Subject: 1) INTENT vs.

MOTIVE & 2) ACTUS NON FECIT REUM NISI MENS SIT REA

PEOPLE vs. DELIM

Facts:
 On January 23, 1999, Modesto, Rita (wife), Randy (son) and their 2 grandchildren were about to eat their dinner when
Marlon, Robert and Ronald barged into the house. They were armed with a short handgun. Marlon poked his gun at
Modesto while Robert and Ronald simultaneously grabbed and hog-tied the victim. A piece of cloth was placed in the
mouth of Modesto. They then herded Modesto out of the house on their way towards the direction of Paldit, Sison,
Pangasinan. Leon and Manuel, also armed with short handguns, stayed put by the door to the house of Modesto and
ordered Rita and Randy to stay where they were. Leon and Manuel left the house at around 7am the following day.
 On January 27, 1999, Randy, in the company of his relatives, found Modesto under thick bushes in a grassy area. He
was already dead. Randy and his relatives immediately rushed to the police station to report the incident and to seek
assistance.
 According to the autopsy, the cause of death was a gunshot wound at the head and the stab wounds sustained by the
victim on his left and forearm were defensive wounds. The investigators confirmed that the accused had no licenses
for their firearms.
 Only Marlon, Ronald and Leon were arrested. Manuel and Robert remained at large.
 To exculpate themselves, Marlon, Ronald and Leon interposed denial and alibi.
 RTC: GUILTY of MURDER, treachery as a qualifying circumstance and of taking advantage of superior strength,
nighttime and use of unlicensed firearms as separate aggravating circumstances – Reclusion Perpetua to Death.

Issue: WoN the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove that accused are guilty of murder or
homicide

Ruling: YES
In this case, the prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus delicti which consists of two things: 1) the criminal
act and 2) defendant's agency in the commission of the act. Wharton says that corpus delicti includes two things: 1) the
objective; 2) the subjective element of crimes.
In homicide (by dolo) and in murder cases, the prosecution is burdened to prove: (a) the death of the party
alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by the criminal act of some other than the deceased and was not the
result of accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c) that defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way
criminally responsible for the act which produced the death. To prove the felony of homicide or murder, there must be
incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately killed (with malice); in other words, that
there was intent to kill. Such evidence may consist inter alia in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location
and number of wounds sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or
immediately after the killing of the victim. If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is
conclusively presumed.
In the case at bar, the prosecution adduced the requisite quantum of proof of corpus delicti. Modesto sustained 5
gunshot wounds. He also sustained 7 stab wounds, defensive in nature. The use by the malefactors of deadly weapons,
more specifically handguns and knives, in the killing of the victim as well as the nature, number and location of the
wounds sustained by said victim are evidence of the intent by the malefactors to kill the victim with all the consequences
flowing therefrom.
As to the motive of the Assailants, such has yet to be revealed. Motive is the reason which prompts the accused
to engage in a particular criminal activity. Motive, as compared to intent, is not an essential element of a crime and need
not to prove the same. Thus, notwithstanding the absence of motive on Assailants’ end, the same are still liable of the
crime committed because as a general rule, proof of motive for the commission of the offense charged does not show
guilt and absence of proof of such motive does not establish the innocence of Accused from the crime charged such as
murder.

***The qualifying circumstance (treachery) to constitute a murder must be present, however, although the Victim
was defenseless, no evidence of how he was assaulted and killed. Thus, treachery as a qualifying circumstance
should not be appreciated. Accused is only GUILTY for the crime of HOMICIDE.
Subject: ACTUS NON FECIT REUM NISI MENS SIT REA
(The act itself does not make a man guilty unless his intention were so)

