Juha Himanka

HUSSERL’S TWO TRUTHS

Adequate and apodictic evidence

Published version: Phänomenologische Forschungen 2005, 93–112.

Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations was the breakthrough of phenomenology. What made it a

breakthrough was the new way of explicating truth or evidence as self-givenness or adequacy.

Husserl did however also have another interpretation of truth: evidence as indubitability or certainty

of apodicticity. Originally Husserl thought that apodicticity increases the evidence of something

already adequately given. Yet, in the first Cartesian Meditation Husserl differentiates the two

modes of evidence. In this article the way to this split up of evidence is elaborated with the help of

some recent publications in Husserliana.1 It is also suggested that the fact that Husserl has two

separate views on truth is one reason for the dispersed state of Husserl-research. This article argues

that Husserl’s early view on evidence adequacy is more original and interesting. The real

philosophical challenge, however, is to be able to join the two modes of evidence under one strenge

Wissenschaft.

1. Introduction

During his visit to Amsterdam in 1928, Edmund Husserl met the Russian philosopher Lev Shestov

(1866–1938). A decade later, Shestov recollects what Husserl had told him. He had first

1
emphasised that his questioning was so radical that ”our science, our knowledge, is shaking,

tottering"(HuaDI/330-1). As a result of this profound inquiry, all existing knowledge gives way:

"And finally, to my own indescribable horror, I convinced myself that if contemporary philosophy

has said the last word about the nature of knowledge, then we have no knowledge." Husserl then

further describes how this happened: "Once, when I was giving a lecture at the university,

expounding ideas which I had taken over from our contemporaries, I suddenly felt that I had

nothing to say, that I was standing before my students with empty hands and an empty soul."

Husserl called this accomplishment where the existing standpoint gave way and opened into a more

original viewpoint epoché. When this further leads to a reduced result, epoché turns into a

reduction,2 to the constitutive moment of Husserl’s phenomenological method.3 And indeed Husserl

continues:

"I began to seek the truth precisely where no one had sought it before, since no one had admitted

that it might be found there. Such was the origin of my Logical Investigations." The result of

this original reduction was Husserl’s groundbreaking work, Logical Investigations.

According to Shestov, Logical Investigations was ”enormously impressive”. The work

made a strong impression on others, too. Wilhelm Dilthey compared the work to Kant’s Critique of

1
Hereafter Hua[volume]/[page] and Husserlina Dokumente HuaD[volume]/[page].
2
”Durch die Epoché reduzieren wir ...” (HuaI/57) ”... der phänomenologischen Epoché. ... Blick
auf die transcendentale Subjektivität, so daß die Methode eo ipso zur Methode der transcendentalen
Reduktion wird.” (HuaVIII/165). ”Die Epoché ist jedoch nur die Initialphase der
Phänomenologischen Reduktion.” (Eugen Fink: Reflexionen zu Husserls Phänomenologischer
Reduktion. In: Nähe und Distanz. Freiburg 1976. 314); ”Die Epoché ist nur der erste Schritt, der
Stoß, welcher das Erdbeben einleitet.” (Ibid, 317).
3
Reduction is an essential factor in Husserl’s phenomenology (HuaI/23; HuaIX/192; HuaXIV/408;
HuaDII/2, 63, 119; Cairns: Conversations with Husserl and Fink. Den Haag 1976. 43; Eugen Fink:
Die Spätphilosophie Husserls in Freiburger Zeit. In: Nähe und Distanz. 218; Sebastian Luft:
Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie. Dordrecht 2002. 5. It can even be said that ”Die Reduktion
prägt vielmehr die gesamte Denkform des phänomenologischen Philosophierens.” (Ferdinant
Fellmann: Phänomenologie als ästhetische Theorie. Freiburg1989. 121). Husserl claimed that not
understanding its central position would lead to a complete misunderstanding of his approach
(HuaV/23; HuaIX/192; HuaXXVII/172; HuaDIII/4, 83).
2
Pure Reason.4 The young student Johannes Daubert was so impressed by the Investigations that he

took his bicycle and rode all the way from Braunschweig to Göttingen to talk to Husserl

(HuaDI/72). Emmanuel Levinas writes about the shock given by Investigations (”le grand choc

donné par les Logische Untersuchungen”) and argues that the whole Husserlian phenomenology is

a result of this work.5 Edith Stein in turn writes about the sensation caused by the Investigations.6

What is it about this work that has made such an impression? What is this breakthrough? In his

story to Shestov, Husserl himself suggested that it was his view on truth, which differs from other

philosophical and scientific views.

Husserl called his Investigations a breakthrough and situated it in his new way of

understanding truth. Martin Heiddegger followed Husserl in both of these aspects. He praised

Husserl’s achievement in his lectures: "This elaboration of evidence was for the first time brought

to a successful resolution by Husserl, who thus made an essential advance beyond all the

obscurities prevalent in the tradition of logic and epistemology." 7

We are familiar with the view of intentionality as the central theme and problem of Husserl’s

phenomenology. According to Husserl, Eugen Fink was the only one who understood him

completely.8 In his essay tracing the central problem of Husserlian phenomenology, Fink

acknowledges intentionality as a central theme, but he transforms the problem of intentionality into

a problem of evidence: “Evidence is the title for the central problem of Husserlian

phenomenology“.9 In this study, we follow Fink’s example.

4
Martin Heidegger: Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs. Frankfurt am Main 1979. 30.
5
Emmanuel Levinas: Réflexions sur la "tecnique" phénoménologique. In: Levinas: En Découvrent
l'existence avec Husserl and Heidegger. Paris 1988. 115. Cf. HuaV/§6; Hua XXXV/373.
6
Edith Stein: Aus meinem Leben. Freiburg 1987. 174.
7
Martin Heidegger: Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs. 67.
8
Max Müller: Erinnerung. In: Hans Sepp (Hrsg.): Edmund Husserl und die phänomenologische
Bewegung. München 1988. 37. Cf. also HuaDIII(3)/263, 274-5; HuaDIII(4)/44, 85);
HuaXXVII/183.
9
”Evidenz ist ... der Titel für das zentrale Problem Phänomenologie Husserls” (Eugen Fink: Das
Problem der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls. In: Eugen Fink: Studien zur Phänomenologie
1930-1939. Den Haag 1966. 202). Cf. also Karl Mertens: Zwischen Letztbegründung und Skepsis.
Freiburg 1996. 171.
3
 When Heidegger in his introduction to Husserl’s Lectures on the Phenomenology of Inner

Time-Consciousness points out the central role of intentionality in the Investigations, he emphasises

that we are not dealing with a solution but with a problem.10 The same holds when we turn to

evidence. Husserl writes in Logical Investigations: "[The inward] evidence on which all knowledge

ultimately reposes is not a gift of nature that appears together with the mere idea of states of affairs

without any methodological or artful set-up."11

In order to see evidence or understand what it means, we have to make preparations. The

purpose of this text is to make a contribution to such preparations.

