Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-44169 December 3, 1985

ROSARIO A. GAA, petitioner, 
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, EUROPHIL INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, and CESAR R. ROXAS,
Deputy Sheriff of Manila, respondents.

Federico C. Alikpala and Federico Y. Alikpala, Jr. for petitioner.

Borbe and Palma for private respondent.

PATAJO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on March
30, 1976, affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

It appears that respondent Europhil Industries Corporation was formerly one of the tenants in Trinity
Building at T.M. Kalaw Street, Manila, while petitioner Rosario A. Gaa was then the building
administrator. On December 12, 1973, Europhil Industries commenced an action (Civil Case No. 92744)
in the Court of First Instance of Manila for damages against petitioner "for having perpetrated certain
acts that Europhil Industries considered a trespass upon its rights, namely, cutting of its electricity, and
removing its name from the building directory and gate passes of its officials and employees" (p. 87
Rollo). On June 28, 1974, said court rendered judgment in favor of respondent Europhil Industries,
ordering petitioner to pay the former the sum of P10,000.00 as actual damages, P5,000.00 as moral
damages, P5,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.

The said decision having become final and executory, a writ of garnishment was issued pursuant to
which Deputy Sheriff Cesar A. Roxas on August 1, 1975 served a Notice of Garnishment upon El Grande
Hotel, where petitioner was then employed, garnishing her "salary, commission and/or remuneration."
Petitioner then filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a motion to lift said garnishment on the
ground that her "salaries, commission and, or remuneration are exempted from execution under Article
1708 of the New Civil Code. Said motion was denied by the lower Court in an order dated November 7,
1975. A motion for reconsideration of said order was likewise denied, and on January 26, 1976
petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari against filed with the Court of Appeals
a petition for certiorari against said order of November 7, 1975.

On March 30, 1976, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari. In dismissing the petition,
the Court of Appeals held that petitioner is not a mere laborer as contemplated under Article 1708 as
the term laborer does not apply to one who holds a managerial or supervisory position like that of
petitioner, but only to those "laborers occupying the lower strata." It also held that the term "wages"
means the pay given" as hire or reward to artisans, mechanics, domestics or menial servants, and
laborers employed in manufactories, agriculture, mines, and other manual occupation and usually
employed to distinguish the sums paid to persons hired to perform manual labor, skilled or unskilled,
paid at stated times, and measured by the day, week, month, or season," citing 67 C.J. 285, which is the
ordinary acceptation of the said term, and that "wages" in Spanish is "jornal" and one who receives a
wage is a "jornalero."

In the present petition for review on certiorari of the aforesaid decision of the Court of Appeals,
petitioner questions the correctness of the interpretation of the then Court of Appeals of Article 1708 of
the New Civil Code which reads as follows:

ART. 1708. The laborer's wage shall not be subject to execution or attachment, except for debts incurred
for food, shelter, clothing and medical attendance.

It is beyond dispute that petitioner is not an ordinary or rank and file laborer but "a responsibly place
employee," of El Grande Hotel, "responsible for planning, directing, controlling, and coordinating the
activities of all housekeeping personnel" (p. 95, Rollo) so as to ensure the cleanliness, maintenance and
orderliness of all guest rooms, function rooms, public areas, and the surroundings of the hotel.
Considering the importance of petitioner's function in El Grande Hotel, it is undeniable that petitioner is
occupying a position equivalent to that of a managerial or supervisory position.

In its broadest sense, the word "laborer" includes everyone who performs any kind of mental or physical
labor, but as commonly and customarily used and understood, it only applies to one engaged in some
form of manual or physical labor. That is the sense in which the courts generally apply the term as
applied in exemption acts, since persons of that class usually look to the reward of a day's labor for
immediate or present support and so are more in need of the exemption than are other. (22 Am. Jur. 22
citing Briscoe vs. Montgomery, 93 Ga 602, 20 SE 40; Miller vs. Dugas, 77 Ga 4 Am St Rep 192; State ex rel
I.X.L. Grocery vs. Land, 108 La 512, 32 So 433; Wildner vs. Ferguson, 42 Minn 112, 43 NW 793; 6 LRA 338;
Anno 102 Am St Rep. 84.

In Oliver vs. Macon Hardware Co., 98 Ga 249 SE 403, it was held that in determining whether a particular
laborer or employee is really a "laborer," the character of the word he does must be taken into
consideration. He must be classified not according to the arbitrary designation given to his calling, but
with reference to the character of the service required of him by his employer.