MANZANARIS vs. PEOPLE

Facts:
 Accused is the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Basilan. As such, he is the custodian of all the records
of the Court of First Instance of Basilan. Among the cases filed in said court was Criminal Case No. 299, against
Geronimo Borja for malversation of public funds. Among the property constituting the property bond filed by said
accused was that covered by Certificate of Title No. 877 of the Register of Deeds of Basilan. When accused
discovered thru his subordinate that Original Certificate... of Title No. 877 was not existing in the Register of Deeds of
Basilan, he ordered a subordinate to deliver owner's copy of Certificate of Title No. 877 to Mr. Borja for the purpose of
administrative reconstitution thereof.
 Borja was asked to sign a receipt for the title. The contents of the receipt stated 'Received from the Clerk of Court
Selso M. Manzanaris OCT No. 877 to be reconstituted in the Register of Deeds. After reconstitution to be returned to
the court.
 The release and delivery of the owner's certificate of title to Geronimo Borja was done without any written order from
the presiding judge of the court. Mrs. Trinidad M. Borja, wife of Geronimo Borja filed a petition with the Office of the
Register of Deeds for the... administrative reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title No. 877. Although she
succeeded in reconstituting the original of said title in November, 1974, Certificate of Title No. 877 was not turned
over to the court.
 On June 11, 1975 the building housing the Court of First Instance of Basilan, including all the records and documents
of the court, were burned. Sometime in 1981, one Atty. Filoteo Jo filed a motion with the court to borrow OCT No. 877.
This... motion was denied on the basis of the certification issued by petitioner that said title was among the documents
destroyed during the conflagration of 1975.
 Atty. Jo later informed petitioner that Trinidad Borja had obtained possession of the said title and in fact had
succeeded in having the same reconstituted. Only then did petitioner remember that he had delivered said title to
Geronimo Borja and that the latter had issued a... receipt therefor. Since then, petitioner had repeatedly asked Mrs.
Trinidad Borja to return the reconstituted title to the court. The latter, however, could not locate the same from the files
of her deceased mother, the registered owner, who was in custody thereof before her... death.
 Petitioner admitted having removed OCT No. 877 from the custody of the court and having delivered the same to
Geronimo Borja for the latter to cause its administra-tive reconstitution after he had found out that the original of said
title in the Office of the Register of Deeds was missing. He professed, however, that in delivering OCT No. 877 to
Borja, he was actuated with a lawful and commendable motive, i.e., to protect the in-terest of the State, since the
unreconstituted certificate of title, given as property bond of the accused Borja, was... absolutely inefficacious for such
purpose.

Issues: WoN Petitioner may invoke good faith to be acquitted from charge against him

Ruling:
To warrant a finding of guilt of the crime of infidelity in the custody of documents, the act of removal, as a mode of
committing the offense, should be coupled with criminal intent or illicit purpose. This calls to mind the oft-repeated maxim
"Actus non facit... reum, nisi mens sit rea," which expounds a basic principle in criminal law that a crime is not committed if
the mind of the person performing the act complained of be innocent. Thus, to constitute a crime, the act must, except in
certain crimes made such by statute, be... accompanied by a criminal intent. It is true that a presumption of criminal intent
may arise from proof of the commission of a criminal act; and the general rule is that if it is proved that the accused
committed the criminal act charged, it will be presumed that the act was... done with criminal intention and that it is for the
accused to rebut this presumption. But it must be borne in mind that the act from which such presumption springs must be
a criminal act
In the case at bar, the act is not criminal. Neither can it be... categorized as malum prohibitum, the mere
commission of which makes the doer criminally liable even if he acted without evil intent.
It is quite clear that in removing the certificate of title in question from the court's files and delivering the same to
Borja for the purpose of effecting its administrative reconstitution, petitioner was not prompted by criminal intent or illegal
purpose. Rather, he was... motivated with a sincere desire to pro-tect the interest of the Government. The prosecution did
not even attempt to impute bad faith on the part of petitioner; and there is nothing in the record to insinuate that petitioner
had profited from the act complained of.
Where the act of removal is actuated with lawful or commendable motives, as when the public officer removes the
public documents... committed to his trust for examination in connection with official duty, or with a view to securing them
from imminent danger of loss, there would be no crime committed under the law. This is so, because the act of removal,
destruction or concealment of public documents is... punished by law only when any of such acts would constitute
infidelity in the custody thereof.
Subject: ACTUS NON FECIT REUM NISI MENS SIT REA
(The act itself does not make a man guilty unless his intention were so)

LIM vs. CA
Facts:
 Petitioner was accused of violating the anti-fencing law.
 Allegedly, Petitioner feloniously received possessed, kept and acquired the spare parts and items being owned by
and belonging to one Loui Anfon Bond, well-knowing that the same were stolen or should be known to him to have
been derived from the proceeds of the crime theft, but inspite of such knowledge accused allowed the same to be
stored or kept in his bodega

