Basin, Ghana
Brazil
US$135.6m
Varanus Island
Australia
Low oil
price
2000 2005 2010 2015 2017

FIGURE 7 GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF 100 LARGEST LOSSES

INDUSTRIES PROPERTY LOSS

(US$ MILLIONS)
Refineries 1,500 – 2,000
Petrochemicals 1,000 – 1,500
Gas processing 750 – 1,000
Terminals and distribution 250 – 750
Upstream 0 – 250
12 Marsh

REFINERIES
There continue to be major losses in the refining There also continues to be a large number of oil
industry, with recent history dominated by a very large sand industry losses. When fires occur on these
loss on a newly commissioned refinery in the Middle major plants, they frequently result in multi-million
East. The size of these losses is often impacted by the dollar losses because of the size and value of the
complexity of the refinery, its level of integration, and plants. The frequency of fires reflects the challenging
the concentration of property value around the location environments in which these units operate and the
of the incident. New refineries will increasingly employ aggressive nature of the materials being processed –
technically complex, high-value process equipment to they are physically located much closer to upstream
maximize the yield of valuable products from each barrel operations than conventional refineries, and there is
of oil processed. It is important, therefore, that passive less intermediate processing of the raw materials.
protection measures such as lay-out and separation,
as well as active risk mitigation measures are still
considered in the design of new refineries to minimize
the potential loss in the event of fires and explosions.
FIGURE 8 REFINERY PROPERTY DAMAGE LOSSES BY YEAR

1000
875
Value US$ million – 2017 values
750
625
500
375
250
125
0
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
14 Marsh
LOCATION PROPERTY DAMAGE ESTIMATED CURRENT VALUE

DATE OF LOSS EVENT TYPE
COUNTRY US$ MILLION US$ MILLION
TEXAS CITY, TEXAS

05/30/1978 EXPLOSION 55 211
US
A failure led to the release of light hydrocarbons that dispersed and found an ignition source. An intense fire followed in the tank farm. After less than five
minutes, a 5,000-bbl storage sphere failed, resulting in a large fireball and rocketed pieces of the sphere throughout the plant. Within the next 20 minutes,
five 1,000-bbl horizontal vessels, four 1,000 bbl vertical vessels, and one additional 5,000 bbl sphere failed, either as a result of missile damage or due to
a boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE). Pieces of the tanks traveled in all directions, falling into operating units and tank farms, starting more
fires. Fragments also hit the firewater storage tank and electric fire pumps, leaving only the two diesel fire pumps operational.
ROMEOVILLE, ILLINOIS
07/23/1984 EXPLOSION 191 484
US
Just prior to the rupture of a 55-feet-tall, 8.5-feet diameter monoethanolamine absorber column, a refinery operator noted a six-inch-long horizontal crack
at a circumferential weld which was leaking propanes. As the operator attempted to close the inlet valve, the crack spread to about 24 inches. The area was
being evacuated and the plant fire brigade was arriving when the column failed massively. Propane at 200 psig at 100ºF propelled most of the 20-ton-
vessel 3,500 feet where it struck and toppled a 138,000-volt power transmission tower.
The weld separation occurred along a lower girth weld joint made during a repair to the column 10 years earlier. The vessel was constructed of one-inch-
thick SA 516 Gr 70 steel plates rolled and welded with full penetration submerged arc joints, but without post-weld heat treatment.
This explosion resulted in severe fires in the unsaturated gas plant, and the FCC and the alkylation units. After about 30 minutes, a BLEVE occurred in a
large process vessel in the alkylation unit. One piece of this vessel traveled 500 feet, shearing off pipelines before striking a tank in the water treatment unit.
Another fragment landed in a unifining unit over 600 feet away, causing a major fire where it landed.
The first explosion, believed to be from an unconfined vapor cloud, broke windows up to six miles from the plant, caused extensive structural damage
to refinery service buildings and disrupted all electric power at the refinery, rendering a 2,500 US gallons per minute electric fire pump inoperable. One
explosion sheared off a hydrant barrel, resulting in a reduction of fire water pressure from the two 2,500 US gallons per minute diesel engine driven fire
pumps, which were operating. The refinery’s blast resistant control center, approximately 400 feet northeast of the absorber, sustained little structural
damage.
An estimated 30 paid and volunteer public fire departments, together with equipment from refineries and chemical plants within a 20-mile radius,
responded promptly. Many of the pumpers took suction from the adjoining canal and from a quarry. The pumpers and a 12,000 US gallons/min fireboat
eventually provided water at pressures sufficient for fire fighting.
08/15/1984 FORT MCMURRAY, ALBERTA

FIRE 75 190
CANADA
Erosion failure in a 10-inch-diameter slurry recycle oil line in an 82,000 bbl per day fluid bed coking unit released liquids close to their auto ignition
temperature. A vapor cloud which covered a large area ignited almost immediately resulted in a ground fire covering a large area which resulted in the
failure of six or seven additional lines. The fire eventually extended over a 150-feet-diameter area with damage up in the unit structure up to a height of
more than 100 feet.
Metallurgical examination revealed that a 1.8-inch-long piece of carbon steel pipe had inadvertently been inserted into the slurry recycle line made of
5-chrome during an earlier metals inspection. The reactor fractionator, light gasoil stripper, 15,000 hp air blower, pumps, and pipe racks were severely
damaged or destroyed. About 2,700 barrels of hydrocarbon liquids were released from process equipment during the fire. Much of this was by gravity
flow from ruptured lines, although pumps, which could not be shut down, contributed much of the flow. A 900 psig steam line, which supplied the turbine
drivers of the compressors, ruptured, hampering fire fighting efforts.
AMUAY
12/13/1984 EXPLOSION 75 180
VENEZUELA
A straight run of eight-inch-diameter line carrying hot oil from the high pressure separator to the low pressure stripper in a refinery hydrodesulfurizer
fractured circumferentially in the parent metal in the heat zone about 1.5 inches from a weld. Hot oil at 700 psi and 650ºF sprayed across the roadway into
the hydrogen units where ignition occurred.
An intense fire around the pipe rack in the hydrogen plant caused a 16-inch-diameter gas line to rupture, adding a second blow torch to the fire. More
pipes ruptured with explosive force in adjacent areas.
The fire resulted in a crash shutdown of the entire 600,000 bbl/d refinery. After six and a half hours, the fire was extinguished. Damage was extensive.
The three hydrogen plants and the four hydrodesulphurization (HDS) units were heavily damaged or destroyed. Before the loss, the line which failed
was judged as having excessive vibration. It is believed that the hot oil line failed due to fatigue, considered, in turn, to be largely due to hydrogen
embrittlement.


NORCO, LOUISIANA
05/05/1988 EXPLOSION 288 665
US
Operations were normal in a 90,000 bbl per day fluid catalytic cracking (FCC) unit when internal corrosion caused the failure of the outside radius of an
eight-inch-diameter carbon steel elbow, located 50 feet above grade in the depropanizer column overhead piping system. An estimated 20,000 pounds
of C3 hydrocarbons escaped through the resulting hole, forming a large vapor cloud during the 30 seconds between failure and ignition. Both the
depropanizer column (operating at 270 psi at 130ºF) and the Depropanizer accumulator depressurized through the opening. Ignition of the vapor cloud
probably was caused by the FCC charge heater. The initial blast destroyed the FCC control building and toppled the 26-feet-diameter main fractionator
from its 15-feet-high concrete pedestal. The column separated from its 10-feet-high skirt before falling. Analysis of bolt stretching of towers in the blast
path indicated over pressures as high as 10 psi.
The refinery immediately lost all utilities, including fire water and the four diesel fire pumps, greatly limiting the fire fighting effort for several hours. Steam
pressure dropped abruptly due to severed lines. Twenty major line or vessel failures occurred in the FCC and elsewhere throughout the 215,000 bbl/d
refinery. Blast damage throughout the plant was extensive, but was most severe in the FCC unit. About 5,200 property claims were received for off-site
damage at distances up to six miles away. The FCC unit eventually was demolished and a new unit was constructed.
A preliminary report stated that the failed elbow was located downstream of the injection point where ammoniated water was added to reduce
depropanizer condensation or fouling. The elbow was a designated inspection point in the overhead piping system for taking ultrasonic thickness
measurements during turnarounds. These inspections had constantly shown the expected corrosion rates of 0.05 mils per year. Measurements taken at the
failed elbow and in the downstream piping after the explosion revealed unexpectedly high localized corrosion rates.
RICHMOND, CALIFORNIA
04/10/1989 FIRE 90 202
US
A two-inch-diameter line carrying hydrogen gas at 3,000 psi failed at a weld, resulting in a high pressure hydrogen fire. The fire resulted in flame
impingement on the calcium silicate insulation of the skirt for a 100-feet-high reactor in a hydrocracker unit. The steel skirt for this reactor, which was
between 10 and 12 feet in diameter and had a wall thickness of seven inches, subsequently failed. The falling reactor damaged air coolers and other
process equipment, greatly increasing the size of the loss.
At the time of the incident, the hydrocracker unit was being shut down for maintenance and the reactor was in a hydrogen purge cycle. The initial hydrogen
leak is believed to have resulted from the failure of an elbow to reducer weld in the two-inch-diameter hydrogen preheat exchanger by-pass line.
MECHANICAL DAMAGE, ST CROIX, VIRGIN ISLANDS

