Pro Hac Vice Motions Forthcoming: United States District Court District of New Jersey

CHRISTOPHER HO, CA State Bar No.
129845
MARISA DIAZ, CA State Bar No. 293072
STACY VILLALOBOS, CA State Bar No. 306710
Pro Hac Vice Motions Forthcoming
LEGAL AID AT WORK
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Additional Counsel Listed on Next Page

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
DOCKET NO.:
CATALINA TABORDA and CARMEN
MONELL, CIVIL ACTION
COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATIONS
Plaintiffs, OF:
v. (1) TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL
CENTRAL CREDIT SERVICES LLC; RIGHTS ACT OF 1964;
RADIUS GLOBAL SOLUTIONS LLC; (2) NEW JERSEY LAW AGAINST
and DOES 1-10, all of whose true DISCRIMINATION;
names are unknown, INCLUSIVE, (3) EQUAL PAY ACT OF 1963;
(4) NEW JERSEY EQUAL PAY ACT
Defendants.
[JURY TRIAL DEMANDED]
COMPLAINT FOR EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

DAVID LOPEZ, DC Bar No. 426463
OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP
Pro Hac Vice Motion Forthcoming
601 Massachusetts Avenue NW
2nd Floor West Suite
Washington, DC 20001
Telephone: (202) 847-4400
Facsimile: (202) 847-4410
Email: [email protected]
GLEN D. SAVITS, NJ State Bar No. 029921982

GREEN SAVITS, LLC
25B Vreeland Road
Florham Park, NJ 07932
Telephone: (973) 695-7777
Facsimile: (973) 695-7788
MENAKA N. FERNANDO, CA State Bar No. 271380

Pro Hac Vice Motion Forthcoming
OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP
One Embarcadero Center, 38th Floor
San Francisco, CA 9411
Telephone: (415) 638-8800
Facsimile: (646) 952-9109
AMY BIEGELSEN, NJ State Bar No. 178552015

OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP
685 Third Avenue, 25th Floor
New York, NY 10017
Telephone: (212) 245-1000
Facsimile: (646) 952-9105