Issue: WoN Petitioner is guilty for violation of Anti-Fencing Law (P.D. 1612, Sec. 5)

RULING: YES
On the aspect of animus furandi, petitioner is of the belief that this element was not clearly established by the
People’s evidence and he, therefore, draws the conclusion that respondent court seriously erred in presuming the
existence of intent to gain. Again, this supposition ignores the fact that intent to gain is a mental state, the existence of
which is demonstrated by the overt acts of a person. And what was the external demeanor which petitioner showed from
which the trial court and respondent court inferred animus furandi? These circumstances were vividly spelled in the body
of the judgment which petitioner chose to blandly impugn and over which he remains indifferent even at this crucial stage.
Withal, the sinister mental state is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act in bringing out the tires from his
bodega which were loaded on his pick-up.
At any rate, dolo is not required in crimes punished by a special statute like the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979
because it is the act alone, irrespective of the motives which constitutes the offense. Verily, when it was proved that
petitioner committed the unlawful acts alleged in the information, it was properly presumed that they were committed with
full knowledge and with criminal intent, and it was incumbent upon him to rebut such a presumption — a burden which
petitioner regrettably failed to discharge.
Moreover, the presumption of fencing under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1612 that: Mere possession of
any good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie
evidence of fencing.
Subject: ACTUS NON FECIT REUM NISI MENS SIT REA
(The act itself does not make a man guilty unless his intention were so)

PEOPLE vs. GEMOYA, et.al.

Facts:
 Armando Gemoya and Candelario Aliazar, together with their relatives, Ronilo and Rolly Tionko, went towards the
house of Irene Lantapon. They were armed with pipe, wood, and an improvised bow and arrow locally called “Indian
Pana”.
 The four went to the house of the Alferezes. They saw Wilfredo Alferez standing by the road waiting for a taxi. The
four rushed at him. Ronilo beat him with a cylindrical wood, Rolly with a pipe, while Candelario held his arms behind
him. Armando aimed his “Indian pana” at Wilfredo and the latter was hit on his left chest. Edgardo and his daughter,
Rosalie Jimenez rushed to his aid. But Rosalie was hit on the left ear by Armando. Then the four ran away. Wilfredo
was brought to the hospital but he died upon arrival. Rosalie, on the other hand, was declared out of danger.
 RTC found Armando and Ronilo guilty of murder and frustrated homicide, while Candelario & Rolly remained at-large

Issue: WoN the RTC erred in convicting Armando and Ronilo of the crime of frustrated homicide for the wounding of
Jimenez

Ruling: YES

The hitting of Rosalie was accidental as the second “Indian pana” was meant for Wilfredo. The intent to kill
Rosalie is absent. However, they are still liable for the consequences of their felonious act. Mistake in the identity of the
victim, which may either be “error in personae” (mistake of the person), or “aberratio ictus” (mistake in the blow), is neither
exempting nor mitigating. They cannot therefore escape the criminal liability resulting from the injury suffered by Rosalie.
Subject: ACTUS NON FECIT REUM NISI MENS SIT REA
(The act itself does not make a man guilty unless his intention were so)

