Siegel 1989

HARVEY SIEGEL
THE RATIONALITY OF SCIENCE, CRITICAL

THINKING, AND SCIENCE EDUCATION*
It is not what the man of science believes that dis-

tinguishes him, but how and why he believes it. His
beliefs are tentative, not dogmatic; they are based on
evidence, not on authority or intuition (Russell 1945,
p. 527).
I believe ..~ that all teaching [in science] on the Uni-
versity level (and if possible below) should be training
and encouragement in critical thinking (Popper 1970,
pp. 52-53).
ABSTRACT. This paper considers two philosophical problems and their relation to
science education. The first involves the rationality of science; it is argued here that the
traditional view, according to which science is rational because of its adherence to (a
non-standard conception of) scientific method, successfully answers one central question
concerning science's rationality. The second involves the aims of education; here it is
argued that a fundamental educational aim is the fostering of rationality, or its
educational cognate, critical thinking. The ramifications of these two philosophical
theses for science education are then considered, and a science education which takes
reasons in science as its fundamental feature is sketched.
I N T R O D U C T I O N : SCIENCE, R A T I O N A L I T Y , AND
SCIENCE EDUCATION
Science has traditionally b e e n seen as the apex of rationality. For the

scientist, as the traditional i m a g e has it, is the dispassionate seeker of
the truth - the person in the lab coat, u n t r o u b l e d by passion or
e m o t i o n , unbiased by prior conviction, guided only by reason,
patiently observing, e x p e r i m e n t i n g , following the e v i d e n c e w h e r e v e r it
leads. O n this image, the scientist believes and acts entirely on the
basis of e v i d e n c e and reasons. W h a t better personification of rational-
ity could there be?
This i m a g e has, alas, b e e n t h o r o u g h l y exploded. C o n t e m p o r a r y
r e s e a r c h in the history, philosophy, sociology, and politics of science
has r e v e a l e d a m o r e a c c u r a t e picture of the scientist as one w h o is
driven by prior c o n v i c t i o n s and c o m m i t m e n t s ; w h o is g u i d e d by g r o u p
loyalties and s o m e t i m e s petty personal squabbles; w h o is frequently
Synthese 80: 9-41, 1989.

© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
10 HARVEY SIEGEL
quite unable to recognize evidence for what it is; and whose personal
careerist motivations give the lie to the idea that the scientist yearns
only, or even mainly, for the truth. Under the weight of this new
image, many philosophers and others have questioned the notion that
science is the apex of rationality, and that the scientist is the per-
sonification of rationality par excellence. And if science and scientists
are as uncritical, and as unguided by reasons and evidence, as the new
image suggests, then how, and to what end, shall science education be
envisioned.'?
In this paper I consider two classic philosophical problems. Both
concern rationality, and both have ramifications for science education.
The first is the problem of the rationality of science. This is, arguably,
the most fundamental problem in the philosophy of science; in any
case it has occupied center stage in philosophy of science for the last
several decades. The many challenges to the traditional understanding
of that rationality - according to which, as the opening motto from
Russell suggests, science is preeminently rational, in virtue of its
adherence to scientific method - have left many philosophers denying
that science is rational, or securing that rationality in some other way
than by appeal to its method. In the first section of this paper, I offer
an analysis which upholds the traditional conception. That is, I argue
that science is properly thought of as preeminently rational, and it is
properly so thought because of its embrace of scientific method
(although my characterization of scientific method is itself un-
orthodox).
In the second section I turn from philosophy of science to philoso-
phy of education and our second classic philosophical problem. In the
philosophy of education, the most fundamental problem concerns the
aims of education. Here I shall argue that education should take as a
basic aim the fostering of rationality; and that rationality, or its
educational cognate, critical thinking, should be taken to be a fun-
damental educational ideal. Calling the critical thinker one who is
'appropriately moved by reasons', I shall in this section develop this
conception of education, and point out its close relationship to the
conception of the rationality of science offered in the previous section.
Finally, in the third section I shall turn to science education. Here I
shall argue that embracing the traditional conception of the rationality
of science, and embracing rationality or critical thinking as a fun-
damental educational ideal, both have important ramifications for
THE RATIONALITY OF SCIENCE 11
science education and the science curriculum. In this section I shall

offer a conception of science education consonant with the previously
defended view of science's rationality, and with the view that rational-
ity is a basic educational ideal.
1. S C I E N C E AND ITS RATIONALITY
A. The Rationality of Science: What is the Question?

Russell's opening motto suggests two traditional and related beliefs
about science. The first is that there is a particular way in which a
scientist properly goes about validating a scientific belief; that way,
which is the hallmark of scientific activity, is the scientific method. The
second is that this method is what legitimates scientific activity, and
justifies the fruits of scientific inquiry; that is, science is a rational
activity, and its rationality is secured by the scientific method. These
two beliefs have been taken for granted until recently by scientists, lay
persons, and philosophers alike. However, some contemporary
philosophers of science challenge both. They claim that there is no
such thing as the scientific method, and that science is not best seen as
rational - or, alternatively, that its rationality is not a function of its
method.
In what follows in this section I shall try to defend the traditional
beliefs against these recent challenges. I shall argue that the plausi-
bility of these challenges rests on a confusion between different
questions one might ask about science's rationality. I shall suggest that
once these questions are sorted out, the puzzles that have perplexed
philosophers working in this area are in part easily solved, or at least
the requirements for their solutions become more clear. I shall suggest
in addition that proper pursuit of these solutions affords a means of
reestablishing the traditional connection between science's rationality
and its method. Finally, I shall argue that the approach to the problem
of the rationality of science offered here illustrates the desirability of
the reestablishment of a primarily epistemological conception of
philosophy of science, and so a pulling back from the excessively
historicist conception which has dominated the field in recent years.
On the traditional view I want to defend here, the rationality of
science is a function of its method. Recent philosophy of science has
largely abandoned that view, however; and many contemporary
12 HARVEY SIEGEL
philosophers either deny that science is rational or seek to locate its

rationality elsewhere. Feyerabend (and sometimes Kuhn) denies both
that science is rational and that it has a method, as do many contem-
porary sociologists of science. Laudan and Toulmin render rationality
as a function of science's problem-solving ability; t Kuhn sometimes
seems to locate rationality in the value-laden judgments that scientists
make. z And several philosophers, including Hempel and Newton-
Smith, embrace a 'means-ends' or instrumental rationality according
to which science's rationality is a function of the ability of its
methodological principles and procedures to achieve its goals. 3 All
these philosophers have important things to say about science.
However, I believe that their accounts of the rationality of science are
deficient because they fail to be clear about the questions the accounts
are supposed to answer. That is, it is not clear in the literature on the
rationality of science what the philosophical problem concerning
science's rationality is. More specifically, that literature fails to dis-
tinguish between three distinct questions we might ask about science's
rationality:
QI: In what does the rationality of science consist?
Q2: What is to count as evidence, or good reason, for some
scientific hypothesis or procedure?
Q3: Is actual science (contemporary or historical) rational, in
fact?
Q1 calls for a definition, or explication, of the concept of rationality as
that concept applies to science. It calls for clarification of the meaning
of the attribution of rationality (or ir- or arationality) to science. What,
Q1 asks, does it mean to say that science is or is not rational?
Q2, by contrast, asks a different question. It presupposes that the
answer to Q1 grounds science's rationality in what I shall call below a
commitment to evidence, and then goes on to inquire about the
constitution of good reason or evidence in science. Once QI and Q2
are distinguished it becomes possible to recognize that disputes
regarding the constitution (or the power, persuasiveness, relevance,
etc.) of evidence in any given scientific debate or situation are not
properly regarded as disputes concerning the rationality/irrationality
of science. That is, Q2-~ Q1. For example, if proponents of rival
scientific theories disagree as to the significance of some experimental
result - say, a Newtonian and an Einsteinian disputing the significance
of the failure of the Michelson-Morley experiment to measure aether
drift, or a Daltonian and a pre-Daltonian disputing the importance of

a surprising measurement of weight during combustion - these sorts of
disagreements do not challenge the rationality of science or suggest
that science is irrational. Rather, they presuppose science's rationality,
in the sense that all parties to the dispute assume that scientific
hypotheses, theories, and procedures are in some way to be backed by
reasons; and they dispute not the general relevance of evidence but
the specific claims regarding the warrant that putative evidence in fact
affords to the hypothesis under consideration. Thus the Newtonian, in
clinging to Newton's theory after Einstein and Michelson-Morley,
does not dispute the relevance of evidence to the acceptance/rejection
of scientific hypotheses. She does not, that is, suggest that science is
not rational. Rather, she claims that the experimental result (together
with a host of additional evidence) is not sufficient to warrant the
rejection of Newton's theory. Similarly for the Pre-Daltonian. In short,
philosophical disputation regarding the rationality of science, especi-
ally that spawned by Kuhn, has suffered from a confusion between QI
and Q2. 'Revolutionary debate' is always debate regarding Q2. It does
not challenge science's rationality in the sense of suggesting that there
is no good answer to Q1, or that QI can't be answered in a way which
secures science's rationality.
In fact, debate regarding Q2 presupposes a commitment to science's
rationality, in that participants in scientific controversy seek to est-
ablish their views as correct, or right, and that it is rational to agree
insofar as one bases one's opinion on reasons or on relevant evidence.
It is often supposed as well that this manner of belief-acquisition and
maintenance is preeminently scientific. That is, there is a way of
acquiring and holding scientific beliefs - namely, the scientific method.
We have here, in short, the traditional view that there is a close
connection between science's rationality and its method, this latter
understood as a manner of holding scientific beliefs and commitments.
It behooves us then to consider the nature of scientific method, and its
connection with science's rationality. This will afford in turn an
opportunity to say more about the answer to Q 1.
B. Scientific Method
It is method rather than doctrine that defines the community of science, and it is the
stability of method in pursuit of truth that holds the community together throughout
doctrinal change. (Schettler 1974, p. 75) 4
14 HARVEY SIEGEL
There is much to say concerning scientific method (henceforth SM)