09/18/1989 167 375
PRODUCTION LOSS US
Hurricane Hugo struck this refinery, causing extensive damage to 14 of the 500,000 - 600,000 bbl storage tanks in the tank farm area, the administration
building, and the company housing. The damage to process units, which were idled in preparation for the hurricane, was limited to the asbestos insulation
on process columns and piping. A maximum wind speed of 192 miles per hour was reported for this hurricane, before the wind speed measuring device at
the St. Croix airport was damaged.
Because of the damaged asbestos insulation, approximately 1,500 company employees and contractors worked seven days a week for 15 weeks to remove
the asbestos debris from the refinery at a substantial extra expense.
A contractor specializing in the construction of atmospheric storage tanks worked for more than one year rebuilding the 14 storage tanks damaged in the
tank farm area.
16 Marsh

BATON ROUGE, LOUISIANA

12/24/1989 EXPLOSION, VCE 69 155
US
An eight-inch-diameter pipeline operating at approximately 700-pounds-per-square-inch ruptured, releasing a mix of ethane and propane. The record low
temperature of 10°F for the region is believed to have contributed to the rupture. After a few minutes, the resulting release was ignited, causing a vapor
cloud explosion.
The explosion shattered windows up to six miles away and could be felt as far as 15 miles away. Seventeen additional pipelines, in a pipe rack containing 70
lines, were ruptured by the explosion. The resulting fire involved two large storage tanks holding 3.6 million gallons of diesel, 12 small tanks containing a
total of 882,000 gallons of lube oil, and two separator units.
The explosion resulted in the partial loss of electricity, steam, and fire water for the refinery, since two power lines, two steam lines and a 12-inch diameter
fire water line were located in this pipe rack. Upon the initial explosion, the lines for the dock fire pumps were damaged. Therefore, the water for fire
fighting had to be supplied with the remaining plant fire pumps and municipal fire trucks taking draught from alternate sources.
Approximately 48,000 gallons of aqueous film-forming foam (AFFF) concentrate, 200 fire brigade members, and 13 pumper units were used during the fire
fighting effort, which was successful in extinguishing the fire approximately 14 hours after the initial explosion. Because of this incident, the refinery was
completely shut down for three days and operated at reduced capacity for an additional three weeks.
10/08/1992 EXPLOSION LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, US 78 165
An explosion originating in the hydrogen processing unit occurred in this 75,000 bbl/d refinery. Extensive damage was caused to the hydrocracker,
hydrodesulphurization, and hydrogen processing units by the explosion and subsequent fires. The fires were fueled by hydrocarbons released from the
damaged process column and equipment. The explosion, which damaged nearby buildings and shattered windows several miles away, was recorded as a
“sonic boom” at the California Institute of Technology in Pasadena, approximately 20 miles from the refinery.
The explosion resulted from the rupture of a the outside radius of a six-inch-diameter carbon steel 90° elbow and the release of a hydrocarbon-hydrogen
mixture to the atmosphere. The vapor cloud ignited within seconds of the rupture. There were no out-of-range or warning indications relevant to the
incident until after the failure of the pipe elbow. An inspection after the failure found the line at nearly full design thickness a short distance away from the
failure. On these facts, it was concluded that the line failure was the result of the thinning of the carbon steel elbow due to long-term erosion/corrosion.
The fire-fighting effort was coordinated by the refinery emergency response team, with the Los Angeles City and Los Angeles County Fire Departments
utilizing the Joint Incident Command System. The refinery emergency response team placed booms in the Dominguez Channel storm drain to stop oily
water run-off generated by the fire fighting effort from reaching the Los Angeles Harbor. The fire was finally extinguished after three days.
The refinery’s gasoline production was reduced to 35,000 bbl/d (approximately 70% of rated capacity) until repairs to the damaged process units were
completed.
SODEGAURA
10/16/1992 EXPLOSION 161 339
JAPAN
An explosion and subsequent fire resulted in significant property damage at this 146,500 bbl per day refinery. The explosion occurred following a heat
exchanger failure in the hydrodesulphurization unit for light oil. The channel cover and lock ring of this heat exchanger were hurled into an adjacent
factory, which was located approximately 650 feet from this plant. The channel cover and lock ring were each five feet in diameter, and weighed 4,000 lb
and 2,000 lb, respectively.
The hydrodesulphurization unit was being restarted following catalyst exchanging work when plant personnel noticed that hydrocarbon was being
released from the heat exchanger. Plant personnel were working to complete the additional tightening work required on the heat exchanger bolts due to
thermal expansion when the explosion occurred. The subsequent fire was brought under control in two hours and 45 minutes by firefighters using 15 fire
trucks.


LA MEDE
11/09/1992 EXPLOSION 225 474
FRANCE
A vapor cloud explosion occurred in the gas plant associated with the 29,700 bbl/d FCC unit on a 136,000 bbl/d refinery.
The initial vapor cloud explosion and several subsequent lesser explosions could be heard in Marseille, approximately 18 miles from the refinery. An
estimated 11,000 pounds of light hydrocarbons were involved in the initial explosion.
A gas detection system in the FCC unit sounded an alarm indicating a major gas leak. While the unit operator was contacting the security service to warn
of this situation, the initial explosion occurred. The initial gas release is believed to have resulted from a pipe rupture in the gas plant, which was used to
recover butane and propane produced in the FCC unit.
The explosions and subsequent fires devastated about two hectares of this refinery, which covers an area of about 250 hectares. The gas plant, FCC unit,
and associated control building were completely destroyed by this incident. Two new process units, which were under construction and scheduled to
come into operation in 1993, were seriously damaged. Outside of the refinery, roofs were damaged in the nearby town of Chateauneuf les Martigues and
windows were broken within a radius of 3,000 feet. Some windows were broken up to six miles away.
The refinery fire brigade and more than 250 fire fighters from three neighboring industrial sites and four nearby towns were used for more than six hours
to bring this incident under control. Approximately 37,000 US gallons of foam concentrate were used during the fire fighting effort. Some fires were
intentionally left burning after the incident was under control to allow safe depressurizing of the process units since the flare system was partially damaged
by the explosions.
MILFORD HAVEN
07/24/1994 FIRE 78 154
UNITED KINGDOM
A severe thunderstorm passed over this refinery between 07:20 and 09:00 on July 24, 1994. Lightning strikes resulted in a 0.4 second power loss and
subsequent power dips throughout the refinery. Consequently, numerous pumps and overhead fin-fan coolers tripped repeatedly, resulting in the main
crude distillation column pressure safety valves lifting. Major process unit upsets occurred in other refinery units including those within the 90,000 bbl per
day FCC complex.
The refinery crude unit was shut down following ignition of vapor escaping from the main crude column pressure safety valves by a subsequent lightning
strike. All of the units in the cracking complex, except the FCC unit itself, were also shut down. However, a process upset in the FCC unit’s gas recovery
section ultimately led to a high liquid level in the on-plot flare drum and several shutdowns of the wet gas compressor, together with other process
anomalies.
As a result of the wet gas compressor shutdown, there was a large vapor load on the FCC flare system, which lead to a high liquid level in the on-plot flare
drum. When the hydrocarbon liquid overflowed into the outlet line of this drum, the line ruptured due to mechanical shock. A pulsing leak appeared at the
flare drum discharge elbow where the outlet line had ruptured and fell to the ground.
The hydrocarbon liquid and vapor mixture released from this flare system formed a vapor cloud that drifted through the process area prior to being ignited
by a heater. The explosion was centered in the process area approximately 360 feet (110 meters) from the FCC on-plot flare drum.
Following the explosion, isolated fires continued to burn at locations within the FCC, butamer, and alkylation units. In view of the entrained hydrocarbons
in damaged areas of the plant and a non-operative flare system, these small fires were allowed to burn out under controlled conditions with the last fire
being extinguished on the morning of July 27, 1994. The fire fighting was handled by the refinery emergency services, with assistance from the Dyfed
County Fire Service.
As a result of this incident, an estimated 10% of the total refining capacity in the UK was lost until this complex was returned to service.
RYAZAN
08/07/1994 EXPLOSION, FIRE 100 199
RUSSIA
This event occurred on a crude unit at this 360,000 bbl per day refinery. A furnace was undergoing maintenance when a worker performed a hot cut and
material was released. Inadequate flushing and blinding and a work scope that did not meet normal industry practices appear to have been the likely
causes.
18 Marsh

PASCAGOULA, MISSISSIPPI
09/01/1998 HURRICANE/FLOOD 190 349
US
The entire refinery was shut down for three months after being struck by Hurricane Georges. The hurricane left the entire plant submerged under more
than four feet of salt water from the Gulf of Mexico. Although the hurricane was only a Category 2 storm, its slow movement subjected the refinery to 17
hours of high wind and rain. The storm surge overtopped the dikes built to protect the refinery. In all, some 2,100 motors, 1,900 pumps, 8,000 instrument
components, 280 turbines, and 200 miscellaneous machinery items required replacement or extensive rebuilding. Newer control buildings and electrical
substations sustained little or no damage, as they had been built with their ground floors elevated approximately five feet above grade.
RICHMOND, CALIFORNIA
03/25/1999 EXPLOSION 113 205
US
This explosion was caused by the failure of a valve bonnet in a high-pressure section of a 60,000 bbl-per-day hydrocracker. A vapor cloud formed from
the release, ignited, and was followed by a large fire fed by escaping hydrocarbons at high pressure. The explosion resulted in the collapse of a large
section of pipe rack and destruction of a large fin-fan cooler mounted above the rack. Many pumps were destroyed and a separator was badly damaged.
Approximately 300 fire fighters and 33 fire trucks participated in the two and a half-hour effort to control the fire. Foam concentrate consumed totaled
3,200 US gallons. The hydrocracker was out of service for 12 months.
KORFEZ, GULF OF IZMIT