Plaintiffs Catalina Taborda, 172 East Main Street, Bergenfield, New Jersey
07621 and Carmen Monell, P.O. Box 383, Sloatsburg, New York 10974, allege the
following:
I. NATURE OF THE ACTION
1. This is an action for relief from employment discrimination in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (“Title VII”), the
Equal Pay Act of 1963, the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, and the New
Jersey Equal Pay Act.
2. Plaintiffs Catalina Taborda and Carmen Monell (collectively,
“Plaintiffs”) allege that Defendants Central Credit Services LLC (“CCS”), Radius
Global Solutions LLC (“Radius”), and John (or Jane) Does 110, all of whose true
names are unknown (collectively, “Defendants”), unlawfully discriminated against
them on the basis of their national origin characteristics, including language, and
sex, and harassed them on the basis of national origin and language, and retaliated
against them.
3. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants’ policies, practices, and
decisions—all arising from the Englishonly policy they established and enforced
—had a disparate impact upon them based on their national origin, Latina.
4. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants denied Plaintiffs equal
compensation based on sex.
5. Plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief, compensatory
damages, punitive damages, liquidated damages, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and
costs as remedies for Defendants’ violations of their rights.
II. THE PARTIES
6. Plaintiff Catalina Taborda is a Spanishspeaking Latina. She worked as
a bill collector for Defendants, from approximately 2012 to 2017.
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7. Plaintiff Carmen Monell is a Spanishspeaking Latina. She worked as
a bill collector for Defendants from approximately 2008 to 2016.
8. Upon information and belief, Defendant CCS is a national debt
collection company that maintains nine office locations employing approximately
2,600 individuals. Defendant CCS operates an office in Ramsey, New Jersey, and all
or most of the events alleged herein occurred while Plaintiffs were employed by
Defendants in that office.
9. At all times relevant herein, Defendant CCS had at least fifteen
employees, and was therefore an “employer” within the meaning of Title VII.
10. Defendant CCS was also an “employer” within the meaning of the New
Jersey Law Against Discrimination, the Equal Pay Act, and the New Jersey Equal
Pay Act.
11. Upon information and belief, Defendant CCS is a subsidiary of
Defendant Radius.
12. Upon information and belief, Defendant Radius is an international
company that maintains thirteen office locations. Defendant Radius, with Defendant
CCS, operates the office in Ramsey, New Jersey where all or most of the events
alleged herein occurred.
13. At all times relevant herein, Defendant Radius had at least fifteen
employees and was therefore an “employer” within the meaning of Title VII.
14. Defendant Radius is also an “employer” within the meaning of the New
Jersey Law Against Discrimination, the Equal Pay Act, and the New Jersey Equal
Pay Act.
15. Defendants CCS and Radius are liable for the acts of their agents and
employees as set forth below.
16. Upon information and belief, Defendants are the successor employers
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and/or successorsininterest to any companies or entities that previously owned,
managed, or operated the Ramsey, New Jersey office, including, but not limited to,
Veldos LLC and NCO Financial Systems, Inc.
17. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that at all times
relevant herein, each of the Defendant Does 110 were responsible in some manner
for the occurrences and injuries alleged in this complaint. Their names and capacities
are currently unknown to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs will amend this Complaint to show such
true names and capacities when the same have been ascertained.
III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
18. This Court has jurisdiction of Plaintiffs’ federal law claims pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1331, as this case involves questions of federal law.
19. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the related state law
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) because those claims form part of the same
case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs’
state law claims share all common operative facts with their federal law claims, and
the parties are identical. Resolving Plaintiffs’ federal and state claims in a single
action serves the interests of judicial economy, convenience, consistency, and
fairness to the parties.
20. Venue is proper in, and Defendants are subject to the personal
jurisdiction of, this Court because Defendants maintain facilities and business
operations in this District, and all or most of the events giving rise to this action
occurred in this District. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(f)(3).
IV. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
21. Plaintiffs timely filed charges of discrimination with the United States
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and the New Jersey
Division on Civil Rights. On or around March 13, 2017, the EEOC issued Plaintiffs
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Notices of Right to Sue.
