ELISEO EDUARTE Y. COSCOLLA vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 176566

FACTS: The trial court rendered a Judgment finding Eliseo Eduarte guilty beyond
reasonabledoubt of the crime of robbery committed in the evening of 26 January 1994
by pointing a sharpinstrument on the waist of the victim, Catherine Navarra while the
former was walking with afriend along UN and Taft Avenue in Manila. Eduarte grabbed
the 22-karat gold bracelet valuedat P8,875.00 from Navarra’s wrist and slowly ran away
as if nothing happened. The Court ofAppeals confirmed the presence of all the elements
of robbery under Article 294 of the RevisedPenal Code and brushed aside the
inconsistencies pointed out by Eduarte in the testimonies ofwitnesses. Maintaining his
innocence, Eduarte fervently argues that he was not the one whorobbed Navarra, but
was erroneously accused as the thief. Eduarte invites the attention of thisCourt to pass
upon the circumstances that assail the credibility of testimonies offered by Navarraand
Adoro, underscoring their frailties and thereby creating a reasonable doubt on his
conviction.Eduarte now urges the Supreme Court to reverse the findings of the RTC
and the Court ofAppeals arguing, in the main, that his conviction was tainted with
reasonable doubt.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction of the crime of Robbery is tainted with reasonable
doubt.

RULING: No. Basic is the rule that factual findings of trial courts, including their
assessment of the witnesses credibility, are entitled to great weight and respect by this
Court, particularly when theCourt of Appeals affirms the findings. Factual findings of the
trial court are entitled to respect and are not to be disturbed on appeal, unless some
facts and circumstances of weight andsubstance, having been overlooked or
misinterpreted, might materially affect the disposition ofthe case. In the case under
consideration, we find that the trial court did not overlook,misapprehend, or misapply
any fact or value for us to overturn the findings of the trial court.
 People of the Philippines vs. Marlon Abetong

G.R. No. 209785

FACTS: According to the prosecution, on August 22, 2003, PO3 Perez received an
information that a certain “Cano” was selling drugs in his house at Bacolod City.
Inspector Lorilla then called a briefing for a buy-bust operation where PO3 Perez as
designated as the poseur-buyer. Two (2) P50 bills were prepared as marked money.

Upon arrival at the target area, PO3 Perez and the asset knocked on the door and were
greeted by accused Abetong, who asked the purpose of the visit. PO3 Perez answered
that he wanted to buy P100 worth of shabu. The two were ushered in by accused-
appellant and once inside, PO3 Perez saw three persons sitting around a table, passing
to one another a tooter and allegedly engaged in a pot session. The three were
identified as Bayotas, Relos and Berturan. PO3 Perez then drew two PhP 50 bills
marked “WCP” and handed them over to accused-appellant who in turn gave him a
plastic sachet containing white crystallinesubstance from his right pocket.

After receiving the plastic sachet, PO3 Perez introduced himself as a police officer and
signalled his back-up to effect the arrest of the four individuals. The suspects attempted
to flee but their plans were foiled by the timely arrival of the other policemen. They were
then brought to the police station where their arrest and the list of the items confiscated
from them were entered in the police blotter. From their arrest until the items seized
were transmitted to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, the pieces of
evidence were allegedly under PO3 Perez’s custody. In his testimony, PO3 Perez
stated that he kept the items inside the evidence locker in the Drug Enforcement Unit
Office, to which only Inspector Lorilla has a key.

On August 25, 2013, PO3 Perez brought the sachet containing crystalline substance
and the tooter to the PNP Crime Laboratory for testing. Inspector Ompoy received the
items and performed the necessary examinations. She testified that the
white crystalline substance in the plastic sachet tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, weighing 0.04 gram while the tooter tested negative
for any prohibited drug.

RTC found accused-appellant guilty of violation of Section 5 of RA 9165. CA affirmed

said decision.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish an unbroken chain of custody over
the drug evidence.

HELD:
No. The Court held that prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody
over the drug evidence.

Jurisprudence indeed instructs that failure to observe strictly Section 21 of RA 9165 can
be excused as long as (1) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officers and (2) non-compliance was attended
by justifiable grounds. However, the prosecution in this case was unsuccessful in
showing that there was no opportunity for tampering, contamination, substitution, nor
alteration of the specimens submitted. On the contrary, there is a dearth of evidence to
show that the evidence presented was well preserved. The prosecution likewise failed
to offer any justification on why the afore-quoted provision was not complied with.
Dr. DELA LLANA vs. BIONG

2013-12-04 | G.R. No. 182356

FACTS: On March 30, 2000, Juan dela Llana was driving and his sister, Dra. dela
Llana, was seated at the front passenger seat while a certain Calimlim was at the
backseat. Juan stopped the car across the Veterans Memorial Hospital when the signal
light turned red. A few seconds after the car halted, a dump truck rammed the car’s rear
end, violently pushing the car forward. Dra. Dela Llana suffered minor wounds. The
traffic investigation report dated March 30, 2000 identified the truck driver as Joel
Primero who is an employee of respondent Rebecca Biong. In the first week of May
2000, Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate pain on the left side of hernneck
and shoulder. The pain became more intense as days passed by. Her injury became
more severe. On June 9, 2000, she to suffer from a whiplash injury, an injury caused by
the compression of the nerve running to her left arm and is required to undergo serious
medication to alleviate her condition. Thus she demanded from Biong compensation for
her injuries, but Rebecca refused to pay. This made her sued Biong for damages before
the Regional Trial Court. The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana but was reversed by
the CA.

ISSUE: Whether Joel’s reckless driving is the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana’s
whiplash injury and consider her medical certificate as an admissible evidence.

RULING: The SC said that “the basic rule that evidence which has not been admitted
cannot be validly considered by the courts in arriving at their judgments. However, even
if we consider the medical certificate in the disposition of this case, the medical
certificate has no probative value for being hearsay. It is a basic rule that evidence,
whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the
personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of another person who is not
on the witness stand. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given
credence except in very unusual circumstance that is not found in the present case.
Furthermore, admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence.
The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while the
weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince
and persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary
weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the Rules of
Court.”

In sum, Dra. dela Liana miserably failed to establish her case by preponderance of
evidence. While we commiserate with her, our solemn duty to independently and
impartially assess the merits of the case binds us to rule against Dra. dela Liana's favor.
Her claim, unsupported by preponderance of evidence, is merely a bare assertion and
has no leg to stand on.
Samalio vs Court of Appeals

SCRA 462

Facts: Weng Sai Qin, a Chinese with Uruguayan passport, was taken to Augusto R.
Samalio, Intelligence Officer of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID),
because her passport was suspected to be fake. Qin paid Samalio $500 in exchange of
her passport but Samalio returned Qin’s passport without an immigration arrival stamp.
Thereafter, a criminal casefor robbery and violation of the Immigration Law was filed
against Samalio in the Sandiganbayan, as well as an administrative case for
dishonesty, oppression and misconduct. Samalio was found guilty of the charges in
both proceedings and was ordered dismissed from service by the BID Commissioner,
and such decision was affirmed by the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the Secretary
of Justice and the Court of Appeals. The CSC and the Secretary of Justice took
cognizance of the testimony of Weng Sai Qin in the Sandiganbayan case, applying
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Issue: Whether or not the Rules on Evidence applies in the administrative case.

Ruling: Yes. The CSC and the Secretary of Justice did not err in applying Section 47,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the “rule on former testimony,” in
deciding petitioner’s administrative case. The provisions of the Rules of Court may be
applied suppletorily to the rules of procedure of administrative bodies exercising quasi-
judicial powers, unless otherwise provided by law or the rules of procedure of the
administrative agency concerned. The Rules of Court, which are meant to secure to
every litigant the adjective phase of due process of law, may be applied to proceedings
before an administrative body with quasi-judicial powers in the absence of different and
valid statutory or administrative provisions prescribing the ground rules for the
investigation, hearing and adjudication of cases before it. For Section 47, Rule 130 to
apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or unable to
testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial
or administrative, between the same parties or those representing the same interests;
(c) the former case involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on
different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is
the same issue involved in the present case and (e) the adverse party had an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case. In this case, Weng Sai Qin
was unable to testify inthe administrative proceedings before the BID because she left
the country even before the administrative complaint against petitioner was instituted.
Petitioner does not deny that the testimony of Weng Sai Qin was given in
Sandiganbayan case, the very basis for filing the administrative complaint. Hence, the
issue testified to by Weng Sai Qin in such case was the same issue in the
administrative case, that is, whether petitioner extorted money from Weng Sai Qin.
Petitioner also had the opportunity to face and cross-examine his accuser Weng Sai
Qin, and to defend and vindicate his cause before the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, all the
requisites for the proper application of the rule on former testimony were satisfied.
Ong Chia vs Republic of the Philippines

SCRA 749

Facts: Ong Chia was born in China but he came to the country when he wasa boy and
stayed here since then. When he was 66 years old, he filed apetition to be admitted as
a Filipino citizen. He testified as to hisqualifications and presented witnesses to
corroborate the facts which willadmit him Filipino citizenship and the trial court granted
such petition.However, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the trial court’s
decisionwhen the State appealed to it, annexing in its appellant's brief thepertinent
documents for naturalization which contends that petitionerfailed to support his petition
with the appropriate documentaryevidence. Ong Chia now contends that the appellate
court erred inconsidering the documents which had merely been annexed by theState to
its appellant's brief and that such documents, not having beenpresented and formally
offered as evidence, are mere scraps of paper.

Issue: Whether or not the documents annexed to the State’s appellant briefsshould be
considered as evidence even if they were not formally introducedas evidence.

Ruling: Yes. The documents should be considered as evidence. In thiscase, the

Supreme Court held that the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule132, Section 34 of
the Rules of Court) now being invoked by petitioner isclearly not applicable to the
present case involving a petition fornaturalization. Rule 143 of the Rules of Court states,
“These rules shallnot apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases,
naturalization andinsolvency proceedings, and other cases not therein provided for,
except byanalogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable andconvenient
.” The only instance when said rules may be applied byanalogy or suppletorily in such
cases is when it is "practicable andconvenient." In the case at bar, petitioner claims that
as a result of thefailure of the State to present and formally offer its
documentaryevidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to objectagainst
their authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamentalright to procedural due
process. However, the Supreme Court is notpersuaded, ruling that the reason for the
rule prohibiting the admissionof evidence which has not been formally offered is to
afford the oppositeparty the chance to object to their admissibility. Petitioner cannot
claim thathe was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the
documentssubmitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have included
hisobjections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals.
Bantolino vs Coca Cola Bottlers, Inc.

SCRA 699

Facts: Prudencio Bantolino, Nestor Romero et al., who are formeremployees of Coca
Cola, filed a case against the latter for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor
of the employees, and ordered theirreinstatement and the payment of backwages. The
Labor Arbiter also ruledthat despite the negative declarations of Coca Cola as to its
relationship withthe complainants, the complainants’ testimonies are more credible to
provethe existence of employer-employee relationship. The NLRC affirmed
suchdecision but the Court of Appeals modified such ruling because thecomplainants’
affidavits should not be given probative value since they werenot subjected to cross-
examination, they were not affirmed and therefore,they are hearsay evidence.

Issue: Whether or not administrative bodies like the NLRC should be strictlybound by
the rules of evidence.

Ruling: No. The argument that the affidavit is hearsay because the affiantswere not
presented for cross examination is not persuasive because therules of evidence are not
strictly observed in proceedings beforeadministrative bodies like the NLRC, where
decisions may be reached on thebasis of position papers only. It is not necessary for
the affiants to appearand testify and be cross-examined by counsel of the adverse
party. Torequire otherwise would be to negate the rationale and purpose of thesummary
nature of the proceedings in the NLRC. The rules of evidenceprevailing in courts of law
do not control proceedings before the labor arbiterand the NLRC. They are authorized
to adopt reasonable means to ascertainthe facts in each case speedily and objectively
without regard totechnicalities of law and procedure all in the interest of due process.
People of the Philippines vs Galleno

SCRA 761

Facts: Joeral Galleno was charged with statutory rape committed againstEvelyn
Obligar, a five year old girl. The prosecution presented three expertwitnesses namely,
Dr. Alfonso Orosco, Dr. Ma. Lourdes Lañada, and Dr.Machael Toledo, whose
testimonies convinced the trial court that rape wascommitted against Obligar. Galleno
contended that he should be acquittedsince the expert testimonies were not impeccable
considering that thedoctors found that there was no presence of spermatozoa, and that
theywere not sure as to what caused the laceration in the victim's vagina.

Issue: Whether or not the lacking testimonies of the expert witnesses as tothe
occurrence of carnal knowledge should result to the acquittal of theaccused.

Ruling: As a general rule, witnesses must state facts and not drawconclusions or give
opinions. It is the court's duty to draw conclusions fromthe evidence and form opinions
upon the facts proved. However, conclusionsand opinions of witnesses are received in
many cases, and are not confinedto expert testimony, based on the principle that either
because of the specialskill or expert knowledge of the witness, or because of the nature
of thesubject matter under observation, or for other reasons, the testimony will aidthe
court in reaching a judgment.In the case at bar, the trial court arrived at its conclusions
not only with theaid of the expert testimony of doctors who gave their opinions as to
thepossible cause of the victim's laceration, but also the testimony of the
otherprosecution witness, especially the victim herself. In other words, the trialcourt did
not rely solely on the testimony of the expert witnesses. Suchexpert testimony merely
aided the trial court in the exercise of its judgmenton the facts. Hence, the fact that the
experts enumerated various possiblecauses of the victim's laceration does not mean the
trial court's interferenceis wrong. The absence of spermatozoa in the victim's vagina
does not negatethe conclusion that it was his penis which was inserted in the victim's
vagina.In rape, the important consideration is not the emission of semen but
thepenetration of the female genitalia by the male organ.
People of the Philippines vs Florante Relanes

G.R. No. 175831

FACTS: Private complainant AAA was only eight years old when her father, the
accused herein raped her on the first week of Aug. 2002 and on Jan. 9, 2003. The
victim got pregnant as a result of the abuses where the accused threatened to kill her
and her family if she would tell anyone. AAA gave a testimony and described how she
was abused.Accused denied the rape incident on Jan. 2003 but eventually admitted on
having sexualintercourse with AAA on Aug. 2002. During the course of the trial, he
pleaded forgiveness to hiswife, daughter and other members of his family. He was
convicted for each count of rape with a penalty of death. Judgment was affirmed by CA
hence, the automatic review.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the trial court erred gravely in giving full weight and credence to the
incrediblestatement of AAA;

2. Whether or not the plea for forgiveness by the accused can be considered as an
attempt tocompromise and is therefore admissible in evidence as an admission of guilt;

RULINGS:

1. NO. The defense of the accused of denial and alibi should be dismissed outright in
light of his positive identification of AAA. It is an established rule that denial and alibi,
being negative self-serving defences, cannot prevail over the positive allegations of the
victim and her categorical and positive identification of the accused as her assailant.

2. YES. Evidently, no one would ask for forgiveness unless he committed some wrong
and a plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to
compromise. Settled is the rule that in criminal cases, except those involving quasi-
offenses as those allowed by law to be settled through mutual concessions, an offer to
compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of
guilt. Under the circumstances, his plea for forgiveness should be received as an
implied admission of guilt. Judgment of CA was affirmed. Penalty of death reduced to
reclusion perpetua.
ANTONIETA LUCIDO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 217764, August 07, 2017

Facts: In an Information, appellant was charged with child abuse under Section 10(a) of
Republic Act No. 7610, alleging that accused, unlawfully and intentionally, beat with the
use of a belt, pinched, and strangulated the child victim AAA, who was then eight (8)
years old, thereby inflicting physical injuries that affected the normal development of the
said child victim. A subsequent physical examination conducted by Dr. Abiera confirmed
AAA's story. His findings were as follows: Multiple abrasions on different parts of the
body secondary to pricking, nail marks/scratches, there is redness on the peripheral
circumference of the hymen, No hymenal laceration noted and there is weakness of (L)
knee joint upon walking. Appellant denied that she pinched, beat and hit AAA and that
she inserted her finger into AAA's vagina. She claimed that she usually cleaned AAA's
vagina and bathed her with hot water.

Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of child abuse.

Ruling: Yes. As defined in the law, child abuse includes physical abuse of the child,
whether it is habitual or not. Section 10 of RA 7610 provides that any person who shall
commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other
conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by Article 59 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.