The next section of this study opens Husserl’s original or reduced view on evidence. Husserl

called this kind of evidence where something is given as itself adequate. The following section

concentrates on Husserl’s second view of evidence, apodicticity. To Husserl, something is

apodictically evident when it cannot be doubted. As we will see, Husserl tried to find a way to start

his phenomenological approach from apodictic certainty in the 1920’s. In this approach, Husserl

finally gained the knowledge that such an indubitable beginning cannot be adequately evident.

Yet it took surprisingly long for Husserl to see the problem of the relationship between the

two views on truth. It was during his search for a more secure or final foundation for

phenomenology in the 1920’s that the two modes of evidence began to differentiate. At the end of

the decade, Husserl made his famous remark: ”adequacy and apodicticity of evidence need not go

hand in hand.”12 Husserl’s tortuous way to this radical view is illuminated in recent publications of

Husserliana (XX/1, XXXIV and XXXV).

10
Martin Heidegger: Vorbemergung des Herausgebers in Edmund Husserl Vorlesungen zur
Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtsein. Tübingen 1980. 1. Cf. HuaIII/337.
11
Translation J. N. Findley. ”Die Evidenz, auf der schließlich alles Wissen beruht, ist nicht eine
natürliche Beigabe, die sich mit der bloßen Vortsellung der Sachverhalt und ohne jede methodisch-
künstlichen Veranstaltungen einfindet.” (Hua XVIII/31)
12
Emmanuel Levinas: From Consciousness to Wakefulness. In: Levinas: Discovering Existence
with Husserl. Evenston 1998. 159, 163; Levinas: Philosophy and Awekening in Levinas:
Discovering Existence with Husserl. 175; Elisabeth Ströker: Husserls Evidenzprinzip. In:
Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 32 (1978). 1-30; Thomas Seebohm: Apodiktizität, Recht
und Grenze. In: Gerhard Funke (Hrsg.): Husserl-Symposium, Mainz 1989. 65-99. 78 note 36.
4
 Husserl’s two truths also open up a view on the multiplicity of Husserl interpretations.

There is no consensus on the ABC of Husserl’s phenomenology.13 As Husserl himself had more

than one view of truth, this hardly comes as a surprise. The Heideggerian view, for example,

strongly emphasises evidence as adequacy and rejects apodicticity. Here the erring experience of

the present takes the foreground, and the way to existentialism is prepared. On the other hand, one

could reject these uncertain aspects and concentrate on Husserl’s reflections on apodictically certain

and eternal truths. Both of these possibilities are supported by Husserliana. Given this, it is no

wonder that Husserl described his writing as a zigzag movement,14 and Husserliana is indeed

caught in a zigzag movement where both truths, adequacy and apodicticity, take turns to serve as

the starting point.

Although the most original parts of Husserl’s thinking start from the adequacy of experience

– and as we will see later on, Husserl himself agrees with this – the real philosophical challenge is

to find a way to join the two views on truth under one strenge Wissenschaft. Husserl himself took

up this challenge surprisingly late in his career and never managed to work it through.15

Husserliana, however, does contain an attempt to situate the two evidences in relation to each

other.

2. Adequate evidence

Why does Husserl use the word ’evidence’ instead of ’truth’?16 The Latin concept evidentia is

Cicero’s translation of the Greek enargeia.17 Quintilian comments on Cicero’s translation in his

13
Ferdinant Fellmann: Phänomenologie als ästhetishce Theorie. 27.
14
HuaVI/59; Hua XVII/30; HuaXVIII/193; Hua XIX(1)/22–3; Hua XXXV/266, Beilage IX, xxxv,
lxi; Dorion Cairns: Conversations with Husserl and Fink. 27; Sebastian Luft: Phänomenologie der
Phänomenologie. 7.
15
Karl Mertens: Zwischen Letztbegründung und Skepsis. 151 note 11.
16
Husserl saw truth (Wahrheit) as an object (Gegenstand) and actual finding (as Erlebnis) of truth
as evidence (Evidenz) (Hua XXIV/§49a; HuaXVIII/193; cf. Hua XIX(2)/§39).
17
George Heffernan: Miscellaneous Lucubrations on Husserl’s Answer to the Question ’was die
Evidenz sei’ in Husser-Studies 15 (1998); W. Halbfass: ”Evidenz I.” in Historisches Wörterbuch
der Philosophie. Basel: Schwabe & Co 1972. Where, then, is a man to look for help who would
5
Institutio oratoria: "enargeia ... which Cicero calls ’illustration’ and ’evidence’, which now seem

not so much ’to say’ as ’to show’ and the feelings follow on them no differently than if we were

with the things themselves."18

Husserl would certainly deny the connection between truth and feeling ([adfectus], HuaII/59–

60), but otherwise the historical background suits his views very well. The key point is the

transition from the evidence of a sentence into a more original level of seeing and experiencing,

from talking and writing about things to the things themselves.