that I haven't the space to say here. 5 Instead, I shall simply lay my
cards on the table and offer the conception of SM I prefer, a concep-
tion which helps us to answer Q1 and to reestablish the traditional
connection between science's rationality and its method.
What is it about the methodological criteria of science that entitles
them collectively to constitute SM? It is, I suggest, their embodiment
of a commitment to evidence. We take testing, for example, to be
central to SM precisely because we regard the results of properly
conceived and run tests (however 'properly run' is understood in any
particular context) as a highly significant kind of evidence. We regard
explanatory power as crucial to the evaluation of scientific hypotheses
for the same reason; similarly for inductive inference, and other
aspects of the 'logic of justification'. Whether or not justification is a
matter of logic, there can be no doubt that methodological criteria
operate so as to establish the evidentiary support of hypotheses and
theories. The hallmark of SM is its commitment to the establishment
of the epistemic worth of scientific claims by virtue of the establish-
ment of the evidential support of those claims.
One might balk at the suggestion that SM be understood as a
commitment to evidence. How, after all, can a commitment be a
method? The question is well taken - the commitment is not a method
as that latter term is usually understood, that is, as a (set of) specific
procedure(s). My suggestion, however, is that this is the wrong way to
think of scientific method. There is no special or specific procedure
which insures the success of scientific inquiry, or which secures
science's ~atjonality, or which separates science from other areas of
human inquiry. Mill's methods can be used in other areas besides
science, and so can enumerative induction, inference to the best
explanation, the process of conjecture and refutation, and so on. In
short, I am suggesting that it has been a mistake to seek to determine
a unique procedure definitive of scientific method; similarly it is a
mistake to seek to ground science's rationality in such a procedure. In
this sense philosophical discussion of scientific method and rationality
has been off-target from Bacon on. There is no procedure that is
constitutive of SM or that insures that science is rational. What insures
that rationality is the commitment to evidence - or, better, science is
rational to the extent that it proceeds in accordance with such a
commitment. To deny that science is rational is not in the first instance
to doubt that it has a 'method' (read 'procedure') which guarantees

truth or success. It is rather to doubt that the activities, theories, and
hypotheses of science are fundamentally justified in terms of reasons
and evidence; that is, it is to doubt that science is epistemologically
respectable as such respectability is traditionally conceived. Scientific
method has thus been generally wrongly conceived - and this is
related to misconceptions regarding science's rationality that stem
from a confusion of the several questions that can be asked concern-
ing that rationality. Consequently, conceiving of SM as I do here not
only affords a corrective with respect to traditional philosophical
consideration of science's method, it also provides an opportunity to
clarify recent discussion concerning the rationality of science and a
way to establish that rationality. (More on these latter matters below.)
Of course, science is not the only domain in which the epistemic
worthiness of beliefs, hypotheses, or claims is putatively established on
the basis of evidence. SM extends far beyond the realm of science
proper. But this is only to say that SM can be utilized widely. It is still
properly labeled scientific method, because science as a knowledge-
seeking enterprise manifests an explicit commitment to evidentiary
criteria. This explicit commitment to evidence - indeed, the self-
structuring of its activities around evidentiary criteria - is the proper
source of science's prestige as the preeminently rational activity.
I have just noted that science is not the only activity that seeks to
base epistemic worth on evidentiary criteria. Other intellectual
domains, the management of practical affairs, common sense, and
everyday life do so (to some extent or other) as well. Is the thesis that
SM is to be understood as a commitment to evidence then mistaken,
since it points up no special feature of science that other activities or
domains of experience lack? I do not think so. For while it is true that
belief based on evidence goes far beyond the bounds of science, it is
nevertheless also true that many human activities utilize modes of
belief-acquisition and -validation that are not based on evidence. (The
standard examples of pseudo-sciences are instances, as are ordinary
beliefs which are held in spite of, or systematically protected from,
contrary evidence.) Science's commitment to evidence, by way of SM,
is what justifies its claim to respect - science is to be taken seriously
precisely because of its commitment to evidence. The characterization
of SM offered here is thus, though general, not trivial. For it is an
extremely important feature of science that it does purport to ground
16 HARVEY SIEGEL
its claims evidentially. Not all claims are even purportedly so

grounded.
It should be clear here that I am emphasizing the 'method', not the
'scientific', of 'scientific method'. For I am not claiming that there is
anything about SM which is unique to science in the sense that only
science does or can do that unique thing. Many other endeavors and
domains can utilize or appeal to evidence in establishing claims;
similarly they can manifest a commitment to evidence. SM so regar-
ded is properly labeled scientific method simply because it is the
method of science - that is, science typically, or at least ideally,
manifests and organizes its affairs with specific attention to the com-
mitment to evidence. 6
I have been writing as if science's utilization of SM is perfect; as if
every scientist always bases her claims evidentially. This is, of course,
not so. As scarcely needs mention, scientists are passionate, human
creatures, not automatons who routinely grind out results according to
some formula for establishing evidential support. But this is perfectly
compatible with the view of SM offered here, for science is a com-
munal affair; individual passions and commitments are controlled by
community assessment. In cases of dispute, settlement comes on the
heels of relevant new evidence. Sometimes such evidence is not
available - in which case disputes remain open. Sometimes evidence is
at hand but not taken as such; at other times it may be denied or
distorted. In these last cases SM is not fully in command, and we might
well say that those who fail to honor the commitment to evidence
forfeit their claim to the title 'scientist'. 7 But these considerations do
not harm the analysis, for an account of SM should not pretend that
the scientific community's reliance on SM is unwavering. It is enough
to note that the community strives, ideally, for such reliance.
A final consideration concerns the legitimacy of construing SM as
wholly a matter of justification. Many philosophers have regarded SM
in this way. 8 Yet scientific activities include much more than efforts at
justification or evaluation; scientists experiment, observe, hypothesize,
create, and do many other things as well as evaluate. Is it not then
myopic to regard SM as a feature only of this one aspect of scientific
activity?
The point must be granted. It is undeniable that scientific activity
includes more than acts on evaluation. Yet there is still good reason
for construing SM in terms of evaluation or justification, for it is the
THE RA'FIONALITY OF SCIENCE 17
commitment to criteria of evaluation which establish evidential sup-

port that constitutes the hallmark of science. Characteristics taken to
reflect key features of science - non-dogmatism, self-correction, and
the like - are direct consequences of the commitment to evidence.
While scientific activities and procedures for doing science change,
the commitment to evidence is basic and essential. If this changed or
was given up, we would have to regard the new activity as something
other than science. Thus it is appropriate to regard SM as strictly a
matter of justification, despite the undeniable fact that scientific
activity far outstrips evaluative activity.
C. Scientific Method and the Rationality of Science

• . . there is a scientific m e t h o d ; but it presupposes prior notions of rationality• (Putnam
1981)
If the preceding discussion is correct, then we do have a viable notion

of SM. This notion allows the reestablishment of the traditional
connection between SM and the rationality of science. Indeed, given
the characterization of SM offered above, the connection is straight-
forward. If SM is properly characterized as a commitment to evidence,
then science's rationality is a direct consequence of that commitment.
SM is to be seen as an embodiment of rationality - SM is the way that
rationality manifests itself in science. For SM is structured so as to
emphasize reasons: testability, objectivity, impartiality, and other fea-
tures and ideals of science are functions of science's regard for
evidence. T h e r e is a deep and obvious connection between evidence
and reason - the former constitutes a central species of the latter, in
that evidence for some hypothesis H constitutes reason(s) for (accept-
ing, pursuing, believing, acting upon, regarding as true) H. T h e r e is,
in short, an intrinsic conceptual connection between evidence and
reason, and consequently the same sort of connection between SM and
the rationality of science.
Here we have our answer to Q1. T o ask if science is rational is to
ask if science is guided by reasons that orchestrate and sanction its
activities and commitments. T o answer affirmatively is to adopt a view
of SM akin to the one proposed here, since on that view SM is a
commitment to evidence, or to reasons more generally. Hence the
analysis of SM offered constitutes an affirmative answer to Q 1.
18 HARVEY SIEGEL
But, as emphasized earlier, Q1 7~ Q2, and SM as analyzed here does

