FIRST DIVISION the land registration case involved.

[G.R. No. 125154. September 28, 2001.]

DECISION
DIGNA VERGEL, EDUARDO SALVACRUZ, BEATRIZ MANACOP,
FELICISIMA FLORES, GENEROSO SALVACRUZ, BLANDINO
SALVACRUZ, MILAGROS SALVACRUZ and THE HEIRS OF CORAZON PARDO , J : p

SANTIAGO , petitioners, vs . COURT OF APPEALS and DOROTEA-

The Case
TAMISIN GONZALES , respondents.
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals 1
Jose F. Manacop for petitioners. setting aside the orders 2 of the trial court that denied petitioners' motion to set aside the
order of general default 3 in an application for registration of a parcel of land, consisting of
Leopoldo P. dela Rosa and Tabalingcos & Associates Law O ces for private one thousand, one hundred seventy six (1,176), situated in barrio Batong Malake,
respondents. municipality of Los Baños, province of Laguna. 4 EaIcAS

The Facts
SYNOPSIS
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, 5 are as follows:
Petitioners led an application for land registration of a parcel of land in Los "On May 26, 1994, Digna Vergel, Eduardo Salvacruz, Beatriz Mañacop,
Baños. The trial court subsequently issued an order of general default against the Felicisima Flores, Generoso and Blandino Salvacruz, Milagros Evangelista and
whole world except the Republic of the Philippines. Respondent led a motion to set the heirs of Corazon Santiago, namely: Leocadio, Jr. and Concepcion Santiago
aside the order of general default, claiming that she failed to timely le her opposition (petitioners herein) led with the Regional Trial Court, Calamba, Laguna an
because the application was led by petitioners in bad faith, surreptitiously and without application for registration of a parcel of land (for titling purposes).
notice to her. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, however, the Court of
"On July 20, 1994, the Republic of the Philippines represented by the
Appeals set aside the order of general default.
Director of Lands filed an opposition to the application for registration.
The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals acted arbitrarily when it set
aside the trial court's order of general default without factual basis. Since the Supreme "On December 15, 1994, the trial court issued "an order of general default
Court is not a trier of facts, the case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for it to against the whole world with the exception of Republic of the Philippines . . . ."
make nding of fact constituting fraud, accident or excusable neglect su cient for the "On October 3, 1995, respondent Dorotea Tamisin Gonzales led with the
court to lift the order of general default in the land registration case involved. trial court an "Urgent Motion to Set Aside the Order of General Default" alleging,
inter alia, in her a davit that she "is claiming the land in question subject of this
SYLLABUS petition as an owner . . ." which motion was opposed by the petitioners herein.

