Doria v. Perez C #17

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FELIX B. PEREZ and AMANTE G.

DORIA, Petitioners, vs PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE


COMPANY and JOSE LUIS SANTIAGO, Respondents.

G.R. No. 152048; April 7, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioners Felix B. Perez and Amante G. Doria were employed by respondent Philippine
Telegraph and Telephone Company (PT&T) as shipping clerk and supervisor, respectively, in
PT&T’s Shipping Section, Materials Management Group. Acting on an alleged unsigned letter
regarding anomalous transactions at the Shipping Section, respondents formed a special audit
team to investigate the matter. It was discovered that the Shipping Section jacked up the value
of the freight costs for goods shipped and that the duplicates of the shipping documents
allegedly showed traces of tampering, alteration and superimposition.

Petitioners were placed on preventive suspension for 30 days for their alleged involvement in
the anomaly. Their suspension was extended for 15 days twice. Then in a Memorandum,
petitioners were dismissed from the service for having falsified company documents. Petitioners
filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal alleging that they were dismissed on
November 8, 1993, the date they received the above-mentioned memorandum.

LA favored petitioners. NLRC reversed the decision of LA. Petitioners appealed to CA. CA
affirmed the NLRC decision insofar as petitioners’ illegal suspension for 15 days and dismissal for
just cause were concerned. However, it found that petitioners were dismissed without due
process. Petitioners now seek a reversal of the CA decision before the SC. They contend that
there was no just cause for their dismissal, that they were not accorded due process and that
they were illegally suspended for 30 days.

ISSUE:

Whether respondents were dismissed for just cause and with the observance of due process.

RULING:

Respondents’ evidence is insufficient to clearly and convincingly establish the facts from which
the loss of confidence resulted. Other than their bare allegations and the fact that such
documents came into petitioners’ hands at some point, respondents should have provided
evidence of petitioners’ functions, the extent of their duties, the procedure in the handling and
approval of shipping requests and the fact that no personnel other than petitioners were
involved. The alterations on the shipping documents could not reasonably be attributed to
petitioners because it was never proven that petitioners alone had control of or access to these
documents.

Willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative is a just cause for termination. However, loss of confidence should not be
simulated. It should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or
unjustified. Loss of confidence may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming
evidence to the contrary. It must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify an earlier action
taken in bad faith.

The burden of proof rests on the employer to establish that the dismissal is for cause in view of
the security of tenure that employees enjoy under the Constitution and the Labor Code. The
employer’s evidence must clearly and convincingly show the facts on which the loss of
confidence in the employee may be fairly made to rest. It must be adequately proven by
substantial evidence. Respondents failed to discharge this burden.

Respondents’ illegal act of dismissing petitioners was aggravated by their failure to observe due
process. To meet the requirements of due process in the dismissal of an employee, an employer
must furnish the worker with 2 written notices: (1) a written notice specifying the grounds for
termination and giving to said employee a reasonable opportunity to explain his side and (2)
another written notice indicating that, upon due consideration of all circumstances, grounds
have been established to justify the employer’s decision to dismiss the employee.

Petitioners were neither apprised of the charges against them nor given a chance to defend
themselves. They were simply and arbitrarily separated from work and served notices of
termination in total disregard of their rights to due process and security of tenure. Respondents
failed to comply with the two-notice requirement for terminating employees.

We note a marked difference in the standards of due process to be followed as prescribed in the
Labor Code and its implementing rules. The Labor Code provides that an employer must provide
the employee ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his
representative if he so desires.

The omnibus rules implementing the Labor Code, on the other hand, require a hearing and
conference during which the employee concerned is given the opportunity to respond to the
charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him.

In case of conflict, the law prevails over the administrative regulations implementing it. The
authority to promulgate implementing rules proceeds from the law itself. To be valid, a rule or
regulation must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute. As
such, it cannot amend the law either by abridging or expanding its scope.

Article 277(b) of the Labor Code provides that, in cases of termination for a just cause, an
employee must be given “ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.” Thus, the
opportunity to be heard afforded by law to the employee is qualified by the word “ample” which
ordinarily means “considerably more than adequate or sufficient.” In this regard, the phrase
“ample opportunity to be heard” can be reasonably interpreted as extensive enough to cover
actual hearing or conference. To this extent, Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of
Book VI of the Labor Code is in conformity with Article 277(b).