In this case, AAA's testimony was corroborated by Dr. Abierra. First, there were
"multiple abrasions on different parts of [AAA's] body." Additionally, he observed a
"redness on the peripheral circumference of the hymen," which could have been caused
by a hard pinching. Finally, there was an evident "weakness on the left knee joint,"
which could have been caused by the victim falling to the ground or being beaten by a
hard object. Strangulating, severely pinching, and beating an eight (8)-year-old child to
cause her to limp are intrinsically cruel and excessive. These acts of abuse impair the
child's dignity and worth as a human being and infringe upon her right to grow up in a
safe, wholesome, and harmonious place. It is not difficult to perceive that this
experience of repeated physical abuse from petitioner would prejudice the child's social,
moral, and emotional development.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ERLINDA A. SISON

G.R. No. 187160, August 9, 2017

Facts: Casuera and Magalona met appellant and the latter briefed Castuera on the
requirements for working as a fruit picker in Australia. She introduced Castuera to
another man who related that he was able to go to Australia with her help. She also
showed Castuera pictures of other people she had supposedly helped to get
employment in Australia. Appellant further narrated that a couple she had helped had
given her their car as payment. Because of her representations, Castuera believed in
her promise that she could send him to Australia. Appellant asked Castuera for
₱180,000 for processing his papers.

Appellant, however, failed to secure an Australian visa for Castuera. Together with
Dedales and Bacomo, appellant convinced Castueara that that it was difficult to get an
Australian visa in the Philippines so they had to go to Malaysia or in Indonesia to get
one. Subsequently, Castuera's application for an Australian visa in Indonesia was
denied. Dedales asked for US$1,000 for the processing of his U.S. visa, which he paid.
However, when his U.S. visa came, Castuera saw that it was in an Indonesian passport
bearing an Indonesian name. Because of this, Castuera decided to just return to the
Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of syndicated estafa.

Ruling: Yes. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate carried out by a

group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. Under
RA 8042, a non-licensee or non-holder of authority commits illegal recruitment for
overseas employment in two ways: (1) by any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referring, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not; or
(2) by undertaking any of the acts enumerated under Section 6 of RA 8042.

In this case, appellant herself admits that she has no license or authority to undertake
recruitment and placement activities. Since it was proven that the three accused were
acting in concert and conspired with one another, their illegal recruitment activity is
considered done by a syndicate, making the offense illegal recruitment involving
economic sabotage.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GILDA ABELLANOSA

G.R. No. 214340, July 19, 2017

Facts: Appellant was charged with Illegal Recruitment in large scale in an Information
alleging that that accused falsely representing to possess authority to recruit job
applicants for employment abroad without first having secured the required authority
from the POEA, illegally collect and receive from GEPHRE 0. POMAR the amount of
(₱5,500.00), as partial payment of processing and placement fees for overseas
employment, which illegal recruitment activities is considered an offense involving
economic sabotage, it being committed in large scale under Sec. 6(m) paragraph 2 of
Republic Act [No.] 8042, having committed the same not only against Gephre O. Pomar
but also against seven (7) others.

Appellant denied meeting any of the private complainants while she was in Iloilo and
maintained that her purpose in going to Iloilo was only to assist Shirley in processing the
latter's business license. Appellant likewise denied that she received money from the
private complainants; she claimed that it was Shirley who was engaged in recruitment
activities.

Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale.

Ruling: Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three
(3) or more persons individually or as a group.

In this case, private complainants Pomar, Pastolero, Cathedral, Orias, Suobiron,

Bueron, and Pelipog testified that appellant went to Pavia, Iloilo and represented herself
as a recruiter who could send them to Brunei for work; that appellant impressed upon
them that she had the authority or ability to send them overseas for work by showing
them a job order from Brunei and a calling card; and appellant collected processing or
placement fees from the private complainants in various amounts ranging from
₱5,000.00 to ₱20,000.00; and that she did not reimburse said amounts despite
demands. In addition, it was proved that appellant does not have any license or
authority to recruit workers for overseas employment as shown by the certification
issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration.

Finally, appellant recruited seven persons, or more than the minimum of three persons
required by law, for illegal recruitment to be considered in large scale.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WILLINGTON RODRIGUEZ

G.R. No. 211721, September 20, 2017

Facts: The evidence for the prosecution is anchored solely on the testimony of Police
Officer I Escober alleging that at around 11:00 P.M .PO1 Escober was at the police
station preparing for the police operation called Oplan Bugaw for the purpose of
eliminating prostitution on Quezon Avenue. PO1 Escober, designated to pose as
customer, was accompanied by P02 Bereber as his backup, and P/lnsp. Lopez. While
parking their vehicles at the target area, PO1 Escober was flagged down by Rodriguez
who allegedly offered the sexual services of three (3) pickup girls. PO1 Escober readily
gave Rodriguez the pre-marked ₱500.00 bill as payment. This signaled his backup to
enter the scene and aid in the arrest. PO1 Escober then retrieved the pre-marked bill.
Thereafter, the officers brought Rodriguez and the three (3) pickup girls to the police
station.

In his defense, Rodriguez denied that he had offered a girl for sexual purposes to PO1
Escober.

Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of qualified trafficking in persons.

Ruling: No. Section 3(a)29 provides the elements of trafficking in persons: (1) the
recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipts of persons with or without
the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders; (2) the means
used which include "threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud,
deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the
person, or the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a
person having control over another; and (3) the purpose of trafficking is exploitation
which includes "exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of
organs.

In the instant case, only PO1 Escober testified as to the actual unfolding of
circumstances which led him to believe that Rodriguez was committing human
trafficking. The prosecution did not bother to present the testimonies of the alleged
victims. Their testimonies that they were sexually exploited against their will through
force, threat or other means of coercion are material to the cause of the prosecution.
JOHN DENNIS G. CHUA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES & CRISTINA YAO

G.R. No. 195248, November 22, 2017

Facts: Sometime in the year 2000, petitioner's mother mentioned that her son would be
reviving their sugar mill business and asked whether Yao could lend them money. Yao
acceded and loaned petitioner ₱1 million on 3 January 2001; ₱1 million on 7 January
2001; and ₱l.5 million on 16 February 2001. She also lent petitioner an additional ₱2.5
million in June 2001. As payment petitioner issued four (4) checks in these amounts but
which were dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account. Upon dishonor
of the checks, Yao personally delivered her demand letter to the office of the petitioner
which was received by his secretary. Petitioner was thus charged with four (4) counts of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

Petitioner argued that the prosecution failed to prove actual receipt of the notice.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of B.P.22.

Ruling: No. To be liable for violation of B.P. Big. 22, the following essential elements
must be present: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for
account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time
of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of
the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.

The Court finds that the second element was not sufficiently established. Yao testified
that the personal secretary of petitioner received the demand letter, yet, said personal
secretary was never presented to testify whether she in fact handed the demand letter
to petitioner who, from the onset, denies having received such letter. It must be borne in
mind that it is not enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of dishonor was sent
to the accused. The prosecution must also prove actual receipt of said notice, because
the fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of
dishonor by the accused.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DENNIS MANALIGOD

G.R. No. 218584, April 25, 2018

Facts: BBB asked her daughter, AAA, an eight (8) year old minor, to borrow a cellphone
charger at the videoke bar where she worked. When AAA came back, BBB saw that
AAA had P20.00 in her possession. She asked AAA where it came from and the latter
answered that appellant gave it to her. BBB asked why appellant would give her P20.00
but AAA refused to answer because appellant told her not to tell anyone. Upon further
questioning by her mother, AAA narrated that appellant brought her to a room at the
videoke bar where he removed her clothes and underwear, and then undressed himself.
Afterwards, he repeatedly inserted his penis into AAA's vagina. Appellant then told AAA
not to tell her mother what had happened and gave her P20.00. Dr. Lorenzo performed
the examination and found lacerations in AAA's vagina.

Accused-appellant, through his counsel, manifested that he would not present evidence
for his defense.

Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of statutory rape under RA 8353.

Ruling: Yes. Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below 12
years of age regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to the sexual act. Proof of force,
intimidation or consent is unnecessary as they are not elements of statutory rape,
considering that the absence of free consent is conclusively presumed when the victim
is below the age of 12. Thus, to convict an accused of the crime of statutory rape, the
prosecution carries the burden of proving: (a) the age of the complainant; (b) the identity
of the accused; and (c) the sexual intercourse between the accused and the
complainant.

As evidenced by her Certificate of Live Birth, AAA was only eight (8) years old at the
time she was sexually molested on 24 September 2007. Inside the courtroom, AAA
identified accused-appellant as her rapist. AAA's narration was likewise corroborated by
Dr. Lorenzo's medical findings as to the existence of hymenal laceration. When the
testimony of a rape victim is consistent with the medical findings, there is sufficient basis
to conclude that there has been carnal knowledge.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANUEL GAMBOA

G.R. No. 233702, June 20, 2018

Facts: During a buy-bust operation, PO2 Nieva asked appellant if he could buy P200.00
worth of shabu, handing as payment the buy-bust money. In turn, appellant gave PO2
Nieva a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. PO2 Nieva removed his
bull cap, prompting the back-up officers to rush towards the scene and arrest appellant.
Subsequently, they recovered another plastic sachet and the buy-bust money. PO2
Nieva immediately marked the two (2) plastic sachets and inventoried the items at the
place of arrest in the presence of appellant and a media representative named Rene
Crisostomo. Photographs of the confiscated items were also taken by PO3 Benitez
during the marking and inventory. Thereafter, PO2 Nieva brought appellant and the
seized drugs to the police station where PO3 Benitez prepared the Request for
Laboratory Examination.

Issue: Whether or not the CA correctly upheld appellant’s conviction for Illegal Sale and
Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs.

Ruling: No, the police officers committed unjustified deviations from the prescribed
chain of custody rule, thereby putting into question the integrity and evidentiary value of
the items purportedly seized from appellant.

Under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the apprehending team shall, among others,
immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph
the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items
were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same.

An examination of the records reveals that the same was not done in the presence of
any elected public official, as well as a representative from the DOJ. In fact, such lapse
was admitted by PO2 Nieva. Thus, for failure of the prosecution to provide justifiable
grounds or show that special circumstances exist which would excuse their
transgression, the Court is constrained to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the items purportedly seized from appellant have been compromised.
REYES VS. COURT OF APPEALS

216 SCRA 25

Facts: Juan Mendoza, the father of defendant Olympio, is the owner of Farm Lots Nos.
46 and 106, devoted to the production of palay. The lots are tenanted and cultivated by
Julian de la Cruz, the husband of plaintiff Eufrocina de la Cruz. In her complaint,
Eufrocina alleged that upon the death of her husband, she succeeded him as bona fide
tenant. However, Olympio in conspiracy with the other defendants prevented her
daughter Violeta and her workers from entering and working on the farm lots.
Defendants likewise refused to vacate and surrender the lots, which prompted Eufrocina
to file a case for the recovery of possession and damages with a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction in the meantime.

The petitioners in this case, the defendants Reyes, Parayao, Aguinaldo and
Mananghaya, are duly elected and appointed barangay officials of the locality, who
denied their interference in the tenancy relationship existing between Olympio and
Eufrocina. Olympio, for his part, raised abandonment, sublease and mortgage of the
farm lots without his consent, and non-payment of rentals as his defenses.

The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the agrarian court’s decision with modification,
which ordered the defendants to restore possession of the farm lots to plaintiff
Eufrocina. The CA likewise ruled that the petitioners are solidarily liable to pay to
Eufrocina the value of cavans of palay until they have vacated the area. On appeal, the
petitioners questioned the favorable consideration given to the affidavits of Eufrocina
and EfrenTecson, since the affiants were not presented and subjected to cross-
examination.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred when it gave favorable consideration to the
affidavits of plaintiff, even if the affiant was not presented and subjected to cross-
examination.

Ruling: The judgment is affirmed. The trial court did not err when it favorable
considered the affidavits of Eufrocina and EfrenTecson although the affiants were not
presented and subjected to cross-examination. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 provides
that the “Rules of Court shall not be applicable in agrarian cases even in a suppletory
character.” The same provision states that “In the hearing, investigation and
determination of any question or controversy, affidavits and counter-affidavits may be
allowed and are admissible in evidence,” Moreover, in agrarian cases, the quantum of
evidence required is no more than substantial evidence. Thus, this case is an
application of the rule with regard the scope of the Rules on Evidence which states that
“The rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts and in all trials and hearings
except as otherwise provided by law (ex. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946)or these rules.”
PEOPLE VS. TURCO

337 SCRA 714

Facts: Rodegelio Turco, Jr. (a.k.a. “Totong”) was charged with the crime of rape. The
prosecution alleged that the victim, Escelea Tabada (12 yrs and 6 months old at the
time of the incident) and accused Turco were neighbors. On the night of the incident,
upon reaching her home, Escelea heard a call from outside. She recognized the voice
to be Turco’s since they have been neighbors for 4 years and are second cousins.
When she opened the door, the accused with the use of a towel, covered the victim’s
face. Then the accused bid the victim to walk. When they reached a grassy part, near
the pig pen which was about 12 meters away from the victim’s house, the accused laid
the victim on the grass, went on top of her an took off her short pants and panty. The
victim tried to resist by moving her body but to no avail. The accused succeeded in
pursuing his evil design by forcibly inserting his penis inside the victim’s private parts.

Upon reaching home, the victim discovered that her short pants and panty were filled
with blood. For almost ten days, she kept to herself the harrowing experience, until she
had the courage to tell her brother-in-law, who in turn told the victim’s father about the
rape of his daughter. Thereafter, they did not waste time and immediately asked the
victim to see a doctor for medical examination. After the issuance of the medical
certificate, they went to the Isabela Municipal Station and filed a complaint against the
accused charging him with rape.

The trial court convicted the accused, stating that the defense of “sweetheart theory”
was a mere concoction of the accused in order to exculpate him from criminal liability.
Appealing his conviction, the accused-appellant argues that the trial court erred
because no actual proof was presented that the rape of the complainant actually
happened considering that although a medical certificate was presented, the medico-
legal officer who prepared the same was not presented in court to explain the same.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting the medical certificate in
evidence, although the medico-legal officer who prepared the same was not presented
in court to testify on it.

Ruling: Conviction affirmed. We place emphasis on the distinction between

admissibility of evidence and the probative value thereof. Evidence is admissible when
it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules (Section 3, Rule
128) or is competent. Since admissibility of evidence is determined by its relevance and
competence, admissibility is therefore, an affair of logic and law. On the other hand, the
weight to be given to such evidence, once admitted, depends on judicial evaluation
within the guidelines provided in rule 133 and the jurisprudence laid down by the Court.
Thus, while evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled to little or no weight at all.
Conversely, evidence which may have evidentiary weight may be inadmissible because
a special rule forbids its reception.
However, although the medical certificate is an exception to the hearsay rule, hence
admissible as evidence, it has very little probative value due to the absence of the
examining physician. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the prosecution relied solely
on the medical certificate. In fact, reliance was made on the testimony of the victim
herself, which standing alone even without the medical examination, is sufficient
evidence. The absence of medical findings by a medico-legal officer does not disprove
the occurrence of rape. It is enough that the evidence on hand convinces the court that
conviction is proper. In the instant case, the victim’s testimony alone is credible and
sufficient to convict.
AGUSTIN VS. CA

G.R. No. 162571

Facts: Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin’s alleged
biological father, petitioner Arnel Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before
the Quezon City RTC. In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe,
after which they entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe
on her 34th birthday but despite Arnel’s insistence on abortion, Fe decided to give birth
to their child out of wedlock, Martin. The baby’s birth certificate was purportedly signed
by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later
refused Fe’s repeated requests for Martin’s support despite his adequate financial
capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also
denied having fathered the child.

On January 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf
and Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting
Fe’s leg. This incident was reported to the police. Several months later, Fe was
diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. Fe and
Martin then sued Arnel for support. Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order
directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing, which Arnel
opposed by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination and moving to
dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action. The trial court denied the MTD and
ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the
applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, thus this petition.

Issue: Whether or Not, the court erred in directing parties to subject to DNA paternity
testing and was a form of unreasonable search.

Ruling: NO. In Ople v. Torres,the Supreme Court struck down the proposed national
computerized identification system embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said:

In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all
incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and
technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good...
Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public
service and the common good.

Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, and the
infringement of privacy of communication where the constitutional right to privacy has
been critically at issue. Petitioner’s case involves neither and, as already stated, his
argument that his right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water.
LOPEZ VS. HEESEN

365 P.2d 448

Facts: Heesen, an air Force officer, purchased a J.C. Higgins Model 51 30.06 rifle from
the store of appellee Sears. The rifle has a bolt action known as a “Mausser type
action” with a “Class 1” safety mechanism. At the time of the purchase, Heesen was
given an instruction pamphlet which he read, explaining the composition of the rifle and
gave operating instructions. Immediately after the purchase, Heesen left for a deer
hunting trip in an area known as Ute Park. He placed a live cartridge in the chamber
and placed the gun on safety position. He traveled a good deal during the hours before
the shooting and on one of two occasions, he discovered the gun off safety position.
This occurred when he had come down a long hill covered with rocks and boulders.
Heesen was not aware that the rifle moved from “safe to fire’ position at least twice
before the shooting. Ten minutes before the accident began, he left the knoll and he
was carrying the gun on his shoulder.

He later heard a rustle and saw a deer go between some trees. When he followed the
deer, his left foot went down hard on the ground on one side of a log and his right foot
slipped on the grass. This brought the rifle down and the rifle discharged, the bullet
hitting appellant Lopez, who was nearby. Lopez brought suit against Heesen for
allegedly unlawfully assaulting him, thereby inflicting dangerous and painful wounds.

