Decision Purisima, J.:: (G.R. No. 100152. March 31, 2000)
Decision Purisima, J.:: (G.R. No. 100152. March 31, 2000)
1[1] Annex A to Memorandum of Respondent City Mayor and City Legal Officer of Iligan, Rollo, p. 231-232.
Associate Justice Luis Javellana, ponente; Associate Justice Alfredo Marigomen and Associate Justice Artemon
2[2]
Luna, members.
5[5] Procter and Gamble Phils. vs. The Municipality of Jagna, 94 SCRA 894.
6[6] Balacuit vs. CFI of Agusan del Norte, 163 SCRA 182.
Saturday, June 3, 1995, "Approval of the Conference Committee Report on S. No. 1998 and H. No. 14100, Record
11[11]
of the Senate, p. 847.
12[12] Ibid.
House of $8.50 Eyeglasses, Inc. vs. State Board of Optometry, 288 Ala 349, 261 So 2d 27; State ex rel. Board of
14[14]
Optometry vs. Sears Roebuck and Co., 102 Ariz 175, 427 Pd 126.
15[15] Silver v. Lansburgh and Brother, 72 App DC 77, 11 F2d 518, 128 ALR 582; 61 Am Jur 2d 289.
16[16] Georgia State Examiners v. Friedman’s Jewelers (183 Ga 669, 189 SE 238).
17[17] State ex rel McKittrick vs. Gate City Optical Co., 339 Mo 427, 97 SW 2d 89).
18[18] Dickson vs. Flynn, 246 App Div 341, 286 NYS 225.
State ex rel. Brother vs. Beck Jewelry Enterprises, Inc., 220 Ind. 276, 41 NE 2d 622, 141 ALR 876) (61 Am Jur
19[19]
187); Kindy Opticians, Inc. vs. State Board of Examiners in Optometry, 1939, 291 Mich 152, 289 NW 112, 113; New
Jersey State Bd. of Optometrists vs. S.S. Kresge Co., 113 NJL 287, 174 A 353).
20[20] Dvorine vs. Castelberg Jewelry Corp., 170 Md. 661, 185 A 562.
22[22] Small and Maine Board of Registration and examination in Optometry, 293 A 2d 786.
It also bears stressing, as petitioner has pointed out, that the public and private respondents did not appeal from the ruling of the Court of
Appeals. Consequently, the holding by the Court of Appeals that the act of respondent City Mayor in imposing the questioned special conditions
on petitioner’s business permit is ultra vires cannot be put into issue here by the respondents. It is well-settled that:
"A party who has not appealed from the decision may not obtain any affirmative relief from the appellate court other than what
he had obtain from the lower court, if any, whose decision is brought up on appeal.23[23]
xxx an appellee who is not an appellant may assign errors in his brief where his purpose is to maintain the judgment on other
grounds, but he cannot seek modification or reversal of the judgment or affirmative relief unless he has also appealed."24[24]
Thus, respondents’ submission that the imposition of subject special conditions on petitioner’s business permit is not ultra vires cannot prevail
over the finding and ruling by the Court of Appeals from which they (respondents) did not appeal.
Anent the second assigned error, petitioner maintains that its business permit issued by the City Mayor is not a contract entered into by Iligan City
in the exercise of its proprietary functions, such that although petitioner agreed to such conditions, it cannot be held in estoppel since ultra vires
acts cannot be given effect.
Respondents, on the other hand, agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the business permit in question is in the nature of a contract
between Iligan City and the herein petitioner, the terms and conditions of which are binding upon agreement, and that petitioner is estopped from
questioning the same. Moreover, in the Resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals held that the contract
between the petitioner and the City of Iligan was entered into by the latter in the performance of its proprietary functions.
This Court holds otherwise. It had occasion to rule that a license or permit is not in the nature of a contract but a special privilege.
"xxx a license or a permit is not a contract between the sovereignty and the licensee or permitee, and is not a property in the
constitutional sense, as to which the constitutional proscription against impairment of the obligation of contracts may extend. A
license is rather in the nature of a special privilege, of a permission or authority to do what is within its terms. It is not in any way
vested, permanent or absolute."25[25]
It is therefore decisively clear that estoppel cannot apply in this case. The fact that petitioner acquiesced in the special conditions imposed by the
City Mayor in subject business permit does not preclude it from challenging the said imposition, which is ultra vires or beyond the ambit of
authority of respondent City Mayor. Ultra vires acts or acts which are clearly beyond the scope of one’s authority are null and void and cannot be
given any effect. The doctrine of estoppel cannot operate to give effect to an act which is otherwise null and void or ultra vires.
The Court of Appeals erred in adjudging subject business permit as having been issued by respondent City Mayor in the performance of
proprietary functions of Iligan City. As hereinabove elaborated upon, the issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality or city is
essentially regulatory in nature. The authority, which devolved upon local government units to issue or grant such licenses or permits, is
essentially in the exercise of the police power of the State within the contemplation of the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 22995 REVERSED; and the respondent City
Mayor is hereby ordered to reissue petitioner’s business permit in accordance with law and with this disposition. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Puno, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., see concurring opinion.
Vitug, J., please see dissent.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Panganiban, and Pardo, JJ., joined Mr. Justice Vitug in his dissent.
Policarpio vs. CA, 269 SCRA 344; Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corporation vs. NLRC, 279 SCRA
23[23]
312; Quintanilla vs. CA, 279 SCRA 397.
24[24] La Campana Food Products, Inc. vs. Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, 142 SCRA 394, 398.