Husserl told Shestov how his view had changed into a different and more original level than

those of his contemporaries. Today, too, most theories on truth start from correct sentences and

reflect on the evidence that makes them correct. Husserl, however, does not aim to build a theory of

truth: phenomenology ”does not engage in theory” (HuaII/58). The Husserlian view does not

primarily try to take part in the discussion between theories, such as the correspondence and

coherence theories, for example. Richard Campbell writes: "A theory about any topic presupposes

some prior understanding of it, a preunderstanding which is implicit in the ’problem’ posed, and

with which the theory is designed to deal, so is it with all these theories of truth."19 It is this

presupposed level that Husserl reaches for by accomplishing reductions. At this original level of

phenomenology, theoretical critique is not even possible yet.20

This radical approach to truth does not start from correct sentences, and Husserl did not

even value correct sentences as such.21 This does not, of course, mean that correct sentences are not

a central interest for philosophy. Instead, Husserl means that in order to study the correctness of

have any clear [enarges] or fixed notion of being in his mind", Plato, Sophist 250c (Dialogues of
Plato, translated into English under the editorship of W. D. Ross. Oxford 1930).
18
M. Fabi Quintiliani: Institutio oratoria, Oxford 1970. 335 (VI, ii, 32). Translation: George
Heffernan: Miscellaneous Lucubrations on Husserl’s Answer to the Question ’was die Evidenz sei’.
14.
19
Richard Campbell: The Covert Metaphysics of the Clash between ’Analytic’ and ’Continental’
Philosophy. In: British Journal for the History of Philosophy 9 (2001), 341-359.
20
Karl Mertens: Zwischen Letztbegründung und Skepsis. 130.
21
”Wahre Aussagen sind nicht ohne weiteres Selbstwerte.” (HuaV/96).
6
them we must first turn to a more fundamental level of experience.22 It is clear from the

phenomenological perspective that language is not a direct description of experience.23 Yet, the

emphasis on experience instead of propositions is not enough to explain why the Investigations was

such a breakthrough.

The most obvious place in Husserliana to open up the problem of evidence is the famous

first methodological principle, the so-called principle of evidence. Husserl writes that we should

begin ”from experiences in which the affairs and the affair complex in question are present to me

as themselves.”24

In his search to explain how we experience things themselves, Husserl began to emphasise

the role of fulfilment from 1894 onwards (Hua XX(1)/107 note 1; Hua XXII/109). How are we to

understand the difference between empty and full? In the recently published Husserliana XX/1,

Husserl demonstrates this difference with the example of a room where the lights go off. In the

dark, the surroundings (Umgebung) are not only given by recollection but are there as really present

(als wirklich gegenwärtige) (Hua XX(1)/97). Yet the environment is not given in its bodily itself

(leibhaften Selbstheit). Husserl even ventures to claim that the surroundings are given in a

completely empty way (in völlig leerer Weise). Although Husserl here forgets the other senses than

seeing – we at least actually touch the ground in each case – the example manages to show the

simple difference in the fullness of the given. This aspect is the key to the Heideggerian reading of

Husserl.

In Heidegger’s reading of Husserl, bodily presence is given priority. Heidegger kept this view

to the end. In the last text published during his lifetime, he summarises Husserl’s thought in one

22
”Auf die Evidenzen der Erfahrung sollen sie letzlich alle prädikativen Evidenzen gründen.”
(Edmund Husserl: Erfahrung und Urteil. Hamburg 1949, §10).
23
Sebastian Luft: Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie. 275.
24
I have here emphasised the words ”experience” and ”themselves”. In this I follow the
Husserliana edition. Other editions (the Meiner Edition, the French translation, and the English
translation) follow the manuscripts more closely and use quotation marks. The situation is rather
complicated as there is no evidence that any of the German manuscripts is identical with the one
sent to France to be translated. In any case, I think ”experience” is to be understood here in a
phenomenologically pregnant sense.
7
sentence: ”Husserls Methode soll die Sache der Philosophie zur letztgültigen originären

Gegebenheit, dies heißt: in die ihr eigene Präsenz bringen."25 Heidegger’s view had a strong

influence on ”continental” readers of Husserl. Emmanuel Levinas, for example, follows this line of

interpretation when he writes: "Reason, for Husserl, does not signify a way to rise above the data

directly; it is equivalent to experience, to its privileged moment of 'leibhaft,' presence of the object,

presence of the object 'in flesh and blood' so to speak."26

The advantage of this ”continental” reading of Husserl is the concrete way it demonstrates how

it functions.27 To Husserl, phenomenology is the only concrete science.28

The emphasis on presence, however, also leads to difficulties. The most famous elaboration

of these problems is given by Jacques Derrida under the title “metaphysics of presence”. But

perhaps evidence as it is exemplified by bodily presence is not the most reduced form of truth? It

takes us to the right direction but must be radicalised or reduced further.

From the very beginning – Plato’s Seventh Letter, for example – the aim in returning to the

thing (pragma) has not only been coming back to a thing but the thing itself (pragma auto). Husserl

also emphasises this in the principle (‘they themselves’) and the aspect also has a role in

Heidegger’s one-sentence interpretations of Husserl: ”to its own presence” (my emphasis). Yet is it

not obvious that we should investigate something as something instead of something as something

else? Let us turn to look at the simplest form of givenness and the possibility of erring on that level.

In the last of the five lectures on the Idea of Phenomenology (1907), Husserl’s writing

becomes so confused and tangled that the reader might well imagine that Husserl is again entering

in a similar situation as the one he described to Shestov. The existing views give way and nothing is

25
Martin Heidegger: Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens. In: Zur Sache des
Denkens. Tübingen 1969. 71.
26
Emmanuel Levinas: Réflexions sur la "tecnique" phénoménologique. In: Levinas: En Découvrent
l'existence avec Husserl and Heidegger. Paris 1988. 114. Translation Richard A. Cohen and
Michael B. Smith.
27
James Mensch has defended Husserl’s view on presence against the critiques quite convincingly
(Postfoundational Phenomenology. University Park 2001). Although presence (or difference
between presence and absence)as the basic sense of our view on reality is not unproblematic, it is
clear that theoretical critique does not reach this primary level of phenomenology.
8
left but ”empty hands and an empty soul”. In the evening after the last lecture, Husserl wrote a

Gedankengang to the lectures. Husserl now sees his own naivety during the actual lectures and

even acknowledges – when the text is read carefully – the failure of his last lecture. In this

Gedankengang Husserl also goes further than in the actual lectures and reaches a new result. In the

reduction that we found in the description given by Shestov, the result that originated the

Investigations was the new insight into truth. In the Idea of Phenomenology, the result is the two-

sidedness of the purely immanently given. Husserl is amazed that ”appearance and that which

appears stand over against each other, and so in the midst of pure givenness, that is within genuine

immanence".29 Husserl repeats this new and important result several times in the next few pages.30

The result of the reduction in the Idea of Phenomenology was that whenever something

appears it always appears in the way that it appears. Now that we already have two elements on the

most reduced level, the possibility of an error is already there, too. Something might appear not as

itself but as something else. The example Husserl often uses is the mistake made between a mere

thing (Körper) and a human body (Leib). The way other human beings appear is characterised by

empathy (Einfühlung).31 Yet, I do make mistakes. I might raise my hand in order to greet a distant

figure only to find out when I get nearer to it that it was a log leaning against a wall.

