Edwin Granada Reyes vs.

The Office of the Ombudsman, the Sandiganbayan,

and Paul Jocson Arches

G.R. No. 208243

Facts:

The Sangguniang Bayan of Bansalan, Davao del Sur passed Municipal Ordinance
No. 357, prohibiting the "storing, displaying, selling, and blowing up ('pagpabuto') of
those pyrotechnics products allowed by law, commonly called 'firecrackers' or
'pabuto' within the premises of buildings 1 and 2 of the Bansalan Public Market."

Then Bansalan Mayor Reyes approved a permit allowing vendors to sell firecrackers
at the Bansalan Public Market.

A fire befell the Bansalan Public Market. It caused extensive damage and destroyed
fire hydrants of the Bansalan Water District. Subsequently, private respondent Paul
Jocson Arches (Arches) filed a complaint against Reyes before the Office of the
Ombudsman, Mindanao. Arches questioned the approval and issuance of a mayor's
permit agreeing to sell firecrackers, in violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 357. He
claimed that this permit caused the fire the previous year.

After the preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Resolution
and found that probable cause existed to charge Reyes with violation of Section 3(e)
of Republic Act No. 3019. The Ombudsman held that Reyes and his co-respondents
were public officers during the questioned acts. Both the government and private
stall owners suffered undue injury due to the fire at the Bansalan Public Market.
While the mayor's permit was not the proximate cause of the fire, it nonetheless,
"gave unwarranted benefit and advantage to the fire cracker vendors ... to sell
firecrackers in the public market despite existing prohibition." The issuance of the
mayor's permit was "patently tainted with bad faith and partiality or, at the very least,
gross inexcusable negligence."

Issue:

Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in determining

that probable cause against petitioner exists.

Held:

No. As a general rule, this Court does not interfere with the Office of the
Ombudsman's exercise of its constitutional mandate. Both the Constitution and
Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) give the Ombudsman wide
latitude to act on criminal complaints against public officials and government
employees.

The rule on non-interference is based on the "respect for the investigatory and
prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman[.]"
An independent constitutional body, the Office of the Ombudsman is "beholden to no
one, acts as the champion of the people[,] and [is] the preserver of the integrity of
the public service." Thus, it has the sole power to determine whether there is
probable cause to warrant the filing of a criminal case against an accused.

This function is executive in nature. The executive determination of probable cause

is a highly factual matter. It requires probing into the "existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts
within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the
crime for which he [or she] was prosecuted." The Office of the Ombudsman is armed
with the power to investigate. It is, therefore, in a better position to assess the
strengths or weaknesses of the evidence on hand needed to make a finding of
probable cause. As this Court is not a trier of facts, we defer to the sound judgment
of the Ombudsman. Disagreement with the Ombudsman's findings is not enough to
constitute grave abuse of discretion. It is settled: An act of a court or tribunal may
constitute grave abuse of discretion when the same is performed in a capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty,
or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or personal
hostility.

Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The Office of the Ombudsman's Resolution on

the Motion for Reconsideration are AFFIRMED.

Sps. Roberto Aboitiz and Maria Cristina Cabarrus vs. Sps. Peter L. Po and
Victoria L. Po/Sps. Peter L. Po and Victoria L. Po vs. Sps. Roberto Aboitiz, et
al.

G.R. No. 208450/G.R. No. 208497

Facts:

This case involves a parcel of land located in Cabancalan, Mandaue City, initially
registered under the name of Roberto Aboitiz. This parcel of land originally belonged
to the late Mariano Seno. On July 31, 1973, Mariano executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of his son, Ciriaco Seno. On May 5, 1978, Ciriaco sold the two (2) lots
to Victoria Po (Victoria). The parties executed a Deed of Absolute Sale. On July 15,
1982, Mariano died and was survived by his five (5) children.
In 1990, Peter Po discovered that Ciriaco “had executed a quitclaim dated August 7,
1989 renouncing his interest in favor of Roberto. In the quitclaim, Ciriaco stated that
he was “the declared owner of Lot Nos. 2835 and 2807.