08/17/1999 EARTHQUAKE 200 362
TURKEY
An earthquake measuring 7.4 on the Richter scale caused a collapse of a 312-feet-high concrete chimney on one of the crude units, setting off fires at this
226,000 bbl-per-day refinery. Fires also broke out on several storage tanks on the site. The process teams successfully isolated and tackled the crude unit
fire. Fires on the tank farm were allowed to burn themselves out after storage tanks were pumped out as much as possible. Due to broken water mains,
firefighting efforts were limited to attempts by aircraft to drop chemicals on the fires. The US and several other countries sent foam supplies, personnel, and
equipment to fight the fires. Damage to the refinery included total loss of six storage tanks, deformation of a further four storage tanks, and approximately
50% damage to other floating roof tanks. Damage to process units included the fire on the crude distillation unit, damage to a reformer, and damage to
several connecting pipelines. All employees were evacuated. Airplanes were used to spray chemicals to extinguish the fire because of a shortage of water
due to broken main.
MINA AL-AHMADI
06/25/2000 EXPLOSION 412 718
KUWAIT
An explosion occurred when employees were attempting to isolate a leak on a condensate line between the natural gas liquid (NGL) plant and the refinery.
Three crude units were damaged and two reformers were destroyed. The fire was extinguished approximately nine hours after the initial explosion. Five
people were killed and 50 others were injured. The initial investigation into the loss indicated a lack of inspection and maintenance of the condensate line,
which was not owned by the refinery. A lack of clear understanding of the ownership of the line is thought to have delayed the isolation of it.
WICKLAND, ARUBA
04/09/2001 FIRE 159 271
DUTCH ANTILLES
An oil spill occurred due to a failure of a block valve to seat properly during maintenance on a pump strainer in the visbreaker unit. The oil auto-ignited
and the ensuing fire spread and destroyed the visbreaker and damaged adjacent equipment. Subsequent explosions, heat restricted fire fighting access,
inadequately trained fire brigade personnel, and damage to the firewater distribution system further hindered extinguishing the fire in a timely manner.
The fire was spread by the firewater application, and was finally extinguished with the help of the local fire department.
KILLINGHOLME HUMBERSIDE
04/16/2001 EXPLOSION, FIRE 80 136
UNITED KINGDOM
A blast occurred in the FCC light gas plant following the release of a six-metric-ton cloud of LPG from the de-ethanizer overhead line. An elbow in the
overhead line failed due to corrosion as a result of water injection upstream.
The resulting explosion caused the rupture of a 14-inch gas line and reboiler return line released further eight-metric-tons of LPG. Both ruptures resulted in
fire balls. The explosions caused major damage to buildings.
CARSON, CALIFORNIA
04/23/2001 FIRE 120 204
US
A piping leak resulted in a fire in this refinery coker unit. Smoke rose to over 3,000 feet, and the coker was shut down for approximately two months.


LEMONT, ILLINOIS
08/14/2001 FIRE 145 247
US
The 160,000 bbl-per-day capacity refinery was shut down due to a pool fire, as a result of a pipework release on the crude distillation unit. Three days later,
the crude column suffered a structural failure due to an internal fire caused by air ingress from the previously ruptured pipework reacting with pyrophoric
material and oil in the column. The crude distillation unit was shut down for 12 months. The cause of the initial pool fire was due to incorrect piping material
specification in one elbow, which failed.
PORT OF MOHAMMEDIA
11/22/2002 EXPLOSION 130 213
MOROCCO
Following torrential rain, rising floodwater allowed waste oil floating on the surface to be brought into contact with hot equipment on the refinery causing
explosions and a fire. A second blaze broke out and several storage tanks reportedly caught fire and exploded. Damage to the refinery was extensive, two
were killed, and a further three reported missing. Later reports said that two to three production units had been affected by the fire. The processing units
affected were the crude unit, the 20,000 bbl-per-day vacuum distillation unit, the 24,000 bbl-per-day catalytic reformer unit, and the 24,000 bbl-per-day
distillate hydrotreater. At the time, it was stated that the units not affected by the fire would restart within 15 days, although the other units would not be
operational for a further eight to 12 months.
FORT MCMURRAY, ALBERTA

01/06/2003 EXPLOSION 120 189
CANADA
This incident occurred at an oil sands facility, specifically with minor explosions occurring in the froth treatment plant. Damage appeared to be mainly
limited to electrical cables in the solvent recovery area. The cause of the fire appears to have been a hydrocarbon leak in piping. The plant’s emergency
response team was assisted by the local fire brigade and the fire was extinguished in two hours. Only one minor injury was reported. The incident occurred
eight days after the new facility began operating.

01/04/2005 EXPLOSION 120 168
CANADA
A fire broke out at the oil sands refinery in Upgrader 2, an area of the plant that converts bitumen into crude oil products. Approximately 250 people were
evacuated from the plant, but no injuries were reported. The fire burned for nine hours before being extinguished. Witnesses reported two explosions
minutes apart which sent a fireball six stories high into the air. The plant also suffered ice damage from water used to fight the fire as temperatures in the
area fell below -35C. On February 3, 2005, the company announced that a ruptured cycle line was the most likely cause of the fire. Oil production was
reduced from 225,000 bbl-per-day to about 110,000 bbl-per-day for about nine months.
TEXAS CITY, TEXAS

03/23/2005 EXPLOSION 200 280
US
A total of 15 people were killed and 105 injured following an explosion at the 460,000 bbl-per-day refinery. The explosion occurred in the isomerization
unit which was being restarted following its annual major maintenance turnaround. Loss of control of the restart of the isomerization unit resulted in one
of the splitter columns becoming full of light hydrocarbon. Eventually, hot liquid was released from the column through relief valves to a 30-meter-high
blowdown stack on the unit. The release generated a large vapor cloud in the vicinity of the unit. There was a group of temporary buildings supporting
planned turnaround activity on another unit located in close proximity to the blowdown stack, and many of the fatalities were attending a meeting in these
buildings when the vapor cloud found a source of ignition and exploded.
PRIOLO, SICILY
04/30/2006 FIRE 110 147
ITALY
Two firefighters were injured tackling a blaze at a refinery. The incident occurred when crude oil leaked from a pipe supplying the refinery from bulk storage
tanks.
MAZEIKIU
10/12/2006 EXPLOSION 143 191
LITHUANIA
The fire on the vacuum distillation unit (VDU) weakened the main vacuum distillation column supports, allowing it to collapse onto the heat exchange train.
The VDU was shutdown completely and the refinery was left running but at a much reduced capacity. An investigation identified that the fire was caused by
a leak from a branch on the column that was fabricated from an incorrect material.
20 Marsh

PASCAGOULA, MISSISSIPPI
08/16/2007 FIRE 200 255
US
A fire broke out in a crude unit of a 325,000 bbl/d refinery and burned for more than six hours. No injuries were reported. Company officials said a major
portion of the refinery was able to continue to operate. The another crude unit at the refinery remained operational.
BIG SPRING, TEXAS

02/18/2008 FIRE 380 454
US
An explosion at this 70,000 bbl-per-day oil refinery caused damage to the FCC, utilities, storage tanks, and asphalt unit. One employee was hospitalized
for burns. Another person was injured when her car was struck by debris from the explosion on the nearby highway. There was a total of four injuries. A
skeleton crew of just 40 people were on site because the blast occurred on a public holiday. There would typically have been about four times as many
people on duty at the time of the explosion. The fire was brought under control the same day by the site’s fire brigade, supported by local fire departments.
The release is believed to have occurred during a start-up on the propylene splitter unit, as a result of the catastrophic failure of a pump. Some processing
resumed about two months later, and the FCC was re-commissioned eight months after the incident.
PRIOLO GARGALLO. SICILY

10/13/2008 EXPLOSION 150 179
ITALY
An explosion and fire in a 562 megawatt (MW)-capacity integrated gasification combined cycle electricity generating plant at a refinery caused a fire in the
gasification unit on a refinery. No one was injured as a result of the explosion and fire, but the loss resulted in the temporary closure of the refinery.
FORT MCKAY, ALBERTA

01/06/2011 EXPLOSION 385 425
CANADA
An explosion occurred on this oil sands upgrader site north of Fort McMurray, Alberta. Five workers were injured in the blast, including one who received
third-degree burns. A subsequent fire occurred at the top of one of the site’s four coke drums and burned for nearly four hours. As a result, two of the coke
drums were disabled. Workers returned to normal shifts the following morning. The majority of the damage was sustained above the cutting deck and
derrick infrastructure of the coke drum.
At the time of the incident, the plant was operating on bypass conditions due to process upsets. An internal investigation team determined that the fire
resulted from the opening of the top unheading valve on an active low-pressure coke drum. This allowed hot hydrocarbons to be released within the coker
cutting deck building and was followed by ignition, leading to the explosion and fire.
Exceptionally cold weather following the incident hampered efforts to gain access to the coker unit’s cutting deck, due to the deluge protection in this area.
Firefighting in freezing conditions caused additional damage.
SENDAI
03/11/2011 EXPLOSION 590 651
JAPAN
A major explosion occurred at a 145,000-barrels-per-day refinery in the north-eastern city of Sendai, hours after the largest earthquake in the country’s
history was followed by a tsunami.
The fire at the Sendai refinery originated from a land oil product shipping facility. Workers at the refinery were evacuated, and there was no capacity
available to extinguish the fire.
Fire in the storage and shipping facilities had also damaged a 35,500 barrels-per-day FCC at the refinery.
PULAU BAKOM
09/28/2011 FIRE 150 166
SINGAPORE
A fire broke out in a refinery, reported to have started in a pump house used for blending refined products, as it was being prepared for maintenance. Site
fire fighters were supported by state fire-authority forces. Non-essential staff were evacuated from the site, and neighboring units were shut down as a
precaution. Further fire eruptions and explosions were reported the next morning, and the company began steps to shut down the whole refinery. The fire
was reported as finally extinguished late in the evening of the second day, about 34 hours after it was first reported. The production units on the refinery
were progressively restarted, and all units were back in production by the end of 2011.