not provide any sort of answer to the latter question. This is as it
should be, since the commitment to evidence that I have argued is
constitutive of SM does not depend on any particular epistemological
view of the nature of evidence. Q2 concerns the constitution of
evidence, and attendant issues involving the nature of testing, in-
duction, and explanation, and the ways in which these features of
scientific practice and inference offer evidence for theories, hypo-
theses, and procedures. Thus SM, while securing science's rationality,
leaves most of the epistemologicai work to be done.
This, again, is as it should be. Philosophy of science has been
preoccupied for the last twenty-five years with Q2, in particular with
issues concerning the nature of evidence and the relation between
evidence and theory. But it is important to see that the discussion has
suffered from a failure to distinguish Q2 from Q1, and so a tendency
on the part of some of the discussants to argue from a negative
analysis of certain conceptions in the domain of Q2 - for example, a
rejection of both enumerative induction and a concomitant concep-
tion of the growth of scientific knowledge by gradual accretion - to a
negative answer to Q I. This is simply a mistake, however. Granting
for the moment the correctness of the rejection of enumerative
induction and gradual accretion, what follows is not that science is not
rational, but rather that different views about the character of in-
ductive reasoning in science, the way in which evidence inductively
supports theories and hypotheses, and the growth of scientific know-
ledge are needed. Efforts to articulate such different views do not
challenge the rationality of science, i.e., do not suggest a negative
answer to Q1. (An argument to further that suggestion would have to
hold that evidence does not in any way serve to justify scientific
theory.) In short, much recent philosophy of science: (1) is concerned
with Q2; (2) does not distinguish between Q1 and Q2; and (3)
consequently offers answers to Q2 which are too often mistakenly
thought to be answers to Q1. I hope this makes clear the importance
of distinguishing between the two questions.
In discussion following one of his papers on this subject, Hempel
remarks that he has "always been convinced that there are standards
of rationality that govern scientific inquiry, but I have come to realize
that it is very difficult to formulate such principles" (1979, p. 60). If
the analysis offered here is correct, then Hempel's conviction is
sustained, and his realization explained. The problem is his failure to

distinguish the general commitment to evidence which is constitutive
of SM and rationality from specific formulations of principles of
evidential support - that is, Q I from Q2. The former justifies his
conviction regarding the rationality of science; the latter provides the
locus of difficult philosophical work, but allows the former conviction
to stand unbesmirched by the difficulties attendant upon the latter
task. One virtue of my account is its handling of the discomfort
Hempel here so clearly articulates.
But this is not its only virtue. The account offered avoids Hempel's
means-ends view of science's rationality, and so the problem of that
view's failure to concern itself with the rationality of the ends or goals
of science. 9 It makes sense of our regarding science as "the exemplar
of rationality" (Hempel 1979, p. 58), by virtue of science's fundamen-
tal commitment to evidence. It highlights the distinction, too often
obscured, between the rationality of the products of scientific inquiry
and the rationality of the activity of inquiry, and emphasizes the need
for an account of the rationality of science to speak to both of these
aspects of science's rationality. 1° It connects the rationality of science
with SM in a natural and obvious way. It acknowledges the timeless,
immutable or a priori character of SM and the rationality of science in
a way compatible with the vagaries of the history of science. ~1 It offers
a way of understanding 'revolutionary science', as disputes about the
nature and force of reasons for or against some theory, in a way that
makes revolutionary debate difficult, but (at least potentially) rational
- thus honoring the facts of history while preserving (at least the
possibility of) science's rationality. Moreover, it explicates science's
rationality in terms of rationality more generally - which is as it should
be, since rationality far outstrips the bounds of science. All of these
virtues speak well, I think, for the account offered.
The analysis of the rationality of science offered here may appear
trivial: science's rationality consists in its commitment to evidence.
But an account of science's rationality should not be overly ambitious
or try to settle too much. It should seek to answer only Q1. My
account of rationality does offer an answer to that question. It does not
attempt to answer Q2, which asks about the constitution of reasons in
science: What counts as a good reason in science? (Or, alternatively,
what counts as a good reason for a scientific hypothesis, theory, or
procedure?) The second question is, I think, a central question for the
20 HARVEY S1EGEI.
philosophy of science. If so, the question makes plain that philosophy

of science is fundamentally an epistemological activity, concerned to
analyze the epistemic force of putative scientific reasons and to offer a
general account of such force. With respect to this task the in-
dependence or autonomy of philosophy of science from the history of
science is manifest. The difficult task facing philosophy of science is
that of developing a general account of the warrant of scientific
reasons that would allow us to determine whether or not, in any given
case, the reasons offered for a hypothesis actually afford warrant to
that hypothesis. But it should be clear that appeals to the history of
science, or to 'naturalized' accounts of scientific activity, have very
little if any relevance to the epistemological task of assessing the
warrant putative reasons offer to scientific hypotheses. By pointing out
the fundamentally epistemological nature of philosophy of science, the
account here offered provides a useful corrective to the excessive
historicism of recent philosophy of science.
My account does not, of course, answer Q3. For this is an empirical
question, which only detailed empirical investigation can settle. We
should not expect a unitary answer to it, in any case; some episodes of
actual scientific activity and belief will no doubt turn out upon
investigation to be rational, others not. But in any event, Q3 should
not be answered by an answer to Q1. A final virtue of the analysis
offered here is its ability to distinguish between these three questions
concerning science's rationality.
2. RA'FIONALITY/CR1TICAL THINKING AS AN
EDUCATIONAL IDEAL
R a t i o n a l i t y . . . is a matter of reasons, and to take it as a fundamental educational ideal is

to make as pervasive as possible the free and critical quest for reasons, in all realms of
study. (Schemer 1973, p. 62) ~2
In the previous section I argued for a particular solution to the

problem of science's rationality: science's rationality is a function of its
method; that method consists in adherence to a commitment to
evidence. In distinguishing between three questions one might ask
about science's rationality, we are afforded a clearer understanding of
that problem; we are able then to see that what have been taken to be
significant challenges to science's rationality do not in fact threaten
that rationality. Rather, they challenge particular conceptions of
scientific reasons. They do not challenge science's general commit-

ment to reasons and evidence. My solution, if successful, allows us to
regard science as preeminently rational; it also allows us to restore the
traditional relationship between the rationality of science and scientific
method.
This solution to the problem of the rationality of science happily
coincides with a very different philosophical problem. The central
problem of philosophy of education concerns education's aims: What
is the point, or hoped-for result, of education? What do we want
students to get out of their education? What do we think educated
persons should be like? Here, as earlier, rationality is basic: a central
aim of education, I shall suggest, is the fostering of rationality, or its
educational cognate, critical thinking.
Elsewhere 13 I introduced the 'reasons' conception of critical think-
ing, according to which a critical thinker is one who is appropriately
moved by reasons, in this section I shall attempt to amplify and clarify
this conception. I begin by exploring the connection between critical
thinking and rationality, after which are examined the 'reason assess-
ment' component of critical thinking and the 'critical attitude' com-
ponent. The educational significance o f the reasons conception, ac-
cording to which critical thinking constitutes a fundamental educa-
tional ideal, is considered as well.
A. Critical Thinking, Rationality, and Reasons

To be a critical thinker is to be appropriately moved by reasons. To be
a rational person is to believe and act on the basis of reasons. There is
then a deep conceptual connection, by way of the notion of reasons,
between critical thinkers and rational persons. Critical thinking is best
conceived, consequently, as the educational cognate of rationality:
critical thinking involves bringing to bear all matters relevant to the
rationality of belief and action; and education aimed at the promul-
gation of critical thinking is nothing less than education aimed at the
fostering of rationality and the development of rational persons.
Rationality, in its turn, is to be understood as being 'coextensive
with the relevance of reasons' (Schemer 1965, p. 107). A critical
thinker is one who appreciates and accepts the importance and con-
victing force of reasons. ~4 When assessing claims, making judgments,
evaluating procedures, or contemplating alternative actions, the criti-
22 HARVEY SIEGEL
cal thinker seeks reasons on which to base her assessments, judg-

ments, and actions. To seek reasons, moreover, is to recognize and
commit oneself to principles, for, as R. S. Peters puts it, "principles are
needed to determine the relevance [and strength] of reasons". 15 Israel
Schemer describes the relationship between reasons and principles in
this way:
•.. reason is always a matter of abiding by general rules or principles.., reason is always
a matter of treating equal reasons equally, and of judging the issues in the light of
general principles to which one has bound oneself.., if I could judge reasons differently
when they bear on my interests, or disregard my principles when they conflict with my
own advantage, I should have no principles at all. The concepts of principles, reasons
and consistency thus go together . . . . In fact, they define a general concept of rational-
ity. A rational man is one who is consistent in thought and in action, abiding by
impartial and generalizable principles freely chosen as binding upon himself. 16
To illustrate the connection between reasons, principles, and con-

sistency: Suppose that Johnny's teacher keeps him after class one day
as punishment "for throwing spitballs. When asked by his parents why
Johnny was kept after class, his teacher replies: "Johnny was kept
after class because (i.e., for the reason that) he was disrupting the
class". The teacher's reason for keeping him after class is that his
behavior was disruptive. For this properly to count as a reason, the
teacher must be committed to some principle which licenses or backs
that reason, i.e., establishes it as a bona fide reason - e.g., 'All
disruptive behavior warrants keeping students after class' (or 'This
sort of behavior warrants keeping students after class') - which must
be consistently applied to cases. If the teacher is not committed to
some such principle, then her putative reason for keeping Johnny after
class does not constitute a genuine reason: Johnny or his parents
would be perfectly entitled to challenge the teacher, for example by
noting that Mary, who also threw spitballs, was not kept after class.
Johnny might well say: "Since you don't apply any relevant principle
consistently, you have no reason to keep me after class. If throwing
spitballs is not a reason for detaining Mary, it cannot be a reason for
detaining me either". Of course there may be mitigating circum-
stances: Mary may be a first-time offender and Johnny a repeater, etc.
Nevertheless, the point remains that the teacher's putative reason is
rightly regarded as a reason which warrants or justifies her behavior
only if it is backed by some principle which (can itself be justified and)
is consistently applied in relevantly similar cases, so that the teacher's
action cannot be seen as arbitrary. Here we see the connection

between reasons, principles, and consistency. In general, p is a reason
for q only if some principle r renders p a reason for q, and would
equally render p' a reason for q' if p and p', and q and q', are
relevantly similar.
Because of this connection between reasons and principles, critical
thinking is principled thinking; because principles involve consistency,
critical thinking is impartial, consistent, and non-arbitrary, and the
critical thinker both thinks and acts in accordance with, and values,
consistency, fairness, and impartiality of judgment and action. ~7 Prin-
cipled, critical judgment, in its rejection of arbitrariness, incon-
sistency, and partiality, thus presupposes a recognition of the binding
force of standards, taking to be universal and objective, in accordance
with which judgments are to be made. 18 In the first instance, such
standards involve criteria by which judgments can be made regarding
the acceptability of various beliefs, claims, and actions - that is, they
involve criteria which allow the evaluation of the strength and force of
the reasons which may be offered in support of alternative beliefs,
claims, and actions. This leads us naturally into consideration of the
reason assessment component of the reasons conception of critical
thinking.
B. The Reason Assessment Component

The basic idea here is simple enough: a critical thinker must be able to
assess reasons and their ability to warrant beliefs, claims, and actions
properly. This means that the critical thinker must have a good
understanding of, and the ability to utilize, principles governing the
assessment of reasons.
There are at least two types of such principles: subject-specific
principles which govern the assessment of particular sorts of reasons in
particular contexts, and subject-neutral, general principles which ap-
ply across a wide variety of contexts and types of reason. Subject-
neutral principles include all those principles typically regarded as
'logical', both informal and formal. So, for example, principles regard-
ing proper inductive inference, proper deductive inference, the avoi-
dance of fallacies - in fact, virtually all that is usually included in
informal logic texts - count as subject-neutral logical principles. On
the other hand, principles which apply only to specific subjects or
24 HARVEY SIEGEL
areas of i n q u i r y - e.g., principles governing the proper interpretation

of bubble-chamber photographs in particle physics, or those govern-
ing proper assessment of works of art, or novels, or historical docu-
ments, or the design of bathroom plumbing fixtures - are, though not
general, nevertheless of central importance for critical thinking. There
is no a priori reason for regarding either of these types of principles as
more basic (or irrelevant) to critical thinking than the other; nor is
there, at least to my knowledge, any significant empirical evidence to
that effect. Similarly, there is no reason for regarding the skills
associated with one sort of principle (e.g., the skill or ability to read a
bubble-chamber photo, a subject-specific skill) as more or less fun-
damental to critical thinking than the skills associated with the other
sort (e.g., the skill or ability to reason well inductively, or assess the
merits of observations, or recognize and avoid the fallacy of begging
the question - all these being subject-neutral, logical skills). Thus
critical thinking manifests itself in both subject-specific and subject-
neutral ways, for reasons, and the principles relevant to their assess-
ment, are both subject-specific and subject-neutral.
Earlier I claimed that the reason assessment component of critical
thinking requires that the student be able to assess reasons and their
warranting force properly, and that this in turn requires that the
student have a good grasp of the principles governing such assess-
ment. A full account of the reason assessment component involves
more than this, however. In addition to the ability to assess reasons
and their warranting force (and a grasp of the related governing
principles), critical thinkers must also have a theoretical grasp of the
nature of reasons, warrant, and justification, and so some understand-
ing of why a given putative reason is to be assessed as it is. That is, the
reason assessment component involves epistemology. 19
To summarize: I have suggested thus far that a central component
of critical thinking is the reason assessment component. The critical
thinker must be able to assess reasons and their ability to warrant
beliefs, claims and actions properly. Therefore, the critical thinker
must have a good understanding of, and the ability to utilize, both
subject-specific and subject-neutral (logical) principles governing the
assessment of reasons. A critical thinker is a person who can act,
assess claims, and make judgments on the basis of reasons, and who
understands and conforms to principles governing the evaluation of
the force of those reasons. The account offered highlights the close
conceptual connections between critical thinking and reasons, and

between reasons and principles. Finally, although I have not argued
the point in any detail, epistemology is also a crucially important
component of a proper conception of critical thinking, for the critical
thinker must have a good grasp of the nature of reasons, warrant and
justification generally, as these notions function across fields, in order
both to carry out and to understand the activity of reason assess-
merit. 2°
Suppose that a student masters the reason assessment component of
critical thinking, and is able to assess reasons, and to understand the
nature of reasons and their assessment, in the ways articulated above.
Has such a student earned the title 'critical thinker'? So far, she has
not, though she is undeniably well along the way to doing so. Being
able to assess reasons is not sufficient for being a critical thinker,
though it ,is necessary. Equally necessary is that our student have an
appropriate attitude toward the activity of critical thinking. This
brings us to the second component of critical thinking to be con-
sidered: the 'critical attitude', or 'critical spirit' component.
C. The Critical Spirit

In order to be a critical thinker, a person must have, in addition to
what has been said thus far, certain attitudes, dispositions, habits of
mind, and character traits, which together may be labelled the 'critical
attitude' or 'critical spirit'. Most generally, a critical thinker must not
only be able to assess reasons properly, in accordance with the reason
assessment component, she must be disposed to do so as well. That is,
a critical thinker must have a well-developed disposition to engage in
reason assessment. A critical thinker must have a willingness to
conform judgment and action to principle, not simply an ability to so
conform. One who has the critical attitude has a certain character 21 as
well as certain skills: a character which is inclined to seek, and to base
judgment and action upon, reasons; which rejects partiality and arbi-
trariness; which is committed to the objective evaluation of relevant
evidence; and which values such aspects of critical thinking as in-
tellectual honesty, justice to evidence, sympathetic and impartial
consideration of interests, objectivity, and impartiality. A critical
attitude demands not simply an ability to seek reasons, but a com-
mitment to do so; not simply an ability to judge impartially, but a
26 HARVEY SIEGEL
willingness and desire to do so, even when impartial judgment runs

counter to self-interest. A possessor of the critical attitude is inclined
to seek reasons and evidence; to demand justification; to query and
investigate unsubstantiated claims. Moreover, a person who possesses
the critical attitude has habits of mind consonant with the just-
mentioned considerations. Such a person habitually seeks evidence
and reasons, and is predisposed to so seek, and to base belief and
action on, the results of such seeking. She applies the skills and
abilities of reason assessment in all appropriate contexts, including
those contexts in which her own beliefs and actions are challenged.
For the possessor of the critical attitude, nothing is immune from
criticism, not even one's most deeply held convictions. Most fun-
damentally, the critical attitude involves a deep commitment to and
respect for reasons - indeed, as Binkley puts it, a love of reason:
• . . the attitudes we seek to foster in the critical reasoning course might be summed up
under the label 'love of reason'. We not only want our students to be able to reason
well; we want them actually to do it, and so we want them to be eager to do it and to
enjoy it - to think it important. We want it to assume an important place in their lives. 22
That is, we want our students to value good reasoning, and to be

disposed to believe and act on its basis. This is the heart of the critical
attitude.
The critical thinker must care about reason and its use and point.
She "must care about finding out how things are, about getting things
right, about tracking down what is the case" (Peters 1973, p. 75), and
must have "the feeling of humility which is necessary to the whole-
hearted acceptance of the possibility that one may be in error" (Peters
1973, p. 79). Consequently, the image of the critical thinker/rational
person as a 'bloodless reasoning machine' will not do. 23 The critical
thinker has a rich make-up of dispositions, habits of mind, values,
character traits, and emotions constitutive of the critical attitude. This
attitude is a fundamental feature of the critical thinker, and a crucially
important component of the reasons conception of critical thinking.
As Peters puts it, "the use of reason is a passionate business" (Peters
1973, p. 101). The reasons conception reflects this fact, and rejects
the commonly drawn distinction between cognition and affect. Besides
the emotional and attitudinal dimensions of critical thinking already
considered, a person who is to be a critical thinker must be, to the
greatest extent possible, emotionally secure, self-confident, and
capable of distinguishing between having faulty beliefs and having a

faulty character. A positive self-image, and traditionally-conceived
psychological health, are important features of the psychology of the
critical thinker, for their absence may well present practical obstacles
to the execution of critical thinking. 24
All of this suggests that education aimed at the development of
critical thinking is a complex business, which must seek to foster a
host of attitudes, emotions, dispositions, habits, and character traits as
well as a wide variety of reasoning skills. Since these traits to be
fostered are traits of persons, not acts of thinking, the present dis-
cussion forces us to consider the distinction between an account of
critical thinking and an account of the critical thinker.
On the reasons conception, critical thinking involves actions which
are not just acts of thinking. 25 For the critical thinker is appropriately
moved by reasons; she acts in accordance with the force of relevant
reasons. Thus the critical thinker is, importantly, a rational actor. 26 As
important to critical thinking as rational action is, however, it is
crucial to see that critical thinking far outstrips rational action. For a
critical thinker is not simply a person who acts rationally (and who has
well-developed skills of reason assessment). A critical thinker not only
acts in certain ways. A critical thinker is, in addition, a certain sort of
person. 27 Dispositions, inclinations, habits of mind, character traits -
these features of the critical thinker are present, and definitive of the
critical thinker, even when they are not being utilized or acted upon.
Just as sugar has the disposition to dissolve in water while still in the
sugar bowl, so does the critical thinker have the dispositions, habits of
mind, and character traits we have considered while not engaged in
reason assessment or (other) rational action. The conception of critical
thinking being offered here is thus as much a conception of a certain
sort of person as it is a conception of a certain set of activities and
skills. When we take it upon ourselves to educate students so as to
foster critical thinking, we are committing ourselves to nothing less
than the development of a certain sort of person. The reasons con-
ception is a conception not only of critical thinking but of the critical
thinker as well. 28
D. Critical Thinking as an Educational Ideal
We should conceive of critical thinking as an educational ideal.

Critical thinking, at least in the way it has been conceptualized here,
28 HARVEY SIEGEL
speaks to virtually all of our educational endeavors. It provides both

important goals for our educational efforts and direction for the
achievement of those goals. It is highly relevant to the determination
of what we should teach, how we should teach, how we should
organize educational activities, what the points of many of those
activities are, how we should treat students and others in the educa-
tional setting, and so on. Perhaps most importantly, it provides a
conception of the sort of person we are trying, through our educa-
tional efforts, to create, and the sort of character to be fostered in such
a person. Critical thinking provides an underlying rationale for
educational activities, a criterion for evaluating those activities, and a
guiding principle for the organization and conduct of those activities.
Surely such a broad-gauged notion is properly thought of as an ideal.
In fact, I should like to suggest, critical thinking is best thought of
as a regulative ideal. It defines regulative standards of excellence
which can be used to adjudicate between rival educational methods,
policies, and practices. Here and elsewhere 29 I have spelled out some
of the features of critical thinking: certain skills, attitudes, habits,
dispositions and character traits of the learner; certain sorts of prac-
tices, qualities and attitudes of the teacher; certain sorts of content of
the curriculum; and certain sorts of properties concerning both the
content and the organization of educational activities. To say that
critical thinking is a regulative educational ideal is to say that the
notion of critical thinking, or its constituent components, can and
should be used as a basis by which to judge the desirability and
justifiability of various features of or proposals for the educational
enterprise. For example, according to the regulative ideal of critical
thinking, whichever of two rival reaching methods conforms more
closely to the manner of teaching described in (Siegel 1988) as the
critical manner is prima facie more desirable and ought to be utilized.
Similarly, of two educational practices, whichever tends to develop in
students those skills, habits, dispositions, and character traits central to
critical thinking is prima facie more desirable and ought to be chosen.
In general, our guiding question in assessing educational activities
should be: Does this manifest and foster critical thinking? To the
extent that we take this as our guiding evaluative question, we take
critical thinking to be a fundamental educational ideal. In this way,
critical thinking regulates our judgments and provides standards of
excellence on which to base evaluations of educational practices, and
so is usefully called a regulative ideal. It aids us in evaluating, and

choosing between, alternative curricula, teaching methods, theories,
policies, and practices .3°
3. R A T I O N A L I T Y , CRITICAL THINKING, AND

SCIENCE EDUCATION
Earlier I argued for a solution to the problem of science's rationality

that preserved both that rationality and its relationship to scientific
method. My strategy was to regard scientific method not as a parti-
cular set of procedures or techniques, but rather as a general com-
mitment to evidence. In treating scientific method as a commitment to
evidence, we emphasize ~the critical nature of science, and that both
scientific activity and research, and the fruits of such research, are
governed by appeals to and demands for evidence. Science is rational
insofar as its procedures and its theories, hypothese s and claims are
evaluated by appeal to relevam evidence, and insofar as evidence is
recognized and honored as the driving force behind scientific practice
and belief.
The task before us now is to connect this conception of the
rationality of science to science education. Given the discussion of the
previous section concerning the aims of education, our task is easily
accomplished. The rationality of science is secured by its commitment
to evidence; the fostering of a commitment to evidence is a fun-
damental educational aim. Science's rationality thus makes it parti-
cularly well suited to the general task of education, and science
education can and should be seen as a central component of an
education dedicated to the fostering of rationality and critical think-
ing. The commitment to evidence is basic both to science and to
education; a science education which fosters in students an ap-
preciation of and commitment to evidence thus helps to satisfy our
basic educational ideals as it successfully initiates them into science.
Philosophical understanding of science's rationality thus contributes to
our conception of science education, once we see the basic connection
between the rationality of science and the centrality of rationality as
an educational ideal.
What should a science education informed by the present accounts
of science's rationality and the aims and ideals of education be like?
Obviously it should seek to impart to students a basic understanding of
30 HARVEY SIEGEL
science's commitment to evidence, and it should foster in students that

same commitment. How might this be done?
The main idea is to conduct science education in such a way as to
emphasize reasons and evidence in science. How might the role of
reasons in science be emphasized?
One way is to focus on the philosophyof science in teaching science.
Philosophy of science takes as its subject matter a variety of issues and
questions relevant to the nature, role, and assessment of reasons in
science. The nature of evidence, the relation between evidence and
theory, the evaluation of the strength of evidence, the role of evidence
and reason in testing and in theory choice - these are all matters which
bear directly on the nature of reasons in science, and which philosophy
of science takes as central to its concerns. A science student studying
philosophy of science would, in so studying, be more attuned to issues
involving scientific reasoning, and to the nature and proper under-
standing of such reasoning. In studying some episode of theory choice,
for example, she might glean an understanding of the way in which a
certain piece of evidence supports theory T rather than its rival T'; or
why that piece of evidence, or some theoretical derivation, supports T
decisively rather than only weakly. In studying efforts to construct
(and the motivations for constructing) an inductive logic, and efforts
to articulate, refine, and criticize the variety of confirmationist and
falsificationist 'logics of science', 31 the student stands to gain enor-
mous insight into the character of reasons in science. Studying
philosophy of science, therefore, may contribute powerfully to the
understanding of reasons in science, and so to the fostering of critical
thinking in science. For philosophy of science is profitably and
properly seen, in part, as the meta-scientific study of reasons in
science. 32
Another way to utilize philosophy of science so as to impart to the
science student a solid understanding of the nature and role of reasons
in science is to contrast genuine science with pseudoscience. Studying
the differences between science and pseudoscience may serve not only
to deepen, in a general way, student understanding of important
features of science - e.g., the importance of formulating testable
theories, and of considering all relevant evidence - it may also help
students to understand, by contrast with pseudoscientific examples, the
constitution and utilization of reasons in science. The contrast be-
tween pseudoscience and science may in this way foster critical
thinking in science students by highlighting the nature and role of

reasons in science. 33
A science education focused on reasons and evidence in science
ought also to embrace what might be called a pluralistic episte-
mology. 34 By this I mean that science education should steer.a course
between relativism and a pernicious 'absolutism'. Relativism defeats
our intention to foster a commitment to evidence because it renders us
incapable of making reasoned judgments about the merits of alter-
native theories and methodologies, and portrays scientific reasoning,
commitment, and judgment as arbitrary. 'Absolutism', on the other
hand, can be construed as committing us to a dogmatic education
which misrepresents the nature of scientific inquiry and its fruits, sug-
gesting indubitable, infallible scientific Truths; discourages us from
'engaging the student in the activity of scientific thinking; and leads us
to teach what Schwab aptly calls a 'rhetoric of conclusions' (Schwab
1962). We can safely avoid the first alternative, for there are com-
pelling reasons for rejecting relativistic epistemology (Siegel 1987).
Can we similarly avoid dogmatic science education? Does an embrace
of a non-relativistic, 'absolutist' epistemology commit us to dogmatism
in science education, since the absolutist holds that science uncovers
'the facts', that there is only one set of such facts, and that the
well-educated science student is aware of those facts? 35
Fortunately, the absolutist is not committed to any such conception
of science education. The absolutist is committed to the view that
knowledge is not relative. But she is not necessarily saddled with the
further views that we have all the knowledge there is to have, that
such knowledge is certain, that there is only one correct method of
obtaining it, that there is therefore no room for ingenuity or creativity
in scientific investigation, or that there is therefore no point to any
scientific education save the 'rhetoric of conclusions' sort. In parti-
cular, the absolutist is not committed to the dogmatic approach to
science education according to which the student is exposed only to
the 'right' - that is, the currently accepted - theoretical perspective.
The absolutist escapes these pernicious views of science education
by distinguishing between relativism and pluralism. While rejecting
the relativist view that 'anything goes', that any particular scientific
thesis or methodology is as good as any other, the absolutist can
recognize the virtues - both philosophical and pedagogical - of
exposure to a variety of methods of investigation and theoretical
32 HARVEY SIEGEL
formulation. Pluralism - a willingness to tolerate and utilize a diversity

of ideas and approaches - differs radically from the relativistic view
that there is no evaluating the worth of rival ideas and approaches, 36
and the absolutist can perfectly well embrace pluralism while rejecting
relativism.
And in fact there are good reasons for embracing a pluralist science
education. Philosophically, it recognizes that scientific knowledge is
never final or certain, but is always subject to amendment and revision
on the basis of additional evidence or novel theoretical considerations.
That is, pluralism recognizes the fallibility of scientific knowledge.
Moreover, pluralism recognizes the virtue and potential fruitfulness of
allowing rival ideas to establish their merits in the free exchange of
ideas. This is a point which has pedagogical as well as philosophical
appeal. Philosophically, it recognizes the fallibility of scientific know-
ledge and the goal of improving our ideas as well as the virtues of
freedom of thought and expression. Pedagogically, the conflict of
ideas can serve to stimulate students, and to spur them on to deeper
understanding of the matter at hand. In Schwab's terms, it can help
students to become 'fluid enquirers', 37 which involves the develop-
ment and appreciation of alternative concepts and frameworks. The
non-pluralistic 'dogmatic classroom', on the other hand, which fails to
develop alternative approaches or conceptions and so avoids plural-
ism, fails to convey to the student an adequate sense of the tentative-
ness and struggle, the lurching, weaving, and false starts of actual
scientific inquiry, and the tentativeness, dubitability, and fallibility of
current scientific knowledge, as
A related pedagogical point is made by Michael Martin, who
advocates that science students be taught to work with a variety of
theories. Borrowing Feyerabend's phrase 'proliferation of theories',
Martin writes:
. . . students of science should be taught a number of different theoretical approaches in
a domain of research. If necessary, discarded theories from the history of science should
be restructured and reexamined. Students should not only be exposed to different
theoretical approaches, but should also learn to work easily with different theories, now
seeing the domain from the point of view of one theory, now seeing it from the point of
view of another, switching back and forth to get various theoretical perspectives and
insights. (Martin 1972, p. 125)
Noting that the student is to regard these alternative approaches as

working hypotheses, Martin concludes:
The pedagogical principle of the proliferation of theories could be stated in this way:
Students should learn to work with many theories a s working hypotheses in a given
domain of inquiry, even if commitment in the strong sense [i.e., as true or probably true]
to an incompatible theory is justified in the domain.
The rationale for the proliferation of theories approach is this: The more theories one
is used to working within a given domain, the less likely it is that one will be blinded by
one's commitments.., to any one of t h e m . . . (Martin 1972, p. 126)
Here Martin is admirably articulating and defending the pluralism

discussed above. His defense, in terms of the lowering of the likeli-
hood that one will be blinded or biased by one's theoretical commit-
ments, is clearly compatible with Schwab's defense of pluralism in
terms of fluid enquiry. Moreover, Martin's argument tends to undercut
the 'absolutist' view that science students, if they are to be successful,
must be dogmatically indoctrinated into some particular theoretical
perspective, and prevented from entertaining rival perspectives.
We have seen thus far several reasons for taking pluralism to be a
valuable approach to science education. It avoids the pitfalls of both
relativistic and dogmatic science education. It is true to the in-
novativeness of actual scientific inquiry and the tentativeness of the
fruits of such inquiry. As Martin suggests, it conforms to our desire to
keep the student (and the scientist) from being blinded by her
theoretical commitments, thus keeping her open to important new
avenues of data and conceptualization. It is on sound epistemological
footing in its embrace of a non-relativist, fallibilist conception of
scientific knowledge. By utilizing alternative theoretical perspectives,
it can help science students to develop an appreciation of evidence
and a commitment to the evaluation of such perspectives on the basis
of reasons. There is yet another powerful reason for embracing a
pluralistic science education: pluralism m~y reasonably be thought to
foster critical thinking in 3cience students. And since we have already
noted several considerations which suggest the importange of the
educational ideal of critical thinking, a science education compatible
with the fostering of that ideal derives additional support from it.
Pluralistic science education favors the fostering of critical thinking,
since it requires students to critically judge the merits of alternative
claims, conceptions, and perspectives; the achievement of the ideal of
critical thinking is independently established as a central education
aim; consequently, pluralistic science education gains support from
the independent justification which the ideal enjoys.
34 HARVEY SIEGEL
A critical science education, then, takes as its primary focus the

study of reasons and evidence in science. Instead of regarding the
science curriculum as a 'rhetoric of conclusions', it is regarded as a
means of helping students to come to understand the nature and role
of reasons in the scientific enterprise. The content of contemporary
scientific theory plays a significant role in such a curriculum, of
course. More significant, however, is a focus on the reasons for
regarding current theory as worthy of our attention and embrace. By
contrasting science with pseudoscience, by studying philosophy of
science, and by examining alternative theoretical perspectives and the
reasons for regarding some as superior/inferior to others - and so, by
being exposed to the general problem of the reasoned evaluation of
alternatives - the student's study of science is never far from con-
sideration of the nature and role of reasons in science.
I have been arguing that science education ought to emphasize the
role of reasons and evidence in science, and ought to take as its goal
the fostering of rationality in science. In fact, this goal is part and
parcel of the general educational aim of fostering rationality. There is
a tight connection between the goals of science education and the
broad aims and ideals of education generally. In helping a student, by
way of exposure to philosophy of science, pseudoscience, and plural-
istic science education, to become a critical thinker with respect to
science, one is helping the student to develop a respect for reasons; an
inclination to seek reasons and take them seriously as guides to belief
and action; an appreciation of objectivity, impartiality, and honesty in
the consideration of evidence and argument; and a general commit-
ment to the ideal of rationality as a guide to life. In these respects, as
Martin has urged, the propensities and skills we seek to impart to
science students are the same that we seek to impart to students more
generally (Martin 1972, pp. 157-60). That is to say, science education
seeks to foster in students characteristics which will render the student
educated - not just in science, but in general. The critical spirit
characteristic of science is the critical spirit we seek to impart to
students as we help them to become critical thinkers. As Martin puts
it, "The aim of science education ought to be to produce people
imbued with the spirit of science who manifest that spirit in all
relevant contexts" (Martin 1972, p. 158). This view of science educa-
tion is very much in line with the thesis advanced here, namely that
the fostering of critical thinking, or rationality, in students should be
regarded as a fundamental aim of education; moreover, because of the

centrality to science education of features which are also central to the
ideal of critical thinking - features such as objectivity, impartiality,
honesty, and commitment to and respect for evidence - science
education has a major curricular role to play in our overall educa-
tional effort, a9 The sort of pluralistic approach to science education
described above can help to prevent students from being blinded by
their theoretical commitments, and can more generally encourage
open-mindedness, attention to evidence, and respect for evidence in
the assessment of practical and theoretical alternatives. In these
respects a pluralistic science education may help to foster the
development of rationality and critical thinking, both with respect to
science and more generally, g°
CONCLUSION: THE RATIONALITY OF SCIENCE AND

SCIENCE EDUCATION
I have argued that philosophy of science is relevant to science

education in several ways, all of which stem from philosophy of
science's focus on the role of reasons in science. This contention
would be significantly less plausible if there were no compelling
account of science's rationality. Consequently, the account of the
rationality of science offered earlier, if successful, underwrites the
relevance of the philosophical study of reasons in science to science
education. The rationality of science is one philosophical problem
concerning science which has ramifications for science education; if
my solution to that problem is accepted, then other dimensions of
philosophy of science are also relevant to science education. So I hope
to have established both specific and more general ways in which
philosophy of science can inform science education.
This conclusion is strengthened by the contention that a fundamen-
tal educational aim is the fostering of rationality. For that educational
point happily coincides with my solution to the problem of the
rationality of science. Basic to the solutions to both philosophical
problems I have discussed is the commitment to evidence. This
commitment is both philosophically and educationally alive. The
recognition of this last point secures the connection between philoso-
phy of science and science education that this paper, and all the
36 HARVEY SIEGEL
p a p e r s in this c o l l e c t i o n , h a v e e n d e a v o r e d to underline. The philoso-

p h y o f s c i e n c e is educationally i m p o r t a n t .
NOTES
* This paper is mainly drawn from other publications. The first section is taken from my
(1985); the second from (1988), Chapter 2; and the third from (1988), Chapter 6. Since
what appears here are truncated versions of those discussions, I urge interested readers
to look to those other works for fuller treatments of the issues here discussed.
i See Siegel (1983) for criticism of this view.
2 See Siegel (1980a) for criticism.
3 See Siegel (1985, pp. 518-22) for criticism of this means-end conception of the
rationality of science.
4 It is not clear from the context if Scheflter is here asserting this thesis himself, or
rather reporting the Pragmatists' commitment to it.
5 See Siegel (1985, pp. 526-28) for further discussion of SM.
6 This paragraph owes much to discussion with Norman GiUespie. Two additional
points need to be made here. First, I am not suggesting that what counts as evidence in
science is in some essential way different from evidence in other areas of inquiry. I
remain, for the purposes of this paper, agnostic on this question. For this is the question
which Q2 asks. As will presently become clear, the characterization of SM offered here
is to be regarded as an answer to Q1, not Q2. Off the record, I would speculate that the
various areas of inquiry are marked off from each other not by means of alternative sorts
of evidence but by complex evolutionary histories of problems, language, etc. See, in
this regard, Toulmin (1972). Second, one may wonder (as one of the referees does) why
SM should be taken as a commitment to evidence, rather than (say) a commitment to
truth. Full consideration of the point would require far more space than is available
here. But, briefly, it seems clear that science cannot achieve truth except, if at all, by
way of evidence, so that, methodologically speaking, evidence is prior to truth;
moreover, recognizing the familiar fallibilist point regarding the possibility of future
evidence and the fact that scientific views change with the uncovering of evidence
requires that current available evidence, rather than truth, be the locus of scientific
belief and inquiry. But there is obviously much more to say on the matter than I have
said here.
7 Even Kuhn seems to agree here. See his (1970), p. 159.
s See Siegel (1985, pp. 526--28).
9 See Siegel (1985, pp. 518-22).
1o Ibid., (pp. 522; 534, Note 21).
la Ibid., pp. 523, 534.
12 See also Popper's remarks on the 'attitude of reasonableness', in (1962, p. 225).
~3 In Siegel (1988), from which the present discussion is taken.
14 Throughout I should be taken to mean that the critical thinker accepts the convicting
force of good reasons, i.e., of reasons which actually have convicting force and which
warrant conviction. I have not added 'good' before each occurrence of 'reason', because
I take it to be implied by 'appropriate' in 'appropriately moved by reasons'. To be
appropriately moved is to be moved to just the extent that the reasons in question
warrant. I am grateful to several correspondents, especially Emily Robertson, for

suggesting this clarification.
15 Peters (1966, p. 248), bracketed phrase added. See also Peters (1973).
t6 Schemer (1973a, p. 76), emphasis in original. I would add to this conception of the
rational person only that the principles freely chosen themselves admit of rational
justification. See Ibid., p. 79.
17 As Peters says, " R e a s o n . . . i s the antithesis of arbitrariness" (1973, p. 77); as
Schefller puts it, "Reason stands always in contrast with inconsistency and with
expediency" (1973a, p. 76).
18 Any view which rejects such standards is thus incompatible with critical thinking. For
further discussion, see Siegel (1988, Chap. 4). Articulating and justifying the standards
are tasks for the theory of rationality (see Ibid., Postscript). The point now being argued
in the text is simply that critical thinking and rationality require, and so presuppose,
such standards; this requirement in turn helps to delineate what is to count as critical
and/or rational thinking.
19 Space forbids detailed consideration of this point. See Siegel (1988, Chap. 2), and
Siegel (1989a) for further discussion.
20 It should be clear that I am not here attempting to formulate specific principles of
reason assessment. Many philosophers, informal logicians, and critical thinking theorists
have done a far better job of articulating such principles than I could hope to do. My
aim has rather been to say something about the place of such principles in a general
conception of critical thinking.
21 On the relation between rationality and. character, cf. Scheiiler (1973, pp. 28, 64, and
passim); also Schemer (1982, p. 142 and passim).
22 Binkley (1980, p. 83). Further insightful discussion of critical spirit may be found in
Passmore (1967) and in Paul (1984). Scheifler notes (1960, Chap. 5) a systematic failure
to distinguish, in curricular contexts, between what he calls 'norm-acquisition' and
'skill-acquisition', which results in a failure to recognize that we often want our students
to develop, not just skills and abilities, but dispositions and habits of mind and action:
•.. we talk of 'citizenship' as if it were a set of skills, whereas our educational aim is,
in fact, not merely to teach people how to be good citizens but, in particular, to be
good citizens, not merely how to go about voting, but to vote. We talk about giving
them 'the skills required for democratic living', when actually we are concerned that
they acquire democratic habits, norms, propensities. To take another example, we talk
of giving pupils the 'ability to think critically' when what we really want is for them to
acquire the habits and norms of critical thought. (pp. 98-99, last emphasis added)
Here, in a nutshell, is why it is necessary to incorporate a critical spirit component
(along with a reason assessment component) into a full conception of critical thinking.
We want students to be, and be disposed to be - not iust be able to be - critical thinkers.
23 Although it goes without saying that critical thinking requires the monitoring of
certain emotions, and the prevention of particular emotions from over-riding the proper
exercise of reasoned judment. One must care enough about truth, for example, to have
one's concern for truth outweight and nullify any feeling (e.g., of envy or hatred) which
might tend to distort one's judgment concerning and truth/falsity of some claim.
24 A related point is made by Scheffler (1965, p. 90). See also Green's related remarks
about 'psychic freedom', in his (1972, pp. 38-39). This psychological make-up is
38 HARVEY SIEGEL
something to be striven for, and developed to varying degrees, over time, not something
to be accomplished once and for all. I am grateful here to discussion with Robert Floden
and Dennis Rohatyn.
25 Assuming here that acts of thinking are acts, the present point is simply that acts of
thinking are not the only sort of acts there are.
26 In the philosophy of action a distinction is frequently drawn between what are called
the 'internalist' and 'externalist' perspectives. The rationality of an action can be
appraised externally, by inquiring as to whether there are (were) good reasons for
performing the action; or internally, by inquiring as to whether the agent has (had) good
reasons for performing the action, and acts (acted) for those reasons. Full consideration
of this matter would take us far afield. It is clear, however, that critical thinking is to be
understood in an internalist way, insofar as the critical thinker acts in accordance with
reasons she has. An excellent and thorough discussion of the internalist/externalist
literature and its relevance to education may be found in Emily Robertson's (1984). I
am grateful to Robertson for correspondence and conversation on these and related
matters.
27 See Passmore (1967, pp. 1951t).
28 Of course achieving the ideal - being a critical thinker - is a matter of degree.
Taking critical thinking as an ideal means fostering the features of critical thinking to
the greatest extent possible. But there is no magic point or threshold at which the
non-critical thinker turns into a critical thinker. Presumably most people have the
capacity to be at least minimally critical, and presumably no one is perfectly critical.
Critical thinking must be taken as an ideal which we strive for, and approximate to
varying degrees. I am thankful for discussion with Robert Floden, Emily Robertson, and
Dennis Rohatyn on this point.
29 Siegel (1988, Chap. 2).
30 I hasten to note that in this Section I have not defended the view that critical
thinking is a fundamental educational ideal. I have only tried to articulate the 'reasons'
conception of critical thinking. For further articulation, especially regarding the dis-
tinction between the probative force and the normative impact of reasons, see my
(1989b). For the defense of the view that critical thinking is a fundamental educational
ideal, see Siegel (1988, Chap. 3).
31 See Martin (1972, Chap. 1).
32 See Schemer (1973, p. 75 and Chap. 3, esp. pp. 35-36), for related discussion; also
Schemer (1973b). See also Martin (1972), whose discussion both exemplifies and argues
for the virtues of a science education informed by philosophy of science.
33 See Martin's discussion of pseudoscience in the science curriculum in his (1972, pp.
40--42). My own favorite example of pseudoscience, for purposes of contrast with
genuine science, is that of 'scientific' creationism. See my (1981) and (1984a). An
excellent discussion may also be found in Moshman (1985). A provocative alternative
view, which denies the science/pseudoscience distinction but nevertheless upholds
standards of good science, is advanced in Kitcher (1985).
34 Siegel (1988, Chap. 6). The rest of the present section is taken from this source. In
this chapter I discuss alternative approaches to science education in considerable detail;
the interested reader may wish to consult the chapter for a more complete and
systematic presentation.
THE RATIONALITY OF S C I E N C E 39
35 See Nelson Goodman's similar suggestions concerning the epistemological 'fun-