22. Plaintiffs have timely filed this action and have complied with all
administrative prerequisites to bring this lawsuit.
V. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
23. At all times material to this action, Plaintiffs Taborda and Monell were
employed by Defendants as bill collectors in Defendants’ Ramsey, New Jersey
office.
24. As part of their jobs, Plaintiffs were responsible for communicating
with consumers about their credit card accounts and debt, and encouraging them to
resolve their outstanding balances.
25. As part of their jobs, Plaintiffs Taborda and Monell, and another
Spanishspeaking Latina bill collector, Ach’sa Pirro, communicated with Spanish
speaking consumers with various levels of English proficiency. At times, it was
necessary for Plaintiffs to communicate with consumers in Spanish. Defendants
benefited from Plaintiffs’ Spanish proficiency because it allowed them to collect on
accounts of Spanishspeaking consumers.
26. In or around July 2013, Ann Claehsen became the supervisor of
Plaintiffs Taborda and Monell, as well as Ms. Pirro.
27. Ms. Claehsen routinely made derogatory comments based on national
origin, including comments about Spanish speakers.
28. For example, on multiple occasions, Ms. Claehsen asked Plaintiff
Taborda, “Why do you have to watch soccer in Spanish?” and “Why are you
watching television in Spanish?” after observing her watching Spanishlanguage
television in the break room during her lunch hour.
29. On another occasion, before Ms. Claehsen returned to work from her
lunch break, she gave another employee, Terrence O’Hanlon, the remote control for
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the television. She loudly stated, “Here, Terrence, take the remote so Catalina
[Taborda] doesn’t make you watch television in Spanish.”
30. Beginning in or around January 2015, Terrence O’Hanlon, who was
also employed by Defendants as a bill collector at the Ramsey, New Jersey office,
frequently made derogatory comments based on national origin, including
comments about Latinos, Latino immigrants, and Spanishspeaking people.
31. When speaking to Plaintiff Taborda, Mr. O’Hanlon repeatedly accused
Spanishspeaking consumers of coming to this country and not paying their taxes.
32. On more than one occasion, after hearing Plaintiffs Taborda or Monell
speak Spanish to a consumer or to each other, Mr. O’Hanlon loudly sang part of the
United States national anthem.
33. Between approximately January 2015 and March 2017, Mr. O’Hanlon
made these and similar derogatory statements almost on a weekly basis.
34. Mr. O’Hanlon’s statements and behavior almost always occurred in
Ms. Claehsen’s presence.
35. Ms. Claehsen never reprimanded Mr. O’Hanlon, nor did she ask him
to stop making these comments. Instead, she often laughed in response to Mr.
O’Hanlon’s conduct.
36. Plaintiffs complained to Ms. Claehsen about her and Mr. O’Hanlon’s
statements and behavior. Each time, Ms. Claehsen dismissed their complaints.
37. Plaintiff Taborda also complained verbally to Robert Pettway, the
general manager of Defendants’ Ramsey office, about Mr. O’Hanlon and Ms.
Claehsen’s treatment on at least three occasions.
38. Each time, Mr. Pettway dismissed her complaints. As a result, Mr.
O’Hanlon’s and Ms. Claehsen’s harassment continued.
39. On or around July 17, 2015, Ms. Claehsen told Plaintiff Taborda and
5
Ms. Pirro that they should not be speaking to one another in Spanish.
40. Prior to this statement, Plaintiff Taborda was not aware of any policy
or practice of Defendants prohibiting the speaking of Spanish.
41. Ms. Claehsen’s demand that Plaintiff Taborda and Ms. Pirro refrain
from speaking Spanish again demonstrated her discriminatory motive based on
Plaintiffs’ national origin.
42. Again, Ms. Taborda complained to Mr. Pettway. She told him that Ms.
Claehsen had prohibited her and Ms. Pirro from speaking Spanish.
43. Later that afternoon, Mr. Pettway called Plaintiffs Taborda and Monell
and Ms. Pirro into a conference room. Jean Tilden, a Human Resources
representative employed by Defendant Radius, joined the meeting via telephone.
44. During this meeting, Mr. Pettway and Ms. Tilden disciplined Plaintiffs
Taborda and Monell, as well as Ms. Pirro, for having spoken Spanish. Defendants
targeted and disciplined all three Latina employees even though Plaintiff Monell
had not been part of the conversation that prompted Ms. Claehsen’s demand to stop
speaking Spanish.
45. Mr. Pettway and Ms. Tilden informed Plaintiffs and Ms. Pirro that
Defendants maintained a policy and/or practice that prohibited employees from
speaking Spanish at work. Mr. Pettway and Ms. Tilden did not make reference to
any prohibitions on any other languages.
46. Plaintiffs Taborda and Monell and Ms. Pirro objected to this policy
and/or practice.
47. Prior to this meeting, in all her seven years of employment with
Defendants, Plaintiff Monell was not aware of any policy or practice by Defendants
prohibiting the speaking of Spanish.
48. During the meeting, Ms. Tilden communicated that Defendants would
6
allow Plaintiffs and Ms. Pirro to speak Spanish when taking calls from Spanish
speaking consumers, but that they could not speak Spanish at any other time or
anywhere else in the building, including the break rooms and the restrooms. She
told them to leave the building if they wanted to speak Spanish.
49. Ms. Tilden stated that they would be terminated if they did not comply
