Intel Technology v. NLRC - Cabiles
Intel Technology v. NLRC - Cabiles
Intel Technology v. NLRC - Cabiles
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* THIRD DIVISION.
515
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MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court filed by petitioner Intel Technology Philippines, Inc.
(Intel Phil.). It assails the October 28, 2011[1] and February 3,
2012[2] Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 118880, which dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by Intel
Phil. thereby affirming the September 2, 2010 Decision[3] of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and its February 9,
2011 Resolution. The NLRC decision modified the March 18, 2010
Decision[4] of the Labor Arbiter (LA), and held Intel Phil. solely
liable for the retirement benefits of respondent Jeremias Cabiles
(Cabiles).
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The Facts
This case concerns the eligibility of Cabiles to receive retirement
benefits from Intel Phil. granted to employees who had complied
with the ten (10)-year service period requirement of the company.
Cabiles was initially hired by Intel Phil. on April 16, 1997 as an
Inventory Analyst. He was subsequently promoted several times
over the years and was also assigned at Intel Arizona and Intel
Chengdu. He later applied for a position at Intel Semiconductor
Limited Hong Kong (Intel HK).
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[1] Rollo, pp. 69-71. Penned by Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro, with
Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino and Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda,
concurring.
[2] Id., at pp. 73-74.
[3] Id., at pp. 113-123. Penned by Commissioner Angelo Ang Palaña, with
Commissioners Herminio V. Suelo and Numeriano D. Villena, concurring.
[4] Id., Position Paper, pp. 267-272. Penned by Labor Arbiter Enrico Angelo C.
Portillo.
517
Jerry – you are not eligible to receive your retirement benefit given
that you have not reached 10 years of service at the time you moved to
Hong Kong. We do not round up the years of service.
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[5] Rollo, pp. 368-369.
[6] Id., at p. 581.
518
There will [be] no gap in your years of service. So in case that you move
back to the Philippines your total tenure of service will be computed less on
the period that you are out of Intel Philippines.[7] [Emphasis supplied]
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[7] Id., at p. 582.
[8] Id., at p. 369.
[9] Id., at p. 211.
519
attorney’s fees. The LA held that Cabiles did not sever his
employment with Intel Phil. when he moved to Intel HK, similar to
the instances when he was assigned at Intel Arizona and Intel
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The NLRC Ruling
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed with modification the LA
decision. In its September 2, 2010 Decision, the NLRC held Intel
Phil. solely liable to pay Cabiles his retirement benefits. It
determined that his decision to move to Intel HK was not definitive
proof of permanent severance of his ties with Intel Phil. It treated his
transfer to Hong Kong as akin to his overseas assignments in
Arizona and Chengdu. As to the email exchange between Cabiles
and Intel Phil., the NLRC considered the same as insufficient to
diminish his right over re-
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[10] Id., at p. 272.
520
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SO ORDERED.[11]
Intel Phil. moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied in
the NLRC Resolution,[12] dated February 9, 2011.
The CA Decision
Aggrieved, Intel Phil. elevated the case to the CA via a petition
for certiorari with application for a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) on April 5, 2011. The application for TRO was denied in a
Resolution, dated July 5, 2011. A motion for reconsideration, dated
July 27, 2011, was filed, but it was denied in a Resolution, dated
October 28, 2011, which also dismissed the petition for certiorari.
[13]
On December 1, 2011, Intel Phil. filed a motion for
reconsideration.
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[11] Id., at p. 122.
[12] Id., at pp. 125-137.
[13] Id., at pp. 69-71.
521
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[14] Id., at pp. 789-790.
[15] Id., at p. 790.
[16] Id., at p. 792.
522
I
The Court of Appeals committed serious error in dismissing the
Petition for Certiorari without expressing clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which its decision was based.
II
The Court of appeals committed serious and reversible error in not
finding that respondent NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it
ruled that private respondent was entitled to retire under Intel
Philippines’ retirement plan.
III
The Court of Appeals committed serious and reversible error in not
finding that respondent NLRC gravely abused its discretion in
annulling private respondent’s quitclaim.
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[17] Id., at pp. 794-799.
[18] Id., at p. 73.
523
IV
The Court of Appeals committed serious and reversible error in not
finding that Cabiles has the legal obligation to return all the amounts
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[19] Id., at pp. 31-32.
[20] Id., at pp. 820-850.