From the phenomenological point of view, something is always seen as something. The aim

then is to see that something as itself instead of as something else. Although we make mistakes, we

identify a given something truthfully in most cases. Phenomenological training, however, leads to

more distinctive views. The priority is given to how something appears, and what it is that appears

is only searched after that (HuaII/36–7). The clearest contrast between our ordinary views of the

28
Dorion Cairns: Conversations with Hussern and Fink. 46; HuaV/152).
29
Edmund Husserl: The Idea of Phenomenology. Dordrecht 1999. 67(HuaII/11). Translation lee
Hardy.
30
Juha Himanka: Reduction in concreto. In: Researches husserliennes 11 (1999), 51-78.
31
Although I can also – when I for example tip over someone's leg – experience another body as
primarily a thing.
9
natural attitude and the phenomenological viewpoint is the case of the Earth.32 According to the

prevailing view of Copernicanism, the Earth is a thing. From the phenomenological point of view,

however, the Earth does not appear as a thing, as something that can move in relation to the Earth.

Therefore, the Earth is not a thing and consequently does not move or rest. Not even today, in the

time of space flights, is there any direct, that is, phenomenological, evidence of the Earth’s

movement.33

The case of the Earth is the clearest way to point out the difference between our normal

views and phenomenologically perceptive views. In most cases the difference, however, is basically

one of emphasis. The emphasis of the phenomenological view is on original experience instead of

the advanced theories. Also, phenomenology does not search for explanations but aims to describe.

In explaining we turn from what appears to that what explains it, we turn away from the thing itself

to something other. When a scientist explains thinking by brain impulses, we turn from our

experience of thinking to something else. This does not diminish the value of explaining. The point

is rather the division of labour: phenomenology ends where objective science begins (Husserl 1999,

p. 43; Hua II, p. 58).

The description of evidence as self-givenness is the weightiest of Husserl’s determinations

of truth.34 Around this centre, Husserl writes about the fullness of intended the presence and

experience of something as itself. All this goes under the headline, adequation. In many cases, the

viewpoint here does not follow the prevailing view of our culture. Husserl was convinced that the

phenomenological viewpoint gives us a more original view than our natural attitude.

Phenomenology opens us something that cannot be seen from the natural attitude but precedes it.

32
Edmund Husserl: Grundlegende Untersuchungen zum phänomenologishce Ursprung der
räumlichkeit der Natur. In Marvin Farber (ed.): Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund
Husserl. Cambridge 1940.
33
Juha Himanka: Husserl's Argumentation for the Pre-Copernican View of the Earth. In: Review of
Metaphysics LVIII (2005). Pierre Kerszberg: The Phenomenological Analysis of the Earth's
Motion. In: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research XLVIII (1987). 177-208.
34
Erfahrung und Urteil, 12; HuaI/§6, §24; HuaVI/367; HuaVIII/32–3; HuaXVII/132, 149, 167;
HuaXIX(1)/365; George Heffernan: Miscellaneous Lucubrations on Husserl's Answer to the
10
From the very beginning Husserl, however, also saw truth in a way that is much less in contrast

with the prevailing views. Husserl’s view of apodictic evidence is actually well in line with other

contemporary views of truth.

3. Apodictic evidence

While adequate evidence meant for Husserl self-givenness, apodictic evidence means

indubitability. Husserl already mentions apodictic evidence a few times in the Investigations (Hua

XVIII, p. 74, 129). There he had in mind essential truths, mainly logical necessities like the rule of

the excluded third. Husserl also follows this line of thought in Ideas I (HuaIII/21). There is no need

to separate the two views of evidence here. When something is adequately evident it could increase

its level of evidence by also achieving apodictic evidence, that is, becoming indubitable.

When dealing with such a compulsive beginner as Husserl, it is hazardous to search for lines

of continuous development.35 Nevertheless it is clear that during the 1920’s, Husserl’s view on

apodicticity changed. Rather than seeing this change as development, we shall here content

ourselves by illuminating Husserl’s motivation for this new opening.

In the 1920’s, Husserl began to realise that phenomenology itself does not qualify as

philosophy in the strong sense of the word. From the phenomenological point of view, objective

sciences are naive. Now Husserl also began to view phenomenology that relies on the evidence of

experience, the evidence of the intuition of possibilities (Möglichkeitsanschauung) or the evidence

of logical relations (logisher Konsequenz) (Hua VIII/172) as naive, although naive in the higher

Question 'was die Evidenz sei'. 36; Klaus Held: Evidenz II. In Historisches Wörterbuch der
Philosophie. Basel 1972; Elisabeth Ströker: Husserls Evidenzprinzip. 11.
35
When one elaborates the development of Husserl’s thought, one should take into account the
issue of beginning. Husserl claimed that a philosopher is essentially a beginner (HuaV/147-148;
HuaVI/185; HuaXXV/61; Eugen Fink: Das Problem der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls. In:
Fink: Studien zur Phänomenologie 1930–1939. Den Haag 1966. 194). He used to repeat the phrase
"Philosoph, ewiger Anfänger" and thought that he himself was as a beginner during his whole
philosophical career. This strong emphasis on the beginning was not an empty claim from Husserl’s
side: he actually began all over again throughout his entire career. Although his earlier writings
have some bearing on the later ones and it is often useful to consider Husserl’s development, one
11
sense (höheren Naıvitet) (HuaDIII/3, 228). Phenomenology also fails to reach authentic

philosophical aims (eigentliche philosophische Prätention) (HuaVIII/172). In other words,

phenomenology is not yet phenomenological philosophy. What was missing was the final

justification (Letzbegründung).36 In order to meet this need, a critique of original phenomenology

was needed.37

According to his testimony in Formal and Transcendental Logic, Husserl’s first attempts

towards a critique of phenomenology took place in the recently published lectures Einleitung in die

Philosophie 1922/23 (HuaXXXIV; HuaXVII/295 note 1).38 Husserl found the paradigm for such a

critique in Cartesianism.