Defendants presented expert testimony on the general reputation of other firearms

companies who use the same modified leaf safety device as the Higgins Model 51.
Lopez objected to this evidence on the ground that it was wholly immaterial and
irrelevant to any issue in the case. He likewise objected on the introduction of testimony
on the “poundage pressure” required to move the safety levers from safe to fire position
on the ground of irrelevance and immateriality.

Issues: Whether or not expert testimony on the general reputation of other firearms
companies using the same safety device is material and relevant.

Ruling: The expert testimony is admissible. The allegations on the ultimate facts in
issue involve whether the Higgins Model 51 rifle was in a dangerous and defective
condition due to its negligent manufacture, in that the safety mechanism moved re4adily
from “safe” to “fire” position. This is an issue, the proper understanding of which,
requires knowledge or experience and cannot be determined independently merely from
deductions made and inferences drawn on the basis of ordinary knowledge. Moreover,
the conduct of others is proper evidence for a jury to consider, in determining whether
the tendency of the thing is dangerous, defective, or the reverse. Considering these
principles, the Court held that the testimony as to the reputation of other firearms
companies using the same safety device is material and relevant to the issue of whether
the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 was unsafe or safe, and that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony.
PEOPLE VS. MARTI

193 SCRA 57

Facts: Andre Marti and his wife went to Manila Packing and Export Forwarders, carrying
with them four gift wrapped packages to be delivered to his friend in Zurich, Switzerland.
Anita Reyes (wife of the proprietor) asked if she could inspect the packages, however,
Marti refused assuring that it only contained books, cigars and gloves as gift to his
friend.

Before delivery to Bureau of Customs/Posts, the proprietor Job Reyes, following

standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened
Marti's boxes, a particular odor emitted therefrom and he soon found out that the boxes
contained dried marijuana leaves. He reported the incident to the NBI who
acknowledged custody of the incident. Marti was convicted for violation of R.A. 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Issue: Marti contends that the evidence had been obtained in violation of his
constitutional rights against unreasonable seach and siezure and privacy of
communication.

Ruling: Evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a

private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation
of State authorities. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberty guaranteed
by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
PEOPLE VS. DAVID

G.R. No. 181881

Facts: Respondent CSC Chair Constantino-David received an anonymous letter

complaint alleging of an anomaly taking place in the Regional Office of the CSC. The
respondent then formed a team and issued a memo directing the team “to back up all
the files in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.”

Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of PALD and
LSD computers were turned over to Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes
were examined by the CSC’s Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of
the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the computer assigned to and
being used by the petitioner were draft pleadings or letters in connection with
administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. On the basis of this finding,
Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause Order, requiring the petitioner, who had
gone on extended leave, to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days
from notice.

In his Comment, petitioner denied the accusations against him and accused the CSC
Officials of “fishing expedition” when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in
his computer. He was charged of violating R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees). He assailed the formal charge and filed
an Omnibus Motion assailing the formal charge as without basis having proceeded from
an illegal search which is beyond the authority of the CSC Chairman, such power
pertaining solely to the court.

The CSC denied the omnibus motion and treated the motion as the petitioner’s answer
to the charge. In view of the absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon the motion
of the prosecution, petitioner was deemed to have waived his right to the formal
investigation which then proceeded ex parte.

The petitioner was dismissed from service. He filed a petition to the CA which was
dismissed by the latter on the ground that it found no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the respondents. He filed a motion for reconsideration which was further denied
by the appellate court. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the search conducted by the CSC on the computer of the
petitioner constituted an illegal search and was a violation of his constitutional right to
privacy

Ruling: The search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal
files was lawful and did not violate his constitutional right.

In this case, the Court had the chance to present the cases illustrative of the issue
raised by the petitioner. In Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 437 (1967), the US Supreme
Court held that the act of FBI agents in electronically recording a conversation made by
petitioner in an enclosed public telephone booth violated his right to privacy and
constituted a “search and seizure”. Because the petitioner had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in using the enclosed booth to make a personal telephone call,
the protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to such area. More so, the concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan noted that the existence of privacy right under prior
decisions involved a two-fold requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation be one that society
is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).
GANAAN VS. IAC

145 SCRA 112

Facts: Complainant Atty. Pintor and his client Montebon, were in the living room of
complainant’s residence, discussing the terms from the withdrawal of the complaint for
direct assault which they filed against Laconico. After they decided on the conditions,
Atty. Pintor made a phone call to Laconico. That same morning, Laconico telephoned
Atty. Gaanan to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault
case.

When Atty. Pintor called, Laconico requested Atty. Gaanan to secretly listen to the
telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the
proposed conditions for the settlement. Twenty minutes later, Atty. Pinto called up again
to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico agreed. An amount of
P5,000 as settlement money was agreed upon. He was instructed to give the money to
give the money to Atty. Pintor’s wife at the office of the Department of Public Highways.
However, Laconico insisted that Atty. Pintor himself should receive the money.
However, when Atty. Pintor received the money, he was arrested by agents of the
Philippine Constabulary. On the following day, Atty. Gaanan executed an affidavit that
he heard complainant Atty. Pintor demand P8,000 for the withdrawal of the case for
direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit to the complaint for robbery/extortion
which he filed against Atty. Pintor. Since Atty. Gaanan listened to the telephone
conversation without Atty. Pintor’s consent, Atty. Pintor charged Atty. Gaanan and
Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act (R.A. No. 4200).

Atty. Gaanan and Laconico were found guilty by the trial court. The decision was
affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) stating that the “extension telephone”
which was used to overhear the telephone conversation was covered in the term
“device” as provided in R.A. No. 4200.

Issue: Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited device in Section
1 of the Anti-Wiretapping Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation would
constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two parties using a
telephone line.

Ruling: The main issue revolves around the meaning of the phrase “any other device or
arrangement.” The law refers to a “tap” of a wire or cable or the use of a “device or
arrangement” for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the
communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the
deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or
record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone,
dictagraph or the other device enumerated un Section 1 of R.A. No. 4200 as the use
thereof cannot be considered as “tapping” the wire or cable of a telephone line. The
telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to
be there for ordinary office use.

The phrase “device or arrangement”, although not exclusive to that enumerated, should
be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is,
instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a
telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed
by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of
common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting, or recording a
telephone conversation.

An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when

the extended unit does not have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can
be moved from place to place within a radius of a kilometer or more.

An extension telephone is not among such device or arrangements covered by Section

1 of R.A No. 4200.
SALCEDO VS CA

235 SCRA 111

Facts:

Rafael Ortañez filed a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against his
wife TeresitaSalcedo-Ortañez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or
psychological incapacity of Teresita. Among the exhibits offered by Rafael were three
(3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between Teresita and unidentified
persons. These tape recordings were made and obtained when Rafael allowed his
friends from the military to wiretap his home telephone.

Teresita objected to Rafael’s oral offer of the said tapes. However, the Regional Trail
Court (RTC) of Quezon City admitted the tapes into evidence. Teresita filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), but the CA upheld the lower court’s order
for two reasons: (1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. hey are admissible
depending on how they are presented and offered and how the trial judge utilizes them
and (2) Certiorari is inappropriate since the order admitting the tape into evidence is
interlocutory. The order should be questioned in the appeal from the judgment on the
merits and through the special civil action of certiorari. Hence, Teresita filed a petition
for review with the Supreme Court (SC).

Issues:

1. Whether or not the recordings of Teresita’s phone conversations, made and obtained
through wiretapping are admissible as evidence (not per se inadmissible)

2. Whether or not a petition for certiorari is the appropriate remedy to question an order
admitting the tapes into evidence

Ruling:

1. The tape recordings are inadmissible. Relevant provisions of R.A. 4200 (Anti-
Wiretapping Act) provides that:

Section 1: It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all parties to any
private conversation or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone, or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described x xx

Section 4. Any communication, or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance,

purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein
contained, obtained, or secured by any person in violation of the preceding section of
this Act shall not be admitted in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or
administrative hearing or investigation.

Hence, absent any clear showing that both parties consented to the recording, the
inadmissibility of the tapes is mandatory under R.A. No. 4200

2. Certiorari was the appropriate remedy. Generally, the extraordinary writ of certiorari
is not available to challenge interlocutory orders of a trial court. The proper remedy is
an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment, incorporating in the said appeal the
grounds for assailing the interlocutory order. However, where the assailed interlocutory
order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and
expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress.
RAMIREZ VS CA

248 SCRA 590

Facts: Ester Garcia filed a criminal case for violation of R.A. No. 4200 (Anti-Wiretapping
Act) against Socorro Ramirez, for secretly taping their confrontation. Socorro filed a
Motion to Quash the Information, which the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay
granted, agreeing that the facts charged did not constitute an offense under R.A. No.
4200 since the law refers to the taping of a communication by a person other than a
participant to the communication. After which, Ester filed a petition for review with the
Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed the ruling of the lower court. Hence, Socorro
filed this instant petition where she raised three

Issues:

1. That R.A. No. 4200 does not apply to the taping of the conversation by one of the
parties to the conversation. She contends that R.A. 4200 only refers to
unauthorized taping of a conversation of a person other than those involved in
the conversation.
2. That the substance or contents of the conversation must be alleged in the
information; otherwise, the facts charged will not constitute a violation of R.A. No.
4200.
3. That R.A. No. 4200 penalizes the taping of “private communication” not a “private
conversation” and that, consequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation
with Ester was not illegal under the said Act.

Rulings:

1. R.A. No. 4200 applies to recordings by one of the parties to the conversation.
Section 1 of the Act clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not
authorized by all parties to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to
whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other
than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute’s
intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is
underscored by the use of the qualifier “any”. Consequently, the CA was correct
in concluding that “even a person privy to a communication, who records his
private conversation with another without knowledge of the latter, will qualify as a
violator under R.A. No. 4200.” A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records,
moreover, supports such conclusion.
2. The substance of the conversation need not be alleged in the information. The
nature of the communication is immaterial. The mere allegation that an individual
made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder
would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. No. 4200. As the
 Solicitor General pointed out, “Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before
one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its
communication to a third person should be professed.”
3. “Private communication” includes “private conversation”. The word communicate
comes from the Latin word communicate, meaning “to share or to impart”. In its
ordinary signification, communication connotes an act of sharing or imparting, as
in a conversation (“process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between
individuals through a common system of symbols”). These broad definitions are
likely to include the confrontation between Socorro and Ester. Moreover, any
doubts about the legislative body’s meaning of the phrase “private
communication” are put to rest by the fact that Senator Tañada in his Explanatory
Note to the Bill used “communication” and “conversation” interchangeably.
CITY OF MANILA VS. GARCIA

19 SCRA 413

Facts: Finding that it was necessary to expand the school grounds of Epifanio de los
Santos Elementary School, Manila’s City Engineer, pursuant to the Mayor’s directive,
ordered the illegal occupants/squatters (defendants) to vacate the property contiguous
to the school. The defendants refused to vacate, thus, prompting the City of Manila to
file a suit to recover possession over the land. The Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Manila favored the plaintiff.

Consequently, the squatters appealed and questioned the lower court’s finding that the
city needs the premises for school purposes. The city’s evidence on this point was the
certification of the Chairman Committee on Appropriations of the Municipal Board. The
certification recites that the amount of P100,000 had been set aside in Ordinance 4566,
the 1962-63 Manila City Budget, for the construction of an additional building of the
elementary school. The said document was originally deemed inadmissible, but was,
subsequently, admitted into evidence by the lower court. Hence, the defendants
appealed.

Issue: Whether or not the CFI of Manila had properly found that the City of Manila
needs the premises for school purposes (considering that it had a contradictory stance
regarding the admissibility of the evidence of the City on this point).

Ruling: The CFI of Manila properly found that the city needs the premises for school
purposes. It is beyond debate that a court of justice may alter its ruling while the case is
within its power, to make it conformable to law and justice. Such was done here. The
defendants’ remedy was to bring the attention of the court to its contradictory stance.
Not having done so, the Supreme Court will not reopen the case solely for this purpose.

Anyway, elimination of the certification as evidence would not benefit the defendants.
For in reversing his stand, the trial judge could have well taken – because he was duty
bound to take judicial notice of Ordinance 4566. The reason being that the city charter
of Manila requires that all courts sitting therein to take judicial notice of all ordinances
passed by the municipal board of Manila.
BAGUIO VS. VDA. DE JALAGAYT

42 SCRA

Facts: GABRIEL BAGUIO filed for the quieting of title to real property against TEOFILA
JALAGAT and her minor children with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Misamis
Oriental. The Jalagats filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the present
complaint is barred by a previous judgment rendered by the same court. The previous
case involved practically the same property, the same cause of action, and the same
parties, with Melecio Jalagat (Teofila’s deceased husband and predecessor in interest)
as the defendant. The previous case was terminated with the court dismissing Baguio’s
complaint.

Acting on the motion and taking judicial notice of its previous judgment, the lower court
dismissed the present complaint on the ground of res judicata. Consequently, Baguio
appealed the order of dismissal. He claimed that for the ground of res judicata to suffice
as a basis for dismissal it must be apparent on the face of the complaint.

Issue: Whether or not the CFI of Misamis Oriental was correct in finding that there was
res judicata by taking judicial notice of its previous judgment.

Ruling: THE CFI OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL WAS CORRECT IN TAKING JUDICIAL OF

ITS PREVIOUS JUDGMENT. It ought to be clear even to the appellant that under the
circumstances, the lower court certainly could take judicial notice of the finality of
judgment in a case that was previously pending and thereafter decided by it. That was
all that was done by the lower court in decreeing the dismissal. Certainly, such an order
is not contrary to law. The Supreme Court quoted Chief Justice Morgan, who said:
“Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to determine whether or not
the case pending is a moot one or whether or not the previous ruling is applicable in the
case under consideration.”
PRIETO VS ARROYO

14 SCRA 549

Facts: ZEFERINO ARROYO and GABRIEL PRIETO were registered owners of

adjoining lots in Camarines Sur. After Zeferino died, his heirs had a new certificate of
title registered in their names. Subsequently, the heirs discovered that the technical
description set forth in their transfer certificate of title and in the original certificate of title
did not conform with that embodied in the decision of the land registration court (which
registered the land in Zeferino’s name), and was less in area by 157 square meters.
They, therefore, filed a petition for the correction of the said description in their titles.
Thereafter, the court issued an order directing the correction of the technical description
of the land covered by their title.

Gabriel filed a petition to annul the order granting the correction claiming that the 157
square meters were unduly taken from his lot. However, his petition was dismissed for
failure to prosecute. Thus, Gabriel filed a second petition containing similar allegations.
As expected, the court dismissed his second petition on the ground of res judicata.

Hence, Gabriel appealed to the Supreme Court to question the dismissal of his second
petition. He insisted that there was no res judicata since the dismissal of his first
petition was erroneous. He claimed that the lower court should have not dismissed his
first petition for failure to prosecute because “no ‘parole’ evidence need be taken to
support it, the matters therein alleged being part of the records land registration
proceedings, which were well within the judicial notice and cognizance of the court.”

Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Camarines Sur (in dismissing
the first petition of Gabriel) erred in not taking judicial notice of the parts of the records
of the land registration proceedings that would have supported Gabriel’s allegations,
thus, making the dismissal for failure to prosecute erroneous.

Ruling: THE CFI OF CAMARINES SUR WAS CORRECT IN NOT TAKING JUDICIAL
NOTICE OF THE RECORDS THE LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS. As a
general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of the
cases pending before them, of the contents of other cases, even when such cases have
been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both
cases may have been tried or actually pending before the same judge. Besides, if
Gabriel really wanted the court to take judicial notice of such records, he should have
presented the proper request or manifestation to that effect. For failing to do so in the
appropriate time, the dismissal of the first petition is now valid and binding on him.
Thus, the dismissal on the ground of res judicata must be sustained.
YAO-KEE VS. SY-GONZALES

167 SCRA 736

Facts: Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died intestate, leaving real and personal properties
in the Philippines. AIDA SY-GONZALES and the other children of Sy with Asuncion
Gillego filed a petition for the settlement of his estate. YAO KEE filed her opposition to
the petition claiming that she is the legitimate wife of Sy. The probate court sustained
the validity of Yao’s marriage to Sy, but the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the lower
court’s decision and held that the petitioner’s and Yao’s children were all of illegitimate
status. The CA ruled that the marriage between Yao and Sy was not proven to be valid
under the Chinese laws.

Hence, Yao filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court claiming that the CA erred
in holding that the validity of the foreign marriage between Yao and Sy had not been
proven. To support this contention, Yao claimed that the CA should have taken judicial
notice of the Chinese laws on marriage which show the validity of her marriage to Sy.

Issue: Whether or not the CA should take judicial notice of foreign laws (i.e. Chinese
laws on marriage), thus, relieving Yao of her duty of proving the validity of her marriage
under Chinese laws.