with this policy or practice.
50. Plaintiffs Taborda and Monell understood this to mean that they could
be terminated for slips of the tongue.
51. Several days later, on or around July 20, 2015, Plaintiffs Taborda and
Monell, and Ms. Pirro were each called into individual meetings with Mr. Pettway.
52. Mr. Pettway gave Plaintiffs Taborda and Monell, and Ms. Pirro, each
an “employee coaching form.”
53. Plaintiff Taborda’s employee coaching form stated that Plaintiff
Taborda was “no longer allowed to speak Spanish” while at work unless “on the
phone with a consumer.” It also stated that her “refusal” to follow this “request to
stop speaking Spanish will result in termination.” Plaintiff Monell’s form used
similar language.
54. The Englishonly policy or practice in the coaching forms was that
“these 3 employees [Catalina Taborda, Carmen Monell, and Ach’sa Pirro] stop
speaking Spanish while at work.”
55. The coaching forms stated, “These conversations are causing
employees to feel uncomfortable, as they don’t know what is being said in
Spanish.”
56. Mr. Pettway threatened Ms. Taborda, during her meeting, that she
would be fired unless she signed the employee coaching form.
57. Plaintiff Taborda signed the form, with the comment “I am signing
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this paper feeling discriminated and single [sic] out. There is a lot of discrimination
and racism going on in this office against Spanish speakers.”
58. Despite this written complaint and further explicit notice of
discriminatory conduct by Plaintiff Taborda, Defendants failed to investigate and/or
take any corrective measures to prevent discrimination and harassment in the
workplace.
59. Mr. Pettway threatened Plaintiff Monell with termination if she did not
sign the coaching form as well.
60. Plaintiff Monell signed the form.
61. Shortly after these meetings, Mr. Pettway greeted Plaintiff Monell in
Spanish, saying “Buenos Dias” (“good morning”).
62. Shortly after these meetings, Mr. Pettway separately greeted Plaintiff
Taborda in Spanish, saying “Buenos Dias” (“good morning”).
63. Several days later, on or around July 23, 2015, Plaintiffs Taborda and
Monell, and Ms. Pirro, were again each called into individual meetings with Mr.
Pettway.
64. During these meetings, Mr. Pettway tore up the employee coaching
forms they had previously been given, stating that those forms were no longer
valid. Mr. Pettway explained that they each had to sign a new form or face
termination.
65. Mr. Pettway gave Plaintiffs Taborda and Monell, and Ms. Pirro, an
employee counseling form. Mr. Pettway informed Plaintiffs Taborda and Monell
that the new “counseling” form was distinct from the previous “coaching” form.
66. Each counseling form stated, “Although the company does not have an
English Only Policy sitewide, we do ask employees who speak other languages to
refrain from using those languages while on the call floor.” It “request[ed] that Ms.
8
[Monell, Taborda, and Pirro] refrain from speaking Spanish on the call floor,
except when [they take] an occasional Spanishspeaking call from a Spanish
speaking customer.”
67. The counseling forms provided the following justifications for the
Englishonly policy: (1) “An English speaking customer who overhears a
background conversation in another language may be distracted, confused, or less
inclined to continue the collection conversation due to the distraction.”; (2) “To
promote efficiency and prevent miscommunications, we need collectors to speak
English for all collaborative discussions. Speaking English on the call floor will
also prevent the perception that a collector is attempting to avoid collaboration on a
shared file by speaking in a different language than the coworker / collaborator.”;
(3) “English must be spoken on the call floor to enable a supervisor to monitor
communications between coworkers. In general, nonwork related conversations
must be kept to an absolute minimum.”; (4) “Collectors on the call floor have
expressed concerns about Ms. [Monell, Taborda, Pirro] having conversations in
Spanish with others and gave the following reasons: 1. It is difficult to concentrate
on the customer when others are having conversations in another language in the
background. 2. If the conversation is workrelated it should be in English because
the files are sometimes shared. 3. Employees feel like Ms. [Monell, Taborda, Pirro]
may be using Spanish to speak about them in a negative manner while they are
trying to work.”
68. Plaintiffs Taborda and Monell both signed the new employee
counseling form. Plaintiff Taborda added a comment, which stated, “I, Catalina
Taborda, reserve my right to take legal action, shall I [sic] consider any act of
discrimination with my native language, in accordance to aforementioned
document.”
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69. Despite this second written complaint and further explicit notice of
discriminatory conduct by Plaintiff Taborda, Defendants failed to investigate and/or
take any corrective measures to prevent discrimination and harassment in the
workplace.
70. Plaintiffs are unaware of any customer complaints regarding hearing
languages other than English being spoken on the call floor.
71. Plaintiffs are unaware of any coworker complaints that a collector was
speaking in a language other than English in an attempt to avoid collaboration on a
shared file.