Husserl’s view on Descartes is two sided. On the one hand, Descartes’s Meditations on First

Philosophy has eternal value as the originator of philosophical motivation (HuaVI/75; HuaVII/63,

cf. HuaXXXV/313–4). On the other hand, to understand phenomenology as Cartesianism is,

according to Husserl, a ludicrous misunderstanding (HuaVI/193).

The part that Husserl valued most highly in Descartes was the very beginning, the first two

Meditations.39 Here Descartes performed reduction for the first time in the history of philosophy

and opened the development of modern philosophy (Hua XIII/150). Right after this, Descartes gave

up his radicality and slipped out of the reduced. According to Husserl, the main problem of

Descartes was that he was both a philosopher and a scientist (Hua XXIV/192). The sciences do not

make the world more understandable in the least (nicht mindesten verständlicher), but they do make

it more useful (nützlicher) (HuaV/96). In Husserl’s eyes, Descartes found the starting point for

should bear in mind Husserl’s urge to begin each time radically anew without paying too much
attention to his earlier work.
36
Martin Heidegger: Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung. Frankfurt am Main 1994.
133.
37
Sebastian Luft: Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie.
38
Cf. also Sebastian Luft: Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie. 8. One could also situate the start
of this kind of critique in the lectures Grundproblema der Phänomenologie (1910–11; Hua XIII).
39
HuaVII/72–3; Emmanuel Levinas: The Work of Edmund Husserl. In: Emmanuel Levinas:
Discovering Existence with Husserl. 81. Martin Heidegger: Einführung in die Phenomenologische
Forshung. 268.
12
philosophy but immediately failed in his mistaken attempt to deduce the rest of the world from

that.40

Husserl set himself the task of following the critical practice of Descartes but by remaining

faithful to its radicality, to the reduced view. In order to do this, Husserl introduced apodictic

reduction (’apodiktischer’ Reduktion) (HuaXXXV/98,114) by which he aimed to complete the

results of the phenomenological reduction into a certain starting point (HuaDIII(3)/228). With this

new reduction, the field of the apodictically evident was reduced even further. Into what?

Husserl’s main determination for evidence is self-givennes. In the above, the ’self’ was

explained as a thing itself. Within Husserlian thinking we could, however, also turn to me myself: I

myself turn to things. Before introducing the principle of evidence, Husserl writes: ”Everything that

makes a philosophical beginning possible we must first acquire ourselves.” (§5) In the next

paragraph, I as an initiator of philosophising is emphasised strongly. During the same time period

(the turn of the 30’s), Husserl also emphasised how one must exercise philosophy oneself.

Husserl’s own writings were also to be thought through personally (HuaDIII(3)/271-2;

HuaDIII(4)/21-4).

The main characteristic of apodicticity is indubitability. The first step towards this direction

is taken when it occurs to me that I cannot imagine the not-being of something. In his Einleitung-

lectures Husserl introduces a step further, so that this not-being becomes a no in principle

(prinzipiell nicht). In the manuscript he has added here that ”And this is the character of the

apodictic.”41 What then remains after apodicticity is reduced this far?

Husserl did not give up his earlier view of the apodictic evidence of the essences.42 Yet,

apodictic reduction accomplished in order to reach the final justification for phenomenology limited

the scope of apodicticity to my actual thoughts. In this radical form, ego cogito was the only

40
HuaVI/193; HuaI/§10; Martin Heidegger: Einführung in die phänomenologiche Forshung.
Frankfurtn am main1994. 279-290. Ernst Tugendhat: Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und
Heidgger. Berlin 1967. 181; cf. HuaV/96; Karl Mertens: Zwischen Letztbegründung und Skepsis.
103–119.
41
”Und das ist der Charakter des Apodiktischen.”, HuaXXXV/241 note 2.
13
example of apodicticity left.43 This renewed sense of apodicticity led Husserl to rethink the

relationship between adequacy and apodicticity.

4. The relationship between adequate and apodictic evidence

Husserl once explained to Dorion Cairns that his daily work consisted of meditations. He further

explained his way of working: "When I go back to what I have written in an earlier meditation, I

always go back to that which is most obscure to me and I wrestle with that problem. I never go on

and leave a problem unsolved and that is why I shall never write a philosophy. My work is not that

of building but of digging, of digging in that which is most obscure and of uncovering problems

that have not been seen or if seen have not been solved."44 The problem between the two kinds of

evidence is the kind of a problem to which Husserl had to return to dig further into more radical

formulations.

It is easier to follow Husserl’s struggle with the problem by using a model of the stages of

evidence (cf. Hua XXXV, p. 403):

(0. Given)

1. Self-given

2. Adequately self-given

3. Adequately and apodictically self-given

4. Adequately, apodictically and absolutely self-given

The reduction of the lectures on the Idea of Phenomenology showed that level 0 is only a fiction.

No matter how far we purify the given, we always find the double structure of appearance and

appearing. In other words, we actually start from the level where we could ask whether the

appearance appears as itself. Self-givennes is evidence in the first sense (Evidenz im ersten Sinne)

(HuaXXXV/403). Although it is difficult to see the difference between self-given and adequately

42
Klaus Held: Evidenz II.
43
Thomas Seebohm: Apodiktizität. Recht und Grenze. 86.
44
Dorion Cairns: Conversations with Husserl and Fink. 10.
14
given, Husserl does state that self-givenness is more primordial (geht voran) (Hua XXXV/403) than

adequacy in a similar way that adequacy comes about before apodicticity (ibid.). Therefore, we

maintain the separate levels 2 and 3. But Husserl was not always content even with the evidence of

both adequacy and apodicticity but searched for an even stronger form of evidence. In these cases,

Husserl sometimes adds the character of absoluteness.

In Investigations and Ideas I, apodicticity has to do with logical essentialities and

strengthens the evidence of something already adequately given.45 Here adequacy and apodicticity

go hand in hand, but adequacy is given priority (cf. HuaII/59). Husserl’s first attempt towards

evidence that differs from the original view of phenomenological evidence was made right after the

publication of Ideas I.