The Spouses Po confronted Ciriaco. By way of remedy, Ciriaco and the Spouses Po
executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated June 28, 1990 in which Ciriaco
agreed to pay Peter the difference between the amount paid by the Spouses Po as
consideration for the entire property and the value of the land the Spouses Po were
left with after the quitclaim. However, also in 1990, Lot No. 2835 was also sold to
Roberto. The Mariano Heirs, including Ciriaco, executed separate deeds of absolute
sale in favor of Roberto. Thereafter, Roberto immediately developed the lot as part of
a subdivision called North Town Homes. On April 19, 1993, Roberto filed an
application for original registration of Lot No. 2835, the trial court granted the
issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 0-887 in the name of Roberto. The lot
was immediately subdivided with portions sold to Ernesto and Jose.

On November 19, 1996, the Spouses Po filed a complaint to recover the land and to
declare nullity of title with damages.

The Spouses Aboitiz appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in its
Decision dated October 31, 2012, partially affirmed the trial court decision, declaring
the Spouses Po as the rightful owner of the land. However, it ruled that the titles
issued to respondents Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel should be respected.

The Court of Appeals discussed the inapplicability of the rules on double sale and
the doctrine of buyer in good faith since the land was not yet registered when it was
sold to the Spouses Po. However, it ruled in favor of the Spouses Po on the premise
that registered property may be reconveyed to the “rightful or legal owner or to the
one with a better right if the title was wrongfully or erroneously registered in another
person’s name.” The Court of Appeals held that the Mariano Heirs were no longer
the owners of the lot at the time they sold it to Roberto in 1990 because Mariano,
during his lifetime, already sold this to Ciriaco in 1973.

It found that the Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco and the Spouses Po was
duly notarized and was thus presumed regular on its face. Their Memorandum of
Agreement did not cancel or rescind the Deed of Absolute Sale but rather
strengthened their claim that they “entered into a contract of sale. “It likewise ruled
that, contrary to the assertion of the Spouses Aboitiz, there was no showing that
Ciriaco merely held the property in trust for the Mariano Heirs.It held that the action
of the Spouses Po had not yet prescribed because their complaint in 1996 was
within the 10-year prescriptive period as the title in favor of the Spouses Aboitiz was
issued in 1994. However, the Court of Appeals ruled that the certificates of title of
Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel were valid as they were innocent buyers in good faith.
ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the Spouses Peter
and Victoria Po's complaint;

2) Whether the doctrines of estoppel and laches apply;

3) Whether the land registration court's finding that Ciriaco Seno only held the
property in trust for the Mariano Heirs is binding as res judicata in this case;

4) Whether the Mariano Heirs, as sellers in a deed of conveyance of realty, are

indispensable parties

Held:

1) Except for actions falling within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts, the
Regional Trial Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over actions involving "title
to, or possession of, real property." Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
provides: Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to,
or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible
entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which
is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts.

The Spouses Aboitiz claim that it is the Court of Appeals that has jurisdiction over
the annulment of Regional Trial Court judgments. The jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals is provided in Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129: Section 9.
Jurisdiction. - The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise: (2) Exclusive original
jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts. While
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to annul judgments of the Regional Trial Courts,
the case at bar is not for the annulment of a judgment of a Regional Trial Court. It is
for reconveyance and the annulment of title.

Considering the Spouses Aboitiz's fraudulent registration without the Spouses Po's
knowledge and the latter's assertion of their ownership of the land, their right to
recover the property and to cancel the Spouses Aboitiz's title, the action is for
reconveyance and annulment of title and not for annulment of judgment. Thus, the
Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear this case.

2) There is laches when a party was negligent or has failed "to assert a right within a
reasonable time," thus giving rise to the presumption that he or she has abandoned
it. Laches has set in when it is already inequitable or unfair to allow the party to
assert the right. The elements of laches were enumerated in Ignacio v. Basilio: There
is laches when: (1) the conduct of the defendant or one under whom he claims, gave
rise to the situation complained of; (2) there was delay in asserting a right after
knowledge of the defendant's conduct and after an opportunity to sue; (3) defendant
had no knowledge or notice that the complainant would assert his right; (4) there is
injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant.
"Laches is different from prescription." Prescription deals with delay itself and thus is
an issue of how much time has passed. The time period when prescription is
deemed to have set in is fixed by law. Laches, on the other hand, concerns itself with
the effect of delay and not the period of time that has lapsed.