72. Nonwork related conversations frequently occurred on the call floor,
and supervisors and managers often participated in the same. Plaintiffs are unaware
of any employee ever being disciplined or counseled for a nonwork related
conversation in English.
73. Defendant CCS has a language-neutral policy against “[u]sing
offensive or profane language on Company property.”
74. After the abovedescribed meetings, on the few occasions that they
tried to speak to each other in Spanish, Ms. Claehsen immediately told them to
stop.
75. Before the Englishonly policy existed, many of Plaintiffs’ nonLatino
colleagues would speak to them in Spanish to practice their own language skills.
After the Englishonly policy was instituted, some nonLatino colleagues, including
Mr. Pettway, continued to speak in Spanish.
76. Some colleagues spoke other languages, such as Haitian Creole, on the
call floor. To Plaintiffs’ knowledge, their colleagues were never disciplined or
counseled for speaking a language other than English.
77. The Englishonly policy prevented Plaintiffs from efficiently carrying
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out their job responsibilities.
78. The Englishonly policy contributed to an atmosphere of inferiority,
isolation, and intimidation for Plaintiffs. They felt humiliated and degraded as a
result of the Englishonly policy, as well as the broader workplace atmosphere of
national origin and sex discrimination.
79. Defendants’ rationale for the Englishonly policy shifted over time and
relied on the discriminatory preferences of others.
80. Mr. O’Hanlon’s derogatory comments continued after the imposition
of the Englishonly policy.
81. On or around January 26, 2016, Plaintiff Taborda was given a “Final
Written Warning” for speaking to a representative for the Ramsey, New Jersey
facility’s main client, American Express while he was on-site, about the English-only
policy. The warning stated, “On July 23, 2015 Taborda was formally coached on the
Company’s policy and procedure for escalating employment related concerns.”
82. Defendants paid Plaintiffs less than male employees for equal work
the performance of which required equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which
was performed under similar working conditions.
83. Plaintiffs were paid less for their jobs as bill collectors than male
employees who were bill collectors.
84. Plaintiffs’ work as bill collectors was substantially equal to male bill
collectors’ work.
85. Defendants assigned accounts to female and male bill collectors in a
way that perpetuated pay differences. Defendants assigned more desirable accounts
to male employees. Male employees were assigned accounts of consumers with
high credit scores while female employees were, regularly and more frequently
than male employees, assigned accounts of consumers with low credit scores.
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Accounts with low credit scores were harder to collect. Female employees were
also more frequently assigned accounts that lacked a telephone number, which
likewise made the accounts more difficult to collect.
86. Mr. Pettway usually assigned accounts.
87. Employee pay rates were tied to monthly goals for collection. An
employee with a higher monthly goal typically had a higher pay rate.
88. The assignment of accounts impacted an employee’s ability to meet
her monthly goals.
89. Employees were also rewarded for exceeding their monthly collection
goals. For a time, Defendants also gave the top collector a reward.
90. One month, Plaintiff Monell was the top collector. She was not
immediately given the reward she was entitled to for being the top collector. She
had to complain several times before Defendants gave her the reward. When men
won the collection reward, by comparison, they were compensated on the same
day, or the day after, and without having to insist.
91. Plaintiffs, as female bill collectors, had lower hourly rates and lower
bonuses than male bill collectors. Plaintiff Taborda earned $10.00 per hour, and
Plaintiff Monell earned $11.00 per hour.
92. Plaintiffs, and other female employees, were treated less favorably
than male employees by Mr. Pettway.
93. Mr. Pettway made female employees wait for long periods of time
outside of his office before they were allowed to enter to discuss a matter with him.
In contrast, Mr. Pettway consistently waved male employees into his office to
speak with him without making them wait. The time employees had to wait to
speak to Mr. Pettway was time taken away from making collection calls, which
were tied to employees’ pay.
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94. Similarly, Mr. Pettway spoke to male employees frequently about non
work related topics, including sports.
95. Ms. Monell resigned on or around January 29, 2016.
96. In or around January 2017, Defendants announced a layoff of all
employees in the Ramsey, New Jersey office, but offered some employees the
opportunity to continue working for Defendants. Mr. Pettway told Plaintiff Taborda
that the company wanted her to continue working with them because of her good
performance, but that she would receive lower compensation. Plaintiff Taborda
decided to reject the offer, and her last day working for Defendants was March 1,
2017.
97. The Englishonly policy remained in existence through Plaintiffs’ last
days of employment.
VI. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