"On October 12, 1995, respondent led with the trial court a reply to the
1. REMEDIAL LAW; APPEAL; ARBITRARILY SETTING ASIDE DEFAULT ORDER opposition interposed by the petitioners and, at the same time, led an "Urgent
WITHOUT BASIS IS ERRONEOUS; CASE AT BAR. — The Court of Appeals arbitrarily set Motion" praying for the suspension of the proceedings.
aside the trial court's order of general default without factual basis save for its own gut
feeling, ipse dixit. . . . In respondent's motion to set aside order of general default, she "On October 18, 1995, the trial court issued the rst assailed order, the
dispositive portion of which is quoted, as follows:
alleged that petitioners were aware of her claim of ownership over the subject property,
but did not give her personal notice of the ling of the application. She learned about the 'WHEREFORE, the motion to set aside the Order of default as well as
application by accident. In the petition for certiorari she led with the Court of Appeals, the motion to suspend the proceedings led by the movant through
respondent alleged that petitioners led the application in bad faith, surreptitiously and counsel is hereby denied for lack of merit.'
without notice to her. The Court of Appeals did not make a nding on this. Hence, we nd
that the appellate court erred in setting aside the order of general default in the Land "On October 20, 1995, petitioners led with the trial court a "Motion to
Registration Case No. 88-94-C, without making a speci c nding of fraud, accident or Strike Out Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceeding."
excusable neglect that prevented respondent from timely opposing the application. "On November 21, 1995 respondent led with the trial court a "motion for
reconsideration" of the order denying the motion to set aside the order of general
2. ID.; ID.; SUPREME COURT IS NOT A TRIER OF FACTS; REMAND OF CASE TO
default, which motion petitioners opposed.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, PROPER. — We are not a trier of facts. Consequently, we have to
remand the case to the Court of Appeals for it to make ndings of fact constituting fraud, "On November 28, 1995, the trial court issued its second questioned order,
accident or excusable neglect su cient for the court to lift the order of general default in the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
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 'WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for Let the case be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings with
reconsideration, dated November 16, 1995, is hereby denied for lack of instructions to determine whether there exists facts warranting the lifting of the order of
merit.' general default in LRC Case No. 88-94-C of the trial court.
"On December 13, 1995, respondent led with the Court of Appeals 6 a No costs.
petition for certiorari alleging that the trial court judge "acted capriciously and
without or in excess of his jurisdiction and gravely abused the exercise of his SO ORDERED.
discretion" in issuing the two aforementioned orders." 7
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
On April 02, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision annulling the trial
court's orders dated October 18, 1995 and November 28, 1995, and consequently, setting
aside the trial court's order of general default dated December 15, 1994, in Land Footnotes
Registration Case No. 88-94-C with respect to respondent. 8 1. In CA-G.R. SP No. 39239, promulgated on April 2, 1998, Mabutas, Jr., J., ponente,
Hence, this appeal. 9 Gonzaga-Reyes and Valdez, Jr., JJ., concurring. Petition, Annex "F", Rollo, pp. 135-138.

The Issue 2. Petition, Annexes "G" and "I", CA Rollo, pp. 52, 57.

3. In LRC Case No. 88-94-C; Petition, Annex "B", CA Rollo, p. 33.

The issue presented is whether the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the trial
court's order of general default in the land registration case involved without making a 4. Petition, Rollo, pp. 8-30. See Application for land registration, RTC Record, pp. 1-12.
speci c nding of fraud, negligence, accident or excusable mistake but relying on its view
that substantial justice and speedy determination of the controversy would be better 5. With editorial changes.
attained in lifting the order of general default, to enable a claimant to oppose and to 6. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 39239, Petition, CA Rollo, pp. 2-20.
establish a case of ownership in herself.
7. Court of Appeals Decision, Petition, Annex "F", Rollo, pp. 135-138, at pp. 136-137.
The Court's Ruling
8. Ibid.
We grant the petition. The Court of Appeals arbitrarily set aside the trial court's
order of general default without factual basis save for its own gut feeling, ipse dixit. 1 0 9. Filed on June 27, 1996, Petition, Rollo, pp. 8-30. On October 19, 1998, we gave due
Respondent's failure to le timely opposition to the application for land registration course to the petition (Rollo, pp. 191-192).
because she missed reading the publication of the notice in the O cial Gazette 1 1 or in the
10. George Yao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132428, October 24, 2000.
newspaper "Malaya" issue of August 8, 1994, 1 2 in itself may not be considered excusable
negligence. 11. Certificate of Publication, Exh. "D", Folder of Exhs., Vol. II, p. 3.

In respondent's motion to set aside order of general default, she alleged that 12. Affidavit of Publication, Exh. "C", Original Record, p. 23.
petitioners were aware of her claim of ownership over the subject property, but did not
13. Petition for Certiorari, CA Rollo, pp. 2-18, at p. 11.
give her personal notice of the ling of the application. She learned about the application
by accident. In the petition for certiorari she led with the Court of Appeals, respondent
alleged that petitioners led the application in bad faith, surreptitiously and without notice
to her. 1 3 The Court of Appeals did not make a finding on this.
Hence, we nd that the appellate court erred in setting aside the order of general
default in the Land Registration Case No. 88-94-C, without making a speci c nding of
fraud, accident or excusable neglect that prevented respondent from timely opposing the
application.
We are not a trier of facts. Consequently, we have to remand the case to the Court of
Appeals for it to make ndings of fact constituting fraud, accident or excusable neglect
su cient for the court to lift the order of general default in the land registration case
involved.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court SET ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 39239.
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