When they discovered that the property was registered in the name of the Spouses
Aboitiz in 1993, the Spouses Po then filed the instant complaint to recover the
property sold to them by Ciriaco, alleging that it was done without their knowledge,
through evident bad faith and fraud. The Spouses Po filed this case in less than
three (3) years from the time of registration. Based on these circumstances, the
elements of laches are clearly lacking in this case. There was no delay in asserting
their right over the property, and the Spouses Aboitiz had knowledge that the
Spouses Po would assert their right. Thus, it cannot be said that they are barred by
laches.

3) This Court rules that this cannot be binding in this action for reconveyance. Res
judicata embraces two (2) concepts: (i) bar by prior judgment and (ii) conclusiveness
of judgment, respectively covered under Rule 39, Section 47 of the Rules of Court,
paragraphs (b) and (c):

Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final
order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment or final order, may be as follows: (b) In other cases, the judgment or final
order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that
could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their
successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or
special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the
same capacity; and (c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their
successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former
judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or
which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary Thereto.

An exception to this rule is if the party claiming ownership has already had the
opportunity to prove his or her claim in the land registration case. In such a case, res
judicata will then apply. When an issue of ownership has been raised in the land
registration proceedings where the adverse party was given full opportunity to
present his or her claim, the findings in the land registration case will constitute a bar
from any other claim of the adverse party on the property.
However, this is not the circumstance in the case at bar. The Spouses Po were not
able to prove their claim in the registration proceedings. Thus, res judicata cannot
apply to their action for reconveyance.

4) The Mariano Heirs are not indispensable parties. Rule 3, Section 7 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides:

Section 7. Compulsory Joinder of Indispensable Parties. - Parties in interest without

whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as
plaintiffs or defendants. An indispensable party is the party whose legal presence in
the proceeding is so necessary that "the action cannot be finally determined" without
him or her because his or her interest in the matter and in the relief "are so bound up
with that of the other parties. The Mariano Heirs, as the alleged sellers of the
property, are not indispensable parties. They are at best necessary parties, which
are covered by Rule 3, Section 8 of the Rules of Court:

Section 8. Necessary Party. - A necessary party is one who is not indispensable but
who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those
already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of
the action.

It is clear that the Mariano Heirs are not indispensable parties. They have already
sold all their interests in the property to the Spouses Aboitiz. They will no longer be
affected, benefited, or injured by any ruling of this Court on the matter, whether it
grants or denies the complaint for reconveyance. The ruling of this Court as to
whether the Spouses Po are entitled to reconveyance will not affect their rights.
Their interest has, thus, become separable from that of Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel.
Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the Mariano Heirs are not
indispensable parties.

Court of Appeals' Decision is AFFIRMED.

CHIQUITA BRANDS, INC. AND CHIQUITA BRANDS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

Petitioners, v. HON. GEORGE E. OMELIO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, DAVAO
CITY, BRANCH 14, SHERIFF ROBERTO C. ESGUERRA, CECILIO G. ABENION,
AND 1,842 OTHER PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 95-45, Respondent.

G.R. No. 189102, June 07, 2017

“Courts can neither amend nor modify the terms and conditions of a compromise
validly entered into by the parties. A writ of execution that varies the respective
obligations of the parties under a judicially approved compromise agreement is
void.”
FACTS:

Thousands of banana plantation workers instituted a class suit in US for damages

against 11 foreign corporations, Chiquita brands being one of those 11 companies.
The claimants claimed to have been exposed to dibromochloropropane (DBCP)
while working in the plantation. As a result, these workers suffered serious and
permanent injuries to their reproductive system.

However US courts dismissed the complaint based on forum non conveniens.

The claimants filed a complaint on the same 11 corporations in the RTC of Panabo
City, Davao. Before pre-trial the petitioner and the claimants entered into a
compromise agreement with the claimants. The agreement states that; the petitioner
shall be release from all or their obligation after they deposited an escrow amount in
favor of the claimant which would be administered by a third person/ mediator.
The RTC of Panabo approved the compromised agreement and dismissed the
petition of the claimant. After dismissal of the civil claim the claimants moved for the
execution of the compromise agreement.

The petitioner opposed the execution on the ground of mootness; they argued that
they had already complied with their obligation by depositing the settlement amount
into an escrow account. Hence, there was nothing left for the court to execute.

However, RTC of Panabo granted the motion for execution because there was no
proof that the settlement amounts had been withdrawn and delivered to each
individual claimant. It held that there was no proof that they have fulfilled their
obligation.