524
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[21] Intel Philippines Retirement Policy provides:
Section 7. Resignation Retirement Benefit.—
A participant who, with 60 days prior notice to the Company, resigns from the
Company with the completion of at least ten (10) years of Plan Service, but
without having entitlement to the benefit mentioned in Section 2 to Section 6 of
this Article, shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit of Pensionable Salary per
year of Pensionable Service. x x x
[22] Cirtek Employees Labor Union-Federation of Free Workers v. Cirtek
Electronics, Inc., G.R. No. 190515, January 6, 2011, 650 SCRA 656.
525
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[23] Timoteo H. Sarona v. NLRC, Royale Security Agency and
Cesar S. Tan, G.R. No. 185280, January 18, 2012, 663 SCRA 394, 415.
[24] Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 158922, May 28, 2004, 430 SCRA 358, 367.
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[25] San Miguel Properties Philippines, Inc. v. Gucaban, G.R. No. 153982, July 18, 2011,
654 SCRA 18, 28-29.
526
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[26] Rollo, p. 581.
527
Phil. would not be rounded off in his favor. He, thus, placed himself
in this position, as he chose to be employed in a company that would
pay him more than what he could earn in Chengdu or in the
Philippines.
The choice of staying with Intel Phil. vis-à-vis a very attractive
opportunity with Intel HK put him in a dilemma. If he would wait to
complete ten (10) years of service with Intel Phil. (in about 4
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months) he would enjoy the fruits of his retirement but at the same
time it would mean forfeiture of Intel HK’s compensation offer in
the amount of HK $942,500.00, an amount a lot bigger than what he
would receive under the plan. He decided to forfeit and became Intel
HK’s newest hire.
All these are indicative of the clearest intent of Cabiles to sever
ties with Intel Phil. He chose to forego his tenure with Intel Phil.,
with all its associated benefits, in favor of a more lucrative job for
him and his family with Intel HK.
The position of Cabiles that he was being merely assigned leads
the Court to its next point.
No Secondment Contract Exists
Cabiles views his employment in Hong Kong as an assignment
or an extension of his employment with Intel Phil. He cited as
evidence the offer made to him as well as the letter, dated January 8,
2007,[27] both of which used the word “assignment” in reference to
his engagement in Hong Kong as a clear indication of the alleged
continuation of his ties with Intel Phil.
The foregoing arguments of Cabiles, in essence, speak of the
“theory of secondment.”
The Court, however, is again not convinced.
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[27] Id., at p. 853.
528
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[28] Victor Meteoro v. Creative Creatures, Inc., G.R. No. 171275, July 13, 2009,
592 SCRA 481, 492.
[29] G.R. No. L-30773, 18 February 1970, 31 SCRA 637.
529
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[30] G.R. No. 188002, February 1, 2010, 611 SCRA 261, citing Periquet v. NLRC,
264 Phil. 1115, 1122; 186 SCRA 724, 730-731 (1990).
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530
Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the
agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable
settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply
because of a change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the
waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the
terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step
in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the
person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of
what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and
reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding
undertaking.
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[31] G.R. No. 105083, August 20, 1993, 225 SCRA 526.
[32] Id., at p. 535.
[33] Rollo, pp. 403-415.
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ever, sees no clear evidence in the records showing that Cabiles was
constrained into signing the document. Also, it cannot be said that
Cabiles did not fully understand the consequences of signing the
Waiver. Being a person well-versed in matters of finance, it would
have been impossible for him not to have comprehended the
consequences of signing a waiver. Failing to see any evidence to
warrant the disregard of the Waiver, the Court is unable to affirm the
CA and, hence, declares it as valid and binding between Cabiles and
Intel Phil.
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Suffice it to state that nothing is clearer than the words used in
the Waiver duly signed by Cabiles — that all claims, in the present
and in the future, were waived in consideration of his receipt of the
amount of P165,857.62. Because the waiver included all present and
future claims, the non-accrual of benefits cannot be used as a basis
in awarding retirement benefits to him.
Lastly, even if the Court assumes that the Waiver was invalid,
Cabiles nonetheless remains disqualified as a recipient of retirement
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[34] Id., at p. 211.
533
all the benefits due him, if any, Cabiles is hereby declared ineligible
to receive the retirement pay pursuant to the retirement policy of
Intel Phil.
For that reason, Cabiles must return all the amounts he received
from Intel Phil. pursuant to the Writ of Execution issued by the
NLRC, dated September 19, 2011.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
October 28, 2011 and February 3, 2012 Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent Jeremias P. Cabiles is ordered to make restitution to
petitioner Intel Technology Philippines, Inc. for whatever amounts
he received pursuant to the Writ of Execution issued by the National
Labor Relations Commission, dated September 19, 2011.
SO ORDERED.
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