167231-2012-Magdalo para Sa Pagbabago v. Commission On
167231-2012-Magdalo para Sa Pagbabago v. Commission On
167231-2012-Magdalo para Sa Pagbabago v. Commission On
DECISION
SERENO , J : p
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Rule 37, Section 1 of the
Commission of Elections (COMELEC) Rules of Procedure, 1 in relation to Rules 64 and 65
of the Rules of Court, assailing the Resolutions dated 26 October 2009 and 4 January
2010 issued by the COMELEC in SPP Case No. 09-073 (PP). 2
On 2 July 2009, Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) led its Petition for
Registration with the COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a regional
political party based in the National Capital Region (NCR) for participation in the 10 May
2010 National and Local Elections. 3 In the Petition, MAGDALO was represented by its
Chairperson, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, and its Secretary General, Francisco Ashley L.
Acedillo (Acedillo). 4 The Petition was docketed as SPP No. 09-073 (PP) and ra ed to the
Second Division of the COMELEC (COMELEC-Second Division). 5
In its Order dated 24 August 2009, the COMELEC-Second Division directed
MAGDALO to cause the publication of the Petition for Registration and the said Order in
three daily newspapers of general circulation, and set the hearing thereof on 3 September
2009. 6 In compliance therewith, MAGDALO caused the publication of both documents in
HATAW! No. 1 sa Balita, Saksi sa Balita and BOMBA BALITA (Saksi sa Katotohanan). 7
On 3 September 2009, a hearing was conducted in which MAGDALO (a) established
its compliance with the jurisdictional requirements; (b) presented Acedillo as its witness;
and (c) marked its documentary evidence in support of its Petition for Registration. The
following day, MAGDALO filed its Formal Offer of Evidence. 8 DTCAES
With all due respect to the Honorable Commission, the MAGDALO PARA
SA PAGBABAGO ("MAGDALO") manifests that the instant MANIFESTATION
is being led ex abutanti [sic] cautelam (out of the abundance of caution) only
and subject to the outcome of the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration
led by Magdalo in SPP No. 09-073 (PP) from the Resolution dated 26 October
2009 of the Second Division of the Honorable Commission denying its Petition
for Registration/Accreditation as a Political Party based in the National Capital
Region [NCR], which motion is still pending the [sic] Honorable Commission En
Banc. It is not in any way intended to preempt the ruling of the Honorable
Commission but merely to preserve the possibility of pursuing the Party's
participation in the Party-List System of Representation in the eventuality that
their Petition is approved.
Thereafter, MAGDALO led a Manifestation and Motion for Early Resolution dated
23 December 2009, in which it clari ed its intention to participate in the 10 May 2010
National and Local Elections as a party-list group. 14
In its assailed Resolution dated 4 January 2010, the COMELEC En Banc denied the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by MAGDALO. 1 5
In the instant Petition, MAGDALO argues that (a) the COMELEC Resolutions were
not based on the record or evidence presented; (b) the Resolutions preempted the
decision of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, in which several members of the
military are being tried for their involvement in the siege of the Oakwood Premier
Apartments (Oakwood); and (c) it has expressly renounced the use of force, violence and
other forms of unlawful means to achieve its goals. Thus, MAGDALO prays for this Court
to: (a) reverse and set aside the 26 October 2009 and 4 January 2010 COMELEC
Resolutions; (b) grant its Petition for Registration; and (c) direct the COMELEC to issue a
Certi cate of Registration. 16 The Petition likewise includes a prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and/or
Injunctive Relief to direct the COMELEC to allow MAGDALO to participate in the 10 May
2010 National and Local Elections. 17 However, this Court denied the issuance of a TRO in
its Resolution dated 2 February 2010. 18
To support the grant of reliefs prayed for, MAGDALO puts forward the following
arguments:
The ndings of the assailed resolutions on the basis of which the Petition
was denied are based on pure speculation. The Resolutions speculated as to the
alleged motives and/or intentions of the founders of petitioner Magdalo, which
claims are not based on evidence but on mere conjecture and pure baseless
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presuppositions;
The assailed Resolutions effectively preempted the court trying the case.