RELUCIO vs. CSC

Facts:
 Civil Service Commission (CSC) finding petitioner Evelyn M. Relucio guilty of Dishonesty and Falsification of Official
Documents and imposing upon her the penalty of dismissal from service.
 Petitioner, Evelyn M. Relucio is a Community Affairs Officer IV of Iligan City. She claimed that her father, the late
Alberto Mansueto, Jr., was a World War II veteran who served with the rank of Sergeant. During the lifetime of Alberto
Mansueto, Jr., he, and after his demise, his wife, Elena Crespo-Mansueto, tried to seek official confirmation of his
military service with the Philippine Veterans Board (now Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, PVAO). They presented
the pertinent documents therefor. Unfortunately, the Mansuetos failed to obtain said confirmation and recognition of
Alberto Mansueto, Jr.'s, military services.
 On April 3, 1982, Executive Order No. 790 was issued granting and extending the veteran preference rating in civil
service examination to any one child of a veteran.
 Thus, petitioner filed a petition to avail of said preference rating in civil service examination. Aware that the military
service of her father was not yet officially recognized by the PVAO, she presented the affidavits in support of her
application.
 Acting on petitioner's application, the PVAO issued Master List No. 274, dated March 30, 1987 and Certification No.
22413A, dated March 24, 1987, stating that Alberto Mansueto, Jr., was a World War II Veteran with the rank of
private. On the basis of said Master List and Certification, the CSC granted her the benefit of 10% additional veterans
preference rating and a Career Service Professional Eligibility.
 Sometime in 1993, the CSC and the PVAO undertook a revalidation of their records to ascertain the truthfulness of
the claims of supposed children of veterans who were given the 10% veterans preferential rating.
 One of those investigated was the claim of petitioner that her father Alberto Mansueto, Jr., who died on December 9,
1964, was a second World War veteran. On the basis of the "Report" submitted by the PVAO that the name of Alberto
Mansueto, Jr., does not appear in any of its records, and after the requisite preliminary and fact-finding investigation,
the CSC approved Resolution No. 95-4573 giving due course to the Formal Charge against petitioner for dishonesty
and falsification of official documents.
 In her letter-Answer to the Formal Charge, petitioner claimed good faith and admitted, inter alia, that her father, before
his demise was unable to complete all the papers and documentation in support of his claim that he was a World War
II veteran.
 On July 5, 1999, the Commission issued Resolution No. 991431, finding the petitioner guilty as charged and imposing
upon her the penalty of dismissal from service.
 On January 10, 2001, the Military Service Board, Department of National Defense, confirmed the military services of
Alberto Mansueto, Jr., and conferred upon him full military veteran status.

Issue: WoN Petitioner may be acquitted by using good faith as a defense

Ruling: YES
Dishonesty connotes a disposition to lie, cheat or defraud. On the other hand, the elements of falsification are as
follows: (a) the offender makes in a documents statements in a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a legal obligation to
disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and, (d) the perversion
of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person
The rule is that "there can be no conviction for falsification of a public document if the acts of the accused are
consistent with good faith..." Thus, the maxim, actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea a crime is not committed if the mind
of the person performing the act complained of be innocent.
In the case at bar, petitioner was undoubtedly in good faith when she claimed that she was a daughter of a World
War II veteran. Aware that her father's veteran status was not yet confirmed, she submitted affidavits of the superiors and
contemporaries in the military of her father to prove that he indeed served during World War II. In fact, on the basis of said
affidavits, the PVAO recognized her father's services and consequently issued Master List No. 274 dated March 30, 1987
and Certification No. 22413A dated March 24, 1987, stating that Alberto Mansueto, Jr., was a World War II Veteran with
the rank of private.
Moreover, one of the elements of the offense of falsification, i.e., that the facts narrated by the offender be
absolutely false, is lacking in the instant case. The subsequent confirmation and recognition of the veteran status of
petitioner's father on January 10, 2001 proves that when she declared that he was a veteran, she was stating the truth.

***Charges against Petitioner be exonerated plus payment of her back salaries.

 Subject: ACTUS NON FECIT REUM NISI MENS SIT REA
(The act itself does not make a man guilty unless his intention were so)

ABDULLA vs. PEOPLE

Facts:
 NORMA A. ABDULLA and NENITA P. AGUIL, both public officers, being then the President and cashier, respectively, of
the Sulu State College, and as such by reason of their positions and duties are accountable for public funds under their
administration, while in the performance of their functions, conspiring and confederating with MAHMUD I. DARKIS, also a
public officer, being then the Administrative Officer V of the said school, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, without lawful authority, apply for the payment of wages of casuals, the amount of FORTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P40,000.00), Philippine Currency, which amount was appropriated for the payment of the salary differentials of
secondary school teachers of the said school, to the damage and prejudice of public service .

 Appellant’s co-accused, Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, were both acquitted. Only appellant was found guilty for
technical malversation and sentenced by the Sandiganbayan in its decision. Upon motion for reconsideration, the
Sandiganbayan amended appellant’s sentence by deleting the temporary special disqualification imposed upon her. Still
dissatisfied, appellant, now before this Court, persistently pleas innocence of the crime charged.