In his work in the second edition of the Investigations in 1913, Husserl considered a radical

separation of evidence as a double sense of adequacy (Doppelsinn von Adäquation) (Hua

XX(1)/262).46 We note that Husserl does not here distinguish the apodictically adequate from others

kind of adequacy, or level three from level two. Instead, Husserl opens the difference within

adequacy. This doubling of level two rather than two joining modes of evidence of level three

anticipates the evidence independent of adequacy in Meditations, section nine.47

In the working manuscript ”Zwei fundamentale Begriffe von Evidenz: Selbstgebung

überhaupt und reine Selbstgebung” (1920/21, HuaXI/Beilage XXVII), Husserl returns to the theme

of an even higher mode of evidence. He now describes this evidence as neither adequate nor

apodictic. But the way this second and more pregnant sense is characterised (absolut

undurchstreichbar gegeben ist) (431) connects it clearly with Husserl’s descriptions of evidence

purified by apodictic reduction.

45
HuaXVIII/74, 129; HuaIII/21.
46
"[Sagen wir] um [die] Vollkommenheit zu bezeichnen, die jeden Zweifel und jede Negation a
priori ausschließt, so ist der Doppelsinn von Adäquation wohl zu beachten."
47
Ullrich Melle: Einleitung des Herausgebers. In: Hua XX/1. 2002. A little later Husserl continues,
that ”Dies Adäquation darf man nicht der Adäquation im Sinne der vollkommenen Erfüllung
unterschieben.”
15
 A few years later, Husserl once again started to think through the basic lines and principal

thoughts of phenomenology (HuaDI/256-7; HuaDIII/3, 85–6). This renewal of phenomenology

leads to Husserl’s statement of the independence of apodicticity. The development opened in the

London lectures of 1922.

At the beginning of the London lectures, Husserl speaks about first philosophy as a method

that justifies itself by itself (sich selbst rechtfertigenden Methodenlehre) (Hua XXXV/314). He felt

that original phenomenology did not meet this criterion, and consequently phenomenology was not

a philosophy in the strong sense of the word. The source from which Husserl searched for help in

this transformation of phenomenology into phenomenological philosophy was Cartesianism and its

view on apodictic certainty.

In the London lectures and the two following lecture series – “Fundamentalvorlesungen”

Einleitung in die Philosophie (1922/3) and Erste Philosophie (1923/4) – Husserl mainly emphasises

the importance of evidence that is both adequate and apodictic (HuaXXXV/329). In the Syllabus of

the London lectures, for example, the presence (flißende Gegenwart selbst) of ego cogito appears to

be apodictic and adequate. Here the two modes of evidence are equally valuable (HuaXXXV/318).

This view is well in line with Husserl’s earlier statement that apodicticity as the impossibility of

doubt is added to something already self-given (Hua XXXV/63,148, 342). However, the lectures

also prepare the way to a radical separation of the two kinds of evidence.48 For example, when

Husserl considers a sound heard, he notices that evidence that has the character of apodicticity

(Undurchstreichberkeit) is no longer adequate in the genuine sense (ehten Sinne) (Hua

XXXV/130). In the list of the levels of evidence presented above there is no level for this kind of

view. This calls for a renewal of the whole structure of evidences.

48
Berdt Goossens: Einleitung des Herausgebers. In: Husserliana XXXV. xxxiv.
16
 Husserl introduces the evidence that is apodictic but not adequate in his working manuscript

from the year 1924.49 What is crucial for phenomenology in this separation is that it appears at the

very starting point of critically motivated phenomenology, in the Cartesian starting point of I-think.

Husserl writes: ”The I-think itself, as apodictically knowable ... is not adequately knowable”.50

Phenomenology started from the clarification of adequate evidence in the Investigations. In his

search for a more secure foundation for phenomenology, Husserl has now ventured to state that

phenomenology should begin from inadequate apodicticity. Husserl wanted to transform

phenomenology into a first philosophy. In order to succeed in this, he finally saw no other option

than to replace the starting point of adequacy with apodicticity. The goal is clear, but did Husserl

also succeed in changing the starting point of phenomenology?

Husserl also considers the separation of adequate and apodictic evidence in some other

working manuscripts of the year 1925. These investigations do not present a coherent view of the

relationship between the two kinds of evidence. Rather, in these texts, we witness Husserl’s

hesitation in the matter. In the manuscript ”Apodiktizität - Adäquation. Kritik der Apodiktizität und

Adäquation” (XII of the HuaXXXV), for example, the starting point oscillates between adequacy

and apodicticity. Husserl also basically agrees with the four-level model of the levels of evidence

presented above. Let us reflect how this order has become problematic.

The problem in this order is that the first steps remain uncertain.51 Levels one and two are

essentially fallible (cf. Hua XVII, p. 164). In Formal and Transcendental Logic, this fallibility

covers even apodictic evidence: ”Even evidence which passes itself off as apodictic can expose

itself as a deception ...” (HuaXVII/16452). As Husserl searches for a certain foundation for

phenomenology he also has to present an even higher level of absolute evidence, the fourth level

49
In Konvolut A I 31 dated July 1924, Husserl already writes about ”adäquate Erkenntnis ist
apodiktisch, aber nicht jede apodiktisch ist ädäquat” Cf. Berdt Goossens: Einleitung des
Herausgebers, xxxiv, note 2.
50
“Selbst das Ich-Denke ist, wenn auch apodiktisch erkennbar ... nicht adäquat erkennbar.” (1925,
HuaVIII/397).
51
Karl Mertens: Zwischen Letztbegründung und Skepsis.175.
52
Translation Dorion Cairns. Formal and transcendental Logic. The Hague 1978.
17
(HuaXVII/165). Yet, in order to reach these higher levels of evidence, one has to start from the

more primitive levels. As the way to the higher modes of evidence is fallible, the possibility of an

error cannot be totally excluded. The mistake may have happened in the stages before reaching the

highest kind of evidence. As long as one starts from adequacy, fallibility remains. The alternative

is to start directly from the apodictically evident that is not adequate. Phenomenology would

become a first philosophy if it succeeded in starting again directly from the evidence that is in itself

first, i.e., apodictic evidence. This is what Husserl tries to do in the first Cartesian Meditation.

5. Adequacy and apodicticity of evidence need not go hand in hand”

Husserl introduces the difference between the two evidences in section six of the Meditations,

“Differentiation of evidence. The philosophical demand for an evidence that is apodictic and first in

itself” and returns to the theme in section nine, ”The range covered by apodictic evidence of the ’I

am’”.

Husserl opens the sixth section by stating that we are at the ”decisive point in the process of

beginning.” (entscheidenden Punkte des Anfangs). Towards the end of his discussion on the matter,

Husserl also emphasises the danger of this point (an altogether dangerous point / einem

gefährlichen Punkt) (cf. Hua II/45–6). The nature of this danger is not elaborated in the text.