Petitioner filed a motion to suspend the execution and be allowed to present

evidence on their behalf.

During the hearing of the case, the claimants picketed outside the court room and
accused the RTC judge of Panabo as a corrupt official who delayed the execution.
Petitioner requested for change of venue and was granted.

The case was transferred and now under the jurisdiction of the RTC of Davao city.
The RTC of Davao city through Judge Omelio ordered the execution of the
compromised agreement. Judge Omelio reasoned that Chiquita never filed its formal
offer of evidence. Hence, the trial court had no other choice but to issue another writ
of execution.

Aggrieved by the RTC’s decision, the petitioner filed for a petition for certiorari even
without a prior appeal to the CA.
Petitioner allege that the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the writ of execution and ordering them to directly pay each of the claimant
contrary to the compromise agreement between petitioner and claimant.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not this case falls under the exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of
courts;

2) Whether or not respondent court committed "grave abuse of discretion amounting

to lack or excess of its jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders and writs."

HELD:

1) Yes, the doctrine on hierarchy of courts prohibits "parties from directly resorting to
this Court when relief may be obtained before the lower courts." Although this Court
has the power to Issue extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, it
is by no means an exclusive power. "It is shared concurrently with the Court of
Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts. However, parties cannot randomly select the
forum to which their petitions will be directed. The doctrine on hierarchy of courts
determines the proper venue or choice of forum where petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus should be filed.

Generally, this Court will dismiss petitions that are directly filed before it if relief can
be obtained from the lower courts. Trial courts and the Court of Appeals are "in the
best position to deal with causes in the first instance." They not only resolve
questions of law but also determine facts based on the evidence presented before
them.

Nevertheless, a direct invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction may be justified

"when there are compelling reasons clearly set forth in the petition."

We may take cognizance of this case "in the interest of judicial economy and
efficiency." The records of this case are sufficient for this Court to decide on the
issues raised by the parties. Any further delay would unduly prejudice the parties.

2) Yes, the writ of execution derives its validity from the judgment it seeks to enforce
and must essentially conform to the judgment's terms. It can neither be wider in
scope nor exceed the judgment that gives it life. Otherwise, it has no validity. Thus,
in issuing writs of execution, courts must look at the terms of the judgment sought to
be enforced.

The Writ of Execution ordering the collection of the settlement amount directly from
petitioners and its co-defendants in Civil Case No. 95-45 is void.
Under the judicially approved Compromise Agreement, petitioners are obliged to
deposit the settlement amount in escrow within 10 business days after they receive
a signed Compromise Agreement from the counsel of the claimants.

A writ of execution may be stayed or quashed when "facts and circumstances

transpire" after judgment has been rendered that would make "execution impossible
or unjust."

Another exception is when the writ of execution alters or varies the judgment. A writ
of execution derives its validity from the judgment it seeks to enforce. Hence, it
should not "vary terms of the judgment ... [or] go beyond its terms." Otherwise, the
writ of execution is void. Courts can neither modify nor "impose terms different from
the terms of a compromise agreement" that parties have entered in good faith. To do
so would amount to grave abuse of discretion.

Payment or satisfaction of the judgment debt also constitutes as a ground for the
quashal of a writ of execution. In Sandico, Sr. v. Piguing, although the sum given by
the debtors was less than the amount of the judgment debt, the creditors accepted
the reduced amount as "full satisfaction of the money judgment." This justified the
issuance of an order recalling the writ of execution.

A writ of execution may also be set aside or quashed when it appears from the
circumstances of the case that the writ "is defective in substance," "has been
improvidently issued," issued without authority, or was "issued against the wrong
party."

The party assailing the propriety of the issuance of the writ of execution must
adduce sufficient evidence to support his or her motion. This may consist of
affidavits and other documents.

On the other hand, in resolving whether execution should be suspended or whether

a writ of execution should be quashed, courts should be guided by the same
principle in the execution of final judgments. Certainly, they may require parties to
present evidence.