damentalist', and my reply, in my (1984).
36 See Michael Scriven's discusssion of this distinction with respect to moral education
in his (1975).
37 Schwab (1962). For detailed discussion of Schwab's views on science education and
their relationship to Kuhnian science education, see Siegel (1988, Chap. 6).
38 See Ennis (1979, p. 152).
39 Here I echo D. C. Phillips (1985), who argues that science education should be
viewed as central to a liberal education. It goes without saying that other curricular
areas, e.g., literature and language arts, mathematics, and history, can also contribute to
the development of critical thinking. But, as I argue in (1985), science is uniquely
qualified for this task in that its method is focussed squarely on the production and
recognition of evidence (both empirical and theoretical) and good reasons on which to
base belief and action. This view of the place of science in education is of course
Dewey's as well. Cf., e.g., Dewey (1916, pp. 189, 228).
40 An excellent discussion of some controversies regarding the way in which science
manifests rationality, with specific attention to science education, may be found in
Holton (1975), and in Nagel's (1975) reply to Holton.
REFERENCES
Binkley, R. W.: 1980, 'Can the Ability to Reason Well Be Thought?', in J. A. Blair and
R. Johnson (eds.), Informal Logic: The First International Symposium, Edgepress,
Inverness, California, pp. 79-92.
Dewey, J.: 1916, Democracy and Education, The Free Press, Macmillan, New York.
Ennis, R. H.: 1979, 'Research in Philosophy of Science Bearing on Science Education',
in P. D. Asquith and H. E. Kyburg, Jr. (eds.), Current Research in Philosophy of
Science, Philosophy of Science Association, East Lansing, Michigan, pp. 138-70.
Green, T. F.: 1972, 'Indoctrination and Beliefs', in I. A. Snook (ed.), Concepts of
Indoctrination, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, pp. 25-46.
Hempel, C.: 1979, 'Scientific Rationality: Analytic vs. Pragmatic Perspectives', in T. G.
Geraets (ed.), pp. 45-66.
Holton, G.: 1975, 'Science, Science Teaching, and Rationality', in S. Hook, P. Kurtz
and M. Todorovich (eds.), The Philosophy of the Curriculum, Prometheus Books, New
York, pp. 101-18.
Kitcher, P.: 1985, 'Good Science, Bad Science, Dreadful Science, and Pseudoscience',
Journal of College Science Teaching 14, 168-73.
Kuhn, T. S.: 1970, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed., enlarged, University
of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Martin, M.: 1972, Concepts of Science Education, Scott Foresman, Glenview, Illinois.
Moshman, D.: 1985, 'A Role for Creationism in Science Education', Journal of College
Science Teaching 15, 106-09.
Nagel, E.: 1975, 'In Defense of Scientific Knowledge', in S. Hook, P. Kurtz and M.
Todorovich (eds.), The Philosophy of the Curriculum, Prometheus Books, New York,
pp. 119-26.
Newton-Smith, W. H.: 1981, The Rationality of Science, Routledge and Kegan Paul,
London.
40 HARVEY SIEGEL
Passmore, J.: 1967, 'On Teaching To Be Critical', in R. S. Peters (ed.), The Concept o[
Education, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, pp. 192-211.
Paul, R.: 1984, 'Critical Thinking: Fundamental to Education for a Free Society',
Educational Leadership, pp. 4-14.
Peters, R. S.: 1966, 'Reason and Habit: The Paradox of Moral Education', in I. Scheffler
(ed.), Philosophy and Education, 2nd ed., Allyn and Bacon, Boston, pp. 245--62.
Peters, R. S.: 1973, Reason and Compassion, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
Phillips, D. C.: 1985, 'Can Scientific Method Be Taught?', Journal of College Science
Teaching 15, 95-101.
Popper, K. R.: 1962, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. 2, Princeton University
Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
Popper, K. R.: 1970, 'Normal Science and Its Dangers', in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave
(eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, pp. 51-58.
Putnam, H.: 1981, Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Robertson, E. E.: 1984, 'Practical Reasons, Authority, and Education', in R. Roemer
(ed.), Philosophy of Education 1983: Proceedings of the Thirty-Ninth Annual Meeting
of the Philosophy of Education Society, Philosophy of Education Society, Normal,
Illinois, pp. 61-75.
Russell, B.: 1945, A History of Western Philosophy, Simon and Schuster, New York.
Scheflter, I.: 1960, The Language of Education, Charles C. Thomas, Springfield, Illinois.
Scheflter, I.: 1965, Conditions of Knowledge, Scott Foresman, Chicago, Illinois.
Scheitter, I.: 1973, Reason and Teaching, Bobbs-Merrill, New York, first published in
1973 by Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.
Scheffler, I.: 1973a, 'Philosophical Models of Teaching', in I. Schettter, Reason and
Teaching, pp. 67-81.
Scheffler, I.: 1973b, 'Philosophies of and the Curriculum', in J. F. Doyle (ed.), Educa-
tional Judgments, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.
Scheffler, I.: 1974, Four Pragmatists, Humanities Press, New York.
Scheifter, I.: 1982, 'In Praise of the Cognitive Emotions', reprinted as Appendix B
in I. Scheffter, Science and Subjectivity, 2nd ed., enlarged, Hackett, Indianopolis,
Indiana, pp. 139-57; originally published in Teachers College Record 79, 171-86.
Schwab, J. J.: 1962, The Teaching of Science as Enquiry, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Scriven, M.: 1975, 'Cognitive Moral Education', Phi Delta Kappan 57, 689-94.
Siegel, H.: 1980, 'Discovery, Justification and the Naturalizing of Epistemology',
Philosophy of Science 47, 297-321.
Siegel, H.: 1980a, 'Objectivity, Rationality, Incommensurability, and More', British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 31, 359-75.
Siegel, H.: 1981, 'Creationism, Evolution, and Education: The California Fiasco', Phi
Delta Kappan 63, 95-101.
Siegel, H.: 1983, 'Truth, Problem Solving and the Rationality of Science', Studies in
History and Philosophy of Science 14, 89-112.
Siegel, H.: 1984, "Goodmanian Relativism', The Monist 67, 359-375.
Siegel, H.: 1984a, 'The Response to Creationism', Educational Studies 15, 349--64.
Siegel, H.: 1985, 'What Is the Question Concerning the Rationality of Science?',
Philosophy of Science 52, 517-37.
T H E R A T I O N A L I T Y OF S C I E N C E 41
Siegel, H.: 1987, Relativism Refuted: A Critique of Contemporary Epistemological

Relativism, Synthese Library, Vol. 189, D. Reidel, Dordrecht.
Siegel, H.: 1988, Educating Reason: Rationality, Critical Thinking, and Education,
Philosophy of Education Research Library, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.
Siegel, H.: 1989a, 'Epistemology, Critical Thinking, and Critical Thinking Pedagogy',
Argumentation 3, 127-140.
Siegel, H.: 1989b, 'Reasoning, Teaching, and Dostoyevsky's The Brothers Karamazov',
in P. W. Jackson and S. Haroutunian-Gordon (eds.), From Socrates to Software: The
Teacher as Text and the Text as Teacher, Eighty-Eighth Yearbook of the National
Society for the Study of Education, Chicago, pp. 115-134.
Department of Philosophy
University of Miami
Coral Gables, FL 33124
U.S.A.

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HARVEY SIEGEL

THE RATIONALITY OF SCIENCE, CRITICAL

It is not what the man of science believes that dis-

Science has traditionally b e e n seen as the apex of rationality. For the

Synthese 80: 9-41, 1989.

science education and the science curriculum. In this section I shall

1. S C I E N C E AND ITS RATIONALITY

A. The Rationality of Science: What is the Question?

philosophers either deny that science is rational or seek to locate its

drift, or a Daltonian and a pre-Daltonian disputing the importance of

There is much to say concerning scientific method (henceforth SM)

to doubt that it has a 'method' (read 'procedure') which guarantees

its claims evidentially. Not all claims are even purportedly so

commitment to criteria of evaluation which establish evidential sup-

C. Scientific Method and the Rationality of Science

If the preceding discussion is correct, then we do have a viable notion

But, as emphasized earlier, Q1 7~ Q2, and SM as analyzed here does

sustained, and his realization explained. The problem is his failure to

philosophy of science. If so, the question makes plain that philosophy

R a t i o n a l i t y . . . is a matter of reasons, and to take it as a fundamental educational ideal is

In the previous section I argued for a particular solution to the

scientific reasons. They do not challenge science's general commit-

A. Critical Thinking, Rationality, and Reasons

cal thinker seeks reasons on which to base her assessments, judg-

To illustrate the connection between reasons, principles, and con-

action cannot be seen as arbitrary. Here we see the connection

B. The Reason Assessment Component

areas of i n q u i r y - e.g., principles governing the proper interpretation

conceptual connections between critical thinking and reasons, and

C. The Critical Spirit

willingness and desire to do so, even when impartial judgment runs

That is, we want our students to value good reasoning, and to be

capable of distinguishing between having faulty beliefs and having a

D. Critical Thinking as an Educational Ideal

We should conceive of critical thinking as an educational ideal.

speaks to virtually all of our educational endeavors. It provides both

so is usefully called a regulative ideal. It aids us in evaluating, and

3. R A T I O N A L I T Y , CRITICAL THINKING, AND

Earlier I argued for a solution to the problem of science's rationality

science's commitment to evidence, and it should foster in students that

thinking in science students by highlighting the nature and role of

formulation. Pluralism - a willingness to tolerate and utilize a diversity

Noting that the student is to regard these alternative approaches as

Here Martin is admirably articulating and defending the pluralism

A critical science education, then, takes as its primary focus the

regarded as a fundamental aim of education; moreover, because of the

CONCLUSION: THE RATIONALITY OF SCIENCE AND

I have argued that philosophy of science is relevant to science

p a p e r s in this c o l l e c t i o n , h a v e e n d e a v o r e d to underline. The philoso-

warrant. I am grateful to several correspondents, especially Emily Robertson, for

35 See Nelson Goodman's similar suggestions concerning the epistemological 'fun-

Siegel, H.: 1987, Relativism Refuted: A Critique of Contemporary Epistemological

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