Issue: WoN there was unlawful intent on the part of Petitioner that would consider her guilty for technical malversation

Ruling: NO

The presumption of criminal intent will not automatically apply to all charges of technical malversation because
disbursement of public funds for public use is per se not an unlawful act.
Here, appellant cannot be said to have committed an unlawful act when she paid the obligation of the Sulu State
College to its employees in the form of terminal leave benefits such employees were entitled to under existing civil service
laws. In the absence of any presumption of unlawful intent, the burden of proving by competent evidence that appellant’s
act of paying the terminal leave benefits of employees of the Sulu State College was done with criminal intent rests upon
the prosecution. However, the prosecution failed to prove the unlawful intent. Conviction should rest on the strength of the
prosecution, not on the weakness of the defense. In the absence of criminal intent, the Court has no basis to affirm the
conviction of the Accused.
In accordance with the elements of the crime technical malversation, the Prosecutor failed to prove that the said
public funds used by the Accused has been appropriated by law or ordinance, hence, has its specific use. It has been
established that in the absence of law or ordinance appropriating the public fund allegedly technically malversed, the use
thereof for public purpose will not make the Accused guilty of violation of Art. 220, RPC.
Subject: FACTORS AFFECTING INTENT & THE OFFENDER’S CRIMINAL LIABITY

PEOPLE vs DALAG
Facts:
 Armando Dalag, a member of the Philippine National Police, was lawfully married to Leah Nolido Dalag. They had
three children. Their marriage was far from idyllic. Their covertures were marred by violent quarrels, with Leah always
at the losing end. Each time the couple had a quarrel, she sustained contusions, bruises and lumps on different parts
of her body.
 On August 15, 1996, Armando was drinking when Leah admonished him not to do so. Leah was then banged on the
wall by Armando. Then he pushed and kicked Leah on the left side of her body which caused her to fall on the
ground. Even as Leah was already lying prostrate, Armando continued to beat her up, punching her on the different
parts of her body. Leah then fled to the house of Felia Horilla but Armando ran after her and herded her back to their
house. Leah fell again to the ground and lost her consciousness.
 The trial court convicted Armando of parricide with voluntary surrender and passion and obfuscation as mitigating
circumstances.

Issue: WoN the Accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime parricide

Ruling: YES

The trial court correctly concluded that the injuries sustained by Leah that caused her death were the
consequence of the appellant’s deliberate and intentional acts.
The crime of parricide is defined by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code thus: Any person who shall kill his
father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall
be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
The prosecution is mandated to prove the following essential elements: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is
killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate
other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. The prescribed penalty for the crime is
reclusion perpetua to death. The key element in parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the
accused and the deceased would be the marriage certificate.
Since the Accused surrendered voluntarily, the Court considered such act as a mitigating circumstance. Thus, the
Accused was charged GUILTY of the crime parricide with punishment of only Reclusion Perpetua due to the mitigating
circumstance.
Subject: MISTAKE OF FACT

US vs. AH CHONG
Facts:
 Ah Chong was a cook in Ft. McKinley. He was afraid of bad elements.
 One evening, before going to bed, he locked himself in his room by placing a chair against the door. After having gone
to bed, he was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out who was it, twice, but received no
answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and called out again “If you enter the room, I
will kill you”. But at that precise moment, he was struck by the chair that had been place against the door, and
believing that he was being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded the intruder who
turned out to be his roommate.
 The deceased and the accused had an understanding to knock at the door and acquaint his companion with his
identity.
 Ah Chong alleged that it was because of repeated robberies that he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal
protection. He admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it under the impression that Pascual
was "a ladron" (burglar) because he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite warnings.
 RTC: Ah Chong was guilty of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances. Ah Chong admitted that he killed his
roommate but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful
right of self-defense.