In this case, petitioners cannot rely on the five (5) quitclaims for the trial court to
quash or recall the writ of execution. The quitclaims are insufficient to establish that
petitioners complied with their obligation under the Compromise Agreement. They
only prove that five (5) claimants received their respective share in the settlement
amount but do not establish that petitioners deposited the entire settlement amount
in escrow. At the very least, petitioners should have attached proof of actual deposit
in their Opposition to the Motion for Execution.
Neither can petitioners rely on the evidence presented during the proceedings
conducted at the Philippine Consulate in San Francisco, California, United States.
This Court takes judicial notice of the administrative case filed against Judge
Grageda for his act of receiving evidence abroad without proper authority.
Given the circumstances of this case, petitioners cannot be faulted for failing to
make a formal offer of evidence because they were denied the opportunity to do so.
Respondent court should have given petitioners the chance to offer the deposition of
Mr. Stubbs in evidence before acting on the pending incidents of the case. Thus,
respondent court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the Order dated July 10,
2009, which affirmed execution against petitioners.

Respondent court also erred in issuing the Order dated July 10, 2009. Petitioners'
subsidiaries and affiliates cannot be adjudged solidarily liable. Solidary liability under
Philippine law is not to be inferred lightly but must be clearly expressed.

Under the Compromise Agreement, the law that shall govern its interpretation is the
law of Texas, United States. In this jurisdiction, courts are not authorized to "take
judicial notice of foreign laws." The laws of a foreign country must "be properly
pleaded and proved" as facts. Otherwise, under the doctrine of processual
presumption, foreign law shall be presumed to be the same as domestic law.
Unfortunately, there is no evidence that Texan law has been proven as a fact.
Hence, this Court is constrained to apply Philippine law.

Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed orders and writs are ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

Mario Veridiano y Sapi vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 200370

Facts:

In the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Province of Laguna and within the

jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being
permitted or authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, control and custody one (1) small heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 2.72 grams of dried
marijuana leaves, a dangerous drug.

Veridiano was arraigned. He pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.

During trial, the prosecution presented PO1 Cabello and PO1 Solano to
testify.
According to the prosecution, at about 7:20 a.m. of January 15, 2008, a
concerned citizen called a certain PO3 Esteves, police radio operator of
the Nagcarlan Police Station, informing him that a certain alias "Baho,"
who was later identified as Veridiano, was on the way to San Pablo City to
obtain illegal drugs.

PO3 Esteves immediately relayed the information to PO1 Cabello and PO2
Alvin Vergara (PO2 Vergara) who were both on duty.

Chief of Police June Urquia instructed PO1 Cabello and PO2 Vergara to set
up a checkpoint at Barangay Taytay, Nagcarlan, Laguna.

At around 10:00 a.m., they chanced upon Veridiano inside a passenger

jeepney coming from San Pablo, Laguna.

The police officers instructed the passengers to raise their t-shirts to

check for possible concealed weapons and to remove the contents of their
pockets. They recovered from Veridiano "a tea bag containing what
appeared to be marijuana." POI Cabello confiscated the tea bag and
marked it with his initials. Veridiano was arrested and apprised of his
constitutional rights. He was then brought to the police station.

Before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Laguna, Veridiano was
charged with the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

The Court of Appeals found that "Veridiano was caught in flagrante

delicto" of having marijuana in his possession.

Veridiano filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a valid warrantless arrest that would vest the court with
jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

HELD:

No, Petitioner's warrantless arrest was unlawful.

The invalidity of an arrest leads to several consequences among which are: (a) the
failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of an accused; (b) criminal liability of
law enforcers for illegal arrest; and (c) any search incident to the arrest becomes
invalid thus rendering the evidence acquired as constitutionally inadmissible.

Lack of jurisdiction over the person of an accused as a result of an invalid arrest

must be raised through a motion to quash before an accused enters his or her plea.
Otherwise, the objection is deemed waived and an accused is "estopped from
questioning the legality of his arrest."

The voluntary submission of an accused to the jurisdiction of the court and his or her
active participation during trial cures any defect or irregularity that may have
attended an arrest. The reason for this rule is that "the legality of an arrest affects
only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused."

Nevertheless, failure to timely object to the illegality of an arrest does not preclude
an accused from questioning the admissibility of evidence seized. The inadmissibility
of the evidence is not affected when an accused fails to question the court's
jurisdiction over his or her person in a timely manner. Jurisdiction over the person of
an accused and the constitutional inadmissibility of evidence are separate and
mutually exclusive consequences of an illegal arrest.

As to the legality of the search and seizure made:

A search incidental to a lawful arrest requires that there must first be a lawful arrest
before a search is made. Otherwise stated, a lawful arrest must precede the search;
"the process cannot be reversed." For there to be a lawful arrest, law enforcers must
be armed with a valid warrant. Nevertheless, an arrest may also be effected without
a warrant.

