Gaerlan

COELI
CASE NO. 13
GAERLAN V. REPUBLIC
FACTS: Petitioner Gaerlan filed an Application for original registration of title over a parcel of land (a
Cadastral lot) situated at Patag, CDO City. In her application, she alleged that she acquired the above–
mentioned property from Mamerta Tan in November 1989 by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale of
Unregistered Land. She had the property declared for taxation purposes under her name. RTC set the
application for hearing after finding petitioner’s application sufficient in form and substance.
 RP thru OSG: filed an Opposition on the ground that (1) neither petitioner nor her predecessors–in–
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier; (2) the muniments of title and tax declarations attached
to the petition do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the
subject land; (3) the claim of ownership based on Spanish title is no longer available for purposes of
registration; and (4) the subject land is a portion of the public domain, hence, not registrable.
 PETITIONER: testified that she acquired said land through sale from Mamerta Tan; that she declared
the property for taxation purposes under her name; and that she took possession of the land and
caused its survey. Mamerta Tan was also presented to testify, and she averred that she became the
owner of the said property in 1975 after she bought the land from Teresita Tan. Another witness,
the City Assessor of CDO, testified that he issued certifications or certified copies of records on file in
his office pertaining to the land in question under the names of the 2 predecessors of the said land.
 RTC: GRANTED the application. OSG: appealed to CA
 CA: reversed, ruled that petitioner failed to present any proof to establish that the subject land is
alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary
had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable and that the land subject of the application falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) or Community
Environment and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO). In addition, the CA held that the applicant
must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as
true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. Moreover, the CA observed that there is no
evidence on record to establish that petitioner, by herself or through her predecessors–in–interest,
had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
land and that she possessed the subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Thus, the appellate
court ruled that petitioner is not entitled to registration under Section 14(1) of PD 1529.
 PETITIONER: asserted that her predecessor–in–interest, Potenciano, possessed the subject property
as early as 1929. She claimed Potenciano was the one who asked for the original survey; that the
subject land is alienable and disposable land of the public domain and this land classification has
long been approved by the DENR Secretary. To support her claim, petitioner submits as additional
evidence the Certification issued by the CENRO stating that the land more or less falls within an area
classified as Alienable and Disposable under Land Classification (LC) Map.
 OSG: argued that petitioner should have offered the aforementioned documents before the land
registration court and while the case was pending appeal before the CA as it is an appellate court
with authority to receive evidence. Petitioner also did not present any certification from the DENR
or a certified copy of any LC map in order to establish irrefutably the fact that the subject parcel of
land is, in fact, alienable and disposable.
ISSUE: W/N CA erred in dismissing the petitioner’s application.
RULING: NO. P.D. No. 1529 specifies those who are qualified to apply for registration of land.
Applicants for registration of title must establish and prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; (2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same;
and (3) that his possession has been under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier. Each element must necessarily be proven by no less than clear, positive and convincing
evidence; otherwise the application for registration should be denied.
To prove that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish
the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative
act or statute. The applicant may secure a certification from the government that the lands applied for
are alienable and disposable, but the certification must show that the DENR Secretary had approved
the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that
the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through
survey by the PENRO or CENRO. The applicant must also present a copy of the original classification of
the land into alienable and disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the
President.
To comply with the 1st requisite, petitioner submitted a CENRO Certification and LC Map which was
certified and approved. However, the attached certification is inadequate to prove that the subject lot is
alienable and disposable. As held in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., a CENRO certification is
insufficient to prove the alienable and disposable character of the land sought to be registered. The
applicant must also show sufficient proof that the DENR Secretary has approved the land classification
and released the land in question as alienable and disposable.
Moreover, the CENRO certification attached by petitioner to her petition deserves scant consideration
since it was not presented during the proceedings before the trial court or while the case was pending
before the appellate court. Also, generally, additional evidence is allowed when it is newly discovered,
or where it has been omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or where the purpose of the evidence is
to correct evidence previously offered. In the present case, petitioner did not offer any explanation why
the CENRO certification was not presented and submitted during the proceedings before the trial court
to justify its belated submission to this Court.
As to the 2nd and 3rd requisites, petitioner failed to establish that she and her predecessors–in–interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land
on or before June 12, 1945. Based on the records, the earliest evidence of possession that petitioner and
her predecessor–in–interest Mamerta Tan had over the subject property was only in 1975 when
Mamerta Tan purchased the subject lot from Teresita Tan. While Mamerta Tan testified that she
purchased the property from Teresita, the records are bereft of any evidence to show Teresita’s mode
of acquisition of ownership over the subject lot or from whom she acquired the property and when her
possession of the subject lot had commenced. Further, there was absolutely no evidence proffered by
petitioner that she derived her title to the property from Potenciano.

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COELI

ISSUE: W/N CA erred in dismissing the petitioner’s application.

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