BANGKOK
07/04/2012 FIRE 140 153
THAILAND
The explosion and fire occurred in the kerosene stripper of the crude distillation unit (CDU) at a 80,000 bbl-per-day refinery located in an industrial zone
surrounded by residential areas. This resulted in fires in the area, but no injuries were reported. The refinery operator said it would postpone a maintenance
shutdown at its refinery, set for late July, to reduce the risk of supply shortages as a result of the fire. The CDU damaged by the fire was replaced within three
months.
FALCON STATE
08/25/2012 EXPLOSION 320 349
VENEZUELA
A very powerful explosion occurred in an area of pressured propane and butane storage at the refinery. At least 48 people were killed and more than 80
injured. The explosion hit an area of storage tanks, damaging nine tanks. It was reported that there had been several leaks at the refinery in the previous
year.
STANLOW, CHESHIRE
01/12/2013 FIRE 150 162
UNITED KINGDOM
Refinery and local fire fighters spent more than six hours battling a fire on a large oil refinery. A warning was issued to local residents because of thick non-
toxic smoke generated from a stack on the site. The fire is thought to have broken out in a furnace. No injuries were reported.
SOHAR
03/11/2013 FIRE 150 162
OMAN
A fire broke out in a wet gas scrubber while heavy maintenance on a unit was being carried out. Personnel were evacuated from the site and there were no
injuries. The site was conducting a planned shutdown and maintenance of the plant equipment including the polypropylene plant.
LA PLATA DISTRICT, ENSENADA

04/02/2013 EXPLOSION 225 243
ARGENTINA
A fire broke out in the 188,000 barrels-per-day refinery, caused by flash-floods during heavy rain. The rain overwhelmed the storm drainage system on the
refinery, resulting in hydrocarbons being washed out of the drains and around the site. An explosion was reported in the crude distillation unit. There were
two fires in the crude distillation unit (CDU), one in the coking plant and two in the topping distillation plant. The government agency said the incident had
been caused by hydrocarbons exploding in one of the coke manufacturing furnaces. The furnaces had been shut down, but were still hot enough to ignite
the hydrocarbon. It took eight hours to extinguish the fire and 10 hours before the incident was under control. There were no fatalities or injuries.
SANNAZZARO DE’ BURGONDI

12/01/2016 FIRE 250 259
ITALY
A major fire broke out on a refinery processing unit designed to convert heavy oil residues into refined products, resulting in serious damage to the plant.
RUWAIS, ABU DHABI UNITED

01/11/2017 FIRE 1,000+ 1,000+
ARAB EMIRATES
A release of hot light hydrocarbon during the completion of a maintenance activity resulted in a major fire. The fire occurred on a residual fluid catalytic
cracking (RFCC) unit that had recently been commissioned as part of a major expansion, doubling the overall refinery capacity. The fire resulted in the
closure of the expanded area of the refinery while extensive rebuilding activity was delivered. The value of the property damage loss is currently estimated
to be in excess of US$1 billion.

03/14/2017 FIRE 220 220
CANADA
A fire occurred on one of the two hydrotreaters on an oil sands upgrader facility. The fire was reported to be as a result of the failure of a pipe, resulting in a
releaser of naphtha. One worker was seriously injured as a result of the fire, which was extinguished after two days.
22 Marsh
PETROCHEMICALS
The loss record for the petrochemicals industry is Some of these plants are now aging, and many are
dominated by the disaster in Pasadena, Texas in 1989, designed to standards that do not reflect current best
the investigation of which had a major influence on the practices. For example, in a modern design, layout
regulation of industrial safety in the US. However, there and drainage arrangements would remove flammable
have been several major losses in Europe over the past materials from hazardous areas, but older designs retain
few years. spillages close to the process plant. As a result, there is
the potential for greater escalation, and greater damage,
These plants are often complex, integrated with in the event that flammable liquids spill and ignite.
concentrations of high value equipment and machinery,
and typically operate at high pressures and temperatures.
The materials that they process have normally been pre-
processed, for example, they are supplied downstream of
oil refineries. As a result, most of the contaminants will
have been removed prior to receipt and they handle a
feedstock with a consistent specification and quality.
FIGURE 9 PETROCHEMICAL PROPERTY DAMAGE LOSSES BY YEAR

2000
Value US$ millions – 2017 values
1500
1000
500
0
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

LOCATION PROPERTY DAMAGE ADJ PROPERTY

DATE OF LOSS EVENT TYPE SITE TYPE
NEWCASTLE, DELAWARE
04/30/1980 EXPLOSION CHEMICAL 45 147
US
An explosion occurred while polypropylene polymerization was being carried out in three parallel reaction trains (A,B,C) at this petrochemicals plant. The
reactants were carried in a hexane solvent with several catalysts and processed onto pellets.
As a result of a maintenance error, a 100 millimeter plug valve was blown out of a line in train A, releasing hydrocarbons and polymers. The vapor cloud rose
upward, carried by a light wind into the finishing building, where the explosion occurred.
Further fires resulted from broken flammable liquid lines in the process area and from the released products in the finishing area. The loss included the
three trains, the control building, the compressor building, and part of the finishing building.
WARRINGTON, CHESHIRE
09/15/1984 FIRE CHEMICAL 62 158
UNITED KINGDOM
A fire started in the oxidization plant. Some 130 firemen using 25 appliances controlled the blaze after four hours. The local railway line, ship canal, and
roads were closed and 200 people evacuated. The plant was rebuilt with larger spacing to obtain authorities approval.
PRIOLO
ITALY
A faulty temperature probe on a 600,000-metric-ton-per-year ethylene plant initiated an isolation of the hydrogenation reactor located within the cold
section. While the operators were attempting to regain normal control, the pressure relief system operated. About the same time, fire was noted near
grade level at the base of the de-ethanizer column. The source of fuel was believed to have been a flange at the de-ethanizer column reboiler or in the relief
system pipe work.
Leaking hydrocarbon, mostly propylene at 375 psig, was possibly ignited by hot steam piping. The intense fire rapidly engulfed the adjoining ethylene and
propylene distillation columns and spread 180 feet to the storage area. Eventually, one vertical pressurized propane storage tank exploded, its top section
traveling 1,500 feet and missing a gas holder by 30 feet. Two other propylene tanks toppled; one onto a pipe rack, and the other against an ethylene
tank. All were protected by deluge waterspray systems, which apparently were ineffective under the intense fire exposure. Five of the eight ethylene and
propylene tanks collapsed or exploded. The fire also spread to the API separator and to three floating roof tanks. Pipe racks, motor control centers, and
pumps were severely damaged or destroyed.
A few minutes after the fire brigade responded, the ethylene column released its 9,300 US gallon inventory, destroying one of the plant’s two foam trucks.
Assisted by outside fire fighting agencies, the plant fire brigade brought the fire under control over 40 hours and finally extinguished it four days after the
initial ignition.
ZWIJNDRECHT, ANTWERP
BELGIUM
An explosion occurred in the final purification column of an ethylene oxide manufacturing plant, resulting in 14 people being injured. The explosion caused
several secondary fires on the original units, as well as other units nearby, but all were under control within 30 minutes. The root cause was identified as a
rapid overpressurization of the column as a result of decomposition of material within it, although the ignition source was not identified.
PAMPA, TEXAS
US
An explosion occurred in an air line in a reactor used for the liquid phase oxidation of butane as it was being started up. The explosion ruptured the external
portion of the air line to the reactor, allowing the reactor contents to vaporize and form a cloud. The vapor cloud drifted and ignited about 25 to 30 seconds
after the initial release. There was extensive property damage in the immediate area as a result of the vapor cloud explosion and significant damage
throughout the site. Windows were broken seven miles away. The immediate cause was believed to be insufficient purging of the reactor when it had
previously been down.
HENDERSON, NEVADA
US
An explosion at a plant that manufactured ammonium perchlorate (AP) for rocket fuel flattened the local industrial park, left a crater 125 meters across,
and cracked walls 15 miles away. Two people were killed. The cause was thought to be a fire in a batch dryer. The initial explosion was at 11:53 and was
equivalent to 108 tons of TNT, with a second explosion four minutes later equivalent to 235 t of TNT. Approximately 50% of the buildings in the nearby town
of Henderson, Nevada were destroyed, at cost of US$70 million. A natural gas pipeline that ran under the plant was ruptured in the event and burned for
one week.
24 Marsh