National Origin-Based Discrimination (Disparate Impact) in Violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
98. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the
allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 97, above.
99. Section 703 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2, prohibits employment
practices that discriminate against persons on the basis of their national origin.
Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that Defendants’ English
only policy (which operated as a noSpanish policy and/or practice) had an adverse
and disproportionate impact on them because of their national origin, Latina.
100. Defendants’ Englishonly policy (which operated as a noSpanish
policy and/or practice) was neither manifestly jobrelated nor consistent with
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business necessity.
101. Less discriminatory alternatives existed to achieve Defendants’ stated
business purposes.
102. As a direct, legal and proximate result of the discrimination, Plaintiffs
have sustained, and will continue to sustain, economic and emotional injuries,
resulting in damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
103. Defendants’ unlawful actions were intentional, willful, malicious,
and/or done with reckless disregard to Plaintiffs’ right to be free from
discrimination based on national origin.
104. Plaintiffs are entitled to their reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of
suit.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
National Origin-Based Discrimination (Hostile Work Environment) in Violation of
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
106. Plaintiffs were subjected to harassment by Defendants’ agents and
employees, including Ms. Claehsen and Mr. O’Hanlon, because of their national
origin, Latina.
107. Plaintiffs were subjected to verbal and written conduct, as well as an
Englishonly policy, by Defendants’ agents and employees, including Ms.
Claehsen, Mr. O’Hanlon, Mr. Pettway, and Ms. Tilden.
108. Defendants’ agents and employees’ conduct was not welcomed by
Plaintiffs.
109. Defendants’ agents’ and employees’ conduct was undertaken because
of Plaintiffs’ national origin, Latina.
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110. The conduct was so severe or pervasive that reasonable persons in
Plaintiffs’ positions would find their work environment to be hostile or abusive.
111. Plaintiffs believed their work environment to be hostile or abusive as a
result of Defendants’ agents’ and employees’ conduct.
112. Management level employees knew, or should have known, of the
abusive conduct. Plaintiffs provided management level personnel, including Mr.
Pettway, Ms. Claehsen, and Ms. Tilden, with information sufficient to raise a
probability of national origin harassment in the mind of a reasonable employer.
Moreover, the harassment was so pervasive and open that a reasonable employer
would have had to have been aware of it. Indeed, management level employees
were themselves complicit in the abusive conduct.
113. Defendants did not exercise reasonable care to prevent harassment in
the workplace on the basis of national origin, and did not exercise reasonable care
to promptly correct any harassing behavior that did occur.
have sustained, and will continue to sustain, economic and emotional injuries,
resulting in damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
discrimination based on national origin.
suit.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Sex-Based Discrimination in Violation of
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
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118. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, makes it
unlawful for an employer, “(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate,
or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a).
119. Defendants discriminated against Plaintiffs by treating them
differently from their male coworkers, including in account assignment and
unequal wages and compensation, because of their sex.
120. Plaintiffs’ sex was the determining factor and/or a motivating factor in
Defendants’ actions.
have sustained, and will continue to sustain, economic damages to be proven at
trial. As a result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiffs have suffered emotional distress,
resulting in damages in an amount to be proven at trial. Plaintiff further seeks
compensatory and punitive damages and all other injunctive, declaratory, and
monetary relief available for discrimination at trial.
discrimination based on sex.
123. Plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of suit.
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
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Retaliation in Violation of
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)
125. Section 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, prohibits employers from discriminating against an employee “because
[she] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
126. Plaintiffs made informal and formal complaints to Defendants’ agents
and employees opposing Defendants’ unlawful, discriminatory employment
practices based on national origin and sex.
127. As a result of Plaintiffs’ complaints, Defendants’ agents and employees
took materially adverse actions against Plaintiffs, including, but not limited to,
issuing disciplinary warnings, such as counseling and coaching forms; threats of
termination; reprimands by supervisors; and instituting an English-only policy aimed
specifically at Plaintiffs.
128. Defendants’ adverse actions constituted retaliatory workplace
harassment.
129. Defendants’ retaliatory actions were sufficient to deter a reasonable
person from engaging in protected activity under Title VII.
130. As a direct, legal and proximate result of Defendants’ retaliation,
Plaintiffs have sustained, and will continue to sustain, economic and emotional
injuries, resulting in damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
suit.
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
17
Sex-Based Pay Discrimination in Violation of
Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)
133. Section 206(d)(1) of the Equal Pay Act makes it unlawful for an
employer “to discriminate . . . between employees on the basis of sex by paying
wages to employees . . . at a rate less than the rate at which he pays to employees of
the opposite sex . . . for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires
equal skill, efforts, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar
working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority
system, (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or
quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than
sex.”
134. Defendants have employed Plaintiffs and male employees in jobs as
bill collectors, requiring substantially equal skill, effort, and responsibility.
135. Plaintiffs and male employees performed their jobs under similar
working conditions.
136. Plaintiffs were paid a lower wage than the male employees doing
substantially equal work.
137. The differential in pay between male and female employees was not
due to a bona fide seniority system, a bona fide merit system, or a bona fide system
that measures employee earnings by quantity or quality of work, nor was the
difference in pay a result of a factor other than sex.
138. Defendants caused, contributed to, or caused the continuation of wage
rate discrimination based on sex, in violation of the Equal Pay Act.
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monetary relief available for equal pay violations at trial, including liquidated
damages for all willful violations, prejudgment interest, attorneys’ fees and costs,
and other compensation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b).
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