The subject Resolutions unfairly jumped to the conclusion that the founders of
the Magdalo "committed mutiny", "held innocent civilian personnel as hostage",
"employed violence" and "use[d] unlawful means" and "in the process de ed the
laws of organized society" purportedly during the Oakwood incident when even
the court trying their case, [Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Makati City], Branch 148, has not yet decided the case against them;
- and -
On the other hand, the COMELEC asserts that it had the power to ascertain the
eligibility of MAGDALO for registration and accreditation as a political party. 20 It contends
that this determination, as well as that of assessing whether MAGDALO advocates the use
of force, would entail the evaluation of evidence, which cannot be reviewed by this Court in
a petition for certiorari. 21
However, MAGDALO maintains that although it concedes that the COMELEC has the
authority to assess whether parties applying for registration possess all the quali cations
and none of the disquali cations under the applicable law, the latter nevertheless
committed grave abuse of discretion in basing its determination on pure conjectures
instead of on the evidence on record. 22
Preliminary to the examination of the substantive issues, it must be discussed
whether this case has been rendered moot and academic by the conduct of the 10 May
2010 National and Local Elections. Although the subject Petition for Registration led by
MAGDALO was intended for the elections on even date, it speci cally asked for
accreditation as a regional political party for purposes of subsequent elections . 23
Moreover, even assuming that the registration was only for the 10 May 2010
National and Local Elections, this case nevertheless comes under the exceptions to the
rules on mootness, as explained in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo: 24
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would
be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such
case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. DIcTEC
The second and fourth exceptions are clearly present in the case at bar. The instant
action brings to the fore matters of public concern, as it challenges the very notion of the
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use of violence or unlawful means as a ground for disquali cation from party registration.
Moreover, considering the expressed intention of MAGDALO to join subsequent elections,
as well as the occurrence of supervening events pertinent to the case at bar, it remains
prudent to examine the issues raised and resolve the arising legal questions once and for
all.
Having established that this Court can exercise its power of judicial review, the issue
for resolution is whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the
Petition for Registration led by MAGDALO on the ground that the latter seeks to achieve
its goals through violent or unlawful means. This Court rules in the negative, but without
prejudice to MAGDALO's filing anew of a Petition for Registration .
The COMELEC has a constitutional and statutory mandate to ascertain the
eligibility of parties and organizations to participate in electoral contests. The
relevant portions of the 1987 Constitution read:
ARTICLE VI — LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fty members, unless otherwise xed by law, who
shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system
of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations .
ECcDAH
Echoing these constitutional provisions, Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (B.P. 881),
otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, states:
Sec. 60. Political party. — "Political party" or "party," when used in this
Act, means an organized group of persons pursuing the same ideology, political
ideals or platforms of government and includes its branches and divisions. To
acquire juridical personality, qualify it for subsequent accreditation,
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and to entitle it to the rights and privileges herein granted to political
parties, a political party shall rst be duly registered with the
Commission. Any registered political party that, singly or in coalition with others,
fails to obtain at least ten percent of the votes cast in the constituency in which it
nominated and supported a candidate or candidates in the election next following
its registration shall, after notice and hearing, be deemed to have forfeited such
status as a registered political party in such constituency.
On the other hand, Republic Act No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System
Act, reads in part: CIDTcH
Thus, to join electoral contests, a party or organization must undergo the two-step
process of registration and accreditation, as this Court explained in Liberal Party v.
COMELEC: 26
. . . Registration is the act that bestows juridical personality for purposes
of our election laws; accreditation , on the other hand, relates to the privileged
participation that our election laws grant to qualified registered parties.
xxx xxx xxx
This Court has, in a string of cases, already taken judicial notice of the factual
circumstances surrounding the Oakwood standoff. 33 The incident involved over 300
heavily armed military o cers and enlisted men — led by the founding members of
MAGDALO — who surreptitiously took over Oakwood in the wee hours of 27 July 2003.