In Wildner vs. Ferguson, 42 Minn 112, 43 NW 793, the Court also held that all men who earn
compensation by labor or work of any kind, whether of the head or hands, including judges, laywers,
bankers, merchants, officers of corporations, and the like, are in some sense "laboring men." But they
are not "laboring men" in the popular sense of the term, when used to refer to a must presume, the
legislature used the term. The Court further held in said case:

There are many cases holding that contractors, consulting or assistant engineers, agents,
superintendents, secretaries of corporations and livery stable keepers, do not come within the meaning
of the term. (Powell v. Eldred, 39 Mich, 554, Atkin v. Wasson, 25 N.Y. 482; Short v. Medberry, 29 Hun. 39;
 Dean v. De Wolf, 16 Hun. 186; Krausen v. Buckel, 17 Hun. 463; Ericson v. Brown, 39 Barb. 390; Coffin v.
Reynolds, 37 N.Y. 640; Brusie v. Griffith, 34 Cal. 306; Dave v. Nunan, 62 Cal. 400).

Thus, in Jones vs. Avery, 50 Mich, 326, 15 N.W. Rep. 494, it was held that a traveling salesman, selling by
sample, did not come within the meaning of a constitutional provision making stockholders of a
corporation liable for "labor debts" of the corporation.

In Kline vs. Russell 113 Ga. 1085, 39 SE 477, citing Oliver vs. Macon Hardware Co., supra, it was held that
a laborer, within the statute exempting from garnishment the wages of a "laborer," is one whose work
depends on mere physical power to perform ordinary manual labor, and not one engaged in services
consisting mainly of work requiring mental skill or business capacity, and involving the exercise of
intellectual faculties.

So, also in Wakefield vs. Fargo, 90 N.Y. 213, the Court, in construing an act making stockholders in a
corporation liable for debts due "laborers, servants and apprentices" for services performed for the
corporation, held that a "laborer" is one who performs menial or manual services and usually looks to
the reward of a day's labor or services for immediate or present support. And in Weymouth vs. Sanborn, 
43 N.H. 173, 80 Am. Dec. 144, it was held that "laborer" is a term ordinarily employed to denote one
who subsists by physical toil in contradistinction to those who subsists by professional skill. And in 
Consolidated Tank Line Co. vs. Hunt, 83 Iowa, 6, 32 Am. St. Rep. 285, 43 N.W. 1057, 12 L.R.A. 476, it was
stated that "laborers" are those persons who earn a livelihood by their own manual labor.

Article 1708 used the word "wages" and not "salary" in relation to "laborer" when it declared what are
to be exempted from attachment and execution. The term "wages" as distinguished from "salary",
applies to the compensation for manual labor, skilled or unskilled, paid at stated times, and measured
by the day, week, month, or season, while "salary" denotes a higher degree of employment, or a
superior grade of services, and implies a position of office: by contrast, the term wages " indicates
considerable pay for a lower and less responsible character of employment, while "salary" is suggestive
of a larger and more important service (35 Am. Jur. 496).

The distinction between wages and salary was adverted to in Bell vs. Indian Livestock Co. (Tex. Sup.), 11
S.W. 344, wherein it was said: "'Wages' are the compensation given to a hired person for service, and
the same is true of 'salary'. The words seem to be synonymous, convertible terms, though we believe
that use and general acceptation have given to the word 'salary' a significance somewhat different from
the word 'wages' in this: that the former is understood to relate to position of office, to be the
compensation given for official or other service, as distinguished from 'wages', the compensation for
labor." Annotation 102 Am. St. Rep. 81, 95.

We do not think that the legislature intended the exemption in Article 1708 of the New Civil Code to
operate in favor of any but those who are laboring men or women in the sense that their work is manual
. Persons belonging to this class usually look to the reward of a day's labor for immediate or present
support, and such persons are more in need of the exemption than any others. Petitioner Rosario A. Gaa
is definitely not within that class.

We find, therefore, and so hold that the Trial Court did not err in denying in its order of November 7,
1975 the motion of petitioner to lift the notice of garnishment against her salaries, commission and
other remuneration from El Grande Hotel since said salaries, Commission and other remuneration due
her from the El Grande Hotel do not constitute wages due a laborer which, under Article 1708 of the
Civil Code, are not subject to execution or attachment.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, We find the present petition to be without merit and hereby AFFIRM the
decision of the Court of Appeals, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson) and Relova, JJ., is on leave.