National Origin-Based Discrimination (Disparate Impact) in Violation of
New Jersey Law Against Discrimination
N.J.S.A. § 10:5-12
141. New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination makes it unlawful for an
employer to discriminate against an individual “in compensation or in terms,
conditions or privileges of employment” because of national origin and ancestry.
142. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that Defendants’
Englishonly policy (which operated as a noSpanish policy and/or practice) had an
adverse and disproportionate impact on them because of their national origin,
Latina.
143. Defendants’ Englishonly policy (which operated as a noSpanish
policy and/or practice) was neither manifestly jobrelated nor consistent with
business necessity.
144. Less discriminatory alternatives existed to achieve Defendants’ stated
business purposes.
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discrimination based on national origin and ancestry.
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

National Origin-Based Discrimination (Hostile Work Environment) in Violation of
N.J.S.A. § 10:5-12
148. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein
149. Plaintiffs were subjected to harassment by Defendants’ agents and
employees, including Ms. Claehsen and Mr. O’Hanlon, because of Plaintiffs’
national origin and ancestry.
150. Plaintiffs were subjected to verbal and written conduct, as well as an
Englishonly policy, by Defendants’ agents and employees, including Ms.
Claehsen, Mr. O’Hanlon, Mr. Pettway, and Ms. Tilden.
151. Defendants’ agents and employees’ conduct was not welcomed by
Plaintiffs.
152. Defendants’ agents and employees’ conduct was because of the fact
that Plaintiffs are members in a protected class.
153. The conduct was so severe or pervasive that a reasonable person in
20
Plaintiffs’ positions would find Plaintiffs’ work environment to be hostile or
abusive.
154. Plaintiffs’ found their work environment to be hostile or abusive as a
result of Defendants’ agents and employees’ conduct.
155. Management level employees knew, or should have known, of the
abusive conduct. Plaintiffs provided management level personnel, including Mr.
Pettway, Ms. Claehsen, and Ms. Tilden, with enough information to raise a
probability of national origin and ancestry harassment in the mind of a reasonable
employer, and/or the harassment was so pervasive and open that a reasonable
employer would have had to have been aware of it. Indeed, management level
employees were themselves complicit in the abusive conduct.
156. Defendants did not exercise reasonable care to prevent harassment in
the workplace on the basis of national origin and ancestry, and did not exercise
reasonable care to promptly correct any harassing behavior that did occur.
discrimination based on national origin and ancestry.
EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Sex-Based Discrimination in Violation of
21
N.J.S.A. § 10:5-12
employer to discriminate against an individual “in compensation or in terms,
conditions or privileges of employment” because of sex.
162. Defendants discriminated against Plaintiffs by treating them
differently from their male coworkers, including in account assignment and
unequal wages and compensation, because of their sex.
163. Plaintiffs’ sex was the determining factor and/or a motivating factor in
Defendants’ actions.
discrimination based on sex.
NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
SexBased Discrimination in Wages in Violation of
New Jersey Equal Pay Act
N.J.S.A. § 34:1156.1 et seq.
22
168. New Jersey’s Equal Pay Act makes it unlawful for an “employer to
discriminate in any way in the rate or method of payment of wages to any
employee because of his or her sex.”
169. Defendants employed Plaintiffs and male employees in jobs as bill
collectors, requiring substantially equal skill, effort, and responsibility.
170. Plaintiffs and male employees performed their jobs under similar
working conditions.
171. Plaintiffs were paid a lower wage than the male employees doing
substantially equal work.
172. The differential in pay between male and female employees was not
based on a reasonable factor or factors other than sex.
173. Defendants caused, contributed to, or caused the continuation of wage
discrimination based on sex, in violation of New Jersey state law.
punitive damages and all other injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief
available for equal pay violations at trial, including liquidated damages,
prejudgment interest, attorneys’ fees and costs, and other compensation pursuant to
N.J.S.A. § 34:1156.1 et seq.
TENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Reprisal in Violation of the
23
N.J.S.A. § 10:5-12
employer to “take reprisals against any person because that person has opposed any
practices or acts forbidden under this act” or to “coerce, intimidate, threaten, or
interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of that
person having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of,
any right granted or protected in this act.”
177. Plaintiffs made informal and formal complaints to Defendants’ agents
and employees opposing Defendants’ unlawful, discriminatory employment
practices based on national origin and sex.
178. Plaintiffs’ complaints were made reasonably and in good faith.
179. As a result of Plaintiffs’ complaints, Defendants’ agents and employees
took adverse actions against Plaintiffs, including, but not limited to, issuing
disciplinary warnings, such as counseling and coaching forms; threats of
termination; reprimands by supervisors; and instituting an English-only policy aimed
specifically at Plaintiffs.
180. As a direct, legal and proximate result of Defendants’ reprisals,
Plaintiffs have sustained, and will continue to sustain, economic and emotional
injuries, resulting in damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
suit.
DECLARATORY RELIEF ALLEGATIONS
24
182. A present and actual controversy exists between Plaintiffs and
Defendants concerning their rights and respective duties. Plaintiffs contend that
Defendants violated their rights under Title VII, the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination, the Equal Pay Act, and the New Jersey Equal Pay Act. Plaintiffs
are informed and believe and thereon allege that the Defendants deny these
allegations. Declaratory relief is therefore necessary and appropriate.
183. Plaintiffs seek a judicial declaration of the rights and duties of the
respective parties.
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF ALLEGATIONS
184. No plain, adequate, or complete remedy at law is available to Plaintiffs
to redress the wrongs addressed herein.
185. If this Court does not grant the injunctive relief sought herein,
Plaintiffs will be irreparably harmed.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for relief as follows:
1. For a declaration that Defendants’ actions, policies, and practices as
alleged herein are unlawful;
2. For reinstatement;
3. For lost wages and all other compensation denied or lost to Plaintiffs
by reason of Defendants’ unlawful actions, in an amount to be proven at trial;
4. For compensatory damages for Plaintiffs’ emotional pain and
suffering, in an amount to be proven at trial;
5. For punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial;
6. For liquidated damages;
7. For interest on lost wages, compensation, and damages, including pre
and postjudgment interest and an upward adjustment for inflation;
25
8. For an order enjoining Defendants from engaging in the unlawful acts
complained of herein;
9. For reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
2000e5(k), New Jersey Revised Statutes § 10:527.1, and other laws; and
10. For such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.
Dated: August 18, 2019 Respectfully submitted,