UERDINGEN
02/14/1989 EXPLOSION, FIRE CHEMICAL 63 141
GERMANY
Overheating and explosion of a reactor occurred, likely as a result of a runaway reaction. The cause was suspected to be the addition of the incorrect
component. A neighboring building also was destroyed.
ANTWERP
BELGIUM
A hairline crack in a welded seam of piping to the level indicator system on an aldehyde column resulted in a minor ethylene oxide leak on this gas
processing plant. As a result of this crack, which was caused by low cycle fatigue, ethylene oxide escaped near the level indicator and formed polyethylene
glycols (PEG) in the mineral wool insulation.
It is believed that both the leak and accumulation of PEG occurred over a period of time. During repairs to the level indicator, the metal sheathing of the
insulation was removed and air contacted the insulation soaked with PEG. Auto-oxidation of the PEG resulted and the insulating material was ignited. The
piping to the level indicator system was heated to such a degree that auto-decomposition of the ethylene oxide within the piping occurred. This auto-
decomposition propagated into the aldehyde column which subsequently exploded.
The force of the explosion completely destroyed the distillation section of this plant. The large resulting fire and impact of flying debris to other process
sections resulted in extensive damage throughout the plant.
PASADENA, TEXAS
10/23/1989 EXPLOSION, VCE CHEMICAL 675 1,518
US
A large flow of ethylene and isobutane was released from one of the high density polyethylene (HDPE) units at a chemical complex. The vapor cloud
drifted north toward the center of the HDPE process area before ignition. This is believed to have occurred approximately one minute after the release. The
explosion had the strength of a 3.5 magnitude on the Richter scale earthquake.
The explosion destroyed two HDPE units, which included a total of eight particle form, loop reactor trains. The heat from the explosion caused BLEVEs of
nearby pressurized storage tanks. Other process units at this chemical complex sustained only minor damage and resumed normal production within a
few weeks of the incident.
The initial release of ethylene and isobutane occurred through an eight-inch-diameter ball valve settling leg of one of the loop reactors. The function of
these pneumatic valves is to isolate the settling leg and other downstream equipment from the reactor for maintenance. The company maintenance
procedures for opening a settling leg included closing the ball valve, inserting a lock-out device into this closed valve, closing the block valves to the air
hoses for the valve operator, and disconnecting these air hoses.
Company personnel confirmed that these maintenance procedures were performed two days before the loss, but maintenance work had not yet begun
because of changes in priorities.
After the explosion, investigations indicated that the lock-out device had been removed from the valve and the air hoses had been reconnected to the valve
operator on settling leg. The valve was found in the open position and the settling leg was open to atmosphere at the bottom of the leg where a swedge/
reducer spool leading to the product take-off valve should have been connected.
PAJARITOS,
03/11/1991 EXPLOSION, FIRE CHEMICAL COATZACOALCOS 97 208
MEXICO
A gas leak involving the pipe rack that runs to the terminal of this petrochemical complex led to an explosion, which occurred near the complex chemical
plant, causing additional damage to the pipe rack and resulting in a major gas leak. A powerful second explosion occurred that could be felt more than 15
miles from the complex. These explosions and a subsequent fire completely destroyed the chemical plant, caused significant damage to the pipe rack, and
resulted in moderate damage to other complex buildings and adjacent third-party facilities. The fire was extinguished after approximately three hours.
Because of this incident, the chemical plant at this complex was completely shut down for seven months to allow for the rebuild of the plant and the pipe
rack.


SEADRIFT, TEXAS
US
An explosion occurred in the ethylene oxide process unit at this plant. As a result, the ethylene oxide refining column was completely destroyed, the
ethylene glycol unit was substantially damaged, and the co-generation unit was partially damaged. A pipe rack near the storage area for liquid ethylene
oxide was damaged when a large piece of shrapnel from the explosion hit the rack, rupturing lines which contained methane and other hydrocarbon
products. The subsequent fire that resulted from the released products was the only significant fire to occur during this incident.
As a result of the explosion, all utilities at the plant were lost for approximately one week. Additionally, several fixed fire protection systems were damaged
by the explosion or inadvertently actuated due to a loss of plant air. These systems were shut off, isolated, or placed back in service, as appropriate. A
manual fire fighting effort was used to extinguish the fire in the pipe rack once the lines in the rack were isolated.
The polyethylene production was restarted in early April 1991 using imported ethylene. The olefins production unit was restarted in late April 1991.
STERLINGTON, LOUISIANA
US
Workers were preparing to check a compressor in the nitroparaffin unit when they noticed a small fire and sounded the plant fire alarm. About 30 seconds
later, an explosion occurred, which was followed by a series of smaller explosions. The effects of the initial explosion were reported as far away as eight
miles from the plant. Additionally, the initial explosion completely damaged an area of the plant approximately the size of a city block. Subsequent fires
were reported to have burned for more than seven hours.
Although the incident did not damage the two ammonia units on site, the entire plant was temporarily shut down for precautionary measures.
BELPRE, OHIO
US
An abnormal chemical reaction occurred during the batch production of a thermoplastic rubber product, resulting in an explosion at this plant. As a result
of the explosion the reactor, process controls, accessories, control room, and building for this production unit were completely destroyed.
The fire then spread to involve part of the tank farm, resulting in the destruction of five atmospheric storage tanks. At approximately 12:30, the first of four
one million US gallon and a 500,000 US gallon styrene storage tanks exploded. A fire fighting attack using cooling water and foam hose streams was used
to prevent the fire from involving other nearby storage tanks, two of which contained butadiene. The fire was extinguished after approximately nine hours.
MECHANICAL DAMAGE, CEDAR BAYOU, TEXAS

10/20/1994 CHEMICAL 130 259
PRODUCTION LOSS US
The Texas floods along the San Jacinto River shutdown the site, involving 650,000 tons-per-year ethylene, 200,000 tons-per-year linear low-density
polyethene (LLDPE), 280,000 tons-per-year low-density polyethene (LDPE) plants, and general utilities. The loss of utilities affected further downstream
clients. Flood water breached dikes around the main substation and inundated control rooms and offices.
PORT NEAL, IOWA

12/13/1994 EXPLOSION FERTILIZER 203 404
US
An explosion occurred in the ammonium nitrate process area of this plant. As a result of the explosion, the seven-story main process building was
completely destroyed and a 30-foot-diameter crater was created.
Metal fragments from the explosion punctured one of the plant’s two 15,000-metric-ton refrigerated ammonia storage tanks. The punctured tank released
an estimated 5,700 metric tons of ammonia, causing the evacuation of approximately 2,500 people from the surrounding area. Metal fragments also
punctured a nitric acid tank, resulting in the release of approximately 100 metric tons of this acid. The explosion tore metal siding from adjacent buildings,
damaged three third-party electric generating stations, broke windows of buildings 16 miles away in Sioux City, and was felt more than 30 miles away.
DEER PARK, TEXAS

US
An explosion and large fire occurred in the olefins plant Number III at a petrochemical plant. The explosion was felt and heard more than 10 miles away
and the ensuing fire burned for approximately 10 hours. The explosion and fire resulted in extensive damage to the facility and several workers received
minor injuries. In addition, nearby properties were damaged, nearby transport routes were closed for several hours, and residents were advised to
remain indoors. The incident originated at the cracked gas compressor system in the olefins unit and was caused by the structural failure of a 36-inch
pneumatically-assisted non-return valve located on a high-pressure light hydrocarbon gas line. The escaping gas formed a vapor cloud and eventually
found a source of ignition, resulting in the unconfined vapor cloud explosion.
26 Marsh

TOULOUSE
09/21/2001 EXPLOSION CHEMICALS 430 732
FRANCE
An explosion at this fertilizer plant killed 31 people and hospitalized more than 600. The blast shattered windows and ripped doors from their hinges in
the center of the city three kilometers away. Two chimneys and several buildings at the factory were flattened and damage was caused to more than 3000
homes, 500 of which are reported uninhabitable. There was a secondary blast at a nearby explosives factory, said to be caused from sparks created by the
first explosion. The thick red and yellow flumes that spread over the city were first thought to be toxic and the public were advised to remain indoors. The
blast left a crater 50 meters in diameter and 15 meters deep.
ILLIOPOLIS, ILLINOIS
US
Five people were killed and two seriously injured following an explosion at a plastics plant producing 200 million barrels per year of specialty grade PVC.
The explosion occurred in a reactor where vinyl chloride and vinyl acetate were being mixed. Up to 75% of the plant was destroyed in the explosion. The
explosion was felt eight kilometers away. The highway was shut and local residents evacuated.
MUNCHMUSTER
GERMANY
A release of hexane created a vapor cloud which was ignited on an electric motor, causing an explosion. This resulted in damage to a process unit and
injured 20 people. The plant was eventually replaced.
PORT ARTHUR, TEXAS