There are three (3) grounds that will justify a warrantless arrest. Rule 113, Section 5
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. — A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
The first kind of warrantless arrest is known as an in flagrante delicto arrest.

For a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, "two elements must

concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he [or
she] has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer."

In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an in flagrante delicto arrest
under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was not committing a crime at
the checkpoint. Petitioner was merely a passenger who did not exhibit any unusual
conduct in the presence of the law enforcers that would incite suspicion. In effecting
the warrantless arrest, the police officers relied solely on the tip they received.
Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a warrantless arrest absent any
overt act from the person to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been
committed, was being committed, or is about to be committed.

The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The law enforcers had no personal
knowledge of any fact or circumstance indicating that petitioner had just committed
an offense.

A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have
personal knowledge of facts, based on their observation, that the person sought to
be arrested has just committed a crime. This is what gives rise to probable cause
that would justify a warrantless search under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The warrantless search cannot be justified under the reasonable suspicion

requirement in "stop and frisk" searches. Law enforcers do not have unbridled
discretion in conducting "stop and frisk" searches. While probable cause is not
required, a "stop and frisk" search cannot be validated on the basis of a suspicion or
hunch. Law enforcers must have a genuine reason to believe, based on their
experience and the particular circumstances of each case, that criminal activity may
be afoot. Reliance on one (1) suspicious activity alone, or none at all, cannot
produce a reasonable search.
Petitioner in this case was a mere passenger in a jeepney who did not exhibit any
act that would give police officers reasonable suspicion to believe that he had drugs
in his possession. Reasonable persons will act in a nervous manner in any
checkpoint. There was no evidence to show that the police had basis or personal
knowledge that would reasonably allow them to infer anything suspicious.
Moreover, petitioner's silence or lack of resistance can hardly be considered as
consent to the warrantless search. Although the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures may be surrendered through a valid waiver, the prosecution must prove
that the waiver was executed with clear and convincing evidence. Consent to a
warrantless search and seizure must be "unequivocal, specific, intelligently given . . .
[and unattended] by duress or coercion."

The validity of a consented warrantless search is determined by the totality of the

circumstances. This may involve an inquiry into the environment in which the
consent was given such as "the presence of coercive police procedures."
The presence of a coercive environment negates the claim that petitioner consented
to the warrantless search.

Another instance of a valid warrantless search is a search of a moving vehicle.

Checkpoints per se are not invalid. They are allowed in exceptional circumstances to
protect the lives of individuals and ensure their safety. They are also sanctioned in
cases where the government's survival is in danger. Considering that routine
checkpoints intrude "on [a] motorist's right to 'free passage'" to a certain extent, they
must be "conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists." The extent of routine
inspections must be limited to a visual search. Routine inspections do not give law
enforcers carte blanche to perform warrantless searches.
In the present case, the extensive search conducted by the police officers exceeded
the allowable limits of warrantless searches. They had no probable cause to believe
that the accused violated any law except for the tip they received. They did not
observe any peculiar activity from the accused that may either arouse their suspicion
or verify the tip. Moreover, the search was flawed at its inception. The checkpoint
was set up to target the arrest of the accused.

Decision of the Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED.

Lolita Bas Capablanca vs. Heirs of Perdo Bas, represented by Josefina Bas Espinosa and
register of Deeds of the Province of Cebu

G.R. No. 224144

Facts:

The subject matter of this case is Lot 2535 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Land's
Estate located in "Biasong, Dumlog, Talisay, Cebu".

Andres Bas and Pedro Bas acquired Lot 2535, "and Patent No. 1724 was issued in
their names.
Pedro sold to Faustina Manreal, married to Juan Balorio, his portion of Lot. The sale
was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale.

After the death of Faustina and her husband, their heirs executed a notarized Extra-
Judicial Declaration of Heirs and Deed of Absolute Sale. Lot 2535 consisting of
"1,000 square meters, more or less," was conveyed to one (1) of their heirs,
Alejandra Balorio.

Alejandra sold the land through a Deed of Absolute Sale to Edith N. Deen, who in
turn sold it to Atty. Eddy A. Deen.