Christopher Ho
Marisa Díaz
Stacy Villalobos
LEGAL AID AT WORK
David Lopez
Menaka N. Fernando
Amy Biegelsen
OUTTEN & GOLDEN
Glen D. Savits
GREEN SAVITS, LLC
By:
GLEN D. SAVITS
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiffs demand a jury trial on all causes of action and claims to which they
have a right to a jury trial.
Dated: June 8, 2017 Respectfully submitted,
26
Christopher Ho
Marisa Díaz
Stacy Villalobos
LEGAL AID AT WORK
David Lopez
Menaka N. Fernando
Amy Biegelsen
OUTTEN & GOLDEN
Glen D. Savits
GREEN SAVITS, LLC
By:
GLEN D. SAVITS
27

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CHRISTOPHER HO, CA State Bar No.

Additional Counsel Listed on Next Page

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

COMPLAINT FOR EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

GLEN D. SAVITS, NJ State Bar No. 029921982

MENAKA N. FERNANDO, CA State Bar No. 271380

AMY BIEGELSEN, NJ State Bar No. 178552015

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

COMPLAINT FOR EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

DECLARATORY RELIEF ALLEGATIONS

Dated: August 18, 2019 Respectfully submitted,

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Dated: June 8, 2017 Respectfully submitted,

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