US
A shelter-in-place was ordered when a fire broke out following an explosion in the propylene refrigeration section of an ethylene unit. The fire, which
burned for three days, forced the shutdown of the facility for approximately six months, but caused no deaths or serious injuries.
NIIGATA
JAPAN
An accident occurred at a methylcellulose manufacturing facility. An explosion occurred and was followed by a fire, which was extinguished about seven
hours later. A total of 17 people working at the site were injured in this accident; three critically, five seriously, and nine with minor injuries. There was
one minor injury off site. Ignition of the methylcellulose powder is though to have been due to static electricity, resulting in a powder dust explosion. All
methylcellulose operations were suspended for two months before sequentially restarting.
MAP TA PHUT
THAILAND
At least 12 people were killed and 129 injured in an explosion and fire at a petrochemicals plant that manufactured polybutadiene. In addition, thousands
of people were evacuated from adjacent factories and communities within a three-kilometer-radius of the site. The explosion and subsequent fire sent thick
black smoke into the air above the site. The deaths and injuries were as a result of blast injuries, burns, and inhalation of toxic fumes. It was reported that
the explosion and fire occurred while workers were cleaning the polymer production line to change between batches, using toluene as a cleaning solvent.
LAVERA
12/22/2012 FIRE CHEMICAL 250 273
FRANCE
The incident occurred as a two-train, ethylene cracker was being started up after its major six-year turnaround. A spanner was left in the pipework going
to the medium pressure stage of a compressor. This resulted in the compressor tripping on high vibration. The trip caused an overpressure in the high
pressure stage of the compressor and a loss of containment of hydrocarbon that was ignited.
LITVINOV
CZECH REPUBLIC
A short interruption in the supply of cooling water to a separation column downstream of a steam cracker resulted in the need to open relief valves from the
column to flare. Subsequent manual choking back of the relief line to flare resulted in the pressure relief valves opening. These valves vibrated excessively,
resulting in the failure of the bolted flanges and the release of the propylene-rich column overhead line into the atmosphere. The resultant explosion led
to the failure of utility lines to the cracker requiring a crash shutdown. The lack of process steam due to the interruption to the utility supply resulted in
the failure of furnace tubes and the release of quench oil. There was subsequently a pool fire from the released quench oil under the cracker, resulting in
damage to four of the 10 cracker furnaces.
PORI
01/30/2017 FIRE CHEMICAL 180 267
FINLAND
A fire occurred at a titanium dioxide manufacturing facility, resulting in significant damage to the plant and the halting of production of the pigment until
repairs could be completed.

GAS PROCESSING
There are few gas processing industry losses The properties of LNG mean that the risk of internal
identified in the 100 Largest Losses. corrosion is virtually eliminated. There is now excellent
global experience with the design, construction, and
The gas processing sector continues to see major operation of LNG facilities that has resulted in a very
investment with the growth of the liquefied natural gas good loss history for the industry. However, the potential
(LNG) industry, with many projects for liquefaction remains for high-consequence losses at facilities
and gasification projects now operating globally. of this type, due to their complexity and value.
FIGURE 10 GAS PROCESSING PROPERTY DAMAGE BY YEAR

1000
800
600
400
200
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
28 Marsh

JUAYMAH
08/15/1987 EXPLOSION, VCE 65 156
SAUDI ARABIA
At this gas processing plant, a series of electrical power interruptions caused several shutdowns of one or both of the identical 165,000 bbl-per-day gas
fractionation process trains. The parallel trains were separated from one another by approximately 100 feet. At the time of the loss, the propane feed was
approximately 100% of design capacity for Plant I and 25% of design capacity for Plant II.
It is believed that there was a release of approximately 1,900 bbl of propane in Plant I over a 30-minute period. A large vapor cloud is believed to have been
ignited by a security vehicle, which had stalled and was being restarted. The probable source of the propane was a flange in a four-inch-diameter relief valve
line.
CACTUS, REFORMA, CHIAPAS

07/26/1996 EXPLOSION 137 260
MEXICO
A vapor-cloud explosion centered in the Cryogenic Unit No. 2 and two subsequent explosions in the Cryogenic Unit No. 1 occurred at this gas-processing
complex. As a result of the explosions, the Cryogenic Unit No. 2 and liquid petroleum gas (LPG) product pumps in the Cryogenic Unit No. 1 were extensively
damaged, the control rooms for both units were destroyed, and the remainder of the Cryogenic Unit No. 1 experienced minor damage.
Plant personnel noticed that one of the two LPG product pumps in the Cryogenic Unit No. 1 had a seal leak. Consequently, plant personnel decided to have
the faulty seal replaced. In preparation for the maintenance work on the LPG product pump, the motor-operated valve (MOV) in the suction line and
the isolation valve in the discharge line of this pump were manually closed. A spectacle blind was then inserted into the pump flange on the suction side of
the pump. After the seal was replaced, plant personnel removed the blind and were in the process of tightening the flange bolts when LPG product began
to leak from this flange. A vapor cloud formed and drifted into the Cryogenic Unit No. 2. It was ignited and resulted in the initial explosion. Following the
explosions, it was determined that the MOV in the suction line of the pump was in the open position, which allowed the LPG product to reach the pump
flange.
The fire brigades successfully extinguished the fire following the explosions after approximately three hours, and protected the adjacent LPG spheres. If
these spheres had failed due to BLEVE, the property plant damage would have been substantially greater. Although the explosions damaged the electric
power in the plant and rendered the electric motor-driven fire water pumps non-operational, fire water was provided by two diesel engine driven fire
water pumps. Because of this incident, the 2.13 billion-cubic-feet-per-year gas-processing capacity at this complex was shut down, disrupting one third of
Mexico’s total gas-processing capacity.
BINTULU, SARAWAK
12/25/1997 EXPLOSION 275 510
MALAYSIA
An explosion and fire occurred at a gas-to-liquids (GTL) plant in Bintulu, Sarawak. The fire was brought under control on the next day. The plant was one of
only two commercially successful GTL plants in the world at the time, with a capacity to produce 12,500 bbl-per-day of middle distillates and waxes from
natural gas feedstocks. The explosion occurred in the air separation unit (ASU) which supplied oxygen for the production of synthesis gas feedstock.
The investigation into the incident pointed to an initial combustion event in the ASU as the most probable cause. This combustion event is thought to have
initiated explosive burning of the aluminum heat exchanger elements in the presence of liquid oxygen, such that the elements ruptured explosively. Twelve
people were injured, none seriously, and the plant was shut down for several months for repairs.
LONGFORD, VICTORIA
09/25/1998 EXPLOSION, VCE 443 813
AUSTRALIA
Gas supplies to Australia’s Victoria State were virtually shut down following an explosion and fire at this gas processing plant. The specific cause of the
accident was attributed to the rupture of a heat exchanger, following a process upset that was set in motion by the unintended, sudden shutdown of hot
oil pumps. The loss of hot oil supply allowed some vessels to be chilled by cold oil, and when the hot oil was re-introduced to the heat exchanger, the
vessel ruptured due to a brittle fracture. An initial release of approximately 22,000 pounds of hydrocarbon vapor exploded, and an estimated 26,000
pounds burned as a jet fire. The fire burned for two and a half days. Operator error and improper training of employees was sited in the report issued by the
Longford Royal Commission formed to study the incident. One of the pipes at the plant had sprung a leak and ignited, with the heat bursting other pipes.
Five explosions ripped through the gas plant, and, in addition to the 120 workers evacuated from the site, police evacuated houses within a five kilometer
radius of the gas plant. The plant has a daily production capacity of 200,000 barrels per day of stabilized crude oil, 40,000 barrels per day of raw LPG, and
450,000 million cubic-feet-per-day of gas to supply natural gas customers. The gas outage has affected 1.4 million users statewide and forced small and
large businesses to temporarily shut down. The estimated insurance payout is US$590 million. It is estimated that the shutdown cost industry nationally up
to US$745 million in lost production.
SKIKDA
01/19/2004 EXPLOSION 470 689
ALGERIA
An explosion at a liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant resulted in 27 people killed, 72 injured, and seven reported missing. The explosion destroyed three out
of six liquefaction trains, damaged a nearby power plant, and led to the shutdown of a 335,000 bbl per day refinery. There was also some damage to the
neighboring industrial facilities. A faulty boiler was initially blamed for the incident. Investigations, however, indicated that a large release of hydrocarbon
from a cold-box exchanger was ignited upon ingestion into the boiler. Train six of the LNG complex re-started in May 2004 and trains five and 10 in
September 2004. Trains 20, 30, and 40 were destroyed in the incident, representing 50% of the capacity of the LNG complex.

TERMINALS AND DISTRIBUTION

Over the 40-year period under review, there have been There have been several major terminal losses over recent
only a few major losses associated with terminal and years in the UK, India, and Puerto Rico – these losses tend
distribution operations that resulted in major property to be spectacular, and therefore well-publicized. Although
damage. This reflects the low-value concentration all of these were significant, and have been important for
associated with pipelines, storage, and distribution learning lessons to improve process safety performance,
terminals. Although terminals can be high-value the property damage associated with these losses was
locations, they are typically large and spread out, with a relatively low.
single event rarely impacting more than a small part of
the site.
FIGURE 11 TERMINALS AND DISTRIBUTION PROPERTY DAMAGE LOSSES BY YEAR

300
250
200
150
100
50
0
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
30 Marsh

BANTRY BAY
01/08/1979 EXPLOSION 70 248
IRELAND
An 11-year-old, 121,000-deadweight-ton tanker had completed unloading its first parcel of Arabian heavy crude when a small fire was noticed on deck.
About 10 minutes later, fire spread to both sides of the ship. Later, a massive explosion occurred. The initiating event of the disaster was likely the buckling of
the ship’s structure at deck level. Explosions in the ballast tanks and the breaking of the ship’s back followed. These events were produced by the conjunc-
tion of two separate factors: a seriously weakened hull due to inadequate maintenance and an excessive stress due to incorrect ballasting at the time of the
disaster. In addition to the total loss of the ship, 1,130 feet of the concrete and steel jetty were damaged or destroyed.
TACOA
12/19/1982 FIRE 70 193
VENEZUELA
A huge boil-over occurred on a fuel oil tank, killing at least 160 people in a huge fire ball. The explosion occurred on the fuel oil tank while it was being
gauged, blowing the roof off the tank and setting it on fire. Eight hours after the tank fire started a violent boil-over occurred. Burning oil flowed down the
hill where the tank was located and surrounded a second tank.
03/05/1987 EARTHQUAKE ECUADOR 120 288
Some 25 miles of Trans-Andean pipeline disappeared in this event, which also damaged natural gas and gasoline pipelines. All 285 producing wells were
shut down and oil exports were suspended and swap arrangement made with Venezuelan suppliers. The first earthquake registered 6.0 on the Richter
scale, the second 6.8, and there was a total of 10 earthquakes in total. Repairs took several months.
RAUDHATAIN
01/31/2002 EXPLOSION 150 246
KUWAIT
Four people were killed in an explosion and fire at an oil gathering center, gas booster station, and power substation. The explosion occurred after a leak
from a buried oil pipeline in the gathering station spread to a power substation, sparking the blaze. The flash explosion and resulting blaze hit the gathering
center and the adjacent gas booster station. At least 19 people were injured in the incident, mainly suffering first- and second-degree burns. The fire was
extinguished two days after the event.
VARANUS ISLAND
06/03/2008 EXPLOSION 120 143
AUSTRALIA
A gas release from a corroded pipeline resulted in an explosion at a gas plant. This resulted in a 30% reduction in the Australian state’s domestic gas supply
and a 45% reduction in the supply of gas to mines and other industries. Workers were evacuated from the island as a precaution. It took six months before
the plant was returned to full capacity operation.

UPSTREAM
There continue to be significant upstream losses, We continue to see the evolution of the upstream
including one in the past two years as a result of a industry with increasing fracking activity in more
mechanical failure on a floating production, storage, and countries. The potential capacity of supply from
loading vessel, which resulted in significant interruption fracked oil and gas is enormous, but the assets
to the oil production from the field. are generally of relatively small size and are well
dispersed. Therefore, although losses have occurred
The Piper Alpha disaster 30 years ago in the UK North in the industry, none individually is very large.
Sea continues to be the largest recorded offshore property
damage loss. Meanwhile, the Deepwater Horizon loss in
2010 had major third-party liability impact, as a result of
the loss of well control and the massive release of crude
oil into the Gulf of Mexico.
FIGURE 12 UPSTREAM PROPERTY DAMAGE LOSSES BY YEAR

2000
1500
1000
500
0
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
32 Marsh

SEA OF JAPAN
08/26/1986 MECHANICAL DAMAGE 75 185
JAPAN
A semi-submersible barge ran aground near Uslan during a typhoon.
BOURBON FIELD, WELL A17,

11/04/1987 BLOWOUT GULF OF MEXICO 200 479
US
Sustained casing head pressure leaked from the production casing into the outer casing strings, resulting in the failure of one
of the casing strings. This caused an underground blowout that resulted in extensive damage to the platform and a gas plume
around the platform. The well was killed to stabilize conditions on the seabed.
ENCHOVA, CAMPOS BASIN

04/24/1988 BLOWOUT 330 762
BRAZIL
During the conversion of one of the platform wells from oil to gas production, a high-pressure gas pocket was encountered that
forced the drill pipe out of the well. The business operations platform (BOP) failed to shut in the well, and sparks, caused by the
drill pipe that was ejected from the well hitting one of the platform legs, ignited the escaping gas. The fire lasted for 31 days. The
majority of the topside structure was destroyed and the facility was later declared a total loss. Redesign of the production module
was completed in 45 days in an effort to shorten the loss of production as much as possible. Full production was restored 18
months after the loss.
PIPER ALPHA, NORTH SEA

07/ 06/1988 EXPLOSION 850 1963
UNITED KINGDOM
A release and ignition of gas condensate from a section of piping in the gas compression module of this platform set off a chain
of fires and explosions, resulting in the almost total destruction of the facility. The condensate was released from the site of a
pressure relief valve that had been removed for maintenance when this section of piping was inadvertently pressurized. The
severity of the accident was largely due to the contribution of oil and gas from ruptured pipelines connected to the platform and
the disabling of nearly all emergency systems as a result of the initial explosion. The compression module had been retrofitted to
the platform adjacent to the control room, which was rendered useless by the initial explosion.
In addition, the firewater pumps had been placed in to manual operation mode due to divers being in the water prior to the
accident.
There were 226 people on the platform at the time of the accident; only 61 survived. Contributing to the loss of life was the
location of the quarters, which was directly over the site of the initial release and resulting explosion and fire.
FULMAR FIELD, NORTH SEA

UK
Failure of seabed components caused 210,000 metric tonnes of FSU to break free in bad weather. Three out of four latch plates
fractured. About 210,000 bbl-per-day of crude was lost, equating to about 10% of UK production.
TREASURE SAGA, NORTH SEA

01/20/1989 PRODUCTION LOSS 220 495
NORWAY
A semi-submersible rig had a gas kick at 15,527 feet during an attempt to clear the drill pipe of cement previously pumped in to
control the well, and the well then suffered a blow-out. It was stabilized after 11 months by pumping heavy mud down a relief well
and was later sealed.
BAKER, GULF OF MEXICO

03/19/1989 EXPLOSION, FIRE 400 899
US
Contract personnel were installing a pig trap on an 18-inch-diameter export gas pipeline on the platform. As a cold cut was made
into the pipeline, hydrocarbons sprayed from the cut and ignited. The explosion and fire burned the main structure and caused
subsequent explosions when six other pipelines ruptured due to the intense heat. The accident resulted in the total destruction of
the platform and seven fatalities. It took two years to replace the platform.
LAMA, LAKE MARACAIBO

03/25/1993 EXPLOSION, VCE 100 194
VENEZUELA
An apparent failure of a propane intercooler liquid level control during unsupervised maintenance led to an explosion and fire.
The control room on the main platform was destroyed and adjacent platforms were affected by the blast wave. There were 11
fatalities.


RONCADOR FIELD, CAMPOS

03/15/2001 EXPLOSION BASIN 500 851
BRAZIL
The world’s largest offshore production facility was rocked by a series of explosions caused by a gas release. The explosions
knocked out a support pillar of the semi-submersible platform allowing seawater to enter the vessel. Workers pumped in nitrogen
and compressed air and tried to pump out almost 3,000 metric tons of seawater to keep the rig afloat, but were unsuccessful. On
March 20, 2001, the rig sank to the sea floor. The incident killed 11 workers.
TEMSAH
08/10/2004 BLOWOUT 190 279
EGYPT
A fire broke out during drilling operations at an offshore gas production platform following a well control incident. The fire on the
production platform, initially under control, spread to a nearby jack-up drilling rig, owned by a major drilling contractor, which
suffered major damage and collapsed. All 79 people on board the drilling rig were safely evacuated. The production platform,
with 150 people onboard, had been evacuated before the fire spread. The drilling rig sank and was not salvageable. The platform
was damaged beyond repair and its destruction was ordered by the state.
THUNDERHORSE, GULF OF
07/10/2005 MECHANICAL DAMAGE MEXICO 250 350
US
Hurricane Dennis passed through the area where the platform was located, causing it to partially sink. A seawater valve in a
ballast tank had been wrongly installed, resulting in excess water in the tanks. The platform had already been evacuated and
there was no leakage of oil, fuel, or other hazardous substances.
The loss resulted in the project commencing production three years behind schedule. The company retrieved and rebuilt all the
seabed production equipment after a series of tests revealed metallurgical failure in components of the field subsea systems.
MUMBAI, HIGH NORTH

07/27/2005 EXPLOSION, FIRE 370 518
INDIA
A total of 22 people were killed when a fire completely destroyed an oil platform. It is believed that a multi-purpose support
vessel, which was evacuating a worker to a medical center, hit the platform’s riser causing an explosion. The vessel also caught
fire and sank, but two nearby platforms were saved when connecting bridges collapsed. The 150 people on board managed to
transfer to a nearby water injection platform and a further 348 people were evacuated from the oil platform. However, the rescue
operation was hampered by bad weather. A cantilever jack-up rig, linked by a bridge to the process platform, was also involved in
the fire. Some 73 people were evacuated from the rig however, one employee died during the evacuation. Meanwhile, six divers
in a saturation chamber on the vessel were rescued 36 hours later.
NORTH SEA
11/05/2006 RELEASE 185 248
NORWAY
Offshore gas alarms were triggered on this floating production unit. Upon investigation, it was established that a leak was
emanating from one of the production risers. Upon further investigation, five other risers were found to be similarly affected.
Remedial work was subsequently carried out.
OFFSHORE
ANGOLA
An anchor-handling tug operating around an offshore field lost control and drifted over a subsea center. The anchor wires
snagged the subsea equipment, causing damage to a Christmas tree, well conductor, and subsea control module. The remedial
actions required included the plugging and abandonment of one well and the drilling of a replacement well.
34 Marsh

NORTH SEA
NORWAY
A well-intervention vessel lost power and collided with an unmanned platform forming part of this 230,000 bbl per day complex.
Heavy damage was caused to the vessel and the platform, including damage to the platform structure, linking access bridge, and
well equipment. Some 23,000 bbl per day of oil production was reportedly affected. The force of the collision caused the bow of
the vessel to compress by about two meters, with the platform pushed partly out of position, loosening several support legs from
the main load-bearing structure. One of the water injection risers on the platform was bent extensively and several wellheads
were moved, with a catalog of further damage from the collision also identified.
TIMOR SEA
08/21/2009 RELEASE 250 303
AUSTRALIA
Oil, condensate, and hydrogen sulphide leaked from a wellhead on platform being serviced by a jack-up rig in the Timor Sea. A
total of 69 workers on the rig were evacuated. Oil and gas started spilling after a plug blocking one of the project’s 1,200-meter
deep wells came free. The next day, a 12-kilometer-long, 30-meter-wide spill was reported. Attempts were made to plug the well
over the next two months. It was estimated that the well was leaking 400 bbl-per-day of oil and gas. On November 1, 2009, it was
reported that drillers had successfully intercepted the well and were beginning to put heavy mud into the shaft. However, a fire
broke out on the drilling platform as deeper leak was being plugged. The fire was extinguished two days later. A total of about
4,140 tons of oil was estimated to have been lost. The incident affected both the platform and the drilling rig.
GULF OF MEXICO
04/21/2010 EXPLOSION, FIRE 560 644
US
A semi-submersible drilling rig working in the Mississippi Canyon Block 252, approximately 48 miles off the coast of Louisiana,
suffered a major explosion and fire following a well integrity failure. The rig had crew of 126, and 11 people were immediately
identified missing and subsequently confirmed as fatalities, with a further 17 people injured. The rig sank within 36 hours of
the initial explosion in a water depth of approximately 5,000 feet. The exploration well had reached a depth of 18,360 feet (total
depth), and was undergoing cementing works prior to the well control event with a view to temporarily abandoning the well.
Hydrocarbons continued to flow through the damaged blow-out preventer (BOP) for a 87 days before successful static kill,
causing a spill of national significance and an unprecedented subsea and surface spill control response. The well was declared
finally killed five months after the original event by successful interception by a relief well.
CARIBBEAN SEA
05/13/2010 SINKING 235 270
VENEZUELA
A natural gas drilling rig sank in the Caribbean Sea, but all 95 workers were evacuated safely and there was no reported leakage.
The sinking was caused by a sudden surge of water entering one of the submarine rafts that the platform legs floated on.
Automatic subsea safety valves meant the well was secure and no leakage of oil occurred.
NORTH SEA
UNITED KINGDOM
Heavy storm conditions in the North Sea caused four of this floating production, storage, and offloading’s (FPSO) 10 anchor
chains to break resulting in the vessel moving off its position. It is estimated that the FPSO was subject to 53-knot winds and nine-
meter waves. Normally, a complex piping system runs from the wells on the seabed up to the FPSO, however, this infrastructure
was damaged in the incident.
Following the vessel moving off its position, all of the wells were immediately shut in. Subsequent surveys showed that no oil had
been lost. The 74 non-essential crew were evacuated to near-by platforms and 43 essential crew members remained onboard.
Two members of crew received minor injuries. The facility was projected to be producing an average of 18,400 bbl-per-day of oil
prior to the loss.
GULF OF MEXICO
04/12/2011 SINKING 160 177
MEXICO
A total of 638 workers were evacuated from this flotel after it began to lean to one side when water entered a pontoon. The
flotel was located about 80 kilometers offshore Campeche, Mexico. There were no injuries reported as a result of the sudden
inclination. It was reported that a total loss of the flotel resulted.


ATLANTIC OCEAN
ANGOLA
A jack-up sank after the seabed collapsed under one of its three legs. The rig sank while being positioned for drilling operations
in approximately 40 meters of water. Some 103 workers were onboard the rig when it suddenly tilted, causing the rig to take on
water and capsize. One crew member went missing and six others received minor injuries.
CAMARUPIM FIELD
03/11/2015 EXPLOSION 250 264
BRAZIL
An explosion on a FPSO off the coast of Brazil resulted in nine fatalities and multiple wounded. The accident happened as the
vessel was anchored in the Atlantic Ocean 120 kilometers from the coast of Espirito Santos, Brazil. The FPSO is a converted very
large crude oil tanker (VLCC), designed to produce up to 10 million cubic meters of natural gas. It is understood that a condensate
leak during a fluid transfer operation released a cloud of flammable vapor into the engine room, resulting in an explosion in the
machinery space. The majority of fatalities were believed to be part of the emergency response team. FPSO took on water, but the
explosion did not result in a breach of the hull of the vessel.
BAY OF CAMPECHE
04/01/2015 FIRE 500 650
MEXICO
A complex of six platforms located in 30 meters of water in the Gulf of Mexico was subject to a major fire. The fire originated on the
lower decks of the production platform and resulted in major damage to that platform, radiation and fire damage to an adjacent
compression platform, the loss of bridge links and pipelines, and radiation damage to other bridge links.
The root-cause investigation required by the government identified corrosion of a small bore pipeline as the cause of the initial
failure.
JUBILEE FIELD
GHANA
The main turret bearing on a FPSO vessel seized and subsequently failed, resulting in the vessel being unable to weathervane.
Production was resumed with a revised operating regime employing tugs to maintain a constant heading. Subsequently, the
vessel was converted to employ a permanent spread moored configuration, fixing the heading of the vessel and installing an
associated deepwater offloading buoy.
36 Marsh
About Marsh
Marsh is a global leader in insurance broking and innovative risk management
solutions. In more than 130 countries, our experts help clients to anticipate,
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MARSH REPORT March 2018

The 100 Largest Losses

4 Harnessing the Power of Data to Prevent Losses

5 Improving Process Safety Performance by Learning from Losses

6 Downstream Losses – 2016 - 2017

9 Newly Qualifying Losses Since March 2016

30 Terminals and Distribution

100 Largest Losses 3

HARNESSING THE POWER OF DATA TO

incomplete inspection program, Engineers should continue to MILFORD HAVEN

100 Largest Losses 5

FIGURE 1 DISTRIBUTION OF THE 100 LARGEST LOSSES BY YEAR

NOTABLE LOSSES IN THE DOWNSTREAM ENERGY SECTOR

LOSS ESTIMATE (PROPERTY DAMAGE PLUS

2016 GERMANY PETROCHEMICALS 500

2017 IVORY COAST REFINERY 210

2016 US GAS PLANT 100

2016 THAILAND PETROCHEMICALS 95

2016 BAHRAIN REFINERY 90

2017 JAPAN REFINERY 85

2016 RUSSIA REFINERY 80

2017 NORWAY CHEMICALS 46

THE IMPACT OF THE PRICE OF OIL

FIGURE 2 CRUDE OIL PRICE VERSUS UPSTREAM LOSSES BY YEAR – 1974-2015

Total value of upstream losses (US$ million ) – 2015 values

Low oil price Low oil price

The Effect of Low Oil Prices on Upstream Assets

100 Largest Losses 7

NATURAL CATASTROPHES LEAD TO SIGNIFICANT LOSSES IN NORTH AMERICA

losses for the downstream sector. 16

For the upstream sector, crude oil 14

production in the region slowed due

to Harvey, but the impact was not as 10

severe as in the downstream sector. 8

NEWLY FIGURE 4 LARGEST LOSSES 2016-2017

LOSSES SINCE 02/11/2016

MARCH 2016 12/01/2016 REFINERY FIRE

RUWAIS, ABU UNITED ARAB

property damage losses 01/30/2017 CHEMICAL FIRE PORI FINLAND 267

to have occurred in the 03/14/2017 REFINERY FIRE

hydrocarbon industry FIGURE 5 THE 20 LARGEST LOSSES 1978 - 2017

RUWAIS, ABU UNITED ARAB

industry, according to 10/23/1989 CHEMICAL

The following pages 03/19/1989 E&P OFFSHORE EXPLOSION, FIRE

provide insight on 03/15/2001 E&P OFFSHORE EXPLOSION

the distribution of the 09/25/1998

geographical distribution 09/21/2001 FERTILIZER EXPLOSION TOULOUSE FRANCE 730

details of these losses are 05/04/1988 CHEMICAL EXPLOSION

available in the relevant 01/19/2004

03/11/2011 REFINERY EXPLOSION, FIRE SENDAI JAPAN 650

5 I nflated to December 2017 values. Values are UNITED

100 Largest Losses 9

FIGURE 6 PROPERTY DAMAGE VALUE OF 100 LARGEST LOSSES BY SECTOR

Gas processing US$1436m US$692.4m

US$488.4m US$468m US$482.8m

US$235.4m US$1857m US$850.9m US$769.3m

Low oil price Low oil

1978 1980 1985 1990 1995

2000 2005 2010 2015 2017

100 Largest Losses 11

5 I nflated to December 2017 values. Values are UNITED