Upon Atty. Deen's death, an extra-judicial settlement of estate, which did not include
Lot 2535, was executed by his heirs. Later, they executed an Additional Extra-
Judicial Settlement with Absolute Deed of Sale, which sold the land for ₱l0,000.00 to
Norberto B. Bas, who took possession of and built a house on it.

Norberto died without a will and was succeeded by his niece and only heir, Lolita
Bas Capablanca.

Subsequently, Lolita learned that a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was issued in
the names of Andres and Pedro on the basis of a reconstituted Deed of
Conveyance.

Josefina Bas Espinosa represented the Heirs of Pedro Bas to file a complaint for
Clarification of Ownership of Lot against Lolita before the Lupong Tagapamayapa.
The conflict between the parties was not resolved and resulted to the issuance of a
Certification to file Action.
A notarized Partition Agreement of Real Property, Quitclaim and Waiver of Rights
was executed between the heirs of Andres and Lolita, representing Norberto,
whereby they partitioned Lot 2535 among themselves.

Lolita sought to register her portion in Lot 2535 but was denied by the Register of
Deeds of Cebu, citing the need for a court order. Lolita then learned that TCT No. T-
96676 had been partially cancelled and TCT Nos. T-100181, T-100182, T-100183,
and T-100185 had been issued in the name of the Heirs of Pedro Bas, represented
by Josefina, on May 29, 1997.

Lolita filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City for the
cancellation of the titles.

Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision in favor of Lolita. The trial court held that
there was substantial evidence to prove that Lolita had been in long possession of
the lot under a claim of ownership as the heir of Norberto and that it was not
necessary for her to be first declared as his heir before filing the complaint. It further
ruled that to dismiss the case on the ground that Lolita should first be declared an
heir would be too late as the Heirs of Pedro Bas did not raise the issue in a motion to
dismiss or as an affirmative defense in their complaint.

The Heirs of Pedro Bas appealed to the Court of Appeals, making the following lone
assignment of error:

The trial court seriously erred in not dismissing the case for plaintiffs lack of cause of
action considering that plaintiff in her complaint alleged, she is the sole heir of
Norberto Bas.

The Court of Appeals reversed the Regional Trial Court Decision and dismissed the
complaint. According to the Court of Appeals, Lolita must first be declared as the
sole heir to the estate of Norberto in a proper special proceeding.

Hence, Lolita filed this Petition principally contending that the Court of Appeals
committed a reversible error in reversing the Regional Trial Court Decision and
dismissing the complaint.

Issue:
1.) Whether or not the CA dismissal of the complaint is proper?

2.) Whether or not a separate special proceeding is required to establish filiation and
heirship?

Ruling:

1) Yes, This Court has stated that no judicial declaration of heirship is necessary in
order that an heir may assert his or her right to the property of the deceased.

The Court of Appeals' reliance on the ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay v.Del Rosario was
misplaced. In that case, the motion to dismiss was filed immediately after the second
Amended Complaint was filed. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, holding
that the Heirs of Yaptinchay "have not shown any proof or even a semblance of it -
except the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the above-named Yaptinchays-
that they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple.

Here, respondents never raised their objection to petitioner's capacity to sue either
as an affirmative defense or in a motion to dismiss. Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court states, "[ d]efenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or
in the answer are deemed waived." Thus, it was erroneous for the Court of Appeals
to dismiss the complaint on the ground that there was no prior judicial declaration of
petitioner's heirship to Norberto.
2) Yes, Contrary to the erroneous conclusion of the Court of Appeals, this Court finds
no need for a separate proceeding for a declaration of heirship in order to resolve
petitioner's action for cancellation of titles of the property.

This case has gone a long way since the complaint was filed in 1997. A full-blown
trial had taken place and judgment was rendered by the Regional Trial Court where
it thoroughly discussed, evaluated, and weighed all the pieces of documentary
evidence and testimonies of the witnesses of both parties. At this point, to dismiss
the case and require petitioner to institute a special proceeding to determine her
status as heir of the late Norberto would hamper, instead of serve, justice.

In Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, where the contending parties insisted to be the legal

heirs of the decedent, this Court dispensed with the need to institute a separate
special proceeding to determine their heirship since the parties had voluntarily
submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence. It held:

It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate
estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the
circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not
expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical;
it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration
proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case -
subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before
the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined
during pre-trial.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling
reason to still subject Portugal's estate to administration proceedings since a
determination of petitioners' status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed
by petitioners, the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by
the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon[.] In this case, there is no
necessity for a separate special proceeding and to require it would be superfluous
considering that petitioner had already presented evidence to establish her filiation
and heirship to Norberto, which respondents never disputed.

Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision are VACATED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City is REINSTATED.

Marlon Bacerra y Tabones vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 204544
“The identity of the perpetrator of a crime and a finding of guilt may rest solely on the
strength of circumstantial evidence.”

Facts:

Alfredo and his family were sound asleep in their home. At about 1:00 a.m., he was
roused from sleep by the sound of stones hitting his house. Alfredo went to the living
room and peered through the jalousie window. The terrace light allowed him to
recognize his neighbor and co-worker, Bacerra.

Bacerra threw stones at Alfredo's house while saying, "Vulva of your mother." Just as
he was about to leave, Bacerra exclaimed, "[V]ulva of your mother, Old Fred, I'll bum
you now." Bacerra then left. Alfredo's son, Edgar, also witnessed the incident
through a window in his room.

Troubled by Bacerra's threat, Alfredo waited for him to return. Alfredo sat down
beside the window. At around 4:00a.m., he heard dogs barking outside. Alfredo
looked out the window and saw Bacerra walking towards their nipa hut, which was
located around 10 meters from their house.

Bacerra paced in front of the nipa hut and shook it. Moments later, Alfredo saw the
nipa hut burning.

Alfredo sought help from his neighbors to smother the fire. Edgar contacted the
authorities for assistance but it was too late. The nipa hut and its contents were
completely destroyed. The local authorities conducted an investigation on the
incident.

Bacerra was charged with violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1613.
Regional Trial Court found Bacerra guilty beyond reasonable doubt of arson.

Bacerra appealed and argued that none of the prosecution's witnesses had
positively identified him as the person who burned the nipa hut.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. Bacerra
moved for reconsideration but was denied. Bacerra filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari.

Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding his conviction based
on circumstantial evidence, which, being merely based on conjecture, falls short of
proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 50 No direct evidence was presented to
prove that petitioner actually set fire to private complainant's nipa hut.

Issue:
Whether or not circumstantial evidence is sufficient to uphold conviction?

Held:

Yes, in this case, no one saw petitioner actually set fire to the nipa hut. Nevertheless,
the prosecution has established multiple circumstances, which, after being
considered in their entirety, support the conclusion that petitioner is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of simple arson.

First, the evidence was credible and sufficient to prove that petitioner stoned private
complainant's house and threatened to bum him. Private complainant testified that
he saw petitioner throwing stones at his house and heard petitioner say, "okinam
nga Lakay Fred, puuran kayo tad ta!" (Vulva of your mother, Old Fred, I'll bum you
now.) Petitioner's threats were also heard by private complainant's son and
grandchildren.

Second, the evidence was credible and sufficient to prove that petitioner returned a
few hours later and made his way to private complainant's nipa hut. Private
complainant testified that at 4:00 a.m., he saw petitioner pass by their house and
walk towards their nipa hut. This was corroborated by private complainant's son who
testified that he saw petitioner standing in front of the nipa hut moments before it
was burned.

Third, the evidence was also credible and sufficient to prove that petitioner was in
close proximity to the nipa hut before it caught fire. Private complainant testified that
he saw petitioner walk to and from in front of the nipa hut and shake its posts just
before it caught fire. Private complainant's son likewise saw petitioner standing at
the side of the nipa hut before it was burned.

A number of circumstantial evidence may be so credible to establish a fact from

which it may be inferred, beyond reasonable doubt, that the elements of a crime
exist and that the accused is its perpetrator. There is no requirement in our
jurisdiction that only direct evidence may convict. After all, evidence is always a
matter of reasonable inference from any fact that may be proven by the prosecution
provided the inference is logical and beyond reasonable doubt.

The crime of simple arson was proven solely through circumstantial evidence in
People v. Abayon. None of the prosecution's witnesses actually saw the accused
start the fire. Nevertheless, the circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution,
taken in its entirety, all pointed to the accused's guilt.

Petition for Review is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Chinatrust Commercial Bank vs. Philip Turner
G.R. No. 191458

“Issues that were not alleged or proved before the lower court cannot be decided for
the first time on appeal. This rule ensures fairness in proceedings.”

Facts: