REPUBLIC V SANDIGAN BAYAN

G.R. No. 152154 July 15, 2003

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules

of Court seeking to (1) set aside the Resolution dated January 31,
2002 issued by the Special First Division of the Sandiganbayan
in Civil Case No. 0141 entitled Republic of the Philippines vs.
Ferdinand E. Marcos, et. al., and (2) reinstate its earlier decision
dated September 19, 2000 which forfeited in favor of petitioner
Republic of the Philippines (Republic) the amount held in escrow
in the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the aggregate amount
of US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002.

On December 17, 1991, petitioner Republic, through the

Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan, docketed as
Civil Case No. 0141 entitled Republic of the Philippines vs.
Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by his Estate/Heirs and
Imelda R. Marcos, pursuant to RA 13791 in relation to Executive
Order Nos. 1,2 2,3 144 and 14-A.5

In said case, petitioner sought the declaration of the

aggregate amount of US$356 million (now estimated to be more
than US$658 million inclusive of interest) deposited in escrow in
the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth.

Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement

and the Supplemental Agreements dated December 28, 1993
were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman
Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of
the Marcos family. Subsequently, respondent Marcos children
filed a motion dated December 7, 1995 for the approval of said
agreements and for the enforcement thereof. On October 18,
1996, petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment and/or
judgment on the pleadings. Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed her
opposition thereto which was later adopted by respondents Mrs.
Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr.
 In its resolution dated November 20, 1997, the
Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's motion for summary
judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings on the ground that
the motion to approve the compromise agreement "(took)
precedence over the motion for summary judgment."

Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed a manifestation on May 26,

1998 claiming she was not a party to the motion for approval of
the Compromise Agreement and that she owned 90% of the
funds with the remaining 10% belonging to the Marcos estate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondents failed to specifically deny each

and every allegation contained in the petition for forfeiture in the
manner required by the rules?

HELD:

Yes. In their answer, respondents failed to specifically

deny each and every allegation contained in the petition for
forfeiture in the manner required by the rules. All they gave were
stock answers like they have no sufficient knowledge or they
could not recall because it happened a long time ago, and, as to
Mrs. Marcos, the funds were lawfully acquired, without stating
the basis of such assertions.

Section 10, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,

provides: A defendant must specify each material allegation of
fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever
practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon
which he relies to support his denial. Where a defendant desires
to deny only a part of an averment, he shall specify so much of it
as is true and material and shall deny the remainder. Where a
defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form
a belief as to the truth of a material averment made in the
complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a
denial.
 The purpose of requiring respondents to make a specific
denial is to make them disclose facts which will disprove the
allegations of petitioner at the trial, together with the matters
they rely upon in support of such denial. Our jurisdiction adheres
to this rule to avoid and prevent unnecessary expenses and waste
of time by compelling both parties to lay their cards on the table,
thus reducing the controversy to its true terms. As explained in
Alonso vs. Villamor, A litigation is not a game of technicalities in
which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of
movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It is
rather a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly
lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside
as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and
technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done upon the
merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier
thrust.

On the part of Mrs. Marcos, she claimed that the funds

were lawfully acquired. However, she failed to particularly state
the ultimate facts surrounding the lawful manner or mode of
acquisition of the subject funds. Simply put, she merely stated in
her answer with the other respondents that the funds were
lawfully acquired without detailing how exactly these funds were
supposedly acquired legally by them. Even in this case before us,
her assertion that the funds were lawfully acquired remains bare
and unaccompanied by any factual support which can prove, by
the presentation of evidence at a hearing, that indeed the funds
were acquired legitimately by the Marcos family.

Respondents denials in their answer at the Sandiganbayan

were based on their alleged lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of the
petition.

It is true that one of the modes of specific denial under the

rules is a denial through a statement that the defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as
to the truth of the material averment in the complaint. The
question, however, is whether the kind of denial in respondents
answer qualifies as the specific denial called for by the rules. We
do not think so. In Morales vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled
that if an allegation directly and specifically charges a party with
having done, performed or committed a particular act which the
latter did not in fact do, perform or commit, a categorical and
express denial must be made.

Here, despite the serious and specific allegations against

them, the Marcoses responded by simply saying that they had no
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of such allegations. Such a general, self-serving claim of
ignorance of the facts alleged in the petition for forfeiture was
insufficient to raise an issue. Respondent Marcoses should have
positively stated how it was that they were supposedly ignorant
of the facts alleged.

Also, by qualifying their acquisition of the Swiss bank

deposits as lawful, respondents unwittingly admitted their
ownership thereof. Respondent Mrs. Marcos also admitted
ownership of the Swiss bank deposits by failing to deny under
oath the genuineness and due execution of certain actionable
documents bearing her signature attached to the petition.
Section 11, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that material averments in the complaint shall be deemed
admitted when not specifically denied.
 CANELAND VS ALON
G.R. No. 142896 September 12, 2007

FACTS:

Caneland Sugar Corporation (petitioner) filed with RTC a

complaint for injunction, and nullity of mortgage against the
Land Bank of the Philippines (respondent) praying for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent
and the Sheriff from proceeding with the auction sale of
petitioner’s property.

RTC issued an Order holding in abeyance the auction sale but

re-scheduled the sale for the reason stated in PD 385 which
provides that it shall be mandatory for government financial
institution to foreclose collaterals and/or securities for any
loan, credit accommodations and/or guarantees granted by
them whenever the arrearages on such account, including
accrued interest and other charges amount to at least 20% of
the total outstanding obligation as appearing in the books of the
financial institution. Moreover, no restraining order,
temporary or permanent injunction shall be issued by the court
against any government financial institution in any action
taken by such institution in compliance with the mandatory
foreclosure provided by said law.

Petitioner then filed with the CA which rendered a decision

affirming that of the RTC.

Hence, petition before this Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Caneland made a specific denial as to the

Promissory Notes covered by the security documents?
HELD:

No. Petitioner does not dispute its loan obligation with

respondent. Petitioner’s bone of contention before the RTC is
that the promissory notes are silent as to whether they were
covered by the Mortgage Trust Indenture and Mortgage
Participation on its property covered by TCT No. T-11292. It does
not categorically deny that these promissory notes are covered by
the security documents. These vague assertions are, in fact,
negative pregnants, i.e., denials pregnant with the admission of
the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not
squarely denied.

As defined in Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, a

negative pregnant is a "form of negative expression which carries
with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind
favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an
admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where
a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the
words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally
denied, has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are
denied while the fact itself is admitted."

Petitioner’s allegations do not make out any justifiable basis

for the granting of any injunctive relief. Even when the
mortgagors were disputing the amount being sought from them,
upon the non-payment of the loan, which was secured by the
mortgage, the mortgaged property is properly subject to a
foreclosure sale. This is in consonance with the doctrine that to
authorize a temporary injunction, the plaintiff must show, at
least prima facie, a right to the final relief.