Ruling: COURTS CANNOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FOREIGN LAWS. Under the
Philippine jurisprudence, to establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be
proven: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the alleged
foreign marriage by convincing evidence. Though Yao may have established the fact of
marriage, she has failed to prove the Chinese laws on marriage that would show the
validity of her marriage to Sy.

Well-established is the rule that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws or customs. They must be alleged and proved as any other fact. On this point,
Yao cannot rely on a the case of SyJocLieng v. SyQuia (16 Phil. 137 (1910)) to prove
her case. The ruling that case did not show that the court took judicial notice of Chinese
laws on marriages. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the court did take
judicial notice of Chinese laws or customs on foreign marriages in that case, Yao still
failed to show that the law assumed to recognized in SyJocLieng case (wherein the
marriage was celebrated in 1847) was still applicable during the time of her marriage to
Sy, which took place 84 years later. Hence, the CA was correct in considering that the
validity of the marriage between Yao and Sy has not been established.
TABUENA VS. CA

196 SCRA 650

Facts: The subject of the dispute is a parcel of residential land of about 440 sq. meters
in Makato, Aklan. In 1973, an action for recovery of ownership was filed by the estate of
Alfredo Tabernilla against Jose Tabuena. After trial, the court ordered Tabuena to return
the property to Tabernilla.

At the trial, it was found that the lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. in 1926 to Tabernilla
while they were in the United States. Upon Tabernilla’s return to the Philippines in
1934, DamasaTimtiman, mother of Juan Peralta acting upon Juan’s instructions
conveyed the land to Tabernilla. Upon her request, she was supposedly allowed by
Tabernilla to remain in the said lot provided she paid the realty taxes on the property
which she did do so. She remained on the lot until her death and, thereafter, the
property was taken possession by Tabuena. This complaint was filed after a demand
for Tabuena to vacate was made.

The trial court rejected his defense that the subject of the sale was a different lot and
that he was the absolute owner of the said property by virtue of the inheritance he
acquired from his deceased parent. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court, rejecting therein his claim that the trial court erred in taking cognizance of
Exhibits “A”, “B”, & “C’ which had been marked but not formally offered in evidence by
Tabernilla.

Issues:

1. Whether or not it was proper for the CA and trial court to properly took cognizance of
the exhibits even if they were not formally offered during trial?

2. Whether or not the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of Tabuena’s testimony in
a case it had previously heard which was closely connected with the case before it?

Ruling: The SC reversed the decision and ruled in favor of Tabuena.

1. No. The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit does not mean
it has thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. It is true that
Exhibits “A,” “B,” and “C” were marked at pre-trial but this was only for identifying them
and not for making a formal offer. It is during the trial that the party presenting the
marked evidence decides whether to offer the evidence or not. In case they don’t, such
documents cannot be considered evidence, nor can they be given any evidentiary
value.
An exception was given in People vs. Napat-a, wherein the court ruled that evidence
even if not offered can be admitted against the adverse party if: first, it has been duly
identified by testimony duly recorded and second, it has itself been incorporated in the
records of the case. In this case, these requirements had not been satisfied. The
documents were indeed testified to but there was no recital of its contents having been
read into the records.

2. Yes. The Court of Appeals conceded that as a general rule, “courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice in the adjudication of cases pending before them of the
contents of the records of other cases, even when such events have been tried or are
pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been
heard or are actually pending before the same judge.” Nevertheless, it applied the
exception that “in the absence of objection,” “with the knowledge of the opposing party,”
or “at the request or with the consent of the parties,” the case is clearly referred to or
“the original or part of the records of the case are actually withdrawn from the archives”
and admitted as part of the record of the case then pending. These conditions however,
were not established in this case. Tabuena was completely unaware that the court had
taken judicial notice of Civil Case no. 1327. Thus, the said act by the trial court was
improper.
PEOPLE VS. GODOY

250 SCRA 676

Facts: This is an automatic review of the decision of the RTC in view of the death
sentence imposed upon Danny Godoy, who was charged in two separate informations
with rape and another for kidnapping with serious illegal detention.

Complainant Mia Taha alleged that Godoy, her Physics Teacher and a married man
raped her first on Jan. 21, 1994 in her cousin’s boarding house wherein upon entering
the back door, Godoy pointed a knife at her. As Godoy removed her panties and
brought out his penis to rape her, a knife was pointed at her neck. As such, she was
not able to resist. The next day, Godoy came by their house and asked the permission
of her parents if she can join him in soliciting funds, since Mia was a candidate for Ms.
Palawan National School (PNS). Mia’s parents allowed her to go with Godoy and she
was allegedly brought to the Sunset Garden Motel where she was repeatedly raped
again. After three days, they transferred to Edward’s subdivision where she was kept in
a lodging house and was again raped.

During this time, a police blotter had already been placed for the missing Mia. She was
later released by Godoy after a certain Naem interceded and only after her parents
agreed to settle the case. It was after Mia’s return that her parents accompanied her to
a medico-legal which found lacerations in her vagina concluding that “she just had
sexual intercourse.” She and her mother Helen went to the police and executed sworn
statements stating that the accused Godoy had raped and abducted Mia.

Godoy denied that he raped Mia Taha. He admitted having had sex with her and that
they indeed stayed in Sunset Gardens and in Edward’s Subdivision, but it was because
they were lovers and that Mia had consented to their having sex. To support his claim
that they were lovers, he presented two letters supposedly delivered to him in the
provincial jail while he was detained by Mia’s cousin Lorna. There Mia explained that it
was her parents who forced her to testify against him.

The delivery of the letter was denied by Lorna but the defense presented the provincial
jail guard on duty on the supposed date of the delivery and testified that indeed Lorna
had visited Godoy on said date. Several witnesses were also presented including two
former teachers of Mia who knew the handwriting on the two said letters as belonging to
Mia having been their former student and where thus familiar with her handwriting
particularly those made in her test papers. Other witnesses were presented by the
defense attesting that they saw the two together in a manner that was affectionate and
cordial, prior to the said “kidnapping” and even during such.

Issue: Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
guilt of the accused
Ruling: The Supreme Court acquitted Danny Godoy. Three guiding principles in the
appellate review of the evidence of the prosecution for the crime of rape, namely: a)
while rape is a most detestable crime, it must be borne in mind that it is an accusation
easy to be made, hard to be proved, but harder to be defended by the party accused,
though innocent; b) the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme
caution; and c) that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits
and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.

Mia claimed that the appellant always carried a knife but it was never explained how
she was threatened with the same in such a manner that she was allegedly always
cowed into giving in to his innumerable sexual demands. In taking judicial notice, the
Supreme Court said that it is not unaware that in rape cases, the claim of the
complainant of having been threatened appears to be a common testimonial expedient
and face-saving subterfuge. But it had not been duly corroborated by other evidence
nor proved that the accused indeed always carried a knife.

The SC also takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas (such as in
Palawan) young ladies are strictly required to act with circumspection and prudence.
Great caution is observed so that their reputations shall remain untainted. Any breath of
scandal which brings dishonor to their character humiliates their entire families. It could
precisely be that complainant’s mother wanted to save face in the community where
everybody knows everybody else, and in an effort to conceal her daughter’s indiscretion
and escape wagging tongues of their small rural community, she had to weave the
scenario of this rape drama.
BPI SAVINGS VS. CTA

330 SCRA 507

Facts: This case involves a claim for tax refund in the amount of P112,491.00
representing BPI’s tax withheld for the year 1989. BPI’s 1989 Income Tax Return (ITR)
shows that it had a total refundable amount of P297,492 inclusive of the P112,491.00
being claimed as tax refund in this present controversy. However, BPI declared in the
same 1989 ITR that the said total refundable amount of P297,492.00 will be applied as
tax credit to the succeeding taxable year.

On October 11, 1990, BPI filed a written claim for refund in the amount of P112,491.00
with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) alleging that it did not apply the 1989
refundable amount to its 1990 Annual ITR or other tax liabilities due to the alleged
business losses it incurred for the same year. Without waiting for the CIR to act on the
claim for refund, BPI filed a petition for review with the CTA, seeking the refund of the
amount of P112,491.00. The CTA dismissed BPI’s petition on the ground that petitioner
failed to present as evidence its Corporate Annual ITR for 1990 to establish the fact that
BPI had not yet credited the amount of P297,492.00 to its 1990 income tax liability. BPI
filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the CTA. The CA affirmed the
CTA. Hence, this Petition. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner called the attention
of the Court to a Decision rendered by the Tax Court in CTA Case No. 4897 involving its
claim for refund for the year 1990 wherein the Tax Court held that “petitioner suffered a
net loss for the taxable year 1990.” Respondent, however, urges the Supreme Court not
to do so.

Issue: Whether or not the Court may take judicial notice of the Decision by the CTA in
deciding the present case?

Ruling: As a rule, "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the
records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the
same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are
actually pending before the same judge." Be that as it may, Section 2, Rule 129
provides that courts may take judicial notice of matters ought to be known to judges
because of their judicial functions. In this case, the Court notes that a copy of the
Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 was attached to the Petition for Review filed before this
Court. Significantly, respondents do not claim at all that the said Decision was
fraudulent or nonexistent. Indeed, they do not even dispute the contents of the said
Decision, claiming merely that the Court cannot take judicial notice thereof. This merely
showed the weakness of the respondent’s case because they did not take steps to
prove that BPI did not suffer any loss in 1990. Respondents opted not to assail the fact
appearing therein - that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990 – the same way that it
refused to controvert the same fact established by petitioner’s other documentary
exhibits. The Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 is not the sole basis of petitioner’s case. It
is merely one more bit of information showing that the petitioner did not use its 1989
refund to pay its taxes for 1990.
CALAMBA STEEL CENTER VS. CIR

G.R. No. 151857

Facts: Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of steel blanks

for use by manufacturers of automotive, electrical, electronics in industrial and
household appliances. In its amended Corporate Annual Income Tax Return on June 4,
1996 it declared a net taxable income of P9,461,597.00, tax credits of
P6,471,246.00and tax due in the amount of P3,311,559.00. It also reported quarterly
payments for the second and third quarters of 1995 in the amounts of P2,328,747.26
and P1,082,108.00, respectively.

It is the contention of the petitioner in this case filed in 1997, that it is entitled to a
refund. The refund was purportedly due to income taxes withheld from it,and remitted in
its behalf, by the withholding agents. Such withheld tax, as per petitioners 1997 return,
were not utilized in 1996 since due to it's income/loss positions for the three quarters of
1996.

Issue: Whether or not a tax refund may be claimed even beyond the taxable year
following that in which the tax credit arises.

Ruling: Yes, however; it is still incumbent upon the claimant to prove that it is entitled to
such refund. Tax refunds being in the nature of tax exemptions such must be construed
strictissimijuris against the taxpayer-claimant. Under the NIRC, the only limitation as
regards the claiming of tax refunds is that such must be made within two years. The
claim for refund made by Calamba steel was well within the 2 year period.

As regards the procedure taken by counsel of Calamba Steel in submitting the final
adjustment returns (1996) after trial has been conducted, the Court said that although
the ordinary rules of procedure from upon this jurisprudence mandates that the
proceedings before the tax court's shall not be governed by strictly technical rules of
evidence.

Moreover, as regards evidence, the court further said that Judicial notice could have
been taken by the CA and the CTA of the 1996 final adjustment return made by
petitioner in another case then pending with the CTA.
PEOPLE VS. TOMAS TUNDAG

G.R. No.s 135695-96

Facts: Mary Ann Tundag, alleged that her father, Tomas Tundag, raped her twice. First
was on September 5, 1997 and the other on November 18, 1997. 2 separate criminal
cases were filed against her father. Mary Ann Tundag also alleged that she was 13
years old when she was raped by her father. (However, the prosecution in the case at
bar was not able to show any documents pertaining to Mary Ann’s age at the time of the
commission of the rape. The prosecution then asked the Court to take judicial notice
that Mary Ann was under 18years of age which was subsequently granted without
conducting a hearing.)

She narrated that her father used a knife to threaten her not to shout while he was
raping her on both occasions. While raping her, he was even asking her if it felt good.
He was even laughing. After the commission of the second rape, Mary Ann went to her
neighbor (by the name of Bebie Cabahug) and told her what happened to her. They
reported this to the police and was later examined by a doctor who concluded that she
was not a virgin anymore.

The Trial Court convicted Tomas Tundag on both counts of rape and was sentenced to
the penalty of death. On appeal to the CA, Tomas flatly denied that the incidents
complained of ever took place. He contends that on September 5, 1997, he was
working as a watch repairman near Gals Bakery in Mandaue City Market and went
home tired and sleepy at around 11:00 o’clock that evening. On November 7, 1997, he
claims he was at work. In his brief, he argues that it was impossible for him to have
raped his daughter because when the incidents allegedly transpired, he went to work
and naturally, being exhausted and tired, it is impossible for him to do such
wrongdoings.

Issues:

1. Whether or nor Tomas Tundag is guilty of the crime of rape

2. Whether or not the penalty of death imposed on him is correct. Whether or not it was
correct for the Court to take judicial notice of Mary Ann’s age without a hearing.

Ruling: Yes! Tomas Tundag’s defense of alibi and denial is negative and self -serving.
It hardly counts as a worthy and weighty ground for exculpation in a trial involving his
freedom and his life. Against the testimony of private complainant who testified on
affirmative matters, such defense is not only trite but pathetic. Denial is an inherently
weak defense, which becomes even weaker in the face of the positive identification by
the victim of the appellant as the violator of her honor.

The victim’s account of the rapes complained of was straightforward, detailed, and
consistent. Her testimony never wavered even after it had been explained to her that
her father could be meted out the death penalty if found guilty by the court. Dr. Acebes
testified that her findings of healed hymenal lacerations in the complainant’s private
parts meant a history of sexual congress on her part. According to her, the lacerations
may have been caused by the entry of an erect male organ into complainants genitals.
But this does not conclusively and absolutely mean that there was sexual intercourse or
contact because it can be caused by masturbation of fingers or other things,
nonetheless, the presence of the hymenal lacerations tends to support private
complainants claim that she was raped by appellant.

Appellant next contends that his daughter pressed the rape charges against him
because she had quarreled with him after he had castigated her for misbehavior. But
such allegation of a family feud, however, does not explain the charges away. Filing a
case for incestuous rape is of such a nature that a daughter’s accusation must be taken
seriously. It goes against human experience that a girl would fabricate a story which
would drag herself as well as her family to a lifetime of dishonor, unless that is the truth,
for it is her natural instinct to protect her honor.

Appellant likewise points out that it was very unlikely for him to have committed the
crimes imputed to him considering that he and his wife had ten children to attend to and
care for. This argument, however, is impertinent and immaterial since he was estranged
from his wife, and private complainant was the only child who lived with him. Nor does
appellants assertion that private complainant has some psychological problems and a
low IQ of 76 in any way favor his defense. These matters did not affect the credibility of
her testimony that appellant raped her twice. We note that the victim understood the
consequences of prosecuting the rape charges against her own father - her father’s
death.

2. No. Death penalty should not have been imposed. It was incorrect for the Court to
take judicial notice of Mary Ann’s age without a proper hearing.

Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659
penalizes rape of a minor daughter by her father as qualified rape and a heinous crime.
The elements are as follows: (1) sexual congress; (2) with woman; (3)by force or
without her consent; and in order to warrant the imposition of capital punishment, the
additional elements that:(4) the victim is under 18 years old at the time of the rape and
(5) the offender is a parent of the victim.

In this case, Mary Ann’s age was not properly and sufficiently proven beyond
reasonable doubt. She testified that she was13 years old at the time of the rapes.
However, she admitted that she did not know exactly when she was born because her
mother did not tell her.
LUCIDO VS. CALUPITAN

27 Phil. 48

Facts: The properties of Leonardo Lucido were sold on auction on Feb. 10, 1903 to
Rosales and Zolaivar. On March 30, 1903, Rosales and Zolaivar with the consent of
Lucido, sold the properties to Calupitan via a public document. On the same day,
Calupitan and Lucido executed a document admitting the sale and that their real
agreement was that redemption by Lucido can only be effected 3 years. from the date of
the document. Lucido tendered the redemption price to Calupitan. For failure of the
latter to surrender the properties to Lucido, this case was instituted.

Calupitan claimed that the sale was not one with a right to redeem. The lower court
decided in favor of Lucido.

Issue: Whether or not Calupitan’s original answer to the complaint may be used as
evidence against him to prove that a sale with a right to redeem was in fact agreed to by
both parties?

Ruling: Yes, Calupitan’s original answer to the complaint expressly stated that the
transaction was one of sale with right to repurchase. The Court held that its admission
was proper, especially in view of the fact that it was signed by Calupitan himself, who
was acting as his own attorney.

The Court cited Jones on Evidence (sec. 272, 273) which stated that although pleadings
were originally considered as inadmissible as admissions because it contained only
pleader’s matter (fiction stated by counsel and sanctioned by the courts), modern
tendency was to treat pleadings as statements of real issues and herein, admissions of
the parties.
TORRES VS. CA

11 SCRA 24

Facts: This is a Petition for Review, treated as a special civil action praying that the
decision of the CA be set aside. Lot no. 551 was originally owned by Margarita Torres.
Margarita was married to Claro Santillan and out of this union were begotten Vicente
and Antonina. Claro died. Antonina married and had six children, who, together with
Vicente are the private respondents. After Claro’s death, Margarita cohabited with Leon
Arbole, and out of this, petitioner Macaria Torres was born.

Lot no. 551, an urban lot, was leased to Margarita, who was the actual occupant of the
lot. A Sale Certificate was issued to Margarita by the Director of Lands. The purchase
price was to be paid in installments. According to testimonial evidence, Leon paid the
installments out of his own earnings. Before his death, Leon sold and transferred all his
rights to ½ portion of the lot in favor of petitioner Macaria. Subsequently, Vicente
executed an Affidavit claiming possession of Lot no. 551 and petitioned the Bureau of
Lands for the issuance of title in his name. A title was then issued in the name of the
legal heirs of Margarita (private respondents).

On June 3, 1954, respondents filed a complaint against petitioner for forcible entry
alleging that petitioner entered a portion of Lot no. 551 without their consent and
constructed a house therein. The case was decided against the petitioner. On June 8,
1954, petitioner instituted an action for Partition of Lot. N0. 551 alleging that said lot was
conjugal property and the she is the legitimated child of Margarita and Leon. The
ejectment case and the partition case was consolidated. The trial court ruled that the lot
was paraphernal property of Maragarita and adjudicated 2/3 of the lot to respondents
and 1/3 to petitioner Macaria. On Motion for Reconsideration, the decision was
amended with Macaria being entitled to 4/6 of the lot. On appeal to the CA, the CA
changed Macaria’s share to ½ of the lot and declared that she is not a legitimated child.

Petitioner now alleges that although the CA is correct in declaring that she is not a
legitimated child of the spouses, it has overlooked to include in its findings of facts the
admission made by the respondents that she and Vicente and Antonina are brothers
and sisters and they are the legal heirs and nearest of relatives of Maragarita. The
admission adverted to appears in paragraph 3 of respondents’ original complaint in the
Ejectment Case, which was however subsequently amended.

Issue:

Whether or not said statement in the original complaint must be treated as a judicial
admission despite the fact that the same statements no longer appears in the amended
complaint?
Ruling:

No, in the Amended Complaint filed by respondents in the same ejectment case, the
supposed admission was deleted and in fact the statement simply read, “That plaintiffs
are the legal heirs and nearest of kin of Margarita.” By virtue thereof, the amended
complaint takes the place of the original. The latter is regarded as abandoned and
ceases to perform any further function as a pleading. The original complaint no longer
forms part of the record.

If petitioner had intended to utilize the original complaint, she should have offered it in
evidence. Having been amended, the original complaint lost its character as a judicial
admission, which would have required no proof, and became merely an extrajudicial
admission of which as evidence, required its formal offer. Contrary to petitioner’s
submission, therefore, there can be no estoppel by extrajudicial admission in the
original complaint, for the failure to offer it in evidence.
CIR VS. PETRON CORPORATION

Facts: Petron, a Board of Investment (BOI)-registered enterprise, was an assignee of

several Tax Credit Certificates (TCCs) from various BOI-registered enterprises for the
taxable years 1995-1998. Petron subsequently utilized said TCCs to pay its excise
taxes for said taxable years. The TCCs had a Liability Clause which provided:

Both the Transferor and the Transferee shall be jointly and severally liable for any
fraudulent act or violation of the pertinent laws, rules and regulations relating to the
transfer of this Tax Credit Transaction.

Sometime in 1999, a post-audit of said TCCs was conducted by the DOF. The TCCs
and the TDMs were cancelled by reason of fraud. The DOF found that said TCCs were
fraudulently obtained by the transferors and subsequently the same was fraudulently
transferred to Petron. Thus, On January 30, 2002, The CIR issued an assessment
against Petron for deficiency excise taxes for the taxable years1995 to 1998 based on
the ground that the TCCs utilized by petitioner in its payment of excise taxes have been
cancelled by the DOF for having been fraudulently issued and transferred.
Subsequently, Petron filed a protest letter regarding said assessment.

In 2002, the CIR served a Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy on petitioner to enforce
payment of the tax deficiencies. Construing the Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy as the
final adverse decision of the BIR on its protest of the assessment, Petron filed a petition
before the CTA contending that the assignment/transfer of the TCCs to petitioner by the
TCC holders was submitted to, examined and approved by the concerned government
agencies which processed the assignment in accordance with law and revenue
regulations and that the assessment and collection of alleged excise tax deficiencies
sought to be collected by the BIR against petitioner through the January 30, 2002 letter
are already barred by prescription.

The CTA Second Division ruled for the CIR. Petron appealed the decision to the CTA
En banc which, in turn, reversed the CTA 2nd Division decision, based on the following
on the ground that Petron was considered an innocent transferee of the subject TCCs
and may not be prejudiced by a re-assessment of excise tax liabilities that respondent
has already settled, when due, with the use of the TCCs.

Issue: Whether or not the stipulations of facts by the CIR amounts to an admission as
well as the parties in stipulations of facts in pre-trial considered as judicial admission?

Ruling: This stipulation of fact by the CIR amounts to an admission and, having been
made by the parties in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial, is treated as a judicial admission.
Under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial admission requires no proof.
The Court cannot lightly set it aside, especially when the opposing party relies upon it
and accordingly dispenses with further proof of the fact already admitted. The exception
provided in Rule 129, Section 4 is that an admission may be contradicted only by a
showing that it was made through a palpable mistake, or that no such admission was
made. In this case, however, exception to the rule does not exist.

We agree with the pronouncement of the CTA En Banc that Petron has not been shown
or proven to have participated in the alleged fraudulent acts involved in the transfer and
utilization of the subject TCCs. Petron had the right to rely on the joint stipulation that
absolved it from any participation in the alleged fraud pertaining to the issuance and
procurement of the subject TCCs. The joint stipulation made by the parties
consequently obviated the opportunity of the CIR to present evidence on this matter, as
no proof is required for an admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings.
Thus, the CIR cannot now be allowed to change its stand and renege on that
admission.
PEOPLE VS. BARDAJE

G.R. No. L-29271

Facts: Marcelina Cuizon, a 14 year old girl, filed a complaint against Adelino Bardaje
and five others in Samar, accusing them of the crime of rape. The incident happened
from December 14 to December 17. Adelino was arrested on December 17 and signed
an alleged confession admitting that he kidnapped and molested Marcelina. The fiscal
filed an information accusing Adelino and others the crime of Rape with Illegal
Detention. Before arraignment, the information was amended to include that Marcelina
was deprived of liberty for three days. After the trial, Adelino was found guilty of Forcible
Abduction with Rape with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and aid of armed
men. Adelino’s version is that they are sweethearts who eloped as planned during the
said period. He admitted having carnal knowledge of her but denied that he raped her.
On the morning of December 17th, two soldiers accompanied by Marcelina’s father,
apprehended him, physically abused him, and made him sign a document - an
extrajudicial confession, implicating 5 other persons even though it’s not true.

Also, the medical certificate of Marcelina was presented in court as evidence stating
that there were no evidence of external injuries on the vulva or any part of the body and
the presence of old lacerations.

Issue: Whether or not Adelino Bardaje’s guilt was sufficiently established beyond
reasonable doubt based on the testimonial and documentary evidence presented.

Ruling: No, Adelino Bardaje’s guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt. The
court found Marcelina’s charge highly dubious and inherently improbable.

The medical findings showed that "no evidence of external injuries was found around
the vulva or any part of the body" of Marcelina, which the court finds strange because
she was allegedly "dragged" slapped" into unconsciousness, "wrestled" with, and
criminally abused. Physical evidence is of the highest order and speaks more eloquently
than witnesses put together. The “old healed laceration” in the hymen, according to the
testimony of the physician, would have occurred two weeks or even 1 month before.
This shows that Marcelina and Adelino had amorous relationship.

Marcelina’s admission that she was taken to a small one-room hut shared with a woman
and two children and where she was ravished seems to be highly improbable. The
same is true for the second hut where she was brought to.

With regard to Adelino’s extrajudicial confession, the court states "an extrajudicial
confession made by an accused shall not be sufficient ground for conviction unless
corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. Corpus delicti is proved when the evidence
on record shows that the crime prosecuted had been committed. Adelino was acquitted.
SISON VS. PEOPLE

G.R. Nos. 108280-83

Facts: A rally was scheduled by Marcos loyalists at Luneta. Although they failed to get a
permit, they continued with their scheduled demonstration. Two police officers
approached their group and asked for their permit. Failing to present any, they were
asked to disperse in 10 minutes. The loyalists asked for 30 minutes before they
disperse but the officers refused. The refusal prompted the people on both sides to
attack each other. A few hours later, a celebrity who is a Marcos supporter was arrested
because she was chanting her support for the loyalists while running around Luneta.
Once again, the loyalist started to attack Coryist and those who were wearing yellow.

Salcedo was wearing a yellow shirt at that time so he was chased, attacked, and failed
to escape the mob-the incident was witnessed by a vendor Banculo. Eventually,
Sumilang was able to extricate Salcedo, however, the mauling continued until he lost
consciousness and was rushed to the hospital by Sumilang. The first hospital refused
his admission and later he was brought to PGH were he died upon arrival. Charges
were filed against several people with the help of Banculo and Sumilang. Some of the
accused presented their alibis and some didn’t testify. The trial court found 5 of them
guilty of murder qualified by treachery.

Issues: Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the testimonies of Sumilang and
Banculo; whether or not the CA erred in giving evidentiary weight to some of the
exhibits [joint affidavit & photos of the mauling incident] because of lack of proper
identification of the person who took them.

Ruling: The CA didn’t make a mistake in considering the testimonies of Sumilang and
Banculo. There is no proof that their testimonies surfaced due to the reward. In fact,
Sumilang’s report was made 2 hours after the incident. Baculo’s submission of 3 sworn
statements were done because of the inclusion of people identified as accused for the
case. Sumilang’s character during the entire trial was not undesirable-his being evasive
is insufficient to cause the discrediting of his testimony.

The CA didn’t make a mistake in admitting the evidence of photographs. The rule in this
jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by the
photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they
were produced. The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct
representation or reproduction of the original, and its admissibility is determined by its
accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime. The photographer, however, is
not the only witness who can identify the pictures he has taken. The correctness of the
photograph as a faithful representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima
facie, either by the testimony of the person who made it or by other competent
witnesses, after which the court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy.
PEOPLE VS. CLIMACO

G.R. No. 199403

Facts: Appellant Gomer S. Climaco was found guilty for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of
Republic Act No. 9165 (The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) for illegal
possession (Criminal Case No. 4911-SPL) and illegal sale (Criminal Case No. 4912-
SPL) of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

PO1 Ignacio was tasked to act as the poseur-buyer and SPO4 Almeda as the overall
team leader. The buy-bust money was prepared, which consist of P500.00 bill and
some boodle money. The team was also armed with a Warrant of Arrest for illegal
drugs issued by Judge Paño. The plastic sachet, which was the product of the buy-
bust, and the one recovered from Gomer were turned over to SPO4 Teofilo Royena,
who turned them over to the Office of the Special Operation Group located at Brgy.
Tubigan, Biñan, Laguna. The plastic sachet product of the buy-bust was marked TR-B,
which means Teofilo Royena and the letter “B” means “Bust.” While the plastic sachet
recovered from Gomer was marked TR-R, which means Teofilo Royena and the letter
“R” means “Recovered”. PO1 Ignacio identified the accused Gomer Climaco in open
court. He likewise identified his sworn statement.

Aside from the testimony of PO1 Alaindelon Ignacio, the following documentary exhibits
were offered for the prosecution: (1) Exhibit “A” – Letter dated 7 September 2004; (2)
Exhibit “B” – Chemistry Report No. D-1102-04; (3) Exhibit “C” – One-half white
envelope; (4) Exhibit “C-1” – Plastic sachet with white crystalline substance with
markings “GSC-1”; (5) Exhibit “C-2” – Plastic sachet with white crystalline substance
with markings “GSC-2”; and (6) Exhibit “D” – Pinanumpaang Salaysay of PO1 Ignacio.

The RTC and the CA found that the elements for the crimes of illegal sale and illegal
possession of shabu were sufficiently established by the prosecution. The RTC held
that Climaco’s defense of frame-up is viewed with disfavor as it can be easily
concocted. The RTC gave full faith and credit to the testimony of PO1 Ignacio, and
declared the police officers who participated in the buy-bust operation were properly
performing their duties because they were not inspired by any improper motive.

Issue: Whether or not the guilt of Climaco for the crimes of illegal sale and illegal
possession of shabu, a dangerous drug, was proven beyond reasonable doubt

Ruling: NO. The prosecution did not explain why the markings of the plastic sachets
containing the alleged drugs, which were submitted to be “TR-B” and “TR-R,” became
“GSC-1” and “GSC-2” in the Chemistry Report, Index of Exhibits and Minutes of the
Hearing. In their decisions, the RTC and CA were silent on the change of the markings.
In fact, since the markings are different, the presumption is that the substance in the
plastic sachets marked as “TR-B” and “TR-R” is different from the substance in the
plastic sachets marked as “GSC-1” and “GSC-2.” There is no moral certainty that the
substance taken from appellant is the same dangerous drug submitted to the laboratory
and the trial court.

As held in Malillin v. People, to establish guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt
in cases involving dangerous drugs, it is important that the substance illegally
possessed in the first place be the same substance offered in court as exhibit. This
chain of custody requirement ensures that unnecessary doubts are removed concerning
the identity of the evidence. When the identity of the dangerous drug recovered from the
accused is not the same dangerous drug presented to the forensic chemist for review
and examination, nor the same dangerous drug presented to the court, the identity of
the dangerous drug is not preserved due to the broken chain of custody. With this, an
element in the criminal cases for illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs,
thecorpus delicti, is not proven, and the accused must then be acquitted based on
reasonable doubt.

For this reason, Climaco must be acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt due to
the broken chain of custody over the dangerous drug allegedly recovered from him.
PEOPLE VS. CARDENAS

G.R. No. 190342

Facts: DSOD-CIDG in Camp Crame received a report from its confidential informant
regarding the rampant selling of shabu by a certain Cipriano Cardenas (a.k.a. “Ope”) at
the Payatas Area in Quezon City. Acting on the information, a team was organized to
conduct a buy-bust operation.

PO3 Palacio recovered two (2) other clear plastic sachets from the accused’s right
pocket. The three sachets were marked “CC-1,” “CC-2” and “CC-3” – “CC” representing
the initials of the accused, Cipriano Cardenas. He was then brought to Camp Crame,
where he was booked and investigated. The plastic sachets recovered from him were
transmitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for analysis upon the request of Police Chief
Inspector Ricardo N. Sto. Domingo, Jr. of the DSOD–CIDG. The results of the Initial
Laboratory Report dated 07 January 2003 showed that the white crystalline substance
contained in the three (3) heat-sealed plastic sachets tested positive for methyl
amphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu, with a total weight of 0.05 gram.

The RTC convicted him of the crime charged, giving credence to the testimonies and
pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution. It ruled that the police operation had
followed the normal course of a drug entrapment operation, and that the arresting
officers presented as prosecution witnesses were credible based on their candid and
honest demeanor. The RTC considered as absurd the allegation of the accused that he
had been whimsically arrested by the police officers during the operation. It found as
weak and inconceivable his uncorroborated denial of the charge. CA affirmed in toto the
RTC’s Decision, which it found to be supported by the facts and law.

Issue: Whether or not there was compliance with the requirements for the proper
custody of seized dangerous drugs under R.A. 9165.

Ruling: YES. In People v. Salonga, we held that it is essential for the prosecution to
prove that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very
same substance offered in court as exhibit. Its identity must be established with
unwavering exactitude for it to lead to a finding of guilt. Thus, drug enforcement agents
and police officers involved in a buy-bust operation are required by R.A. 9165 and its
implementing rules to mark all seized evidence at the buy-bust scene.

The chain of custody is defined in Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation
No. 1,Series of 2002, which implements R.A. No. 9165.

To protect the civil liberties of the innocent, the rule ensures that the prosecution’s
evidence meets the stringent standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. We have
held, however that substantial compliance with the procedural aspect of the chain of
custody rule does not necessarily render the seized drug items inadmissible. In People
v. Ara, we ruled that R.A. 9165 and its IRR do not require strict compliance with the
chain of custody rule.

Briefly stated, non-compliance with the procedural requirements under RA 9165 and its
IRR relative to the custody, photographing, and drug-testing of the apprehended
persons, is not a serious flaw that can render void the seizures and custody of drugs in
a buy-bust operation.

Although we find that the police officers did not strictly comply with the requirements of
Section 21, Article II of the IRR implementing R.A. 9165, the noncompliance did not
affect the evidentiary weight of the drugs seized from the accused, because the chain of
custody of the evidence was shown to be unbroken under the circumstances of the
case.

We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will bring about
the non-admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due to non-compliance with
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there is non-compliance
with said section, is not of admissibility, but of weight – evidentiary merit or probative
value – to be given the evidence. The weight to be given by the courts on said evidence
depends on the circumstances obtaining in each case.
AIR FRANCE VS. CARRASCOSO

18 SCRA 155

Facts: Carrascoso, bought a first class ticket to go to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok,
Plaintiff traveled in first class but on their stop-over in Bangkok, the Manager of the
defendant airline forced the plaintiff to vacate his seat in order to make room for a “white
man”, who, the Manager alleged, had a better right to the seat. After a brief commotion
whereinCarrascoso said he would leave his seat on over his “dead body,” he gave it up.

The CFI decided in favor of Carrascoso , while the CA affirmed the decision but reduced
the award further. During the trial, one piece of evidence that was admitted was the
alleged entry by the purser employed by the defendant and testified to by the plaintiff.
The alleged notebook entry, read “First class passengers was forced to go to tourist
class against his will and that the captain refused to intervene”. Defendant charges that
such testimony by Carrascoso is incompetent for being hearsay. It is claimed by Air
France that such piece of evidence comes within the proscription of the Best Evidence
rule they are claiming such entry could not have been proven by mere testimony but by
presenting the notebook itself.

Issue: Whether or not the entry in the notebook is incompetent as evidence?

Ruling: Yes. The subject of inquiry is not the entry but the ouster incident. Testimony on
the entry does not come within the Best Evidence rule. It is admissible. Besides, from a
reading of the transcript above mentioned, when the dialogue happened, the impact of
the startling occurrence was still fresh and was continued to be felt. The excitement had
not as yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of
the Res Gestae. For they grow out of “the nervous excitement and mental and physical
condition of the declarant.” The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the
notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its
trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule.
It forms part of the Res Gestae. It is not within the Best Evidence Rule as the entry was
made outside the Philippines by the employee of Air France. It would have been an
easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted Carrascoso’s testimony. If it were true
that no entry was made the deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter.
PEOPLE VS. TAN

105 Phil. 1242

Facts: Pacita Gonzales and others were charged with the crime of falsification of public
documents in their capacities as public officials and employees. It was alleged that they
have made it appear that certain relief supplies were purchased by Gonzales for
distribution to calamity victims in such quantities and at such prices and from such
business establishments or persons as are made to appear in the said public
documents, when in truth and in fact, no such distributions of such relief and supplies as
valued and supposedly purchased by said Pacita Gonzales in the public and official
documents had ever been made. The prosecution presented to a witness a booklet of
receipts containing blue invoices of the Metro Drug Corporation. The booklet contained
the triplicate copies, and according to said witness the original invoices were sent to the
Manila office of the company, the duplicates to the customers, so that the triplicate
copies remained in the booklet. The witness further testified that in preparing receipts,
two carbons were used between the three sheets, so that the duplicates and the
triplicates were filled out by the use of the carbons. While the witness was testifying, the
trial court judge interrupted and said that the triplicates are not admissible unless it is
first proven that the originals were lost and cannot be produced.

Another witness was presented by the prosecution to testify. The witness testified that
the original practice of keeping the original white copies no longer prevails as the
originals were given to the customers. After the cross-examination of this last witness,
the prosecution again went back to the identification of the triplicate invoice. At this
point, the judge told the prosecutor that the originals must be produced. The
prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not triplicates formed by the use of carbon papers are admissible in
evidence without accounting first for the loss of the originals.

Ruling: The Court said that the admissibility of duplicates or triplicates has long been a
settled question. It quoted with approval the opinion of Moran, a commentator on the
Rules of Court. When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of writing
paper so that the writing of a contract upon the outside sheet, including the signature of
the party to be charged thereby, produces a facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such
signature being thus reproduced by the same stroke of the pen which made the surface
or exposed the impression, all of the sheets so written on are regarded as duplicate
originals and either of them may be introduced in evidence as such without accounting
for the non-production of the others.
PEOPLE VS. TANDOY

192 SCRA 98

Facts: On May 27, 1986, detectives of the Makati Police conducted a buy-bust
operation at Solchuaga St., Barangay Singkamas, Makati. The target area was a store
along the said street, and detective Singayan was to pose as the buyer. He stood alone
near the store waiting for any pusher to approach. Soon, three men approached him.
One of them was Mario Tandoy who said: “Pare, gusto mo bang umiskor?” Singayan
answered yes. The exchange was made then and there—two rolls of marijuana for one
P10.00 and two P5.00 bills marked ANU (meaning Anti-Narcotics Unit). The team then
moved in and arrested Tandoy. The marked money and eight foils of marijuana were
found on Tandoy’s body. An information was filed against Tandoy. The RTC of Makati
found him guilty of violating RA 6425. Tandoy appealed. In his appeal, Tandoy invoked
the best evidence rule and questioned the admission by the trial court of the Xerox copy
only of the marked P10.00 bill.

Issue: Whether or not the Xerox copy of the marked P10.00 bill is excludible under the
best evidence rule.

Ruling: NO. The Supreme Court quoted with approval the Solicitor General’s Comment
which refuted the contention of Tandoy. The best evidence rule applies only when the
contents of the document are the subject of inquiry. Where the issue is only as to
whether or not such document was actually executed, or exists, or in the circumstances
relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and
testimonial evidence is admissible. Since the aforesaid marked money was presented
by the prosecution solely for the purpose of establishing its existence and not its
contents, other substitutionary evidence, like a Xerox copy thereof, is therefore
admissible without the need of accounting for the original.
THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF PAMPANGA VS. REYES

55 Phil 522

Facts: The provincial fiscal of Pampanga filed two informations for libel against Andres
Guevarra. The informations alleged that the defendant, with malicious intent, published
on the weekly paper Ing Magumasid an article intended to impeach the honesty,
integrity, and reputation of Clemente Dayrit and of Mariano Nepomuceno. A joint trial
was held of criminal cases Nos. 4501 and 4502. The fiscal attempted to present as
evidence for the prosecution, the aforementioned Exhibits A, B, C, and D, which are
copies of the Ing Magumasid containing the libelous article with the innuendo, another
article in the vernacular published in the same weekly, and its translation into Spanish.
Counsel for the defendant objected to this evidence, which objection was sustained by
the court. The petitioner contends that the exhibits in question are the best evidence of
the libel, the subject matter of the information, and should therefore be admitted; while
the respondents maintain that, inasmuch as the libelous articles were not quoted in the
information, said evidence cannot be admitted without amending the information. The
prosecution asked for an amendment to the information, but the court denied the
petition on the ground that it would impair the rights of the defendant, holding that the
omission of the libelous article in the original was fatal to the prosecution.

Issue: Whether or not the exhibits should be admitted.

Ruling: The general rules regarding the admissibility of evidence are applicable to cases
of libel or slander. The evidence must be relevant, and not hearsay. This being so, the
rule of procedure which requires the production of the best evidence, is applicable to the
present case. And certainly the copies of the weekly where the libelous article was
published, and its translation, constitute the best evidence of the libel charged. The
newspaper itself is the best evidence of an article published in it.
COMPANIA MARITIMA VS. ALLIED FREE

77 SCRA 24

Facts: The Compañia Maritima and the Allied Free Workers Union entered into a written
contract whereby the union agreed to perform arrastre and stevedoring work for the
consignees vessels at Iligan City. The contract was to be effective for one month. It was
stipulated that the company could revoke the contract before the expiration of the term if
the union failed to render proper service. The contract could be renewed by agreement
of the parties.

The issue of whether the company should pay for the stevedoring service became a
sore point of contention between the parties. The union members labored under the
impression that they were not being compensated for their stevedoring service as
distinguished from arrastre service. Although the arrastre and stevedoring contract was
disadvantageous to the union, it did not terminate the contract because its members
were in dire need of work and work, which was not adequately compensated, was
preferable to having no work at all.

Upon the expiration of the one-month period, the said contract was verbally renewed. In
1954, Maritima entered into a stevedoring agreement with the Iligan Stevedoring
Association. The union picketed in the wharf for nine days and prevented Iligan
Stevedoring from performing its services. Maritima retaliated by filing an action with the
union for the rescission of the 1952 contract, for injunction against the union workers
and for damages. This initiated a protracted litigation between the two. The amended
decision of the trial court rendered among others money judgment against the union.
The appeal made by the union attacked the manner in which the trial court arrived at the
sum of 450,000 which Maritima allegedly suffered because of lost freightage,
inefficiency in the services of the union workers, among other causes attributable to the
union.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in awarding to the plaintiff company actual
damages, moral damages and attorney’s fees on the ground that the auditor’s report on
which they were based was hearsay.

Ruling: The company argues that the accountants' reports are admissible in evidence
because of the rule that "when the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss-of time and the fact
sought to be established from them is both the general result of the whole", the original
writings need not be produced. That rule cannot be applied in this case because the
voluminous character of the records, on which the accountants' reports were based,
was not duly established. It is also a requisite for the application of the rule that the
records and accounts should be made accessible to the adverse party so that the
company, of the summary may be tested on cross-examination.
VILLA REY TRANSIT VS. FERRER

25 SCRA 845

Facts: Jose M. Villarama was an operator of a bus transportation, under the business
name of Villa Rey Transit, pursuant to certificates of public convenience granted him by
the Public Service Commission which authorized him to operate thirty two units on
various routes or lines from Pangasinan to Manila, and vice-versa. On January 8, 1959,
he sold the aforementioned two certificates of public convenience to the Pangasinan
Transportation Company, Inc. for Php350,000 with the condition, among others, that the
seller "shall not for a period of 10 years...apply for any TPU service identical or
competing with the buyer." Barely three months later, a corporation called Villa Rey
Transit, Inc. was organized with Natividad R. Villarama, wife of Jose M. Villarama, was
the Treasurer as well. In less than a month after its registration with the SEC, the
corporation bought five certificates of public convenience, forty nine buses, tools and
equipment from one Valentin Fernando. On that same day when the contract of sale
was executed, the parties immediately applied with the PSC for its approval, with a
prayer for the issuance of a provisional authority in favor of the vendee Corporation to
operate the service therein involved. On May 19, 1959, the PSC granted the provisional
permit prayed for, upon the condition that "it may be modified or revoked by the
Commission at any time, shall be subject to whatever action that may be taken on the
basic application and shall be valid only during the pendency of said application." Before
the PSC could take final action on said application for approval of sale however, the
Sheriff of Manila levied on two of the five certificates of public convenience involved.
This is pursuant to a writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan in favor of Eusebio Ferrer, a judgment creditor of Fernando. A public sale
was then conducted by the Sheriff of the said two certificates of public convenience and
Ferrer was the highest bidder, and a certificate of sale was issued in his name. He
eventually sold the certificates of public convenience to Pantranco. PSC thereafter
issued a ruling awarding provisional right to operate to Pantranco. The Corporation took
issue with this ruling and elevated the matter to the Supreme Court which ruled that it
should be the Corporation who must provisionally operate the lines until the dispute on
ownership is settled by the proper court. The Corporation then filed a petition to declare.
Thus, Pantranco filed an appeal contending that the Corporation and Jose Villarama are
one and the same, and consequently, the non-competition clause embodied in the deed
of sale entered into by Jose Villarama is also binding to the Corporation. To prove its
contention, Pantranco presented photostatic of the said ledgers and vouchers
contending that it has no evidentiary value as they are merely photocopies of originals
and thus are not the best evidence.

Issue: Whether or not the photostatic ledgers and vouchers are admissible
Ruling: Yes. Section 5, Rule 130 provides for the requisites for admissibility of
secondary evidence when the notice to opponent to produce the original, (3)
satisfactory proof of existence, (4) failure or refusal of opponent to produce the original
in court. In this case, such requisites have been complied with. Villarama has practically
admitted the second and fourth. As to the third, he admitted its previous existence in the
files of the Corporation and had even seen some of them. As to the first, he said that the
originals were missing and the Corporation is no longer in possession of it. However, it
is not necessary for a party seeking to introduce secondary evidence to show that the
original is in the actual possession of his adversary. It is enough that the circumstances
are such as to indicate that the writing is in his possession or under his control. Neither
is it required that the party entitled to the custody of the instrument should, on being
notified to produce it, admit having it in his possession. Hence, secondary evidence is
admissible where he denies having it in his possession. The party calling for such
evidence may introduce a copy thereof as in the case of loss. For, among the
exceptions to the best evidence rule is when the original has been lost, destroyed or
cannot be produced in court in question must be deemed to have been lost, as even the
Corporation admits such loss. Hence, there can be no doubt as to the admissibility in
evidence of the said photocopies of vouchers & ledgers.
DE VERA VS. AGUILAR

218 SCRA 603

Facts: The petitioners De Vera and respondent Leona, married to respondent Aguilar,
are the children and heirs of the late Marcosa Bernabe. During her lifetime, she owned
the disputed parcel of land in Camalig, Maycauayan, Bulacan. Two of the petitioners,
Basilio and Felipe, mortgaged said land to Atty. Bordador. When the mortgage matured,
the Aguilar spouses redeemed it from Atty. Bordador and were in turn sold to them by
Marcosa, evidenced by a deed of absolute sale. Thereafter, an OCT was issued in their
name. Three years later, the De Veras wrote to the Aguilar spouses demanding for
partition of the disputed land claiming that as children of Marcosa, they were co-owners
of the property. They further claimed that the Aguilar spouses had resold the property to
Marcosa. The Aguilar spouses denied all these allegations by the De Veras. The De
Veras filed a suit for re-conveyance of the lot and the trial court ruled in favor of the
petitioners after admitting, over the objection of the Aguilar spouses, a photocopy of an
alleged deed of finding that the loss or destruction of the original deed of sale has not
been duly proven by the petitioners rendering the photocopy of the deed of sale as
inadmissible in evidence.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have satisfactorily proven the loss of the original
deed of sale so as to allow the photocopy of the same.

Ruling: Yes. Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were
actually lost or destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the
proponent must establish the former existence of the instrument. The correct order of
proof is as follows: (1) existence, (2) execution, (3) loss, (4) contents, although this
order may be changed in the discretion of the court. The sufficiency of proof offered as
a predicate for the admission of an alleged lost deed lies within the judicial discretion of
the trial court under all the circumstances of the particular case. A reading of the
decision of the trial court shows that it merely ruled on the existence and due execution
of the alleged deed of sale dated April 28, 1959. It failed to look into the facts and
circumstances surrounding the loss or destruction of the original copies of the alleged
deed of sale.

In establishing the execution of a document, the same may be established by the

person or persons who executed it, by the person before whom its execution was
acknowledged, or by any person who was present and saw it executed or who, after its
execution saw it and recognized the signatures or by a person to whom the parties to
the instrument had previously confessed the execution thereof. The Court agreed with
the findings of the trial court that the petitioners have sufficiently established the due
execution of the alleged deed of sale through the testimony of the notary public. The
destruction of the instrument may be proved by any person knowing the fact.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. CODILLA

G.R. No. 170491

Facts: M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry owned and operated by private
respondent Bangpai shipping co. allegedly bumped and damaged petitioners power
barge 209 which was then moored at Cebu international port. Petitioner filed before the
Cebu RTC a complaint for damages against Bangpai shipping co. petitioner filed an
amended complaint impleading Wallem shipping inc. contending that the latter is a ship
agent of Bangpai. Wallem and Bangpai filed a motion to dismiss which was
subsequently denied by the court.

After adducing evidence during the trial of the case, petitioner filed a formal offer of
evidence consisting of Exhibits A to V together with the sub-marked portions thereof. On
the other hand, Bangpai and Wallen filed their respective objections to petitioner’s
formal offer of evidence. The RTC denied the admissions and excluding from the
records Exhibits A,C,D,E,H and its sub-markings I,J,K,L,M,N,O,P. it argued that the
petitioner has been given every opportunity to present the originals of the photocopies
of the documents it offered, but it never produced the originals. Also, the photocopies
do not constitute as electronic evidence as the information was not received, recorded,
retrieved or produced electronically. Moreover, it was not authenticated. Finally, the
required affidavit to prove the admissibility and evidentiary weight of the alleged
electronic evidence was not executed, much less presented in evidence. Therefore, the
photocopies must be stricken off the records. Aside from being not properly identified by
any competent witness, the loss of the principals was not established by any competent
proof. Petitioner filed a motion to reconsideration, however it was denied. Certiorari was
also denied. Hence this petition.

Issues: Whether or not that photocopies are indeed electronic evidence contemplated in
RA 8792 as well as the Rules on electronic evidence.