However, the obvious danger is the possibility of losing the original phenomenological view. As

Husserl tries to start from inadequate apodicticity he has to put original (adequate)

phenomenological evidence aside. There is a risk that this evidence can no longer be included

within this new kind of the apodictic phenomenology. In others words: is there still a reason to

write about adequacy? (Hua XXXV/404).

The main point of the sixth section is that ”the perfection of evidence becomes

differentiated”. Husserl first introduces the perfection of adequate evidence where ”attendant

meanings become fulfilled” and then turns to a different perfection of apodicticity. This kind of

evidence of ”absolute indubitability” can ”occur even in evidence that is inadequate.” In the next

18
paragraph Husserl continues that although evidence as grasping something in the mode of ”it itself”

is certain, it does not exclude the ”conceivability that what is evident could subsequently become

doubtful, or the conceivability that being could prove to be illusion”. In other words, adequate

evidence is always fallible. The text then explains how we make these mistakes: ”Indeed, sensuous

experience furnishes us with cases where that happens.” When you experience something you can

never be sure whether you experience an illusion or the thing itself.

In contrast to this, the other kind of perfection of evidence does not even enter into

experience. Critical reflection recognises the possibility of an error made ”in advance". This

evidence of critical reflection is apodictic and takes place before experience. Apodictic evidence is

further characterised as being first in itself and preceding ”all other imaginable evidences.”53

Husserl continues from this theme in section nine.

The beginning of the second paragraph of section 9 is famous: ”We remember in this

connexion an earlier remark: that adequacy and apodicticity of evidence need not go hand in hand.

Perhaps this remark was made precisely with the case of transcendental self-experience in mind.”

Although Husserl hesitates (”perhaps”) exactly where he is establishing indubitable beginning his

attempt is clear. The apodictic and in itself first starting point of I-think is not adequately given.54

After Husserl has separated the two kinds of evidence at the very starting point, he writes: "In

such experience the ego is accessible to itself originaliter. But at any particular time this experience

offers only a core of that which is experienced ”with strict/ [eigentlich] adequacy”, namely the
55
ego’s living present (which the grammatical sense of the sentence, ego cogito, expresses)." We

can now start to reorganise the levels of evidence. The first level is the apodicticity of I-think.

53
Husserl here uses the plural, but actually only the content of ”I-think” is apodictically evident in
the most rigorous sense.
54
Lothar Eley: Nachwort. In: Edmund Husserl, Erfanrung und Urteil. Hamburg 1985. Berdt
Goossens: Einleitung des Herausgebers. xxxvii.
55
The original passage could be read in a way that agrees with the levels of evidence presented
above – and Cairn’s translation follows this line of interpretation. Cairns translates the crucial
passage ”this experience offers only a core that is experienced ’with strict adequacy’”, and the
translation correctly matches the original. I would, however, suggest another reading. This reading
19
1. Apodictic but not adequate sense of ”I-think”

This is the core of the wider range of adequate evidence.

2. Adequacy

That which in original phenomenology was prioritised as adequate evidence is degraded onto the

second level. How are we to take the step from the new first level to the second level of adequacy?

From the point of view of ”I-think”, the rest is seen as ”an indeterminately general presumptive

horizon”. Husserl then explains how a perceived thing always has a horizon. For example, the

backside of a thing is given as a horizon that I potentially perceive from another angle. In the

exposition of section 19, Husserl determines horizons generally as ”’predelineated’ potentialities.”

(HuaI/82)

After thematising the theme of horizon, Husserl continues: "[T]he reality (Wirklichsein,

Cairns: actual being) of the intrinsically first ground for (Cairns: field of) knowledge is indeed

assured absolutely." All that appears, however, is not given absolutely apodictically and is not

included (nicht erschlossen) in this certainty but only presumed (nur präsumiert). Apodictic

evidence is the core for the first level of evidence from which the horizon of adequate possibilitiews

opens.56

The obvious problem of the range (Tragweite) of the apodictically evident is repeatedly

considered in Husserliana. The difficulty of seeing the limit of apodicticity is also concretely

demonstrated in Husserliana XXXV, for example. Husserl there admits afterwards that he had made

a mistake in his supposedly apodictic considerations (HuaXXXV/205 note 1). If even Husserl could

make a mistake in recognising apodicticity, is there in fact any clear line that separates apodicticity

from erring experience?57 Faced with this difficult problem, we shall here follow the Husserl of

interprets the passage as the summit of Husserl’s search for an absolute foundation for
phenomenology.
56
This view is already prepared in the Beilage XII of Husserliana XXXV.
57
Even if we take a little wider perspective than the grammatical sense of I-think, apodictic facts
are not that exciting; for example: ’2 < 3’and ’a + b = b + a’ (HuaXXXV/238). Inthe London
lecture, Husserl also gives examples of apodictical impossibilities like ’2 > 3’(Hua XXXV/319).
20
Meditations and simply leave it out of consideration. Instead, let us go back to the question of the

first evidence.

6. First evidence

In the lectures on The Idea of Phenomenology, we read a striking sentence: "No tendency, ... , is

more dangerous to the untuitive knowledge of origins, of those things absolutely given, than to

think too much, and to draw out of such thoughtful reflection things that are ostensibly obvious." 58

Philosophers do not usually warn us of the dangers of thinking.59 What Husserl has in mind

here is that instead of reflecting or speculating, we should turn to a direct experience of the things

themselves. From the phenomenological perspective, experiencing and reflecting are different

actions.60 In the same lectures, Husserl also emphasised how evidence ”signifies nothing other than

adequate self-givenness”.61 It is evidence as adequacy that is essential for early phenomenology.

Yet, even after Husserl had declared that apodictic evidence has a higher rank than adequacy

(HuaI/§6; HuaV/§73; Hua XXXV/406), he still maintained that the contribution of phenomenology

to the philosophy of the modern age (Neuzeit) lies primarily in truth as adequacy (HuaXXXIV/409).

He claimed that truth as certainty or apodicticity has dominated the philosophical discussion after

Descartes (ibid.). Husserl’s original phenomenology of adequate evidence is a wider alternative to

this theory.

