Philippine Airlines v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-49188. January 30, 1990)
Philippine Airlines v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-49188. January 30, 1990)
Philippine Airlines v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-49188. January 30, 1990)
FACTS
Amelia Tan was found to have been wronged by Philippine Air Lines (PAL). She filed her
complaint in 1967. After ten (10) years of protracted litigation in the Court of First Instance and
the Court of Appeals, Ms. Tan won her case. Almost twenty-two (22) years later, Ms. Tan has not
seen a centavo of what the courts have solemnly declared as rightfully hers. Through absolutely
no fault of her own, Ms. Tan has been deprived of what, technically, she should have been paid
from the start, before 1967, without need of her going to court to enforce her rights. And all
because PAL did not issue the checks intended for her, in her name. Petitioner PAL filed a
petition for review on certiorari the decision of Court of Appeals dismissing the petition for
certiorari against the order of the Court of First Instance (CFI) which issued an alias writ of
execution against them. Petitioner alleged that the payment in check had already been effected
to the absconding sheriff, satisfying the judgment.
ISSUE
Whether or not payment by check to the sheriff extinguished the judgment debt.
RULING
NO. The payment made by the petitioner to the absconding sheriff was not in cash or legal
tender but in checks. The checks were not payable to Amelia Tan or Able Printing Press but to
the absconding sheriff.In the absence of an agreement, either express or implied, payment
means the discharge of a debt or obligation in money and unless the parties so agree, a debtor
has no rights, except at his own peril, to substitute something in lieu of cash as medium of
payment of his debt. Strictly speaking, the acceptance by the sheriff of the petitioner’s checks, in
the case at bar, does not, per se, operate as a discharge of the judgment debt. The check as a
negotiable instrument is only a substitute for money and not money, the delivery of such an
instrument does not, by itself, operate as payment. A check, whether a manager’s check or
ordinary cheek, is not legal tender, and an offer of a check in payment of a debt is not a valid
tender of payment and may be refused receipt by the obligee or creditor. Mere delivery of
checks does not discharge the obligation under a judgment. The obligation is not extinguished
and remains suspended until the payment by commercial document is actually realized (Art.
1249, Civil Code, par. 3).