They disarmed the security guards and planted explosive devices around the building and
within its vicinity. They aired their grievances against the administration of former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (former President Arroyo), withdrew their support
from the government, and called for her resignation, as well as that of her cabinet
members and of the top o cials of the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP). After the ensuing negotiations for these military agents to
lay down their weapons, defuse the explosives and return to the barracks, the debacle
came to a close at 11:00 p.m. on the same day. 34 That the Oakwood incident was widely
known and extensively covered by the media made it a proper subject of judicial notice.
Thus, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it treated these facts
as public knowledge, 3 5 and took cognizance thereof without requiring the introduction
and reception of evidence thereon. CTAIHc
The assertions of MAGDALO that no one was held hostage or that no shot was red
42 do not mask its use of impelling force to take over and sustain the occupation of
Oakwood. Neither does its express renunciation of the use of force, violence and other
unlawful means in its Petition for Registration and Program of Government 43 obscure the
actual circumstances surrounding the encounter. The deliberate brandishing of military
power, which included the show of force, use of full battle gear, display of ammunitions,
and use of explosive devices, engendered an alarming security risk to the public. At the
very least, the totality of these brazen acts fomented a threat of violence that preyed on
the vulnerability of civilians. The COMELEC did not, therefore, commit grave abuse of
discretion when it treated the Oakwood standoff as a manifestation of the predilection of
MAGDALO for resorting to violence or threats thereof in order to achieve its objectives.
C. The finding that MAGDALO seeks
to achieve its goals through violence or
unlawful means did not operate as a
prejudgment of Criminal Case No. 03-2784.
MAGDALO contends that the nding of the COMELEC that the former pursues its
goals through violence or unlawful means was tantamount to an unwarranted verdict of
guilt for several crimes, which in effect, preempted the proceedings in Criminal Case No.
03-2784 and violated the right to presumption of innocence. 44 This argument cannot be
sustained.
The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2 (5) of the Constitution and Section 61 of
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BP 881 in the COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups
to participate in the elections is purely administrative in character. 45 In exercising this
authority, the COMELEC only has to assess whether the party or organization seeking
registration or accreditation pursues its goals by employing acts considered as violent or
unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in nature. Although this process does not entail any
determination of administrative liability, as it is only limited to the evaluation of
qualifications for registration, the ruling of this Court in Quarto v. Marcelo 46 is nonetheless
analogously applicable: ECcDAH
In the case at bar, the challenged COMELEC Resolutions were issued pursuant to its
administrative power to evaluate the eligibility of groups to join the elections as political
parties, for which the evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence is applicable. In nding
that MAGDALO resorts to violence or unlawful acts to ful l its organizational objectives,
the COMELEC did not render an assessment as to whether the members of petitioner
committed crimes, as respondent was not required to make that determination in the rst
place. Its evaluation was limited only to examining whether MAGDALO possessed all the
necessary quali cations and none of disquali cations for registration as a political party.
In arriving at its assailed ruling, the COMELEC only had to assess whether there was
substantial evidence adequate to support this conclusion. DcITaC
On the other hand, Criminal Case No. 03-2784 is a criminal action charging members
of MAGDALO with coup d'état following the events that took place during the Oakwood
siege. As it is a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary. Therefore,
although the registration case before the COMELEC and the criminal case before the trial
court may nd bases in the same factual circumstances, they nevertheless involve entirely
separate and distinct issues requiring different evidentiary thresholds. The COMELEC
correctly ruled thus:
It is at once apparent that that [sic] the proceedings in and the consequent
ndings of the Commission (Second Division) in the subject resolution did not
pre-empt the trial and decision of the court hearing the cases of the Magdalo
members. These are two different processes. The proceedings in the Commission
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i s [sic] a petition for registration of Magdalo as a political party and the
Commission is empowered to ascertain facts and circumstances relative to this
case. It is not criminal in nature unlike the court case of the Magdalo founders.