Ruling: No. A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by

petitioner will reveal that not all of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the
persons who purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or produced
electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can a person’s signature affixed
manually be considered as information electronically received, recorded, transmitted,
stored, processed, retrieved or produced. Hence, the argument of petitioner that since
these paper printouts were produced through an electronic process, then these
photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence is
obviously an erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having thus
declared that the offered photocopies are not tantamount to electronic documents, it is
consequential that the same may not be considered as the functional equivalent of their
original as decreed in the law. The pieces of documentary evidence by the NAPOCOR
were not properly identified by any competent witness. As correctly pointed out by
Bangpai, the witness did not have personal knowledge of and participation in the
preparation and making of the pieces of documentary evidence.
ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO

G.R. No. 146710-15

Facts: The case at bar stemmed from the events that transpired during EDSA II.
President Joseph Estrada pursuant to the calls for resignation, left Malacanang, and
pursuant to this, Gloria Macapagal-¬Arroyo, then Vice-President under Estrada’s reign
took place. Estrada now goes to the court to contest the legitimacy of Arroyo’s
Presidency, arguing that he never resigned as President, and hence, hence, claims
hence, claims to still be the lawful President of the Philippines. Among the pieces of
evidence offered to prove that Estrada had indeed resigned from the presidency is the
Angara Diary, chronicling the last moments of Estrada in Malacanang.

Issue: Whether the Angara Diary is inadmissible as hearsay evidence?

Ruling: No. The Supreme Court held that the Angara diary is not an out-¬of-¬court
statement but is a part of the pleadings of the case. Furthermore, the Court noted that
the Angara diaries contained direct statements of Estrada with respect to his proposal
for the holding of a snap election, his intent to leave his post by Monday and his
exasperation over the bureaucracy, controversy and red tape. An ANALYSIS of the
same leads to the conclusion that the contents of the diary may be more accurately
classified as admissions of a party. Pursuant to Rules of Evidence, “the act, declaration
or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.”

Moreover, the statements cannot be regarded as hearsay evidence because the same
can be properly categorized as independently relevant statements. Independently
relevant statements are those which are “Independent” from the truth of the statements.
Independent relevant statements classified into statements which consist of the very
facts in issue and those which are circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue, such as
the statements of a person showing his state of mind or statements of a person from
which an inference may be made as to the state of mind of another. Pursuant to this, it
may well be said that the entries in the Angara diary may be regarded as containing
statements regarding the state of mind of Estrada, hence constituting circumstantial
evidence of his intent to resign.
EBREO VS. EBREO

483 SCRA 583

Facts: Felipe Ebreo died intestate leaving behind as heirs his five children. He left to his
children an untitled parcel of land situated in Barangay Sampaga, Batangas City.
Pursuant to the subdivision made by their father Felipe, the land was divided into six
lots identified as Lots A, B, C, D, E and F.

The five heirs executed and signed a document where they extrajudicially partitioned
the property except the portion known as Lot No. 9046-F. They agreed that said portion
shall remain under the co-ownership of all the heirs. However, plaintiffs were surprised
to discover that such portion of the land was declared for taxation purposes in the name
of defendant Antonio Ebreo. Based on the plaintiffs' recitals, they alleged that they
never sold, ceded, conveyed or transferred their rights, share and co-ownership over
Lot 9046-F.

Answering the complaint, the defendants countered that after the execution of the
document of partition, Lot 9046-F was sold by the heirs to Santiago Puyo. By virtue of
this sale, the corresponding Real Property Tax Declaration was transferred in the name
of Santiago Puyo as owner. However, the deed of sale evidencing this transaction was
never presented.

Issue: Whether or not an annotation in a tax declaration of an alleged Deed of Sale

sufficiently prove conveyance of title to a property.

Ruling: No. The Court held that the tax declarations for Lot 9046-F that were issued in
the name of defendant Antonio Ebreo and that he paid taxes for the land provides no
evidentiary value that he was the owner thereof. Tax declarations are not sufficient
evidence to prove possession in the concept of owners.

Considering that the annotation of the disputed Deed of Sale in a tax declaration is not
sufficient proof of the transfer of property and inasmuch as the subject of inquiry is the
Deed of Sale, it was incumbent on the petitioners to adduce in evidence the original or a
copy of the deed. In the absence of the said document, the exhortations of petitioners
regarding the existence of said deed of sale must fail.
ENRIQUEZ VS. RAMOS

6 SCRA 219

Facts: Plaintiffs entered into a contract of conditional sale with Pedro del Rosario over a
land in QC for P600K, to be paid within 2 years. Upon a performance bond, Del Rosario
was given possession of the land for development as a subdivision. He also undertook
to pay for the subdivision survey, the construction of roads, the installation of light and
water and the payment of whatever income tax may be required. Unable to pay, and to
avoid court litigation, a contract of rescission was entered into. To release the
performance bond, Del Rosario’s partner, Socorro Ramos, was allowed to buy 20 of the
lots on condition that she assume the payment of P50K as her share in the construction
of roads and other improvements required in the subdivision. A new deed of sale was
executed in consideration of P235,056.00, of which an initial payment of P35,056 was
made, the balance secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over the 20 lots and a ½ interest
on a parcel of land in Bulacan. Ramos failed to pay the balance. Ramos claimed that
the contract failed to mention certain important conditions agreed upon, such as the
plaintiffs’ promise to construct roads in the lands to be subdivided for sale. Such
condition was allegedly a superfluity, there being an ordinance in QC requiring the
construction of roads in a subdivision before lots therein could be sold, and said
ordinance was deemed part of the contract. Ramos also claims that the true purchase
price of the sale was P185,000.00, not P235,056.00, the difference being the voluntary
contribution of Ramos to the cost of the construction of the roads which plaintiffs
allegedly assumed to do.

Issue: Whether or not the court a quo erred in allowing presentation of parole evidence
to prove that a contemporaneous oral argument was also reached between the parties.

Ruling: No. The Court held that while it is argued that the court a quo erred in allowing
presentation of parole evidence to prove that a contemporaneous oral agreement was
also reached between parties relative to the construction of the roads for same is in
violation of our rule which provides that when the terms of an agreement had been
reduced to writing it is to be considered as containing all that has been agreed upon and
that no evidence other than the terms there can be admitted between the parties. This
rule, however, only holds true if there is allegation that the agreement does not express
the intent of the parties. If there is and this claim is in issue in the pleadings, the same
may be the subject parole evidence (Idem.). The fact that such failure has been put in
issue in this case is patent in the answer wherein defendant has specifically pleaded
that the contract of sale in question does not express the true intent of the parties with
regard to the construction of the roads. It appearing that plaintiffs have failed to comply
with the condition precedent relative to the construction of the roads in the subdivision in
question, it follows that their action is premature as found by the court a quo. The failure
of defendant to pay the realty and income taxes as agreed upon, as well as to register
the mortgage with respect to the Bulacan property, aside from being minor matters,
appear sufficiently explained in the brief of defendant-appellee. WHEREFORE, the
decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants.
CANUTO VS. MARIANO

37 Phil 840

Facts: Espiridonia Canuto and Juan Mariano entered into a contract of sale with a right
to repurchase over a parcel of land for P360. Such right of repurchase was to expire on
December 4, 1914, one year after. Two days before such expiration, Canuto begged an
extension of tiem to repurchase the land as she would only be able to get the money to
pay Mariano within the end of the month. Mariano agreed to extend it till December 31,
as witnessed by Severino Pascual. The following Sunday, Canuto went to the house of
Mariano, who promised to meet her at the house of an Atty. Mercado the next
afternoon. However, when Canuto went to the meeting place the next day, Mariano
didn’t show up. Since then, Mariano has refused to carry out the alleged oral
agreement, insisting that the redemption period as set in the deed of sale.

Issues: Whether or not was there an oral agreement extending the redemption period;
and whether or not parole evidence as to such extension is allowed.

Rulings: Yes. The Court held that Mariano had extended the time within which Canuto
could repurchase the land on the condition that she would find the money and make
repurchase within the extended period. He cannot be permitted to repudiate his
promise, it appearing that Canuto stood ready to make the payment within the extended
period and was only prevented from doing so by the conduct of Mariano himself.

Yes. The Court held that the rule forbidding the admission of parole or extrinsic
evidence to alter, vary, or contradict a written instrument does not apply so as to prohibit
the establishment by parole of an agreement between the parties to a writing, entered
into subsequent to the time when the written instrument was executed, notwithstanding
such agreement may have the effect of adding to, changing, modifying, or even
altogether abrogating the contract of the parties as evidenced by the writing. Such
parole evidence does not in any way deny that the original agreement of the parties was
that which the writing purports to express, but merely goes to show that the parties have
exercised their right to change or abrogate the same, or to make a new and
independent contract. It is immaterial how soon after the execution of the written
contract the parole agreement was made. If it was in fact subsequent and is otherwise
unobjectionable, it may be proved and enforced.
YU-TEK VS. GONZALES

G.R. No. L-¬9935

Facts: Yu Tek and Co. and Basilio Gonzales entered into a written contract wherein
Gonzales obligated himself to deliver to Yu Tek 600 piculs of sugar of first and second
grade within 3 months in consideration of the receipt of the sum of Php3,000. However,
Gonzales failed to carry out his obligation. Yu Tek filed an action against Gonzales,
proving that no sugar had been delivered that it had not been able to recover the
Php3,000. Meanwhile, Gonzales alleges that the parties intended that the sugar was to
be secured from the crop which he raised on his plantation, and that he was unable to
fulfill the contract by reason of the almost total failure of his crop. The lower court
refused to admit the parol evidence and ruled in favor of Yu Tek.

Issue: Whether or not the parole evidence should be admitted.

Ruling: No. While parole evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the
meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the
contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the
writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake.

In the case at bar, it is sought to show that the sugar was to be obtained exclusively
from the crop raised by the defendant. There is no clause in the written contract which
even remotely suggests such a condition. Gonzales undertook to deliver a specified
quantity of sugar within a specified time. The contract placed no restriction upon him in
the matter of obtaining the sugar. He was equally at liberty to purchase it on the market
or raise it himself. It may be true that Gonzales owned a plantation and expected to
raise the sugar himself, but he did not limit his obligation to his own crop of sugar. The
conclusion is that the condition which the defendant seeks to add to the contract by
parole evidence cannot be considered. The rights of the parties must be determined by
the writing itself.
MAULINI v. SERRANO

28 PHIL 640

Facts: This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila in favour of the plaintiff for the sum of P3,000, with interest thereon at the rate of
1 ½ per cent month from September 5, 1912, together with the costs. The action was
brought by the plaintiff upon the contract of indorsement alleged to have been made in
his favor by the defendant upon the following promissory note:

“3000 Due 5th of September 1912. We jointly and severally agree to pay to the order of
Don Antonio G. Serrano on or before the 5th day of September, 1912, the sum of three
thousand pesos (P3,000) for value received for commercial operations. Notice and
protest renounced. If the sum herein mentioned is not completely paid on the 5th day of
September, 1912, this instrument will draw interest at the rate of 1 ½ per cent per month
from the date when due until the date of its complete payment. The makers hereof
agree to pay the additional sum of P500 as attorney's fees in case of failure to pay the
note.

Manila, June 5, 1912.

(Sgd.) For Padern, Moreno & Co., by F. Moreno, member of the firm. For

Jose Padem, by F. Moreno, Angel Gimenez”

The note was indorsed on the back as follows:

“Pay note to the order of Don Fernando Maulini, value received. Manila, June 5, 1912.

(Sgd) A.G. Serrano

Issue: Whether the evidence is admissible.

Ruling: Yes. Parole evidence is admissible for the purposes named. The prohibition
against parole evidence is to prevent alteration, change, modification, or contradiction of
the term of a written instrument, admittedly existing, by the use of some parole evidence
except in cases specifically named in the action. The case at bar is not one where the
evidence offered varies, alters, modifies, or contradicts the terms of indorsement
admittedly existing. The evidence was not offered for that purpose. The purpose was to
show that the contract of indorsement ever existed; that the minds of the parties never
met on the terms of such contract that they never mutually agreed to enter into such
contract and that there never existed a consideration upon which such an agreement
could be founded.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. BENITO SEETO

G.R. No. L-¬4388

Facts: On March 13, 1948, Seeto presented to PNB at Surigao a P5,000 check, payable
to cash or bearer, and drawn by one Gan Yek Kiao against the Cebu branch of the
Philippine National Bank of Communications. After consultation with the bank
employees, Seeto made a general and unqualified endorsement of the check, which
was accepted by PNB’s agency, which paid Seeto the value of the check therefore.
Upon being presented to the drawee bank for payment, however, the check was
dishonored for “insufficient funds”. PNB demanded refund from Seeto. Seeto, however,
refused, claiming that at the time of the negotiation of the check, the drawer had
sufficient funds in the drawee bank, and had not PNB delayed in forwarding the check
until the drawer’s fund were exhausted, the same would have been paid. PNB alleged
that Seeto gave assurances that the drawer of the check had sufficient funds with the
bank, and that Seeto had made a general and unqualified indorsement thereon. As
evidence, PNB presented two witnesses at the trial, who testified that the check was
cashed due to assurances given by Seeto and the promise that he would refund the
amount paid by PNB should the check be dishonored.

Issue: Whether parole evidence with respect to the verbal assurances made by Seeto
be admitted as evidence?

Ruling: Yes. Any prior or contemporaneous conversation in connection with a note or its
indorsement may be proved by parol evidence. An extrinsic agreement between
indorser and indorsee which cannot be embodied in the instrument without impairing its
credit is provable by parol. If, therefore, the supposed assurances that the drawer had
funds and that the Seeto would refund the amount of the check if the drawer had no
funds, were the considerations or reasons that induced the branch agency of PNB to go
out of its ordinary practice of not cashing out of town checks and accept the check and
to pay its face value, the may be proved by parole, provided, of course, that the
assurances or inducements offered would not vary, alter, or destroy the obligations
attached by law to the indorsement. In this case, however, there was no express
obligation assumed by Seeto that the drawer would always have funds, or that he would
refund the amount of the check even if there was delay in its presentation. Therefore,
such assurances were discharged by the unreasonable delay in the presentation of the
check for payment.
CHARLES F. WOODHOUSE v. FORTUNATO F. HALILI

G.R. No. L-¬4811

Facts: Plaintiff entered into a written agreement with the defendant to the effect that
they shall organize a partnership for the bottling and distribution of soft drinks, plaintiff to
act as industrial partner or manager, and the defendant a capitalist furnishing the capital
necessary therefor. The defendant claims that his consent to the agreement was
secured by the representation of plaintiff that he was the owner, or was about to
become owner, of an exclusive bottling franchise, which representation was false. The
fraud and false representation were sought to be proven by means, among others, of
the drafts of the agreement prior to the final one, which drafts are presumed to have
already been integrated into the final agreement.

Issue: Whether those prior drafts excluded from the prohibition of the parole evidence
rule.

Ruling: Yes. The purpose of considering the drafts is not to vary, alter, or modify the
agreement, but to discover the intent of the parties thereto and the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the contract. The issue of fact is, did plaintiff represent to
defendant that he had an exclusive franchise? Certainly, his acts or statements prior to
the agreement are essential and relevant to the determination of said issue. The act or
statement of the plaintiff was not sought to be introduced to change or alter the terms of
the agreement, but to prove how he induced the defendant to enter into it -¬ to prove
the representations or inducements, or fraud, with which or by which he secured the
other party's consent thereto. These are expressly excluded from the parol evidence
rule. Fraud and false representation are an incident to the creation of a jural act, not to
its integration, and are not governed by the rules on integration. Where parties
prohibited from proving said representations or inducements, on the ground that the
agreement had already been entered into, it would be impossible to prove
misrepresentation or fraud. The parol evidence rule expressly allows the evidence to be
introduced when the validity of an instrument is put in issue by the pleadings (sec. 22-a
of Rule 123).
LUCIO CRUZ VS CA

G.R No. 79962

Facts: Conrado Salonga filed a complaint for collection and damages against petitioner
Lucio Cruz alleging that in the course of their business transactions of buying and
selling fish, the petitioner borrowed from him an amount of P35,000, evidenced by
receipt. Salonga claimed that of this amount, only P20,000 has been paid. Salonga
claimed that he and Cruz agreed that the latter would grant him an exclusive right to
repurchase the harvest of certain fishponds leased by Cruz in exchange for certain loan
accommodation and that pursuant thereto, Salonga delivered to Cruz various loans
totaling P15, 250.00 as evidenced by 4 receipts.

Cruz denied having contracted any loan from Salonga. By way of special defense, he
alleged that he was a leasee of several hectares of a fishpond owned by Yabut and that
he entered into an agreement with Salonga whereby the latter will purchase fish in
certain areas in the pond. Cruz admitted having received the amounts mentioned but he
contended that these amounts were not received as loans but for their “pakyaw”
agreement.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in disregarding parole evidence to determine the
real transactions of the parties.

Ruling: The parole evidence rule is not applicable in this case. Exhibit D does not
contain any agreements to determine the transaction made by the parties. It is only a
receipt attesting to the fact that the petitioner received from the private respondent the
amount of 35,000.00.