58
Edmund Husserl: The Idea of Phenomenology. 46 (HuaII/62).
59
Although for example: "Lack of experience diminishes our power of taking a comprehensive
view of the admitted facts. Hence those who dwell in intimate association with nature and its
phenomena grow more and more able to formulate, as the foundation of their theories, principles
such as to admit of a wide and coherent development: while those who whom devotion to abstract
discussion has rendered unobservant of the facts are too ready to dogmatize on the basis of a view
observations." Aristotle, De generatione et corruptione, 316a, Works of Aristotle, translated into
English under the editorship of W. D. Ross, Oxford. Clarendon Press 1930)
60
Antonio Aguirre: Die Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls im Licht ihrer gegenwärtigen
Interpretatio und Kritik. Darmstadt 1982. 57.
61
Edmund Husserl: The Idea of Phenomenology. Dordrecht 1999, 44 (HuaII/59). "Das
Fundamentale ist ... daß Evidenz ... nicht anderes als adäquate Selbstgegebenheit besagt.”
(HuaII/59)
21
 Although the phenomenological experience of truth is original, it is not as compelling as

apodictic certainty. If someone cannot see phenomenological evidence, the situation is usually not

helped by an argument; instead, one should try to show the evidence again. Other academic

traditions of philosophy are more argumentative in the narrow sense of the word. Perhaps that is

why Husserl wanted to find a more compelling apodictic starting point for phenomenology. He

tried to combine the phenomenological view of experience with the philosophical view of certain

foundation. In order to do this, he has to replace the priority of experience (adequacy) with the

priority of reflection (apodicticity).

The relationship between adequacy and apodicticity can be turned into a question of the

relationship between correlative actions, experience and reflection. The most important difference

between reflection and experience is the relation to time. It is fundamental to Husserl that

experience happens in time ("Erfahrung ist Zeitigung", HuaXXXIV/213). However, reflection that

reaches for apodicticity is done before one enters into action, and the possibility of an error is seen

beforehand. Husserl even writes that timely being cannot be apodictically known.62 Which of these

two possibilities – experience and adequacy or reflection and apodicticity – is then primordial?63

Although section nine makes a clear break between adequacy and apodicticity, Husserl does

not want to make a clear difference between reflection and experience. He writes about apodictic

reflection as experience and it seems that he tries to add some characters of experience to reflection

62
”Kein zeitliches Sein ist in Apodiktizität erkennbar” (HuaVIII/398).
63
This struggle between two starting points can be seen as a continuation of the gigantomachia in
Plato’s Sophist. The struggle there was between the earth-born and the friends of ideas. It is
difficult to say whether Plato presented a solution, a way to reach both views originally and on their
own, to gigantomachia. This contrast between reflection and experience could be seen in many of
the tensions of the history of philosophy. The tension between logic or sensation (aisthesis) in
Aristotle (Wolfgang Welsch: Aisthesis, Grundzüge und Perspektiven der Aristotelischen
Sinneslehre. Gerlingen 1987. Franci Volpi:. Das problem der Aisthesis bei Aristoteles. In: Die
Erscheinende Welt.) and between an ontological and a theological reading of Metaphysics (cf.
Joseph Owens: The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics. Toronto 1963) will serve as
examples. One could also mention the difference between Begriff and Anschauung in the Kantian
system or the relation between Hegel’s phenomenology (experience) and system (speculation).
Alexandre Kojève’s point that I might verify the existence of God – but it would be at the cost of no
longer being able to verify my own existence (Introduction á la lecture de Hegel. Paris 1947. 345) –
can also be read from the perspective of gigantomachia.
22
that precedes it. Husserl is unwilling to face the obvious problem of adequacy as a horizon for

apodicticity. When the apodictic starting point is purely reflected, how could it have different

possibilities and expectations? Is there really a horizon where timeless reflection ends up thinking

”itself” as thinking?64 Could this transcendental Ego that is not born and will not die65 really have a

horizon of possibilities?

Some commentators66 have seen that Husserl succeeded in his search for absolute

foundation as a starting point. Others understand that Husserl actually showed exactly the opposite:

the impossibility of such a beginning.67 It seems that Husserliana does not give a simple answer to

the quarrel. In his last work, Husserl on the one hand emphasises the fallible life-world as a realm

of original self-evidences (HuaVI/130). On the other hand, the Husserliana version of the work

ends with the pathos of apodicticity. Husserl forces his readers to think by themselves.

In the same year that Méditations cartésiennes appeared, Husserl discussed apodicticity

with Fink and Cairns. Cairns raised the question whether reduction ”were primarily or exclusively a

means of getting an apodictically necessary realm of being”?68 If Husserl had succeeded in section

nine of the Meditations he would have had to answer affirmatively. Yet he replied that “this was

rather an interpretation of reduction.” This can be read as a confession that he has not succeeded in

actually performing apodictic reduction. Husserl then continues: ”Of course it has a grain of truth in

it.” It was Husserl’s hope that apodicticity would be that grain out of which phenomenology would

grow. From that point of view, I would have to agree with Gilbert Ryle’s view, when he writes: ”In

a word, phenomenology is not exciting and most often not even interesting.” 69

64
Berdt Goossens: Einleitung des Herausgebers. xxxviii.
65
HuaXXXV/420; HuaIII/198; HuaXIII/399; HuaXV/138, 195; Hua XXIX/332–3, 338; Dorion
Cairns: Conversations with Husserl and Fink. 19, 33-4, 43-4, 52; Sebastian Luft: Phänomenologie
der Phänomenologie. 190–1.
66
Thomas Seebohm: Apodiktizität. Recht und Grenze.
67
Elisabeth Ströker: Husserls Evidenzprinzip. Karl Mertens: Zwischen Letztbegründung und
Skepsis. 217; HuaIX/67.
68
Dorion Cairns: Conversations with Husserl and Fink. 43 (20 November 1931).
69
Gilbert Ryle: Phenomenology and Linguistic Analysis. In: Neue Hefte für Philosophie I (1971),
7.
23
 However, phenomenology did grow and flourish out of the grain of truth of adequacy. As

such, phenomenology is something exciting and interesting, even adventurous. Starting from

experience, phenomenology risks a failure and, as Husserl’s adventure in the Idea of

Phenomenology shows, it can learn from these failures.70 Unfortunately, the other dangerous

adventure of the First Cartesian Meditation did not lead to a clear result.

70
Juha Himanka: Reduction in concreto.
24