Nonetheless, Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code should
not be taken to mean that holding an actual hearing or conference is a condition sine qua non
for compliance with the due process requirement in termination of employment. The test for
the fair procedure guaranteed under Article 277(b) cannot be whether there has been a formal
pretermination confrontation between the employer and the employee. The “ample
opportunity to be heard” standard is neither synonymous nor similar to a formal hearing.

The standard for the hearing requirement, ample opportunity, is couched in general language
revealing the legislative intent to give some degree of flexibility or adaptability to meet the
peculiarities of a given situation. To confine it to a single rigid proceeding such as a formal
hearing will defeat its spirit.

Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code itself provides that
the so-called standards of due process outlined therein shall be observed “substantially,” not
strictly. This is a recognition that while a formal hearing or conference is ideal, it is not an
absolute, mandatory or exclusive avenue of due process.

A hearing means that a party should be given a chance to adduce his evidence to support his
side of the case and that the evidence should be taken into account in the adjudication of the
controversy. “To be heard” does not mean verbal argumentation alone inasmuch as one may be
heard just as effectively through written explanations, submissions or pleadings. Therefore,
while the phrase “ample opportunity to be heard” may in fact include an actual hearing, it is not
limited to a formal hearing only. The existence of an actual, formal “trial-type” hearing, although
preferred, is not absolutely necessary to satisfy the employee’s right to be heard.

Due process of law simply means giving opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered.
In fact, there is no violation of due process even if no hearing was conducted, where the party
was given a chance to explain his side of the controversy. What is frowned upon is the denial of
the opportunity to be heard. Twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential
elements of due process in the dismissal of employees. It is deemed sufficient for the employer
to follow the natural sequence of notice, hearing and judgment.

In sum, the following are the guiding principles in connection with the hearing requirement in
dismissal cases:

(a) “ample opportunity to be heard” means any meaningful opportunity (verbal or written) given
to the employee to answer the charges against him and submit evidence in support of his
defense, whether in a hearing, conference or some other fair, just and reasonable way.

(b) a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory only when requested by the employee
in writing or substantial evidentiary disputes exist or a company rule or practice requires it, or
when similar circumstances justify it.

(c) the “ample opportunity to be heard” standard in the Labor Code prevails over the “hearing or
conference” requirement in the implementing rules and regulations.

On the other hand, an employee may be validly suspended by the employer for just cause
provided by law. Such suspension shall only be for a period of 30 days, after which the employee
shall either be reinstated or paid his wages during the extended period.

Where the dismissal was without just or authorized cause and there was no due process, Article
279 of the Labor Code mandates that the employee is entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges and full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other
benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time the compensation was not paid
up to the time of actual reinstatement. In this case, however, reinstatement is no longer
possible because of the length of time that has passed from the date of the incident to final
resolution. 14 years have transpired from the time petitioners were wrongfully dismissed. To
order reinstatement at this juncture will no longer serve any prudent or practical purpose. So
petitioners will just be paid their separation pay.

Petition is hereby GRANTED.


FELIX B. PEREZ and AMANTE G. DORIA,

vs.

PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY and JOSE LUIS SANTIAGO,

FACTS:

Felix Perez and Amante Doria were employed by Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company
(PT&T) as shipping clerk and supervisor. There was an alleged anomalous transactions that the
freight costs for goods and shipping documents showed traces of tampering, alteration and
superimposition. The said petitioners were placed on preventive suspension for 30 days which
was extended for 15 days twice for their alleged involvement in the anomaly. Pursuant to the
suspension and filing of criminal charges, petitioners were then dismissed from the service.
Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal and alleged that they
were dismissed on the same date that they received the complaint memorandum.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioners were denied due process entailed in their dismissal.

HELD:

Respondents failed to prove just cause and to observe due process. To meet the requirements
of due process in the dismissal of an employee, an employer must furnish the worker with two
written notices:

a written notice specifying the grounds for termination and giving to said employee a reasonable
opportunity to explain his side and

another written notice indicating that, upon due consideration of all circumstances, grounds
have been established to justify the employer’s decision to dismiss the employee.

In the said case, petitioners were neither apprised of the charges against them nor given a
chance to defend themselves. They were simply and arbitrarily separated from work and served
notices of termination in total disregard of their rights to due process and security of tenure.
The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process.
Due process of law simply means giving opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered.

Petition is granted.

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