Even if it were assumed that exhibits D and I are covered by the parole evidence rule,
its application by the CA was improper.
ROSARIO TEXTILE vs. HOME BANKERS

G.R. No. 137232

Facts: Rosario Textile Mills Corporation (RTMC) applied from Home Bankers Savings &
Trust Co. for an Omnibus Credit Line which was approved. Edilberto V. Yujuico signed
a Surety Agreement in favor of the bank, in which he bound himself jointly and severally
with RTMC for the payment of all RTMC’s indebtedness to the bank. RTMC availed of
the credit line by making numerous drawdowns, each drawdown being covered by a
separate promissory note and trust receipt. RTMC, represented by Yujuico, executed in
favor of the bank a total of eleven promissory notes. RTMC then failed to pay its loans.
Hence the bank filed a complaint for sum of money against RTMC and Yujuico before
the RTC.

In their answer, RTMC and Yujuico contend that they should be absolved from liability.
They claimed that although the grant of the credit line and the execution of the
suretyship agreement are admitted, the bank gave assurance that the suretyship
agreement was merely a formality under which Yujuico will not be personally liable.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of the bank.CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue: Whether or not the suretyship agreement Yujuico signed does not bind him, the
same being a mere formality

Ruling: The Court rejected Yujuico’s contention. The Suretyship Agreement he signed
binds him. The terms clearly show that he agreed to pay the bank jointly and severally
with RTMC. The parole evidence rule under Section 9, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Court is in point, thus:

"SEC. 9. Evidence of written agreements. – When the terms of an agreement have

been reduced in writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and
there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written agreement.

However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain, or add to the terms of the
written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:

(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake, or imperfection in the written agreement;

(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties thereto;

(c) The validity of the written agreement; or

(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest
after the execution of the written agreement.

Under this Rule, the terms of a contract are rendered conclusive upon the parties and
evidence aliunde is not admissible to vary or contradict a complete and enforceable
agreement embodied in a document. We have carefully examined the Suretyship
Agreement signed by Yujuico and found no ambiguity therein. Documents must be
taken as explaining all the terms of the agreement between the parties when there
appears to be neither ambiguity in the language of said documents nor any failure to
express the true intent and agreement of the parties.
EDENBERT MADRIGAL VS.CA

G.R. No. 142944

Facts: Jose and his wife Fermina are the owners of a residential lot with a 2-storey
residential house erected thereon. Jose planned to mortgage the property to the bank
but his son Virgilio convinced him not to proceed with the intended mortgage and to
instead assign to him a portion of the same property, assuring his father that the latter
could continue in occupancy of the property and that he will not dispose of the property
without his father’s consent and that the latter could redeem the said property any time
he acquires money.

Jose and Fermina executed a "Deed of Absolute Sale", whereunder the couple
appeared to have conveyed to their son Virgilio the house and lot in question for a
consideration of P50,000 although the property easily commands much more at that
time. Virgilio then sold the said property to Madrigal without the knowledge of Jose.
Madrigal then asked Jose to vacate the property. Jose filed against Virgilio and Madrigal
the complaint for annulment, redemption and damages with the RTC. RTC ruled in favor
of Jose and Fermina which the CA affirmed.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in receiving parol evidence to establish that
the instrument in question is actually one of equitable mortgage

Ruling: The trial court is correct. As ruled in the case of Lustan vs CA, “Even when a
document appears on its face to be a sale, the owner of the property may prove that the
contract is really a loan with mortgage by raising as an issue the fact that the document
does not express the true intent of the parties. In this case, parol evidence then
becomes competent and admissible to prove that the instrument was in truth and in fact
given merely as a security for the repayment of a loan. And upon proof of the truth of
such allegations, the court will enforce the agreement or understanding in consonance
with the true intent of the parties at the time of the execution of the contract".
PEOPLE VS. DE JESUS

129 SCRA 4

Facts: Clara Mina, a feeble-minded single woman of 28, lived with her parents in barrio
Amistad, Alicia, Isabela. At around 2:00 in the afternoon of January 3, 1974, Clara was
left in the house when members of the household went farming. Rogelio de Jesus, a
neighbor, entered Clara’s house and with the use of force, raped the feeble-minded
woman. Pastora Simon, the mother of Clara, happened to rerun in the house and
caught De Jesus in the act. The latter managed to escape. Simon reported the incident
to the police and had her daughter examined by the municipal health officer. De Jesus
subsequently surrendered.

During trial, De Jesus testified in his defense. He claimed that he only admitted to the
authorities that he had sexual intercourse with Clara due to his maltreatment by the jail
guards. Clara, on the other hand, testified for the prosecution and narrated the events
leading to her rape albeit with some difficulty because of her mental condition. Giving
great weight to the testimony of Clara, the Circuit Criminal Court of Isabela found De
Jesus guilty of rape. The accused appealed to the Supreme Court challenging the
competency of Clara as a witness.

Issue: Whether the feeble-minded Clara qualifies as a competent witness?

Ruling: Yes. It is undisputed that Clara is mentally-ill. However, there is no showing that
she could not convey her ideas by words or signs. Clara gave sufficiently intelligible
answers. The Court was satisfied that Clara can perceive and transport in her own way
her perceptions. The ruling of the lower court was affirmed.
PEOPLE VS. SOLOMON

229 SCRA 403

Facts: On October 11, 1987, while Sylvia Soria, a 20-year old mental retardate, was
walking along the Maharlika Highway at Casabahan, Gandara, Samar, Alejandro
Salomon and Feliciano Conge, who were apparently waiting for her, accosted her and
forcibly took her to the rice field some ten meters away. There she was raped by
Salomon with Conge's assistance. On her way home, she met her brother Senecio, to
whom she related her ordeal. The two of them reported her rape to their father. That
same night, the family walked the three-kilometer distance to the police station, where
Restituto Soria signed a complaint for the rape of his daughter by Salomon and Conge.
Sylvia was medically examined at the Gandara General Hospital by Dr. Susan Tanseco.
Three days later, Salomon and Feliciano could no longer be found. It was only after a
four-month search that they were arrested in Aguado, Plaser, Masbate, from where,
after being detained there for one month, they were taken back to Samar. Following a
protracted investigation, an information for rape was filed against them on August 9,
1988, with the Regional Trial Court in Calbayog City.

The two accused flatly denied the charge against them. Conge swore that on the night
in question, Sylvia arrived at the highway and loudly demanded a lamp from the people
in Epifanio de Guzman's house. He approached her and said there was no lamp to
spare, whereupon, as he turned his back to leave, she hit him in the neck with a piece
of wood, causing him to stagger. In swift reaction, he caught Sylvia by the waist and
pushed her to the ground and as she lay there exposed (she was not wearing any
underwear), he angrily shoved his five fingers into her vagina. Sylvia cried out at the top
of her voice. Fearing that her relatives might come, he withdrew his hands and
immediately left the place.

Issue: Whether or not the testimony of Sylvia Soria a mental retardate should be
admissible as evidence?

Ruling: Yes. A mental retardate is not for this reason alone disqualified from being a
witness. As in the case of other witnesses, acceptance of his testimony depends on its
nature and credibility or, otherwise put, the quality of his perceptions and the manner he
can make them known to the court. Thus, in People v. Gerones, the Court accepted the
testimony of a rape victim notwithstanding that she had the mentality of a nine or ten-
year old "because she was able to communicate her ordeal... clearly and consistently."

In the case before us, the trial court noted that although Sylvia's speech was slurred and
it was necessary at times to ask her leading questions, "her testimony was positive,
clear, plain, coherent and credible." Her mental condition did not vitiate her credibility.
We also believe, as we have observed often enough in many cases that a woman will
not expose herself to the humiliation of a rape trail, with its attendant publicity and the
morbid curiosity it will arouse, unless she has been truly wronged and seeks atonement
for her abuse.
PEOPLE VS. CASTANEDA

G.R. No. L-46306

Facts: Victoria Manaloto filed a complaint against her husband Benjamin Manaloto for
Falsification of Public Documents because Bejamin forged, imitated, and counterfeited
the signature of Victoria in a deed of sale of a property which is part of the conjugal
partnership when in fact she did not give her consent to it.

Victoria was called to the witness stand but they moved to disqualify her based on Rule
130, Section 20. The prosecution argued that this is one of the exceptions since it is a
criminal case where a crime is committed by one against the other but the Judge
disqualified her.

Issue: Whether or not this case is an exception to the rule on marital disqualification?

Ruling: Yes. The Court, citing Ordoño v. Daquiganwhich also cited Cargill v. State,
provided the criterion to be followed in resolving this Issue: “…when an offense directly
attacks, or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the
exception…”

In this case, the same principle should be applied because the person who stands to be
prejudiced by the forgery is not a third person but his wife. Also, it directly and vitally
impairs the conjugal relation. By reason of public policy, the wife should not be
disqualified because to do otherwise would set a dangerous precedent where the
husband may conjure as many falsifications as possible with impunity.
PEOPLE VS. FRANCISCO

G.R. No. L-568

Facts: Juan Francisco was previously arrested and detained for robbery. His request to
visit his home with his guard was granted. His guard allowed Francisco to visit his wife
in a room while he waited at the foot of the house. A few minutes later, the guard heard
Francisco’s wife screaming, running, and holding her bloodied hand to her breast. He
also found Francisco wounded and lying on the ground together with his dead son who
is lying on his breast. He was charged with the crime of parricide.

Francisco’s affidavit stating that he killed his wife and son because he was tired of his
father-in-law’s statements about his shameful condition & that he would order someone
to kill him was admitted in evidence. His affidavit was shown to have been voluntarily
made and the testimony of his guard was also given much weight. Francisco’s
testimony, however, presents a different version from that written in his affidavit-stating
that he was scared of his guard so he wrote such statements in his affidavit. He also
placed the blame on his wife as regards the death of their son. His wife testified to deny
the allegations. The defense strongly impugns the testimony of his wife based on Rule
123, Section 26.

Issue: Whether or not the wife is disqualified to testify.

Ruling: No. In this case, the wife didn’t testify in the direct evidence for the prosecution
but under circumstances presently to be stated. It will be noted that the wife only
testified against her husband after the latter, testifying in his own defense, imputed upon
her the killing of their son.

By all rules of justice and reason this gave the prosecution, which had theretofore
refrained from presenting the wife as a witness against her husband, the right to do so,
as it did in rebuttal; and the wife herself the right to so testify, at least, in self-defense,
not of course, against being subjected to punishment in that case in which she was not
a defendant but against any or all of various possible consequences which might flow
from her silence

The court also mentioned the concept of waiver of incompetency. Objections to the
competency of a husband or wife to testify in a criminal prosecution against the other
may be waived as in the case of the other witnesses generally. Thus, the accused
waives his or her privilege by calling the other spouse as a witness for him or her,
thereby making the spouse subject to cross-examination in the usual manner.

In this case, when Francisco said that his wife committed the crime, he couldn’t expect
the State to stay silent and not rebut such new matter in his testimony.
LEZAMA VS. RODRIGUEZ

G.R. No. L-25643

Facts: Jose Dineros filed an action against the decision of the CFI which decided in
favor of Lezama. His complaint alleged that due to Lezama’s mismanagement, the
company was placed under the receivership of Dineros. During the receivership, Roque
brought an action for collection of the amount he lent to the company. The summons
was not served to the receiver but to Lezama. Dineros claimed that due to collusion
between Lezamas, Roque was able to obtain judgment by default against the company.

Dineros asked the court to issue a subpoena for PaquitaLezama because he claimed
that the loan from Roque is fictitious and that Paquita was the secretary and the person
who knew about the negotiations for the said loan and is knowledgeable about the
records in the company book. The Lezamas were charged with fraudulent conspiracy.

Issue: Can a wife be compelled to testify as an adverse party witness concerning her
participation in the alleged fraud without violating Section 20 (b) of Rule 130?

Ruling: No. The interests of husband and wife in this case are necessarily interrelated.
Testimony adverse to the wife's own interests would tend to show the existence of
collusive fraud between the spouses and would then work havoc upon their common
defense that the loan was not fictitious. There is the possibility, too, that the wife, in
order to soften her own guilt, if guilty she is, may unwittingly testify in a manner entirely
disparaging to the interests of the husband.

Because of the unexpensive wording of the rule which provides merely that the wife
cannot be examined "for or against her husband without his consent," it is further
argued that "when husband and wife are parties to an action, there is no reason why
either may not be examined as a witness for or against himself or herself alone," and his
or her testimony could operate only against himself or herself.

Even if such view were generally acceptable as an exception to the rule, or even as a
separate doctrine, it would be inapplicable in this case where the main charge is
collusive fraud between the spouses and a third person, and the evident purpose of
examination of the wife is to prove that charge.

This rule carries with it two purposes: 1. a disqualification and 2. a privilege not to testify
against the other.
GUERRERO VS. ST. CLAIRE REALTY

G.R. No. L-58164

Facts: Andres Guerrero owned a parcel of land which he inherited from his father upon
his death. He loaned the land to his sister Cristina Guerrero before Andres died. Cristina
became extremely ill, according to the testimony of Laura, so that they borrowed money
from Manual Guerrero. When Cristina died, Manuel computed the amount of money
borrowed and the land in dispute was cadastrally surveyed in his favor. The lone
claimant was Andres. A subsequent sale was executed in favor of St. Claire Realty. The
siblings of Andres claimed ownership of the said lot. Jose Cervantes testified about his
knowledge on the nature of the transaction between Cristina and Manuel-that it wasn’t
one of sale but of mortgage. Laura and Jose were sought to be disqualified pursuant to
Rule 130, Sec. 20(a).

Issue: Whether or not Laura and Jose Cervantes are disqualified to testify based on
Rule 130, 20(a) [now Section 22, Rule 130].

Ruling: No. In this case, Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes are not parties in the
present case, and neither are they assignors of the parties nor "persons in whose behalf
a case is prosecuted."

They are mere witnesses by whose testimonies the plaintiffs aimed to establish that it
was not Cristina Guerrero, but Andres Guerrero, who owned the disputed land at the
time of its alleged sale to Manuel Guerrero; that Cristina Guerrero did not really sell but
merely mortgaged the property to Manuel Guerrero. The incompetency contemplated in
the provision affects only the persons therein mentioned, and no others, that is, only
parties plaintiff or their assignors, persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted. Also, it
is not a claim or demand against the estate of the deceased Manuel Guerrero. The
defendants Guerreros are not the executors or administrators or representatives of such
deceased. They are being sued as claimants of ownership in their individual capacities
of the disputed lot. The lot is not a part of the estate of Manuel Guerrero. "It has been
held that statutes providing that a party in interest is incompetent to testify where the
adverse party is dead or insane, must be applied strictly in accordance with their
express wording, irrespective of their spirit. The law uses the word ‘against an executor
or administrator or other representative of a deceased person.’ It should be noted that
after the mention of an executor or administrator the words or other representative
follows, which means that the word ‘representative’ includes only those who, like the
executor or administrator, are sued in their representative, not personal, capacity. And
that is emphasized by the law by using the words ‘against the estate of such deceased
persons,’ which convey the idea of an estate actually owned by the deceased at the
time the case was brought and that, therefore, it is only his rights that are to be asserted
and defendant in the litigation by the person representing him, not the personal rights of
such representative."
ABRAHAM VS. RECTO-KASTEN

4 SCRA 298

Facts: Juan Ysmael obtained a loan from Alfonso Abraham Sr., and executed a
promissory note in favor of the latter. The note was executed in the presence of
Florencia Abraham, Alfonso’s wife, who affixed her signature as witness. A demand was
made upon its due date, but Juan Ysmael failed to pay. Alfonso Abraham and Juan
Ysmael later on died with the note still being left unpaid. During the settlement of
Ysmael’s estate, FLorencia Abraham together with her sons filed a pleading entitled
“Reclamation” demanding payment of the amount represented by the note. During the
hearing before the commissioner, the counsel of administratix Priscilla Recto-Kasten
interposed a general and continuing objection to the testimony of Florencia Abraham
invoking the dead man’s statute. However, after Florencia testified , the counsel of
Ysmael lengthily cross-examined her on the very matters in which he interposed a
general objection.

Issue: Whether or not the dead man’s statute applies

Ruling: Yes, Note that counsel for the administratix did not present evidence to destroy
the alleged genuineness of the promissory note. As to the issue on the dead man’s
statute, there was a waiver of the prohibition when the counsel for the administratix
extensively crossed-examined the witness on the matters subject of the prohibition. It
was for this reason that the trial judge overruled the continuing object and admitted the
testimony of the accused.

Clearly, under the current rules the testimony would have fallen under the Dead Man’s
Statute and should be inadmissible. However, as with all other rules, objections to the
admissibility of these pieces (testimonial) evidence may be waived. And in this case, the
counsel of the administratix in choosing to cross-examine the petitioner effectively
waived the objection.

The same principle applies under the proposed revised rules. Objections may be
waived, however, the difference lies in that even without the objection and subsequent
waiver of such objection, the testimony of Florencia Abraham would now have been
admissible provided the statement was made upon the personal knowledge of the
deceased person and while his recollection was clear. And as long as there are no
circumstances that would indicate untrustworthiness the statement is admissible.