Thus, the Second Division did not violate the right of the Magdalo founders to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty when it promulgated the questioned
resolution. There is likewise no violation of due process. Accreditation as a
political party is not a right but only a privilege given to groups who have qualified
and met the requirements provided by law. 4 9
It is unmistakable from the above reasons that the ruling of the COMELEC denying
the Petition for Registration led by MAGDALO has not, as respondent could not have,
preempted Criminal Case No. 03-2784 or violated the right of petitioner's members to a
presumption of innocence. SDIaCT
[(e)] All AFP and PNP personnel granted amnesty who are not
reintegrated or reinstated shall be entitled to retirement and separation bene ts, if
quali ed under existing laws and regulation, as of the time of separation, unless
they have forfeited such retirement bene ts for reasons other than the acts
covered by this Proclamation. Those reintegrated or reinstated shall be entitled to
their retirement and separation bene t upon their actual retirement. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In light of the foregoing, to still sustain the nding, based on the participation of its
members in the Oakwood incident, that MAGDALO employs violence or other harmful
means would be inconsistent with the legal effects of amnesty. Likewise, it would not be in
accord with the express intention of both the Executive and the Legislative branches, in
granting the said amnesty, to promote an atmosphere conducive to attaining peace in line
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with the government's peace and reconciliation initiatives.
Nevertheless, this Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions of the COMELEC as
regards the use of violence. Thus, should MAGDALO decide to le another Petition for
Registration, its o cers must individually execute a davits renouncing the use of
violence or other harmful means to achieve the objectives of their organization. Further, it
must also be underscored that the membership of MAGDALO cannot include
military o cers and/or enlisted personnel in active service , as this act would run
counter to the express provisions of the Constitution: HESCcA
This Court nds that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying the Petition for Registration led by MAGDALO. However, in view of the
subsequent amnesty granted in favor of the members of MAGDALO, the events that
transpired during the Oakwood incident can no longer be interpreted as acts of violence in
the context of the disqualifications from party registration.
WHEREFORE , the instant Petition is DISMISSED . The 26 October 2009 and 4
January 2010 Resolutions of the Commission on Elections are hereby AFFIRMED , without
prejudice to the filing anew of a Petition for Registration by MAGDALO. CacTSI
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Leonardo-de Castro , Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama,
Jr., Perez, Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., J., is on official leave.
Mendoza, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1.Section 1. Petition for Certiorari; and Time to File. — Unless otherwise provided by law, or by
any specific provisions in these Rules, any decision, order or ruling of the Commission
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty
(30) days from its promulgation.
5.Petition, rollo, p. 5.
6.Id.
7.Id. at 6.
8.Id.
9.Id.
17.Id. at 23-27.
18.Rollo, p. 190.
19.Petition, rollo, p. 9.
21.Id.
22.Reply to Comment dated 14 March 2010, rollo, pp. 213-234.
25.Id. at 753-754.
(1) The agency may admit and give probative value to evidence commonly accepted by
reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs.
(2) Documentary evidence may be received in the form of copies or excerpts, if the
original is not readily available. Upon request, the parties shall be given opportunity to
compare the copy with the original. If the original is in the official custody of a public
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officer, a certified copy thereof may be accepted.
(3) Every party shall have the right to cross-examine witnesses presented against him
and to submit rebuttal evidence.
(4) The agency may take notice of judicially cognizable facts and of generally
cognizable technical or scientific facts within its specialized knowledge. The parties
shall be notified and afforded an opportunity to contest the facts so noticed.
31.521 Phil. 585 (2006).
32.Id. at 604.
33.See Pimentel v. Romulo, 466 Phil. 482 (2004); Navales v. Abaya, 484 Phil. 367 (2004);
Gonzales v. Abaya, 530 Phil. 189 (2006).
34.Id.
39.Id. at 1536; Bahilidad v. People, G.R. No. 185195, 17 March 2010, 615 SCRA 597.
43.Id. at 15-18.
44.Id. at 12-15.
47.Id. at 611-612.
48.Miro v. Dosono, G.R. No. 170697, 30 April 2010, 619 SCRA 653, 660.
49.Resolution dated 4 January 2010, pp. 4-5; rollo, pp. 40-41.
50.395 Phil. 690 (2000), citing People v. Casido, 336 Phil. 344 (1997).
51.Id. at 699.