Issue: WoN Accused can be acquitted for the reason of mistake of fact

Ruling: YES

There is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to
negligence or bad faith. Ah Chong acquitted.
There can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to complete exception from criminal liability for the death of
the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or
"ladron," as the defendant believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant
to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's thrice-
repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be
questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him
despite his warnings defendant would have been wholly justified in using any available weapon to defend himself from
such an assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the first
blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the defendant nor his
property nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger at the time when he struck the fatal blow. That there
was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling and resisting,
and that there was no real "necessity" for the use of the knife to defend his person or his property or the property under
his charge.
Ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent which
under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larceny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in
crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances
demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of
article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act
committed by him, even though it be different from that which he intended to commit.
Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient
excuse"). Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act
committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability provided
always there is no fault or negligence on his part; That is to say, the question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and
without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the
time when the mistake was made, and the effect which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to
have on his mind, in forming the intent, criminal or otherwise, upon which he acted.
Ah Chong struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the
door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and
of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to
the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more
than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been
wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence or
recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend
himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property and the property under his
charge.
Subject: MISTAKE OF FACT

US vs. APEGO
Facts:
 The defendant was charged of Murder and was sentenced by CFI Batangas on February 15, 1912, by Honorable
Mariano Cui, the penalty of twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, to the accessories, to pay an indemnity of
P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased, and the costs.
 At about 8 o'clock in the evening of December 24, 1911, the spouses, Pio Bautista and Maria Apego, coming from the
municipality of Nasugbu, returned to their house, situated in the barrio of Sampaga, pueblo of Balayan, Batangas, and
before entering the same called to Genoveva Apego, the woman's sister, who they knew was therein, and as they
received no reply, went up into the house; the husband led the way and opened the door; the house was so dark,
Maria went directly to look for a match and lit a kerosene, while Pio stumbled on the defendant and accidentally
touched her left arm. Defendant was awaken and immediately reached for her pocketknife thinking that someone
entered the house and is going to rape her, before she striking Pio with her pocketknife, she first inquired of his
identity, when there was no answer, she immediately struck him to the chest. The wound inflicted by the defendant to
the victim was so deep and fatal that it injured both the heart and left lung. A few moments later Pio died.

Issue: WoN Accused can be acquitted due to mistake of fact

Ruling: NO

Defense: Defendant is only defending herself, upon awakening, defendant was startled and thought someone is going to
rape her, the house was pitch black so before striking her knife, she first inquired of the “intruder’s” identity, receiving no
answer she immediately struck him to his chest.
Defendant, 25 years of age, single and uneducated, lived with Pio and Maria for two years, and they never
developed any conflict.

Prosecution: The defendant exceeded her right of defense, since there was no real need of wounding the man whohad
merely caught by her arm.

From the foregoing considerations it is concluded that in the commission of the crime there was present the
circumstance of incomplete exemption from responsibility, as all the three requisites specified in subarticle 4 of article 11
of the Penal Code are not applicable; wherefore the criminal act is not altogether excusable, on account of the lack of the
second of the said requisites, although a majority of them were present, that is, the first and the third requisites; and,
therefore, in accordance with the provisions of article 86 of the code, a penalty lower by one or two degrees than that
prescribed by article 404 of the code, in the discretion of the court, must be imposed upon the defendant.
In view of the fact that the accused is an ignorant woman, wholly uneducated, and that it was not shown that, at
the time when she assaulted the deceased, she knew that he was her brother-in-law, account must be taken of the
circumstance prescribed by article 11 of the code, in connection with Act No. 2142, as no aggravating circumstance
whatever was present to counteract the effects of the said extenuating circumstance; therefore, the penalty applicable to
the defendant is the one lower by two degrees and in the minimum period.
Subject: MISTAKE OF FACT

US vs. BAUTISTA
Facts:
 Bautista was charged with assault upon agents of the authorities and insulting them
 1914, an order to arrest Bautista was rendered. Policemen then proceeded to Bautista’s home to implement the
warrant of arrest. Upon making an inquiry and confirming that Accused was in the house, Policemen proceeded to
arrest the former by entering his house without permission and attempted to arrest Bautista without explaining the
nature and cause of his arrest. Bautista resisted, then he started shouting and called the Policemen bandits and that
the same are abusing him
 When the Policemen started to explain the nature and cause of Bautista’s arrest, the latter submitted to such
peacefully.
 Bautista argued that since the Policemen did not introduce themselves, he thought the same were “tulisanes”

Issue: WoN Accused may be acquitted due to mistake of fact.

Ruling: YES
If the accused believed that those who entered his house were, in fact, tulisanes, he was entirely justified in
calling his neighbors and making an attempt to expel him from his premises.